THE CLOUT OF THE SILVER SCREEN

University of Kent at Brussels
Brussels School of International Studies
THE CLOUT OF THE SILVER SCREEN
United States Foreign Policy & the American Film Industry
Andrew B. Doll
Student no.: 10902284
Monday 6 August 2012
PO997 - Fundamentals, Dissertation, and Research
Supervisor: Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels
Word Count: 18,343

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my mom and dad for all their support;
Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels for all her knowledge,
support, and advice; Martin Gaal, Bojan Savic, Michael Palo,
and Sean Kay for all their assistance, inspiration, and wisdom;
my friends and family all around the world; and everyone with
whom I have ever watched a movie.

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER II - POWER 5

THE CONCEPT OF POWER 6

SOFT POWER 13

CHAPTER III – COLD WARRIORS, RELUCTANT WARRIORS &
LEADING FROM BEHIND: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 20

FROM “HOLLYWOOD HOTEL” TO THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENTS
RONALD REAGAN & GEORGE H.W. BUSH 21

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN 21

PRESIDENT GEORGE H.W. BUSH 27

THE INDISPENSIBLE NATION 31

THE TIMES THEY ARE A CHANGIN’: PRESIDENTS GEORGE W. BUSH AND
BARACK OBAMA 33

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 33

PRESIDENT BARACK H. OBAMA 41

LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL 45

CHAPTER IV – HOLLYWOOD HYPERPOWER 48

POLISHING THE SILVER SCREEN 50

1980’S CINEMA: SHALLOW SOUNDS & PROFOUND PICTURES 54

2000’S CINEMA: JUST LIKE IN REAL LIFE 59

ii
FADE TO BLACK 65

CHAPTER V – THAT’S A WRAP 68

FILMOGRAPHY LXXI

BIBLIOGRAPHY LXXIV

1
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here!
This is the War Room!"
-President Merkin Muffley
Dr. Strangelove or:
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964)
Around the world, its familiar flag symbolizes the United States of America. This
symbolism, how the “American Idea” is perceived, depends greatly upon two things:
American foreign policy as the official voice and actions of the United States abroad, and the
export of American culture. What follows is an examination of the relationship between
American foreign policy and American culture in other countries, looking specifically at the
film industry as a foremost vehicle of American culture. This study will demonstrate how the
United States’ film industry influences the perception of the United States abroad. By
positively influencing the perception of the United States abroad, America is made more
attractive to other countries thus affecting foreign policy execution in a positive light.
Through the dissemination of American values, ideas, and culture American films
have been able to effectively further American foreign policy interests by way of increasing
America’s attractability. Through this hypothesis, this study aims, first, to examine the
relationship between American films around the world and the foreign policy of the United
States. Second, highlighting the significance of soft power in modern international politics
and foreign policy with an in-depth focus on a cultural aspect of the United States capable of
portraying differing – and often controversial – themes, ideas, and values. Finally, this study
aims to demonstrate American films as a source of soft power as well as to what extent they
are a source.

2
Typically studies of soft power list cultural items (including film) as a source of soft
power but fail to show how different cultural media create or affect soft power in differing
ways. Amongst the United States’ plentiful exports are food products (McDonalds and Coca-
Cola), fashion attire (Nike, Reebok and Levi Strauss) and music (MTV’s global reach).1
Each of the above examples resonates as an image of America that amounts to a single
snapshot of the American Idea. Film, on the other hand, resonates the themes, ideas, and
values of the United States providing countless single snapshots for not only a more thorough
portrayal, but also through a medium that appeals to both emotional and intellectual degrees.
Film was selected as the independent variable due to the interaction between art and
culture. Film’s popularity is a global phenomenon attracting scores of people every year. In
the United States, theatres sell out fueling a multi-billion dollar industry that is an almost
ubiquitous facet of American culture. In a manner best described as “viral,” films seep past
American shores appealing to and influencing most of the world. As an effect of this,
America’s entertainment industry has a global span projecting its national culture, ideas, and
values to foreign lands influencing the perception of the United States. Considering the
industry’s size, reach, and popularity, American films are a salient source of power via
foreign policy.
In order to examine the relationship between American films abroad and American
foreign policy this dissertation will first discuss the concept of power in Chapter II, and then
foreign policy in Chapter III – included with both will be an examination of each concept’s
relation to film. Chapter II will examine the general concept of power discussing different
views and interpretations of this constant within international relations. Here also will be
addressed some of the controversies that surround power along with how the concept has
1
Viacom, Inc., Global Reach, Jan 1, 2012, http://www.viacom.com/ourbrands/globalreach/Pages/default.aspx
(accessed May 23, 2012).

3
changed and is changing, especially in a globalized world. Following from this will be a
discussion of the “soft power” concept – of which film is an instrument – looking at the rise
of its necessity, as well as soft power’s different (and at times, more effective) practice
compared to more traditional hard power. Here will be demonstrated first the importance of
soft power, and second the American film industry’s salient ability to exercise this power.
Chapter III will be devoted to the practice of foreign policy and its exercise by the
United States. This will be focused on two periods of United States’ foreign policy defined
by the shock of global change; an active and at times bellicose American foreign policy; and
times of domestic change within the United States. The first era will focus from 1981 to
1993 during the tenures of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. The most
prominent features of this era were the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall,
along with the First Gulf War and tumultuous domestic politics for the United States. The
second era will examine 2000 to 2011 during Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama
during which were the unprecedented attacks of September 11; United States invasion and
occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan; and the worst economic crisis since the Great
Depression.
Each period will be taken separately and examined according to two variables: first
examining the general trends of US foreign policy, along with global public reaction and
perception to American policies and behaviors; and second, comparing the box office results
of the top 10 films as determined by domestic and international gross during the film’s initial
release period. The films of each period will then be analyzed according to genre and themes
to demonstrate what “image” of America is being portrayed during that time and the
reception of that image while looking at global attendance of those films. This will take
special consideration of the fact that different genres/themes paint different pictures and thus
elicit different responses.

4
This dissertation will conclude by first analyzing the trends in both film and foreign
policy from the previous eras internationally and the United States to help demonstrate the
necessity and efficacy of soft power through culture. Second, the film industry’s value in the
pursuit of America’s foreign policy interests will be evaluated, comparing it against the data
and original hypothesis.

5
CHAPTER II - POWER
“May the Force be with you.”
-Obi Wan Kenobi,
Star Wars (1971)
Today’s world is one of continuity and change: military and armed forces continue to
hold sway over an international environment of sovereign states with sovereign ideals, and at
the same time states foster the idea of a “global village” within a “world without borders.”2
Despite the ebbs and flows, what changes and what stays, the aspect of power is still “a key
independent variable of international relations [that] remains constant.”3
International
relations and its study quite often boil down to the examination and – to greater effect –
interpretation of power: “what is it,” “what constitutes it,” and “who has it” are a few of the
primary questions scholars examine. This scholastic examination looks at something that at
its simplest is the ability to act so to influence another simultaneously as a capacity, as an
attribute, and as a resource.
This chapter will examine the concept and background of those questions by delving
first into the concept and idea of power by examining competing definitions and conceptions
of this “essentially contested concept” first in a basic sense, second in a political sense and
third as set in modern international affairs.4
In an era where globalization involves an
increasing number of actors in international relations, this question has perhaps never been
more contested than it is today. As controversial as it is, there is also overlap between
2
Keohane and Nye (2012), 3-4.
3
Kay (2004), 9.
4
Barnett and Duvall (2005), 41.

6
different schools and interpretations that work both to the benefit and demise of the debate as
will be discussed in the following sections.
Through the figurative fog of war that has settled across this debate, two distinctions
have emerged in the forms of “hard” and “soft” power, which have in turn given birth to a
third known as “smart” power. Power as a concept will first be discussed, followed by
addressing types of power, giving special attention to soft power. The second section of this
chapter will debate and reveal the aspects of soft power. There will be demonstrated the rise
of soft power as both an academic concept and a policy tool whose capitalization would
benefit governments, policy makers, and non-governmental actors. As film is a vehicle for
culture and ideas across boundaries, the rise of soft power also gives rise to film’s potential
utility to states as means to influence the modern international environment.
The Concept of Power
Given power’s significance, it is an issue of extreme controversy. Each school of
thought has its own interpretation of power: Realists interpret it as being materially derived
so to compel another; Neo-Liberalists explain power as a contextual phenomenon stemming
from both such material force, but also from ideational means of influence; and the
Constructivist’s interpretation draws power out of intersubjective social contexts born of
norms and practices.5
Despite the differences that often deeply encamp one school from
another, creating “paradigm wars,”6
there are similarities.
5
Barnett and Duvall (2005), 40; Nye (2004), 1-3; and Hopf (1998), 173.
6
Wendt, On Constitution and Causation in International Relations (1998), 116.

7
Regardless of where they finish, the most common understanding of power amounts
to the ability to do, to act. In physics, from which we derive the most elemental
understanding, power is associated with energy capable of causing movement or creating
electricity; for politics it is similar, creating not energy but influence, specifically towards
other actors and within the international system. Accepted in its most basic sense, power is a
means to the end of an actor’s goals and desires. As actors in the international environment
are generally both rational and risk-adverse, one can quickly infer that pursuit of such goals
would be in the interest of the actor seeking those goals and so not against their own interests.
Whether accepting of the Realist, Liberalist or Constructivist interpretation, the
modern international environment is replete with multitudinous actors from small developing
countries to large economic giants, and from international governmental bodies such as the
United Nations to private multinational corporations like Microsoft, the overlap between
interests, goals, and methods grows thicker with every day thanks to globalization. As such,
the actions of every actor can, will and do affect at least one other actor within the
environment to varying degrees. As such, it is impossible to pursue a goal without it
somehow involving others, making power not only the ability to act, but also the ability to
interact.
Professor Nye defines power as an interactive concept providing “the ability to
influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants;” such that it is applicable at
both the structural and agentic levels assuming a system constituted of multiple actors. In
assuming a policy-oriented perspective, the analysis is concerned only with intentional
outcomes as we “want to know the probability that an actor in a social relationship can carry
out his own will,” and not the likelihood of unintentional or happenstance outcomes.7
As
7
Nye (2004), 1; Idem (2011), 6.

8
power is contextual, in saying that an actor “has power” it must also be specified “to do
what,” by determining who is part of the power relationship and what topics are involved.8
“Power” definitions have taken on two forms in discourse: power as behavior and
power as resources. The former retroactively determines power by what outcomes were
produced, known as the “behavioralist fallacy” that defines power in terms of behavior
taken;9
the latter – “power as resources” – proactively defines power by what outcomes could
be produced with given resources. Power as resources assumes states’ power in tangible,
measurable terms determining a state to be as powerful as its resources such as population
size, economic strength, and military strength. In this instance, first by using only resources
to determine a state’s power, and second by defining power in potential (and so, yet-
unproven) terms presents the paradox of the stronger actor failing to achieve its objectives
against a weaker one– take for example the US and France in Vietnam. Or, as Nye explains,
“power in this sense is like holding the high cards…[But] holding a strong poker hand does
not win if the game is bridge.”10
From here the power debate has developed three strains of interest. First, the concept
of power plays a performative role in our political discourse as to how our conception of
power “makes a difference to how we think and act…especially in political contexts.”11
Such
lends to the controversy as greater disagreement concerning the concept means a greater
amount of alternate ideas concerning not just power, but the rest of the political discourse as
8
Nye (2011), 7.
9
Guzzini (2005), 501.
10
Nye (2011), 6.
11
Lukes (2005), 477.

9
well making the power question a loaded gun for which “what it does when it is used” could
be quite substantial.12
Some of this comes from the second strain that implies power is not an actuality for
states such as sovereignty or foreign policy: power identifies a state’s potential to act. 13
This
is a half-truth in effect. Power does, in part, identify an actor’s capacity to perform a
function: during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union both amassed enough
nuclear weapons to obliterate the planet several times over in an overwhelming display of
military power that was never used, so remaining a power-potential for both countries.
However, power is also an actuality when it is implemented: the example of US-Soviet
nuclear weapon build-up also serves as an example of each country exerting power through
deterrence so influencing the other not to launch a first strike. Such exhibition did not
involve the deployment of troops, changes in economies or any use of force (traditional
displays of “power”), however the demonstration of such devastating capacity prevented a
launch providing for a jointly desirable outcome for both sides.
The third strain of interest concerns the modern debate on power being one of cause
and effect – though with a strong focus on the effects of power and not the causes –
examining actors’ capacities to control their own existence and not on how such capacities
came to be. Power is a means to achieve a desired goal, yes, but how that power is
implemented and what constitutes that power is of great debate. The debate, however, often
lacks deep conception and substance due to its profound (though not exclusive) steeping in
the Realist tradition that “power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state
possesses…[to draw upon] when competing with rival states” and “use material resources to
12
Guzzini (2005), 510.
13
Lukes (2005), 478.

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get others to do what they otherwise would not.”14
This conception is not the only one
informing the debate as I have briefly shown, however it does have the greatest saturation
relative to others - something that is largely an effect of timing and history.
As a distinguished scholar of international relations once noted, “The observer [of
international politics] is surrounded by the contemporary scene with its ever shifting
emphasis and changing perspectives.”15
Ideas often do greatly reflect the time in which they
were created: Wilsonianism (which would later become Liberalism) coming at the end of
World War I espousing liberal ideas of freedom, democracy and cooperation; or
Constructivism gaining renown following the end of the Cold War as the only main theory
able to explain what just happened. With Realism, the theory gained most of its momentum
during the Cold War when the world was perpetually “minutes to midnight” for fifty years
allowing security rhetoric and national security symbolism to flourish and fuel the Realist
ideal that interest is defined in terms of power in a political world “of opposing interests and
of conflict amongst them.”16
As Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall argue, rivals to Realism purposefully
distance themselves from defining power in such strict terms as Realists leading to the latter’s
definition providing a jumping-off point against which definitions are juxtaposed.17
It is also
noted by Alexander Wendt that the traditional proposition of power relations customarily
defining international politics “cannot be a uniquely Realist claim…, since then every student
of international politics would be a realist.”18
The development of “other” conceptions and
14
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: Norton, 2001), 55; Barnett and
Duvall (2005), 40.
15
Morgenthau (1967), 16.
16
Keohane and Nye (2012), 4-6; Morgenthau (1967), 3-7.
17
18
Wendt (1999), 96-97.

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operationalizations of power from a primordial stage has in large part been neglected. Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye, for instance, in their seminal work, Power and Interdependence,
begin by defining power as something that is changing from the traditionally militaristic
interpretation to a concept of increasing complexity.19
Such lack of alternatives impairs
academia’s understanding of “how global outcomes are produced and how actors are
differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates.”20
Grasping the epistemological reasoning behind the means and ends of power requires
considering not only the “who,” “what” and “why” of the question, but also the “where.”
The “where” in this case is, naturally, the planet Earth as embodied in the international
political environment composed of different processes, structures and actors exerting force
upon each other. It is essential to remember that all of this occurs within an ultimately social
entity, necessitating consideration of the interaction between social actors, processes and
structures in pursuit of interests, ideals and goals.21
By focusing on power in such a way it is interpreted solely as a capacity that is
potential, though not actual, leading to “two different forms of reductionism, often combined
and often confused, depending on whether the attempt was to reduce a power to its exercise
or to its vehicle.”22
In the first instance, the “exercise fallacy,” power is determined only by
causing an observable sequence of events: the powerful are those who win and prevail over
others. Such is an inadequate definition because it accounts only for what is accomplished
defining power through what “it designates a potential that is never made manifest except
through acts (decisions).” The second instance is the “vehicle fallacy” committed by
19
Keohane and Nye (2012), 9-10.
20
21
Ibid., 42; Wendt (1987), 337-339.
22
Lukes (2005), 478.

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assuming power to be “whatever goes into operation when power is activated” equating being
powerful with power resources. Steven Lukes argues that while acts of both fallacies –
observing the exercise of power and the counting of power resources – can indicate power
distribution, defining power’s capacity comes from neither its exercise nor its vehicle.23
Historically, resources and the capacity to transform those resources into the exertion
of influence has been a gauge of a country’s power.24
However, resources in no way
guarantee outcomes. As power is contextual – thus situationally variant – and a state’s
tangible resources such as military, economy and population are relatively static, power
resources – both the tangible and intangible raw materials that underlie power relationships
and are at an actor’s disposal – must be converted to enable their full potential. Nye posits
that in order to utilize resource’s full potential as influence, they must be converted into
power behaviors – which are a state’s actions that attract others and influence their behavior
to produce preferred outcomes. Such a conversion occurs through skillful strategy and
leadership, bringing to bear the available and appropriate resources in an attempt to produce
the desired outcomes – a practice often performed inadequately and misjudged by leaders.25
Power is, evidently, a very complex issue that has grown all the more complex over
time. The advent of an information age fueled by the Internet, 24-hour news networks and a
globalized economy has empowered a greater number and variety of actors who a century
ago were not even considered political. Such has lead to the declination of government’s
being the sole executioner of force and policy. They are still organizations “claiming a
monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence,” as the only actors that possess
legitimate militaries; however, organized violence and militaries are also seeing their
23
Lukes (2005), 478-479.
24
Kay (2004), 13-14.
25
Nye (2011), 8.

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legitimacy decline.26
Globalization has tossed a web around the world connecting all actors
together in a system of economic interdependence where the use of force is gambled against
the economy placing a higher premium on the power of cooperation over the power of
confrontation.27
By increasing the value of the cooperation, the importance of credibility and
reputation also increase necessitating states to place greater importance on their promotion
and protection. The most effective method of this is through the messages sent to the world
abroad that portray a country’s ideas, values and culture. Though practiced primarily through
a state’s foreign policy, the ability of film and other cultural artifacts to transmit these
messages abroad is not to be denied. The following section will examine soft power and its
ability to affect through culture – both positively and negatively – the overall power of the
United States.
Soft Power
Power has always been a primary variable in politics and international relations.
What it has not been, however, is consistent. Once determined by the largest military with
the ability to defeat all comers “a state’s strength could be measured by its ability to protect
its population from attack.” Such hawkish calculus has lost quite some of its prior credibility.
Even as early as 1969, Henry Kissinger admitted that things were changing and “power has
grown more awesome, it has also turned abstract, intangible, elusive.” Brute force no longer
determined absolute power, and power no longer determined influence. 28
The environment
26
Wendt (1999), 202; Nye (2002).
27
Kay (2004), 17.
28
Kissinger (1969), 59-61.

14
was changing and actors needed to be able to convince others at least as (if not more)
effectively than coerce them.
This ability would come to be soft power: that is, power implemented indirectly to
convince another of your ideas. By working indirectly, “a country may obtain the outcomes
it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its
example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it.” Politics today
necessitates having others subscribe to your values and desires, a goal out of reach by using
commands alone.29
To this end, a state’s soft power stems primarily from three sources: its
culture, its political values, and its foreign policies. As culture is a society’s set of values and
practices that give it meaning or fulfillment, the cultural aspect is critical in the definition of
soft power. Culture is able to emphasize soft power’s “social” aspect that encourages
cooperation, as opposed to hard power’s more “lone-wolf” vision that depends upon coercive
inducements and threats (the “carrot” and the “stick”) to achieve goals. With a foundation in
culture, soft power emanates from society’s inherent social forces to create a social power
able to shape the “underlying social structures, knowledge systems and general environment”
of a society.30
In the modern age of globalization and information technology the ability of a
message to spread around the world is unprecedented making it a crucial factor in power
equations. The United States stands to profit much in the global information age because soft
power gains will be allotted to countries that possess dominant culture and ideas that are in
line with global norms (such as those that encourage free markets, democracy, openness and
the media).31
The United States prides itself – and has for some time now – on possessing an
29
Nye (2004), 5.
30
Idem (2011), 6.
31
Gallarotti (2010), 229-230.

15
egalitarian, liberal, and pluralistic society that has developed a pervasive culture and media
style bestowing the United States with “unrivaled cultural primacy in the modern world…[as]
the leading disseminator of global culture.”32
While “people generally prefer their indigenous cultures,” reported Todd Gitlin in the
late 1990’s, “American products are their favorite second choice.”33
The United States is
home to a cultural hegemony the likes of which have not existed since the Roman Empire:
capable of penetrating through all layers of society, German journalist Josef Joffe once
admitted, “America has the world’s most open culture, and therefore the world is the most
open to it.”34
An extensive 2003 Pew survey indicated a strong draw towards “the American
lifestyle,” due in no small part to the foremost disseminator of American culture,
globalization. Amongst the 38,000 people surveyed across 44 countries, people reported that
“globalization is now a routine fact of their everyday lives…[experienced] though trade
finance, travel, communication and culture” showing a keen favoritism towards American
media.35
The entertainment industry of the United States is a primary vehicle of disseminating
American media and culture. The allure of this culture has greatly influenced American soft
power through the broadcast of “American values that are open, mobile, individualistic, anti-
establishment, pluralistic, voluntaristic, populist, and free.”36
Such traditionally “Western”
32
Gallarotti (2010), 228-229.
33
Todd Gitlin, "The Adorable Monsters of American Culture: Mickey Mouse, Bruce Willis, and the Unification
of the World," in America Beyond its Borders, ed. Pierre Guerlain (Marne la Vallée: University of Marne-la-
Vallée, 1999), 75-81, 76.
34
Josef Joffe, America the Inescapable, The New York Times, June 8, 1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/08/magazine/america-the-inescapable.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
(accessed June 1, 2012).
35
Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Views of a Changing World 2003," The Pew Research Center For The People
& The Press, ed. Carroll Doherty, June 3, 2003, http://www.people-press.org/2003/06/03/views-of-a-changing-
world-2003 (accessed April 27, 2012); Gallarotti (2010), 228-230.
36
Gallarotti (2010), 226-227; Nye (2004), 47.

16
values have developed into their own addictive American strain creating “a pronounced
superiority in the competition over ideas” for the United States.37
The United States is
evidently very well placed in the globalized information age producing a substantial portion
of humanity’s popular culture, through which it is connected to most every other society on
Earth. Considering the speed with which messages can travel the globe, countries with “the
most access to multiple channels of communication” have the most influence over how those
messages are transmitted and more importantly, what those messages are.38
Existing as part of the larger international structure, this networked system greatly
influences the United States’ soft power by granting it substantial control over the global
agenda. It is here that soft power is exogenous to the greater social system by conditioning
the rules of the game, so affecting not the individual relationships or actors, but the system or
grouping as a whole. In this sense, soft power is a “meta-power” that shapes “social
relationships, social structures, and situations” by changing the overall environment of
interactions through the rules of the game.39
By dominating global culture through the ideas
and values distributed through an expansive network, the United States has a greater ability to
alter the environment and its rules than most any other player.
By introducing networks into the power calculus of the twenty-first century, the
importance of structural power is emphasized. Such is a form of meta-power where
“positioning in social networks can be an important power resource” that can increase or
decrease based on network positioning. Before the information age, networks were hub
centered with a network’s most powerful actor at its center. Today, networks are more
complex and constructed of multiple sub-networks stratified along the same lines as the
37
Gallarotti (2010), 229.
38
Nye (2002), 69.
39
Peter M. Hall, "Meta-Power, Social Organization, and the Shaping of Social Action," Symbolic Interaction 20,
no. 4 (1997): 397-418, 405.

17
international political system. Power distribution is affected by the extent of the networks; so
larger networks provide greater audiences of diverse groups. The ability to influence and
manipulate the structure is “integrative power.” Film is an especially useful means to this
end as “one of the most accessible art forms” able to be both accessed – either in a theatre or
at home – and understood by an incredibly wide audience (film’s accessibility will be further
covered in the subsequent chapter).40
By virtue of this, cinema around the world easily
disperses through the networks connected by countries, theatres and audiences extending the
American power network – and so, the American sphere of influence – globally.41
By inundating foreign markets with American products created using “formulas [that]
have, over time, helped establish the conventions which productions outside the U.S. aim to
match,” American products both dominate what audiences are seeing, and how those ideas
are being seen.42
Thru its media and popular culture alone the United States has a
commanding lead on the agenda and the rules of the game. Though indirectly through
Hollywood and MTV, the ideas being transmitted overseas are very distinctly American and
do not stay within the theatres or television sets. By exporting individualized values that are
often anti-establishment and counter-tradition “creativity rather than order rules” at the grass
roots level forcing foreign governments to adapt in order to maintain order on their own.43
The American exports of Facebook and Twitter proved their mettle in such a manner though
their part in the Arab Spring 2011. Those two social networking fora espouse open
communication and pluralism, which even now Islamic groups are grappling with.44
40
Mark Cousins, The Story of Film (New York, NY: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2004), 7.
41
Nye (2011), 17.
42
Gitlin (1998), 76.
43
Joffe (1997).
44
Haris Tarin, "The Biggest Challenge for Islamic Political Parties? Pluralism," The Huffington Post, May 31,
2012.

18
The universalistic culture, values, ideas and interests of the United States are more
likely to generate desired outcomes and cooperation greatly facilitating its ability to reach
other countries.45
The US possesses not only a culture of wide appeal, but also a vast supply
of commercial elements able to spread its culture around the world.46
Culture can only serve
so far on its own, despite appeal and reach, though greatly influences the next two aspects of
soft power. Political values and foreign policies are separate, however they can be combined
considering first the social structures and knowledge systems at play within the cultural
system of the United States, and second the greater socialization amongst those with shared
values elevating the singularly domestic to the collectively global. This provides political
values with heavy influence on foreign polices: consider, for instance, the United States’
values of liberty, democracy and freedom effecting the selection of alliances and where to
focus foreign policies, as well as the implementation of both domestic and foreign polices.
In the case of film, the United States has commanding market saturation around the
world.47
The next chapter will demonstrate the cultural and societal effects of film showing
market and box office statistics in order to indicate saturation, reach and opinions as they
correlate to film and the cinema industry. In the case of the United States, its cultural system
has embedded the industry – domestically and internationally – with certain norms that have
constructed and developed axioms and ideologies portrayed to audiences through film. When
presented to the world abroad, these principles and ideals contribute to other countries’
perception of “what the United States is.” Over time a picture is painted that is quite well
detailed, though of arguable accuracy. Such accuracy is affected by myriad other factors
45
Nye (2004), 11.
46
Nye (2004), 11.
47
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Values and shares of creative goods exports (film),
annual, 2010," UNCTADStat, United Nations, Jan 1, 2011,
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (accessed May 20, 2012).

19
such as individual temperament/biases; a country’s own society, culture and value systems;
and what other exposure there has been to the United States’ culture.

20
CHAPTER III – COLD WARRIORS, RELUCTANT
WARRIORS & LEADING FROM BEHIND: U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY
“Once that first bullet goes past your head,
politics and all that [stuff] just goes right out the window.”
-SFC Norm “Hoot” Gibson,
Black Hawk Down (2001)
Film is an artistic form of culture around the world capable of presenting and
conveying ideas with the power to call to action, satirize governments, criticize public policy
or touch people’s hearts. It is when hearts and minds are changed by film that it becomes of
interest to foreign policy. Though films do not always change hearts and minds, the cinema
and foreign policy comprise the two of the greatest vehicles of American culture and ideas to
the outside world. Much as film can influence people to think and discuss in the abstract,
foreign policy decisions can take these abstractions and bring them to life with sometimes
unpredictable outcomes.
This chapter will examine two recent eras in United States history that occurred
during times of especially outspoken policies, as well as global – almost systemic – change.
The first period analyzed is from 1982-1992 during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush (Bush-41); the second is from 2001-2011 during the terms of George W.
Bush (Bush-43) and Barack Obama. While both eras cover the terms of two separate
Presidents, they also look at how American presidential succession can both stay the course
and vary greatly. In the first instance, both Presidents were of the Republican Party, with
Bush-41 having served as Reagan’s Vice-President the latter as the former’s Vice-President,

21
though the two differed substantially in their background and international outlook. In the
second, President George W. Bush was a Republican and President Obama a Democrat. Both
differed greatly in their ideologies and international backgrounds In this chapter, we will
examine the background and foundations of their foreign policies with an eye towards the
message and ideas those policies broadcast.
From “Hollywood Hotel” to the White House: Presidents Ronald
Reagan & George H.W. Bush
President Ronald Reagan
“Tell me, Future Boy,” said Doctor Emmett Brown to the orange vest-clad Marty
McFly, “who’s President of the United States in 1985?” Confidently asserting to the
untamed mess of stark-white hair that was the Doc, “Ronald Reagan.” “Ronald Reagan?!”
blurts back Doc, “The actor?!”48
As absurd a proposition as this may have sounded to
someone in 1955 – let alone by a strange dressed teenager claiming to have travelled from the
future – when the Screen Actors Guild was Ronald Reagan’s best known constituency, the
1980’s viewed this proposition as the truth that would lead the United States to victory over
the Soviet Union.
For the better part of the twentieth century, the Cold War and its circumstances
defined American foreign policy. Rare has there been a better example of a state’s policies
defined so explicitly by “the Other.” During this time, the film industry’s stature grew within
the United States and abroad to the point that this former actor with “no experience in
48
Robert Zemeckis and Bob Gale, Back to the Future, directed by Robert Zemeckis, Universal Pictures, 1985.

22
national government or foreign affairs before he became president” was elected President of
the United States.49
Originally a Roosevelt Democrat, Reagan drifted to the right eventually becoming a
conservative Republican in the 1960’s.50
This drift from the conscientious liberal aided
Reagan’s presidency and foreign policy by enabling him to connect with both sides of the
aisle. He was a man who maintained his grounding in Hollywood, “Like many actors,
Reagan was the quintessential loner – as charming as he was self-centered,” said Henry
Kissinger.51
Ronald Reagan was a friendly, social man well liked at least on a personal level who
possessed a complex character that he kept shrouded in simplistic robes. Though a man of
limited – even, shallow – intellectual background, he legitimately and honestly rooted
himself in the values of the American Dream, touching the American psyche as did few
Presidents before.52
Elected during an “era of self-doubt” when Americans felt weak and
ready to retreat following defeats in Vietnam and Angola, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
and the hostages in Iran.53
Dominoes, it would appear, were toppling around the world.
American exceptionalism needed resuscitation and a straightforward – though not simple –
man who tapped into people’s “reservoirs of initiative and self confidence” did that.54
49
Thomas G. Paterson, American foreign relations : a history, 6th Edition, Vol. II, II vols. (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 2005), 431.
50
Michael Palo, Lecture IX: US Foreign Policy from Nixon to Reagan, 1969-89, Lecture, Department of History,
U.S. Foreign Policy, 1898 to Present (Brussels: Versalius College, Spring 2012), 23.
51
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 766.
52
George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, Inc., 2008), 862.
53
Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1897, 2nd Edition (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 485.
54
Kissinger (1994), 762-766.

23
President Reagan knew just how to enliven the American spirit, as it was one and the
same with his own. History and foreign policy, though, were not so near his heart.55
A
stubborn revisionist, Reagan would take what little he did know and tailor it to his beliefs,
often fondly retelling historical anecdotes with no factual basis or predicting outcomes based
on biblical references to Armageddon. An analytical mind for details Reagan’s was not.
Bored by the details of foreign policy boiling such down to “the dangers of appeasement, the
evils of communism, and the greatness of his own country.”56
Limited in intellectual
capacity, but with a knack to cut to the core issues, Reagan allowed his Secretary of State to
develop an effective foreign policy reflecting American idealism and exceptionalism. As his
presidency evolved, Reagan’s style and personality embodied an effective use of soft power
to “sell” America around the globe. President Reagan was a true idealist, which his staff
would at times have to rein in. His thinking was “always a little bit above us” admitted one-
time National Security Advisor Colin Powell.57
Reagan’s rather idealistic and instinctively unilateralist ideology was tempered by the
pragmatism of the mainstream Republican internationalism finding its champions in both of
his Secretaries of State, and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. They brought a
hard-nosed Machiavellianism to a White House staff with a general disregard for the rest of
the world and lacking trust in the United Nations and other international institutions. The
Reagan foreign policy rested on the “the superiority of American ideals and institutions.”58
Reagan and his advisers came to office determined to reverse the last fifteen years of
American foreign policy, deeply distraught by what had come to be a foreign policy focus on
55
Herring (2008), 864.
56
Kissinger (1994), 765.
57
General Colin Powell, interview by Jon Stewart, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, Comedy Central, New
York, Jun. 12, 2012.
58
Herring (2008), 864.

24
human rights during the Carter years and the détente built by President Nixon and Secretary
of State Kissinger.59
At his first Oval Office press conference, President Reagan charged the Kremlin as
“prepared to lie, cheat, and steal” for the Communist cause . The Soviets caused “all the
unrest in the world.”60
Later branding the Soviet Union “the evil empire,” borrowing a
phrase from the blockbuster film Star Wars.61
The behavior of the Reagan administration
often raised the ire of critics such as former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, George F.
Kennan who, deemed such simplifications “intellectual primitivism and naiveté.”62
Kennan
later claimed in 1983 the views of Washington towards the Kremlin were, “simply childish,
inexcusably childish, unworthy of people charged with the responsibility for conducting the
affairs of a great power in an endangered world”.63
The administration’s goals were greatly impeded by internal divisions resulting in a
foreign policy lacking the determination and coherence promised in the 1980 campaign.
During the campaign Reagan desired a “North American Accord” to economically link the
United States, Canada and Mexico, declaring “It is time we stopped thinking of our nearest
neighbors as foreigners.”64
Following their ascension to the White House, the administration
lost not only its first Secretary of State to scandal after only a year, but also went through two
Secretaries of State and six National Security Advisors, with Secretaries of State and Defense
59
Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy since 1900, 5th Edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2002), 334.
60
Jones (2008), 485..
61
Herring (2008), 866.
62
John J. Goldman, "Kennan takes swipe at Reagan: View of USSR termed unrealistic," The Bulletin,
November 17, 1981: A-3; TRB from Washington, "Geneva will test Reagan foreign policy flexibility," The
Modesto Bee, November 29, 1981: A-11.
63
John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York, NY: The Penguin Group, 2011), 660.
64
Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York, NY:
Metropolitan Books, 2008), 37.

25
Alexander Haig and Casper Weinberger, constantly at odds.65
This was in addition to a
skeptical and split Congress for the first six years of the administration with the Republicans
holding the Senate, and the Democrats the House of Representatives.66
In the early years of one of the most anti-Communist administrations in American
history Reagan openly refused to meet with Soviet leaders because it “represented the sort of
wooly minded idealism their assertive foreign policy was designed to combat”, breaking a
tradition dating back to President Herbert Hoover. It was instead the priority to protect the
country’s Minuteman land-based ICBM’s by pushing forward the largest peacetime military
buildup since 1940 because, “we do not know how much time is left” in the words of
Secretary of Defense Weinberger.67
Through most of the first Reagan term, foreign policy followed a slippery and
dangerous course that ever increased the specter of nuclear war. Such military buildup
served mostly to antagonize the Soviets, who believed Weinberger and his team were of
preparing for war. As well, the administration continued to increase the nuclear arsenal,
while deemphasizing Carter’s efforts to build relationships through economic assistance.
In the president’s mind strength, American moral superiority and the evils of
communism framed the Cold War as a reality only hard power and military strength could
answer. In the early years, the president and his administration were indeed acting, as
Kennan put it, childish in seeing unabashed Soviet aggression. This resistance began to melt
away during President Reagan’s second term, eventually to disappear all together.
Privately, Reagan proved increasingly more willing to negotiate, even as early as
1982. His diary and autobiography reveal the machismo and stereotype militant anti-
65
Jones (2008), 488.
66
Schulzinger (2002), 334.
67
Ibid., 334-335; Jones (2008), 487.

26
Communism more as political maneuvers than actual policy.68
While famous for “Cold
Warrior” tactics that deemed the Soviet Union the “evil empire” – his Secret Service
nickname was “Rawhide” reminiscent of the Western, cowboy heroes he portrayed in film –
his friendly, charming personality was not reserved to capitalists alone.69
Through that rawhide, Cold Warrior exterior, President Reagan was showing a desire
to both practice and elevate the use of soft power in his foreign policy. He was not a true
believer of structural or geopolitical causes of tension, putting greater faith in the human
element of the equation, and thus allowing his extraordinary tactical flexibility. Still, for the
archetypal anti-communist with undying faith in his country, rhetoric meant convincing the
Soviets of capitalism’s and the United States’ great benefits. As a policy, Reagan approved
the ideas of balancing the world order and negotiating with the Soviet Union so to reach
agreements “consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.”70
By showing all equal friendliness, a natural congeniality and amiable disposition at
the personal level; at the political level by reaching out to Soviet leadership and using a
rhetoric that “wove a seamless tapestry of ‘morality, heritage, boldness, heroism, and
fairness’ that offered a compelling, if rather fanciful, vision of a genuine national
community.”71
68
Kissinger (1994), 770.
69
Herring (2008), 864-866.
70
National Security Council of the United States, "U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R," National Security Decision
Directive 75 (Jan. 17, 1983).
71
Kissinger (1994), 767-771; Herring (2008), 861-866; Richard A. Melanson, American Foreign Policy Since
the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 136-137.

27
President George H.W. Bush
In the Reagan administration, foreign policy operated upon mechanics of simplicity
imitating Occam’s Razor through their executive. Reagan was a former actor and television
personality who, along with his team, lacked foreign policy experience. His personality often
epitomized Hollywood -- outgoing, social and creative. In contrast, Reagan’s Vice-President
and successor, George H.W. Bush (Bush-41) had a very impressive international resume:
ambassador to the United Nations under President Nixon; de facto ambassador to China; and
Director of Central Intelligence. His personal and professional background bred an ethos of
hard work, modesty, competition and public service that was typical of his generation and
class.72
During his time in office – both as president and vice-president – foreign policy was
his passion. He travelled 1.3 million miles to 65 countries as vice-president, building a
network of relationships – earning him the title “Rolodex President” – that he would later
utilize during Operation Desert Storm. His foreign policy team was composed of a tight-knit
partnership of like-minded men providing a strong contrast to constant bickering bedeviling
the Reagan administration. They took a narrow vision of U.S. interests, which suited the
president and his “obligation to temper optimism with prudence” focusing less on grand ideas
and more so on the process. 73
President Bush-41 believed in letting history take its course.
Seeing the positive revolutions occurring in Eastern Europe, he refused to encourage or
exploit the events, acting with a standoffish policy in the beginning.74
72
Herring (2008), 899-900.
73
Schulzinger (2002), 354; Jones (2008), 525.
74
Jones (2008), 525.

28
As a man of process and not creativity, Bush-41 had a problem with the “vision
thing” in his own words.75
However, for better or worse, the world that he inherited was
nothing like the one he and his team knew, and his foreign policy anchor – namely
Containment –no longer had a purpose.76
. Upon taking office in January 1989 the president
seemed to show little understanding of the revolutions ending the Cold War.77
This resulted
in a tentative and incomplete adaption of U.S. foreign policy to the post-Cold War world.78
The Bush-41 administration stuck to what they knew: namely the Cold War policies
of Reagan.79
Once confessing, “I am not an emotional kind of guy,” when the Berlin Wall
came down, President Bush-41 prided himself as cautious and unemotional he preferred to
make decisions after the dust had begun to settle.80
So as world quickly spun towards a new
world order Bush-41 and his advisers adopted the “status quo approach,” the intent on which
was to observe the Cold War sphere of influence status quo and respect events beyond the
Berlin as outside of the American sphere.
President Bush was initially suspicious of Gorbachev but more so of whoever could
follow him – still clinging to the soon-to-be outdated Cold War mentality.81
As the Berlin
Wall fell and thousands crossed the once foreboding border, the administration remained
predictably cautious seeking the balance between freedom and order. At a time of confusion
75
Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2002), 55.
76
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: Revised and Expanded (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 343.
77
Jones (2008), 525.
78
Bacevich (2002), 55.
79
Jones (2008), 526.
80
Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the End of the Soviet Union, 1983-
1991 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 364.
81
Herring (2008), 902.

29
and reorientation for policy makers the world over, such stunning shifts created something
unpredictable and bewildering. With the separation of Germany the looming question of the
day, the easiest method to employ was NATO.82
Action was especially necessary here due to the rapid influx of immigrants from east
to west (roughly 50,000 per month) leading to the approaching collapse of the East German
economy. The United States was vital in this procedure, but the Germans lead the major
push declaring themselves one people. By this point, Gorbachev was out of cards to play and
despite a nervous Soviet Union and Europe – who especially had vivid memories of the
World Wars – was seeking concessions desperately: Gorbachev’s initial proposal allowed for
German unification, but not admitting them to NATO (as is always a sensitive issue to
Soviets and Russians). At President Bush’s insistence the plan was settled as the “Two-plus-
Four” method allowing Germans to govern domestic matters while requiring negotiation with
the four postwar occupiers.83
After the dust had begun to settle in 1989 as the Berlin wall began to crumble,
President Bush felt euphoria and “repeatedly hailed ‘freedom’s march’ and ‘democracy’s
advance’…[towards] ‘the creation of a true community of nations built on shared interests
and ideals.’”84
In a truly Wilsonian manner, Bush-41 was declaring a “new world order”
emphasizing the need for international cooperation, collaboration and organizations,
82
Linda B. Miller, "American Foreign Policy: Beyond Containment?," International Affairs (Blackwell
Publishing) 66, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 313-324, 315.
83
Herring (2008), 907; Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, "Wendt’s constructivism: A relentless quest for
synthesis," in Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics, ed. Stefano Guzzini
and Anna Leander, 73-91 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 104.
84
John A. Thompson, "Wilsonianism: the dynamics of a conflicted concept," International Affairs (Blackwell
Publishing), no. 1 (2010): 27-48, 44.

30
“replac[ing] the realist international system of bipolarity and balance of power that had
dominated the Cold War era.”85
The Bush-41 administration was eager to maintain the relationship with China an
excellent economic partner as it westernized its economy. In a subtle execution of soft
power, thousands of students studied abroad in the United States, returning home enamored
by – and now seeking – western ideals of liberty, democracy and freedom. Begun in 1984,
these demands grew into the nationwide Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 provoking a
nervous government to declare martial law in May and violently suppressing the protestors
before a stunned world watching on television.86
Caught off guard, the Bush administration’s response was confused and ambivalent at
best, working fervently behind the scenes to maintain “the Sino-American ties cultivated by
every president since Richard Nixon.”87
The Chinese did not react and continued their
crackdown. The meek and ineffective response on the part of the Bush administration
garnered severe criticism from both the right and the left at home, and changed Sino-
American relations in ways that still linger today.
In the late 1990’s, President Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeline Albright declared,
“We are the indispensible nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into
the future.” Such confidence is what drove U.S. foreign policy through the 1990’s and was
able to unseat President George H.W. Bush in 1992. The changing of the guard in 1992 had
much to do with Operation Desert Storm of 1991. As it provided a decisive victory for the
United States – and thus the president – it should have clinched the election in favor of the
incumbent. The results, however, went quite the other way. Bush-41’s loss at the polls is
85
Elke Krahmann, "American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing Visions of International Security,"
International Studies Review (Blackwell Publishing), no. 7 (2005): 531-545, 532.
86
Bacevich (2002), 64-65.
87
Herring (2008), 900-903; Bacevich (2002), 65.

31
attributed mostly to the administration’s paying too much attention to foreign policy and not
enough to domestic allowing the economy to weaken.88
The defeat also reflected dissatisfaction with the administration’s handling of foreign
policy, specifically that following Tiananmen. The American people disapproved of using
valuable U.S. resources – human, economic and political –with a country that would openly
massacre protesting civilians.89
Though the most obvious, the Bush-41 administration proved
rife with blunders including what Bush’s last Secretary of State characterized as “pasted
together diplomacy” and a glaring inability to articulate a plausible rational for their foreign
policy and exercise of power following the Cold War.90
The Indispensible Nation
It was a remarkable period in human history and change from 1982 to 1992 during the
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations seeing the fall of Communism, the
liberation of East Europe and the end of the Cold War. This was a war of ideology,
spearheaded by Reagan’s efforts to restore a sense of national well being, promoting
American superiority while delegitimizing Soviet views. The Soviet vision was not being
undermined by abstract liberal principles, but by the material and cultural manifestations of
Western freedoms. “Western popular culture – exemplified in rock and roll, television, film,
and blue jeans – seduced the communist world.”91
During one of the most frightening and dangerous times in our history, one constantly
overshadowed by the specter of nuclear war, it was not military hard power that undermined
88
Bacevich (2002), 78.
89
Ibid., 77.
90
Ibid., 78.
91
Deudney and Ikenbery (1992), 134.

32
Soviet efforts, but cultural soft power from the West – primarily the United States – that had
the greatest effect not on Soviet leadership, but on the Soviet peoples. As was shown in
Chapter II, soft power is an indirect form of power that often is not in a government’s control.
The U.S. government could not control its society’s cultural affect on the Soviet sphere of
influence, and neither could the Supreme Soviet control that culture influencing its peoples.
Such a reality fits a president like Reagan. For him, despite rhetoric of “evil
empires,” the Cold War was a conflict of values. Reagan was the absolute embodiment of
American cultures, values, faiths and ideas. As General Colin Powell recently said of
President Reagan, “During those years he was the greatest manifestation and representation
of what the American people and the American spirit and what America was all about.”92
Ronald Wilson Reagan believed so strongly in the American form of government and
American ideals of freedom, liberty, democracy and equality that these principles kept him
grounded. He could pursue friendly relations with the country he had just called an “evil
empire.”
This idealistic, value-based approach renewed American’s hope in their own nation,
and built global hope in America as a hyperpower. By depending solely on military tactics
and hard power Reagan would not have been able to build solid, lasting relationships with
other world leaders, namely Mikhail Gorbachev. Other leaders would have resented both the
United States and their executive -- pushing them closer to Soviet influence. The greater
world was able to empathize with America and its values – most profoundly, the Soviet
peoples with American popular culture – making them want to follow the United States.
Reagan achieved this not only through his persistent, almost stubborn, beliefs but also
through his ability to sell those ideas. Reagan’s acting background allowed him the
experience presenting and speaking before people in a variety of characters that made him a
92
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, June 12, 2012.

33
natural to sell America’s ideas to the world; the only difference, though, was that Reagan was
not playing a character, but himself and his heart. This is something that his successor,
George H.W. Bush, lacked greatly, considered a far plainer man than Reagan. Lacking
creativity and “the vision thing” put him at a weakened stance in selling values. Though
having to resort to more traditional means such as classic diplomacy, Bush-41 was still able
to portray the same values as Reagan though with less flair.
The Times They Are A Changin’: Presidents George W. Bush and
Barack Obama
President George W. Bush
By the end of the twentieth century, foreign policy was an issue of little concern to
Americans. The Clinton administration had downgraded foreign policy, sharply reducing the
foreign affairs budget and increasing the defense budget.93
Thirty embassies were closed,
leading Secretary of State Warren Christopher to lament, “We cannot advance American
interests by lowering the American flag. Our global presence should be expanding, not
contracting.”94
American foreign policy and action abroad caused French Foreign Minister
Hubert Vedrine to define the country as a “hyperpower.”95
President Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration of
an inconsistent foreign policy, while deploring “a sharp decline in the morale of the U.S.
armed forces,” emphasizing his belief that national security was the primary component of
93
Herring (2008), 937.
94
Steven Erlanger, "Clinton May Be Pressured to Act on Global Stage," The New York Times, Nov. 11, 1996.
95
The New York Times, "To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower'," Feb. 5, 1999.

34
foreign affairs, further indicating a disdain for humanitarian interventions and “nation
building.”96
The Yale and Harvard educated son of former President George H.W. Bush had
travelled little and the bulk of his governing experience came from the Texas statehouse. He
appointed a strong foreign policy team consisting in large part of his father’s team members
to help balance for his own lack of experience: the internationalist, popular and experienced
Colin Powell as Secretary of State; prudent Soviet-expert Condoleezza Rice as National
Security Advisor; the often gloomy and sinister Richard Cheney as the most powerful Vice-
President in history; and the militant bureaucrat Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense.97
From the beginning, the foreign policy envisioned by this team was unilateralist,
security centric and isolated. National security was always the first priority, believing it
could be best preserved though “a la carte multilateralism…look[ing] at each agreement and
make a decision, rather than come out with a broad-based approach.”98
Such statements often
contrasted with direct, often internationally defiant, actions to reject the Middle East peace
process, declare dead the Kyoto Protocol on global Warming, suspend talks with North
Korea, and re-characterize China as a strategic rival instead of a partner.99
Critics at home
and abroad were quick to brand the administrations “rude manners and go-it-alone methods”
as a new isolationism.100
During the first six-months in office, the Bush-43 administration
had spurned allies, turned away from international constraints, and given up on partnership or
cooperation beyond their shores. The hard power implications of their policy were clear; a
rejection of the globalization taking greater hold of the world was even clearer.
96
Schulzinger (2002), 378; Michael C. Desch, "Humanitarian Intervention: Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons,"
Orbis (Foreign Policy Research Institute) 45, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 519-533, 528.
97
Herring (2008), 938; Schulzinger (2002), 379.
98
Thom Shanker, "White House Says the U.S. Is Not a Loner, Just Choosy," The New York Times, July 31,
2001; Thom Shanker, "The World; Spinning À la Mode," The New York Times, Aug. 5, 2001.
99
Schulzinger (2002), 379.
100
Herring (2008), 939.

35
On the morning of September 11, 2001, it became even clearer. In the wake of the
first foreign attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Bush administration
made revolutionary changes in American foreign policy that were unequalled since President
Truman in 1947.101
The attack aimed to restore Islam to its former power and to rally
jihadists around the world. To prove that America and the West were not as powerful as
assumed, bin Laden and his Al Qaeda hoped to rally jihadists to the cause of bringing the
West down.
In response, the American spirit and psyche were instead inflamed, bringing people
together fueled by fear and anger. President Bush vowed to “Take the battle to the enemy,
disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”102
A soft power
response would not work. A military response was the best – perhaps only – option. As the
catastrophe brought the American people together, the world came together behind America.
The French newspaper Le Monde avowed, “We are all Americans. We are all New
Yorkers.”103
In an address to Congress nine days later on September 20, President Bush declared,
“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you
are with the terrorists.”104
During the following weeks, the United States and the president
received expressions of solidarity and sympathy from around the world including pledges of
cooperation and support from France, Japan, Jordan, and Indonesia.105
Under the leadership
101
Ibid., 938.
102
Bacevich (2008), 124.
103
Jean Marie Colombani, "Nous sommes tous Américains ("We are all Americans")," Le Monde, Sept. 13,
2001 (Translated with Google Translate).
104
Office of the Press Secretary, "President Declares "Freedom at War with Fear"", The White Hosue -
President George W. Bush, Sept. 20, 2001, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed Jun. 8, 2012).
105
Office of the Press Secretary, News Archive - September 2001, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ (accessed Jun. 8, 2012).

36
of Powell, a coalition began to form including Britain, France, Russia, China and even
Pakistan to invade Afghanistan. The unilateralism declared during the previous nine months,
as it would appear, was a thing of the past.
The Global War on Terror (“GWOT”) began as a global effort to cut off terrorist
financing around the world. This measure supported by the Japanese, the Saudis, and the
Russians agreed to a mission to “rout out and destroy international terrorism.”106
Through
this, the Bush-43 administration was able to cripple Taliban and Al Qaeda support in
Afghanistan successfully; however, “The war managers made crucial errors that turned
tactical successes into strategic failure.”107
Over the following decade, the Taliban survived –
though still crippled – hiding out in the mountains of Pakistan, while the United States made
the ill attempt of nation building in Afghanistan with insufficient resources, inadequate
preparation, and severely lacking enthusiasm for the project.108
In January 2002, the Bush administration unveiled the 2002 National Security
Strategy: a doctrinal work designed by Rice’s NSC staff under the direction of President
Bush evoking 9/11 and the GWOT to codify the ideas and values of conservatives and neo-
conservatives. This document harkened back to the days of President Reagan and the elder
President Bush calling on American exceptionalism that would “grant itself a right it would
deny to other countries.”109
This document truly codified what would come to be known as
the Bush Doctrine: a very controversial policy and practice that bred much ill will towards
the United States by its singular vision of American exceptionalism (“A distinctly American
106
Ibid., "International Campaign Against Terror Grows," The White House - President George W. Bush, Sept.
25, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010925-1.html (accessed Jun.
8, 2012).
107
Herring (2008), 943.
108
Michael Ignatieff, "Nation-Building Lite," The New York Times Magazine, July 28, 2002.
109
Stanley A. Renshon, National Security in the Obama Administration: Reassessing the Bush Doctrine (New
York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 150.

37
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”110
). National
security now equaled foreign policy, making the National Security Strategy the defining
document of American foreign policy during the Bush-43 years.
The doctrine had four elements. First, democracies are peaceful by nature possessing
the interest of creating a likewise international environment “that is congenial to American
interests and ideals.” Such set out that all democracies though a benign and pacifist nature,
exist as such and so to create an American-centric environment. Second, terrorists are
especially threatening in the modern age, all the more so when linked to WMD and tyrannical
regimes. Third, defense and deterrence, though useful, are inadequate to perform the job
fully so the United States must be able to act preemptively – if necessary, including war –
because consensus is difficult to achieve and a militarily superior United States must be
better prepared to act. Finally, the widest possible support should be attained, but no other is
allowed to veto the United States.111
Such ideology, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, “relied on the implicit judgment
that the United States is different than other countries and can be trusted to use its military
power justly and wisely in ways that other powers cannot.”112
As many scholars have noted,
this strategy was determined, though incomplete and unsustainable.113
The call for ending
tyranny and dictatorial practice around the world involves the transformation of global and
domestic systems; for which hard power and military force are effective, though will only
110
The White House, "National Policy: National Security Strategy of the United States of America,"
GlobalSecurity.org, Jan. 1, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf
(accessed Jan. 26, 2011), 1.
111
Robert Jervis, "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," Political Science Quarterly (The Academy of
Political Science) 120, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 351-377, 351.
112
Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 101.
113
See Jervis (2005), Michael Hirsh, "Bush and the World: The Need For A New Wilsonianism," Foreign
Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations) 81, no. 5 (Sept./Oct. 2002): 18-43; and Jeremy Suri, "American Grand
Strategy from the Cold War’s End to 9/11," Orbis (Elsevier Limited), Fall 2009: 611-627.

38
attain so much. Others in consultation and action would be necessary to change these
systems, and these actions would be inhibited, however, by the unilateralist impulses of the
Bush Doctrine.114
The Bush Doctrine, however, served some undeniable purpose for American foreign
policy. For a foreign policy originally based on realist visions of isolationism the Doctrine
provided an animating service that transformed the administration’s focus by rationalizing
assertiveness abroad that has been neither seen nor warranted since the early Cold War. Such
policy confidence has lead to the U.S. greatly redefining its relationships around the world
and asserting itself (appropriately and otherwise), as in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 115
European countries, especially, had severe complaints with one aspect of the
Doctrine.116
The Doctrine gave the United States sweeping, almost uncontrollable power,
creating a vast power disparity between the United States and the rest of the world. However,
the Doctrine itself did not grant the power, only indicated the intent with which it would be
used. A doctrine such as this requires a nation with the power resources to back its strong
words. The United States does, in fact, have overwhelming material capabilities, causing
some states reason to be anxious. However, such anxiety should stem from knowledge of
those intentions – or lack there of. By and large, states do know each other’s intentions, and
normally can exist with some confidence that they are safe from United States aggression.117
There were reasons to be nervous: first, the threat of such action are entirely
unilateral; second, the reaction could not be vetoed; and, finally, the Doctrine proved an
114
Jervis (2005), 375.
115
Hirsh (2002), 19.
116
Ibid., 20.
117
Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory as Cartesian science: An auto-critique from a quantum perspective," in
Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics, 178-216 (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2006), 207.

39
ideological breach of sovereignty, in so much as it would potentially require another state to
change beliefs or policy so to avoid attack. While under normal circumstances, the countries
of Europe and the rest of the world had no real reason to fear the United States. However,
with such threats and potential actions levied against them, they were not given much choice
in the early days of the Bush Doctrine.
The administration’s behavior played a significant role in provoking the ire of the rest
of the world. The Doctrine spoke of lofty and universal ideas such as human civilization,
global security, and common values. Yet, there was a somewhat consistent disregard for “the
civilities and practices that other nations would identify with a common civilization.”118
Not
the least of which was the brazen threat of force to ensure compliance, part of which was the
absolute unilateral standpoint that refused consultation or objection.
Unfortunately, the only security the United States was committed to was American
security. Such exercise was one determined to limit the abilities of others, thus enhancing
American abilities. In ancient Greek theatre, the deus ex machina was a plot device of often-
divine origin that “suddenly appears when naturalist explanations are exhausted.”119
For a
man of strong faith such as George W. Bush who often invoked God and biblical imagery in
his statements, anointing himself and his country as charged with bettering the world for its
own good would be no stretch of the imagination.120
While in tune with the ideologies of President Reagan (who preferred a soft power
approach of talking with the Kremlin and Soviet leadership) President Bush desired hard
power to force democracy and freedom upon foreigners because they do not know better –
118
Hirsh (2002), 20.
119
Petr Drulák, "Reflexivity and structural change," in Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander
Wendt and his critics, 138-157 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 138.
120
Tom Carver, Bush puts God on his side, BBC, Apr. 6, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2921345.stm
(accessed June 7, 2012).

40
creating a Manichaean dyadic in policy of “if you are not with us, you are against us.”121
American core values have always bolstered American’s “abiding faith in democracy,”122
encompassed essentially liberal freedoms and rights. During the Bush-43 administration,
though, these core values took a startling de-evolution causing often great abuse of those
cherished universal rights such as through the USA PATRIOT Act that essentially, “made a
mockery for many inside and outside the country of America’s commitment to freedom,
democracy, and human rights.”123
The Bush Doctrine ultimately resulted in what Giulio Gallarotti terms “hard
disempowerment,” which is the manifestation of the exercise of power generating significant
weakening effects. In the event of such over-reliance on hard power such dependence
eventually resulted in “manifold adverse consequences…[that] are pervasive in a complex
international system” affecting American diplomatic, commercial, and cultural exchanges
amongst others.124
It was during these years that the United States was seen from abroad – as well as at
home – as a bully and a hypocrite. The Bush-43 foreign policy that developed early in the
term and almost entirely responding to a single – though catastrophic – event, did relax over
time as Bush-43 tempered his unilateralism, though this behavior modification was greatly
caused by decreasing favorability of the administration at home and abroad. For instance,
headlines detailing controversies and other news from the Abu Ghraib prison scandal to
details of what was happening at Guantanamo Bay. As then-Senator Barack Obama stated in
121
Harvey Sicherman, "Virtue, Interest, and Works in American Foreign Policy," Soc (Springer Science +
Business Media, LLC) 44 (Oct. 2007): 113-119, 117.
122
William O. Walker III, National Security and Core Values in American History (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 5.
123
Walker (2009), 269.
124
Gallarotti (2010), 181-196.

41
a Foreign Affairs article leading up to the 2008 election, “the world has lost trust in our
purposes and our principles.”125
President Barack H. Obama
“Hello, Chicago!” boomed the voice in the middle of Chicago, Illinois’ Grant Park
surrounded by countless supporters. Before them stood President-elect of the United States
of America Barack Hussein Obama: the first African-American elected to this lofty office on
a campaign driven by “Hope,” “Change,” and “Yes We Can!” a message spread to every
corner of the country, and across the world.126
Obama’s victory speech on the evening of
Tuesday, November 4, 2008 emphasized his campaign message that put people first and
underscored the importance of standing behind beliefs. In an almost defiant manner he
reminds those watching that he was not elected to a collection of individuals, nor a patchwork
of ideologies. “We are, and always will be,” Obama declared passionately, “the United
States of America.”
By early 2007 the country and the world had tired of American imperialism and the
hawkish attitude adopted so readily by the Bush-43 Administration. The 2006 mid-term
elections gave the Democrats the majority in Congress, and appointing Delaware Democrat
Senator Joseph Biden chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and began actively to
push back against Bush Administration assertive unilateralism. Perhaps one of the most
poignant statements came from Illinois Democrat, Representative Rahm Emanuel that
125
Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations) 86, no. 4
(July/Aug. 2007), 4-13.
126
Barack Obama, "This is your victory," Campaign Victory Speech to Supporters in Grant Park, Chicago, IL
(Nov. 4, 2008); Jeff Zeleny, "Burnishing Credentials, Obama Will Visit the Middle East and Europe," The New
York Times, June 29, 2008.

42
“Everybody came to the conclusion that more of the same – of no change – was not a viable
option.”127
By March 2007, the world was ready for a change almost as much as Americans.128
The Pew Global Attitudes Project found a severe loss of the goodwill towards America. By
June 2005 “anti-Americanism is becoming increasingly entrenched.”129
Though a global
phenomenon, it became strongest in the Muslim world, even more so after the invasion of
Iraq. The U.S. even lost favor in places it had had popular support . In Indonesia favorability
between 2002 and 2003 dropped from 61% to 15%, and in Turkey from 52% in the late
1990s to 15% by 2003. In an effort to “win hearts and minds” throughout the Islamic world,
President George W. Bush and his administration managed to entrench feelings of disdain
and ill will.130
The Obama Administration needed to repair and rebuild the American image so to
regain the power lost under the Bush Administration.131
. In summer 2007, well over a year
before his election, then-Senator Barack Obama espoused the beginnings of his foreign
policy. Acknowledging great American leaders such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry
Truman, and John F. Kennedy, Obama noted that “They ensured that America, by deed and
example, led and lifted the world.” He underlined both his own personal disapproval of the
127
Jeff Zeleny, "The Reach of War; House, 218 to 212, votes to set date for Iraq pullout," The New York Times,
March 24, 2007.
128
Lydia Saad, "Americans Favor President Meeting With U.S. Enemies," Poll, Gallup World, Gallup, Inc.
(2008); Frank Newport, "Americans Favor Diplomacy With North Korea, Not Military Action," Poll, Gallup
World, Gallup, Inc. (2006).
129
Pew Global Attitudes Project, March 14, 2007.
130
Ibid.
131
Gallarotti (2010), 224-225.

43
Bush-43 Administration, but also his understanding of and appreciation for a soft power
approach.132
In this article, Obama declared the “mission of the United States is to provide global
leadership grounded in the understanding that the world shares a common security and a
common humanity.” From day one the goals of the Obama Administration were focused on
repairing the mistakes of the previous administration, be they political, economic, domestic
or international. Following the Iraq War and scandals at the Abu Ghraib prison, Obama
openly admitted, “The world has lost trust in our purposes and our principles.”133
The plan laid out in summer 2007 was based on the idea of “Common Security for
our Common Humanity” focused on cooperation with other countries. “American cannot
meet threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them without America.”134
In
order to repair the mistakes of the past, Senator Obama prescribed the need to, first, rebuild
American partnerships by demonstrating that the United States is dedicated to cooperating
and not, “Bullying other countries to ratify changes we hatch in isolation.”135
Obama also indicated a priority repair relationships and standings with international
organizations such as the UN and NATO and “forg[ing] a more effective framework in Asia”
to interact with and be more inclusive of Eastern Asia. In addition to balancing the
relationship with China as one of broad cooperation and fair, capable competition, efforts to
collaborate and cooperate with the existing major powers – China, Brazil, India, Nigeria, and
South Africa – ensuring that everyone has a stake in the international order. However,
despite the necessity of diplomacy to the administration, in the event of humanitarian crises,
132
Obama (2007), 2.
133
Obama (2007), 4.
134
Ibid., 4
135
Ibid., 11.

44
the U.S. should look to NATO or other organizations if a more forceful approach is
necessitated.136
Obama made no small point regarding that his administration has been “cleaning up
something that is quite simply a mess.”137
A significant portion of his first years in office was
dedicated to this. Obama’s first year, for instance, was dominated by the economic crisis –
that today is still a matter of concern – as well as a congressional fight over health-care
reform.138
However, his office and administration still strive for an international, cooperative
foreign policy based on global interdependence where alliances and cooperation are key.
While accepting the importance of national security and national interests, the President does
not believe that American interest can only survive as long as American values are
hegemonic. Knowing that there are as many varieties of values on the planet, there are also
common values as seen through “common security for our common humanity” that the
United States needs to set the example on such as dignity, tolerance and equality, and fair and
equitable justice for all.139
Additionally, President Obama has made strong efforts to build coalitions and
cooperate with other countries in addressing international issues such as building an
international coalition to stop the massacre in Libya; authorizing and executing resources and
manpower for relief efforts for Haiti following the earthquake in January 2010, and following
the earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March 2011; and met with leaders of the International
136
Susan E. Rice, Anthony Lake and Donald M. Payne, "We Saved Europeans. Why Not Africans?," The
Washington Post, Oct. 2, 2006; Lise Morjé Howard, "Sources of Change in United States–United Nations
Relations," Global Governance (Lynne Rienner Publishers) 16, no. 4 (2010): 485-503, 498.
137
Marc A. Thiessen, "Obama's Inhereitance: Al-Qaeda in Retreat," World Affairs (Heldref Publications),
Summer 2009: 74-83, 74.
138
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "From Hope to Audacity: Appraising Obama's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs
(Council on Foreign Relations) 89, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2010): 16-30, 30.
139
The White House, "National Security Strategy," The White House, National Security Council, Jan 1, 2011,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed Mar 15,
2011), 35.

45
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan during the annual NATO Summit to discuss the
next step in the transition, setting the goal that by 2013 “all parts of Afghanistan will have
begun transition and the Afghan forces will be in the lead for security nation-wide.”140
Light At the End of the Tunnel
The years from 2001 to 2011 in the Untied States have been some of the most
fascinating and aggressive in American history. Having survived the first attack on
American soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the first on the continental United States by a
foreign country since the War of 1812 the United States has come out the other side with
some scars to show for it, though with great signs of healing. The purpose of the 9/11 attacks
was to bring a world power to its knees show its weakness, instead the absolute opposite
happened: the country stood behind its motto E Pluribus Unum – from many, one –
modifying it to “united we stand, divided we fall” showing the American resilience when
standing together.
While the motto and idea endured consistently, in practice such was not always true.
The issues and the responses of the Bush Administration to the concerns in the beginning
held the country together; though after time those same responses became some of the most
divisive in recent memory giving President Bush-43 the lowest domestic approval rating in
history. The United States was lambasted abroad isolating the country at a time when
international cooperation could not have been more important for a “Global War on Terror.”
The world became afraid and distrustful of the United States, harming even some of their
oldest, most desired alliances – most notably with Europe.
140
The White House, Foreign Policy | The White House, Jan. 1, 2012,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy (accessed June 2, 2012); North Atlantic Treaty Orgnization,
"Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan," NATO, May 21, 2012,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm? (accessed June 2, 2012).

46
Though the Bush-43 hawkish rhetoric became subdued, and the world could relax
slightly, the damage had been done to the point that all over the world people were watching
the 2008 Presidential Election; at home the Republican Party candidate, John McCain began
distancing himself from Bush-43. During the 1990s, President Clinton de-prioritized foreign
policy setting the stage for a president with lackluster foreign policy credentials to redesign
American foreign policy almost from scratch. During the 2000s, the redesigned foreign
policy left American foreign relations in shambles setting the stage for President Obama to
need to rebuild the United States’ image, policies, and relationships around the world.
By 2007 there was little to no hope or grace left for the United States, either
domestically or internationally. Senator Barack Obama tapped into what reserves were left at
home encouraging the people that the United States was great still, and could continue to be
great. Obama went to work to repair and rebuild by showing the world that the U.S. wanted
cooperate, could compromise, and was a world leader still whether with the UN or NATO; or
by reinvigorating relationships with Asia and developing economies ensuring that everyone
had a stake in the international order.
Both presidents Bush-43 and Obama believed in the United States: they shared a
patriotism that is necessary and unique to those who have held their office, however the
implementation of that patriotism could not have been more different. The U.S. is a special
and powerful country capable of leading the world to a better place: according to President
Bush-43, that better place was wherever he said it should be because other countries do not
know as well; for President Obama, that better place was working with the rest of the world
as a leader accepting of other countries capacity for success. Through compassion,
understanding, and listening the Obama Administration was able to – with mixed though
notable successes – walk back much of the ill will developed around the world during his
predecessors tenure.

47
The United States is still a world power, placing it in a position of great criticism and
adulation. The problem with being placed on a pedestal is the higher vantage point also
makes it easier to be seen: mistakes, successes, failures are seen by all. While on that
pedestal, the image portrayed to the world abroad will gain both respect and fear depending
on how that image is portrayed. President Bush-43 decided to make those below the pedestal
aware of their inferiority, while President Obama acknowledged the lofty placement while
acknowledging more equal standing with other countries. The soft power approach of the
Obama Administration showed more effective, successful results in world politics and
foreign policy by making other countries want to join the US in their endeavors and not
forcing it upon them by fear.

48
CHAPTER IV – HOLLYWOOD HYPERPOWER
AMERICAN FILM, CULTURE & SOCIETY AT HOME & ABROAD
“Street corners lined church next to synagogue, next to mosque,
newspapers that can print anything they want,
women who can do anything they want including
taking a rocket ship to outer space, vote, and play soccer.
This is a plural society. That means we accept more than one idea.”
-Josh Lyman,
The West Wing, “Isaac & Ishmael” (2001)
The telling and experiencing of stories have been enjoyed for millennia, and
regardless of the medium, it still is today. From a business perspective, film in the United
States is the most popular means of an evening out with the family providing an attendance
of about 1.28 billion in 2011 (compared to a combined 133 million attendees at all major
sports). Such popularity correlates with admission cost where in 2011 a movie ticket cost on
average about $8 each, an average ticket to a Major League Baseball game cost around
$30.141
From a cross-cultural perspective, film is equally as accessible and enjoyable.
Though here boiled down to “a storytelling medium” or “multi-billion-dollar industry,”
film’s greatness comes from what Mark Cousins calls its “alluring dualism.” While it is art –
and so, subjective – the camera does photograph something objectively, however with
broader appeal than other creative media:
141
MPAA, "Theatrical Marketing Statistics 2011," Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (2011), 10.

49
“Music, being less representational than film, is purer and more evocative;
novels can more adroitly describe mental processes; painting is more directly
expressive; poetry, far less unwieldy.”142
Looking at film this way, it is able to appeal to a broader array of senses and emotions
without intricate technical knowledge. As film historian Scott MacDonald described his
being drawn to film, “it provides an experience fundamentally different from reading literary
texts…a public experience” of auditory/visual stimuli that people come together to
experience socially.143
The social and cultural effects and implications of film will be examined here looking
to the purpose film holds within a society as a form of both art and entertainment. The belief
will be maintained that “to set politics apart from the rest of culture is not a feasible option
for the maintenance of citizenship” considering the political-cultural symbiosis, but more
importantly politics’ need of culture to remain in touch with the people.144
This dissertation
will then trace the cultural atmosphere of the United States during the 1980’s and 2000’s,
comparing the national culture with the film culture, which we shall see are not always one
and the same, though at times follow similar courses. The bulk of discussion for each era
will comprise analysis of the culture of the time according to the era’s top grossing films.
The purpose of this division will be to separate the cultural and the political from an
analytical standpoint. This is necessary for the analysis, first, because of soft power’s ability
to operate outside of and independent from the sphere of government and politics requiring a
look at the ways non-governmental actors develop a country’s power. Second is the
142
Cousins (2004), 9.
143
MacDonald (1988), 39.
144
Ruth Wodak, "The glocalization of politics in television: Fiction or reality?," European Journal of Cultural
Studies 13, no. 1 (2010): 43-62, 45.

50
developmental relationship between culture and politics at the national level, often following
similar courses. To this end, film “helps us get a sense of everyday connections between the
‘popular’ and the ‘political’.”145
Finally, this separation is necessary for the agentic reasoning
that traditional political agency is given to elites, bureaucracy, and governance; and cultural
agency is bestowed upon the citizenry, private organization, and creative outlets.
Polishing the Silver Screen
The rise of film criticism has become an important component for encouraging U.S.
cinema’s global power. People enjoy discussing films, and a film will leave different
impressions upon different people. Such conversations continue to build a discourse
concerning both film and the greater society capable of influencing change by indirectly
influencing thoughts and actions. These conversations connect politics, personal experiences,
and public life to the larger social context forming an important piece of their repertoire and
personality.146
Film, thus, can “reshape cognitive meaning and even to reinvent, or at least
reconfigure reality” in response to a filmmaker’s need to express through traditional methods
or from a different approach; or from an audience’s feeling a need to be inspired or
provoked.147
Film is part of our culture because of some human desire to experience or create “art,
truth, and beauty” as a theatre professor of mine oft repeated. Though Hollywood films are
145
Klaus Dodds, ""Have You Seen Any Good Films Lately?": Geopolitics, International Relations and Film,"
Geography Compass (Blackwell Publishing Ldt.) 2, no. 2 (2008): 476-494, 478.
146
Dodds (2008), 476-477.
147
Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (January 1968): 1-14, 3-4; William
Franke, "Metaphor and the Making of Sense: The Contemporary Metaphor Renaissance," Philosophy and
Rhetoric (Penn State University Press) 33, no. 2 (2000): 137-153.

51
mostly fictional, the projection of our personal and societal values onto characters and other
familiarities enhance the cinema’s ability to change or create. Over time, film has come to be
accepted as a powerful cultural artifact. It was not at first.
Originally considered a lower form of culture associated with the working classes it
has come to “be appreciated and evaluated as a serious artistic endeavor” by academics,
society, and the artistic community.148
This complex cinematic phenomenon is the product of
a complex network that produces and distributes films. Film critics and criticism were
essential to legitimize film as an art form in the United States and abroad.149
Though film is
not a uniquely American media, the U.S. has been one of the most active contributors to the
art form and its development.150
Professional critics both legitimized and popularized film culture. For example,
Roger Ebert and his partner-of-late, Gene Siskel, left an indelible mark upon American
cinema and its review process in conferring “two thumbs up” on their favorite films in their
weekly TV show. For better or for worse, such a boiled-down rating system is the prevailing
method of rating films in the United States. While such may lack the “passionate argument
and reasoned judgment” and be “the enemy of nuance and complex thought,” such ratings
reinforce film as an open and accessible medium.151
148
Shyon Baumann, "Intellectualization and Art World Development: Film in the United States," American
Sociological Review 66, no. 3 (June 2001): 404-426, 404-405.
149
Mary Ann Glynn and Michael Lounsbury, "From the Critics' Corner: Logic Blending, Discursive Change and
Authenticity in a Cultural Production System," Journal of Management Studies (Blackwell Publishing Ltd.) 42,
no. 5 (July 2005): 1031-1055, 1031-1032; Baumann (2001).
150
Cousins (2001), 5; Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell, Film history: An Introduction, 2nd Edition (New
York, NY: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2003), 679-704.
151
Anthony O. Scott, "Roger Ebert, the Critic Behind the Thumb," The New York Times, The New York Times
Company, April 13, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/movies/13scot.html?ei=5124&en=f8c0d5eab2237088&ex=1365652800&
partner=permalink&exprod=permalink&pagewanted=all (accessed April 1, 2012); Shyon Baumann, "Marketing,
cultural hierarchy, and the relevance of critics: film in the United States, 1935-1980," Poetics (Elsevier Science
B.V.) 30, no. 4 (2002): 243-262, 259-261.

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