The Reflection Paper supports the three learning outcomes for the

The Reflection Paper supports the three learning outcomes for
the course:
1. Analyze the components of positive psychology that
contribute to the health and well-being of individuals,
organizations, and environments.
2. Use critical thinking, skeptical inquiry, research
methodologies, and appropriate instruments to analyze scientific
evidence to differentiate positive psychology from other
psychological approaches.
3. Evaluate positive psychology theories and theorists to
determine appropriate and ethical applications and interventions
within the individual as well as organizational and multicultural
settings.
Objective: Write a 4 to 5-page personal Reflection Paper that
communicates how specific topics, theories, and research
findings covered in the course 1) shape your understanding of
positive psychology; and, 2) connect to your current knowledge,
experiences, and areas of interest.
Instructions Summary: The following guidance lists the key
steps for the Reflection Paper.
1. Review the topics we have covered in class, to include those
covered during the week this assignment is due.
2. Choose two to three* positive psychology topics, theories, or
research studies covered within the applicable week’s content.
3. Reflect and identify personal relevance of the selected
subjects.
4. Research using the UMGC Library.
5. Write and submit for grading a well composed, 4 to 5-page
APA style formatted Reflection Paper.
*This is a minimum target, not a finite value. To maximize the
benefits of this assignment, focus on a range of subjects that
capture your attention. It is appropriate to discuss and integrate
related topics. For example, in a discussion of “hope,” the
inclusion of theory (e.g., Snyder, 2002), details extracted from

course Learning Resources, and research findings pulled from
peer-reviewed articles, can create topic depth. Incorporating
relevant points that address linkages to the construct, optimism,
can demonstrate breadth of understanding. The related points,
when constructively used to compare, contrast, and synthesized
your understanding of hope, builds out a thoughtfully elaborated
presentation on the topic.
Rubric:The following informs on the distribution of points
assigned to each section of the paper. The Reflection Paper will
be graded on the following areas:
Reflection Paper Point Allocations
(Please reference the rubric accompanying this assignment for
in-depth scoring details.)
Rubric for Reflection Paper
CONTENT (8-points each)
1. All topics were discussed in clear detail.
2. Assertions supported.
3. Ideas were interrelated coherently and logically.
ORGANIZATION (16 Points)
4. An introduction previews main points of reflection, body of
paper develops and elaborates main ideas, conclusion
summarizes main points.
WRITING MECHANICS and STYLE (5 points each)
5. Paper grammatically sound (proper sentence structure) and
free of mechanical errors (e.g., misspellings, typos, etc.).
6. Citations and references in proper APA style.
Points to be
Awarded
Behaviors Demonstrated
Exceptional
paper contains no errors in this area
Exceeds Expectations
paper contains limited errors in this area; however, the overall
presentation of the material is readable and appropriate
Meets Expectations

paper contains limited errors in this area; however, the overall
presentation of the material is difficult to read
Meets Some Expectations
paper contains a number of errors in this area; however, the
overall presentation is acceptable
Minimal Expectations Met
paper contains a number of errors in this area, and the overall
presentation is difficult to read
Not Achieved
paper contains extensive errors in this area, which detracts from
the overall presentation; or not addressed
Requirements: The requirements for the Reflection Paper
include:
Submit a single document that reflects upon how specific
topics, theories, and research findings covered in the course 1)
shape your understanding of positive psychology; and, 2)
connect to your current knowledge, experiences, and areas of
interest.
Within the document…
a. Introduce. Concisely introduced the reader to clearly defined
topics addressed in the paper. Anchor the paper through a well -
constructed thesis statement.
b. Have purpose. Dedicate discussion and analysis to two-three
(minimum*) focal topics within the body of the paper. All
topics are to be discussed in clear detail.
c. Synthesize. Demonstrate synthesis of each topic with your
current understanding of, or experiences with, the topic.
Support assertions made.
d. Connect. Identify personal opportunities for application
(private, professional, public contexts). Express interrelated
ideas coherently and logically.
e. Include sources.Incorporate course sources and a minimum of
two (2) peer-reviewed professional sources from our UMGC
Library.
f. Use Authorial Voice. Discuss materials in your own words

and your own writing style and structure. Avoid excessive use
of direct quotes. Doing so may incur a point penalty for each
occurrence and will not be accepted as content towards the page
count of the reflection paper.
g. Apply APA Style**. Neatly and concisely present a 4 to 5-
page APA formatted document containing
· Title Page
· Introduction
· Body (with heading levels applied when appropriate)
· Conclusions
· References Page
· Properly formatted in-text citations and references
*Remember this is a minimum, not a restrictive, fixed target.
See note under Instructions.
**Use APA style headings and subheadings, double-spacing, an
appropriate serif or sans serif font (e.g., Times Roman 12-point;
Arial 11-point; Calibri 11-point), one-inch margins (left, right,
top, and bottom), page numbering, and logical flow from topic
to topic. Write with clarity, paying attention to spelling,
grammar, and syntax. Consult the UMGC Citing and Writing
Guide, for proper form of APA Style in-text citations and
references.
Australia’s national research and knowledge centre on crime
and justice
Trends
& issues
in crime and criminal justice
Foreword | A multifaceted strategy is

required to effectively combat organised
crime. A key element of preventing and
responding to organised criminal
activity is to target how individuals
become involved in illicit activities and
to develop effective methods of
preventing their recruitment.
Using prior research into the methods
used by organised crime groups to
identify potential targets or confederates,
and individuals’ motivations to seek or
agree to participate in criminal activity, a
framework is presented that identified key
recruitment pathways together with some
strategies that would make recruitment
and engagement less effective.
Adam Tomison Director
Responding to organised crime
through intervention in recruitment

pathways
Russell G Smith
The essential components of an organised crime group are
defined in article 2 of the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a
structured group of three
or more persons, existing for a period of time, acting in concert
with the aim of committing
serious criminal offences in order to obtain some financial or
material benefit (United Nations
2004). As such, organised crime requires three or more persons
to come together for
the execution of their common purpose. This paper examines the
processes involved in
recruitment and the opportunities and incentives that make
participation in organised crime
attractive for suitably motivated individuals. Armed with a
sophisticated understanding of
how recruitment takes place, it is possible to develop
appropriate intervention strategies
that would seek to disrupt recruitment pathways and to make it
difficult for organised crime
groups to secure the services of potential collaborators.
Considerable research has been undertaken into the daily

activities of organised crime
groups, including how they fund their operations, maintain
control over communities and
launder the proceeds of their criminal enterprises. Organised
crime groups in Australia
include outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs; Holmes 2007;
Lozusic 2002), ethnic-based
crime groups, family-based crime groups and groups formed on
the basis of place of
origin such as prisons (CCC WA 2005). The Australian Crime
Commission has noted that:
although most organised crime activities in Australia are
focused on illicit drug markets,
organised crime is increasingly diversifying its activities, with
convergences being observed
between legitimate or licit markets and illicit markets (ACC
2013: 7).
Organised crime exists on a continuum of seriousness and
complexity of activity as shown
in Figure 1. At the lower end of seriousness are instances of
small-scale street crime
committed by small groups of individuals, often young people
or family members who
become involved in low-level property or violent crime. Small

groups of individuals
can also commit economic crimes such as small business-related
revenue fraud. Other
No. 473 October 2014
2 | Australian Institute of Criminology
criminal networks are involved in organised
cybercrime and online consumer scams
that are coordinated entirely online (Choo &
Smith 2008). Organised criminal activities
are also linked to environmental crime,
intellectual property infringement, maritime
piracy and financial crime, which require
the presence of multiple players in order for
offences to be planned and perpetrated.
Arguably, at the most serious level are
large-scale, organised criminal activities
related to child exploitation, human
trafficking, corporate fraud and illicit

drug production and supply. Large-scale
terrorist activity can also entail extensive
organisation and planning.
The extent of co-offending
At the outset, it is important to understand
the extent to which serious crime is carried
out collaboratively, as the pathways of
recruitment will differ depending on the
number of individuals involved and the
complexity of their relationships. Recruiting
two individuals to carry out a major fraud
within a bank is substantively different from
the recruitment of 50 skilled participants
to conduct a major drug production and
distribution network.
Research carried out by the Australian Institute
of Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers
(Smith 2003) found that out of 155 case files

involving serious fraud in Australia and New
Zealand, 84 percent had only one accused
person involved, and in only 11 case files (7%)
were more than two persons involved (Smith
2003). This finding contradicts the view that
a high proportion of serious economic crime
is perpetrated by criminal organisations. The
study in question, however, examined only
successfully detected serious fraud and it
could be the case that organised crime is
involved in other matters that do not come to
the attention of the authorities.
More recently, KPMG (2013) reported an
increase in the proportion of serious fraud
cases involving more than two offenders
acting together between its 2010 and
2012 fraud surveys. In 2010, 23 percent
of internal fraud involved collusion (KPMG

2010), while in 2012 this increased to 29
percent (KPMG 2013). The percentage of
cases of internal fraud involving four or more
persons increased from two percent in 2010
to six percent in 2012 (KPMG 2013, 2010).
The vast majority of serious fraud reported
in the surveys was, however, perpetrated
by individuals acting alone.
Figure 1 Ranked seriousness of organised criminal activities
High
Medium
Low
• Terrorist activity
• Serious financial crime
• Small-scale business fraud and tax evasion
• Family-based local crime
• Small-scale street crime
Seriousness

• Organised cybercrime and scams
• Organised environmental crime
• Organised maritime piracy
• Child exploitation
• Human trafficking
• Corporate fraud
• Drug cartels
Australian Institute of Criminology | 3
Theoretical approaches
Criminological theory provides a number
of insights into the processes through
which crime is commissioned. Edwin
Sutherland’s (1939) theory of differential
association, for example, that was
developed in the late 1930s in the United
States to explain juvenile gang behaviour,
proposed that criminal behaviour is learned
through a process of social interaction
between individuals in which they learn

how to commit crimes and to justify their
illegal conduct (Sutherland 1939). He
argued that if the conditions favourable
to acting illegally outweigh the frequency
and intensity of conditions unfavourable
to violating the law, then an individual is
more likely to decide to break the law
(Sutherland & Cressey 1974). Sutherland
(1937) developed the theory drawing on
his classic study, The Professional Thief,
in which he analysed and described
ethnographically the life and daily routines
of professional thieves in the United States.
More recently, Derek Cornish (1994)
developed the notion of ‘crime scripts’
to understand the processes by which
criminals conduct their activities. Research
of this kind has been applied in relation to

the resale of stolen vehicles (Tremblay, Talon
& Hurley 2001), cheque forgery (Lacoste
& Tremblay 2003) and organised crime
(Hancock & Laycock 2010).
Crime scripts, according to Cornish (1994:
161) are a sequence of ‘script functions’ and
accompanying ‘script actions’ that organise
our knowledge and understanding of routine
behavioural processes. In the present
context, these relate to the identification and
engagement of co-offenders who can be
encouraged to join in the illegal activity.
The recruitment of a third party to commit
a crime can be broken down into a number
of routine processes. These include
preconditions, initiation, actualisation,
doing and post-conditions, and these
script functions have corresponding script

actions (Cornish 1994). By developing
an understanding of how organised
crime groups may seek to recruit new
members, a script analysis can then be
used to identify the script functions and
corresponding actions.
This paper explores the processes by which
recruitment for organised crime takes place
from the perspectives of:
• existing members of organised crime
groups seeking out new members to
facilitate proposed criminal activities
(recruiter pathways); and
• environmental opportunities, which
make participation in organised crime
attractive for previously law abiding
citizens (recruitee pathways).
Research evidence and anecdotal

illustrations of identified pathways are
drawn from a number of ethnographic
studies of organised crime published in
the academic literature. These include
Dick Hobbs’s Lush Life (2013), which
explored organised crime in ‘Dogtown’,
a composite of various East London
communities that he examined and Jan
Goldstraw-White’s (2012) work for which
she interviewed 41 incarcerated white-
collar offenders in the United Kingdom.
Organised financial crime has also been
studied extensively by Mike Levi (2008) in
his interview-based research into long-
firm fraud (planned bankruptcies); while
in 2007 the consultancy firm, Matrix
Knowledge Group (2007), carried out a
study of 222 convicted drug traffickers

for the Home Office in the report The Illicit
Drug Trade in the United Kingdom.
Research has also been conducted at the
Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime
and Law Enforcement at the Research and
Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry
of Security and Justice in particular, research
supporting the Organized Crime Monitor that
examined 1,092 organised crime offenders
including in-depth interviews with inmates
convicted of participation in organised
crime and incarcerated in Dutch prisons
(Kleemans & De Poot 2008; Van Koppen
2012; Van Koppen & De Poot 2013).
In the United States, Adler and Adler
(1983) spent six years observing and
interviewing 65 upper-level marijuana and
cocaine traffickers and their associates in

south-western California, and examining
their typical career paths. They noted how
‘potential recruits are lured into the drug
business by materialism, hedonism, glamor,
and excitement’ (Adler & Adler 1983: 206).
Diego Gambetta’s Codes of the Underworld
(2009) also provides an extensive analysis
of how organised criminals communicate
with each other, and use signals and
intimidation to support their activities, while
Carlo Morselli’s Contacts, Opportunities
and Criminal Enterprise (2005) provides
a social network analysis of a number of
case studies of criminal organisations taken
from Canadian police operations (see also
Morselli 2009).
In Australia, Arthur Veno, in his book The
Brotherhoods (2012) presents the results

of his ethnographic study of bikie gangs in
Australia over 27 years; while in the United
States, Robert Mazur in The Infiltrator (2009)
gives an account of his five years’ undercover
work for the FBI infiltrating the criminal
hierarchy of Colombia’s drug cartels.
These are clearly only a small selection of
the published literature on organised crime,
but they provide firsthand, ethnographic
accounts of recruitment practices in various
organised crime contexts, which are relevant
illustrations of the processes identified in
this paper. Generally, there has been little
specific research on recruitment processes,
apart from one doctoral dissertation that
presented an economic model of how
government policies can affect membership
patterns among organised crime groups

(Long 2013).
Some caution, however, needs to be
exercised when trying to fit the results
of prior ethnographic research into a set
of predetermined categories. In many
respects, organised criminal activity is far
from organised and as Dick Hobbs (2013: 5)
rightly observes:
criminal collaborations generate chaotic
sets of personal and commercial
affiliations featuring fluid and often
unpredictable interchanges that are
ill suited to the sociometric analysis
favoured by police and police science.
Recruitment pathways
With this admonition in mind, certain

pathways in which organised crime
recruitment occurs can begin to be
identified. Pathways can be examined
from the points of view of those who
are seeking to recruit new members to
become involved in criminal enterprises
(recruiter pathways) and those who may
be the targets of recruitment initiatives
(recruitee pathways). Often, recruitees
are individuals without prior criminal
connections who are seeking to raise
funds in order to maintain their lifestyle or
to consort with established crime figures
for various reasons, as explained below.
The pathways to recruitment also vary
according to the organisational structure
displayed by the group in question—be it
hierarchically based, network-based, or

via more diffuse, loose arrangements (see
UNODC 2002). Having centralised control
can often make recruitment activities more
targeted and efficient, while unstructured
groups, such as those that exist online,
often recruit in an ad hoc manner.
Recruiter pathways
Established members of organised crime
groups seek out new members for a variety
of reasons including the skillsets they offer,
which might facilitate criminal activities such
as the manufacture of illicit drugs or the
counterfeiting of payment cards; their ability
to use violence and intimidation, which
crime bosses might not wish to undertake
themselves; skills they possess in facilitating
the laundering of the proceeds of crime;
and their willingness to engage in high-risk

activities involving weapons or explosives
or other activities likely to lead to arrest.
In addition, organised crime groups can
seek to establish relationships with those
in influential government positions who can
assist in facilitating the flow of information
or decisions relevant to proposed criminal
activities. The case of ‘Ron’, a drug courier
manager, is an example of how organised
crime can seek to recruit otherwise law-
abiding individuals (see Box 1).
Box 1 Recruitment of drug couriers
Ron was in his mid-50s and had been retired from
his job in law enforcement for a decade when he
first became involved in the drug trade. Ron
managed an operation based on couriers importing
cocaine into the United Kingdom from Granada and
his role was to recruit and manage the couriers. He
frequented a local casino where he spotted potential
couriers from among the casino’s clientele, tending
to target white, middle-aged men, low on money
and ‘who needed a holiday’. Ron made all the travel
arrangements, purchased the airline tickets,
provided the suitcase and handed over the spending

money…The couriers would have their holiday and
return with an identical suitcase containing cocaine.
On the successful arrival of a consignment into the
United Kingdom, Ron would collect the case from
the courier at the airport and hand the drugs over to
his bosses, who would be waiting in a nearby
carpark. The boss would pay Ron £12,000 in cash,
which was £7,000 for the courier (who had also had
a 2 week holiday) and £5,000 for Ron. Matrix
Knowledge Group in Hobbs (2013: 242).
Recruitee pathways
Pathways can also be understood from the
perspective of those who are the subject of
recruitment. Otherwise law-abiding citizens
may seek to become involved in criminal
enterprises for a variety of reasons. They
might need funds to satisfy debts or lifestyle
expenditure, they may have a desire to
enhance their financial or social standing
or they might demonstrate an interest in
risk-taking activities, or possess motivations
based in pathological psychological
processes (Hobbs 2013; Kleemans & De

Poot 2008; KPMG 2013). Rather than
commence criminal activities in isolation,
they might seek out known criminals who
could be seen to assist in their proposed
course of action. The case of ‘Billy’, a used
car dealer, is illustrative of such a person
(see Box 2).
Crime scripts of recruitment
Hancock and Laycock (2010) have applied
Cornish’s (1994) approach to analysing
criminal behaviour through the use of crime
scripts to the disruption of organised crime
and identified recruitment as one area
where disruption might have potential. The
present discussion identifies three main
stages in the recruitment process as—
target identification, establishing trust and
engaging in compliance, and enforcement

script actions.
Target identification
One of the initial tasks that both recruiters
and the targets of their recruitment have to
undertake is the identification of willing and
cooperative collaborators. This activity is
fraught with risk as identifying participants
for criminal activity can, itself, be criminal
and can also lead to threats of, or actual
violence, being inflicted.
Identification by recruiters
Potential criminals are able to be sourced
from many occupational and other groups
in society, largely based on their interests
and the skills they possess. This can include
those with experience in telemarketing who
can participate in boiler-room investment
fraud (ACC 2012), ex-military personnel who

have experience in the use of weapons and
explosives, and members of the public willing
to act as drug or money mules. On other
occasions, organised crime groups may
seek out those working in the professions
such as lawyers and accountants who can
assist in laundering the proceeds of crime or
in establishing corporate entities and other
vehicles for use in tax evasion (see Choo et
al. 2012).
Box 2 Recruitment of a used car dealer
Billy was a successful car dealer and nightclub
owner, and had also made money from an
expanding property portfolio before he was
introduced to a group of drug importers who were
contemplating how to invest their profits. Attracted
by the prospect of easy money, Billy fed these profits
through his car dealership and progressed to
become a ‘middle man’, seeking out buyers for the
drug importers. Eventually, he ran the enterprise,
becoming embroiled with the day-to-day workings of
a large operation consisting of storers, mixers,
testers and legitimate professionals, many of whom
were paid a salary. Billy also courted the friendship

of police officers who, in exchange for free drinks,
would provide him with information and carry out
background checks on business associates and
employees. Matrix Knowledge Group in Hobbs
(2013: 241).
Those working in the information technology
and security industries also have attractive
skills that organised crime can use. The
other productive location for recruitment is
the public sector, particularly those working
in law enforcement, border control, intelligence
and corrections. Rowe et al. (2013) provide
examples of recent instances in which public
servants in Australia have been recruited by
organised crime to provide access to law
enforcement intelligence through a range of
corrupt practices.
Prisons, in particular, provide many

opportunities for inmates to establish
ties with other offenders, sometimes
individuals with low-level convictions who
can be recruited into more serious criminal
enterprises both while incarcerated, as
well as after their release (see Box 3).
Prison recruitment also carries the benefit
that everyone involved can be assured
that those whom they approach have
criminal records sufficient to warrant a
term of imprisonment.
Identification by recruitees
Arguably, a more difficult task exists for
those in the law-abiding community who
wish to become involved in organised
crime. One cannot simply approach
people who appear to be criminal and
seek membership of an illegal organisation.

Some traditional organised crime
groups are clearly recognisable, such
as the Yakuza with their tattooed bodies
(Adelstein 2010), or OMCGs with their club
colours and patches (Veno 2012). Even
if individuals are recognisably members
of a criminal enterprise, there may still be
many procedures that they are required to
undertake in order to establish trust and to
secure membership.
Diego Gambetta (2009) has explored
in detail the use of non-verbal cues to
facilitate identification of those involved
in criminal enterprises and notes how the
use of language and behavioural cues can
facilitate covert introductions in ways that
do not attract attention from authorities
or others who may be disposed to report

what transpires to the police. Subtle
conventions in the use of language, dialect,
dress and behaviour are used to ensure
that trust and legitimacy in the criminal
enterprise are guaranteed.
Serendipitous identification
Finally, identification of potential criminal
collaborators may take place accidentally
or inadvertently through contact that
occurs in common meeting places such
as pubs, casinos, gyms, brothels and
internet sites. Often, these are places at
which individuals with either law-abiding or
criminal orientations meet, establish social
relationships and begin the process of
criminal collaboration. Similarly, unplanned
recruitment can also arise within extended
families such as has been documented

in the case of Mafia families (Tyler 1971),
while more recently, social media have
provided abundant ways in which people
with common interests can establish
relationships—both for legitimate and
illegal purposes (Choo & Smith 2008).
On occasions, organised crime groups
have simply advertised online for new
recruits such as the following (unedited)
online invitation for people to undertake
credit card skimming operations:
We are private organisation for your
special developing requests. We are
focused at Electronic and Computer
Engineering. If you need special
hardwares (especially hi-tech) nor
software that can not be done or even
discuss in your Country because of

any reason such as laws etc. then
u are at the very right place. We are
offering absolutely anonymous &
offshore developing for your projects.
We don’t care what you want to do
with hardwares and softwares you
requested to be done by us. Needless
to say, your privacy is very important for
us and we don’t share with anyone else
because of any reason. We don’t need
your Name, Adress etc. because of any
reason. We only need your email. You
will have a certificate and account for
secure login to our private forum for
tracking your development, you even
may ask question to engineers who
engineering your project. If you reach
this Web Site then you already know us.

We are not cheap developers and we
cant make partnership with you. If you
wish your dreams to come true then u
have to have enough money to invest
for your dreams. You even have to pay
for request for quote from us for your
project (Glenny 2011: 203–204).
Such online advertising for willing recruits
is also prevalent in connection with online
consumer scams such as work-from-home
scams and online romance and dating
fraud. Although increasing in sophistication,
many such invitations are barely credible
and yet continue to trick unsuspecting
individuals into participation (Jorna &
Hutchings 2013).
Box 3 Recruitment in correctional settings
Karl was a former accountant who was serving a
term of imprisonment for tax fraud in Western

Australia. While in prison, he was approached by
another prisoner who needed his assistance in order
to obtain funds from the Tax Office. The accountant
assisted him, but later found out that the claim was
not legitimate. He was then approached by other
prisoners who asked him to prepare false income
tax returns with false business details and other
fabricated evidence. Over a period of a year he filed
210 fraudulent tax returns on behalf of 125 fellow
prisoners in which fraudulent tax refunds, amounting
to almost $1.3m were claimed. A total of half a
million dollars was refunded by the Tax Office to the
prisoners. Karl administered the scheme using a
computer for online banking and mobile phone and
received $61,000 in commissions and fees over the
12 month period. He argued that he was forced to
carry out the scheme under duress, but was
sentenced to an additional two years with a
non-parole period of 12 months. [2002] WASC 265
(CCA, 20 September 2002).
A further example of serendipitous
recruitment in the Netherlands concerned a
former truck driver who had set up a café to
be able to spend more time with his family
and who was recruited into transporting
heroin for an organised crime group through
contacts he had with a group of customers
at his café. This provides a clear example

of how routine activities can facilitate the
recruitment process (Felson & Clarke 1998).
The café owner was eventually sentenced to
12 years’ imprisonment for heroin trafficking
(Van Koppen & De Poot 2013). He explained
how he became involved as follows:
You start talking and ask each other:
‘What did you do before and where do
you come from?’ That’s the first thing
you do. And when I mentioned I’d been
a truck driver for years, that triggered
something of course. He should know
people, maybe he wants to. But I never
wanted to [. . .] I wasn’t interested at
all. I did not need the money and did
not bite, it did not fascinate me. After
some months, however…After all,
they are your frequent customers and

you talk to them all the time. There
comes a time it goes through your mind
that some others you know have the
ability to and probably want to do it. At
first I thought: I’ll do them both a favour
and I can earn some additional money,
you know. I really did not see the danger in
doing it (Van Koppen & De Poot 2013: 82).
Adler and Adler (1983) also found instances
of serendipitous recruitment in which law-
abiding individuals gradually became involved
in drug trafficking in order to make use of
their skills or to enhance their income (see
Box 4).
Box 4 Recruitment into money laundering
I used to be into real estate making good money. I

was the only person at my firm renting to longhairs
and dealing with their money. I slowly started getting
friendly with them, although I didn’t realize how
heavy they were. I knew ways of buying real estate
and putting it under fictitious names, laundering
money so that it went in as hot cash and came out
as spendable income. I slowly got more and more
involved with this one guy until I was neglecting my
real estate business and just partying with him all
the time. My spending went up but my income went
down and suddenly I had to look around for another
way to make money fast. I took the money I was
laundering for him, bought some bricks from another
dealer friend of his and sold them out of state before
I gave him back the cash. Within six months I was
turning [selling] 100 bricks at a time (Adler & Adler
1983: 198).
Establishing trust
Establishing trust and confidence that the
person with whom one is dealing is not
an undercover police officer, or someone
likely to blow the whistle, is often a lengthy
and invasive operation both for organised
criminals and those whom they are seeking
to recruit. In many cases, this can entail
initiation tasks such as demonstrating

criminal skills, providing samples of actual
criminal conduct (particularly the use of
violence) and showing a willingness to
share confidential information with other
group members.
In the case of online organised crime
groups engaged in sharing child exploitation
material, it is often the case that recruits
need to supply extensive libraries of illegal
exploitation images in order to establish
their bona fides and to gain access to group
libraries of similar material (Choo & Smith
2008; Wolak, Finkelhor & Mitchell 2011).
Establishing trust in the online criminal
world can also require the use of various
anonymising and security technologies.
In particular, it is important to ensure that
one’s true identity is not revealed and so

aliases and false identities are invariably
used when logging on to illicit websites.
Security of data is also required and
organised crime groups now make use
of encryption, steganography, biometrics
and Tor software that reduces the risk
of online activities being monitored by
law enforcement. Some organised crime
groups also require identity verification both
during enrolment and when undergoing
regular checks designed to confirm trust
and security of group members. An
example exists in the case of OMCGs
(Lozusic 2002).
Trust also needs to be maintained during
the early stages of group membership and
tests are often used to demonstrate an
absence of risk, proof of veracity and loyalty

to the organisation. Occasionally this can
entail involvement in successful criminal
operations to demonstrate skills and in the
case of unsuccessful activities, willingness
to be convicted and serve prison time.
Compliance and reinforcement
Further proof of commitment to the cause
may require financial investment in the
organisation and successful recruitment of
new members of the organisation—such as
occurs in connection with online networks
that share child exploitation material.
Failed recruitment
On occasions, recruitment may be
unsuccessful and fail. This can occur
where criminal activity is detected by
law enforcement and new recruits are
suspected of whistleblowing or of being

undercover operatives (Mazur 2009).
In the case of hierarchically organised
networks, sanctions of escalating severity
may be imposed leading to expulsion
from membership, or threats of, or actual,
violence and murder.
Intervening in recruitment
pathways
Having explored the various pathways for
the recruitment of individuals to engage
in organised crime and identified the
crime scripts associated with methods
of recruitment, it is possible to identify
strategies that could be considered to
intervene in such pathways so as to make
recruitment difficult and likely to lead to
detection by law enforcement.
Not all of the available opportunities for
intervention may be possible, having regard

to privacy, human rights and legislative
limitations on taking action. At a minimum,
however, the ways in which recruitment
takes place can be identified and made
obvious and available for official scrutiny.
Table 1 summarises a number of possible
intervention points in recruitment pathways
that could be explored by policymakers
seeking to control organised criminal
activities. Although some may be difficult
to implement, discussion of each could
be examined as possible ways in which to
control recruitment activities. It develops
Hancock and Laycock’s (2010) comparable
presentation of prevention strategies arising
from crime script analysis that are applicable
to organised criminal activities generally. The
principal areas to address in connection with

recruitment relate to the use by organised
crime of anonymity, reliance on professional
advisers, convenient meeting locations
and the availability of motivated recruitees.
There is also a need to publicise the risks
associated with involvement in organised
crime from the perspective of likelihood of
arrest, confiscation of assets and physical
harms that may be inflicted both personally
and on friends and relatives of recruitees
who participate in organised crime.
Addressing anonymity
First, as Hancock and Laycock (2010) rightly
emphasised, there is a need to address the
use of anonymity among organised crime
groups, especially those that operate online.
In particular, removing the ability of organised
crime to access pre-paid information and

communication technologies (ICT) services
and regulating the use of anonymising
software and encryption for illegal purposes
would be beneficial. Further, making effective
use of existing lawful databases of persons
convicted organised crime could assist law
enforcement with identification of recruitment
activities, while enhanced data analysis of
financial and cyber intelligence including
associated tracking of funds transfer
locations might be possible.
Table 1 Potential interventions in recruitment pathways relevant
to identified crime scripts
Script action Intervention category Intervention
Act anonymously under law enforcement radar Anonymity
Remove anonymity afforded by access to pre-paid ICT services
(mobile phones, Internet services,
payment cards)

Regulating the use of anonymising software and encryption for
illegal activities
Using intelligence databases of convicted organised criminals
Enhanced analysis of financial intelligence collected by
Financial Intelligence Units
Enhanced data-matching and e-authentication procedures
Obtain professional advice on commission of
crime and laundering of proceeds
Use of professionals Enhanced regulation of accountants and
financial advisers
Enhanced regulation of ICT professionals and transport sector
workers
Full compliance with FATF anti-money laundering
recommendations for professional advisers
Tighter controls and identity checks on company formation
Enhanced checks on convicted organised criminals seeking to
form companies
Coordination of anti-corruption measures
Improved protection of whistleblowers who report organised
crime and improvement of reporting
mechanisms
Identify places to meet Meeting locations Monitoring high-risk
meeting locations

Anti-fortification laws directed at fortified organised crime club
premises
Mandatory membership records for high-risk meeting locations
such as gyms, fitness clubs,
gambling venues and for sex industry proprietors
Improving the collection and sharing of prison intelligence
among law enforcement and correctional
agencies
Locate motivated recruitees Motivated recruitees Address the
red flags of fraud and rationalisations for the commission of
financial crime (eg
problem gambling, excessive lifestyle expenditure with
inadequate assets, small business failures)
Publicise high-risk lifestyle and fun associated
with organised crime
Risk awareness Enact and publicise uniform unexplained wealth
and assets confiscation laws
Publicise the harms associated with organised crime lifestyles
(eg violence, intimidation, family
loss, asset loss, addictions)
Publicise the cost–benefit balance associated with organised
crime lifestyles
Publicise the probability of detection of serious crime and
sanctions applicable to organised
criminal activity
Enhance opportunities for lawful avenues of risk-taking

activities
Regulating professional advisers
Enhanced efforts could also be made
to ensure that financial advisers and
accountants, in particular, are adequately
regulated to ensure that their services
cannot be used, overtly or unwittingly, by
organised crime groups.
Additional controls may need to be
developed for other occupational groups,
such as those in the transportation and ICT
industries. Having procedures that could
identify high-risk individuals within these
sectors could assist in locating red flags
for corruption before they are acted upon.
For example, enhanced reference checking
for those seeking employment in trusted
positions in the transport industry and those

working in ICT may help to identify individuals
who may be subject to corruption. Similarly,
having national standards and disciplinary
controls for those working in ICT may help to
identify high-risk individuals.
Prohibitions could also be enforced against
those convicted of serious crimes from
forming companies and enhanced identity
checks undertaken when businesses are
being established that could be used in
connection with organised crime. In addition,
the use of Australia’s anti-corruption regime
could be used to identify potential infiltration
of government by organised crime groups
(Rowe et al. 2013). Allied to this is the need
to encourage reporting of serious crime and
the protection of those who make reports in
the public interest.

Controlling meeting places
There is compelling evidence that
recruitment takes place in a limited
number of high-risk locations, particularly
prisons, pubs, fitness clubs and brothels.
Ensuring that fit-and-proper persons’
tests applicable to those in charge of such
venues are enforced might help to deter
organised crime involvement. Similarly,
ensuring that such businesses maintain
accurate and verifiable records of members
and regular users could also make some
premises unattractive to organised crime.
Recent anti-organised crime legislative
measures such as anti-fortification laws and
anti-association laws could also be useful in
ensuring that meeting places frequented by

organised criminals are made less desirable
places to congregate.
Finally, when police task forces are
targeting organised crime groups, it would
be beneficial to focus some activity on
increasing the probability of detection of
organised crime groups when attempting
to recruit new members. Improving
prison security and further development
of corrections agency intelligence could
assist in disrupting recruitment activities
that take place within prisons, while
allowing online data monitoring—with
judicial authorisation—would assist
law enforcement in identifying high-risk
recruitment environments.
Attacking recruitee motivations

Attacking the motivations for involvement
in organised crime by otherwise law-
abiding individuals is an essential element
in breaking pathways to recruitment.
For example, there is now an established
awareness of the red flags of individuals
becoming susceptible to involvement in
serious financial crime (eg KPMG 2013),
such as the presence of lifestyle pressures,
gambling addiction and business failure.
An illustration of how personal financial
difficulties led a senior public servant
to be recruited by organised crime to
obtain confidential intelligence for the
group is the case of the former Assistant
Director Investigations at the NSW Crime
Commission who became involved with
a drug trafficking organisation and the

importation of 300kg of pseudoephedrine.
His motivations for becoming involved in the
criminal organisation were clearly financial
gain, to clear himself of debts and to provide
for his family. To this end, he entered into
an agreement with an informant and a
legitimate businessman to import a large
quantity of pseudoephedrine concealed in
a container of rice ([2011] NSW Supreme
Court 1422, 8 December 2011). Had the
NSW Crime Commission been aware of
his financial position, his vulnerability to
corruption could have been identified and
perhaps prevented. Any such monitoring
of personnel would need to comply with
privacy and human rights protections.
There is also evidence that neutralising
the rationalisations or justifications for

involvement in serious crime can be an
effective deterrent to individuals acting
illegally (Duffield & Grabosky 2001).
Publicising risks
Making organised crime unattractive and
unprofitable through the confiscation of
assets and use of unexplained wealth laws
has been identified as a key strategy in
preventing and responding to organised
crime (Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Law Enforcement 2012). Recent
legislation that has sought to proscribe
membership of organised crime groups
could also have the indirect beneficial
effect of deterring individuals from seeking
to become new members of such groups
through fear of prosecution as a member of
a proscribed gang.

Broadhurst, Lauchs and Lohrisch (2014)
argue, for example, that many OMCG
members are simply motivated by a desire
to have ‘fun’ and to engage in risk-taking.
Publicising the negative consequences of
criminality including the potential physical and
mental harms, risk of imprisonment, loss of
livelihood and involvement in addictions could
all help to make organised crime appear to
be an unattractive lifestyle choice.
Organised crime is a multifaceted, complex
phenomenon and as such, requires a
multifaceted response strategy. Initiatives
need to be flexible and dynamic and able
to meet changes in the nature of organised
crime as they become apparent. A key
element of preventing and responding to
organised criminal activity is to interdict

or prevent individuals being recruited into
criminal organisations. This paper has
identified some potential ways in which this
may be achieved that reinforce a multifaceted
approach to combat organised crime.
Acknowledgements
Preliminary research for this paper was
carried out by Cienan Muir during an
Internship at the AIC in 2013. The author is
grateful to the anonymous reviewers who
provided comments on an earlier draft.
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Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research • Volume
3 Issue 1 • January 2011 © Pier Professional Ltd12
Introduction

The presence of gangs in incarcerated facilities
presents a host of issues for policymakers and
correctional staff, managers and administrators.
Estimates from the US indicate that gang
members comprise as much as 13% of jail
populations (Ruddell et al, 2006), 12% to 17%
of state prison populations (Griffin & Hepburn,
2006; Kreinert and Fleisher, 2001), and nine per
cent of the federal prison population (Gaes et al,
2002). These figures take on added significance
when considering the violence associated with
gangs, inside and outside of prison walls. In large
US cities, for example, Decker and Pyrooz (2010)
reported that gang members have homicide rates
100 times higher than the national average.
Gang members are disproportionately
represented in prisons, but our knowledge
of prison gangs does not match their level
of prison involvement. We attribute this
discrepancy to two main sources. First, there
are administrative challenges to gathering
such information. Correctional agencies
screen research proposals and may consider
appropriate only those projects with relevance
to programmes and operations of correctional
institutions. Researchers must also receive
approval from university and correctional
agencies’ human subjects committee. Second,
there are methodological limitations. There
are no field studies on prison gangs, and
information about prison gang activity must be
From the street to the prison,

from the prison to the street:
understanding and responding
to prison gangs
David C Pyrooz
Doctoral Student, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice,
Arizona State University, USA
Scott H Decker
Foundation Professor, School of Criminology and Criminal
Justice, Arizona State University, USA
Mark Fleisher
Kent State University, USA
Invited paper
ABSTRACT
This article examines a range of issues associated with gangs in
incarcerated settings. We
begin by examining the similarities and differences between
street and prison gangs, and
differentiating them from other types of criminal groups. Next,
we focus on the emergence
and growth of gangs in prison, including patterns and
theoretical explanations. Importantly,
we draw theoretical linkages between differing perspectives on
gang emergence and gang
violence. We also present administrative and official responses

to gangs in prison. Finally,
we discuss the movement from prison to the street, examining
the difficulties that former
prisoners face when re-entering communities.
KEY WORDS
Gangs; prison; programming; re-entry.
10.5042/jacpr.2011.0018
13 Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research •
Volume 3 Issue 1 • January 2011 © Pier Professional Ltd
While similarities such as durability and
identity distinguish street and prison gangs
from other types of criminal groups, there are
differences between the two (see Table 1).
According to Klein and Maxson (2006, p4),
street gangs are: ‘durable, street-oriented youth
group[s] whose involvement in illegal activity
is part of its group identity’. The prison gang,
on the other hand, is defined by Lyman (1989,
p48) as: ‘an organization which operates
within the prison system as a self-perpetuating
criminally oriented entity, consisting of a
select group of inmates who have established
an organized chain of command and are
governed by an established code of conduct’.

It is important to point out that definitions of
gangs in prison have not been met with the
same degree of criticism as definitions of street
gangs. Only after many decades of debate has
some semblance of consensus been reached
on the definitional criteria of street gangs. The
lack of research attention to gangs in prison,
as mentioned previously, could be partially
attributed for this divergence.
In Table 1, we display a series of variables
comparing street and prison gangs. While there
are a number of similarities, it could be argued
that prison gangs are more controlled, organised
versions of street gangs. Prison gangs exhibit
higher levels of racial and ethnic homogeneity,
instrumental violence, entrepreneurial offending,
covert behaviours and actions, collective drug
dealing, and unqualified loyalty to the gang.
These are characteristics that are found only in
rare cases in the street context. In street gangs,
membership tends to be fluid, leadership is
situational, violence is less co-ordinated and
more symbolic, and drug dealing tends to be
individualistic rather than collective (Curry &
Decker, 2002; Decker & Van Winkle, 1996;
Klein & Maxson, 2006).
From street to prison
Emergence and growth of prison
gangs
The Gypsy Jokers, formed in the 1950s in
Washington state prisons, were the first
identified American prison gang (Orlando-
Morningstar, 1997, pp1–13; Stastny & Tyrnauer,

1983). In 1957, the Mexican Mafia (La Eme)
was first documented in California. Le Eme was
the first prison gang with alleged nationwide
garnered through interviews with inmates,
prison staff or prison records (see Gaes et
al, 2002). Researchers remain sceptical about
the validity of prison record data, which is
confounded by definitional variability and
variation in disciplinary policies (Fleisher &
Decker, 2001).
This article delves into a range of issues
associated with gangs in incarcerated settings.
We begin by examining the similarities and
differences between street and prison gangs,
and what differentiates them from other types
of criminal groups. Next, we focus on the
emergence and growth of gangs in prison,
reviewing the literature on patterns of gang
behaviour and theoretical explanations for that
behaviour. Importantly, we draw theoretical
linkages between differing perspectives on
the formation of gangs and gang violence.
We next review official responses to gangs in
prison. Finally, we discuss the movement from
prison to the street, examining the difficulties
former prisoners face when re-entering
communities, and recidivism patterns. For all
intents and purposes, we use ‘prison gangs’ as
the term to encompass gangs in incarcerated
facilities, which also includes jails and other
settings. Further, while prison administrators
commonly refer to gangs as ‘security threat
groups’ or ‘inmate disruptive groups’, we refer
to these groups simply as ‘gangs’ for ease of

discussion of the movement from the street to
the prison and back.
Street and prison gang
similarities and differences
Street and prison gangs are groups that
engage in criminal activity. In this regard they
are similar to graffiti or tagging groups, or
groups engaging in human, firearms or drug
trafficking. There are, however, distinctive
characteristics that distinguish street and
prison gangs from these groups, as well as
from one another. Street and prison gangs
differ from the aforementioned groups in
that they are more durable (in terms of
persistence across time) and they maintain
a collective identity (typically in terms of
a name or set of insignia). The durability
of prison gangs reflects their age structure,
higher level of organisation, and role in
illicit activity.
Understanding and responding to prison gangs
membership nearly quadrupled between 1985 and
1992, from 12,624 to 46,190 (Baugh, 1993).
Prison gangs expanded as prisons did.
Useem and Piehl (2008) assessed the rate of
imprisonment from 1930 to 2005, finding four

distinct periods of imprisonment:
1. The 1930–1960 period is described as a
‘trendless trend’.
2. The 1961–1972 period is described as a
‘large to modest decline’ trend.
3. The 1973–1988 period is described as ‘the
buildup begins’ trend.
4. The 1989–2005 period is described as
‘accelerated growth’.
ties. In 1980, America’s state prisons housed
294,000 inmates and federal prisons housed
21,974. Camp and Camp’s 1985 national prison
survey identified approximately 114 gangs with
a membership of approximately 13,000 inmates.
Of the 49 correctional agencies surveyed, 33
reported gangs. Of those 33 gangs, 26 had street
gang counterparts. For example, Illinois had 14
gangs and 5,300 gang members; Pennsylvania
had 15 gangs and 2,400 gang members; California
had 2,050 gang members; Texas had nine prison
gangs with 2,407 gang members (Ralph &
Marquart, 1991); and Fong (1990) reported eight
Texas gangs with 1,174 members. The American
Correctional Association reported that prison gang
Table 1: A comparison of prison and street gangs
Variable Prison gang Street gang

Race Single race or ethnicity Mostly single race or ethnicity
Age Concentrated in mid-20s, Average age in upper teens
with members into 30s-40s
Organisational structure* Hierarchical Situational/hierarchical
Sources of violence Symbolic and instrumental; Symbolic; core
activity
core activity
Offending style** Entrepreneurial Cafeteria style
Visibility of behaviour Covert Overt
Drug trafficking Major activity; organised, Varies; mostly
individualistic
collective
Loyalty to gang Absolute Weak bonds
Key to membership Unqualified fidelity, abide Real or
perceived fidelity; hanging out;
by gang rules; willingness abide by street rules
to engage in violence
Key psychological attribute*** Oppositional, intimidation,
Oppositional, intimidation, camaraderie
control, manipulation

Notes:
* Situational refers to structural flexibility from loose to more
rigid.
** Entrepreneurial activity refers to specific types of profit-
generating activity. Cafeteria-style activity
refers to a range of profit-generating and non-profit activities.
*** Oppositional refers to attitudes toward correctional
supervision in the case of prison gangs. For
street gangs, it reflects a generalised opposition to authority.
(Fishman, 1934; Clemmer, 1958) and importation
(Irwin & Cressey, 1962).1 These perspectives
focus mostly on the development of prison
culture. Implicit in the description of prison
culture is the emergence of gangs. The seeds
of what later became known as adaptation/
deprivation are found in Fishman (1934).
Fishman’s concept of deprivation applied to
imprisonment as a type of punishment but also
connoted the loss of freedom (‘loss of liberty
constitutes the real punishment’, p165). Clemmer
(1958) expanded the discussion of deprivation
in The Prison Community, arguing that structural
constraints (such as isolation and the lack of
privacy) strip inmates of their identity. Cultures
endogenous to the institution arise as an

adaptive response to prison conditions – gangs
being one of them. Incoming inmates are
then socialised gradually into various prison
subcultures (see also Jacobs, 1974), including
gangs. This socialisation accounts for gang
members who shed their street gang identity
upon admission to the prison, where they
assume membership in a prison gang.
The importation model, alternatively,
advocates that pre-institutional characteristics
shape prison culture. This perspective is
argued most prominently by Irwin and
Cressey (1962). Inmate composition,
including demographic characteristics, cultural
background and personality characteristics,
are responsible for the prison culture. In other
words, prison gangs do not emerge due to
indigenous conditions within the prison; rather,
they emerge due to pre-institutional conditions
that inmates bring with them. Schwartz (1971)
termed this ‘cultural drift’, as compositional
factors do not observe the boundaries and
walls of the prison. In this way, gang members
bring their individual and cultural histories with
them when they go to prison.
Parallel arguments can be found in the
street gang literature. It has been argued that
the emergence of gangs is consistent with
the principles of homophily, where similarly-
situated and like-minded individuals come
together because of personality deficiencies
and geographical proximity (Gottfredson
& Hirschi, 1990). Further, elevated criminal
propensity (eg. poor self-control) is the key

characteristic drawing the gang together. This
The context for prison gang growth is the
expansion of America’s prison systems as a
consequence of national crime control policy
(Garland, 2001; Travis, 2005). Over the past
30 years, as state and federal prisons were
constructed in the US, hundreds of thousands
of prisoners poured into state prisons from 1980
to 2007. Over the years, the prison population
grew from 315,974 in 1980, to 739,980 in 1990,
to 1,331,278 in 2000 and to 1,532,800 inmates
in 2007 – approximately a five-fold increase. In
2000, there were 84 federal and 1,023 general
confinement facilities equalling 1,107 state and
federal prisons. By year-end 2005, there were
1,821 state and federal correctional facilities
(United States Department of Justice, 2003).
While the number of prisons and inmate
population expanded, there are no national
(or state) longitudinal data tracking street gang
expansion in state and federal prisons, and
prison gang growth over the three decades
of prison expansion. We do, however, have
data that infer street gang expansion into state
prisons. If one assumes that some percentage
of the street gang members per 1,000 state
residents are arrested and imprisoned, then
it can be inferred that those states with the
highest per capita rate of gang members should
also have the highest number of imprisoned
gangs and gang members. The 2009 National
Gang Threat Assessment (National Gang
Intelligence Center, 2009) provided data on
gang members per capita. The state of Illinois

has the highest rate per capita (eight to eleven
per 1,000 residents); California, Colorado, New
Mexico and Nevada have the second highest
rates at five to seven per 1,000; and Idaho and
Florida are third highest with four per 1,000.
Most prison gang members are 20 to 30 years
old. We recognise the difficulty of collecting
accurate estimates of the number of prison
gangs and gang membership, particularly today
when prisons house an enormous imprisoned
population. In mid-year 2009, state and federal
prisons housed more than 1.6 million prisoners
(West, 2010).
Explaining gang emergence and gang
violence in prison
Two perspectives have guided the explanation
of gangs in prison: adaptation/deprivation
1 Modern terminology notwithstanding, the seminal germination
of the concepts of importation and deprivation were conceived
in ancient Greece
(Morris & Rothman, 1995). That offenders ‘import’
characteristics, personality traits, beliefs, values and norms into
prison was the basis of debate over
the effects of prison conditions on inmates in late 13th century
Italian prisons and onwards throughout the history of prisons
(Geltner, 2008).

periods of gang membership, but remained
minimal before and after gang membership
(consistent with process or deprivation views).
Enhancement was any combination of the two.
A considerable amount of attention has been
devoted to testing these models empirically.
In a recent review of the literature, Krohn and
Thornberry (2008) concluded that findings in
favour of the facilitation effect exceed that of
the selection effect in terms of the prevalence of
the studies and the frequency of effects.
In the prison context, a modest body of
literature has explored the effect of gang
membership on prison misconduct (see Table
2). Similar to the street gang literature, gang
membership appears to exhibit a robust effect
on prison misconduct (see DeLisi et al (2004)
for the lone exception). It should be noted that
the methodological rigour of the prison gang
literature is not comparable to the street gang
literature, where researchers have modelled the
relationship using elaborate analytic techniques
and with longitudinal data capable of capturing
the entire life course of gang membership. That
said, the findings displayed in Table 2 portend
perspective is consistent with the importation
model; that is, conditions of deprivation unique
to the prison don’t draw inmates together –
propensity and other characteristics external
to the prison environment are the driving
force in this process. The counterpart to the
homophily perspective can be found in the

works of Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Cohen
(1955), Miller (1958) and Thrasher (1927), where
socioeconomic conditions, limited opportunity
structures and neighborhood subculture are the
driving force behind gang emergence.
At the individual level, the conceptual
arguments about gang emergence have
translated into a set of theoretical models on
the relationship between gang membership
and criminal offending. Thornberry et al (1993)
advanced three models – selection, facilitation,
and enhancement – to account for this
relationship. Selection effects were supported
if offending remained elevated before and
after gang membership, but did not increase
during periods of gang membership (consistent
with propensity views). Facilitation effects
were supported if offending increased during
Table 2: Studies examining the effect of gang membership on
criminogenic outcomes in
prison settings
Study Data Key finding
DeLisi et al (2004) Southwestern US state, N=1,005 Prison
gang: Violent misconduct (+)
Street gang: Violent misconduct (+)
Street & prison gang: Violence (ns)

Gaes et al (2002) Bureau of Prisons, 1997-98, Gang to non-
gang: Violence (+)
N=82,504 Core to periphery gang: Violence (+)
Griffin & Hepburn Arizona DOC, new admissions Assault (+),
Threats (+),
(2006) 1996, N=2,158 Fights (ns), Weapons (ns)
Huebner (2003) 185 state correctional facilities, Assault
correctional staff (+)
N=4,168
Kreinert & Fleisher Nebraska prison system admissions,
Engage in assault (+), Drug use (+)
(2001) N=704
MacDonald (1999) California Youth Authority, Various acts of
violence (+)
two samples, FYs 82 and 87,
N=3,995
Note: a positive effect of gang membership on criminogenic
outcomes is symbolised by (+), negative
effect (-) and no effect (ns).

evaluated for their effectiveness in the
prevention and intervention of gang activity.
This is consistent with our generally low state of
knowledge about prison gangs.
Correctional agencies have developed policies
guiding initiatives that control gang-affiliated
inmates’ misconduct. Carlson and Garrett’s
2006 collection of essays illustrates the diverse
approaches that major correctional agencies have
implemented to manage prison gangs.
Since Clemmer’s (1958) The Prison
Community, prison scholars have debated
the effects of prison administration and
management on the formation of inmate groups
and individual behaviour. Do prison policies
and procedures intended to create safe prisons
have iatrogenic effects on inmates, which then
result in the formation of disruptive groups? In
spite of prison managers’ best efforts to create a
positive environment, inmates continue to form
disruptive groups as a prison extension of their
street behaviour (Jacobs 1977; Hunt et al, 1993).
Prisons have tried a variety of overt and
covert strategies, including the use of inmate
informants, the use of segregation units
for prison gang members, the isolation of
prison gang leaders, the lockdown of entire
institutions, vigorous prosecution of criminal
acts committed by prison gang members, the
interruption of prison gang members’ internal
and external communications, and the case-by-
case examination of prison gang offences. There

are, however, no published evaluations testing
the efficacy of these suppression strategies
on curbing prison gang violence and/or other
criminal conduct inside correctional institutions.
These substantial gaps in our knowledge hinder
the safety of other inmates, staff and ultimately
the public (see also Trulson et al, 2006).
The Texas state legislature passed a bill
in September 1985 that made it a ‘felony for
any inmate to possess a weapon’ (Ralph &
Marquart, 1991, p45). The bill also limited the
discretionary authority of sentencing judges:
inmates convicted of weapon possession
must serve that sentence subsequent to other
sentences. Officials believe that laws such
as this one help to keep inmates, especially
those in prison gangs, under control (Ralph &
Marquart, 1991).
A common inmate control procedure is
administrative segregation, often referred to as
‘secured housing units’ (SHU). This isolation
strategy is commonly applied to gang members.
what future research may find, suggesting that
gangs do indeed exert an effect on offending
behaviour in incarcerated settings.
The UK experience
Gangs have been documented in European
cities and countries for at least two decades
(Klein et al, 2001; Decker et al, 2009). The
presence of gangs in Europe suggests that
studies in prison facilities should find gangs and
gang activity. The problem, however, is that,

outside of England, so little is known on gangs
in jails and prisons that there is little to discuss.
Adult male gang members’ behaviour was
linked to higher levels of offending in the UK,
similar to the US. In a study of recent arrestees,
Bennett and Holloway (2004) found that current
gang members were more involved in robbery,
drug-related offences and weapons offences
than former and non-gang members. Further,
gang members (current and former) comprised
15% of the sample, yet accounted for 31% of all
of the offences reported, including 89% of all
the robberies. The above results, as a whole, are
consistent with studies in the US.
Jane Wood and colleagues have conducted
a series of studies on gang activity in English
prisons (Wood, 2006; Wood and Adler, 2001;
Wood, Moir, and James, 2009; Wood, Williams,
and James, 2010). Based on information and
approaches from American studies of gangs,
they examined the views of staff members in
English prisons. Staff members across 16 prisons
were asked questions regarding their knowledge
of gangs, gang members and gang behaviours.
Gang activity was highest in male institutions
that maintained medium security. Gangs formed
around race, and there were high levels of drug
possession among prison gangs. This study was
a groundbreaking approach to understanding
the issue of prison gangs in England although,
as the authors noted, it is an indirect measure
of prison activity. Regional affiliations were a
key part of gang groups, as noted above in
American prisons, as individuals from the same

regions tended to associate together.
Institutional gang intervention
strategies
In this section, we summarise prison and
jail gang intervention strategies. Note that
the interventions we discuss have not been
were left in the general population, violence
would erupt between rival gangs. Two key
federal court rulings have addressed this issue:
Toussaint v. McCarthy (1984) and Madrid
v. Gomez (1995). In the Toussaint case, the
courts held that segregating inmates based on
gang affiliation was permissible, based on the
opinion that segregation is administrative as
opposed to punitive or disciplinary. Because
of the administrative designation, the ruling
held that inmates that are labelled as gang
affiliated should not be afforded more rigorous
standards of due process (eg. notice of charges,
representation, witnesses). The court recognised,
however, that special considerations were
necessary for determining gang membership
and that minimal due process rights should
be provided to inmates. In other words, the
implications for policies on gang members in
general were that prison officials would need to

develop more systematic methods for classifying
inmates as gang members. This ruling was
ultimately upheld in the Madrid case (for a
more detailed discussion, see Tachiki, 1995).
Orlando-Morningstar (1997) cites the need
for better information gathering and sharing
between law enforcement and corrections. Law
enforcement can provide corrections officials
with background information on street conflicts
among inmates entering facilities. Corrections
can provide similar information for offenders
returning to the community. Correctional
agencies now use databases to track prison
gang members and gang activities. This allows
for more effective communication between
a correctional and a state police agency, and
improves data accuracy because data can be
entered as soon as they are gathered (Gaston,
1996). The New York City Department of
Correction uses a system that allows for
digitised photos that document gang members’
marks and/or tattoos. Database searches can be
done by tattoo, scars or other identifying marks.
The speed and capacity to update intelligence
information makes the use of a shared database
an effective tool in prison gang management.
Providing alternative programming could
become part of prison gang management
strategies; however, prison gang members
have not embraced such programming. The
Hampden County Correctional Center in Ludlow,
Massachusetts, developed a graduated programme
for prison gang members who wanted to leave
segregation. Two years into the programme, 190

Segregation keeps inmates alone in a cell,
23 hours a day, with one hour assigned to
recreation and/or other activities. Texas used
administrative segregation and, in 1985, put all
known prison gang members into segregation
in the hope of limiting their influence on
mainline inmate populations. Violence in the
general population decreased, resulting in nine
prison gang-motivated homicides from 1985 to
1990; fewer armed assaults were reported as
well. By 1991, segregation housed more than
1,500 gang members (Ralph & Marquart, 1991).
Knox (2000) reported that a majority of 133
prison officials interviewed in a national survey
believed segregation policy did not accomplish
its anti-gang crime objective. Nevertheless,
isolating gang members, and especially gang
leaders, is a popular control strategy. With
prison gang leaders locked down, officials
hoped vertical communication within the gang
would be weakened, resulting in an erosion of
group solidarity.
Another form of isolation transfers prison
gang leaders among institutions (United States
Department of Justice, 1992). To reduce gang
membership, an official notice of suspected
gang activity is kept in an inmate’s file, a
procedure known as ‘jacketing’. This note
follows the inmate and allows authorities to
transfer him to a high-security facility. Hunt
et al (1993) describe a ‘debriefing’ technique.
This requires prison gang inmates to report
information about their gangs as a precondition
of release from a high-security facility. Staff

might use a threat of a transfer to high-security
facility unless the inmate divulges information.
The legality of this procedure remains
questionable and may threaten the life of an
inmate who has been, or is thought to have
been, debriefed.
The constitutionality of these policies has
been challenged in federal courts. The argument
behind these challenges is that secure housing
facilities are reserved for inmates responsible
for disciplinary infractions ranging from
minor malfeasance to major acts of violence.
Based on this logic, if a gang member has
not violated prison rules then they should
not be confined in a SHU; however, prison
policies systematically segregate and transfer
gang members to more secured settings (see
Toch, 2007). Prison officials contend that gang
members maintain an elevated propensity
for violence and that if all gang members
From the prison to the street
Re-entry
The prison boom over the last two decades has
forced policymakers and researchers alike to
turn their attention to prisoner re-entry. Lynch
and Sabol (2001, p6) reported that, from 1985

to 1995, the number of prisoners released into
society increased from 260,000 to 566,000.
These figures beg the question: what happens
to people once they are released from prison?
Once paroled or released, the institutional
controls over behaviour are removed, and
material benefits of imprisonment (housing,
food, activity, supervision, medication etc)
disappear. Forty years ago, Irwin (1970, p107)
observed that the ‘impact of release is dramatic
… The problems of the first weeks are usually
staggering and sometimes insurmountable
… and for many impossible’. The burden is
lessened for only a select few, but especially
among those with strong familial support
systems (Martinez, 2007). These challenges
remain today.
Given the prevalence of gang membership
in prison, it is logical to conclude that many
of those released from prisoners are gang
members. Should they return to their place
of last residence or to areas where they grew
up, it is likely that they will associate or
reconnect with their gang (see eg. Petersilia,
2003; Pyrooz et al, in press). While these
street gang members were in prison, their
gang allegiances may have changed and
the hierarchies, processes and behaviour of
their street gang will certainly have changed.
They return to a very different gang scene
than before they went to prison. A body of
risk factor research indicates that street and
prison gang members possess an array of

risk factors, ranging from poor education
to poor mental health to poor job skills to
poor social support in the community. In the
modern economy, where will former inmates,
with inadequate skills, personal problems,
grade school reading levels, and a history
of felony convictions and imprisonment, fit
in the marketplace? While opportunities for
legitimate employment appear slim (see eg.
Pager, 2003; Huebner, 2005), opportunities
for illegitimate money-generating activities
appear ubiquitous. For these reasons, it is not
surprising that former prisoners end up back
in prison, especially gang members.
inmates had been enrolled and 17 had been
returned to segregation for gang activities (Toller
& Tsagaris, 1996), although no details of the
programme’s evaluation were available.
Out-of-state transfers are a control strategy
that sends key prison gang members out of
state, in the hope of stopping or slowing a
prison gang’s activities. If a gang exists, officials
hope a transfer will disrupt its leadership and
activity and cause its elimination; however,
there has not been an evaluation of this
strategy to control gang activity. The United
States Department of Justice (1992) reported
that transfers may export gang activity to other
prisons. Correctional agencies have tried to
weaken prison gangs by assigning members
of different prison gangs to the same work
assignment and living quarters, in anticipation
of limiting the number – and thus the power
of one prison gang over another – at a specific

place. Illinois tried this approach to no avail,
because the inmate prison gang population
was too large to control effectively within a
few locations (United States Department of
Justice, 1992). Camp and Camp (1985) surveyed
facilities and asked officials which strategies
they were most likely to employ against prison
gangs. Transfer was cited by 27 of the 33
agencies; the use of informers was cited 21
times; prison gang member segregation was
cited 20 times; prison gang leader segregation
was cited 20 times; facility lockdown down
was cited 18 times; and vigorous prosecution
and interception of prison gang members’
communications was cited 16 times.
Knox (2000) shows that training for
correctional officers has improved, and that
over two-thirds of the 133 facilities surveyed
provided some gang training in 1999. Despite
this, only 20% of prison administra tors surveyed
by Knox (2005) indicated that they had
programming for gang members who wanted
to leave the gang. Correctional administrators
(Knox, 2005) identified six potential solutions to
make their institutions safer:
1. increased sanctions against gang members
2. special housing for gang members
3. new restrictions on benefits for prison
misconduct
4. new services for prison gang members

5. new policies to deal with prison gang
members
6. increased staffing and resources.
were not only more likely to recidivate, but also
recidivate more quickly, than drug-dependents.
Huebner et al (2007, p208) concluded that gang
membership proves to be a ‘difficult barrier
to overcome and [has] important effects on the
timing of post release convictions’. The obstacles
faced by those who are released from prison
are substantial; such obstacles are significantly
greater for gang members.
In an experimental study, Di Placido et
al (2006) examined the effectiveness of high
intensity cognitive behavioural programmes on
gang member recidivism. Using data on 1,824
male adult offenders drawn from the Regional
Psychiatric Centre, a mental health hospital in
Canada, the researchers matched treated and
untreated gang and non-gang members on
age, race, criminal history and conviction type
(ie. a 2X2 design; N=160). Treated subjects
experienced programming that targeted
criminogenic attitudes and beliefs, aggression
and substance use, as well as educational and
life skills when appropriate. The follow-up

period for the subjects was two years. Twenty-
five per cent of the treated gang members
recidivated, compared to 40% of the untreated
gang members and 35% of the non-gang treated
and untreated subjects. Further, among those
recidivating, the untreated gang members
received the longest sentences (33 months),
whereas treated gang members (12 months),
treated non-gang members (seven months)
and untreated non-gang members (11 months)
received around one-third of the sentence. At
a cost of $100,000 for an eight-month stay,
the authors maintained that treatment would
outweigh the social and economic costs of
doing nothing.
Conclusion
This review has documented the substantial
magnitude of the problem posed by
incarcerated gang members. Gang members
enter prison with very high levels of crime in
their background. They are more prone to be
involved in violence, have weak community
ties, have low integration into conventional
society and possess deficits that impede their
progress in the employment market. Once in
prison, opportunities for involvement in crime
abound. Whether by affiliating with members of
their own gang, neighborhood or new prison
Recidivism
State and federal prisons have the responsibility
to ‘correct’ the behavioural problems prisoners
import into prison. Because prisons stand
outside the mainstream of American cultural and

behavioural patterns, it is important that they
do not further isolate already marginal men and
women. It is also argued that communities have
little concern for prisoners’ families and the
well-being of prisoners once they are released
to the community. Some (DuPont-Morales and
Harris 1994) call such disregard ‘lackadaisical’
and a ‘damaging mistake’ (see also Tonry,
2004). Logan and Gaes (1993) contend that
prison’s primary role focuses on the fair
governance of prison institutions but does not
extend to the rehabilitation and reintegration
of former prisoners into the community. Others
contend that prison system performance can
be best measured by the lawful behaviour
of released prisoners (eg. Harding, 2001).
Correctional funding data precisely define
the prisons’ legislatively prescribed role: state
governments pay for security officers but not
for teachers, psychologists, treatment specialists,
mental health care or even basic constitutional
requirements for medical care systems (see, for
example, Plata et al v. Schwarzenegger et al,
2006). Prison staff cannot control, influence or
moderate the behaviour of released prisoners
any more than physicians can control the calorie
intake of obese patients outside of hospitals
and treatment centres. Despite this, recidivism
among former inmates remains a large issue.
Two studies have examined the effect of
gang membership on recidivism. Olson and
Dooley (2006) used data gathered from 3,364
probationers discharged from supervision and
2,534 prison releases/parolees in Illinois. Six
per cent of the probation sample and 24% of

the prison sample were reportedly gang active.
They found that within two years, 64% of gang
probationers (compared to 30% of non-gang
probationers) and 75% of gang prison releases/
parolees (compared to 65% of non-gang
releases/parolees) were rearrested for a new
crime. Huebner et al (2007) examined a sample
of 322 young male subjects released from prison
in a Midwestern state, using more sophisticated
analyses. Gang members comprised 37% of the
sample. Contrary to Olson and Dooley’s (2006)
findings, gang members were twice as likely
to be convicted; however, a five-year window
was allotted for reconviction. Gang members
on the street before entering prison. Fourth,
when leaving prison, gang members find a
changed landscape in their communities and
the gangs that they once belonged to. Finally,
as a consequence of this, gang members have
among the highest risks for return to prison.
While considerable effort is expended on
prevention of gang membership, promoting
gang desistance on the part of gang members
leaving prison needs careful scrutiny.
The existing knowledge base does offer the
basis to reflect on several theoretical issues of
importance to understanding the relationship

between prison gangs and the street. First, the
contrast between importation versus adaptation
remains salient. Clearly, the individuals who end
up in prison bring a large amount of ‘baggage’
with them. This baggage includes educational
and employment deficits, a history of substance
abuse, negative family relationships, and
friendships with peers who violate the law on
a regular basis, among other things. For a new
inmate, the presence of prior gang membership
also means that they have a ready source of
enemies and allies as they navigate their way
through prison life. The deficits imported
to prison by gang members are likely to be
greater than those of non-gang members,
largely because of the increased involvement
in crime – especially violent crime – that gang
membership brings with it. Prison socialisation
can be contrasted to importation. Clearly prisons
have their own cultures and subcultures, and
these can be powerful forces in shaping the
behaviour of inmates, choking off legitimate
opportunities for change, and opening doors to
misconduct within prison (Griffin & Hepburn,
2006). The street alliances and history that gang
members bring with them to prison makes their
socialisation into prison more difficult as they
bring a set of ready-made enemies through the
door of the prison. Yet, in prison, their street
gang alliance may neither protect them from
rivals nor provide easy alliances. But clearly,
street gang members are more likely to be
socialised into prison gang culture, owing to
their familiarity with ‘the life’ and commitment
generally to the norms of oppositional culture.
We believe that the life course conceptual

framework offered by Thornberry et al (2003)
can be integrated into an understanding of
prison gangs (see DeLisi et al, in press).
Importation clearly is related to the importation
model of prison culture described by Clemmer
gangs, gang members engage in higher levels
of institutional misconduct. This misconduct can
take a variety of forms, including but not limited
to violence, extortion and the sale of drugs
and other contraband. The presence of white
hate groups in prison exacerbates institutional
tensions and conflicts in prison, multiplying the
opportunities for misconduct and the longer
prison sentences and isolation that accompany
such behaviour. Such patterns of conduct further
insulate gang members from opportunities to
learn skills and to have experiences that will
help them transition to legitimate society. As
a consequence of prison misconduct, there
are few programming opportunities directed
specifically at gang members. They are more
often the target of segregation, jacketing or
isolation, activities that may (or may not,
as our review documents) make it easier to
manage prisons, but are not likely to improve
the chances of gang members successfully
transitioning from the prison to the street. When
gang members are released back into their
communities, they find a different environment
in many ways. The labour market is certainly
dynamic and demands new skills, skills many
gang members lack entering prison and fail
to accumulate while in prison. The criminal
landscape, along with the power relationships
among and within gangs, also changes. A gang

‘leader’ who is incarcerated for several years
may return to their community only to find that
their gang has been absorbed into a new gang
with new leaders and new activities. Worse
yet, gang members returning from prison may
not be known by a new ‘generation’ of gang
members, as ‘generations’ of gang members turn
over with great frequency.
We know far more about how gang
members get from ‘the street to the prison’ and
far less about how they get from ‘the prison
to the street’. The evidence that does exist is
only suggestive, but several conclusions can be
drawn. First, gang members are ‘hard cases’;
that is, they are likely to become the targets
of institutional control through misconduct,
disciplinary hearings, segregation and
‘jacketing’. Second, and as a consequence of
such behaviour, they are isolated from routine
programming, educational and employment
opportunities available to the general prison
population. Third, while in prison gang
members are likely to form new alliances with
prison gangs that differ than the ones they had
Curry GD & Decker SH (2003) Confronting Gangs: Crime
and community (2nd edition). Los Angeles: Roxbury.

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Decker SH & Pyrooz DC (2010) Gang violence
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Decker SH & Van Winkle B (1996) Life in the Gang:
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DeLisi M, Berg MT & Hochstetler A (2004) Gang
members, career criminals and prison violence: further
specification of the importation model of inmate
behavior. Criminal Justice Studies 17 369–383.
DeLisi M, Trulson CR, Marquart JW, Drury AJ &
Kosloski AE (in press) Inside the prison black
box: toward a life course importation model of
inmate behavior. International Journal of Offender
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DuPont-Morales MA & Harris JE (1994) Strengthening
accountability: incorporating strategic planning and
performance measurement into budgeting. Public

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