Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring State Stability against the Variables of- the Wealth–Poverty Divide, Environmental Limitations, Educational Levels and Increased Militarisation.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Reasons for undertaking this study
The majority of the world’s carbon fuel sources are located in nine states. These
states all suffer from varying degrees of autocracy / limited democracy. Six of
them are located in the Arabian / Persian Gulf and four of them share less than
harmonious relationships with the West. An analysis of the propensity for
intrastate conflict, measured considering the (i) wealth-poverty divide, (ii)
environmental limitations, (iii) educational levels and (iv) increased
militarization of security as resource variables may serve to guide western
policy makers in deciding how to conduct foreign policy interventions, which may
reduce the potential for intrastate conflict by affecting one or more of the four
variables mentioned above.
Much of the extant research into causes of conflict shows that, particularly since
the end of the Cold War there has been an increase in intrastate conflicts,
commonly termed Civil wars. Much of this research focuses on diverse causes
for this conflict from greed and grievance issues to the effects of post
colonialism. Another main focus of recent research is on post-conflict state
building, namely, trying to sort out the mess once it has occurred.
In recent decades, the vast majority of armed conflicts in the world
have occurred within single states, rather than between states. Apart
from inflicting great human suffering in the immediate area of conflict,
civil wars have major impacts on stability and prosperity throughout
the region where they occur. Internal armed conflicts can trigger
foreign interventions that, in turn, can spark regional crises and even
international armed conflict.1
Sarkees, cited by Mason, looking at the correlates of war, cites 104 civil wars
that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. These occurred in 54 states. Of

2
those 54 states only 28 had only one civil war2. Currently there are nine officially
recognized ongoing intrastate conflicts / Civil wars.3 Two of the most recent, the
civil wars in Libya and Syria have both had an effect on the global oil price.
The Freedom Index rating for Political Rights and Civil Liberties of the nine
states currently engaged in Civil war as well as the four states under scrutiny
(SUS) in this thesis, according to the 2013 Freedom Index4 can be seen in Table
1 below.
Country Freedom Status
Not Free (NF)
Partly Free (PF)
Free (F)
Political
Rights
Civil Liberties Trend
Arrow
States Engaged in Civil War
Afghanistan NF 6 6
Burma NF 6 6 
Colombia PF 3 4
Iraq NF 6 6 
Mexico PF 3 3
Pakistan PF 4 5
Somalia NF 7 7
South
Sudan
NF 6 5
Syria NF 7 7 
Four States Under Scrutiny (SUS)
Russia NF 6 5 
Iran NF 6 6 
Saudi
Arabia
NF 7 7 
Venezuela PF 5 5 
Table 1 – Freedom Index of the Nine States currently experiencing Civil
War and the Four States under Scrutiny.
(Source: Freedom House5)

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Of the four SUS in this dissertation all have a freedom index rating of Not Free,
with the exception of Venezuela, which with a rating of five points for Political
Rights and five points for Civil Liberties just achieves a status of Partly Free.6
The importance of carbon fuels, (gas and oil) to the global economy is
undeniable. Developed states currently use a large proportion of the world’s oil.
As at 2012 the US used 19.8% and the European Union (EU) used 14.8%,
whilst the developing BRICS states of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa used 23.2% of the total output. The rate of change in usage between
2011 and 2012 shows an increase for Brazil of 2.5%, Russia 2.5%, China 5.0%
and South Africa 2.6%. The EU actually saw a reduction of 4.6% with the US
also seeing a reduction in demand of 2.3% over the same period.7 This rapid
growth in demand by the BRICS coupled with the continued demand from the
US and Europe will inevitably mean an overall increase in demand in oil
production from the prime producing states. The move to switch to non-carbon
based fuels, to support reductions in carbon emissions in line with the Kyoto
Protocol, has lost much of its momentum since the global economic slowdown
took hold. The recent decision by the US Government amongst others to exploit
the opportunities afforded by the controversial technique of Hydraulic Oil
Fracturing (Fracking), will certainly help to relieve some of the demand for these
carbon fuels and arguably it may have an effect on US Foreign Policy, vis-à-vis
the carbon producing states, however it is expected that given the time required
for fracking to be able to provide a suitable replacement for conventional carbon
fuels that the overall demand for carbon fuels will remain high. By the time the
US is self-sufficient in energy in 2035 nine-tenths of Middle Eastern oil exports
will be consumed by Asia, with China being a particularly big customer.8 In
addition as the price of oil is set on world markets, disruptions to supply in other
world oil producing regions will continue to act as a stimulus for oil price
increases within the US.9
The importance of the relationship between the carbon energy using states and
the carbon energy producing states remains critical and is likely to do so for
some considerable time. The balance that needs to be sought is in maintaining
trade with these states, for all parties’ benefit but also, arguably more

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importantly in allowing the people of these states to profit from the sales of oil
and gas and allow for the development of good governance within these states.
It is hoped that the development of good governance will lead to a lowering in
the propensity for intrastate conflict.
This Dissertation aims to examine the welfare needs of the people’s of four
major carbon-fuel producing states and to look at the degree of good
governance experienced within them by conducting an analysis of four
variables. The focus of the analysis will be to try and ascertain if there is a
relationship between these four variables and the propensity for intrastate
conflict.
1.2 Aim
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of critical
threats to intrastate security by measuring the effect of the wealth-poverty
divide, environmental limitations, educational levels and increased militarization
on the stability of Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela.
1.3 Objectives
The objectives required to achieve the aim of this dissertation are:
 Gather statistical data on the four variables mentioned
 Develop a model to correlate the four variables with the propensity for
intrastate violence in these states
 Measure the effect that the four variables have on regime stability in these
states
 Suggest further applications for the model
 Make suggestions for further research.

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1.4 Literature Review
1.4.1 Eschewing the Traditional Military Response. The inspiration for this
thesis was drawn from a presentation at the Overseas Security Advisory Council
(OSAC) Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Regional Security Conference
held in Dubai in March of 2011. The presentation by Professor Paul Rogers
eschewed the traditional military responses to inter and intrastate conflict and
focused on “The main challenges facing the world community over the next
thirty years”.10 These challenges were identified as the widening socio-economic
divide, environmental limits on human activity and the militarization of security.11
Rogers described this shift in focus as “an approach rooted in what is now being
termed sustainable security.12 One of the biggest barriers to adopting this new
approach to security is the foreign policy of the US and other powerful Western
states. During the latter half of the 20th Century and onwards into the 21st
Century the US has been living off its hegemonic dividend derived through its
pivotal efforts at ending the 2nd World War and the Cold War. The New
American Century Project, which guided a lot of President George W Bush’s
thinking, considers this dividend a justly earned one.
As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as
the world's pre-eminent power. Having led the West to victory in the
Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the
United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of
past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a
new century favourable to American principles and interests?13
Robert Kaplan cited in Foreign Affairs exclaims “lessening US engagement in
the world would have devastating consequences for humanity”.14 The notion that
the US has been a relatively benign hegemon, when compared to Communism
is probably fair, according to Krauthammer cited by Rogers. Krauthammer
believes that multipolarity should only exist when there is absolutely no
alternative and that the world is far more likely to be peaceful under the US,
which he considers a “uniquely benign imperium”.15 The author contends that
the international security concerns existing in the 21st Century are borne out of

6
the hegemonic actions of the US and other Western powers. The effects of
these actions which have been taken either at an interstate level such as the
Gulf War of 1990 which Rogers describes as a resource war fought over the
control of Persian Gulf oil between an autocratic leader with regional ambitions
and a powerful coalition of oil importing states,16 or an intrastate level as
witnessed in Afghanistan, have led to the destabilising of many states.
Deliberate non-interventionist foreign policies that allowed Assad of Syria,
Gadaffi of Libya and Hussein of Iraq to retain power for so long or on the other
side of the equation, interventionist foreign policies such as the support to the
Mujahadeen in Afghanistan have also led to a failure to secure a state of peace
at an intrastate level.
1.4.2 The Four Variables. This paper aims to measure the effect of the
Wealth-Poverty Divide (WPD), Environmental Limitations (ENL), Educational
Levels (EDL) and Increased Levels of Militarization (ILM) on the stability of four
leading carbon-fuel rich states. In using the term stability the author implies that
these four resource variables may have the ability to change the conflict
landscape by affecting the root causes of conflict as discussed above, and
discussed in chapter two and thus causing a switching or variation in the state of
the conflict continuum from a stable to unstable state or vice versa.
The author refers to these variables as resource variables as they are viewed as
resources whose presence and correct use may derive a tangible benefit. In this
respect the interpretation of the four variables differ from the original use by
Rogers. The WPD in this paper refers to this resource variable as the intrastate
differences in wealth between different ethnic groups or between the governing
elite and the population. Rogers, citing Brooks, refers to this variable in a global
context and talks of the result being ‘a crowded glowering planet of mass
inequalities, buttressed by stark force yet endlessly threatened by desperate
people in the global ghettos of the underprivileged.’17 Concerning ENL, Rogers
writes about a myriad of environmental limitations such as deforestation,
desertification, water pollution, hydro-electric dams, acid rain, depletion of the
ozone layer and over-fishing as some of many factors that can act as
destabilising influences which may lead to interstate conflict or mass migrations

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of people. This thesis focuses more narrowly and considers only the potential
use or misuse of carbon-based fuels that may be used by the government for
the betterment of the whole state through the appropriate distribution of the
rents received from the sale of these commodities. It can also be viewed as the
asset or resource that will most easily restore or maintain the perceived wealth /
poverty imbalance. Rogers highlights the importance of this resource in his
phrase, the resource shift, stating that all major industrialised states of the world,
except Russia, but including China are becoming progressively more dependant
on Persian Gulf oil.18 EDL are not one of Rogers’ ‘drivers’ of conflict however
they do warrant a mention. A key negative factor related to improvements in
literacy is the increasing awareness of the world’s poor, due to increased access
to media, of the growing marginalisation, this awareness can breed resentment,
anger and higher crime rates.19 This thesis regards educational provision as a
human capital resource that can allow the state to develop economically. If it is
not equally accessible across society it could lead to disgruntlement amongst
affected sections of the population. At an individual level, education can bring
social mobility allowing individuals to gain economic independence. The final
resource variable, ‘increased militarization’ (ILM) is viewed by Rogers as the
developed states trying to maintain the status quo by ‘Taming the Jungle’
through defence of existing states from an unstable and violent world through
increased militarization, rather than addressing the fundamental causes of this
instability.20 This thesis focuses only at an intrastate level and views ILM as
money spent on security that is not being used to directly benefit the population.
This increased militarization can be unevenly brought to bear against different
ethnic and religious groups within the population and may also be used as a
resource by the government to ensure the security of its own position and
therefore reduce the opportunity for democratic development.
1.5 Research Methodology
Yin (2009), proposed four tests to establish the quality of social research:
construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.21 This section
will outline the methodological approach to this thesis examining each of these
tests. It will provide an overview of how the research question was established

8
using a literature review and with a description of the purpose behind trying to
answer the question posed in the thesis aim. It will then examine the strengths
and limitations of the research, with a view to how generalizable the results may
be and the efforts made to ensure its reliability and validity.
1.5.1 Establishing the Research Question. The aim of this research is to
contribute to the understanding of critical threats to intrastate security by
measuring the effect of the WPD, ENL, EDL and ILM on the stability of four
leading carbon-fuel rich states: (Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela). To
further describe how the research question was defined it is important to
deconstruct this aim. Firstly with regard to the term ‘stability’ the author refers to
the effect that the four chosen variables may have on the variation in the state of
the conflict continuum from either a stable to unstable state or vice versa. The
next area to examine is the selection of the four variables. Rogers’ eschewed
the traditional military responses to inter and intrastate conflict and highlighted
three of the four variables chosen as being an important focus for this new
approach to examining intrastate conflict. Chapter two reviews the contemporary
literature regarding the traditional causes of intrastate conflict, however there is
a considerable lack of literature specifically linking the four selected variables to
causes of conflict. This is potentially because the four variables are often seen
as underlying factors within a state and not as immediate triggers for conflict.
The author considers these four variables to be ‘resource’ variables whose
presence and correct use may derive a tangible benefit to the people and the
state and as such ameliorate the conditions within a state and ultimately change
the conflict landscape by addressing key underlying issues.
This paper aims to measure the effect of the WPD, ENL, EDL and ILM on the
stability of four leading carbon-fuel rich states, with the focus of the question
being to demonstrate if there is a relationship between these four variables and
the propensity for intrastate conflict in these four states. The benefit of the
research to the wider International Security community is that the results, if they
show a correlation, may serve to guide western policy makers in deciding how to
behave towards these states and more importantly how, through their foreign

9
policy the potential for intrastate conflict may be reduced by affecting one or
more of the four variables.
The selection of states for this study was chosen for two reasons, firstly because
together they constitute the most influential bloc of carbon-fuel exporting states
in the world and as such are of critical importance for global trade interactions.
Secondly these four states were chosen because from an intrastate perspective
as described in Table 1 they all suffer from low levels of Political Rights and Civil
Liberties and from an international perspective, for different reasons, they all
have strained relationships with the West.
The final impetus in establishing this research question was the lack of any
extant models to measure this or similar phenomenon. Other types of predictive
tools do exist and the most accurate of these is the Integrated Conflict Early
Warning System (ICEWS) Programme run by the US Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (DARPA). This massive database collects event data
examining verbal and material cooperation as well as verbal and material
conflict between different actors both within and external to the state.22 This
system is used as an early warning model as the event data starts to show an
increase in verbal and material conflict the data sets help to establish the
specific actors and issues behind the conflict. The model suggested in this
thesis aims to identify a correlation between the four chosen variables and
position of the state on the conflict continuum. It is intended that the data from
the model be viewed as a long-term forecaster for the potential for intrastate
conflict with the intention that international community try and intervene in a
positive way to support a state in developing these four resource variables. By
means of example the use of targeted international aid and support in reducing
corruption to help rebalance the wealth–poverty gap or support in developing
educational programmes would both serve to help restore the balance within a
state. The effect of these actions with relation to the ICEWS would be that the
data from the ICEWS would show a diminishing series of data representing
verbal and material conflicts and an increase in data representing verbal and
material cooperation.

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1.5.2 Strengths and Limitations of the Research. Due to its novelty and
limited scope, by definition this thesis will only report limited results. Referring
once more to Yin’s four tests of social research, the first of which was
identification of correct operational concepts, or construct validity, in reaction to
criticism by Laurie of Collier and Hoeffler’s work23 great effort has been made by
the author to ensure that the proxies used in the data sets, are as accurate and
representative as possible. The second test was that of internal validity or
seeking to establish a causal relationship. It is doubtful whether such a small-
scale study could show a statistically proven causal relationship. The author
hopes to establish a correlation between the four variables and subsequently to
recommend future research to expand the study in order to demonstrate
causality. External validity was Yin’s third test, described as ‘defining a domain
in which a study’s findings can be generalized.’24 The use of four states with
quite different political and demographic characteristics should support the
generalizability of the results. The small scale of the study n=4 will limit the
generalizability of these results. The final test of Yin’s was reliability. Measures
to try and preserve reliability were the use of publicly accessible data sets from
reputable organizations such as the World Bank and UN, which produces data
that is acknowledged by most states around the world, represents most states in
the world, and is expected to be produced in the future. The model construction
and methodology appears in chapter five to ensure that in any future replication
of the results the correct weighting and grouping of data sets is used.
1.6 Structural Framework
This dissertation contains five chapters. Its structure is detailed below:
Chapter One: The reasons for undertaking the study, the aim and objectives. It
contains a literature review, research methodology and a structural framework
for the dissertation.
Chapter Two: Examines the causes of intrastate conflict by defining civil war and
the causal factors relating to civil wars. It also describes the four resource
variables in detail.

11
Chapter Three: Explains the importance of the four selected carbon-rich states
to the rest of the world, and then delivers a brief profile of these states.
Chapter Four: Discusses the results then the selection, description,
implementation and interpretation of a model to correlate the four resource
variables.
Chapter Five: Outlines conclusions from the findings of the dissertation and
makes recommendations on how the ‘West’ may interact with the carbon-rich
states more productively to ameliorate the risk of intrastate conflict. It also
includes recommendations for future development of the model and future
research.
References:
1 Cockayne, James, Mikulaschek, Christoph, Perry, Chris, “The United Nations
Security Council and Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset”, International
Peace Institute, September (2010), pVI;
2 Mason, Simon, “Environment-related Conflicts: Balancing Ecology and
Politics,” Center for Security Studies, Vol 2, No 24, Nov, 2007, p171;
3 Themnér, Lotta, Wallensteen, Peter, “Armed Conflict, 1946-2011.” Journal of
Peace Research Vol 49, No 4, 2012, pp573-574;
4 Freedom House Methodology, The survey, measures freedom according to
two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights ratings are
based on an evaluation of: electoral process, political pluralism and
participation, and functioning of government. Civil liberties ratings are based on
an evaluation of: freedom of expression and belief, associational and
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual
rights. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2013/methodology#.U0gY79xQXgI;
5 Puddington, Arch, Freedom House, Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance,
Selected data from Freedom House’s annual survey of political rights and civil
liberties, (2013),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-
%20for%20Web_0.pdf;
6 Ibid;

12
7 BP Statistical Review of World Energy Full Report June (2013),
BP.com/statisticalreview;
8 Bawden, Tom, US to become world leader in oil and gas thanks to Fracking,
The Independent, last updated 13 November (2012),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/us-to-become-world-leader-
in-oil-and-gas-thanks-to-fracking-8307372.html;
9 Levi, Michael, “America’s Energy Opportunity: How to harness the New
Sources of US Power” Foreign Affairs, Vol 92, No 3, May / June (2013), p96;
10 Rogers, Paul, “Global Security after the War on Terror,” Oxford Research
Group, Briefing Paper November (2009), p10;
11 Ibid, p10;
12 Ibid, p5;
13 Ibid, p4;
14 Parent, Joseph, M, MacDonald, Paul, K, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment:
America Must cut back to Move Forward”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 90, No 6,
November / December (2011), p37;
15 Rogers, Paul, op. cit. p5;
16 Rogers, Paul, Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd
Edition, London, Pluto Press, (2010), p79;
17 Rogers, Paul, Losing Control, op. cit. p80;
18 Ibid, p91;
19 Rogers, Paul, “Global Security after the War on Terror,” Oxford Research
Group, Briefing Paper November (2009), p11;
20 Ibid, p13;
21 Yin, Robert, K, Case Study Research Design and Methods, 4th
Edition, Los
Angeles, Sage Publications, (2009), p40;
22 D'Orazio, Vito. Yonamine, James, E, Schrodt, Philip, A. “Predicting Intrastate
Conflict Onset: An Event Data Approach Using Euclidean and Levenshtein
Distance Measures,” prepared for Annual Meeting of the MidWest Political
Science Association, Chicago, March, (2011), p7;
23 Nathan, Laurie, “The Frightful Inadequacy of Most Statistics: A Critiques of
Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War”, Crisis States Discussion Paper
Discussion Paper No 11, September, (2005), p12;
24 Yin, Robert, K, op. cit. p26;

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CHAPTER TWO
CAUSES OF CONFLICT
2.1 Introduction
This thesis will relate causes of conflict solely to intrastate conflict. The reason
is that since the end of the Cold War the number of intrastate conflicts far
outstrips the number of interstate conflicts, and this trend shows no sign of
abatement. According to Mundy, since the Second World War internal armed
conflict had become not only the predominant mode of warfare by as much as
three to one but also the most deadly. An estimated five times more people
died in intrastate conflicts as in interstate conflicts.1 Indeed when comparing
these two types it can be shown that intrastate wars have significantly
outnumbered interstate wars since 1945 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 –- Trends in State Based Conflicts by Type, 1946-2009.
(Source: Human Security Report 20122)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
NumberofState-BasedArmedConflicts
Year
Intrastate
Internationalized Intrastate
Interstate
Extrastate
Data Source: UCDP/PRIO
Published in the Human

14
An added consideration is that the rate of reoccurrence in civil wars has been
on a gradual increase since 1960 as shown in Figure 2. According to Fearon,
as states in the international system have been subject to a more or less
constant risk of violent civil conflict over the period, the conflicts they suffer,
have been difficult to end.3
Figure 2 – The Rate of Reoccurrence in Intrastate Conflicts, 1950-2004.
(Source: Human Security Report 20124)
Currently there are nine on-going intrastate conflicts recognised by the UN and
achieving the critical number of 1,000 fatalities within a year. The standard
definition of an intrastate war according to the Uppsala Conflict Data
Programme is defined as at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year and to
achieve the status of a Minor Armed Conflict it is at least 25 battle-related
deaths.5 The states affected are: Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Iraq, Mexico,
Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.6 Even this figure though is grossly
misleading, using data sets from the same research Themner and Walensteen
list a further 33 states where some form of armed intrastate violence is
occurring, however the annual reportable death toll in these cases does not
surpass 1,000 fatalities.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04
PercentofIntrastateConflictTerminations
FollowedbyRecurrenceinunderFiveYears
Years
Data Source: UCDP/HSRP

15
This chapter sets out to define the term, intrastate conflict for this thesis.
Considerable difference of opinion exists within the literature. Definitions range
from 25 to 1,000 battle fatalities per year. Additionally definitions vary regarding
the population size, the nature of conflict as well as the typology of the
antagonists. The famous dictum by Clausewitz that ‘War is nothing more than
the continuation of policies by other means,7 has some relevance to this study.
Conflict sits on a continuum. In a 2007 World Bank report Bodea and Elbadawi
argued that:
Civil war is but one, albeit extreme, manifestation of a continuum
of conflicts within a society that could also take the shape of
cooperative or non-cooperative but peaceful outcome as well as
violent non-cooperative outcomes. In addition to civil war, the
latter would include coups as well as violent riots,
demonstrations and uprisings.8
The chapter examines the current literature regarding the causes of intrastate
conflict. It will examine causal factors such as Collier and Hoeffler’s Greed and
Grievance model9, good governance, ethnic fractionalisation, environmental
resources and the end of the period of the Cold War and Colonisation. It must
be stressed that when examining the causes of conflict the examples chosen
are drawn from the current literature. In the opinion of the author the principle
reason for intrastate conflict can be defined as a state or condition where a
lack of equilibrium exists within a state and the government is either unwilling
or unable to deal with the situation in an egalitarian manner. This condition
then causes the continuum of conflict to shift.
2.2 Defining Civil War
According to Mundy, the very concept and ontology of civil war has been
implicitly and explicitly contested.10 A common theme is the issue of the correct
intensity threshold. The discussion of intensity thresholds must be held in the
context of an intrastate conflict existing on a continuum of conflict and therefore
because a conflict has not quite reached an annual death rate relating to a

16
neat decimal number it does not mean that the conflict is not trending towards
this figure and it should not be dealt with just as other conflicts that have
achieved some pre-proscribed intensity threshold. A common figure cited by
Basedau and Richter amongst others, is ‘any armed conflict that has caused at
least 1,000 battle‐related deaths in a given year.’11 The reason given for this
per annum figure is that civil wars necessarily involve large scale violence12
however it is also recognised that ‘civil war may include armed conflicts in
small countries that are unlikely to surpass this threshold of 1,000 battle-
related deaths per year.’13 This per annum figure does not take into account
several factors, the population size, or that in many states, fighting is seasonal
and only occurs for a small part of the year due to climactic conditions or
seasonal crop growth.
A more realistic proposition is to de-annualize this threshold, or at least to
overcome the taxonomic issue of describing it as a minor armed conflict or a
civil war to set a realistic figure for an annual death rate, which may be linked
to the population size. Here the literature differs greatly. Regan, cited by
Mundy, recommends 200 deaths per year14, Cockayne et al argue for a figure
of 50015. It is argued by the author that a threshold of 1,000 total fatalities (not
annualized) should be the threshold used to identify the situation as intrastate
conflict and not as a minor armed conflict and that a continued death rate
related to the same causal issues of 200 deaths or more in a year should serve
to demonstrate that the state of intrastate conflict is still active.
Regarding other characteristics required to define a civil war, Regehr, cites
two: ‘a political conflict and it involves armed combat by the armed forces of a
state or the forces of one or more armed faction seeking a political end’16.
Cockayne et al refine this definition.
A civil war consists of one or several simultaneous disputes over
generally incompatible positions that concern government and/or
territory in a state; are causally linked to the use of armed force …
and involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties

17
are the government of the state where armed force is used, and one
or several non-state opposition organizations.17
This thesis will use the definition by Cockayne et al, with a revised figure of
200 battle deaths per year and a standing threshold of 1,000 deaths used
to raise the conflict from the status of minor armed conflict to Civil war.
This condition will be referred to in this thesis, as intrastate conflict.
2.3 Causal Factors Relating to Civil Wars
2.3.1 Greed and Grievance. According to Collier and Hoeffler Greed
rebellion is motivated by securing rents through the predation of primary
commodity exports, whereas Grievance rebellion is motivated by objective
resentments such as religious differences, domination by an ethnic majority,
political repression, or economic inequality.18 They conclude that grievance
motivations for engaging in intrastate conflict have far less explanatory power
than greed motivations. Their work, has received criticism. According to Laurie
Nathan, Collier and Hoeffler’s explanations are ‘speculative, based on
conjecture rather than evidence.’19 Nathan dismisses many of the proxies used
by Collier and Hoeffler and states, even Collier and Hoeffler occasionally
concede that some of the proxies intended to test for greed could just as well
be indicators of grievance.20 In the opinion of the author the biggest issue with
Collier and Hoeffler’s work is their effort to distinguish between greed and
grievance in terms of primacy of causality. It may be better to recognize that
both factors have a significance, which will vary according to ‘regional’
conditions, but also to realize the interdependence between the variables of
greed and grievance.
The presence of primary commodity exports may sustain rebellions,
which are motivated by objective grievance, while the presence of
objective grievance may sustain rebellions motivated by predation.
Such interdependence may make case study evidence difficult to
interpret.21

18
2.3.2 Poor Governance. The expression of poor governance may cause a
shift in the conflict continuum. A 2011 report in the Economist described poor
governance as it relates to perceived legitimacy of governance.
Even if poverty is a cause of violence, it is not the only one.
Legitimacy of government also matters … countries with good
governance are much less likely than their peers to have suffered
from civil conflict or high murder rates.22
Poor governance can be expressed in other ways, for example ‘equality of
basic service provision, policing its peripheries, and inability to distinguish law-
abiders from lawbreakers.’23 Being unable to provide basic services to the
population differs markedly from being discriminatory in the provision of these
services. The World Bank noted that ‘states with discriminatory policies face
larger chances of war in socially diverse societies.’24 Ostby cited by Keen
suggests that ‘economically inclusive government tends to reduce the risk of
conflict.’25
2.3.3 Ethnic Fractionalization. Ethnicity itself is not a key cause of intrastate
conflict. Analysis by Laitin found that cultural differences between minorities
and the dominant cultural group of their state do not help distinguish groups
that have been in rebellion from those that have not.26 According to Laitin there
is ‘no consistent relationship between ethnic demography and the likelihood of
a civil war.’27 Three issues relating to ethnic fractionalisation do have some
effect on the causes of conflict. When a critical mass of one ethnic group are
settled in one territory or region of a country it is more likely that they will be
involved in rebellion against the state.28 This effect may be linked to the
second issue, Collier’s supposition, that in ethnically diverse societies
homogeneity in recruitment will make it ethnically specific, and the need for the
rebel organization to generate a subjective sense of grievance may focus the
discourse on ethnicity.29 Collier’s final circumstance is, when a critical mass of
one ethnic group exists within a state. He terms this ethnic dominance, in
which ‘the largest ethnic group constitutes a modest majority of the
population.’30

19
2.3.4 The Resource Curse. Ross identifies that, the resource-curse theory
links resource wealth to negative economic and political effects, such as slow
growth, poor governance and weak institutions. All of these factors, he
comments, ‘are strongly related to the onset of secessionist wars’.31 Fearon
qualifies this stating, ‘deriving at least one-third of export revenues from fossil
fuels is estimated to more than double a country’s odds of intrastate conflict.’32
Collier, cited by Goodhand, has a variation on this estimate, ‘more than 25%
dependence on primary commodity exports is more than 5 times more likely to
engage in conflict.’33 Debate remains over why resources cause conflict.
Collier is adamant that it is the curse of resource wealth.34 Other commentators
claim a nexus of variables such as low income levels, mountainous terrain and
a large distinct ethnically or linguistically distinct population35 need to be
contingent for mineral wealth to have a significant effect. This would indicate
that grievance and opportunity / capability relating to the mountainous terrain
are also key factors. Elaborating, Collier cites fluctuations in income and
economic growth rates linked to mineral export sales, lower government
taxation due to mineral income, which may lead to corruption in government
spending practices as well as corruption by officials when making large deals
for the sale of these resources36. The final issue is linked to good governance.
Mineral wealth can produce heightened income inequalities and subsequently
lead to conflict. This conflict ‘reduces or scares off alternative investment in the
state causing a downwards spiral.’37 The funds derived from further mineral
wealth sales either by the government or rebels may be used to fund coup
d’états or non-state actors.38 Good governance thus becomes a crucial factor
in developing the growth-enhancing potential of mineral resources by means of
its effect on the political elites’ incentives to invest such resources wisely and
evenly.39
2.3.5 End of Empire. Both the end of colonization and the end of the Cold
War have been cited as factors that may have contributed to intrastate conflict.
The rapid dismantling of empires led to power vacuums and allowed new
leaders, once in power, to misappropriate state resources for personal benefit
or to favour a particular faction of the population. Without the colonial power

20
present, it was left to the minorities to engage in armed rebellion.
According to Clinton cited by McKay, ‘the removal of the hegemonic patronage
… in the post Cold War era is contested to have lifted the lid from a cauldron of
long simmering hatreds.’40 The only organisation with the right to intervene was
the United Nations (UN). Due to superpower rivalry existing in the Cold War
the UN Security Council (UNSC) was effectively paralysed and as such rarely
qualified civil wars as a threat to international peace and security.41 The
Council’s mandate was limited to ‘responding to disputes or situations which
currently threaten, or whose continuance is likely to endanger, the
maintenance of international peace and security.’42 Intrastate conflict did not
qualify. By the end of the Cold War the UNSC became more active in ending
intrastate conflicts, however with limited resources it did not adopt resolutions
on some long-standing civil wars, including those in Colombia, Myanmar, Peru,
the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.43 Today the UN is far more ambitious, it
increasingly seeks to encourage warring parties to implement post-conflict
political arrangements that can sustain peace and given the high rate of
reoccurrence of civil wars it also tries to mitigate some of the threats to this
often fragile peace that civil war countries experience during the early period of
recovery.44
2.4 Why Choose These Four Variables?
The author was introduced to the concept of increased militarization of
security, the wealth-poverty divide and environmental limitations as factors that
could affect sustainable security as ‘the main challenges facing the world
community over the next thirty years’45 in a 2009 paper entitled ‘Global
Security after the War on Terror’ by Paul Rogers. The notion of examining
these variables and using them to drive longer-term interventions that may
support a more durable and longer lasting inter and intrastate security
framework was an interesting concept. This dissertation sets out to examine
more closely through the use of a model, what sort of relationship may exist at
an intrastate level between these variables and the position of any of the
selected states on the conflict continuum. The author has included the addition

21
of educational levels as the fourth variable because recent events in the Arab
Spring and in Brazil have demonstrated a rise in ‘frustrated expectations’ of the
youth in these states that despite high levels of tertiary education are still
unable to get skilled jobs. Conversely, states struggle to fill their capacity for
skilled and semi-skilled jobs without having to recruit a large expatriate
workforce to do these jobs.
This thesis will view the four variables not as specific causes of conflict per se,
rather they should be considered as resources whose allocation, or
misallocation, may affect the conflict continuum. In trying to measure the
stability of four leading carbon-fuel rich states, as is the aim of this paper, the
term stability refers to the effect these four variables may have on changing the
conflict landscape moving it along the conflict continuum hopefully from an
unstable to a more stable state.
2.5 The Level of Education (EDL)
In this thesis the term ‘level of education’ refers to a human capital resource
that has the potential to be utilized by the state to achieve economic growth
and social mobility within the state. Brown, comments specifically on the effect
of education and its propensity to marginalise certain groups within a society.
The education system constitutes one of the most important
institutions through which social inequities along class, gender,
ethnic, religious or other lines are created and maintained. These
inequalities are increasingly recognized to lie at the root of many
contemporary conflicts, yet reducing such inequalities – including
through the education system – can also increase the likelihood of
conflict in advantaged groups feeling unfairly discriminated.46
This thesis focuses on data relating to the male population, as they are usually
the main protagonists in any violent conflict. Brown notes that assuming that
young men are the primary recruits into rebellion, high unemployment, which is
linked to lack of educational qualification, acts as ‘an incentive to be employed

22
as a potential recruit to fight in a rebellion rather than living a life of poverty.’47
Collier and Hoeffler support this notion and found ‘econometric evidence that
countries with lower rates of male secondary school enrolment are indeed
more susceptible to violent conflict.’48
High levels of education can also lead to conflict. For example, ‘many of those
directly involved at the higher levels of [Al-Qaida] are well educated. In one
sense the attacks of 11 September really are an illustration of that
uncomfortable revolution of frustrated expectations’.49 Secondly, the levels of
education have a direct impact on the wealth-poverty gap as poorly educated
or trained members of the population will fail to secure appropriate
employment, which in turn limits their social mobility as well as placing a
greater burden on the state to offer some form of social aid.
The development of human capital within a state ‘depends crucially on
government investments in education, particularly at the primary level’.50 If
government sponsored education does not deliver to the needs of all
communities certain minority groups within a state may find they are ill-
equipped and poorly educated to fill roles within a ‘labour market structured
around the norms of a majority community’.51 ‘State governments use
education as a tool for stratification between social and ethnic groups.52 Some
states choose to place a greater emphasis on particular subjects such as
religious studies in order to assert a cultural or religious distinctiveness.
Unfortunately the skills learnt in many Madrasas are incompatible with the
skills required to fulfil many jobs in the modern labour market. This leads to ‘the
assertion of cultural autonomy through Madrasa schooling contributing towards
the persistence of religious horizontal inequalities.’53 A further issue correlated
with an over-reliance on religion as the main focus for an educational system is
that the institutes that deliver this education can constitute sites for the
indoctrination, radicalization, and the direct recruitment of minority groups into
rebel organizations.54

23
2.6 Increased Levels of Militarization (ILM)
Increased Militarization of Security can be more precisely defined as resources
expended on security that are not being used to benefit the population. This
thesis is concerned with the increased militarization of security, which leads to
these security forces being brought to bear against different ethnic and
religious groups whilst also being used as a resource by the government to
ensure its own security.
‘The most important manifestations of state failure are the breakdown of
internal security and the increasing inability of the state to control borders and
territory and to exert its monopoly on the use of force’.55 It is a fact that security
is enforced or maintained by legitimate as well as illegitimate governments but
as Mair concludes ‘Security alone is not sufficient to ensure development and
self-determination but without it neither can be achieved’.56
Other pertinent reasons for increased militarization of security are, to thwart
terrorist attacks on state infrastructure, authoritarian governments which were
unfairly elected seeking to stay in power, the exclusion of ethnic or religious
groups from participation in the society either by other ethnic groups or by the
government itself, and the risk of ‘conflict spill-over’ by neighbouring failed
states.
All of the four states under scrutiny in this thesis fear that their political system
is under threat by members of their own population. The Saudis feel
threatened by their Shia population, the Russians by the Chechens. Former
President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was returned to power by loyal members
of the Army in 2002 after a failed coup. The Iranians employ the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in order to protect the ‘ideals of the revolution’
against internal dissenters.
The MOIS actively repress the Baluchis, Turks, Arabs and Kurds. In Russia the
threat of Salafi Islam and incursion by Muslim dominated Northern Caucus
Republics, has seen a brutal military response.

24
The Saudi Arabian National Guard are charged with protecting the borders and
interior of the State. Fears of conflict spill-over have recently seen them
supporting the Bahrain government during the Arab Spring as well as offering
military assistance to the Jordanians, should the conflict in Syria spread. The
Venezuelan government was concerned at the influence that FARC guerrillas
were having whilst they used the Venezuela / Colombian border area as a
region to gain support for their actions as well as resupply with arms.
The downsizing of security forces has its own problems. Rwanda, Sierra Leone
and Iraq provide examples of intrastate violence being exacerbated when the
governments attempted to rapidly demobilize their Armies. The sacked soldiers
become a key resource for these insurgencies57 as they become an easily
recruitable workforce with the correct training and a need to continue to earn
money. Rather than demobilise military personnel many states are actively
attempting to increase their security forces. These forces include not just the
regular army but police, internal security services, intelligence agencies as well
as civilian oversight agencies such as those that monitor the media.58 A study
of civil wars that the UN Security Council did not engage with, demonstrated a
negative correlation between the likelihood of the deployment of blue helmets
and the size of the armed forces of the government involved in a civil war.
‘These states were found to be spending more resources on their armed forces
than 57% of other states.’59 Increased militarization may contribute to intrastate
violence, because the population perceives that an increase in security forces
causes the government to acquire greater capacity to ensure its own survival
by suppressing legitimate civilian opposition.60
2.7 A Growing Wealth-Poverty Divide (WPD)
High levels of education can lead to a ‘brain drain’ as educated members of the
population migrate to other states in search of an income commensurate with
their education. This drain on human capital diminishes the ability of the state
to develop its economy through the establishment of small to medium-sized
businesses and the resulting employment gains.

25
The SUS have large carbon export rents at their disposal. These governments
see the opportunity of developing their security forces to abate the growing
discontent about the WPD. Ethnic or religious factions within the state may
also use the opportunity of looting this carbon wealth to fund conflict within the
state. Stewart, cited by Keen, argues that the ‘horizontal inequalities present
within a society such as economic, social or political are a powerful cause of
civil wars.’61 This thesis defines the WPD as the financial expression of the
unequal allocation of resources. This unequal allocation can be between
different ethnic, religious or social groups of a given state, or between the
governing elite and the population.
The post Cold War global market has been relatively successful in delivering
economic growth, however this newly generated wealth has not been spread
equitably which has led to the success of a few at the expense of the many.
According to Collier and Hoeffler, a state with more than a 25% dependence
on primary commodity exports is more than five times more likely to engage in
conflict.62 It is this resource curse that is particularly prevalent in the four SUS.
‘Those states who have the capacity to generate large incomes from the export
of oil and gas have ‘little incentive to provide public goods and services for their
citizens’.63
This political exclusion, which is compounded by poor governance as well as
the disparity in the WPD, leads inexorably to conflict. Chronic poverty is a
significant factor in initiating and sustaining wars, as ‘violent crime and
predation become the only viable livelihood strategy for the chronically poor’.64
Collier and Hoeffler report that ‘the `rage of the poor’ at high economic
inequality is indeed probably the single most popular explanation for conflict
after that of inter-ethnic hatred.65 In a recent Economist article two-fifths of
militants in Mali and the West Bank, when asked about their motivation to join
rebel groups cited unemployment as the main reason, only a tenth said belief
in the cause was the reason.66

26
2.8 Environmental Limitations (ENL)
This thesis focuses on only the potential use or misuse of stored mineral
resources; in this instance principally carbon-based fuels, that may be used by
the government for the betterment of the whole state through the distribution of
rents received from the sale of these commodities.
Palonkorpi’s research has found a relationship between the price point of
global crude oil and the amount of free speech, fair election processes the rule
of law and freedom of the judiciary within states that are highly dependent on
the rents from oil exports.67 Citing Friedman, Palonkorpi goes on to explain this
relationship. Because governments are not reliant on taxes or other capital
inflows and because they receive increased inflows of capital due to the oil
revenues the states feel more able to finance themselves and less inclined to
bow to pressures for reform. Additionally, they can afford to invest some of the
oil rents in developing and financing more repressive security state
structures68.
According to Homer-Dixon, resource scarcity has ‘an increasing presence in
the causal chain that often erupts in civil and international violence’.69 Internal
migration by those attempting to capitalise on the opportunities presented by
jobs in the oil and gas industries can cause ethnic and civil strife and can ‘lead
to fragmentation of the state or conversely, to a hardening of the state.’70
Environmental resources are attained from fixed locations and require a large
fixed infrastructure. The result is that these sites are easily targeted and
require at lot of physical security.
Mineral dependent states, those states that have a mineral export values of
over 5%,71 are dependent on their finite environmental resources for their
economic development and as long as demand from the rest of the world
remains high for carbon-based fuels they will ensure that the capacity of the
state is totally focussed on maintaining production output. This means that they
may ignore environmental concerns, fail to invest in alternative industries or

27
human capital development and increase internal security by ‘using resource
revenues for large‐scale development of security apparatuses, buying off
potential dissidents or effectively suppressing rebellion’.72 State owned or
dominated companies also use the protection of the state to ensure that
environmental or security concerns do not impede their production. This control
of production through state-run companies, allows the companies to be highly
secretive about the amount of environmental reserves that remain for
production and this factor in itself could increase the intrastate security aspects
of energy production as marginalised groups seek to benefit from the oil and
gas production before these finite environmental resources are ultimately
depleted.
Structural changes to the environment caused by carbon-fuel extraction, soil
erosion, and desertification in land previously used for agricultural propagation
can lead to large-scale migrations of those peoples seeking fertile land or jobs.
This can lead to ethno-political conflicts outside their region of origin.73 The
enforced co-location of different cultural or ethnic groups such as highlanders
and lowlanders, pastoralists or urban dwellers74 is the primary cause for this
potential for conflict. The most important factor in preventing the conflagration
of violence as a result of environmentally induced migration is the degree to
which the rule of law and civil society exists. The lower the ability of the state
to provide regulatory and security structures to accommodate these migrations
the more likely violence is to occur.
2.9 Summary - Causal Factors relating to Intrastate Conflict.
It does not often appear to be one factor exclusively that leads to conflict,
rather a combination of factors. For example poor governance or ethnic
fractionalization on their own may not lead to conflict, however, when
opportunity for increased wealth exists through large deposits of mineral
wealth, the situation is far more likely to descend into conflict. It is the author’s
opinion that the nexus between the greed motive and a viable grievance is far
more complicated than postulated by Collier and Hoeffler and that both factors

28
have a significance, in some cases the action taken to enrich a certain section
of the population through greed motivation will act as a catalyst for a grievance
motivation. In other cases the grievance motivation is the sole driver by the
population trying to achieve the now wrongly termed ‘Greed’ motivation, as it
should really be viewed as a search for equilibrium. This search for equilibrium
will exist in a state where the government is either unwilling or unable to deal
with the situation in an egalitarian manner.
As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter causal factors are
interlinking. As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters if a regime is
focused primarily on its own political and economic survival it may well pursue
a strategy of ILM and ENL, but in so doing runs the risk of increasing the WPD
and distorting the EDL. The quality of governance is both a cause and effect of
these occurrences. The intent within the following chapters is to determine the
extent to which Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela are at risk of
instability.
References:
1 Mundy, Jacob, “Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the new wars debate,”
Security Dialogue, Vol 42, pp279-295, June, 2011, p280;
2 Human Security Report Project, “Human Security Report 2012, last updated
10 October 2012, http://hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2012/text.aspx;
Figure 5.7;
3 Fearon, James, D, Laitin, David, D, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”,
American Political Science Review, Vol 97, No 1, February (2003), pp77-78;
4 Human Security Report Project, op. cit. p6.3;
5 Themnér, Lotta, Wallensteen, Peter, “Armed Conflict, 1946-2011.” Journal of
Peace Research Vol 49, No 4, 2012, p572;
6 Ibid, p572;
7 Clausewitz, Carl, Von, On War, Wilder Publications, Radford, VA, 2008, p17;
8 Bodea, Cristina, Elbadawi, Ibrahim, A, “Riots, Coups and Civil War: Revisiting
the Greed and Grievance Debate,” Policy Research Working Paper 4397, The

29
World Bank Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth Team, November,
2007, p4;
9 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” The World
Bank, CEPR and CSAE, Policy Research Working Paper 2355, April 2000;
10 Mundy, Jacob, op. cit. p279;
11 Basedau, Matthias, Richter, Thomas, “Why do Some Oil Exporters
Experience Civil War But Others Do Not? – A Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Of Net Oil-Exporting Countries,” German Institute of Global and Area Studies,
Working Paper No 157, January 2011, p11;
12 Licklider, 1995, cited, Mundy, Jacob, “Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the
new wars debate,” Security Dialogue, Vol 42, pp279-295, June, 2011, p281;
13 Cockayne, James, Mikulaschek, Christoph, Perry, Chris, “The United
Nations Security Council and Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset,”
New York: International Peace Institute, September 2010, p43;
14 Regan, 2000, cited, Mundy, Jacob, “Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the
new wars debate,” Security Dialogue, Vol 42, pp279-295, June, 2011, p281;
15 Cockayne, James, et al, op. cit. p43;
16 Regehr, Ernie, Background Paper, Armed Conflict: Trends and Drivers, last
updated 14 March 2011;
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/PEACEBUILD_ArmedConfl
ict_TrendsandDrivers_BackgroundPaper.pdf, p3;
17 Cockayne, James, et al, op. cit. pV;
18 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, op. cit. p24;
19 Nathan, Laurie, “The Frightful Inadequacy of Most Statistics: A Critiques of
Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War”, Crisis States Discussion Paper
Discussion Paper No 11, September, (2005), p12;
20 Ibid, p3;
21 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, op. cit. p13;
22 “Conflict and Poverty, The Economics of Violence: Are countries poor
because they are violent or violent because they are poor?,” The Economist,
14 April 2011, p3;
23 Laitin, David, D, Nation States and Violence, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, (2007), pp226-228;
24 Bodea, Cristina, Elbadawi, Ibrahim, A, op. cit. p24;

30
25 Keen, David, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, International Affairs, Vol
88, No 4, (2012), p761;
26 Laitin, David, D, op. cit. pp201-205;
27 Ibid, 174-175;
28 Ibid, 207-208;
29 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, “The Challenge of Reducing the Global
incidence of Civil War”, Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, Centre for
the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University,
March, (2004), p9;
30 Ibid; p10;
31 Ross, Michael, L, “Mineral Wealth, Conflict and Equitable Development,”
Equity and Development Report, World Development Report, Background
Papers, UCLA, Department of Political Science, (2004), pp202-203;
32 Fearon, James, D, Laitin, David, D, op. cit. p85;
33 Goodhand, Jonathan, “Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty,”
Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Working Paper No 6, May, (2001), pp26-27;
34 Ibid;
Papers, UCLA, Department of Political Science, (2004), p194;
36 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, “The Challenge of Reducing the Global
incidence of Civil War”, op. cit. p12;
37 Ross, Michael, L, op. cit. p193;
38 Mason, Simon, “Environment-related Conflicts: Balancing Ecology and
Politics,” Center for Security Studies, Vol 2, No 24, November (2007), p1;
39 Kurtz, Marcus, J, Brooks, Sarah, M, “Conditioning the “Resource Curse”:
Globalization, Human Capital, and Growth in Oil-Rich Nations,” Comparative
Political Studies, Vol 44, No 6, (2011), p752;
40 McKay, Al, The Study of Modern Interstate Warfare, e-International
Relations, last updated 03 February (2011), http://www.e-
ir.info/2011/02/03/the-study-of-modern-intrastate-war/, p2;
41 Cockayne, et al, op. cit. p6;
42 Ibid, p16;

31
43 Ibid, p27;
44 Ibid, p12;
45 Rogers, Paul, op. cit. p10;
46 Brown, Graham, K, “Education and Violent Conflict,” Background paper
prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report, UNESCO, (2011),
p2;
47 Rogers, Paul, op. cit. pp3-4;
48 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, (2004) cited, Brown, Graham, K, “Education
and Violent Conflict,” Background paper prepared for the Education for All
Global Monitoring Report, UNESCO, (2011), p4;
49 Rogers, Paul, Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century,
3rd
Edition, London, Pluto Press, (2010), p149;
50 Hekmann, cited, Keen, David, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”,
International Affairs, Vol 88, No 4, (2012), p733;
51 Brown, Graham, K, op. cit. p3;
52 Ibid, p17;
53 Ibid, p10;
54 Ibid, p3;
55 Ottaway, Marina, Mair, Stefan, “States at Risk and Failed States: Putting
Security First”, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, September, (2004), p3;
56 Ibid, p3;
57 Keen, David, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, International Affairs, Vol
88, No 4, (2012), p763;
58 Ottaway, Marina, Mair, Stefan, op. cit. p6;
59 Cockayne, James, et al, op. cit. p23:
60 Ottaway, Marina, Mair, Stefan, op. cit. p6;
61 Stewart, Keen, David, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, International
Affairs, Vol 88, No 4, (2012), p757;
62 Goodhand, Jonathan, op. cit. pp26-27;
63 Ibid, p24;

32
64 Ibid, p4;
65 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, op. cit.
p12;
66 Conflict and Poverty, The Economics of Violence: Are countries poor
because they are violent or violent because they are poor?,” The Economist,
14 April 2011, p3,
67 Palonkorpi, Mikko, “Energy Security and the Regional Security Complex
Theory,” Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute / University of Helsinki, (2007), p15;
68 Friedman, cited, Palonkorpi, Mikko, “Energy Security and the Regional
Security Complex Theory,” Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute / University of
Helsinki, (2007), p15;
69 Homer-Dixon, cited, Matthew, Richard, A, “Environment and Security:
Demystifying the Concept and Clarifying the Stakes,” Environmental Change
and Security Program Report No 1, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, (1995), p18;
70 Homer-Dixon cited, Issues of Conflict and Redefinition,” Environmental
Change and Security Program Report No 1, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, (1995), p5;
Papers, UCLA, Department of Political Science, (2004), p194;
72 Basedau, Matthias, Richter, Thomas, op. cit. p7;
73 Baechler, Guenther, “Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence:
A Synthesis,” Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Issue 4
Spring (1998), p25;
74 Ibid, p28;

33
CHAPTER THREE
THE FOUR STATES UNDER SCRUTINY
3.1 Introduction
There are nine carbon-fuel rich states: Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. It is these last four
which are the focus of this study. These four represent different cultures, types
of government, and geographic displacements; factors that may support the
efficacy of the model and its ability to project its analysis onto differing states
around the world.
This chapter will firstly outline the selected proxies, chosen to represent the four
resource variables. Then it will give an overview of each of the four states using
open source data to examine (i) borders and ethnic composition, (ii) resources,
(iii) economy, (iv) internal and external threats to the state, (vi) types of
government, and finally (v) foreign relations.
3.2 Selected Measurement Criteria
The criteria were chosen to try to act as meaningful data points that would
reflect the four variables under discussion in this thesis.
3.2.1 EDL
 Primary Completion Rate (Male) % of relevant age group
 School Enrolment Secondary (Male) % Gross of relevant age group
 School Enrolment Tertiary (Male) % Gross of relevant age group
 Literacy Rate Youth % of (Male) ages 15-24
3.2.2 WPD
 Financial Wealth per Adult

34
 Unemployment with Tertiary Education (Male) % of Male Unemployment
 Unemployment % of males ages 15-24
 Public Spending on Education % of GDP
 Public Spending on Health % of GDP
 Gini Coefficient
3.2.3 ENL
 Oil Rents % of GDP
 Total Natural Resource Rents % of GDP
 Gas Proven Reserves Trillion Cubic Metres
 Oil Proven Reserves Thousand Million Barrels
3.2.4 ILM
 Military Expenditure % of GDP
 Freedom Index Political Rights
 Freedom Index Civil Liberties
 Global Militarization Index
 Global Peace Index
3.3 Russia in Profile
The following sections of this chapter give context to the four states under
scrutiny. It adds a narrative to the traditional causes of intrastate conflict outlined
in chapter 2, greed and grievance, poor governance, ethnic fractionalisation, the
resource curse and the end of empire. This narrative provides a context for the
modelling of the four resource variables and allows for a comparison between
states that possess a different social, political and economic systems.
3.3.1 Borders / Ethnic Composition. Russia spans two continents and is
nearly double the size of Canada its nearest rival. Its land borders cover 21, 139
km. Its largest land borders are with Kazakhstan (6,846km), China (3,645km)

35
and Mongolia (3,441km). Russia has a tiny yet significant 19km border with the
Democratic Republic of North Korea. To the north Russia shares a border with
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway and Finland. Azerbaijan and Poland have
limited borders covering 284km and 432km respectively. The final grouping is
Georgia 723km; Belarus 959km; and, the Ukraine with an extensive border
covering 1,576km.1
Russia is relatively homogenous with nearly 80% of the population declaring
themselves to be ethnically Russian. The remaining key ethnic groups only
represent small proportions of the population: Tatar 3.8%, Ukrainian 2%;
Bashkir 1.2%: Chuvash 1.1% and the others totaling 12.1% of the total
population. Three factors act as a common source of identity for the population.
The first is the Russian language, which is the official language, however there
are over 100 other languages spoken by small, yet representative portions of
the population. The second, is religion, Russian Orthodoxy has been inextricably
linked with the State from the earliest years and was even used by the
Communists to support the Great Struggle in the fight against the Nazis. The
next fastest growing religious group is Islam and many of the problems that
Russia is now facing with separatist groups in the North Caucasus have an
Islamic component related to them. In 1997 the State required all religions to be
registered, which means that those groups who could not, or have not registered
with the government enjoy no legal status and as such are repressed and can
be treated as terrorist organisations.2 Nationalism is the third unifying and
simultaneously dividing factor. Since the fall of Communism it has been used
increasingly as a tool for creating a new Russian identity.
3.3.2 Carbon-Fuel Resources. With over 21% of the world’s total, Russia has
the greatest known natural gas deposits in the world. It also possesses
significant oil deposits accounting for 5% of global oil reserves. In 2006
revenues from the oil and gas industry contributed around 25% of Russia’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and oil revenues accounted for 35% of
Russia’s total exports. 3

36
Russia currently supplies about one quarter of Europe’s natural gas supplies
with some Eastern European states being almost totally dependent on Russia.
Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020, states that ‘the resource potential
of Russia is one of the factors that has expanded the possibilities of the Russian
Federation to strengthen its influence on the world arena’4. Concerns about this
over-dependence are growing within the EU and support has been gained for
the building of a southern pipeline that will travel through Azerbaijan and Central
Asia to Europe and completely circumvent Russia.
3.3.3 Economy. In 1991 Russia was forced to reform its economy from a
centralised economy to a more free-market economy. Declining oil prices, the
East Asian Stock Market crash and the heavy cost of the first Chechen war
caused the Russian economy to implode in 1998. After a bailout worth $22.6
billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and with
a renewed surge in oil prices the Russian economy started to regain
momentum. This economic crisis showed Russia’s exposure to, the fluctuations
in world energy prices. On 04 July 2008, the price of a barrel of Urals-32 peaked
at $137.61 then sank to a low point of $34.02 by 02 January 2009, a drop of
75.3% in six months.5
3.3.4 Internal / External Threats. The Russian Government has large
paramilitary forces at its disposal to deal with internal threats. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MIA), the Federal Security Services (FSB) and the Office of the
Prosecutor are responsible for law enforcement at all levels.6 The threats are
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, fighting crime and corruption, controlling
the media and acting against political protesters. The forces total 415,000
personnel broken down as follows; 160,000 - Federal Border Guard Service,
170,000 - MIA, 4,000 - FSB and 10,000 to 30,000 - Federal Protection Service,
including the Presidential Guard Regiment.7
The state spends considerable resources monitoring all media. All internet
service providers must install, at their own expense, a device which
automatically reroutes all traffic to an FSB terminal, where email traffic is

37
monitored.8 Confiscations of materials and equipment through snap inspections
of TV and radio stations are not uncommon.
Actual or perceived members of the political opposition are routinely arrested
and detained. In 2011 the government identified and targeted 39 people as
political prisoners.9 Political control is exercised over the judiciary. Judges
routinely receive phone calls from their superiors ordering them how to rule in
specific cases.10
High levels of nationalism and racism exist within the Slavic, Russian
population. Much of this is driven by the perceived threat of radical Salafi Islam,
as well as the government’s response to the rising discontent in Georgia and
Chechnya and the North Caucus region. It has been estimated that as at 2009
there were approximately 70,000 skinhead and radical nationalist organisations
in Russia. This compares with only a few thousand in the early 1990s.11
Since the end of communism, more republics have felt inclined towards
secessionism. Putin denies the republics the right to secede from Russia and a
2011 Commission stated that ‘anti-Russian interests could launch efforts to
break up the rest of Russia’.12 The government’s response to the threat of
secession has been brutal with some commentators arguing that Russia’s
attempts at suppression in Chechnya have been the most brutal and violent in
Europe in recent years in terms of military and civilian casualties and human
rights abuses.13 Chechnya is not an isolated case, Dagestan now accounts for
more than half of the terrorist acts in the North Caucasus.14
3.3.5 Types of Government. Since the new constitution in 1993 the structure
of the government is an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. As a result of the
2004 terrorist attack on a primary school in Beslan the President consolidated
formidable powers as head of the armed forces and the Security Council.
President Putin seized the opportunity provided by the crisis to launch a
number of political changes … the changes marked the consolidation of

38
his centralized control over the political system and the vitiation of fragile
democratic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.15
Of greater concern is the lack of oversight of the Executive. In 2012 the Russian
Supreme Court ruled that, a Russian citizen who received a beating from the
police had no legal right to resist, because until challenged in a court of law the
beatings would be presumed to be legal.16
The position of President can only be held for two consecutive four-year terms.
At the end of Dimitry Medvedev’s one term in office Vladimir Putin was reelected
as President in 2012 and Dimitry Medvedev was selected by Vladimir Putin as
the new Prime Minister. Despite being nominally a democratic state, Vladimir
Putin has managed to achieve almost total domination over all of the legal and
political institutions.
3.3.6 Foreign Relations. ‘A consensus emerged as the Putin era began on re-
establishing Russia’s global prestige as a “great power” and its dominance in
“the former Soviet space.’17 In achieving this aim it has sought to try and limit the
perceived expansion of the US. Putin is determined to restore Russia to its
‘rightful place as a significant influence on the world stage’.18
Russian commercial support for US operations in Afghanistan has been
significant. Russian firms supplied over 30% of the aviation fuel used by the US,
80 helicopters were supplied to the Afghan National Army and Russian
companies made over 12,000 flights in support of US operations.19 Russia has
also cooperated on the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons. Former US Under
Secretary of State William Burns stated ’Without Russia’s partnership, ‘I don’t
think we would have had Resolution 1929 or as significant a set of measures
from the EU.’20 Despite a sometimes openly hostile series of exchanges
between Washington and Moscow, as recently witnessed in the Russian backed
attempts to interfere in the domestic politics of Ukraine, the dialogue between
Russian and US leaders is still relatively positive.

39
The Caucasus remains the most active area of Russian foreign policy. In an
attempt to stop Moldova from joining the EU, Russia is actively supporting the
breakaway region of Transnistria21 by stationing troops in the region against the
wishes of the Moldovan government. In Georgia Russia supports two
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian foreign policy
actions towards Tajikistan, Georgia, and Moldova are fuelling anti-Muslim and
nationalistic sentiment within Russia.
Russian / EU foreign relations are at a low point. This is principally due to the
conditions attached to the sale of gas through the state run firm Gazprom. ‘In
September 2012 the European Commission launched an investigation into
allegations of price fixing by Gazprom in eight eastern EU member states.’22
3.4 Venezuela in Profile - Borders / Ethnic Composition.
Venezuela is ranked 33rd in the world by area and a considerable portion of its
4,993Km borders are shared with Brazil and Colombia, with a relatively small
743 km border shared with Guyana. Territorial disputes with its neighbours do
exist, and are principally over access to islands in disputed waters and through
this access, further access to a greater maritime economic-shelf territory.23
The population is far from homogenous. There are about 200,000 Amerindians
who were originally indigenous to the area and who speak a mixture of different
dialects. The immigrant population is made up of Spanish, Italian, German,
Arabic and Portuguese natives who all use Spanish as the national language. A
2001 census recorded that the population consisted of: 67% mestizo (mixed
race), 21% Caucasian, 10 % black, and 2% indigenous.24
3.4.1 Carbon-Fuel Resources. Venezuela possesses the largest oil reserves
in the Western Hemisphere, its extra-heavy crude deposits rank sixth in the
world and are greater than the deposits in the US, Canada and Mexico
combined.25 Venezuela ranks eighth in the world for natural gas deposits. These
gas reserves remain largely untapped.

40
3.4.2 Economy. Petroleum generates about one half of the government’s
operating revenue principally via the state-owned company, Venezuelan
Petroleum. In recognition of the need to diversify a 2002 government review
stated its objective for ‘complete integration into the world economy as one of
the country’s main objectives, with a view to achieving a higher standard of
living for the country’s citizens.’26 Since 2004 a surge in oil prices has helped the
economy to recover. Despite this, Venezuela has been running a sizable central
government deficit, largely as a result of fiscal profligacy.27
3.4.3 Internal / External Threats. The principle internal security issues in
Venezuela revolved around the deep divisions between supporters and
opponents of the former President Hugo Chavez.
The principle agent responsible for internal security is the National Guard. Their
key tasks are; maintaining pubic order, guarding key government installations
and prisons, conducting counter-narcotics operations, monitoring the borders
and providing local law enforcement in remote regions.28 The National Guard
became a political force loyal to the President, with many high-ranking officers,
some still serving, appointed by Chavez to important positions within the central
and regional government.29
Other security forces include the Police, which are represented at National,
State and municipal levels. A Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention
Services, which comes under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, also exists
and is directed to deal with crimes against the state such as subversion, arms
smuggling, narcotics trafficking and kidnapping. The Ministry of the Interior also
controls a separate force, the Judicial Technical Police, which is responsible for
investigating any federal crimes not covered by other agencies.
Discrimination remains an internal security issue within Venezuela. This
discrimination extends to the minority indigenous tribes of Venezuela who
appear to be ‘disproportionately affected by discrimination, poverty and
unemployment’.30

41
Externally, Venezuela’s biggest threat is a spill-over in the armed conflict in
Colombia. It has been reported that ‘Guerrillas and rebel groups have used the
frontier zone as a place of refuge, and have committed crimes against
Venezuelan citizens.’31
Despite being a major oil supplier to the US, relations between the US and
Venezuela have deteriorated in recent years. This may partly be due to the
former Chavez government’s desire to protect the socialist revolution and the
perception that the US was working to destabilize the country. It may also be
due to the increased efforts by Venezuela to try and foster relations with Russia
and Iran.32
3.4.4 Types of Government. The most recent of 23 constitutions was adopted
in 1999 to mark the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic, that is, from
a ‘party-dominated’ democracy to ‘popular” democracy.’33 The key change was
the extension of the President’s tenure to six years.’34 The real-term effects of
this change was to centralize more power in the position of the President whilst
offering nominal power to all of the disparate endogenous groups within
Venezuela, none of which would have the power alone to present a real threat
to the President.
After being diagnosed with cancer in 2011, Hugo Chavez tried to do everything
he could to ensure that his revolutionary ‘Chavismos’ ideals would continue. All
of his ideas were reliant upon lavish government spending, which despite
considerable income from oil sales has ‘put a strain on the country’s
international reserves’.35 His successor Mr Nicolas Maduro who, was appointed
as the ‘favoured candidate’36 of Venezuela’s closest ally, Cuba, has inherited an
economy struggling under heavy government spending, a growing national debt
and an alarming currency devaluation37. If he wants to continue the fiscal
profligacy of Hugo Chavez then he will need to borrow international money. If
suitable overseas donors are not found, Mr Maduro will ‘expect to face growing
domestic restlessness as he fails to deliver the promises of Chavismo’38.

42
3.4.5 Foreign Relations. Venezuela’s principle external threat is Colombia.
Foreign relations with Colombia have deteriorated significantly as the effects of
the counter-insurgency in Colombia impact on Venezuela.
The Venezuelan Defence forces had strong ties to the US military and used to
have a military contingent at the US Army’s Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation at Fort Benning in Georgia.39 Relations started to sour
when President Chavez openly criticised the 2001 US bombing campaign of
Afghanistan. In the same year Venezuela signed a military cooperation deal with
Russia, which allowed Venezuela to purchase a substantial quantity of Russian
military hardware. Relations with the US really soured after the 2002 coup
attempt for which President Chavez blamed the US. President Chavez criticized
the US Global War on Terror and saw the US sympathy towards the electoral
opposition candidates in the 2004 Venezuelan referendum as ‘another example
of U.S. meddling in Venezuela’s internal affairs.’40
Venezuela has developed significant military ties to Russia, trading ties with the
Chinese and extremely close, economic and military ties with Cuba. Venezuela
has become Cuba’s main trading partner with a series of trade agreements.
‘Since October 2000, Cuba has received 53,000 barrels per day of oil and
derivatives from Venezuela on easy, long-term credit terms’.41
3.5 Iran in Profile - Borders / Ethnic Composition.
Iran is far from a homogenous state. It shares extensive land borders with
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan, it also has
two smaller borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Nakhicheven enclave.
Ethnic Persians make up 65% of Iran’s population, the next largest ethnic
groups in order are Azerbaijani Turks 16%, Kurds 7%, Lurs 6%, Arabs 2%,
Baluchis 2%, Turkmens 1%, Turkish tribal groups such as the Qashqai 1%, with
non-Persian, non-Turkic groups such as Armenians, Assyrians, and Georgians
making up less than 1%. Persian is the lingua franca with over 65% of the
population speaking it as a first language and 35% of the population speaking it

43
as a second language.42
The Iranian government targets many of the minority ethnic groups by several
means, indirectly through discriminatory restrictions on business licenses,
university admissions or land rights or directly through arbitrary arrest, detention
or physical abuse.43 A UN special rapporteur cited large Baluchi populations
who were severely underdeveloped with limited access to education, housing
and health care.44 In terms of physical abuse, reports from the UN cite arrest,
torture and detention of ethnic Arabs from Khuzestan Province.45
3.5.1 Carbon-Fuel Resources. Iran’s oil reserves, estimated at 130 billion
barrels rank third in the world behind only Saudi Arabia and Iraq and its gas
reserves estimated at around 32 trillion cubic metres, rank second only to
Russia.
3.5.2 Economy. Today the oil and gas industry, which are state sector
industries, account for 80% of total export earnings. The net effect of this over-
reliance on these exports is that large fluctuations in income occur due to the
link to fluctuating world commodity prices.46 Three internal actors have an
influence on Iran’s economic direction. The government, which sets out a five-
year economic plan. The most recent five-year plan started in 2011 and aims to
reduce public sector state-owned industries by 20%47. The second group are the
Bonyads, which own the majority share of Iran’s non-petroleum industrial output.
It is estimated that they account for approximately 30% of Iran’s exports.48 They
exert their influence through their connections to senior Iranian politicians and
the ‘conservative elite who allegedly launder their money beyond the eyes of the
Ministry of Finance’.49 Finally, the traditional import-export merchants,
collectively known as the bazaar, also occupy an influential place in economic
policy making. The effect of the US-led economic sanctions will continue to have
considerable impact on the Iranian economy. Oil exports are limited to 700,000
barrels per day and the strain is beginning to show with 40% of Iranians thought
to be living below the poverty line and a shrinking economy and inflation running
at 30%’50

44
3.5.3 Internal / External Threats. Since the Revolution, Iran has retained its
regular Armed Forces, it also has developed a 125,000 strong Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps, which includes organisations such as the Basjj
paramilitaries, which work with little formal supervision.51 The SAVAK have been
replaced with the MOIS whose mandate it is to protect the Revolution.
The MOIS uses such methods as infiltrating internal opposition groups,
monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissent, arresting alleged spies
and dissidents, exposing conspiracies deemed threatening, and maintaining
liaison with other foreign intelligence agencies as well as with organizations
that protect the Islamic Republic’s interests around the world.52
Due to their separatist desires, non-Persian ethnic groups such as Kurds,
Baluchis, Turks, and Arabs are targeted by the MOIS.53 Reports of unlawful
killings, beatings and torture directed by the MOIS towards these groups remain
disproportionately high.54 Another section of society targeted by the Iranian
authorities is the media. The Basjj Cyber council monitors the Internet55. Political
dissenters are tightly controlled within Iran, with former presidential candidate,
Mr Hossein Mousavi, being held under house arrest since the beginning of
2011.56
Since the removal of Saddam Hussein. Iran has significantly increased its
influence with the Shia population in Iraq, which has led to concern amongst
Sunni States, principally Saudi Arabia. The US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan
is unsettling to Iran. The US is viewed as the number one enemy of Iran, and
Israel is seen as a major threat because it repeatedly threatens air strikes
against Iran’s nuclear facilities.57 Iran attempts to counter these intrusions by the
US and Israel by its active support for Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad.58 Despite Iran’s economic crisis and the election of a reformist Prime
Minister, Iran continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability. It now has the
Iraqi government as its ally59 and with its support for the beleaguered Assad
regime in Syria and its funding for Hezbollah in Lebanon it appears intent on
rebuilding the Shia Crescent.

45
3.5.4 Types of Government. Since 1989 the system of governance has been
based on a Shia Islamic principle of Velayat – e Faqh (Guardianship of the Jurist
or rule by jurisprudent).60 This system of government is dominated by the
Supreme Leader. The current incumbent is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who is
directly responsible for the control of the legislative, executive and judicial areas
of government. He is also indirectly in control of the internal security forces
including the MOIS. The second highest elected official is the President,
however in reality his power over the executive as well as over key ministries is
limited. The President is elected every four years in national elections and his
term is limited to two consecutive terms.
On 14 June 2013 Hassan Rouhani was elected President with a surprising
majority of 51% and even more surprisingly with the full support of the Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei.61 The reaction in the west to Rouhani’s victory was
cautiously optimistic. The Iranian stock market rallied and the Iranian currency
the Rial, recovered some of its value against the dollar. Another surprising effect
of the election was a relaxation of the control of the internet’62. President
Rouhani presents himself as a moderate who seeks to ‘enhance mutual trust
between Tehran and the international community, including Britain and the
US’63. Describing Western Sanctions against Iran’s economy and its banking
system as cruel64 he aims to lift the current sanctions and stop future sanctions
from being imposed showing greater transparency in Iran’s nuclear programme.
The judicial branch is dominated by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is
responsible for overseeing enforcement of the law by lower courts it sets judicial
precedent, and acts as a court of appeal.65 The courts have the right to hold
suspects for long periods without a trial on vague charges such as ‘anti-state
activity’ or ‘warring against God.’66
3.5.5 Foreign Relations. Iran and the UAE share disputed territory, which Iran
occupies.67 Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iran has begun to exert an
increasing amount of influence in Iraq. This has had a destabilising effect within
Iraq as the Kurdish separatists and the Sunni minority vent their frustrations at
the government. The Khatami government (1997 – 2005) emphasized the

46
development of relations with Japan, who remain Iran’s largest single trading
partner and Europe. The relations with the US and Israel failed to prosper over
this time and the accession of the conservative Ahmadinejad to the Presidency
only served to further weaken these relationships. Iran’s insistence on
developing its own nuclear programme and its support to Hezbollah and other
terrorist organisations lay at the root of the issues between the US / Israel and
Iran.
3.6 Saudi Arabia in Profile - Borders / Ethnic Composition.
Saudi Arabia is the 14th largest country in the world. Nearly 1500km of its 4,431
km of shared borders are with its southern neighbour, Yemen. It also has
sizeable land borders with Iraq, Jordan, Oman and the UAE. It has a relatively
short border of only 60 km with Qatar and a ‘Friendship Causeway’ linking it to
Bahrain. In the south with Yemen many areas of the border are currently being
negotiated and defined. This work forms part of a hugely ambitious project to
physically demarcate and position security-monitoring equipment around the
border of the entire Saudi state. In the North the disputed areas with Kuwait are
managed amicably with equal shares of any oil revenue being distributed
between the two states.
The tribal structure is pivotal in Saudi society. It was fighters from these tribes
that helped the Saudi family initially gain power and the Royal family even today
are aware of this dynamic within their society and ensure that they are seen to
be distributing opportunities for employment and social wealth to these tribal
groups.
Despite consisting of many tribes the Saudi population is extremely
homogenous, nearly all of the 30 million native inhabitants are ethnic Arabs,
they all speak Arabic and they are nearly all Muslims. The key division in the
state is between the majority Sunni Wahhabi Muslim population and the two
million strong Shia population. The proximity of Iran and the recent uprisings in
the majority Shia state of Bahrain only serve to cause more concern to the
Saudi government. The government is taking steps to limit any future problems

47
by building more barracks for the National Guard Special Security Battalions in
the Eastern Province and through the development of an Electronic Warfare
Battalion which will possess the capability not just to listen in to radio and
telephone communications external to the state but also to communications
made by its own citizens within Saudi.
3.6.1 Carbon-Fuel Resources. Saudi Arabia’s oil exports make up 90-95% of
total exports and 40% of total GDP.68 Despite this massive importance of oil to
the overall economy, the sector only employs 1.5% of the working population.
Saudi Arabia has the world’s largest known oil reserves. It only requires an
income of $69.28 per barrel for its current account to break even.69 Apart from
sitting on the world’s largest oil reserves it also has copious gas reserves. It is
estimated that the gas reserves of 235 trillion cubic feet give it a little over 4% of
the world’s total reserves.70 In an effort to increase natural gas production the
Saudi government built the largest gas processing plant in the world at Hawiya.
3.6.2 Economy. The economy is based around its oil and gas products. The
government has recognised this inherent economic weakness, Since the 1970s
they have reduced economic vulnerability by achieving consistent GDP growth,
increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, and by creating
significant numbers of new jobs for their own Saudi citizens.71 The IMF reports
that in 2013 the non-oil private sector is set to grow by 7.6% this year, most of
this is driven by huge construction projects.72
It has been mooted in the news that a high level of discontent exists within the
young Saudi male population. The recent uprisings in Bahrain in 2011 spurred
the Saudi government into action. The result being a more visible distribution of
wealth from the Royal family to the people. This has been evidenced in a new
programme of social welfare payments for the unemployed and increased job
availability in the government sectors.
The King’s long-term plans include an aggressive promotion of Saudization
within the country. This is most obvious in his economic support for any student

48
wishing to study overseas. The economic return should be an educated Saudi
workforce capable of replacing the large expatriate community.
3.6.3 Internal / External Threats. Saudi Arabia appears to have weathered
the Arab Spring remarkably well, although this may in part be due to its
‘relatively small population and its extreme oil wealth’73, coupled of course with
the ability and motivation by its King to distribute some of this wealth to the
people. The planned Day of Rage in 2011 manifested itself more as a day of
apathy. A future threat of popular discontent does remain and despite high oil
revenues the standard of living for the average Saudi has fallen and the rate of
unemployment particularly amongst the youth is rising.74
Saudi internal security has three main elements. The police force, which is
controlled by the Ministry of the Interior, the Religious Police which enforce
religious compliance and the Saudi Arabian National Guard, which is controlled
directly by the King. The National Guard has 75,000 active soldiers and 25,000
tribal levies.75 These personnel are often viewed as a counterpoise to the
Regular Armed Forces hence their direct control by the King.
There are three major threats to internal security within Saudi Arabia. Discontent
within the Shia population, the juxtaposition between being a modern
progressive state whilst remaining an Islamic State of the highest significance
and the ability to protect the oil installations from terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda
inspired attacks occurred in 2003, on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah and two car
bombings in Riyadh in December 2004, as well as a February 2006 attack on an
oil complex.76
The removal of Saddam Hussein has heightened tensions as the now Shia
dominated government that has close ties to Iran has left the Saudis feeling
encircled and threatened. Paradoxically this situation may soften the relationship
between the Saudis and the Israelis. The Saudis are reliant on the Israeli’s main
supporter, the US, for their own security needs and also any attack made by
Israeli forces on an Iranian nuclear facility would only work in Saudi Arabia’s
favour. The border issue and the free flow of Yemeni tribesman in the South of

49
the country remains a concern but not an existential one.77 The Saudi Air Force
are actively flying drones and fighter aircraft across the border.
3.6.4 Types of Government. Saudi Arabia is a near-absolute monarchy with
a Basic law that dictates that all Kings must come from the Al Saud family.
Superficial attempts at democracy have been made. Elections for Municipal
representatives were held in 2005, although only Saudi males were granted
suffrage and the elected body holds no real national power. The Royal family
are restricted in the way in which they can exercise power by two means; firstly,
the Basic law articulates the ‘government’s rights and regulations and sets forth
the civil rights, system of government, and administrative divisions by which the
state is run’.78 The second ‘control’ over the exercise of power by the Al Saud
family, is that Sunni Islamic law sits above any other considerations and as such
it acts as the State’s constitution. The current King, Abdullah, is the last of his
generation. The next succession will be infinitely more complicated with
potentially hundreds of Princelings eligible for the position of King. A succession
council has already been established to try and provide an orderly transition of
power.
3.6.5 Foreign Relations. Saudi Arabia sits at the heart of the Gulf Cooperation
Council. This working group of Bahrain, Oman and the UAE regularly meet to
discuss economic and security issues within their immediate sphere of
influence. Relations are generally good however they did deteriorate slightly
when ‘the other three members signed individual trade agreements with the
US.’79
During the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi government asked its
neighbours to enter the coalition to fight the Iraqis. Jordan, the Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO), Kuwait and Yemen all refused to support the
coalition.80 It took a further five years after the end of the war for the relationship
with Jordan and the PLO to normalize again.
The most difficult foreign relationship that Saudi Arabia has had to manage is
that between itself and the US. The US, the EU and Japan are Saudi Arabia’s

50
largest trading partners. The Saudi government is keen to officially retain a
moderate stance on extremism. The trigger for Osama bin Laden leaving Saudi
Arabia and establishing Al Qaeda was the refusal of the Saudi Government to
accept the offer of his help against Saddam Hussein, instead the Saudi
Government elected to ask for US support. Relations with the US have not
always been unified or coordinated and since 9/11 the relationship between the
two has been under considerable strain, with tensions focusing on the
connection to Osama Bin Laden alleged latent financial support of terrorist
organisations by the Saudi government.
3.7 Summary
This chapter has given a descriptive narrative of each of the four states under
scrutiny. This narrative aims to inform the reader of the importance of these four
states as well as to provide a descriptive context in which to place the variables
and proxies that will be addressed in Chapter 4. Within that chapter the
methodology of how the proxies were incorporated into the model and the
results achieved will be explained.
References:
1 Blázquez, J, Martin-Moreno, J, M, “The Rise of Emerging Markets and its
Impact on Global Energy Security,” ESADE-Center for Global Economy and
Geopolitics, Ramon-Llull University, Working Paper May, (2012), p3;
2 Ibid, p6;
3 Ibid, p11;
4 Ibid, p28;
5 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Profile, Russia, May
(2006), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Russia.pdf; p26.
6 United States Department of State, “2011 Country Reports on human Rights
Practices – Russia,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, (2012);
p11.
7 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, op. cit. p27;
8 United States Department of State, op. cit. p29;

Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring State Stability against the Variables of- the Wealth–Poverty Divide, Environmental Limitations, Educational Levels and Increased Militarisation.

Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring State Stability against the Variables of- the Wealth–Poverty Divide, Environmental Limitations, Educational Levels and Increased Militarisation.

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Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring State Stability against the Variables of- the Wealth–Poverty Divide, Environmental Limitations, Educational Levels and Increased Militarisation.