1. Graham Scott
Capstone
War, What is it Good For? A Discursive Look at How War is Legitimized
Abstract:
Despite the immense cost of enacting a foreign policy of war, the United States has nonetheless
chosen to enact such policy quite frequently. This leads to an interest in how such policies gain
legitimacy and support. The following study particularly asks how the Vietnam and Iraq Wars
were legitimized. By employing discourse analysis, this study examines the discursive
formations that led to the legitimization of each war. The findings indicate that identity
constructions of the self and other, as well as representations of significant events were the most
significant discursive formations of the dominant discourse that legitimized each war. This study
demonstrates the need for further research in this area of political science, and a need for all
individuals to be aware of how certain groups and events are represented with language.

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Introduction:
War is often seen as the only logical response to an event or situation. However, war is
not inherently the only option. Instead, this privileged status is produced through public
discourse. This discourse may be originally generated by political elites, but it is expanded,
developed, and retold by media and the public. In fact, without acceptance of the political elite’s
message, the narrative and policy option derived from that narrative will die. This struggle of
discursive framings and representations to achieve dominance demonstrates the element of
power in political discourse. Discourse analyst Richard Jackson (2005) explains that political
discourses are used to create, maintain, and extend power. Discourses compete to represent
actors and events in factual or true terms. This fight to create truth is a political power struggle.
The dominant discourse exudes a dominance of political power over other discourses. This
dominant representation then enables certain policies to be supported and enacted. In this way,
the study of how discourse legitimizes war is also a study of power.
War’s enormous costs of human life, financial resources, military power, and time should
make it an option the public does not often consider. For example, the Vietnam War cost the
United States 686 billion dollars and 90,220 military lives (Dagget 2008; Hickey and Santhanam
2015). The Iraq War cost the United States roughly 815 billion dollars and 4,486 military lives
(Belasco 2014; Goodman 2014). Yet, the United States has often chosen to pursue war,
indicating the power of discourse in legitimizing war. With this in mind, I ask, “How is war
legitimized in the United States?” Examining how messages are spread and accepted will create
increased awareness of how the United States chooses to enact costly policy options such as war.
The following section of this paper lays out a literature review. This literature review is
based on what has been said by different schools and approaches about the causes of war. Next,

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this paper’s specific argument is given. The research design is then explained, followed by an
analytical discussion of the textual data used in this study. Finally, the paper concludes with a
summary of the research findings, the implications and significance of those findings, and ideas
for future research.
Literature Review:
This study’s research topic deals with a state’s decision to initiate violence and war. A
discursive approach will be used to trace out how states, in particular the United States,
legitimize going to war. However, discursive approaches, such as poststructuralism, are only
one approach to studying the legitimization of war and violence. Other theories within the realm
of international relations posit different circumstances and conditions that will lead countries to
war. As such, this literature review surveys works that have used other approaches in the
discussion of war and violence.
Realism is the first major theory to be covered. According to realism, international
anarchy permits states to go to war with each other. States compete and fight over resources and
territory. John Vasquez applies this theory here in his comparison of two paths to war. Vasquez
espouses realist ideas, with his focus on rivalries between states of equal power (1996).
Vasquez, himself, points out that this approach is ill-suited for the Iraq War or Vietnam War,
because these wars are fought between states of unequal military power. He recommends using
an imperialist perspective instead (1996). What Vasquez does say about unequal relationships is,
“the strong have no need to fear their weaker opponent, and hence are more motivated by
predation than security,” (1996, 533). The message espoused by the Bush administration,
however, was one of insecurity and fear of weapons of mass destruction. Herein lies the problem

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of such objective stances as realism; objective theories attempt to box states into what they
logically should do. A discursive approach, instead, examines how this conception of Iraq as a
threat was formed, spread, and normalized.
Next, we examine the concept of liberalism, which Fearon uses to explain why countries
go to war. Liberalism puts more faith in international organizations to progress global politics
through international anarchy. When wars and conflict do occur, it is most likely due to a
breakdown in communication. This article assumes that states are rational actors (Fearon 1995).
Fearon continues, however, that none of the established rational explanations for war adequately
explain why countries would choose war over compromise (1995). In a clear challenge to
realism, Fearon explicitly disputes that anarchy explains why states bypass compromise for war
(1995). The article advances its two theories to explain why states go to war. First, states may
purposefully dramatize their military capabilities in order to gain leverage in negotiations. This
escalation may lead to an outbreak of war (Fearon 1995). The liberal background of this
explanation is clear, with its primary blame positioned on a communication failure. The second
explanation is that negotiated settlements may break down due to a state’s inability to commit to
such a settlement (Fearon 1995).
The assumption of state rationality is the first problem with this theoretical lens.
Rationality radically differs between perspectives. For example, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait could be seen as highly irrational from a western perspective that witnessed an
international coalition crush Iraq in response to a clear breach of Kuwait’s territorial integrity.
Yet, Hussein may have seen rationality in projecting Iraqi power across the Middle East. The
Reagan and Bush administrations had been also willing to overlook Iraqi acts of aggression and
human rights abuses in the past. Fearon’s theory of purposeful information distortion is also

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questionable with the capabilities of American intelligence. In application to the Iraq War,
American officials did incorrectly state Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Yet, the Bush
administration’s commitment to uncovering the whole truth of Iraq’s weapons program is
questionable. A discursive approach avoids these problems; it neither claims state rationality,
nor necessitates the uncovering of the Bush administration’s true intelligence aims. Instead, a
discursive approach examines how George W. Bush used the idea of an Iraqi WMD program as
a tool to legitimize a U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Closely related to liberalism is Peace Research, a theory committed to reducing conflict.
Mansfield and Snyder attempt to understand why countries with fledgling democracies have a
higher chance of engaging in conflict. The authors believe that fragile rulers of transitional
democracies shape political agendas and media content in a way that promotes militancy in the
population as a whole (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Such a study may be supported by
empirical correlation, but it does not apply to this research, which revolves around the
democratically mature United States. In contrast, a discursive approach can be applied
universally, because states of any size or form of government produce language that legitimizes
or delegitimizes violent foreign policies. The other issue with this study is its assertion that
mature democracies do not fight preventative wars (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). America’s
involvement and Iraq and in Vietnam were both textbook preventative cases of war.
Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser’s work falls at the conventional end of the constructivist
realm. Looking at the subjective more than the objective, constructivists go beyond the material
world and into the ideational world. This article’s research question approaches my own, asking
how the American mass public decides whether to support American military force abroad
(Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). The study uses a survey to discover how respondents

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with different political dispositions react to five different hypothetical foreign policy situations.
Their results show that those who identify as isolationists are less likely to support foreign
intervention (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). Support for intervention rose when the
aggressor was powerful, nuclear capable, attacked out of the blue, and attacked an advanced
democracy (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999).
This study is helpful to governments hoping to create a discourse that will rally public
support for foreign intervention. We can see many of these successful themes in the rhetoric
between September eleventh and the Iraq War. The dominant discourse asserted that the attacks
of September eleventh were out of the blue, Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and this was
an attack on the democracy of the United States. A discursive study, however, looks at what
precedes the identities and ideas Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser measure. A discursive approach
will also examine how such themes are applied, as briefly mentioned in relation to the Iraq War.
Finally, we will examine how other discursive theorists have applied discourse analysis
to the construction of enemies and the legitimization of war. Pileckie et al. examine how the
Bush and Obama administrations have legitimized counterterrorism policies, by distinguishing
the violent tactics of terrorists from those of other political adversaries (2014). This study
specifically examines the speeches made by Presidents Bush and Obama in regard to terrorism.
While Pileckie’s study shares the same method of research that utilized in this study, this paper
will go further by looking not only at what presidents have said, but also what the media and
popular culture have contributed to war discourse. Such an approach will better reflect the
reality that discourse is repeated and shaped by all levels of political society, not just political
elites.

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Nico Carpentier’s work also falls under the discursive branch. He uses discourse analysis
to trace the construction of the self and the enemy, and form what he calls, “the ideological
model of war,” (Nico Carpentier 2011, 13). This model is then applied to the Vietnam, Gulf,
Kosovo, and Iraq Wars. This paper does a good job in describing discursive theory, which is
important for understanding the fluidity of identity. The role of basic dichotomies is explained
as a building block of discourses (Carpentier 2011). The article also identifies the government
and the media as those actors who play the largest role in the hegemonisation of certain
discourses (Carpentier 2011). Carpentier’s article has the closest resemblance to this paper’s
methodology. However, the research presented here will improve upon Carpentier’s article by
looking more broadly at the legitimization of violence than simply the construction of the self
and other. Certainly, this is an important component of the discursive legitimization of war, but
it is not the only one. This paper will also differ by going in-depth with two case studies, instead
of briefly discussing four.
Argument/Thesis/Hypothesis Statement:
The language espoused by the United States Government preceding the Vietnam War and
the Iraq War was not a documentation of reality. Rather, it was a politically motivated set of
words and symbols that legitimated a large-scale military intervention. By constructing fears,
identities, and historical parallels, the political elite used language to legitimate the Vietnam and
Iraq Wars. Although the dominant discourse was not unchallenged, it exerted enough power to
frame actors and events in a way that legitimized large-scale military intervention, while
delegitimizing inaction or alternative foreign policy approaches

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ResearchDesign:
The method of study used is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is often utilized by
postmodern theorists, but is a foreign concept to most political scientists working in the positivist
research field. Therefore, a basic explanation of discourse analysis is needed before moving on
to the analysis itself. First, what is a discourse? Richard Jackson writes, “A discourse is a
particular way of talking about and understanding the world that involves a limited number of
statements and words,” (Jackson 2005, 18). One discourse is only one representation of the
world. There are many different discourses, often competing with each other for dominance in
the representation of one subject, topic, or actor. Discourses are constituted by discursive
constructions and discursive practices. Discursive constructions or formations are, “groups of
related statements about a subject that determine its meaning, characteristics, and relationship to
other discursive formations,” (Jackson 2005, 18). Discursive practices are actions and tangible
objects, such as symbols and marches, that accompany the textual component of a discourse
(Jackson 2005). Now that the subject matter of discourse analysis has been explained, what is
discourse analysis itself? Essentially, discourse analysis is a systematic analysis of spoken and
written language in order to understand how such language relates to social and political
phenomena (Jackson 2005). In terms of the specific technique of discourse analysis, Jackson
(2005) adds, “critical discourse analysis involves carefully reading a specific text- such as a
speech, interview, radio address or report – and employing a series of analytical questions,” (25).
Finally, how does discourse analysis apply to foreign policy decisions? The poststructuralist
Lene Hansen writes, “(foreign) policies are dependent upon representations of the threat,
country, security problem, or crisis they seek to address,” (2006, 5-6). Those representations

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Hansen speaks of are produced by language and accompanying actions. Therefore, a direct link
exists between discourse and foreign policy.
The initial research question presented here asks, “How has war been legitimized in the
United States?” This question is too broad to directly and completely answer. Therefore, this
study uses two case studies to examine this question in-depth. The inclusion of two cases also
provides the opportunity to compare and contrast the content and strength of the discourses
broadcasted to legitimize war in each case. The case studies chosen are the Vietnam War and the
Iraq War.
These wars are chosen for multiple reasons. First, they were surrounded by contentious
debates, in which the dominating narrative was continuously challenged by competing
narratives. Such contention provides multiple narratives to analyze. Furthermore, contentious
heated rhetoric has the energy to penetrate more levels of political society than generally
accepted messages. This grants linguistic data to gather from the political elite, as well as the
general public. Secondly, both wars occurred in a relatively modern time, which makes it
possible to acquire a large source of texts. Additionally, the discursive practices used in both
wars relate well to our modern media age. Thirdly, the Vietnam and Iraq Wars occurred in
differing political contexts and global campaigns. The Vietnam War materialized in the Cold
War, while the Iraq War was a central part of the War on Terror. Such distinction provides a
better platform on which to compare and contrast. Finally, each war is now widely considered a
massive foreign policy blunder. How is it, then, that these wars gained the necessary support and
legitimation to be enacted?
What texts are used in the research? In order to discover what narratives the political
elite were espousing, this study incorporates presidential speeches, congressional debates, and

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speeches by other senior administration officials into the analysis. Mass media’s discursive
productions are documented by archived newspaper articles, editorials, columns, and radio
broadcasts. The general public’s discourse is the most difficult source to document, because
their discourse is rarely documented in formalized archives or texts. To overcome this challenge,
this study utilizes archived constituent letters written to congressmen and letters written to the
editors of newspapers. Popular culture is incorporated with an examination of song lyrics of
music addressing each war. It is important to emphasize that both narratives supporting and
opposing the war are documented and analyzed. Legitimization is a struggle, therefore making
the oppositional narratives important to document. Furthermore, the opposition shapes the
dominant discourse by forcing the dominant discourse to defend its claims and attack the
opposition’s claims.
What tools are employed to organize and analyze these texts? To start, texts are
organized into either a position of support or opposition to each war. There are several
discursive formations and rhetorical tools existing in each document. In order to document and
organize every one, coding is used. Coding involves the systematic assignment of a number
representing a particular theme or tool, to each corresponding theme or tool found in the text.
For example, the narrative of freedom was a common element in the legitimizing discourse of
the Vietnam War. This element was coded with a “10.” Every discussion of freedom by both
those supporting and opposing the Vietnam War was ascribed a 10. This method brought
necessary organization to the lengthy process of discourse analysis, thereby minimizing any
arbitrary nature of the research.

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Evidence/Discussion/Analysis:
The following section will first present a discursive analysis of the Vietnam War,
followed by an analysis of the Iraq War, and concluding with a comparison of both cases. Due
to the fact that discourse analysis examines texts as data, this section’s organization may appear
different than quantitative studies. This section will not follow a linear organization of a
presentation of data, followed by an analysis. Instead, this section will be organized by
discursive formations, with a presentation of textual data, and analysis of that data residing under
each formation sub-heading.
The Vietnam War
In her book Security as Practice, Lene Hansen (2006) explains that identity is
discursively created and is inseparable from foreign policy. In the case of the Vietnam War, the
discursively constructed identities of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the United States
influenced U.S. foreign policy decisions in the region. The decision to go to war against North
Vietnam was predicated on certain constructions of the identities of these three countries.
Furthermore, the successful legitimization of the Vietnam War depended upon the success and
acceptance of these discursive constructions of identity. As such, this discourse analysis of the
Vietnam War discusses the constructions of these three actors.
The Construction of the North Vietnamese Other
By the 1960s, communism had been framed as a threat to the United States and American
values for thirty years, with McCarthyism and the House Un-American Activities Committee
functioning as catalysts for widespread anti-communist sentiment. Therefore, it was important
that the United States political elite tie the North Vietnamese to communism. The Tonkin Gulf
Resolution specifically referred to the North Vietnamese as communists, establishing this link in

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an official authorization of force against the North Vietnamese. Citizens reiterated this
identification as well. Writing to his congressman in support of the Vietnam War, one Hixon,
Tennessee resident referred to the North Vietnamese as “the Communist,” (“Hixon, Tennessee
Resident,” 1965). This labeling made the North Vietnamese inseparable from communism. The
ability to identify a North Vietnamese soldier as a human being much the same as an American
had been totally stripped away and that North Vietnamese individual was now part of a force
diametrically opposed to Americans. That an American constituent was saying this also pointed
to the strength of the representation of North Vietnamese as communists. Aside from
communism, North Vietnam was also identified as a dictatorship, further alienating it from
American values (Dulles 1954). This is despite the fact that America supported dictators ruling
South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Finally, General Westmoreland (1967, 87) and Senator
Barry Goldwater (1967, 96) both simply referred to the North Vietnamese as “the enemy.” For
these two political elites, the discourse of North Vietnam as the enemy had reached the point of
synonymy.
In order to legitimize military action against the North Vietnamese, they had to be
constructed as a threatening, ruthless enemy. Undersecretary of State George Ball (1966)
publicly stated that Communists recruited soldiers by force and General Westmoreland (1967)
asserted that the North Vietnamese used terrorist actions. Westmoreland (1967, 87) further
added that the North Vietnamese, “believes only in force, and his intensification of violence is
limited only by his resources and not by any moral inhibitions.” This statement removed
diplomacy as an option in dealing with North Vietnam. If their only limiting factor were their
resources, America would then have to bomb and destroy those resources. It also helped raise

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fear of the North Vietnamese as an enemy not capable of mercy, and with all the morality of a
destructive robot.
The North Vietnamese were also referred to as aggressors with malicious desires. In a
1968 television address, President Johnson (1968, 99) called the North Vietnamese “Communist
invaders,” identifying North Vietnam as the aggressor and placing them in violation of
international law and the principle of state sovereignty. A 1966 public broadcast expressed their
malicious goals, stating the North Vietnamese wanted to “subdue them (the South Vietnamese)
and convert them to Communism,” (Dirksen 1966). This statement implied that the South
Vietnamese were opposed to becoming communist, and without America’s help, they would be
forced against their will to join America’s enemy. Finally, President Johnson (1965, 60)
managed to combine both the identity constructions of aggression and malicious intent in a
speech at John Hopkins University, stating, “North Vietnam has attacked independent South
Vietnam. Its object is total conquest.”
In the same speech, Johnson (1965, 60) also linked North Vietnam to China, stating that
North Vietnam “is the new face of an old enemy.” This implied that North Vietnam was
supported by China, thereby increasing the potential danger of North Vietnam, and integrating it
into the broader Cold War.
During the debate for war in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese were constructed by the
dominant discourse in a specific manner. They were dehumanized through naming, and
connected to communist and dictatorial forms of government. Their military tactics were one of
terror, unrelenting force, and completely devoid of rational thought. Finally, they had malicious
intentions with South Vietnam and were backed by a dangerous China. However, these identity

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constructions were not entirely accepted; instead, alternative discourses competed for
dominance.
At the constituency level, there was evidence of rejection to the discursive construction
presented above. In a letter to Senator Birch Bayh, one Indiana resident outright rejected the
dominant portrayal of Communists, pointing out the historical record of Communist powers
behaving with the rationality of other states. Significantly, the resident concluded his rejection
by stating, “they are human beings,” (“Bloomington Resident,” 1965). The mere need of the
letter to defend this biological fact pointed to the strength of the dominant discourse’s
dehumanization of the North Vietnamese. Another constituent rejected the view of communism
as “some great monolithic force to which we can attribute all the evils in the United States,”
(“Frustration with Johnson,” 1966). The exaggerated tone served as a tool to mock America’s
portrayal of Communists as the absolute enemy, destabilizing the dominant construction of
North Vietnam and Communists. Martin Luther King Jr. (1967, 113) used the umbrella of
Christianity to group North Vietnamese with Americans, writing, “no document from human
hands can make these humans any less our brothers.” The contrast between General
Westmoreland’s naming of North Vietnamese simply as our enemy and King’s naming as our
brothers is sharp, and they each have significant policy implications. Empathy and olive
branches are extended to brothers, while intolerance and rifles are extended to enemies. King
(1967) furthered his construction by lending perspectives from the National Liberation Front and
the Hanoi government. King’s hypothesized perspectives offered rational explanations for the
actions of these groups.

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The Construction of the American Self
Every construction of the other is accompanied by a construction of the self. In the case
of the Vietnam War, the United States was discursively constructed in opposition to the North
Vietnamese. In general, discursive constructions are often built upon binary relationships. The
first binary examined is the rationality of the two actors. As has already been described, North
Vietnam was constructed as an irrational actor who only understood force. In contrast, America
was constructed as a rational actor. President Johnson (1965) described America’s military
power as one used with restraint and wisdom. In the same speech he stated, “we fight for values
and we fight for principles,” (Johnson 1965, 61). This was directly opposed to the North
Vietnamese, who fought for the conquest of territory. This construction of rationality was also
used to legitimate expansion of the war as President Nixon (1970) described the patience granted
by America before invading Cambodia.
America was discursively constructed in other ways as well. Barry Goldwater (1967, 99)
portrayed national honor, which meant holding to international contracts, as a fact “that
transcend(s) completely all partisan politics.” This was a creative discursive tool that allowed
certain differences of opinion to exist, but excluded national honor from allowable debate.
Consequently, the opinion that America did not need to hold to international contracts, the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Vietnam’s case, was completely pushed to the margins of
societal discourse. Goldwater (1967, 101) also portrayed America as a country of peace, stating,
“when violence is substituted for political process…men who treasure peace must march to war.”
Once again, this contrasted with North Vietnam, which had been constructed as a militant power.
It also allowed for the identity of America as a country of peace to coexist with the reality of
America as a country at war. Finally, Goldwater (1967) asserted that it was the enemy who

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initiated violence, not America. As a result of these discursive constructions, the United States
gained a position in total opposition to North Vietnam. Yet, the identity of the United States was
a contested one.
Those opposed to this identity construction of America used creative discursive tools to
challenge the dominant discourse. In a letter to his senator, a constituent used the poem, “I am
the Nation,” to identify who the United States was, and explain that intervention in Vietnam did
not fit this identity. Not only was the use of a poem a creative tool, it was a powerful one. “I
Am the Nation” was an explicit identity construction of America, with its conclusion of the
Declaration of Independence, Paul Revere, Babe Ruth, and Pearl Harbor, emphasized by its
steady repetition of “I am,” (“Disappointment in Vietnam,” 1965). It was an identity
construction full of historical characters so dominant that it was difficult to challenge, and to use
it to exclude something, in this case the Vietnam War, was a powerful discursive weapon.
Oppositional leaders, such as Students for a Democratic Society president, Carl Oglesby, also
employed the usage of historical figures. Oglesby (1965) explained how Thomas Jefferson and
Thomas Paine would be opposed to a war fought against fellow revolutionaries.
The dominant discourse constructed America’s military force as one used with restraint,
patience, and justness. Alternative discourses weakened this conceptualization. John Kerry’s
testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee included a visceral retelling of
brutal violence committed by American soldiers against Vietnamese civilians (Kerry 1971). In a
letter to his Senator, a constituent isolated the United States as the only country since World War
One to use chemical weapons (“Bloomington Resident,” 1965). This alternative discourse made
it difficult for the United States to construct itself as the moral superior to North Vietnam.

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Others in the public used written discourse to distance their conception of America and
national self from those leading the Vietnam War effort. One constituent described the Defense
and State Department’s judgment and spirit “alien to our best traditions,” (“Bloomington
Resident,” 1965). Another constituent referred to the Vietnam War as “Mr. McNamara’s War in
Vietnam,” referring to the Secretary of Defense (“Bloomington Resident Criticizes,” 1965).
Notice that the constituent did not write “our war in Vietnam,” “America’s War in Vietnam,” or
even “the War in Vietnam.” This was a deliberate distancing; emphasizing the Vietnam War
was something separate from himself and America.
Martin Luther King Jr. explicitly opposed the dominant construction of American
identity, writing that Vietnam was poisoning America’s soul (King 1967). In King’s speech,
America’s identity reached an almost material state. For King, the Vietnam War was not only
alien to the identity of America, but also threatened to destroy it.
Speakers of the dominant discourse fought back against those mouthing these competing
discourses. Multiple American political leaders called for unity in order to achieve victory in
Vietnam. Richard Nixon’s “Silent Majority Speech” asserted that a minority who overpowers
the majority threatens freedom (Nixon 1969). Such an assertion delegitimized those opposed to
the war by placing them in the minority. Ironically, it claimed to defend freedom by calling for
the suppression of freedom of expression. Nixon’s concern was echoed throughout the political
power spectrum, including by the Muncie, Indiana Jaycees organization. The Jaycees began a
letter-writing campaign to push back against “unpatriotic, morale-dimming aspects of recent
protest marches against U.S. Vietnam policies.” They continued, “the letters should express
appreciation of freedom-loving peoples everywhere,” (Sauer 1965). Such discourse attempted to
position Vietnam War protesters as an “other,” not a malicious “other” needing to be bombed,

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but an “other” who did not embody the values of freedom and patriotism necessary to become a
member of the American self.
Alternative discourses resisted this suppression. One constituent described the increasing
legitimacy of protesters, writing that “responsible, informed professors and students” were
joining the opposition movement at his local university (“Frustration with Johnson,” 1966). An
individual opposed to the Vietnam War directly responded to those attempting to position him as
a traitor, by reframing his betrayal as a betrayal of “those who feel that the Constitution of the
United States is merely a scrap of paper,” (“A Student,” 1966). This clever discursive tool
positioned the speaker as the true keeper of the American spirit.
In conclusion, the construction of the American self was both influential to American
foreign policy in Vietnam, and hotly contested. In order to gather necessary support for the
Vietnam War, America needed to be constructed as the righteous savior, making foreign policy
decisions on rational thought. However, this identity faced challenges. Moreover, supporters
and protesters of the Vietnam War wrestled with who embodied the true identity of America.
This struggle demonstrated the instability of this identity construction, and the fact that any
identity is constantly reproduced.
The Construction of the South Vietnamese Victim
In the Vietnam War, the United States would be aiding and fighting primarily for South
Vietnam. Therefore, the identity construction of South Vietnam was important in the
legitimization of the Vietnam War. South Vietnam needed to be constructed in particular ways
to legitimize U.S. military intervention.
First, the South Vietnamese needed to be in clear and present danger. A U.S. State
Department White Paper written in 1965 claimed that, “South Vietnam is fighting for its life,”

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(91). In other words, South Vietnam is on the brink of collapse, but it is simply not bowing to
the enemy, it is fighting with everything it has! How can the U.S. not intervene in such a
situation? In the media, one broadcast referred to the South Vietnamese as “this little people,”
(Dirksen 1966). By the discourse’s account, it was evident that South Vietnam was a feeble
country in dire need of help.
Secondly, the South Vietnamese needed to be, or needed to aspire to be similar to
Americans. President Nixon (1969) portrayed the South Vietnamese as a people hoping for
peace and freedom against the threat of totalitarianism. In constructing who the South
Vietnamese were, it was also important to construct who they were not. Undersecretary of State
George Ball (1966) insisted that the communist “National Liberation Front is not a political
entity expressing the will of the people of South Vietnam.” In opposition to this dominant
representation, others objected that the South Vietnamese leaders America was supporting were
dictators (“A Student,” 1966).
Finally, South Vietnam needed to be seeking American help. A 1966 radio broadcast
communicated that, in fact, South Vietnam had asked for our help (Dirksen 1966). Others,
however, argued differently. One constituent wrote to Congressman Carl Albert, “we are
fighting a war for people who do not care which side wins,” (“Remove Forces,” 1965). Martin
Luther King Jr. (1967) firmly stated that America was the enemy in the eyes of the South
Vietnamese.
The dominant discursive construction of South Vietnam satisfied all three characteristics
needed to create the proper “damsel in distress.” A clear and present danger was established for
America to respond to and rectify. Americans could support sending money and sons to fight for
a nation that shared American democratic ideals. And, the U.S. military would not be barging in

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uninvited, but instead responding to a loud cry for help. However, these final two
representational characteristics were challenged by an alternative discourse. Much like the
identity construction of the North Vietnamese Other and the American Self, the South
Vietnamese Victim was unstable and challenged.
The Iraq War
Identity also played a significant role in the legitimization of the Iraq War. However, the
process of legitimizing war in Iraq began with representations of the attacks on September 11,
2001. Next, the legitimization of the Iraq War necessitated a link between those held responsible
for the September eleventh attack and Iraq. Therefore, these two discursive formations will be
analyzed before continuing to a discussion of the identity construction of the Iraqi other and the
American self.
The Construction of September 11, 2001
The World Trade Center attacks were discursively represented as something more than
planes flying into two buildings in New York City; they were represented as something even
greater than a malicious attack on the United States. The World Trade Center attacks were
quickly constructed as an attack on the very concept of freedom. On September twentieth,
President George W. Bush declared, “freedom itself is under attack,” (Bush 2001). In the same
speech he identified the perpetrators of the attacks as, “enemies of freedom,” (Bush 2001). Bush
concluded that America was attacked because the terrorists hated America’s freedoms. The
representation of the World Trade Center attacks as an attack on freedom functioned in multiple
ways to begin legitimization of the Iraq War. First, it ascribed increased significance to the
attack. This was not just an attack a few physical structures in New York City, it was an attack
on America’s principles, values, and way of life. Secondly, it began the construction of a distinct

21. Scott 21
American “self” and terrorist “other.” Finally, it removed any possible blame on American
actions for the attacks, thereby elevating the American image.
The September eleventh attacks were also constructed to be a materialization of pure evil.
During a debate on the resolution to authorize force in Iraq, Representative Tom Delay (2002,
359) remembered, “we saw in tragic detail that evil is far more than some abstract concept.” In
The Washington Post on September 21, 2001, Charles Krauthammer (2001, 217) asked, “Has
there ever been a time when the distinction between good and evil was more clear?” By labeling
the labeling the attacks evil, the dominant discursive representation of the September eleventh
attacks stripped any rationality or relatable reasoning of the attackers. The naming of the
attackers as evil defined Americans as the binary opposite- good.
The September eleventh attacks were articulated as attacks without precedent. President
Bush (2001) declared, “night fell on a different world.” This created what David Holloway
referred to as a “historical rupture,” (2008, 1). This discursively created rupture marginalized the
idea that the September eleventh attacks were a retaliation to American foreign policy.
Furthermore, unprecedented attacks legitimized unprecedented responses, namely, the preventive
war policy that was used against Iraq. Such legitimization materialized in Bush’s June 1, 2002
speech, where he stated, “new threats require new thinking.” The door was opened to a host of
foreign policies previously constrained by international law and public opinion. Jackson writes,
“This is known as ‘pre-emptive self-defense’ and it involves a profound rewriting of the
internationally accepted laws of war,” (2005, 11).
The few alternative constructions of the September eleventh attacks rejected the
representations presented above. In The New Yorker, human rights activist Susan Sontag (2001,
215) said the events of September eleventh were “not a ‘cowardly’ attack on ‘civilization’ or

22. Scott 22
‘liberty’ or ‘humanity’ or ‘the free world’ but an attack on the world’s self-proclaimed
superpower, undertaken as a consequence of specific American…actions.” In this one phrase,
Sontag rejected a dominant representation of the attackers, the attack, and America. By placing
key words in quotes, Sontag revealed that those “facts” were myths without reality outside of the
social world. Although drowned out by the dominant discourse, Sontag and others displayed the
possibility of an alternative representation of September eleventh.
The Construction of the Terrorist-Iraq Link
The Bush administration blamed the attacks of September 11, 2001 on Osama Bin Laden
and the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, which had been harbored and supported by the Taliban
in Afghanistan. Therefore it took a deliberate discursive effort by the Bush administration to link
the “terrorists” held responsible for the September eleventh attacks to the state of Iraq.
The linking process began on September 20, 2001, when President Bush stated that
America would pursue both terrorist organizations and the nations who supported or harbored
those terrorist organizations. This opened the door for the United States to pursue military action
against states not directly related to terrorist acts or the September eleventh attacks.
The next step in this discursive process was to instill a fear of both the possibility and the
ramifications of an alliance between a terrorist organization and a state sponsor. In his address to
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, Bush stated, “our greatest fear is that terrorists will
find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the
technologies to kill on a massive scale.” Bush helped construct important identities of the
terrorists, state sponsors, and their relationship to one another in this phrase. Terrorists were
constructed as mad and driven by an unquenchable thirst to kill. Meanwhile, potential state
sponsors were constructed as willing partners to terrorist organizations, freely loaning their

23. Scott 23
military and technological resources, and serving as a means through which evil thoughts could
materialize into mass attacks. This discursively generated fear diminished the ability of
Americans to critically think about the relationships between states and terrorist organizations,
and drove support for a military campaign against the source of such fear.
With the groundwork laid, Iraq could now be articulated as the state sponsor of terror. In
the same speech to the U.N., Bush specifically named Iraq as a supporter of terrorism, and the
pinnacle embodiment of the feared alliance (2002). This link quickly took root and expanded by
reiteration from multiple levels of political society. Writing in The Weekly Standard, Robert
Kagan and William Kristol (2002, 244) stated, “Saddam is an ally of the world’s terrorists and
always has been.” Writing to the editor of The New York Times, one individual wrote, “We must
stop Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, and Al Qaeda now if we do not want to witness any
more horrific days like September 11,” (Blumberg 2003). The expressions of this link by both
the media and individuals demonstrated the salience of this discursive link. These multiple
voices also served to amplify the discursive formation, and increasing the “truthfulness” of the
link.
An alternative discourse also demonstrated strength and saliency. This alternative
discourse disputed the terrorist-Iraq link. Organizing his argument in to a list of rhetorical
questions, Representative Ron Paul argued the intelligence community had not been able to
make any link tying Iraq to global terrorism. He also pointed out that fifteen of the nineteen
hijackers on September eleventh were from Saudi Arabia, not Iraq. Such assertions weakened
the link and troubled the effort to construct a clear enemy. In the media, Arianna Huffington
(2002, 344) described effort to link Iraq to the September eleventh attacks as fantasy. She added,
“despite the frantic efforts of the Bush administration, (Iraq) has not been directly linked to

24. Scott 24
9/11.” Such rejections resonated at the individual level as well. The failure of the dominant
discourse to solidify the link between terrorists and Iraq resulted in more contentious debate than
that which surrounded the Afghanistan War.
The Construction of the American Self
In order to successfully legitimize the Iraq War, American identity had to be constructed
as the opposite of the evil terrorists and insane tyrants American leaders were claiming to fight.
This identity construction resulted in several evident characteristics of what it meant to be an
American.
First, the discourse constructed America as diverse yet unified. Nine days after the
September eleventh attacks, President Bush (2001) spoke of the intercultural unity and patriotism
following the attack. He also extended respect and friendship to Muslims, including them into
the American identity. An identity constituted by a diversity of religions, cultures, races, and
ethnicities immunized U.S. leaders from critiques of the war on terrorism as an unfair targeting
of Islam or the Arab world. Furthermore, by constructing the circle of acceptable American
identity to appear larger than it really was, alternative representations of September eleventh and
the ensuing foreign policy decisions were pushed to the margins of political discourse.
In direct contrast to the construction of the enemy as evil and irrational, America’s
identity was constructed as an honorable savior. In an address by Bush on June 1, 2002, he
stated, “America was attacked by a ruthless and resourceful enemy,” and in the very next
sentence, described the American military as “powerful and…honorable.” This juxtaposition of
identities served to construct any American military campaign performed under the umbrella of
the War on Terrorism as one of just cause against an enemy that needed to be defeated. The
dominant discourse also portrayed America as a savior and protector. In The Washington Post,

25. Scott 25
columnist Charles Krauthammer discussed America’s foreign policy in the 1990s. Krauthammer
(2001, 218) wrote, “The Gulf War saved the Kuwaiti people from Saddam. American
intervention in the Balkans saved Bosnia. And then we saved Kosovo from Serbia… In every
one we saved a Muslim people.” As an influential columnist, Krauthammer helped construct the
identity of American foreign policy as not one of imperialism, neo-colonialism, or policing the
world, but as one of saving people.
Finally, America was constructed as standing for freedom, peace, and justice. President
Bush proclaimed the American flag would stand for freedom. Debating the resolution to
authorize force against Iraq, Representative Tom Delay (2002, 363) stated, “As a free society, we
have to defeat dangers before they ripen.” Delay not only contributed to the identity of America
as a place of freedom, but also argued this freedom needed to involve preventive warfare.
President Bush (2002) argued it was America’s duty to fight for a just peace. Delay (2002, 363)
furthers this construction of peace by stating, “war was thrust upon us.” This discursive
construction of America’s identity was thus able to legitimate starting another war, while
retaining an image of peacefulness.
The defining of American identity leading up to the Iraq War was not a simple process
of application; instead, it was a discursive and political struggle. Senator Robert Byrd fought
back against the dominant discourse with historical tools. Specifically, he quoted Abraham
Lincoln’s own concerns of preemptive military action and acquisition of military power by the
executive. Byrd (2002, 6) then asked, “What would Lincoln say of the Bush doctrine concerning
preemptive strikes?” Abraham Lincoln is a historical figure viewed by most Americans as the
embodiment of America’s best qualities and perhaps one of America’s greatest leaders.
Therefore, Byrd’s positioning of Lincoln in opposition to preemptive military action against Iraq

26. Scott 26
was a powerful historical and discursive tool in the attempt to banish preventive war policy from
the American identity. The civilization-barbarian binary was commonly used in the dominant
discourse of the Iraq War. The United States had been constructed as the civilized society
attacked by the barbaric terrorists. However, the theological professor Susan Thistlewaite (2002)
stated on National Public Radio, “If the United States strikes first against Iraq, then it is
Americans who have become barbarians.” These alternative identity constructions prevented
preemptive war policy from being fully implanted into the American identity. This made the
preemptive nature of the Iraq War a harder sell to the American public, and a sticking point in
the legitimization process of the Iraq War.
Finally, what was the width or breadth of American identity and what was its tolerance of
opposition to the Iraq War? President Bush (2001) stated, “Either you are with us, or you are
with the terrorists.” This dichotomy left no grey area for those to criticize or even be neutral in
opinion of America’s counterterrorism campaign. Columnist Ann Coulter (2002, 334) described
those critical of Bush as “the anti-American set.” In a letter to the editor of the New York
Times, Europeans were labeled anti-American because they were opposed to the Iraq War,”
(Tauber 2003). Such tightening of the American self suffocated critiques of the Iraq War.
Critics of Bush’s anti-war policy were easily brushed away as not belonging to the American
self. In an effort to open up the parameters of the self to include critics, The Beastie Boys (2003)
sang, “don’t get us wrong cause we love America,” in their song In a World Gone Mad, which
criticized the Iraq War. Despite these efforts, the dominating discourse tightened the confines of
the American self, limiting criticism, thereby legitimizing the Iraq War.

27. Scott 27
Comparisons Between the Legitimization of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars
The Vietnam and Iraq Wars were legitimized in similar ways. First, there were sharply
contrasting constructions of the self and other. In both cases, these contrasting identities were
founded upon binaries or dichotomies. The American self was described as civilized, free, just,
rational, honorable, and seeking peace. The enemy other was described as barbaric, tyrannical,
evil, irrational, ruthless, and seeking destruction. In both cases these contrasting constructions
functioned to legitimize war by distancing the other from the self. Not only was the enemy other
very different from the American self, but it was threatening to American security and way of
life. The enemy other’s irrationality and ruthlessness removed negotiation and diplomacy from
the possible foreign policy responses. Instead, military action was the only means to combat
such an enemy. And, the American people could trust their military was serving the causes of
peace, freedom, and justice.
Secondly, both the Vietnam War and the Iraq War were articulated not as conflicts
between two states, but a broader struggle between ideals competing for world order.
Undersecretary of State George Ball, Senator Barry Goldwater, and others affirmed that North
Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam was a threat to world security. Former Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles (1954, 40) stated that a Communist takeover of Southeast Asia would
be “a grave threat to the whole free community.” Similarly, President George W. Bush (2001)
stated, “This is not…just America’s fight… This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s
fight.” An article in The Weekly Standard read, “Whether or not we remove Saddam Hussein
from power will shape the contours of the emerging world order, perhaps for decades to come,”
(Kagan and Kristol 2002, 243). The discursive construction of world order at stake helped
legitimize both wars by increasing the significance of those wars. No longer were Americans

28. Scott 28
weighing the costs of war against the benefits of defeating one dictator, regime, or state. Instead,
they weighed the costs of war against the benefit saving civilized society and global freedom.
In each war, historical tools were employed by both the dominant discourse and the
alternative discourses. These historical tools linked present events to previous attacks and wars
in order to legitimize or delegitimize certain foreign policies. Historical tools were also
employed in the struggle to define the American self. In each case, the opposition turned to
popular historical figures as a tool to exclude certain foreign policies from the American identity.
The usage of historical representations in both wars points to the strength of this tool in
discursive struggles.
The main differences between the legitimization of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars resulted
from the differing premises of each war. The Vietnam War was constructed as a response to an
attack against a foreign state. Therefore, the discursive struggle of the Vietnam War also
included the identity construction of a victim state, South Vietnam. In contrast, the Iraq War was
constructed as a response to an attack upon America. The legitimization of the Iraq War
depended upon the representation of the attack in America, as well as the connection of the
attack to the state of Iraq.
Conclusion:
This work has attempted to answer how the Vietnam and Iraq Wars were legitimized.
This was not explained by examining the military capabilities of states, or American strategic
goals, but instead by examining the discourses that existed preceding and during each war. As
has been shown here, the dominant discourses of each war promoted the legitimization of those
wars. The thesis is supported in that representations of the other, self, attacks, and events were

29. Scott 29
the discursive elements most important in the legitimization of both Iraq and Vietnam. While no
dominant discursive formation ever reached absolute hegemony, the dominant narratives did
resonate throughout the political power spectrum, from political elites to individual constituents.
This permeation supported the process of turning discursive representations into “facts.” This
successful process then legitimized foreign policies of large-scale military action against both
North Vietnam and Iraq.
This study’s findings have major implications for those within and outside academia.
First, this study demonstrates that the discursive process of legitimizing war is not merely
contained within the political elite, but instead is produced and shaped by the media and
individuals outside of formal political power positions. This leads to the assertion that discourse
analysis should be expanded beyond the texts written by political elites. Future research should
incorporate texts from media and constituent productions. For those outside academia, this
realization signals that everyone has an important role in shaping American foreign policy, and
all policies for that matter. Secondly, this study has shown that “facts” are often mere social
constructions and representations. For political scientists, this is an encouragement to move
beyond positivist thinking to post-positivism when examining legitimization processes.
Discourse analysis, especially, is a useful tool to uncover how certain policies are legitimized,
and how representations become factual. For everyone, this is an encouragement to be aware of
the language used by politicians, friends, family, and yourself to identify states and events. This
is not to state that all sense of morality and judgment should be abandoned, but merely to
emphasize the social basis of representations, and the policy implications of those
representations.

30. Scott 30
This paper concludes with an acknowledgment of wrong turns, and suggestions to rectify
those mistakes and delve into further research in the future. The main fault of this research is
that it casted a net way to large for an undergraduate thesis. This paper’s discussion of the
legitimization process of both wars touched only on a few of the many discursive formations
found in the study of the textual data. Future research is needed to fully expand upon what has
been discussed here. For example, future research could focus only on the legitimization of one
war, but go into much more depth. There is also a need to examine pop culture’s role in the
legitimization process, especially as media and pop culture gain influence. However, the
immense cost of war makes any future discursive study of the legitimization process a worthy
endeavor.

31. Scott 31
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