This document analyzes electricity theft in Uttar Pradesh, India from 2000-2009 using data from the state power corporation. The key findings are:
1. Electricity theft is substantial in magnitude in Uttar Pradesh.
2. Theft varies with the state's electoral cycle, with more theft occurring in years when state assembly elections are held.
3. Theft increases with the number of tubewells used by farmers for irrigation, suggesting it is linked to unmetered agricultural electricity use.
Electricity theft in India constitutes a significant portion of total losses, around 40%, which leads to higher electricity prices for consumers. Prepayment metering systems help address this issue by allowing consumers to purchase electricity up front like a commodity. Under this system, the consumption data is communicated to the supplier via antennas on the meters and poles, allowing consumers to better budget their usage while reducing losses and prices for utilities and consumers overall.
*Many developing countries confront widespread theft of electricity from government owned power utilities.
*In India electricity theft leads to annual losses estimated at USA $4.5 billion, about 1.5 percent of GDP.
*Honest consumers, poor people and those without connections bear system inefficiencies and inadequate and unreliable power supply are the losers due to power theft
Electricity theft is a major issue for India's power industry, resulting in estimated annual losses of $4.5 billion or 1.5% of GDP. Theft occurs through tampering with meters, bypassing meters, illegal wiring taps, and billing irregularities. Some common technical solutions to reduce theft include electronic tamper detection meters, pre-payment meters, plastic meter enclosures, anti-theft cabling, and using technologies like GSM and PLCs to monitor electricity distribution networks. Non-technical approaches also aim to increase accountability and enforcement of laws against electricity theft.
Electricity theft impacts utilities by lacking funds to operate, lacking exposure to new technologies, and enabling corruption. It occurs when illegal consumers steal directly from lines or legal customers, or when legal customers tamper with or bypass meters. Technical solutions include electronic tamper detection meters, pre-payment meters, plastic meter encasements, automatic meter reading systems, and anti-theft cables. If successful in avoiding power theft, there will be less scarcity of power utilization.
Webinar: Under Lock & Key; Theft Protection in Today's Utility Marketplace IUSTechnologies
The document discusses the issue of electricity theft globally and provides solutions. It finds that electricity theft is a major global problem, with some countries experiencing losses of up to 50% due to theft. In the US, theft amounts to $6 billion in losses annually for utilities. Theft occurs through illegal connections, unbilled consumption, non-payment, and bypassing meters. Grow houses are a growing problem. Solutions proposed include smart meters, end-of-line monitoring, public outreach, legal measures, and stricter regulations.
Wireless power theft monitering systemAshwin Gowda
This document describes a wireless power theft monitoring system. The system uses a microcontroller interfaced with an energy metering circuit, current sensing circuit, and RF communication link to detect power theft. If current is being drawn but the energy meter is not registering usage, the microcontroller trips the output using a relay. This information is wirelessly sent to a PC at the substation to identify the house where power theft occurred. The system aims to help electricity boards reduce power losses and lower costs by preventing theft.
The document describes an electrical power theft detection system that uses a GSM network. It detects unauthorized tapping on distribution lines by comparing pulse counts from the energy meter to a reference value before the meter. If a difference above a set limit is detected, the system disconnects the load and sends a "Power Theft Alert" message via GSM to authorized contacts. The system protects distribution networks from theft using wireless data transmission and receiving techniques.
This document describes a proposed system for wirelessly monitoring power theft. A microcontroller would be interfaced with a meter and sensors to detect abnormal power usage. If power theft is detected, it would trigger a relay to cut power and send a wireless message to alert authorities. The goal is to reduce losses from power theft by identifying exact locations of theft in real-time.
Electricity theft in India constitutes a significant portion of total losses, around 40%, which leads to higher electricity prices for consumers. Prepayment metering systems help address this issue by allowing consumers to purchase electricity up front like a commodity. Under this system, the consumption data is communicated to the supplier via antennas on the meters and poles, allowing consumers to better budget their usage while reducing losses and prices for utilities and consumers overall.
*Many developing countries confront widespread theft of electricity from government owned power utilities.
*In India electricity theft leads to annual losses estimated at USA $4.5 billion, about 1.5 percent of GDP.
*Honest consumers, poor people and those without connections bear system inefficiencies and inadequate and unreliable power supply are the losers due to power theft
Electricity theft is a major issue for India's power industry, resulting in estimated annual losses of $4.5 billion or 1.5% of GDP. Theft occurs through tampering with meters, bypassing meters, illegal wiring taps, and billing irregularities. Some common technical solutions to reduce theft include electronic tamper detection meters, pre-payment meters, plastic meter enclosures, anti-theft cabling, and using technologies like GSM and PLCs to monitor electricity distribution networks. Non-technical approaches also aim to increase accountability and enforcement of laws against electricity theft.
Electricity theft impacts utilities by lacking funds to operate, lacking exposure to new technologies, and enabling corruption. It occurs when illegal consumers steal directly from lines or legal customers, or when legal customers tamper with or bypass meters. Technical solutions include electronic tamper detection meters, pre-payment meters, plastic meter encasements, automatic meter reading systems, and anti-theft cables. If successful in avoiding power theft, there will be less scarcity of power utilization.
Webinar: Under Lock & Key; Theft Protection in Today's Utility Marketplace IUSTechnologies
The document discusses the issue of electricity theft globally and provides solutions. It finds that electricity theft is a major global problem, with some countries experiencing losses of up to 50% due to theft. In the US, theft amounts to $6 billion in losses annually for utilities. Theft occurs through illegal connections, unbilled consumption, non-payment, and bypassing meters. Grow houses are a growing problem. Solutions proposed include smart meters, end-of-line monitoring, public outreach, legal measures, and stricter regulations.
Wireless power theft monitering systemAshwin Gowda
This document describes a wireless power theft monitoring system. The system uses a microcontroller interfaced with an energy metering circuit, current sensing circuit, and RF communication link to detect power theft. If current is being drawn but the energy meter is not registering usage, the microcontroller trips the output using a relay. This information is wirelessly sent to a PC at the substation to identify the house where power theft occurred. The system aims to help electricity boards reduce power losses and lower costs by preventing theft.
The document describes an electrical power theft detection system that uses a GSM network. It detects unauthorized tapping on distribution lines by comparing pulse counts from the energy meter to a reference value before the meter. If a difference above a set limit is detected, the system disconnects the load and sends a "Power Theft Alert" message via GSM to authorized contacts. The system protects distribution networks from theft using wireless data transmission and receiving techniques.
This document describes a proposed system for wirelessly monitoring power theft. A microcontroller would be interfaced with a meter and sensors to detect abnormal power usage. If power theft is detected, it would trigger a relay to cut power and send a wireless message to alert authorities. The goal is to reduce losses from power theft by identifying exact locations of theft in real-time.
This document proposes a power theft detection system consisting of a transformer type detection system, smart wireless transmitter and receiver, and display. It aims to reduce energy wastage by detecting power theft without human control in order to save time and labor costs, and maximize profits for the electricity authority. Power theft is currently estimated at 30% in Nepal and negatively impacts customers, grids, and the national economy. The proposed automated system would help monitor customers and identify theft through a methodology involving power supply, rectification, encoding, transmission, reception, decoding, and display of information.
This document presents the concept of a wireless power theft monitoring system to address the problem of power theft in Uganda. Power theft results in significant financial losses for utility providers annually. The proposed system would detect power theft using current sensors before and after the meter to compare voltages and detect discrepancies. If theft is detected, power would be disconnected and a message sent via GSM to notify authorities. The document outlines the types of power losses, methods of theft, details of the prototype designed and tested, and concludes that implementing such a system could help reduce losses from theft.
WIRELESS POWER THEFT MONITORING SYSTEMvivatechijri
Power larceny is the sizably voluminous quandary now days which causes immensely colossal loss to electricity boards. And to surmount these losses prices are incremented. So if we can obviate this larceny we can preserve lots of potency. The mundane practice for power larceny is to short input output terminals or to place magnet on the wheel in case of old meters. In this system a micro controller is interfaced with an energy metering circuit current sensing circuit, RF communication & a contactor to make or break power line. If current is drawing & energy pulses are mundane then no puissance is larceny. If current is drawing & energy pulses are not coming then it designates power larceny. So microcontroller trip the o/p utilizing relay. This information is sent to substation utilizing wireless communication. Line faults may be caused due to over current or earth fault. If there transpires to be a connection between two phase lines then over current fault occurs. Earth fault occurs due to the earthing of phase line through cross arm or any other way.
This document proposes a microcontroller-based wireless power theft monitoring system. The system architecture includes wireless sensor nodes that measure power consumption at transformers and along transmission lines, and report the data to a central control station. The sensor nodes communicate via Zigbee wireless technology. By comparing measured and reported power values, the system can detect differences indicating power theft or transmission line faults. The system aims to reduce power losses from theft and improve energy monitoring in India's electrical grid.
EPIRA led to electricity rates more than doubling in the Philippines over 10 years. The law failed to cancel unfair contracts and introduced new fees. It also led to industry consolidation with just three groups now dominating distribution. NAPOCOR remained heavily indebted, paying $18 billion to cover previous financial obligations. Energy security also remained precarious with brownouts occurring due to plant shutdowns and lack of new capacity expansion.
The document defines quality for distribution companies in Pakistan based on a quality model with three aspects: (1) continuity of supply, (2) commercial relationship, and (3) voltage quality. It analyzes scenarios in Pakistan related to each aspect. Continuity of supply has high interruptions due to generation shortages. Commercial relationships have issues with tariffs, billing, and slow service connections. Voltage quality causes equipment damage due to fluctuations beyond limits.
An efficient and improved model for power theft detection in PakistanjournalBEEI
This paper describes an improved model for the monitoring of power used by a party such as household users and different industries in Pakistan. The power theft detection was done using the intelligent internet of things (IoT) service system for calculating the user's power simultaneously. The power meter catches a theft detection device that is instantly transmitted to the central system which compares both the data by means of microcontroller and if there is any difference found, it informs the power utility about the hooking, meter relief or theft activities happen. Information of the theft detection through the global mobile communications system is transmitted and notified theft is displayed on the terminal monitor or won. As a result, although consumers continue to use excess fuel, the customer's power supply is cut in the electricity boards segment. The general radio package module system sends central circuit and meter data via an internet protocol address to a web server. GSM's IoT based perception is used to monitor the power supply and billing information calculated with a microcontroller continuously with the determination of the electricity table area. With this unit, the duplicate user can be located at the rear of the electricity office with the power meter status.
This document proposes a solution to remotely detect illegal electricity usage through power line communications (PLC). It introduces PLC and automatic meter reading (AMR) systems. It then describes common methods of illegally obtaining electricity before detailing a detection system that adds PLC modems and energy meter chips to existing AMR infrastructure to monitor for discrepancies between distribution and subscriber lines that could indicate theft or tampering.
Debasis Mohanty gave a presentation on wireless charging. Wireless charging uses electromagnetic induction to transfer power through induction coils, allowing devices to charge without being plugged in. There are three main types of wireless charging: resonance, inductive, and radio frequency. Wireless charging works through an oscillator circuit that creates a magnetic field between transmitter and receiver coils to charge a device's battery. While convenient, wireless charging is currently slower and more expensive than wired charging. Potential applications include charging pads for mobile devices and electric vehicles.
Does Energy Deregulation Affect Your Household?Shop My Power
Regulation of the energy industry began to ensure a reliable supply of electricity but led to monopolies that raised prices. Deregulation laws passed in the 1970s introduced competition which has led to lower costs and more choice for consumers. Consumers can now choose their energy provider and have influenced companies to offer cleaner energy sources. Deregulation has given consumers both economic and personal freedom in the energy marketplace.
On Going research on Problems Faced In smart grid in general. Yet Work is in progress Just a light notes on General issues in smart grid, Technically work is to be on target in smart grid.
This document discusses the benefits of passive harmonic filters over active harmonic filters. It states that active filters only mitigate harmonics at the main panel and utility transformer, but harmful harmonics still circulate inside the electrical system. Active filters also consume energy and require complex electronics that are prone to failure in tropical conditions. Passive filters, on the other hand, mitigate harmonics at the source so they do not circulate in the system and damage equipment. Passive filters have no electronics, are durable lasting 10-15 years, save energy with payback periods of less than 1 year, and completely mitigate harmonics inside the electrical system in accordance with industry standards.
Smart india ,smart infra,smart ev road transportation vehicles smart city and...Mahesh Chandra Manav
Presentation for Smart India-Smart Road Transportation-Smart Cities-Smart Pole . Usefull Segment Architect, MEP ,Electrical Project Consultants, EV Public Car Charging Station, Solar PV and High Energy Storage Battery Systems , MNRE,SECI,NSM ARAI,DHI,Niti Aayog ,OEM EV Vehicles Two/Three/Four Wheeler and Bus Manufacturer and Their Charging Station Infrastructure
The Indian Electricity Rules were established in 1956 under the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 to regulate the safe generation, transmission, supply and use of electricity. The governing body is now the Central Electricity Authority. The rules cover licensing, safety requirements, supply conditions and precautions for overhead lines, underground cables, generating stations and more. Key safety rules address switches on live conductors, circuit protection, and clearances for overhead lines from buildings and the ground. The rules aim to ensure the safe use of electricity for all.
This document discusses open access power purchase in India. Open access allows for the non-discriminatory use of transmission and distribution systems by licensees, consumers, and generators. It describes bilateral transactions for buying and selling power as well as collective transactions through power exchanges like IEX. Requirements for open access include installation of specialized meters, available transmission capacity, a contract demand over 1 MW, payment security, and no pending legal issues. Cost analyses are provided for purchasing 1 MW of power through IEX daily bidding and a bilateral fixed tariff agreement.
Electricity theft, also known as power theft, is a significant problem that results in major financial losses for electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs). There are various methods of electricity theft including meter tampering, illegal connections, billing irregularities, and unpaid bills. Electricity theft is often linked to corruption within the DISCOM and poor corporate governance. Reducing theft requires technical solutions like advanced metering as well as managerial reforms and a crackdown on corruption. The author recommends that DISCOMs thoroughly analyze theft in their systems, invest in upgrading infrastructure, implement strict anti-theft policies, and reform practices to improve transparency and accountability in order to effectively address the problem of electricity theft.
IRJET- Investigation of Various Power Quality Issues & its Solution in Gr...IRJET Journal
This document discusses various power quality issues that can occur in grid-connected distributed power systems and their potential solutions. It defines power quality and lists several common power quality issues including voltage sags, swells, fluctuations, interruptions, harmonics, flicker, and unbalances. For each issue, it provides a definition and description of the potential causes and impacts. The goal of the paper is to investigate these power quality problems and discuss their possible solutions to help suppliers, distributors and consumers of electricity maintain a clean and stable power supply.
POWER ELECTRONICS BASED AUTONUMOUS POWER SYSTEMSKLUniversity
This document discusses autonomous power systems enabled by power electronics. It first defines an autonomous region as one that can govern itself. It then discusses how power electronics can enable autonomous power systems by allowing inverters to operate as virtual synchronous generators, as in one technical route, or through robust droop control technology in another route. The document notes challenges with conventional droop control and how more robust droop control can address issues like parameter drift through additions like an integrator and output voltage feedback. It aims to explore technical routes for autonomous power systems.
This document provides an overview of Vinay Vashisht's industrial training project report on the 33/11 kV substation in Uttarkashi, Uttarakhand Power Corporation Ltd. The report includes acknowledgments, contents, and sections covering an overview of UPCL, training at the Uttarkashi substation, transformers, substation components like earthing materials and bus bars, protection equipment, and protection against lightning. It provides technical details and specifications of the equipment at the substation.
It is a presentation about GIS in RAPDRP project. DISCOM can use GIS tools and data for their betterment to navigation towards their electrical assets & for calculation of AT&C losses.
This document proposes a power theft detection system consisting of a transformer type detection system, smart wireless transmitter and receiver, and display. It aims to reduce energy wastage by detecting power theft without human control in order to save time and labor costs, and maximize profits for the electricity authority. Power theft is currently estimated at 30% in Nepal and negatively impacts customers, grids, and the national economy. The proposed automated system would help monitor customers and identify theft through a methodology involving power supply, rectification, encoding, transmission, reception, decoding, and display of information.
This document presents the concept of a wireless power theft monitoring system to address the problem of power theft in Uganda. Power theft results in significant financial losses for utility providers annually. The proposed system would detect power theft using current sensors before and after the meter to compare voltages and detect discrepancies. If theft is detected, power would be disconnected and a message sent via GSM to notify authorities. The document outlines the types of power losses, methods of theft, details of the prototype designed and tested, and concludes that implementing such a system could help reduce losses from theft.
WIRELESS POWER THEFT MONITORING SYSTEMvivatechijri
Power larceny is the sizably voluminous quandary now days which causes immensely colossal loss to electricity boards. And to surmount these losses prices are incremented. So if we can obviate this larceny we can preserve lots of potency. The mundane practice for power larceny is to short input output terminals or to place magnet on the wheel in case of old meters. In this system a micro controller is interfaced with an energy metering circuit current sensing circuit, RF communication & a contactor to make or break power line. If current is drawing & energy pulses are mundane then no puissance is larceny. If current is drawing & energy pulses are not coming then it designates power larceny. So microcontroller trip the o/p utilizing relay. This information is sent to substation utilizing wireless communication. Line faults may be caused due to over current or earth fault. If there transpires to be a connection between two phase lines then over current fault occurs. Earth fault occurs due to the earthing of phase line through cross arm or any other way.
This document proposes a microcontroller-based wireless power theft monitoring system. The system architecture includes wireless sensor nodes that measure power consumption at transformers and along transmission lines, and report the data to a central control station. The sensor nodes communicate via Zigbee wireless technology. By comparing measured and reported power values, the system can detect differences indicating power theft or transmission line faults. The system aims to reduce power losses from theft and improve energy monitoring in India's electrical grid.
EPIRA led to electricity rates more than doubling in the Philippines over 10 years. The law failed to cancel unfair contracts and introduced new fees. It also led to industry consolidation with just three groups now dominating distribution. NAPOCOR remained heavily indebted, paying $18 billion to cover previous financial obligations. Energy security also remained precarious with brownouts occurring due to plant shutdowns and lack of new capacity expansion.
The document defines quality for distribution companies in Pakistan based on a quality model with three aspects: (1) continuity of supply, (2) commercial relationship, and (3) voltage quality. It analyzes scenarios in Pakistan related to each aspect. Continuity of supply has high interruptions due to generation shortages. Commercial relationships have issues with tariffs, billing, and slow service connections. Voltage quality causes equipment damage due to fluctuations beyond limits.
An efficient and improved model for power theft detection in PakistanjournalBEEI
This paper describes an improved model for the monitoring of power used by a party such as household users and different industries in Pakistan. The power theft detection was done using the intelligent internet of things (IoT) service system for calculating the user's power simultaneously. The power meter catches a theft detection device that is instantly transmitted to the central system which compares both the data by means of microcontroller and if there is any difference found, it informs the power utility about the hooking, meter relief or theft activities happen. Information of the theft detection through the global mobile communications system is transmitted and notified theft is displayed on the terminal monitor or won. As a result, although consumers continue to use excess fuel, the customer's power supply is cut in the electricity boards segment. The general radio package module system sends central circuit and meter data via an internet protocol address to a web server. GSM's IoT based perception is used to monitor the power supply and billing information calculated with a microcontroller continuously with the determination of the electricity table area. With this unit, the duplicate user can be located at the rear of the electricity office with the power meter status.
This document proposes a solution to remotely detect illegal electricity usage through power line communications (PLC). It introduces PLC and automatic meter reading (AMR) systems. It then describes common methods of illegally obtaining electricity before detailing a detection system that adds PLC modems and energy meter chips to existing AMR infrastructure to monitor for discrepancies between distribution and subscriber lines that could indicate theft or tampering.
Debasis Mohanty gave a presentation on wireless charging. Wireless charging uses electromagnetic induction to transfer power through induction coils, allowing devices to charge without being plugged in. There are three main types of wireless charging: resonance, inductive, and radio frequency. Wireless charging works through an oscillator circuit that creates a magnetic field between transmitter and receiver coils to charge a device's battery. While convenient, wireless charging is currently slower and more expensive than wired charging. Potential applications include charging pads for mobile devices and electric vehicles.
Does Energy Deregulation Affect Your Household?Shop My Power
Regulation of the energy industry began to ensure a reliable supply of electricity but led to monopolies that raised prices. Deregulation laws passed in the 1970s introduced competition which has led to lower costs and more choice for consumers. Consumers can now choose their energy provider and have influenced companies to offer cleaner energy sources. Deregulation has given consumers both economic and personal freedom in the energy marketplace.
On Going research on Problems Faced In smart grid in general. Yet Work is in progress Just a light notes on General issues in smart grid, Technically work is to be on target in smart grid.
This document discusses the benefits of passive harmonic filters over active harmonic filters. It states that active filters only mitigate harmonics at the main panel and utility transformer, but harmful harmonics still circulate inside the electrical system. Active filters also consume energy and require complex electronics that are prone to failure in tropical conditions. Passive filters, on the other hand, mitigate harmonics at the source so they do not circulate in the system and damage equipment. Passive filters have no electronics, are durable lasting 10-15 years, save energy with payback periods of less than 1 year, and completely mitigate harmonics inside the electrical system in accordance with industry standards.
Smart india ,smart infra,smart ev road transportation vehicles smart city and...Mahesh Chandra Manav
Presentation for Smart India-Smart Road Transportation-Smart Cities-Smart Pole . Usefull Segment Architect, MEP ,Electrical Project Consultants, EV Public Car Charging Station, Solar PV and High Energy Storage Battery Systems , MNRE,SECI,NSM ARAI,DHI,Niti Aayog ,OEM EV Vehicles Two/Three/Four Wheeler and Bus Manufacturer and Their Charging Station Infrastructure
The Indian Electricity Rules were established in 1956 under the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 to regulate the safe generation, transmission, supply and use of electricity. The governing body is now the Central Electricity Authority. The rules cover licensing, safety requirements, supply conditions and precautions for overhead lines, underground cables, generating stations and more. Key safety rules address switches on live conductors, circuit protection, and clearances for overhead lines from buildings and the ground. The rules aim to ensure the safe use of electricity for all.
This document discusses open access power purchase in India. Open access allows for the non-discriminatory use of transmission and distribution systems by licensees, consumers, and generators. It describes bilateral transactions for buying and selling power as well as collective transactions through power exchanges like IEX. Requirements for open access include installation of specialized meters, available transmission capacity, a contract demand over 1 MW, payment security, and no pending legal issues. Cost analyses are provided for purchasing 1 MW of power through IEX daily bidding and a bilateral fixed tariff agreement.
Electricity theft, also known as power theft, is a significant problem that results in major financial losses for electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs). There are various methods of electricity theft including meter tampering, illegal connections, billing irregularities, and unpaid bills. Electricity theft is often linked to corruption within the DISCOM and poor corporate governance. Reducing theft requires technical solutions like advanced metering as well as managerial reforms and a crackdown on corruption. The author recommends that DISCOMs thoroughly analyze theft in their systems, invest in upgrading infrastructure, implement strict anti-theft policies, and reform practices to improve transparency and accountability in order to effectively address the problem of electricity theft.
IRJET- Investigation of Various Power Quality Issues & its Solution in Gr...IRJET Journal
This document discusses various power quality issues that can occur in grid-connected distributed power systems and their potential solutions. It defines power quality and lists several common power quality issues including voltage sags, swells, fluctuations, interruptions, harmonics, flicker, and unbalances. For each issue, it provides a definition and description of the potential causes and impacts. The goal of the paper is to investigate these power quality problems and discuss their possible solutions to help suppliers, distributors and consumers of electricity maintain a clean and stable power supply.
POWER ELECTRONICS BASED AUTONUMOUS POWER SYSTEMSKLUniversity
This document discusses autonomous power systems enabled by power electronics. It first defines an autonomous region as one that can govern itself. It then discusses how power electronics can enable autonomous power systems by allowing inverters to operate as virtual synchronous generators, as in one technical route, or through robust droop control technology in another route. The document notes challenges with conventional droop control and how more robust droop control can address issues like parameter drift through additions like an integrator and output voltage feedback. It aims to explore technical routes for autonomous power systems.
This document provides an overview of Vinay Vashisht's industrial training project report on the 33/11 kV substation in Uttarkashi, Uttarakhand Power Corporation Ltd. The report includes acknowledgments, contents, and sections covering an overview of UPCL, training at the Uttarkashi substation, transformers, substation components like earthing materials and bus bars, protection equipment, and protection against lightning. It provides technical details and specifications of the equipment at the substation.
It is a presentation about GIS in RAPDRP project. DISCOM can use GIS tools and data for their betterment to navigation towards their electrical assets & for calculation of AT&C losses.
This document provides a summary of a training report on a 33/11 KV substation in Lucknow, India. It discusses the types of transformers used in substations, including power transformers and instrument transformers. It also describes the specifications of current transformers used at the 33/11 KV substation. Finally, it discusses some of the key components and functions of substations, including bus bars, insulators, circuit breakers, metering equipment, protection devices, and transformers.
This document is a summer training report submitted to the National Power Training Institute and Maharishi Dayanand University. It details a project conducted with the Uttrakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited to calculate the aggregate technical and commercial losses of the Dakpathar Distribution Division and make recommendations to strengthen and upgrade the division. The report finds the AT&C losses of the division to be 50.83%, which is very high. It analyzes reasons for the high losses including inadequate infrastructure, lack of metering, illegal connections, and issues with billing and record keeping. Recommendations are provided to install meters, improve infrastructure, enforce policies for employee housing, pursue timely billing and collection, and increase investments to reduce
This document summarizes a summer training report analyzing aggregate technical and commercial (AT&C) losses in the Dakpathar Distribution Division (DDD) of Uttrakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited (UJVNL). The report determines DDD's current AT&C loss is 50.83%, which is very high compared to the national average of 24.15%. Several factors contribute to the high loss, including inadequate infrastructure, lack of meters, illegal connections, and billing/collection inefficiencies. The report provides recommendations to reduce losses such as improving employee tracking, replacing lines to prevent theft, installing meters, collecting fees for excess usage, and improving billing practices. Implementing these recommendations could reduce D
GSM based electricity theft contol system, it also intimates the concernded person when theft is happening. It sends messages about the unit consumed too.
Using Grid data analytics to protect revenue, reduce network losses and impro...Schneider Electric
Currently electricity losses are a significant issue for utilities totalling an estimated annual costs of over $200 billion and electricity theft is a worldwide problem but which varies depending on regions. These losses also have environmental impacts causing 1.200 M tonnes of CO2 emissions and wasting up to 8% of generation capacity annually.
T&D India (March 2017): Privatization not a cure-all, but still worth pursuingT&D India
In the entire power value chain, it is power distribution that has most singularities. While power generation and transmission are largely institution-related businesses, it is power distribution that interfaces with the end-consumer. All the commercial losses that are talked about in the power sector originate in power distribution. Even Smart Grid architecture has a bearing on power distribution, much more than power generation or transmission.
This document provides information on transmission and distribution (T&D) losses and Aggregate Technical and Commercial (AT&C) losses in the Indian power sector from 2001-2004. Some key points:
- T&D losses were historically overstated due to issues in accounting, and AT&C losses provide a clearer measure of efficiency by accounting for technical, commercial and collection losses.
- Many states showed improvements over this period, with some reducing AT&C losses below 25%, while others remained above 50%. Reform efforts focused on metering, energy auditing and establishing regulatory commissions.
- The Accelerated Power Development and Reforms Programme was launched to strengthen infrastructure and provide incentives to reduce cash losses from
The document discusses using programmable logic controllers (PLCs) installed with power meters to minimize power theft. PLCs connected to power meters via an optical fiber network can remotely monitor and control power usage. If payments are delinquent, power companies can stop supply from the networked meters. Installing PLC-enabled meters high on poles separates the measurement and display functions, preventing tampering while still allowing users to check usage.
Electricity theft is a major problem around the world, resulting in significant lost revenues for utilities. In India, around 27% of electricity is lost to theft, costing $16 billion per year. Brazil loses around 15% of its annual energy production to theft, amounting to over $8 billion in losses annually. In the United States, power theft costs an estimated $6 billion per year, with some individual utilities like Tampa Electric losing millions each year investigating cases of theft.
Detection and Instantaneous Prevention of Power TheftIOSR Journals
This document discusses methods for detecting and preventing power theft. It begins by outlining the problem of electricity theft in India, costing $17 billion annually. It then describes some common methods of theft, such as attaching magnets to meters or bypassing meters. The document presents a proposed circuit to detect two types of theft: phase bypassing and overloading. It includes block diagrams of the circuit and simulations of overload and phase bypass conditions. Upon detection, the circuit would instantly disconnect the main power supply. The circuit uses readily available components like optocouplers and relays in a cost-effective design. In conclusion, the circuit could help address the significant problem of power theft.
This document discusses methods for detecting and preventing power theft. It begins by outlining the problem of electricity theft in India, costing $17 billion annually. It then describes some common methods of theft, such as attaching magnets to meters or bypassing meters. The document presents a proposed circuit to detect two types of theft: phase bypassing and overloading. It includes block diagrams of the circuit and simulations of overload and phase bypass conditions. It concludes that the circuit can detect and instantly stop the supply in these theft situations, helping to reduce losses for electricity boards.
International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
Resurch parer on electricity online bill paymentdhananajay95
The document proposes a system for online electricity bill payment using SMS through a GSM network to allow for prepaid and postpaid payment schemes. It describes the current issues with the manual process for reading meters and processing bills. The proposed system would help reduce errors, allow customers to better monitor usage, and help reduce wastage of electricity.
The Energy Crisis of Nigeria An Overview and Implications for the FutureMichael Olafusi
The document provides an overview of Nigeria's energy crisis, which stems from structural problems across its energy system including hydropower, oil, natural gas, and its grid structure. The crisis is exacerbated by low governmental cooperation, public opposition to privatization efforts due to past negative experiences, and widespread use of unsafe fuelwood. To address this, Nigeria's 2003 energy policy aims to diversify energy sources and increase capacity from oil, natural gas, and renewables, while reducing dependence on fuelwood. However, progress has been limited due to social, political, and economic challenges.
1. Around 1.1 billion people globally lack access to electricity, most living in rural areas of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Some entrepreneurs are developing off-grid solar energy systems to provide power, with payments made via mobile phones in small, affordable installments.
2. Governments and utilities often cannot afford to expand power grids to rural areas. People are also reluctant to pay for electricity as a public good. New payment technologies and social programs aim to change attitudes and encourage payment.
3. Companies providing solar home systems on payment plans that are paid off over time are having success getting initially unwilling customers to pay for small amounts of renewable power. Their lessons could help make grid electricity more accessible and
A massive power outage in India left 600 million people without electricity and provided insights into potential failures in the United States. Key lessons from India's outage include: the importance of individual preparedness since people are highly reliant on electricity; the need for organizations and governments to have emergency plans and backup power; and the potential for social media to share information when official responses are limited. Maintaining and modernizing infrastructure will also be important to ensure resilient power grids in both countries.
The International Journal of Engineering & Science is aimed at providing a platform for researchers, engineers, scientists, or educators to publish their original research results, to exchange new ideas, to disseminate information in innovative designs, engineering experiences and technological skills. It is also the Journal's objective to promote engineering and technology education. All papers submitted to the Journal will be blind peer-reviewed. Only original articles will be published.
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https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/africa-programme/social-norms-and-accountable-governance
An Energy Fraud Detection Scheme for Power UtilitiesIJERA Editor
Energy fraud is when the consumer deliberately tries to deceive the utility. A common practice is to tamper with the meter so that a lower reading of power use is shown than is the case. This paper develops an automated energy fraud detection scheme for power utilities. In the scheme, when the mains is switched ON, input and output signals are compared to check for any discrepancies. When no discrepancy is recorded, a green LED will be ON until a discrepancy occurs. When a discrepancy is recorded, a red LED at the substation turns ON to notify the operator after which the consumer data will recorded. The nearest substation is then notified after all the data have been taken and the mains are turned OFF. The scheme saves time as well as helping to maximize profit margin for power utilities working in electrical distribution network. The scheme also assists utility companies to keep a constant eye on its customers.:
Eco green group utility overview presentation finalTony Green
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This document discusses financing options for rural infrastructure in India. It begins by laying out key attributes of rural infrastructure, such as economic parameters, decentralization possibilities, and interlinkages with funding issues. It then assesses the demand-supply gap that exists in various rural infrastructure services like water and sanitation, roads, irrigation, electricity, telecom, agro-processing, and marketing. Major gaps still exist in providing access to these essential services for rural populations. The document aims to understand prevailing financing options and identify new viable alternatives to bridge infrastructure gaps in rural areas of India.
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The International Journal of Engineering & Science is aimed at providing a platform for researchers, engineers, scientists, or educators to publish their original research results, to exchange new ideas, to disseminate information in innovative designs, engineering experiences and technological skills. It is also the Journal's objective to promote engineering and technology education. All papers submitted to the Journal will be blind peer-reviewed. Only original articles will be published.
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Prevalence of Electricity Power theft in Nueva Ecija II Electric Cooperative,...IJAEMSJORNAL
This research focused on the prevalence of electricity power theft in areas covered by NEECO II- Area 2. The data from the Special Energy Recovery Group (Apprehension Group) revealed that there were 386 apprehended electric pilferers from 2014-2016 and that the towns of Sta. Rosa and San Leonardo recorded the highest number of consumers and also have the highest number of electric pilferers as compared to other towns covered by NEECO II – Area 2. Among all the types of electric theft, the jumper is the most prevalent in areas covered by NEECO II – Area 2 from 2014-2016. Based on data available, the towns of Sta. Rosa registered the highest number of electric power theft by means of jumper (91) and illegal connection (30), followed by the town of Gen. Tinio (42), San Leonardo (32), Peñaranda (32), Bongabon (23), Gen. Natividad (16) and the rest of the towns are minimal in number. By comparing the total number of electric power theft regardless of its type, the year 2014 registered the highest number of violators (173) and significantly decrease in the year 2015 and 2016 (119 and 95, respectively) and up to August 2017 (39). Based on the computation from the Special Energy Recovery Group (Apprehension Group) and that of the Finance Department, the total non-technical losses occurred from 2014-2016 was 6.50 % and it is equivalent to P81,464,791.83 or on the average P2,292,910.88 per month. Losses can be even higher because the actual non-technical losses cannot be easily detected, meaning the apprehended party might consume higher than the average consumption because as being said, it is electric theft.
Prevalence of Electricity Power theft in Nueva Ecija II Electric Cooperative,...
Theft and loss of electricity
1. Theft and Loss of Electricity
in an Indian State1
Miriam Golden
University of California, Los Angeles
Princeton University
magolden@princeton.edu
Brian Min
University of Michigan
brianmin@umich.edu
January 4, 2012
Version 2.0.
Comments welcome.
Graphics require printing in color.
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2011 Annual Meetings of the American
Political Science Association, September 2–5, Seattle and at the 2nd IGC-ISI India Development
Policy Conference, December 19–20, 2011, ISI Delhi Center. For research assistance, we thank
Julia YuJung Lee. Funding was provided by the International Growth Centre and the Center for
International Business Education and Research at the University of California at Los Angeles. The
authors are solely responsible for the views presented here.
2. Abstract
Utilizing data from the power corporation of Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state,
we study the politics of electricity theft over a ten year period (2000–09). Our results
show that electricity theft is substantial in magnitude. The extent of theft varies with
the electoral cycle of the state. In years when elections to the State Assembly are held,
electricity theft is significantly greater than in other years. Theft is increasing with the
intensity of tubewells, suggesting that it is linked to unmetered electricity use by farmers.
Incumbent legislative members of the state assembly are more likely to be reelected as
power theft in their locality increases. Our interpretation of these various results is that
power theft exhibits characteristics consistent with the political capture of public service
delivery by local elites. Our results fail to substantiate that theft is linked either to political
criminality or is the product of weak institutions.
3. 1 Introduction
In many poor countries economic growth is hampered by inadequate and irregular supplies
of electricity. Indian firms ranked electricity problems as the number one issue facing their
businesses in the 2006 World Bank Enterprise Survey. The scarcity and unpredictable
supply of electricity are in part results of widespread theft, as well as lack of adequate
generating capacity. Given its high value, the relative ease with which it is diverted, and the
difficulty of identifying individual offenders, theft of electrical power is easily accomplished
as well as useful to enterprises and individuals. As a result, it is widespread across much of
the developing world. Power theft leads to lost government revenues, reducing the ability
of the public sector to pay for the maintenance of existing facilities or to invest in new
power generation; it places unexpected strains on already taxed and often inadequate
infrastructure, increasing the risk and frequency of power shortages; and it reduces the
availability of electricity to paying businesses and consumers. Where power is scarce, firms
and agricultural enterprises may offer bribes to government officials to divert electricity
illegally, or they may opt out of public sector energy delivery and install their own power
generators. The former potentially establishes persistent collusive and illicit ties between
businesses and government officials, whereas the latter reduces the stream of revenue to
government. If it is extensive, collusion between government, industry and agriculture
provides a political incentive to keep electricity supplies inadequate so that government
officials may continue to collect bribes. Estimating the extent of electricity theft, the nature
of any illicit ties between politicians, power sector bureaucrats, and users, and the political,
sectoral and geographic characteristics of users involved in theft is thus one step towards
identifying strategies that will ultimately reduce it to manageable levels.
We report results of an analysis of electricity theft in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s most
populous state. Using local data on power generation and payment receipts over a ten
1
4. year period from the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. (UPPCL), the state’s electricity
provider, we analyze the politics of where and when power theft occurs, who is involved,
and whether it appears linked to other criminal activities.
Our analysis is guided by considerations of political economy. We want to know
whether power theft is affected by elections, political parties, and the criminal status of
state legislators. The reasoning behind our analysis is that the political system controls
the institutions that ultimately prevent (or permit) the occurrence of large-scale power
theft. In some settings, institutions appear to be relatively effective in preventing such
abuses. For instance, widespread power theft is neither a known and noticeable problem
in North America or western Europe, nor in some developing countries. In these environ-
ments, power use is metered down to the individual household, it is difficult to tap into an
electricity line illegally, and bills are regularly issued for power used. Moreover, bills that
remain unpaid result in a suspension of service. For the interactions of the power corpora-
tion and consumers to be vastly different, as is the case in India, things must be different
at multiple points in the process. We seek to identify the specific aspects of the system of
energy transmission and bill collection that are vulnerable to malfeasance or leakage.
The most visible indication of energy theft occurs when users illegally tap into the
public supply. Throughout the less developed world, users without access to electricity
tap illegally into existing lines, as illustrated in the photograph displayed in Figure 1.
Unsanctioned connections to the grid are probably the numerically most frequent way
that electricity is stolen. These illegal connections are common and easily detached when
monitors or bill collectors arrive, although in some cases they are allowed to remain for
indefinite periods.
But although they are highly visible and very frequent, illegal hookups are unlikely to
be the largest source of energy loss. This instead stems from the two other main ways
that energy is sent out but not paid for: meter fraud and unmetered use. One way that
2
5. Figure 1: Illegally Tapping into the Power Line
Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4802248.stm>.
Copyright BBC.
3
6. meter fraud occurs is when the public utility meter reader is bribed to report an inaccurate
number, thereby effectively providing unpaid power to a consumer. This type of fraud is
apparently common in settings generally characterized by high levels of bureaucratic cor-
ruption, although as far as we are aware, there are no accurate estimates of its frequency.
Meter tampering is a second type of meter fraud that allows users more power than is paid
for. Standard electro-mechanical meters use a slowly spinning disk to record the amount
of power that is being drawn. The rotation of the disks can be slowed using magnets or by
impeding the disk mechanism with foreign objects — depositing spiders and spider eggs to
encourage web buildup is one known technique. Disk rotation can be stopped completely
by inserting small rocks, gum, or other obstructions. However, complete obstruction of a
meter is more likely to attract attention.
The third way that energy is lost is through excess unmetered use of electricity. Power
is unmetered in various settings. In urban areas, individual apartments may be unmetered,
with only a single meter serving a multifamily dwelling. Unmetered use is even more com-
mon in rural settings, where it may be difficult and expensive to install individual meters
and even more problematic to ensure that they are regularly and accurately read. As a
result, as Varshney (1998, p. 171) contends, ”agricultural consumers ... account for ap-
proximately 25 percent of total electricity consumption ... and are responsible for the bulk
of the power sector’s financial losses.” More recently, others have deepened the criticism,
arguing that “thanks to perverse subsidies under its flat system of electricity pricing, In-
dia’s booming groundwater irrigation economy has wrecked its energy economy” (Shah,
Giordano & Wang 2004, p. 3452).
India deliberately abandoned metering the power supply for agricultural irrigation in
the 1970s, as part of the Green Revolution strategy of switching to new high-yield crops,
which required regular water supplies. The provision of subsidized power to farmers was
considered a critical investment for improving the productivity of the agricultural sector.
4
7. Since the 1970s, Indian agricultural irrigation has involved flat rate connections with tariffs
set at the state level depending on the type of energy-utilizing equipment in place. In
the absence of technical enforcement mechanisms, the temptation to overdraw electrical
power beyond the contracted flat rate level can be high.
In the agricultural sector, electricity is used to power irrigation pumpsets or tubewells
to extract groundwater for crop watering. In many parts of the country that cannot rely
on rainfed crops, including Uttar Pradesh, low cost power represents one of the most
significant — and expensive — subsidies to the farming sector. Part of the subsidy is
effected through the pricing schemes adopted by government, but another part occurs
when electricity is sent out to irrigation equipment that encourages farmers to use more
than the maximum amounts they are allocated. In South Asia, some 14 million electric
tubewells pump water mainly for irrigation purposes without being metered (Shah, Scott,
Kishore & Sharma 2004, p. vi). Hence, the basic features of the environment that we study
in UP are exceedingly common to the region.
The main results of our analysis are as follows. First, we corroborate the common
perception that power theft in India in large in magnitude (Transparency International
India 2005). We document that in UP, theft is greatest in periods immediately prior to state
elections. Extending this line of argument, we document that incumbent members of the
state assembly are more likely to be reelected in areas where power theft is more extensive.
Power theft, we show, is most intense in the state’s most agricultural localities, suggesting
that theft is largely due to unmetered agricultural use. The natural interpretation is that
farmers simply exceed their allotted maximums when more energy is supplied. Perhaps
as a result, power theft is not related to specific markers of political criminality. We find
little in our data suggestive of persistent collusive illegal networks linking politicians and
users. While we know that individual meter readers accept bribes to underreport the
amount of electricity used, the aggregate effects of this appear relatively small. Instead,
5
8. our findings are consistent with the view that relatively well-off farmers — those who own
electric tubewells — comprise a powerful interest group to whose interests democratically
elected state legislators are particularly sensitive. As those farmers with the wealth to own
tubewells comprise a rural elite, our results are consistent with a literature that argues that
public service provision is liable to political capture by local elites (Bardhan & Mookherjee
2000).
Our paper proceeds in seven parts. First, we briefly review related literature. Second,
we present four sets of hypotheses that we study. Third, we describe some basic character-
istics of electricity use in Uttar Pradesh and, fourth, we describe our dataset. A fifth section
provides descriptive statistics and a sixth, the results of statistical estimations of our four
sets of hypotheses. A final section offers concluding thoughts.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to studies of the political business cycle in subnational units (examples
include Baleiras & Costa (2004), Drazen & Eslava (2005), Mouriuen (2007)), which grew
out of studies of the political business cycle at the national level (Nordhaus 1975, Tufte
1980). Various papers show that municipal level elected officials manipulate aspects of the
local political economy prior to elections in order to improve their chances of reelection.
Of particular relevance is Khemani (2004), which documents state-level electorally sensi-
tive targeting of advantage to special interests in India. Also important for our purposes
is Shi & Svensson (2006), which finds that the political business cycle is larger in less
developed than in developed countries, suggesting that elected officials are under greater
pressure to manipulate the economy prior to elections in poorer countries. This may take
forms that would not be encountered in developed economies. Burgess, Hansen, Olken,
Potapov & Sieber (2011) identity “political logging cycles“ in Indonesia, where illegal log-
6
9. ging increases substantially in the years prior to local elections.
A large related literature on political corruption is also relevant (Rose-Ackerman 1999,
Johnston 2006, Treisman 2007), especially studies that document that corruption rises
or declines according to the reelection incentives of local politicians (Ferraz 2006). The
only study of which we are aware that specifically studies energy theft as a problem of
corruption is Smith (2004). This cross-national study of transmission and distribution
(T&D) losses in energy transmission finds that the extent of such losses is highly corre-
lated with corruption in general, as well as weaknesses in accountability and institutional
performance.
Our study draws on a large literature on the politics of public goods provision, as well
as a small literature that studies the political economy of electricity provision in particu-
lar. The former is exceedingly vast; for a relevant review, see Golden & Min (Forthcoming
2012). The main result of the distributive politics literature is to underscore that pub-
lic officials use electoral criteria in the allocation of public and government goods and
services rather than utilizing strictly welfare maximizing criteria. There is considerable
national and local variation in how this occurs, however, in part because features of elec-
toral competition differ. As regards electricity provision, Brown & Mobarak (2009) show
that in poorer countries, democratic political institutions shift electricity provision from
the industrial sector to households, whereas authoritarian institutions favor industry. Min
(2010) documents partisan effects in electricity provision in Uttar Pradesh. Other studies,
including Bernard, Gordon & Tremblay (1997), show that electricity prices may be politi-
cally manipulated for electoral ends, in line with the general distributive politics theme. In
a paper especially related to this one, Badiani & Jessoe (2011) show that the well-known
price subsidies to Indian agriculture for electricity are partially due to political capture;
subsidies increase significantly in the year prior to an election.
Finally, our study is informed by a theoretical literature on policy distortions due to
7
10. capture by special interests (Grossman & Helpman 2002, Bardhan & Mookherjee 2000).
3 Hypotheses Explored in the Study
We seek to understand variations in line loss across sectors, geographic units, and years
in Uttar Pradesh. Drawing on existing literature for our hypotheses, we use a variety of
statistical techniques to study the following four questions:
1. Does line loss increase in electoral periods?
2. Is line loss greater for important socio-economic interests, especially agriculture?
3. Is line loss electorally beneficial to state assembly members?
4. Is line loss greater in geographic areas whose elected representatives are under self-
reported criminal indictment?
We provide details about the specific estimation techniques used for each of these later
in the paper.
4 Electricity in Uttar Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh is India’s largest state, with a population of 190 million people in an area
about half the size of California. If it were a country, it would have the fifth largest pop-
ulation in the world. According to World Bank estimates, it is home to 8 percent of the
world’s poor. As the map presented in Figure 2 shows, UP sits in the center of northern
India.
All electricity transmissions and distribution in the state is controlled by the Uttar
Pradesh Power Corporation (UPPCL). The UPPCL was formed in 2000 as a result of power
8
11. Figure 2: The State of Uttar Pradesh in India
Uttar Pradesh
9
12. sector reforms and the unbundling of the state electricity boards across India. However,
UPPCL remains a state-owned entity. Its workers are state employees and its key leader-
ship positions are filled by political appointees. The managing director of UPPCL is drawn
from the Indian Administrative Service.
Compared to a baseline estimated demand of between 7.5 and 9 gigawatts (GW), UP-
PCL is capable of providing up to about 6 GW of power at any point in time. For compari-
son, this is roughly the level of electricity consumption of the state of Connecticut, whose
population is about 2 percent that of the population of Uttar Pradesh. Electrical power is
distributed through an intricate network of generating plants, substations, transformers,
and thousands of miles of power lines. To manage the surplus demand and protect the
fragile power grid, electrical power has to be rationed and massive blackouts sweep across
the state every day of the year. At any given time, one-fifth of users are typically without
power. Standard guidelines exist for the scheduling of blackouts. For instance, urban areas
are supposed to get 20 hours of power a day and villages, 12. However, these guidelines
are not always met, especially during seasons of high demand. The UPPCL in fact exer-
cises considerable discretion in the transmission of electricity to localities, and is under
constant pressure from consumers (and elected officials) to provide power when supply is
inevitably inadequate.
For the UPPCL, consumers are distinguished by sector. In 2008, there were 10 million
consumers registered with the UPPCL. Of these, 81 percent were domestic, 10 percent
commercial, 1.5 percent industrial, and 8 percent agricultural. However consumers vary
greatly in their intensity of use. In terms of connected load going to each sector, 55 percent
went to domestic users, 9 percent to commercial users, 16 percent to industry, and 17
percent to agriculture. Thus, the average agricultural connection was connected to three
times the load of a typical domestic consumer.
The composition of billing for electricity use varies yet again because of differences in
10
13. tariffs across sectors. In the same year, domestic users accounted for 29 percent of the
total amount billed, 12 percent went to commercial customers, 45 percent of bills went to
industry, and a mere 5 percent of billing went to agricultural users. As these figures show,
agricultural users enjoy a subsidy, paying for 5 percent of total electricity while accounting
for 17 percent of the total electrical load. Industrial users, while connected to a similar
share of total load as agriculture, pay 45 percent of the total amount of electricity billed.
At least in part, tariff regimes are subject to political manipulation and can be targeted
in order to secure the electoral support of different constituencies. In mid-2006, the ruling
Samajwadi Party (SP) government announced a lower flat rage tariff structure for power
looms by weavers in the state. The new rates were 65 Rupees ($1.44) per horsepower in
urban areas and 37.5 Rupees ($0.83) per horsepower in rural areas, providing weavers
access to power at the same low tariffs as the powerful farming sector.1 The decision
was notable for how finely targeted the beneficiaries were: there are only about 300,000
power looms in the state, concentrated in the districts of Mau, Varanasi, Ambedkar Nagar,
Meerut and Jhansi. The timing of the decision also appeared to be politically motivated,
announced just months before the 2007 state elections. Finally, many weavers are of the
Kori caste, among the Scheduled Castes who form a critical element in the core support
base of the opposition BSP party. It would not be implausible to hypothesize that the SP’s
subsidy was an attempt to wrest from the BSP the electoral support of voters who owned
power looms.
1
“Power at flat rate to U.P. weavers,” The Hindu, 21 June 2006. http://www.hindu.com/2006/06/21/
stories/2006062107500400.htm
11
14. 5 The Data
We collected administrative data on electricity use from the Uttar Pradesh Power Corpora-
tion Ltd. from 2000 to 2009.2 The availability of data is the main reason that we selected
UP for analysis, although its large size makes it a prominent and important case. More-
over, it is worth noting that, according to Transparency International India’s ranking of
corruption across 20 major Indian states, UP falls right in the middle (Transparency Inter-
national India 2005, table 1.5, p. 10), making it broadly representative of the country as a
whole. In India, public electricity providers, which are state-specific, are widely viewed by
the public as corrupt (Transparency International India 2005, p. 49).
Our primary outcome variable is line losses, measured as the share of electrical power
that is distributed from the power station but not billed for. In many contexts, line loss is
known as transmission and distribution (T&D) losses. Some line losses unavoidably result
from technical factors. Over long distances, power inevitably degrades due to physical
factors inherent to the transmission process. Such technical losses range from 1–2 percent
in efficient systems to as high as 9–12 percent of total power output in less efficient systems
(according to Smith (2004, p. 2070)). Line losses in India are much larger than this, on the
order of 30 percent. As we noted above, the larger share results from meter tampering,
bypassing of meters via illegal connections, and unauthorized excess usage by flat rate
customers. We call the share of power that is used but unpaid for, “theft,” although part
of this comprises genuine T&D losses. But even if we allow that as much as 12 percent of
line loss may stem from technical features of India’s inefficient power system, theft itself
comprises a total amount that is fifty percent greater than this.
Line losses are not the only losses experienced by the UPPCL. Even when bills are sent
to customers, many go unpaid, aggravating the power company’s revenue shortfalls. Bills
2
The data are recorded monthly, though we focus on annual fiscal year totals in this paper.
12
15. go unpaid for numerous reasons, only some of which might be related to corruption by
corporation officials or to deliberate consumer malfeasance. Bureaucratic inefficiencies
might prevent the collection of bills. Even for those willing to pay, making payments in
India can be difficult. Because it has not been possible until extremely recently to pay
electricity bills electronically, consumers must pay in person at a UPPCL office. In remote
rural areas, customers must often travel long distances to pay their bills. Because we
believe that much of the non-payment of bills is due to factors such as these (but we have
no way to estimate the proportion), we do not use non-payment as a proxy for electricity
theft, even though the result of non-payment is effectively such.
The power company collects and reports data at the level of the geographic service
division, which are units specific to the UPPCL. The state of Uttar Pradesh was divided into
179 divisions at the end of 2009. When the number of customers within a division gets
too large, the division is split. As a result, the number of divisions at the beginning of our
time frame is smaller than in 2009. In our analysis, we aggregate divisions that were split
back to their 2000 boundaries in order to create a uniform series.
Additional administrative data records the number of consumers, the total connected
load, and total billing, broken down by sector (residential, commercial, industrial, and
agricultural, among others) and by division. Note that the true usage by different con-
sumers is not known, only the total supply delivered from each power substation and the
total amount that is billed for. The gap between power that is delivered and power that is
billed for represents line losses.
This data enables us to describe the composition of consumers within each division,
thus identifying areas whose intensity of energy use is more agricultural or more industrial,
for example. However, line losses can only be estimated at the division level and cannot
be further disaggregated by sector; that is, we do not have the information to report the
precise proportion of line loss due to agriculture, industry, households, or commerce.
13
16. Because we are interested in the possible political correlates of power theft, we collect
data on a number of potentially relevant political factors. The first are state assembly elec-
tions. Electricity provision is a state-level responsibility in India’s federal structure, power
company officials are state employees, and key appointments to the power company lead-
ership are made by elected state leaders. Village leaders have limited ability to influence
the provision of electricity to their localities. Thus state assembly elections are the most
salient level for political analysis, more than federal parliamentary elections or local vil-
lage council elections. Uttar Pradesh has 403 single-member state assembly constituencies
and elections to the Vidhan Sabha, its lower house, were held in 2002 and 2007.
The 1990s was a period of intense electoral competition and fragile coalition govern-
ments formed between new parties that had helped crack and supplant the Congress Party
from its decades-long grip on power in both the national capital and UP’s state capital,
Lucknow. Prior to the 2002 election, the Chief Minister’s office (equivalent to a state gov-
ernor in the United States) was held by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a conservative
Hindu nationalist party with strong support from upper caste and middle-class urban vot-
ers. The BJP was in the process of strengthening its claim as the most powerful party in
post-Congress India. However, the 2002 UP state elections dealt a severe blow to the BJP’s
upward trajectory, as it won fewer seats than both the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the
Samajwadi Party. The BSP’s core support came from Scheduled Castes — comprised of
groups who historically occupied the very lowest rungs of India’s social hierarchy — while
the SP enjoyed the support of many Other Backward Class (OBC) and Muslim voters.
In the 2007 elections, the BSP won an outright majority of seats in the state house,
the first time in two decades that coalition rule was not required. The success of a party
that championed the interests of UP’s poorest and most marginalized citizens was both a
stunning and unexpected achievement. Our data track this period of deep political and
social transformation in Uttar Pradesh.
14
17. A second political factor that we incorporate into our work is the self-reported criminal
status of candidates to the UP State Assembly in 2007. In 2003, the Indian courts issued
a ruling requiring that all federal and state level legislative candidates provide sworn af-
fidavits in which they reported, among other things, whether they were currently under
criminal indictment or had been convicted of criminal malfeasance. The timing of the court
ruling is such that this information is unavailable for candidates to the 2002 State Assem-
bly. However, the information is available for the 2007 elections. We utilize it for the 403
assembly constituencies, which saw just over 6,000 candidates run, or an average of 15
per constituency. Of these, approximately 11 percent of candidates were either convicted
criminals or had criminal charges pending against them. However, of the 403 legislators
elected in 2007, fully 25 percent were either under criminal indictment when elected or
had previously been convicted of criminal malfeasance. Although we do not have infor-
mation on the nature of the charges, it is reasonable to investigate whether power theft is
greater where legislators with criminal records or facing indictment hold the seat.
There is no way to directly map the 403 assembly constituencies to the 170 geo-
graphic service divisions, since boundaries of the UPPCL service divisions are not pub-
lished. Each assembly constituency and UPPCL service division can, however, be precisely
located within a single administrative district, which is a unit roughly comparable to a U.S.
county. We can thus aggregate data from both other levels to the administrative district
level, of which there are 70 in Uttar Pradesh. In addition, census data (from 2001) are
available at the level of the administrative districts. We therefore are able to merge into
our dataset a range of relevant control variables at the level of administrative districts.
Given the mismatch in the geographic levels between our power theft variables and our
political variables, there is no single optimal way to merge the data together for analysis.
One option is to aggregate all the data into larger units, computing averages and totals at
the level of the 70 administrative districts. However, we lose a lot of information doing this.
15
18. We can also create a separate dataset at the assembly constituency level (but with imputed
electricity data drawn from the district) and another at the UPPCL service division level
(but with imputed electoral data from the district). These alternatives lead us to construct
three datasets, one at the administrative district level (n = 70), a second at the UPPCL
service division level (n = 170), and a third at the assembly constituency level (n = 403).
We utilize each of these for different parts of the analysis.
The UPPCL division level dataset allows us to describe characteristics of power use
and theft at the most detailed level, while estimating political effects from electoral con-
stituency data aggregated to the larger district in which the division is located. We use
this dataset to examine where power theft is greatest and the characteristics of politicians
elected in the districts in which the division is located.
The assembly constituency level dataset is most appropriate for exploring determinants
of election outcomes as well as the criminal status of assembly candidates. With these vari-
ables, we can examine whether politicians are more likely to win when their constituency
is in a district with higher rates of power theft and whether tainted candidates appear
more often in constituencies with more power theft.
Finally, we use the administrative district dataset, which contains the most aggregated
data, to evaluate the robustness of our findings.
6 Descriptive Analysis
Nearly a third of all electrical power in Uttar Pradesh is unaccounted for. In other words,
adding up all the meter readings from all consumers in the state only results in bills that
amount to two-thirds of the power sent out by UP’s power stations. The remaining power
cannot be tracked and is assumed lost to ordinary T&D losses as well as to theft, me-
ter tampering, and excess usage by flat rate customers. The proportion of power that is
16
19. lost in UP is approximately the same as the national average (Narendranath, Shankari &
Rajendra Reddy 2005, table 3, p. 5566).
6.1 Geographic Variations
There is wide variation in electrical line losses across Uttar Pradesh. In 2005, for example,
a stunning 66 percent of all power in the Mainpuri district was not billed for. Meanwhile, in
that same year, line losses were lowest (just under 13 percent) in the Sonbhadra district.3
Line loss is, as we observe from the data depicted in the upper panel of Figure 3, greatest
in the western part of the state and generally less farther east. This difference coincides
with the differential distribution of tubewells in the state, whose irrigation coverage is 27
percent greater in western than in eastern UP (authors’ calculations from 1998–99 figures
reported in Pant (2004, p. 3464, Table 1)).
For comparison, the lower panel of the figure shows a satellite-based image of night-
time light output, which depicts variations in the availability of power and intensity of use
(Min 2010).4 The image is a composite of all satellite imagery captured of Uttar Pradesh
between 8:00PM and 9:30PM local time across the calendar year. Further processing ex-
cludes images shrouded by cloud cover and other digital noise. The composite image
shows no obvious correlation between overall electricity use and the rate of line losses.
This supports the view that most line loss is due to factors other than merely technical
features of the transmission and distribution of electricity.
Table 1 lists the districts with the highest average line losses between 2000 and 2009.
On average, half of all power supplied in the Hathras district (now known as Mahamaya
Nagar) could not be accounted for, higher than any other district in the state. Among
the other leading districts, Etawah is the home of Mulayam Singh Yadav, leader of the
3
Sonbhadra is sparsely populated and home to several of India’s largest coal-based thermal power plants.
4
Analysis in Min (2010) shows that nighttime light output and electricity consumption at the district-level
are very highly correlated in Uttar Pradesh.
17
20. Figure 3: Linelosses and Nighttime Lights Across Uttar Pradesh
Note: Line losses in districts in fiscal year 2005. Average evening hour nighttime light output from 2003.
Sources: UP Power Corp, US Air Force Weather Agency, and NOAA-NGDC.
18
21. Table 1: Highest Line Losses by District, 2000–09 Average
District Line losses (%) Energy Supplied (MU) Energy Billed (MU)
Hathras 49.9 472.5 192.7
Mainpuri 49.9 241.7 118.5
Jhansi 45.8 662.2 364.8
Jalaun 45.7 419.2 231.9
Etawah 45.4 321.8 173.5
Bulandshahr 43.8 933.0 526.5
Saharanpur 42.8 1233.9 709.4
Firozabad 42.5 675.5 395.7
Rampur 42.3 370.7 216.6
Moradabad 40.5 964.1 573.2
Table 2: Lowest Line Losses by District, 2000–09 Average
District Line losses (%) Energy Supplied (MU) Energy Billed (MU)
Gautam Buddha Nagar 13.6 1370.0 1197.0
Sonbhadra 16.4 259.7 218.1
Lakhimpur Kheri 19.5 218.2 174.8
Basti 19.8 196.7 157.4
Kushinagar 20.0 142.2 113.1
Maharajganj 20.3 120.7 95.8
Deoria 20.7 211.2 166.5
Hardoi 21.9 252.4 195.6
Sitapur 22.6 211.8 163.2
Hamirpur 22.8 275.9 213.3
Samajwadi Party and Chief Minister of the state from 2003 to 2007. Mainpuri is home to
his brother and a stronghold of the Singh Yadav family.
The districts with the lowest line losses on average during our study period are listed in
Table 2. At the top of the list is Gautam Buddha Nagar, home to the bustling outsourcing
hub of Noida, just east of New Delhi. The efficiency of collections in this district may
reflect a greater willingness to bill commercial customers, including many foreign-owned
entities.
19
22. Table 3: Average Line Loss by Year Across UPPCL Divisions, 2000–09
Average
Fiscal year | Obs %Lineloss Std. Dev. Min Max
------------+---------------------------------------------------
2000 | 154 37.02 12.42 3.97 65.32
2001 | 153 35.26 12.15 2.26 63.38
2002 | 146 36.85 9.98 13.33 62.51
2003 | 149 28.51 11.39 5.74 59.13
2004 | 158 35.33 11.67 14.70 69.00
2005 | 169 31.14 11.42 10.53 65.77
2006 | 170 31.25 10.56 9.60 64.08
2007 | 179 31.90 10.04 8.42 65.79
2008 | 190 29.89 9.46 8.19 63.72
2009 | 193 24.83 7.84 5.45 50.87
6.2 Variations in Line Loss Over Time
Line losses have been decreasing over time, as documented in Table 3. From a rate of 37
percent in 2000, total line losses has declined steadily to just under 25 percent in 2009.
Two modest peaks in the downward trend occur in 2002 and 2007, which correspond to
election years.5
The higher averages in election years seem to result from higher losses in UPPCL di-
visions all across the state and do not appear geographically concentrated. In Figure 4,
we draw kernel density plots showing the distribution of line losses across all geographic
observations in each year. The election year lines are shifted towards the right, indicating
broad-based increases in losses.
7 Statistical Analyses
Thus far, we have identified two patterns in our data of potential theoretical importance.
First, line losses are geographically concentrated in western UP, where more tubewells
5
The UPPCL fiscal year runs from April to March. Elections were held in May 2002 and February 2007.
20
24. drawing irrigation water are located. Second, although losses have fallen over the period
examined, they appear greater in years of state elections than other years.
We now study these patterns using more systematic methods. As already indicated, we
investigate four questions: (1) whether power theft is affected by the occurrence of an
election to the State Assembly; that is, whether we observe a “political business cycle” to
line loss; (2) whether theft occurs across all groups in society or whether some appear to
engage in more power theft; (3) whether theft pays politically; that is, whether political
incumbents benefit electorally from power theft; and (4) whether the geographic areas
with more power theft exhibit other symptoms of political criminality.
7.1 Electoral Cycles
The annual data just reviewed suggests that electoral effects in line loss may be present.
Confirming this, we find strong statistical effects for an electoral cycle in line losses. The
t-test reported in Table 4 shows that line losses are nearly 3 percentage points higher in
election years than other years and the difference is highly statistically significant.
Table 4: UP Line Losses in Election and Non-Election Years, 2000–09
Division-Year Mean Std. Dev.
Observations
Election Year 325 34.1 10.3
Non-Election Year 1,336 31.4 11.5
Difference +2.7∗∗∗
∗∗∗
p ≤ 0.001
To investigate how robust these results are, we conduct regression analysis. As we
document in the results reported in Table 5, the election year effect is slightly larger in fixed
effects regressions that study line loss with election years as regressors and that include
indicator variables for each division to control for time-invariant division characteristics.
22
25. These results provide circumstantial evidence that the provision of electricity is subject to
political manipulation. Moreover, constituents appear to benefit from reduced efforts by
the state to monitor electricity use in periods prior to elections.
Table 5: Fixed Effects OLS: Testing for Electoral Cycles in UP Line Loss
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Election Year 2.847∗∗ (0.391)
Division Fixed Effects Yes
Intercept 30.972∗∗ (1.554)
N 1661
R2 0.675
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
7.2 Who Steals: Sectoral Analysis
The UPPCL geographic divisions vary in the share of power that goes to different sectors,
including the domestic, industrial, commercial, and agricultural sectors. Given the rela-
tive economic and political importance of these varying constituencies, we examine how
line losses varies with the sectoral mix of customers within each geographic zone. Our
data permits us to describe whether line losses are higher in places with more domestic
customers, more industry, or more agriculture. (Recall that the data do not permit us to
identify sectoral line losses per se.) Since we are interested in whether politicians sanction
energy theft for electoral gain, identifying who is allowed to steal is relevant.
Figure 5 plots line losses in 2007 compared to the proportion of energy load going to
different sectors. Each point represents a geographic service division. The most notable
pattern is that line losses are increasing in private tubewells, but flat or decreasing in
the other three sectors that we depict (domestic users, industry, and commerce). This
means that as the proportion of electricity to private tubewells increases, the proportion
of energy lost out of the total sent rises. Hence, where agriculture is a more concentrated
23
26. interest, there is more power loss. In addition to the fact that private tubewells are by and
large used for agricultural irrigation, we note that they are markers of relatively wealthy
agricultural interests, since only relatively well off farmers are able to afford the financial
burden of installing and maintaining a tubewell.
Figure 5: UP Line Losses by Sector
Why are line losses higher in more agricultural areas? Agriculture is the largest eco-
nomic activity in Uttar Pradesh, accounting for nearly half of gross state product in 1991
and employing three-quarters of the labor force. Farmers are among the most important
of electoral constituencies in the state. We interpret this result as indicating the tacit will-
ingness of the state government to ignore electricity theft by relatively wealthy farmers,
especially in election years.
24
27. We also compare the slopes of the best-fit line for private tubewells in 2007 with the
year before and after; our results are presented in Figure 6. The slope is higher for the
election year, which is again suggestive that political intervention to enable or disregard
theft is occurring. (A similar analysis, not reported here, for 2002 found no election year
effect, however.)
Figure 6: Linelosses in Agriculture, by Year
7.3 Incumbency Effects
A third pattern that is consistently strong in the data we analyze is the relationship between
reelection and line losses. Previous research has documented a significant incumbency dis-
advantage for Indian state legislators (Uppal 2009). The February 2007 elections appear
consistent with this expectation: across UP’s 403 state assembly constituencies, only 146
of the winners were incumbents who had served in the same seat in the prior legislature.
25
28. Notably, the rate of line losses was for these incumbents was 33.0 percent compared to
30.8 percent for all other legislative constituencies. At first glance, it does appear that
incumbents may benefit electorally from higher line losses within their constituencies.
We explore whether this difference in line losses could help explain variations in re-
election rates. Since incumbency re-election is a function of several factors, we run a
logistic regression on whether an incumbent was re-elected in the February 2007 elec-
tions. The main theoretically relevant independent variable is the measure of line loss in
the assembly constituency in fiscal year 2007 (April 2006 – March 2007), most months of
which occurred prior to the election. We also include as control variables whether the con-
stituency seat is reserved for a member of a Scheduled Caste, three measures of economic
welfare from the UP Human Development Index (average income, education, and health),
the size of the electorate, the turnout rate, and controls for which party controlled the seat
in the prior period.
In the logistic regression results reported in Table 6, The results document a positive
effect and marginally significant effect of line loss on the probability of being reelected.6
One possible interpretation of our results is that when incumbent MLA’s allow high rates
of power theft, they are more likely to be rewarded by voters and be reelected.
7.4 Criminal Environments
With a quarter of the members of the UP state assembly reporting that they are either
under criminal indictment or have previously been convinced on criminal charges, there
is evidence of criminal intrusion into state politics. In this section, we study whether line
losses are significantly greater in assembly constituencies with candidates or elected rep-
resentatives who report criminal records compared with constituencies with no candidates
or no representative reporting criminal malfeasance.
6
Again, we observe no similar electoral effect in 2002.
26
29. Table 6: Logit Regression Predicting Incumbency Reelection
February 2007 UP State Assembly Elections
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Line losses, FY 2007 0.028† (0.016)
Criminal charges 0.056 (0.286)
Reserved SC seat -0.137 (0.311)
∗
HDI 6.138 (2.933)
Number of voters -6.446∗ (3.176)
∗
Voter turnout -4.535 (2.102)
∗∗
Win margin, last election 8.172 (1.839)
Seat previously held by SP 1.882∗∗ (0.546)
∗∗
Seat previously held by BSP 3.564 (0.573)
∗
Seat previously held by BJP 1.433 (0.573)
Seat previously held by INC 1.180 (0.780)
†
Intercept -3.713 (2.175)
N 392
Log-likelihood -202.285
χ2
(11) 104.011
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
All candidates in the 2007 election were required to file affidavits stating whether they
faced any pending criminal charges. We analyzed data for 6,055 candidates across the
state. Of these, 645, or nearly 11 percent of candidates reported criminal charges. Criminal
candidates competed in 288 of the 403 constituencies, with a criminal candidate winning
in 103 of these seats.
Overall, we find no confirmatory evidence that line losses differ substantially in areas
with criminal candidates. Figure 7 compares criminality against line losses at the district
level in 2007. The x-axis shows the proportion of candidates facing criminal charges in
each district while the y-axis shows line losses in the district. No apparent relationship
emerges between line losses and environments that attract criminal candidates.
We examine the relationship more closely with a regression that adds several district-
level controls including level of development (HDI index), population, proportion SC, and
27
30. Figure 7: Linelosses and Criminality of State Assembly Candidates, Districts in 2007
proportion urban. The results, shown in Table 7, confirm the lack of a relationship between
criminal candidates and line losses. By contrast, line losses are lower in district with larger
populations, and more Scheduled Castes. The results are unchanged if we look only at
the share of winning candidates that are criminals in each district (not reported). One
interpretation of these results is that self-reported criminal politicians are not linked in
systematic ways to line loss. If they were, we might suspect that they were accepting
kickbacks from users in order to permit power theft. That instead they are not suggests
instead that power theft, although of clear electoral benefit to incumbent MLA’s, is not part
of persistent illicit criminal networks linking elected politicians and users.
However, as displayed in Figure 8, realized revenue, which is a measure of bills col-
lected relative to bills issued, are substantially higher in clean constituencies. This trend
is confirmed in the multivariate regression reported in Table 8. The model predicts that
a 10 percent increase in the share of criminal candidates is associated with a 5.4 percent
28
31. Figure 8: Realized Revenue and Criminality of State Assembly Candidates, Districts in
2007
29
32. Table 7: OLS Regression on District-level Line Losses, 2007
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Prop. Criminal Candidates 3.581 (19.408)
Level of Development (HDI) 45.681 (28.661)
∗
Population -2.618 (1.239)
Prop. Scheduled Caste -37.712† (20.266)
Prop. Urban -2.337 (12.517)
Intercept 21.356 (15.612)
N 68
R2 0.175
F (5,62) 2.634
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 8: OLS Regression on District-level Realized Revenues, 2007
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Prop. Criminal Candidates -54.014∗ (23.870)
Level of Development (HDI) -29.100 (35.250)
Population 1.334 (1.524)
Prop. Scheduled Caste -13.114 (24.925)
Prop. Urban 31.478∗ (15.394)
Intercept 101.151∗∗ (19.201)
N 68
R2 0.189
F (5,62) 2.89
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
decrease in realized revenues. In other words, places where people do not pay their bills
appear to attract state assembly candidates with criminal records. This result is not subject
to unambiguous interpretation. It may indicate an environment of generally high crimi-
nality, or both high line loss and high rates of criminal candidates may instead reflect other
phenomena, such as a tight connection between the ownership of private tubewells and
social groups that are tolerant of criminal charges against their elected representatives.
30
33. 8 Conclusions
Power theft is widespread in developing countries and important economically as well as
politically. Using data from one very large Indian state, we provide evidence that power
theft is politically correlated. It occurs more often around election time when well-off
farmers are allowed to exceed their allotted usage for private tubewells, and this proves
electorally advantageous to the incumbent member of the legislative assembly. But al-
though power theft is linked to state assembly elections, both in the magnitude of theft that
occurs in election years and in the electoral benefit it provides incumbent MLA’s, power
theft does not appear to represent a component of persistent criminal linkages between
politicians and landowners.
Our results underscore that power theft has become bound up with the intense electoral
competition that now occurs in Uttar Pradesh. It does not, by contrast, appear to be an
outcome of poor governance as such, if by that we mean government institutions that lack
the capacity to fulfill their mission. Our analysis documents that power theft is part of
deliberate political strategy and not a by-product of weak institutions.
Many questions remain. Can we say how many incumbents were reelected in 2007
thanks to power theft? That is, can we estimate the overall political significance of the
phenomenon? Second, how much energy are farmers using beyond their allotted maxi-
mum and can we calculate the aggregate economic effect of this additional energy use?
Reducing power theft to more moderate levels would require at least three policy
changes. First, power company officials need to be sheltered from political influence so
that incumbent legislators cannot pressure them in election years to supply more power to
particular categories of users than allocated or than is equitable. Second, the state govern-
ment needs to adopt a policy of metering agricultural energy use so that owners of private
tubewells pay for the electricity they use. Third, the latter should occur in the context of
31
34. a general policy study of the overall costs and benefits of the current electricity pricing
scheme, which subsidizes agricultural users.
32
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