1. Copyright Kurt Callaway, 2014
Application 2 Section Paper
Kurt Callaway, FORE 6331
13 Nov 14
For centuries the crossroad of East and West, Hong Kong has always seemed to present itself as the
perfect blend of Chinese culture and unfettered Western capitalism. The current state of the region,
however, has been less than serene since it was returned in 1997 by the UK to the control of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Although promised in 2007 universal suffrage by 2015, the citizens of Hong
Kong recently demonstrated in the streets against the decision of the PRC government that directed the
election of the region’s Chief Executive in 2017 only from a small pool of candidates, all of whom will
have been selected by a pro-Beijing nominating committee (“Hong Kong’s Democracy Debate”, 2014,
para. 4). This paper examines these recent events in Hong Kong using the framework of Ralf
Dahrendorf’s model of internal social conflict. The model tells us the position of the protesters is probably
one of weakness, unlikely to end in success against the authorities.
Dahrendorf states an assumption: “the dichotomy of social roles within imperatively coordinated groups,
the division into positive and negative dominance roles, is a fact of social structure” (p. 177). With that in
mind, quasi-groups with opposing interests may be identified, one with domination over the other. These
quasi-groups organize formally, to an effectiveness determined by a set of conditions: social, political, and
technical. The organizations conflict with one another to keep or change the status quo, to an extent
depending on two further conditions: social mobility and conflict regulatory mechanisms. Any resulting
social structure change (that is, change in the dominance relationship) is determined by more conditions:
conflict intensity, endurance of the rulers, and the ability of the ruled to apply pressure to the rulers.
Applying the above framework to the events in Hong Kong we can easily identify the dichotomy of social
roles among the conflicting groups. The governments of Hong Kong and of the PRC are clearly the group
in the positive domination role. Strictly speaking, they are separate bodies under China’s “one country,
two systems” policy, yet there’s little practical difference in terms of current events. While the Hong Kong
government is constrained to operate under its more liberal “Basic Law,” its power “comes solely from the
authorization by the central leadership” (“The Practice of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy’, 2014),
a point emphasized publicly by a member of the region’s Executive Council quoted in the Economist:
“Hong Kong, she said, was ‘not an independent entity’ and could not ‘decide on its own its political
development’ ” (25 Oct 14, p. 48). The group occupying the negative domination role is the aggregation
of Hong Kong citizens dissatisfied with the PRC’s ruling on who may stand for the elected post of Chief
Executive (“Why is Hong Kong Protesting?”, 2014, para. 2).
Both sides exist as “interest groups” as defined by Dahrendorf. The Chinese government is implicitly an
organization, with an established ideology, firm leader (President and Party Chairman Xi Jinping), and
strong interest in maintaining the power of the state; in contrast, the negative domination interest group is
much less formally defined. The most organized parts of the protest movement consist of three groups:
Occupy Central, Scholarism, and the Hong Kong Federation of Students, the latter two of which are
student activist associations, though the last seems to be the only one that exists as a formal organization.
In general, the protest has been “without clear leadership” (“No exit”, 2014, p. 52), and no formal means
of membership such as one would find in a labor trade union. But the groups share a common, if informal,
pro-democracy ideology of “political reform and democratic elections” (“Why is Hong Kong protesting?”
2014, para. 19). As Hong Kong is an relatively open society in regard to free speech (compared to the
mainland), the protesting interest group appears to have no problem communicating amongst itself and
with others, at times rallying up to 100,000 participants. Indeed, technology has improved the condition of
communication through widespread use of a mesh network that allows the ubiquitous cell phones to
connect directly with each other without going through the standard cell network (Rutkin & Aron, 2014).
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2. Copyright Kurt Callaway, 2014
To assess the intensity of conflict, Dahrendorf offers only two conditions to consider, but both are relevant
to the events in Hong Kong. The first is social mobility, which at first glance may not appear to be an issue
in the pro-democracy movement. Actually it is an important factor for the student protesters, who have
cited social inequality, the unavailability of housing, and lack of opportunity as persistent concerns (“Hong
Kong leader extends”, 2014, para. 17). Second is the presence of mechanisms which the two interest
groups can bring to bear to regulate the conflict. The scope of the rallies, and especially their degree of
violence, is a means available to the non-dominant group. Of course, the government as the dominant
group wielding formal authority has the choice to apply overwhelming force (or not) to influence the
conflict. Such a response would escalate the social conflict greatly, at least for the short-term, as occurred
in Tiananmen Square, but this is not 1989; Hong Kong’s global importance to commerce would mean such
a action could result in “likely international and business repercussions” (“Why is Hong Kong protesting”,
2014, para. 29). Another regulation mechanism both sides have explored are negotiations between the
interest groups to manage the conflict, with the cancellation of talks in early October contributing to the
revitalization of the non-dominant groups protest activities (Whitehead, 2014, para. 4). This falls in line
with Dahrendorf’s observation that the “intensity of social conflict is at a minimum where the conflict as
such is taken seriously and pursued most energetically” (p. 181). To be sure: in this circumstance serious
negotiations may not be a reasonable expectation. Totalitarian states tend to prevent discussion
(Dahrendorf, p. 182), and this may be as true for China now, if talks could be construed as weakness, not
just for the Hong Kong government, but for the PRC as well (“Hong Kong protests”, 2014, para. 20).
Thus, the conflict must remain in tension: the protesters are reluctant to escalate (which might alienate
potential supporters), but the government refuses to de-escalate by negotiating in good faith with the
protest groups.
Last to consider are the conditions for the resulting change. While the organization and conflict are
already fact, change for Hong Kong seems to remain in the future. Dahrendorf theorizes in his conditions
for structural change only three factors (p. 179). First, a relation between the intensity of the conflict and
resulting change. Quantifying the severity of the events in Hong Kong is difficult; one can only point to the
fact they have been generally peaceful, popular street demonstrations. They do not appear to be driving
systematic or structural change. Protests in the region have been generally unsuccessful, with the notable
exception of those in 2003 and 2012, when the protest goals were on subjects the government “wanted,
but didn’t absolutely need” (“No exit”, 2014, p. 52). A condition of greater import than perhaps all others
is that of the capacity of the rulers to stay in power. This appears to be strongly in the PRC government’s
favor; Chinese President Xi’s emphasis seems to be “consolidating personal power, by . . . silencing
political opposition, and legitimizing his leadership and the Communist Party’s power in the eyes of the
Chinese people” (Economy, p. 82). This hardly seems the course of a leader or an institution ready to
weaken their power by accepting Western democratic political ideas. In contrast, the remaining factor
listed by Dahrendorf – pressure potential of the dominated interest group (p. 179) – seems to be strictly
limited. The protest groups have been steadfastly non-violent, and it remains an open question whether the
informal groups can call on any influence that would force change, especially given the not insignificant
opposition to their efforts by many leaders of the Hong Kong business community, which sees stability as a
more favorable business climate (“Hong Kong’s democracy debate”, 2014, para. 22).
In conclusion, from the above we can make some inferences about the protest events in Hong Kong. The
fact that the groups are somewhat nebulous may be a factor for their survival and moderate success, since
the coalition of a formal, permitted organization would be seen as a greater danger to the state – and more
easily crushed (Dahrendorf, p. 183). Protests will continue in one form or another, since the latent source
of conflict remains: lack of mobility for the young students, along with the general intransigence of the
Chinese government to regulate the conflict via negotiation. The formidable power of the government
seems a clear barrier to the change desired by the protestors. And by reflecting on Sun Tzu’s principle that
“supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting” (Tzu, para. III.2), we can
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3. Copyright Kurt Callaway, 2014
understand Henry Kissinger’s assessment that China’s “doctrine emphasizes the psychological exhaustion
of the opponent” (p. 535). There is no reason to believe this is any less true when the government deals
with its domestic opponents – in which case the protestors in Hong Kong are probably in for a long wait
indeed.
References:
Dahrendorf, R. (June 1958). Toward a Theory of Social Conflict. The Journal of Conflict Resolution
Vol. 2 No. 2. Available from https://canvas.instructure.com/courses/870857/files/30834715
Economy, E. (2014). China’s Imperial President. Foreign Affairs, 93(6), 80-91.
Full Text: The Practice of the "One Country, Two Systems" Policy in the Hong Kong Special
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http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/10/c_133396891_11.htm
Hong Kong’s Democracy Debate. (2014, October 7). BBC. Retrieved November 9, 2014, from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27921954
Hong Kong leader extends olive branch to pro-democracy protesters. (2014, October 21). The Guardian.
Retrieved November 9, 2014, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/21/hong-kong-leader-
leung-olive-branch-democracy-protesters
Hong Kong protests: Echoes of Tiananmen. (2014, October 2). BBC. Retrieved November 9, 2014,
from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29454326
Kissinger, H. (2012). On China. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
No Exit. (2014, October 4). The Economist, 413(8907), pp. 51-52.
Poor Conversation. (2014, October 25). The Economist, 413(8910), p. 48.
Rutkin A. & Aron J. (2014, September 30). Hong Kong Protesters Use A Mesh Network to Organise.
New Scientist website. Retrieved November 9, 2014, from http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn26285-
hong-kong-protesters-use-a-mesh-network-to-organise.html
Tzu, S. (n.d.). The Art of War. (L. Giles, Trans.). The Internet Classics Archive. Retrieved November
11, 2014, from http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html
Why is Hong Kong Protesting? (2014, October 18). BBC. Retrieved November 9, 2014, from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29054196
Whitehead, K. (2014, October 10). Hong Kong Protests Swell Again After ‘Insulting’ Government Snub.
Fox News. Retrieved November 9, 2014, from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/10/10/hong-kong-
protests-swell-again-after-insulting-government-snub/?intcmp=latestnews
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