The document summarizes the Wells Fargo cross-selling scandal where it was discovered that Wells Fargo employees had opened millions of unauthorized bank and credit card accounts. While Wells Fargo prided itself on its culture of putting customers first, internal incentives focused too heavily on cross-selling targets, motivating some employees to open fake accounts. The scandal damaged Wells Fargo's reputation significantly despite limited financial impact. It prompted investigations, management changes, and highlighted the need for organizations to carefully monitor incentive structures and ensure cultural values are consistently reinforced.
Wells Fargo Fake Accounts Scandal – Who Should We Blame?Zoran Temelkov
The Wells Fargo fake accounts scandal is one of the most popular topics in in the past couple of weeks. There are many issues and concerns that have come to the surface as result of the scandal. Everyone is blaming the internal culture, internal control, auditors, executives, etc. But are they the only one to be blamed. What about the customers, should we also put the blame on them?
Wells Fargo is one of the largest banking and financial service providers in the US. However, the company has recently been accused of staggering fake accounts scam, which has put the company in deep trouble. Find the details about the scandal and the SWOT analysis of the company in this presentation.
“Greed” typically is at the forefront.
It is unfortunate that Frauduent activities often start at the top of an organization with its culture.
It really is tragic how some companies conduct their activities to deceive people and regulators in such fraudulent methods. And, these are all examples of the lack of effective internal control activities and processes in these organizations. Interestingly, history seems to repeat itself as the same thing occurred here that previously stunned the business world internationally thus enhancing SOX with the activities at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Arthur Andersen, etc.
Wells Fargo Fake Accounts Scandal – Who Should We Blame?Zoran Temelkov
The Wells Fargo fake accounts scandal is one of the most popular topics in in the past couple of weeks. There are many issues and concerns that have come to the surface as result of the scandal. Everyone is blaming the internal culture, internal control, auditors, executives, etc. But are they the only one to be blamed. What about the customers, should we also put the blame on them?
Wells Fargo is one of the largest banking and financial service providers in the US. However, the company has recently been accused of staggering fake accounts scam, which has put the company in deep trouble. Find the details about the scandal and the SWOT analysis of the company in this presentation.
“Greed” typically is at the forefront.
It is unfortunate that Frauduent activities often start at the top of an organization with its culture.
It really is tragic how some companies conduct their activities to deceive people and regulators in such fraudulent methods. And, these are all examples of the lack of effective internal control activities and processes in these organizations. Interestingly, history seems to repeat itself as the same thing occurred here that previously stunned the business world internationally thus enhancing SOX with the activities at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Arthur Andersen, etc.
McKinsey & Company: Managing Knowledge and LearningDisha Ghoshal
As part of Strategy execution, this presentation on was on how McKinsey & Company flourished throughout the years by Managing Knowledge and Learning diligently.
A solution for the HBR case study, We Googled You. The hiring firm Hathaway Jones, seems to face a problem as they seem to have found a perfect candidate for solving their problems, but land in a fix when some unpleasant news is digged up by the HR regarding her past. WHat should they do?
Dave Carrol, a musician traveled in United Airlines and finds his Guitar being broke due to poor cargo handling. The case tells about the events that followed and how United Airlines responded back and the customer service that was given to Dave and how he responded back.
“Greed” typically is at the forefront.
It is unfortunate that Fraudulent activities often start at the top of an organization with its culture.
It really is tragic how some companies conduct their activities to deceive people and regulators in such fraudulent methods. And, these are all examples of the lack of effective internal control activities and processes in these organizations. Interestingly, history seems to repeat itself as the same thing occurred here that previously stunned the business world internationally thus enhancing SOX with the activities at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Arthur Andersen, etc.
McKinsey & Company: Managing Knowledge and LearningDisha Ghoshal
As part of Strategy execution, this presentation on was on how McKinsey & Company flourished throughout the years by Managing Knowledge and Learning diligently.
A solution for the HBR case study, We Googled You. The hiring firm Hathaway Jones, seems to face a problem as they seem to have found a perfect candidate for solving their problems, but land in a fix when some unpleasant news is digged up by the HR regarding her past. WHat should they do?
Dave Carrol, a musician traveled in United Airlines and finds his Guitar being broke due to poor cargo handling. The case tells about the events that followed and how United Airlines responded back and the customer service that was given to Dave and how he responded back.
“Greed” typically is at the forefront.
It is unfortunate that Fraudulent activities often start at the top of an organization with its culture.
It really is tragic how some companies conduct their activities to deceive people and regulators in such fraudulent methods. And, these are all examples of the lack of effective internal control activities and processes in these organizations. Interestingly, history seems to repeat itself as the same thing occurred here that previously stunned the business world internationally thus enhancing SOX with the activities at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Arthur Andersen, etc.
Strategies for cross selling success - BankingMARC USA
Cross-selling can boost institutional profitability if banks identify the appropriate sales opportunities, improve the customer encounter and monitor training and reward programs.
Cross-selling, or persuading customers to purchase additional products, is one of a bank’s most powerful and
efficient revenue-boosting tools. Yet, many banks do not cross-sell effectively. In today ’s competitive market, banks
need to develop carefully planned, measured and specialized programs to engage and target customers
effectiv ely through cross-selling.
Content Strategy - Blogging for Small BusinessLeanne Ross
What a Content Strategy is with a focus on Business Blogging, the benefits content will bring to a business - SEO, Social Marketing, Media Coverage, Sales plus top tips and practical guides to create and promote branded content (specific case study examples from my own consultancy business as well as local eCommerce retailer Utility Bear). And the key evaluation tools to measure return on investment for your business.
My books- Learning to Go https://gumroad.com/l/learn2go & The 30 Goals Challenge for Teachers http://amazon.com/The-Goals-Challenge-Teachers-Transform/dp/0415735343
Resources at http://shellyterrell.com/techtips
and http://teacherrebootcamp.com/survivaltips/mlearning/
google finance academy 1By Brian Tayanjanuary 8, 2019.docxgreg1eden90113
google finance academy 1
By Brian Tayan
january 8, 2019
The wells fargo cross-selling
scandal
Stanford cloSer looK SerieS
introduction
In recent years, more attention has been paid to corporate
culture and “tone at the top,” and the impact that these have on
organizational outcomes. While corporate leaders and outside
observers contend that culture is a critical contributor to
employee engagement, motivation, and performance, the nature
of this relationship and the mechanisms for instilling the desired
values in employee conduct is not well understood.
For example, a survey by Deloitte finds that 94 percent
of executives believe that workplace culture is important to
business success, and 62 percent believe that “clearly defined
and communicated core values and beliefs” are important.1
Graham, Harvey, Popadak, and Rajgopal (2016) find evidence
that governance practices and financial incentives can reinforce
culture; however, they also find that incentives can work in
opposition to culture, particularly when they “reward employees
for achieving a metric without regard to the actions they took to
achieve that metric.” According to a participant in their study,
“People invariably will do what you pay them to do even when
you’re saying something different.”2
The tensions between corporate culture, financial incentives,
and employee conduct is illustrated by the Wells Fargo cross-
selling scandal.
Wells Fargo culture, Values, and ManageMent
Wells Fargo has long had a reputation for sound management.
The company used its financial strength to purchase Wachovia
during the height of the financial crisis—forming what is now the
third-largest bank in the country by assets—and emerged from
the ensuing recession largely unscathed, with operating and stock
price performance among the top of its peer group (see Exhibit 1).
Fortune magazine praised Wells Fargo for “a history of avoiding
the rest of the industry’s dumbest mistakes.”3 American Banker
called Wells Fargo “the big bank least tarnished by the scandals
and reputational crises.”4 In 2013, it named Chairman and CEO
John Stumpf “Banker of the Year.”5 Carrie Tolstedt, who ran the
company’s vast retail banking division, was named the “Most
Powerful Woman in Banking.”6 In 2015, Wells Fargo ranked 7th
on Barron’s list of “Most Respected Companies.”7
Wells Fargo’s success is built on a cultural and economic model
that combines deep customer relations with an actively engaged
sales culture. The company’s operating philosophy includes the
following elements:
Vision and values. Wells Fargo’s vision is to “satisfy our
customers’ needs, and help them succeed financially.” The
company emphasizes that:
Our vision has nothing to do with transactions, pushing products,
or getting bigger for the sake of bigness. It’s about building lifelong
relationships one customer .
An overview of the challenges and options business owners in the graphic arts space are facing with the transformation taking place in today's industry.
ETH–1Marketing Ethics Prepared and written by Dr. Linda.docxSANSKAR20
ETH–1
Marketing Ethics
� Prepared and written by Dr. Linda Ferrell,
University of Wyoming
Marketing ethics addresses principles and standards that define acceptable conductin the marketplace. Marketing usually occurs in the context of an organization,
and unethical activities usually develop from the pressure to meet performance objec-
tives. Some obvious ethical issues in marketing involve clear-cut attempts to deceive
or take advantage of a situation. For example, two former senior executives with Ogilvy
& Mather Advertising were sentenced to more than a year in prison for conspiring to
overbill the government for an ad campaign warning children about the dangers of
drugs. The executives were also required to perform 400 hours of community service,
pay a fine, and draft a proposed code of ethics for the advertising industry.1 The
requirement to draft a code of ethics implies that the court viewed the executives’
wrongdoing as a lapse of ethical leadership in the advertising industry. Obviously, mis-
representing billing on accounts is a serious ethical issue which can evolve into mis-
conduct with severe repercussions. The overbilling in this case was to benefit the
advertising agency’s bottom line.
The Ethics Resource Center (www.erc.org) reported in its most recent National
Business Ethics Survey that “one in two employees witnessed at least one specific type
of misconduct.”2 At least 52 percent of employees observed at least one type of mis-
conduct in the past year, while the percentage of employees willing to report the
misconduct dropped by 10 percentage points between 2003 and 2005.3 This may
explain the increase in corporate whistle-blowing reports to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Even with a regulatory requirement that public companies have an anony-
mous and confidential means of reporting misconduct under Sarbanes Oxley and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, companies are likely to learn about
the ethical misconduct in marketing at the same time as the public. This overview of
marketing ethics is designed to help you understand and navigate organizational eth-
ical decisions. �
Why Marketing Ethics Is Important
There are many reasons to understand and develop the most effective approaches to
manage marketing ethics. All organizations face significant threats from ethical mis-
conduct and illegal behavior from employees and managers on a daily basis. Well-
meaning marketers often devise schemes that appear legal but are so ethically flawed
that they result in scandals and legal entanglements. For example, in one case, a sales-
person pretended to be in shipping rather than sales to hopefully develop customer
trust. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act was found to be violated in this case.
There is a need to identify potential risks and uncover the existence of activities or
events that relate to misconduct. Overbilling clients, deceptive sales methods, fraud,
antitrust, and price fixing are all ...
Linguists and psychologists have developed techniques to identify deceptive language and behavior. Why don’t shareholders use these same techniques to evaluate the truthfulness of management and detect financial manipulation?
In my Advertising and Promotions class we worked with Wells Fargo to create a marketing campaign for the opening of a new branch. Our tasks were to create a unique campaign that would raise awareness and draw in new households to the branch. By combining our marketing knowledge and previous experiences, we created a few noteworthy strategies allowing us to meet our objectives.
Time to Scrap Performance AppraisalsJosh BersinJosh BersinGTakishaPeck109
Time to Scrap Performance Appraisals?
Josh Bersin
Josh Bersin
Global Industry Analyst, I study all aspects of HR, business leadership, corporate L&D, recruiting, and HR technology. ✨
Published May 4, 2013
+ Follow
Something big is going on in business today. More and more companies have decided to radically change their performance appraisal process.
Last week at our research conference we spoke with Adobe, Juniper, Kelly Services, and a variety of other companies who have decided to do away with traditional performance ratings and completely change the annual appraisal process.
Our research shows that this is a strong and positive trend.
Why the process must change.
Why do companies have annual reviews in the first place? Primarily they are an artifact from traditional top-down companies where we had to "weed out" the bottom performers every year. By forcing managers to rate people once per year we can have annual talent reviews and decide who gets more money, who to promote, and who to let go.
Coupled with the performance rating is the "potential" rating, which tries to capture an individual's potential to move up two levels in the organization (the traditional definition).
This approach is based on a philosophy that "we cant totally trust managers" so we're going to force them to fit people into these rating scales. And in many companies (around 20%) there are forced distributions.
The well publicized problems with this process abound. These include:
· Employees need and want regular feedback (daily, weekly), so a once-a-year review is not only too late but it's often a surprise.
· Managers cannot typically "judge" an entire year of work from an individual, so the annual review is awkward and uncomfortable for both manager and employee.
· The manager-employee link is not 1:1 like it used to be - we usually have many peers and managers we work with during the year, so one person cannot adequately rate you without lots of peer input.
· While some employees are a poor fit and likely are poor performers, these issues should be addressed immediately, not once per year.
· People are inspired and motivated by positive, constructive feedback - and the "appraisal" process almost always works against this.
· The most important part of an appraisal is the "development planning" conversation - what can one do to improve performance and engagement - and this is often left to a small box on the review form.
Of course companies are very nervous about eliminating this process because:
· We need a fair and validated way to distribute compensation increases (don't we?)
· We need a record of low performance when we let someone go
· We need to capture performance data in an employee's profile for future promotion and other talent reviews, development plans, and career migration
· We need a way to make sure managers are doing their jobs well.
Well I've probably discussed these issues with 100+ companies over the last five years and our research shows more and ...
Authored by: David F. Larcker, Bradford Lynch, Brian Tayan, and Daniel J. Taylor, June 29, 2020
Investors rely on corporate disclosure to make informed decisions about the value of companies they invest in. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to examine disclosure practices of companies relative to peers in real time about a somewhat unprecedented shock that impacted practically every publicly listed company in the U.S. We examine how companies respond to such a situation, the choices they make, and how disclosure varies across industries and companies.
We ask:
• What motivates some companies to be forthcoming about what they are experiencing, while others remain silent?
• Do differences in disclosure reflect different degrees of certitude about how the virus would impact businesses, or differences in management perception of its obligations to shareholders?
• What insights will companies learn to prepare for future outlier events?
Authored by: avid F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, CGRI Research Spotlight Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative (CGRI), April 2020
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on board composition, quality, and turnover. It reviews the evidence of:
The appointment of outside CEOs as directors
The importance of industry expertise to performance
The relation between director skills and performance
The stock market reaction to director resignations
Whether directors are penalized for poor oversight
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide Board of Directors: Selection, Compensation, and Removal.
David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, April 21, 2020, Stanford Closer Look Series
Little is known about the process by which pre-IPO companies select independent, outside board members—directors unaffiliated with the company or its investors. Private companies are not required to disclose their selection criteria or process, and are not required to satisfy the regulatory requirements for board members set out by public listing exchanges. In this Closer Look, we look at when, why, and how private companies add their first independent, outside director to the board.
We ask:
• Why do pre-IPO companies rely on very different criteria and processes to recruit outside directors than public companies do?
• What does this teach us about governance quality?
• How important are industry knowledge and managerial experience to board oversight?
• How important are independence and monitoring?
• Does a tradeoff exist between engagement and fit on the one hand and independence on the other?
Authored by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, April 1, 2020, Stanford Closer Look Series
We examine the size, structure, and demographic makeup of the C-suite (the CEO and the direct reports to the CEO) in each of the Fortune 100 companies as of February 2020. We find that women (and, to a lesser extent, racially diverse executives) are underrepresented in C-suite positions that directly feed into future CEO and board roles. What accounts for this distribution?
By John D. Kepler, David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, and Daniel J. Taylor, January 28, 2020
Corporate executives receive a considerable portion of their compensation in the form of equity and, from time to time, sell a portion of their holdings in the open market. Executives nearly always have access to nonpublic information about the company, and routinely have an information advantage over public shareholders. Federal securities laws prohibit executives from trading on material nonpublic information about their company, and companies develop an Insider Trading Policy (ITP) to ensure executives comply with applicable rules. In this Closer Look we examine the potential shortcomings of existing governance practices as illustrated by four examples that suggest significant room for improvement.
We ask:
• Should an ITP go beyond legal requirements to minimize the risk of negative public perception from trades that might otherwise appear suspicious?
• Why don’t all companies make the terms of their ITP public?
• Why don’t more companies require the strictest standards, such as pre-approval by the general counsel and mandatory use of 10b5-1 plans?
• Does the board review trades by insiders on a regular basis? What conversation, if any, takes place between executives and the board around large, single-event sales?
Short summary
We identify potential shortcomings in existing governance practices around the approval of executive equity sales. Why don’t more companies require stricter standards to lessen suspicion around insider equity sales activity? Do boards review trades by insiders on a regular basis?
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan
Core Concepts Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative,
A roadmap to understanding the fundamental concepts of corporate governance based on theory, empirical research, and data. This guide takes an in-depth look at the Principles of Corporate Governance.
Authors: David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, November 25, 2019
Among the controversies in corporate governance, perhaps none is more heated or widely debated across society than that of CEO pay. The views that American citizens have on CEO pay is centrally important because public opinion influences political decisions that shape tax, economic, and regulatory policy, and ultimately determine the standard of living of average Americans. This Closer Look reviews survey data of the American public to understand their views on compensation. We ask:
• How can society’s understanding of pay and value creation be improved and the controversy over CEO pay resolved?
• How should the level of CEO pay rise with complexity and profitability, particularly among America’s largest corporations?
• Should pay be reformed in the boardroom, or should high pay be addressed solely through the tax code?
• Are negative views of CEO pay driven by broad skepticism and lack of esteem for CEOs? Or do high pay levels themselves contribute to low regard for CEOs?
By David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan
CGRI Survey Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance, November 2019.
In fall 2019, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University conducted a nationwide survey of In October 2019, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University conducted a nationwide survey of 3,062 individuals—representative by age, race, political affiliation, household income, and state residence—to understand the American population’s views on current and proposed tax policies.
Key findings include:
--Tax rates for high-income earners are about right
--Majority favor a wealth tax … but not if it harms the economy
--Americans do not want to set limits on personal wealth
--Americans do not believe in a right to universal basic income
--Trust in the ability of the U.S. government to spend tax dollars effectively is low
--Americans believe in higher taxes for corporations who pay their CEO large dollar amounts
--Little appetite exists to break up “big tech”
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, Dottie Schindlinger and Anne Kors, CGRI Survey Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance and the Diligent Institute, November 2019
New research from the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University and the Diligent Institute finds that corporate directors are not as shareholder-centric as commonly believed and that companies do not put the needs of shareholders significantly above the needs of their employees or society at large. Instead, directors pay considerable attention to important stakeholders—particularly their workforce—and take the interests of these groups into account as part of their long-term business planning.
• While directors are largely satisfied with their ESG-related efforts, they do not believe the outside world understands or appreciates the work they do.
• Directors recognize that tensions exist between shareholder and stakeholder interests. That said,
most believe their companies successfully balance this tension.
• In general, directors reject the view that their companies have a short-term investment horizon in
running their businesses.
In the summer of 2019, the Diligent Institute and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University surveyed nearly 200 directors of public and private corporations globally to better understand how they balance shareholder and stakeholder needs.
by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, October 7, 2019
A reliable system of corporate governance is considered to be an important requirement for the long-term success of a company. Unfortunately, after decades of research, we still do not have a clear understanding of the factors that make a governance system effective. Our understanding of governance suffers from 1) a tendency to overgeneralize across companies and 2) a tendency to refer to central concepts without first defining them. In this Closer Look, we examine four central concepts that are widely discussed but poorly understood.
We ask:
• Would the caliber of discussion improve, and consensus on solutions be realized, if the debate on corporate governance were less loosey-goosey?
• Why can we still not answer the question of what makes good governance?
• How can our understanding of board quality improve without betraying the confidential information that a board discusses?
• Why is it difficult to answer the question of how much a CEO should be paid?
• Are U.S. executives really short-term oriented in managing their companies?
David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, Vinay Trivedi, and Owen Wurzbacher, Stanford Closer Look Series, July 2, 2019
Currently, there is much debate about the role that non-investor stakeholder interests play in the governance of public companies. Critics argue that greater attention should be paid to the interest of stakeholders and that by investing in initiatives and programs to promote their interests, companies will create long-term value that is greater, more sustainable, and more equitably shared among investors and society. However, advocacy for a more stakeholder-centric governance model is based on assumptions about managerial behavior that are relatively untested. In this Closer Look, we examine survey data of the CEOs and CFOs of companies in the S&P 1500 Index to understand the extent to which they incorporate stakeholder needs into the business planning and long-term strategy, and their view of the costs and benefits of ESG-related programs.
We ask:
• What are the real costs and benefits of ESG?
• How do companies signal to constituents that they take ESG activities seriously?
• How accurate are the ratings of third-party providers that rate companies on ESG factors?
• Do boards understand the short- and long-term impact of ESG activities?
• Do boards believe this investment is beneficial for the company?
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, Vinay Trivedi and Owen Wurzbacher, CGRI Survey Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance, July 2019
In spring 2019, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University surveyed 209 CEOs and CFOs of companies included in the S&P 1500 Index to understand the role that stakeholder interests play in long-term corporate planning.
Key Findings
• CEOs Are Divided On Whether Stakeholder Initiatives Are A Cost or Benefit to the Company
• Companies Tout Their Efforts But Believe the Public Doesn’t Understand Them
• Blackrock Advocates … But Has Little Impact
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan
Core Concepts Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, June 2019
A roadmap to understanding the fundamental concepts of corporate governance based on theory, empirical research, and data. This guide will take an in-depth look at Shareholders and Activism.
By Brandon Boze, Margarita Krivitski, David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, and Eva Zlotnicka
Stanford Closer Look Series
May 23, 2019
Recently, there has been debate among corporate managers, board of directors, and institutional investors around how best to incorporate ESG (environmental, social, and governance) factors into strategic and investment decision-making processes. In this Closer Look, we examine a framework informed by the experience of ValueAct Capital and include case examples.
We ask:
• What is the investment horizon prevalent among most companies today?
• Do companies miss long-term opportunities because of a focus on short-term costs?
• How many companies have an opportunity to profitably invest in ESG solutions?
• What factors determine whether a company can profitably invest in ESG solutions?
• Can investors earn competitive risk-adjusted returns through ESG investments?
• If so, how widespread is this opportunity?
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities including:
• The relation between ESG activities and firm value
• The impact of environmental and social engagements on firm performance
• The market reaction to ESG events
• The relation between ESG and agency problems
• The performance of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide “Investors and Activism”.
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on how dual-class share structures influence firm value and corporate governance quality. It reviews the evidence of:
• The relation between dual-class shares and governance quality
• The relation between dual-class shares and tax avoidance
• The relation between dual-class shares and firm value and performance
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide “The Market for Corporate Control.”
By Courtney Hamilton, David F. Larcker, Stephen A. Miles, and Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, February 15, 2019
Two decades ago, McKinsey advanced the idea that large U.S. companies are engaged in a “war for talent” and that to remain competitive they need to make a strategic effort to attract, retain, and develop the highest-performing executives. To understand the contribution of the human resources department to company strategy, we surveyed 85 CEOs and chief human resources officers at Fortune 1000 companies. In this Closer Look, we examine what these senior executives say about the contribution of HR to the strategic efforts and financial performance of their companies.
We ask:
• What role does HR play in the development of corporate strategy?
• Does HR have an equal voice or is it junior to other members of the senior management team?
• Do boards see HR and human capital as critical to corporate performance?
• How do boards ascertain whether management has the right HR strategy?
• How adept are companies at using data from HR systems to learn what programs work and why?
By David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, December 3, 2018
Companies are required to have a reliable system of corporate governance in place at the time of IPO in order to protect the interests of public company investors and stakeholders. Yet, relatively little is known about the process by which they implement one. This Closer Look, based on detailed data from a sample of pre-IPO companies, examines the process by which companies go from essentially having no governance in place at the time of their founding to the fully established systems of governance required of public companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission. We examine the vastly different choices that companies make in deciding when and how to implement these standards.
We ask:
• What factors do CEOs and founders take into account in determining how to implement governance systems?
• Should regulators allow companies greater flexibility to tailor their governance systems to their specific needs?
• Which elements of governance add to business performance and which are done only for regulatory purposes?
• How much value does good governance add to a company’s overall valuation?
• When should small or medium sized companies that intend to remain private implement a governance system?
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, CGRI Survey Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance, November 2018
In summer and fall 2018, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University surveyed 53 founders and CEOs of 47 companies that completed an Initial Public Offering in the U.S. between 2010 and 2018 to understand how corporate governance practices evolve from startup through IPO.
David F. Larcker, Stephen A. Miles, Brian Tayan, and Kim Wright-Violich
Stanford Closer Look Series, November 8, 2018
CEO activism—the practice of CEOs taking public positions on environmental, social, and political issues not directly related to their business—has become a hotly debated topic in corporate governance. To better understand the implications of CEO activism, we examine its prevalence, the range of advocacy positions taken by CEOs, and the public’s reaction to activism.
We ask:
• How widespread is CEO activism?
• How well do boards understand the advocacy positions of their CEOs?
• Are boards involved in decisions to take public stances on controversial issues, or do they leave these to the discretion of the CEO?
• How should boards measure the costs and benefits of CEO activism?
• How accurately can internal and external constituents distinguish between positions taken proactively and reactively by a CEO?
More from Stanford GSB Corporate Governance Research Initiative (20)
Affordable Stationery Printing Services in Jaipur | Navpack n PrintNavpack & Print
Looking for professional printing services in Jaipur? Navpack n Print offers high-quality and affordable stationery printing for all your business needs. Stand out with custom stationery designs and fast turnaround times. Contact us today for a quote!
The world of search engine optimization (SEO) is buzzing with discussions after Google confirmed that around 2,500 leaked internal documents related to its Search feature are indeed authentic. The revelation has sparked significant concerns within the SEO community. The leaked documents were initially reported by SEO experts Rand Fishkin and Mike King, igniting widespread analysis and discourse. For More Info:- https://news.arihantwebtech.com/search-disrupted-googles-leaked-documents-rock-the-seo-world/
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Company Valuation webinar series - Tuesday, 4 June 2024FelixPerez547899
This session provided an update as to the latest valuation data in the UK and then delved into a discussion on the upcoming election and the impacts on valuation. We finished, as always with a Q&A
Improving profitability for small businessBen Wann
In this comprehensive presentation, we will explore strategies and practical tips for enhancing profitability in small businesses. Tailored to meet the unique challenges faced by small enterprises, this session covers various aspects that directly impact the bottom line. Attendees will learn how to optimize operational efficiency, manage expenses, and increase revenue through innovative marketing and customer engagement techniques.
Kseniya Leshchenko: Shared development support service model as the way to ma...Lviv Startup Club
Kseniya Leshchenko: Shared development support service model as the way to make small projects with small budgets profitable for the company (UA)
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1. Stanford Closer LOOK series
Stanford Closer LOOK series 1
By Brian Tayan
december 2, 2016
the wells fargo cross-selling
scandal
introduction
In recent years, more attention has been paid to corporate
culture and “tone at the top,” and the impact that these have on
organizational outcomes. While corporate leaders and outside
observers contend that culture is a critical contributor to
employee engagement, motivation, and performance, the nature
of this relationship and the mechanisms for instilling the desired
values in employee conduct is not well understood.
For example, a survey by Deloitte finds that 94 percent
of executives believe that workplace culture is important to
business success, and 62 percent believe that “clearly defined
and communicated core values and beliefs” are important.1
Graham, Harvey, Popadak, and Rajgopal (2016) find evidence
that governance practices and financial incentives can reinforce
culture; however, they also find that incentives can work in
opposition to culture, particularly when they “reward employees
for achieving a metric without regard to the actions they took to
achieve that metric.” According to a participant in their study,
“People invariably will do what you pay them to do even when
you’re saying something different.”2
The tensions between corporate culture, financial incentives,
and employee conduct is illustrated by the Wells Fargo cross-
selling scandal.
Wells fargo
Wells Fargo has long had a reputation for sound management.
The company used its financial strength to purchase Wachovia
during the height of the financial crisis—forming what is now the
third-largest bank in the country by assets—and emerged from
the ensuing recession largely unscathed, with operating and stock
price performance among the top of its peer group (see Exhibit 1).
Fortune magazine praised Wells Fargo for “a history of avoiding
the rest of the industry’s dumbest mistakes.”3
American Banker
called Wells Fargo “the big bank least tarnished by the scandals
and reputational crises.”4
In 2013, it named Chairman and CEO
John Stumpf “Banker of the Year.”5
Carrie Tolstedt, who ran the
company’s vast retail banking division, was named the “Most
Powerful Woman in Banking.”6
In 2015, Wells Fargo ranked 7th
on Barron’s list of “Most Respected Companies.”7
Wells Fargo’s success is built on a cultural and economic model
that combines deep customer relations and an actively engaged
sales culture. The company’s operating philosophy includes the
following elements:
Vision and values. Wells Fargo’s vision is to “satisfy our
customers’ needs, and help them succeed financially.” The
company emphasizes that:
Our vision has nothing to do with transactions, pushing products,
or getting bigger for the sake of bigness. It’s about building lifelong
relationships one customer at a time. … We strive to be recognized
by our stakeholders as setting the standard among the world’s great
companies for integrity and principled performance. This is more
than just doing the right thing. We also have to do it in the right
way.8
The company takes these statements seriously. According to
Stumpf, “[Our vision] is at the center of our culture, it’s important
to our success, and frankly, it’s been probably the most significant
contributor to our long-term performance.”9
… “If I have any one
job here, it’s keeper for the culture.”10
Cross-selling. The more products that a customer has with
Wells Fargo, the more information the bank has on that customer,
allowing for better decisions about credit, products, and pricing.
Customers with multiple products are also significantly more
profitable (see Exhibit 2). According to Stumpf:
To succeed at it [cross-selling], you have to do a thousand things
right. It requires long-term persistence, significant investment
in systems and training, proper team member incentives and
recognition, [and] taking the time to understand your customers’
financial objectives.11
Conservative, stable management. Stumpf’s senior
management team consists of 11 direct reports with an average
2. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
2Stanford Closer LOOK series
of 27 years of experience at Wells Fargo.12
Decisions are made
collectively. According to former CEO Richard Kovacevich, “No
single person has ever run Wells Fargo and no single person
probably ever will. It’s a team game here.”13
Although the company
maintains independent risk and oversight mechanisms, all senior
leaders are responsible for ensuring that proper practices are
embedded in their divisions:
The most important thing that we talk about inside the company
right now is that the lever that we have to manage our reputation
is to stick to our vision and values. If we are doing things for our
customers that are the right things, then the company is going to be
in very good shape. … We always consider the reputational impact
of the things that we do. There is no manager at Wells Fargo who
is responsible for reputation risk. All of our business managers in
all of our lines of business are responsible.14
Wells Fargo has been listed among Gallup’s “Great Places to Work”
for multiple years, with employee engagement scores in the top
quintile of U.S. companies (see Exhibit 3).
cross-selling scandal
In 2013, rumors circulated that Wells Fargo employees in Southern
California were engaging in aggressive tactics to meet their
daily cross-selling targets.15
According to the Los Angeles Times,
approximately 30 employees were fired for opening new accounts
and issuing debit or credit cards without customer knowledge,
in some cases by forging signatures. “We found a breakdown in
a small number of our team members,” a Wells Fargo spokesman
stated. “Our team members do have goals. And sometimes they
can be blinded by a goal.”16
According to another representative,
“This is something we take very seriously. When we find lapses,
we do something about it, including firing people.”17
Some outside observers alleged that the bank’s practice of
setting daily sales targets put excessive pressure on employees.
Branch managers were assigned quotas for the number and types
of products sold. If the branch did not hit its targets, the shortfall
was added to the next day’s goals. Branch employees were
provided financial incentive to meet cross-sell and customer-
service targets, with personal bankers receiving bonuses up to 15
to 20 percent of their salary and tellers receiving up to 3 percent.
Tim Sloan, at the time chief financial officer of Wells Fargo,
refuted criticism of the company’s sales system: “I’m not aware of
any overbearing sales culture.”18
Wells Fargo had multiple controls
in place to prevent abuse. Employee handbooks explicitly stated
that “splitting a customer deposit and opening multiple accounts
for the purpose of increasing potential incentive compensation is
considered a sales integrity violation.”19
The company maintained
an ethics program to instruct bank employees on spotting and
addressing conflicts of interest. It also maintained a whistleblower
hotline to notify senior management of violations. Furthermore,
theseniormanagementincentivesystemhadprotectionsconsistent
with best practices for minimizing risk, including bonuses tied to
instilling the company’s vision and values in its culture, bonuses
tied to risk management, prohibitions against hedging or pledging
equity awards, hold-past retirement provisions for equity awards,
and numerous triggers for clawbacks and recoupment of bonuses
in cases where they were inappropriately earned (see Exhibit 4). Of
note, cross-sales and products-per-household were not included
as specific performance metrics in senior executive bonus
calculations even though they were for branch-level employees.20
In the end, these protections were not sufficient to stem a
problem that proved to be more systemic and intractable than
senior management realized. In September 2016, Wells Fargo
announced that it would pay $185 million to settle a lawsuit filed
by regulators and the city and county of Los Angeles, admitting
that employees had opened as many as 2 million accounts without
customer authorization over a five-year period.21
Although
large, the fine was smaller than penalties paid by other financial
institutions to settle crisis-era violations (see Exhibit 5). Wells
Fargo stock price fell 2 percent on the news (see Exhibit 6).
Richard Cordray, director of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, criticized the bank for failing to
… monitor its program carefully, allowing thousands of employees
to game the system and inflate their sales figures to meet their sales
targets and claim higher bonuses under extreme pressure. Rather
than put its customers first, Wells Fargo built and sustained a
cross-selling program where the bank and many of its employees
served themselves instead, violating the basic ethics of a banking
institution including the key norm of trust.22
AWellsFargospokesmanrespondedthat,“Weneverwantproducts,
including credit lines, to be opened without a customer’s consent
and understanding. In rare situations when a customer tells us
they did not request a product they have, our practice is to close it
and refund any associated fees.”23
In a release, the banks said that,
“Wells Fargo is committed to putting our customers’ interests first
100 percent of the time, and we regret and take responsibility for
any instances where customers may have received a product that
they did not request.”24
The bank announced a number of actions and remedies,
several of which had been put in place in preceding years. The
company hired an independent consulting firm to review all
3. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
3Stanford Closer LOOK series
account openings since 2011 to identify potentially unauthorized
accounts (see Exhibit 7). $2.6 million was refunded to customers
for fees associated with those accounts. 5,300 employees were
terminated over a five-year period.25
Carrie Tolstedt, who led the
retail banking division, retired. Wells Fargo eliminated product
sales goals and reconfigured branch-level incentives to emphasize
customer service rather than cross-sell metrics.26
The company
also developed new procedures for verifying account openings
and introduced additional training and control mechanisms to
prevent violations.27
Nevertheless, in subsequent weeks, senior management
and the board of directors struggled to find a balance between
recognizing the severity of the bank’s infractions, admitting fault,
and convincing the public that the problem was contained. They
emphasized that the practice of opening unauthorized accounts
was confined to a small number of employees: “99 percent of the
people were getting it right, 1 percent of people in community
banking were not. … It was people trying to meet minimum goals
to hang on to their jobs.”28
They also asserted that these actions
were not indicative of the broader culture:
I want to make very clear that we never directed nor wanted our
team members to provide products and services to customers that
they did not want. That is not good for our customers and that is
not good for our business. It is against everything we stand for as
a company.29
If [employees] are not going to do the thing that we ask them to
do—put customers first, honor our vision and values—I don’t want
them here. I really don’t. … The 1 percent that did it wrong, who
we fired, terminated, in no way reflects our culture nor reflects the
great work the other vast majority of the people do. That’s a false
narrative.30
They also pointed out that the financial impact to the customer
and the bank was extremely limited. Of the 2 million potentially
unauthorized accounts, only 115,000 incurred fees; those fees
totaled $2.6 million, or an average of $25 per account, which the
bank had refunded. Affected customers did not react negatively:
We’ve had very, very low volumes of customer reaction since that
happened. … We sent 115,000 letters out to people saying that you
may have a product that you didn’t want and here is the refund of
any fees that you incurred as a result of it. And we got very little
feedback from that as well.31
The practice also did not have a material impact on the company’s
overall cross-sell ratios, increasing the reported metric by a
maximum of 0.02 products per household.32
According to one
executive, “The story line is worse than the economics at this
point.”33
Nevertheless, although the financial impact was trivial, the
reputational damage proved to be enormous. When CEO John
Stumpf appeared before the U.S. Senate, the narrative of the
scandal changed significantly. Senators criticized the company for
perpetuating fraud on its customers, putting excessive pressure
on low-level employees, and failing to hold senior management
responsible (see Exhibit 8). In particular, they were sharply critical
that the board of directors had not clawed back significant pay
from John Stumpf or former retail banking head Carrie Tolstedt,
who retired earlier in the summer with a pay package valued at
$124.6 million.34
Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts told
Stumpf:
You know, here’s what really gets me about this, Mr. Stumpf.
If one of your tellers took a handful of $20 bills out of the cash
drawer, they’d probably be looking at criminal charges for theft.
They could end up in prison. But you squeezed your employees to
the breaking point so they would cheat customers and you could
drive up the value of your stock and put hundreds of millions of
dollars in your own pocket. And when it all blew up, you kept your
job, you kept your multimillion dollar bonuses, and you went on
television to blame thousands of $12-an-hour employees who were
just trying to meet cross-sell quotas that made you rich. This is
about accountability. You should resign. You should give back the
money that you took while this scam was going on, and you should
be criminally investigated by both the Department of Justice and
the Securities and Exchange Commission.35
Following the hearings, the board of directors announced that
it hired external counsel Shearman & Sterling to conduct an
independent investigation of the matter. Stumpf was asked to
forfeit $41 million and Tolstedt $19 million in outstanding,
unvested equity awards. It was one of the largest clawbacks of
CEO pay in history and the largest of a financial institution. The
board stipulated that additional clawbacks might occur. Neither
executive would receive a bonus for 2016, and Stumpf agreed to
forgo a salary while the investigation was underway.36
Two weeks later Stumpf resigned without explanation. He
received no severance and reiterated a commitment not to sell
shares during the investigation. The company announced that
it would separate the chairman and CEO roles.37
Tim Sloan,
chief operating officer, became CEO. Lead independent director
Stephen Sanger became nonexecutive chairman; and Elizabeth
Duke, director and former Federal Reserve governor, filled a
newly created position as vice chairman.
4. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
4Stanford Closer LOOK series
The long-term impact on the bank was unclear. Customer visits
to branches declined 10 percent year-over-year in the month
following the scandal. Credit card and debit card applications also
fell. Deposits and new checking accounts, however, continued to
grow—albeit at below-historical rates.38
The senior management
team promised more proactive outreach to customers and
investors. Internally, the company placed greater emphasis on
customer service and sought to clarify roles and responsibilities
for risk management.
Why This Matters
1. The Wells Fargo cross-selling scandal demonstrates the
importance of financial incentives not just at the senior-
management level but at all levels of an organization.
Was the company wrong to provide incentives to branch-
level employees to increase the number of products sold
per household? Would the program have worked better if
coupled with additional metrics? With closer monitoring and
measurement?
2. Branch-level employees were incentivized to increase products
per household but the senior-executive bonus system did not
include this metric. Did this disconnect contribute to a failure
to recognize the problem earlier? Did it lead to senior executive
failure to monitor lower-level incentive structures?
3. The financial impact of the Wells Fargo cross-selling scandal
was fairly limited but the reputational damage to the bank was
massive. What systems should have been put in place to identify
and escalate potential problems earlier? What steps should
senior management and the board have taken immediately
following the news to better contain the fallout?
4. Wells Fargo prides itself on its vision and values and culture.
By several measures, these have been highly beneficial to the
company’s performance. What is the best mix of incentives
to reinforce these concepts across the company? How do you
maximize the positive contribution that financial incentives
make to culture while minimizing the potential negative
outcomes that can occur?
5. Wells Fargo chose an inside executive as CEO successor
to John Stumpf. Was this the correct decision? Are
wholesale changes needed to the company, its culture,
and its systems? Or is a seasoned company veteran better
positioned to help Wells Fargo recover from the scandal?
1
Deloitte, “Core Beliefs and Culture: Chairman’s Survey Findings,”
(2012).
2
John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, Jillian Popadak, and Shiva
Rajgopal, “Corporate Culture: Evidence from the Field,” Social Science
Research Network (2016).
3
Adam Lashinsky, “Riders on the Storm,” Fortune (May 4, 2009).
4
Maria Aspan, “Wells Fargo’s John Stumpf, the 2013 Banker of the Year,”
American Banker (Nov. 21, 2013).
5
Ibid.
6
Tolstedt was named to the list continuously from 2003 to 2015 and
named number 1 in 2010. See Sara Lepro, “Wells’ Tolstedt at Top of
Power List,” American Banker (Sep. 27, 2010).
7
Vito J. Racanelli, “Apple Tops Barron’s List of Respected Companies,”
Barron’s (Jun. 27, 2015).
8
Wells Fargo’s Vision & Values was written in booklet form in the early
1990s and is distributed to all employees. See Wells Fargo, “The Vision
and Values of Wells Fargo,” (Accessed Nov. 1, 2016).
9
“Wells Fargo & Co. at Goldman Sachs U.S. Financial Services
Conference,” CQ FD Disclosure (Dec. 8, 2015).
10
Maria Aspan, loc. cit.
11
Wells Fargo, 2010 Annual Report.
12
Wells Fargo, “Wells Fargo & Co. 2016 Investor Day,” CQ FD Disclosure
(May 24, 2016).
13
Maria Aspan, loc. cit.
14
Pat Callahan, Executive Vice President, “Wells Fargo & Company 2010
Investor Conference,” CQ FD Disclosure (May 14, 2010).
15
There is some evidence that employees were discussing sales pressure
on social media sites, such as Glassdoor, as far back as 2010; however,
the frequency is modest (less than 10 percent of employee reviews).
Research by the authors. For a discussion of the ability of social media
to predict organizational risk, see David F. Larcker, Sarah M. Larcker,
and Brian Tayan, “Monitoring Risks Before They Go Viral: Is It Time
for the Board to Embrace Social Media,” Stanford Closer Look Series
(Apr. 5, 2012); “Josh Hardy and the #SaveJosh Army: How Corporate
Risk Escalates and Accelerates Through Social Media,” Stanford Closer
Look Series (Apr. 14, 2014); and “Lululemon: A Sheer Debacle in Risk
Management,” Stanford Closer Look Series (Jun. 17, 2014).
16
E. Scott Reckard, “Wells Fargo Fires Workers Accused of Cheating on
Sales Goals,” Los Angeles Times (Oct. 3, 2013).
17
E. Scott Reckard, “Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes
at a Cost,” Los Angeles Times (Dec. 21, 2013).
18
Ibid.
19
Cited in Emily Glazer, “How Wells Fargo’s High-Pressure Sales Culture
Spiraled Out of Control,” The Wall Street Journal (Sep. 16, 2016).
20
Wells Fargo, Form DEF-14A (Mar. 16, 2016).
21
The fine comprised of $100 million to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, $35 million to the Office of Comptroller of the
Currency, and $50 million to the city and county of Los Angeles. In
addition, the bank refunded customers for fees they incurred on these
accounts. Accounts included deposit accounts, checking accounts, debit
cards, and credit cards. The lawsuit was first filed in 2015. James Rufus
Koren, “Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million Settlement for ‘Outrageous’
Sales Culture,” Los Angeles Times (Sep. 8, 2016).
22
“Full Committee Hearing on ‘An Examination of Wells Fargo’s
Unauthorized Accounts and the Regulatory Response,’” Federal News
Service (Sep. 20, 2016).
23
Emily Glazer, “Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million Fine Over Account
Openings,” The Wall Street Journal (Sep. 8, 2016).
24
Wells Fargo press release, “Wells Fargo Issues Statement on Agreement
Related to Sales Practices,” BusinessWire (Sep. 8, 2016).
25
This represented 1 percent per year of the approximately 100,000
Wells Fargo employees working in retail branches. 10 percent of the
terminated employees were at the manager level or above. The review
was subsequently expanded to include 2009 and 2010.
26
Emily Glazer “Can This Woman Save Wells Fargo’s Consumer Banking
6. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
6Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 1 — wells fargo: selected performance metrics
As of March 21, 2016, rounded to the nearest percentage.
total shareholder return
7% 6% 6% 5%
-10%
-20%
-3%
12%
8%
12%
9%
1%
-1%
7%
12%
11%
9%
11%
4%
-2%
7%
Wells
Fargo
JP Morgan US Bank PNC Bank of
America
Citigroup KBW Bank
Avg
AnnualizedTSR
10 Year
5 Year
3 Year
Relation Between Returns and Volatility
Wells
Fargo
JP Morgan
Citigroup
Bank of America
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
0% 50% 100% 150%
Long-TermAverageROA
Normalized Standard Deviation of ROA
Based on quarterly results, Q1 2009 through Q4 2015.
7. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
7Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 1 — continued
Sources: Wells Fargo, Investor Day (May 24, 2016); Wells Fargo, Credit Suisse Financial Services Forum (Feb. 9, 2016).
Revenue Growth (2015 v. 2014)
Average Loan Growth (2015 v. 2014)
Average Deposit Growth (2015 v. 2014)
2.0%
0.8%
-1.0% -1.0%
-1.6%
-2.1%
Wells
Fargo
US Bank Citigroup PNC JP Morgan Bank of
America
RevenueGrowth
7%
6%
4%
3%
-2%
-5%
JP Morgan Wells
Fargo
US Bank PNC Bank of
America
Citigroup
LoanGrowth
8% 8%
7%
3%
2%
-5%
PNC US Bank Wells
Fargo
Bank of
America
JP Morgan Citigroup
DepositGrowth
8. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
8Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 2 — Wells Fargo: Cross-Selling Metrics
Note: Shows the relationship between the number of products that a retail banking customer holds with Wells Fargo and the percentage of those customers who
make an additional product purchase from Wells Fargo in the subsequent year.
Relation Between Number of Products per customer and Future Purchases
Retail Banking Profit per Customer
Source: Wells Fargo, Investor Day (May 20, 2014).
12%
52%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
%CustomersPurchasingAdditionalProduct
Products per Customer
1x
3x
5x
10x
3 5 8 10+
ProfitperCustomer
Products per Customer
9. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
9Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 3 — Wells Fargo: employee engagement metrics
Note: Engagement data from Gallup. Engagement ratio calculated as the ratio of engaged employees to actively disengaged employees.
Source: Wells Fargo, Investor Day (May 24, 2016).
.
employee engagement ratio
6.2:1
9.7:1
11.6:1
12.8:1
1.9:1
2012 2013 2014 2015 U.S Average
2015
EngagementRatio
10. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
10Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 4 — Wells Fargo: Selected Executive Compensation Provisions
Note: Edited slightly for length.
Source: Wells Fargo, Form DEF-14A (Mar. 16, 2016).
Policy / Provision Requirement / Trigger
Executive Officer Stock
Ownership Policy
Until one year following retirement, our executive officers must hold shares
equal to at least 50% of the after-tax profit shares (assuming a 50% tax
rate) acquired upon the exercise of options or vesting of RSRs [Restricted
Share Rights] and Performance Shares, subject to a maximum requirement
of ten times the executive officer’s cash salary.
Unearned Compensation
Recoupment
Misconduct by an executive that contributes to the Company having to
restate all or a significant portion of its financial statements.
Extended Clawback Policy
Incentive compensation was based on materially inaccurate financial
information, whether or not the executive was responsible.
Performance-Based Vesting
Conditions
Misconduct which has or might reasonably be expected to have
reputational or other harm to the Company or any conduct that constitutes
“cause.”
Misconduct or commission of a material error that causes or might be
reasonably expected to cause significant financial or reputational harm to
the Company or the executive’s business group.
Improper or grossly negligent failure, including in a supervisory capacity,
to identify, escalate, monitor or manage in a timely manner and as
reasonably expected, risks material to the Company or the executive’s
business group.
The Company or the executive’s business group suffers a material
downturn in financial performance or suffers a material failure of risk
management.
11. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
11Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 5 — Selected Crisis-Era Bank Settlements
Note: Bank of America settlement for mortgage practices, JPMorgan for mortgages ($13 billion) and London Whale ($1.02 billion), BNP Paribas
for violation of U.S. sanctions, Citigroup for mortgages, Credit Suisse for aiding tax fraud, HSBC for money laundering lapses, UBS for Libor
manipulation, Rabobank for Libor manipulation, Deutsche for interest rate cartels, and Wells Fargo for opening unauthorized accounts.
Source: Shane Ferro, “Bank of America’s Big Fine,” Reuters (Aug. 22, 2014). Wells Fargo settlement added by the author.
$185
$985
$1,020
$1,070
$1,530
$1,920
$2,500
$7,000
$8,900
$13,000
$16,650
Wells Fargo
Deutsche
JPMorgan
Rabobank
UBS
HSBC
Credit Suisse
Citigroup
BNP Paribas
JPMorgan
Bank of America
Settlement ($ in millions)
12. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
12Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 6 — Wells Fargo: Stock Price
Note: Prices of the KBW Bank Index re-indexed to coincide with Wells Fargo stock price as of September 1, 2016.
Source: Yahoo! Finance.
$40
$42
$44
$46
$48
$50
$52
1-Sep 8-Sep 15-Sep 22-Sep 29-Sep 6-Oct 13-Oct 20-Oct 27-Oct
Wells Fargo KBW Bank Index
1. Settlement with Consumer Financial Protection Bureau announced.
2. Stumpf testifies before the U.S. Senate.
3. Stumpf testifies before the U.S. House of Representatives.
4. Stumpf resigns as CEO and is replaced by Sloan.
1
2
3 4
13. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
13Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 7 — Wells Fargo: John Stumpf Statement to U.S. Senate – Excerpted
Source: “Full Committee Hearing on ‘An Examination of Wells Fargo’s Unauthorized Accounts and the Regulatory Response,’” Federal News
Service (Sep. 20, 2016).
“We recognize now, that we should have done more, sooner, to eliminate unethical conduct or incentives that may have
unintentionally encouraged that conduct. We took many incremental steps, over the past five years in an attempt to address
these situations. But we now know, those steps were not enough.
“In 2011, a dedicated team began to engage in proactive monitoring of data analytics, specifically for the purpose of rooting
out sales practice violations. In 2012, we began reducing sales goals that team members would need to qualify for incentive
compensation. In 2013, we created a new corporate-wide enterprise oversight for sales practices. In 2014, we further revised
our incentives compensation plans, to align pay with ethical performance. In 2015, we added more enhancements to our training
materials, further lowered goals, and began a series of town hall meetings to reinforce the importance of ethical leadership and
always putting our customers first.
“Throughout this five-year period, we identified potential inappropriate sales practices. We investigated those and we took
disciplinary actions that included terminations of managers and team members for sales policy violations, the 5,300 terminations
over the five years that have been widely reported.
“Despite all of these efforts, we did not get it right. We should have realized much sooner that the best way to solve the problems
in the retail banking business was to completely eliminate retail bank product sales goals. And one of the areas that we missed
was the possibility that a customer could be charged fees in connection with accounts opened without their authorization.
Because deposit accounts that are not used are automatically closed, we assumed this could not happen.
“We were wrong. And we took steps to refund fees that were charged and made changes so this could not happen again.
In August 2015, we began working with a third-party consulting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, which conducted extensive
large-scale data analysis of all 82 million deposit accounts, and nearly 11 million credit card accounts that we had opened from
2011 through 2015. Of the 93 million accounts reviewed, approximately two percent, 1.5 million deposit accounts and 565,000
consumer credit card accounts, were identified as accounts that may have been unauthorized. To be clear, PWC did not find
these accounts had been unauthorized, but because it could not rule out the possibility, these accounts were further reviewed to
determine if any fees had been charged.
“PWC calculated that approximately 115,000 of these accounts had incurred $2.6 million of fees, which have been refunded
to those customers. Even one unauthorized account is one too many. This type of activity has no place in our culture. We are
committed to getting it right 100 percent of the time, and when we fall short we accept responsibility and we will do everything
we can to make it right by our customers.”
14. The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal
14Stanford Closer LOOK series
Exhibit 8 — U.S. Senators: Selected Comments to CEO John Stumpf
Source: “Full Committee Hearing on ‘An Examination of Wells Fargo’s Unauthorized Accounts and the Regulatory Response,’” Federal News
Service (Sep. 20, 2016).
Robert Menendez (D., NJ): “In the last week, you and your chief financial officer have taken to the press and laid the blame
squarely on low-paid, retail bank employees. And while I don’t excuse what they did by any stretch of the imagination, I find
that despicable. … You and your senior executives created an environment in which this culture of deception and deceit thrive.”
Joe Donnelley (D., IN) : “It’s not a square deal when the people that are fired are the tellers who make 15 bucks [an hour], and the
senior execs walk off with $100 million.”
Sherrod Brown (D., OH): “Wells Fargo team members struggling to support a family on $12 to $15 an hour followed their
manager’s guidance to do whatever it took to make their quotas. Some may have worked off the clock. Others cut corners
to avoid being fired, for missing goals, goals that Wells now admits were too high. … 5,300 team members earning perhaps
$25,000, $30,000, $35,000 a year have lost their jobs while Ms. Tolstedt walks away with up to $120 million.”
Pat Toomey (R., PA): “This isn’t cross-selling. This is fraud.”
Jeff Merkley (D., OR): “A pressure culture situation, putting tellers and personal bankers in an impossible situation.”
Elizabeth Warren (D., MA): “Since this massive, years-long scam came to light, you have said repeatedly, ‘I am accountable.’ But
what have you actually done to hold yourself accountable? Have you resigned as CEO or chairman of Wells Fargo? ... Have you
returned one nickel of the millions of dollars that you were paid while this scam was going on? ... Have you fired a single senior
executive? … Instead, evidently your definition of accountable is to push the blame to your low-level employees who don’t have
the money for a fancy PR firm to defend themselves. It’s gutless leadership.”
Heidi Heitkamp (D., ND): “This is a behavior that was created by the culture, that was allowed. … What we’ve now lost has been
trust… between this committee and large financial institutions.”