1. HIBAKUSHA ETHICS: UNIVERSALISM IN THE NUCLEAR ERA
Katharine Mckenney
Student I.D.: 002670563
GS360: Religion, Violence, & Peacemaking
Presented to: Dr. Kathryn Poethig
May 18th, 2016

2. Mckenney 1
INTRODUCTION
The global ‘we’ is a relatively new concept, and arrives on the heels of globalization.
Globalization creates increasingly interdependent international networks, whereby
systems approaches to framing international conflicts become a necessity to
understanding any impact in the growing chain of international relations. Currently, the
international theatre is dominated by realpolitik and accompanying political rhetoric,
with the idea of state preservation taking precedence over all other forms of relations.
Within this context, admission of any new narrative outside of this realpolitik does not
conform with current international custom.
Hibakusha, a term encompassing all victims of nuclear weapons, have come to form a
narrative distinct and in direct opposition to the realpolitik employed by international
actors; while this is not in itself unique, hibakusha ethics, as coined by Miyamoto, is
more “realistic” than current discourse pertaining to the nation-state framework.1
Hibakusha ethics postulates the universality of nuclear weapons (as their indiscriminate
nature affects all of mankind), and thus advocate for methods of “reconciliation”, as
opposed to aggression, no matter the ostensible justification for such aggression.2 The
realism and pragmatism associated with the current framework ignores the present danger
of undetonated nuclear weapons, whether with the intention to utilize them for deterrence
or aggression. It is with this in mind that the hibakusha narrative must be addressed, to
bring an essential dimension into the ambit of realpolitik.
1
Miyamoto, Yuki. Beyond the Mushroom Cloud : Commemoration, Religion, and Responsibility
after Hiroshima. Bronx, NY, USA: Fordham University Press, 2011. Accessed May 16, 2016.
ProQuest ebrary. 3.
2
Ibid.

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Notwithstanding the necessity of the discussion of hibakusha ethics, the narrative of
nuclear universalism and reconciliatory practices to achieve peace, has not entered the
realm of current discourse, and is often dismissed as naïve.3
THE ROLE OF SYMBOLS
The role of symbols in reaffirming existing narratives and forming new dimensions of
discourse was a frequent theme throughout my research.
Symbols are powerful and intentional harbingers of what a community wishes to
remember and what a community prefers to forget. Commemoration, in addition to being
an instrument of political legitimation, is also a way in which symbols become reflective
of the values and beliefs of a given community.4 The practice of commemorating a
memory provides a clue into the memories of pride and the memories of shame; recorded
memory is an intentional consideration of interpretations and values. Memories of shame
will not be highlighted, and are often likely to be avoided by the collective.5 This
intention is visible in textbook revisionism waves, which have ebbed and flowed
throughout post-war Japan.6 Most contentious remains discussion of the “Three Alls”
(“kill all, burn all, loot all” -- a military strategy of WWII Japan) and the issue of Korean
comfort women, both of which have been consistently censored.7
3
Ibid.
4
Fujiwara, Kiichi. "Imagining the Past: Memory Wars in Japan." Policy and Society 25, no. 4
(October 1, 2008): 143-53. Accessed May 9, 2016. doi:10.1016/S1449-4035(06)70096-0. 147-
148.
5
Ibid.
6
Nozaki, Yoshiko. "Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy, 1982-2001."
International Journal of Educational Research 37, no. 6-7 (October 22, 2003): 603-22. Accessed
May 10, 2016. doi:10.1016/S0883-0355(03)00053-3. 604-605.
7
Ibid. This process of self-censorship, characterizing textbook revisionism since the turn
of the century.

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Symbols and their interpretations are an important component of atomic discourse, and to
the narratives seeking to contribute more dimensions to it. Significantly, the symbolism
of the ‘mushroom cloud’, as representative of scientific prowess as well as a promise of
nuclear growth, plays a large component in atomic discourse, and the legitimation of
nuclear weapons, despite the hibakusha ethic refuting it.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Several theories will be used throughout this paper, which will be elaborated in detail. In
addition to the framework used, the following arguments will be informed using just
war8, chosen trauma9, and complex political victimhood.10
Firstly, I will be using Olick’s ‘politics of regret’ and postliminary concepts of
individualistic versus collectivistic procedures of collective memory, identified as a
dynamic process relying on a collusion and continuation of dialogue.11
The politics of regret refers to the dominance of ‘regret’ as a principle in contemporary
politics, insofar as it has shaped and influenced contemporary discussions of political
transgressions in a state’s past. The politics of regret operate under and within the nation-
8
Corey, David D., and Charles, J. Daryl. Just War Tradition : An Introduction. Wilmington, DE, USA: ISI
Books, 2012. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 16 May 2016.
9
Volkan, Vamik D. Chosen Trauma, the Political Ideology of Entitlement and Violence. June 10, 2004.
Accessed May 13, 2016. http://www.vamikvolkan.com/Chosen-Trauma,-the-Political-Ideology-of-
Entitlement-and-Violence.php.
10
Bouris, Erica. "Political Victim Discourse: Adequate for the Twenty-First Century?" In Complex
Political Victims, 1-12. Bloomfield, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 2007.
11
Olick, Jeffrey K. The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility.
New York, NY: Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group, LLC), 2007.

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state paradigm, although it’s ascension to the current position as a political principle is
context-specific -- the context of which was developed during the twentieth century.12
The politics of regret are dependent on the collective memory of a group. Collective
memory is related to many other terms used in sociological works, such as political
tradition, or myth.13
Olick’s conceptualization of collective memory will complement Margalit’s theory of
thick (moral) versus thin (ethical) relations, and how they relate to commemoration and
memory on the broader level of humanity. Margalit’s theory focuses on the ethical duties
one has towards one’s community, but the moral duties we have to mankind (i.e.,
members of a broader community, but not our own).14 Memory, in regards to the process
of remembering, can only be derived from ‘thick’ relations -- in other words, ethical
relations -- found in our own communities.15 Despite memory as an ongoing dialectic
process, hinging on thick relations, this does not preclude the hibakusha narrative from
being expanded into the so-called collective memory, as defined by Olick. However, in
the current nation-state framework, the ethics of the hibakusha are obscured by the
symbol of the mushroom cloud.16 This research is principled on the universality of
nuclear bombs (nuclear universalism) or the idea that nuclear weaponry is indiscriminate
and poses a risk for all of humanity.17
12
This is based on Olick’s work being predicated on the conclusions of Hannah Arendt,
who argued, using the case of the French Revolution, that every culture has the capacity
for compassion, although it’s presence is context-specific.
13
Olick, 18.
14
Miyamoto, 21-23.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Yoneyama, 15.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Historical perceptions, and more broadly historical narratives, reflect perspectives of a
domestic populations. 18 In this respect American and Japanese discourses have stark
differences, but interact and evolve throughout the American occupation and into the
Cold War era.
American perception of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is coloured by the
pervasive ‘just war’ narrative, operating within the realpolitik of the nation-state concept.
This perception continues to dominate the international scene and is a major stumbling
block on the road to political accountability and responsibility for wartime transgressions,
as will be explored later in this paper. The American perspective on their role in the
large-scale trauma that is nuclear warfare remains shrouded in political rhetoric, widely
used by both the United States and Japan to redeem themselves in the eyes of the
international community and to their own people. The United States went to great lengths
to dwarf the destruction of the bombs; accountability is largely missing from both
military and technocratic accounts.19 The bombs quickly became a symbol of American
prowess, representative of the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the American people in
the face of the enemy. In addition to the technological superiority of Americans, the
United States also avoided significant blame in their role in the ‘nuclear genocide’
committed against the Japanese people; the blame was instead pushed onto a loosely-
defined ‘militarist state’, further reinforcing American exceptionalism.20 This
exceptionalism was the product of multiple factors. While Japan’s avoidance of ‘naming
18
Fujiwara, 147.
19
Hong, Christine. 2009. Flashforward Democracy: American Exceptionalism and the Atomic
Bomb in Barefoot Gen. Comparative Literature Studies. 46, no. 1: 125-155. 127.
20
Hong, 130.

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and shaming’ reinforced American exceptionalism, it was largely a by-product of Japan’s
economic boom. Japan’s growth in the Cold War period was perceived by many to
nullify the carnage following Little Boy and Fat Man, as did the subsequent Pax
Americana of the twentieth century.21
Japanese perceptions of the defeat and subsequent occupation shape the current narratives
surrounding nuclear technology; memory as a continuing process of reaffirmation of
previously established narratives plays a large role in current Japanese discussions of
memory and political responsibility. Instead of ascribing blame to the most immediate
and obvious enemy (i.e., the United States), Japan identified a much larger and more
abstract victimizer: the militarist state. In this case, the militarist state exploited the
Japanese people, and had led them into a predestined military loss against a
technologically superior army.22 However, the nuclear bomb, as traumatizing and
cataclysmic as it was, also provided a modicum of inspiration. Japan’s widespread anti-
militarism was coupled with a sense of merited loss, due to their perceived scientific
inadequacy. This inadequacy could be corrected by focusing on the scientific applications
of nuclear technological advancement, and could then be used in the pursuit of peace.
Japan wished to become a ‘nation of science’ -- rapidly becoming a pseudonym for
‘peace’.23
Notwithstanding the rapid economic and scientific advancements made by Japan
throughout the Cold War era, this narrative pervading the so-called collective
unconscious carried a variety of social stigmata. Weapons-related pursuits using
21
Ibid.
22
Hong, 136.
23
Dower, John W. "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory." In
Hiroshima in History and Memory, edited by Michael J. Hogan, 116-42. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 122.

8. Mckenney 7
scientific advancements were shunned, as was funding projects associated with military
advancement. The hibakusha were also unwelcome countrymen in the new Japan;
misunderstandings of maladies associated with radiation and nuclear fallout abounded.24
In a broader sense, Japanese ownership of nuclear victimhood created a sense of privilege
or moral self-righteousness; their victimhood became a sense of self-worth after the
embarrassing defeat of World War II.25 Rhetoric surrounding the bombings and related
commemoration typically described nuclear disaster as “exclusively Japanese”. This
rhetoric discounts the presence of prisoners-of-war, Japanese-Americans, and Koreans,
all of whom were present at the time of the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.26
Additionally, the term hibakusha encompasses not only the Japanese, but all victims of
nuclear warfare -- so-called ‘downwinders’ during nuclear weapons tests on American
soil, victims of nuclear fallout, etcetera -- this rhetoric expressly bars non-Japanese from
claiming their victimhood.27 Although the hibakusha narrative articulates the
universalism of nuclear victimhood -- in that all of humanity is encompassed in the harm
caused by nuclear weapons -- this narrative has barely infiltrated the dominant national
discourse surrounding nuclear weapons, and remains largely outside the ambit of
international narrative frameworks.
24
Dower, 128.
25
Miyamoto, 38.
26
Ibid.
27
Miyamoto, 3.

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COLLECTIVE MEMORY & COMMUNITY
Situations and events are selectively placed into the collective memory.28 It is through
this mechanism that memories of events (which must be externalized as a narrative,
passing from the private to the public sphere) become systems of political legitimation.29
Political legitimation is directly dependent on collective memory; this process of
instrumentalization is broad and ongoing, in that it has no set beginning and can only be
disrupted by a ‘trauma’ to the existing narrative. A trauma in this sense creates
discontinuity in the legitimacy of the narrative, in which fissures may occur in political
legitimation discourses.
Commemoration of a trauma is one way of creating political legitimation.
Commemoration occurs through a prolonged dialogue process; it is through this process
that commemoration is necessary for a community to sustain itself.30 Japan’s cultural
backdrop prevented a meaningful ‘politics of regret’ to take place, however,
interdependent global markets create a need for reparations and apology.31 Here becomes
the important distinction between apology and responsibility, whereby Japan has issued
numerous official apologies for the atrocities committed against their Asian neighbours,
but has continued to advocate for textbook revisionism and the omission of several key
historical events characterizing Japan’s role in the second world war (i.e., the “Three
Alls”, comfort women, etcetera).32
28
Fujiwara, 146.
29
Olick, 32.
30
Ibid.
31
Olick, 131.
32
Nozaki, 616.

10. Mckenney 9
COMMEMORATION & A COMMUNITY OF PEACE
In a relationship of almost poetic irony, prior to the detonation of Little Boy (the first
atomic bomb dropped on Japanese soil) Hiroshima was a military base, and had been
since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894.33 The dropping of the bombs, the subsequent defeat
and occupation, and the dissolution of the Japanese military, in tandem with the rising
anti-militarist sentiment of the Japanese public, led to a reformulation of Hiroshima’s
identity. Six months after the bomb dropped, Hiroshima adopted its identity as the ‘city
of peace’ (heiwa toshi).34
Memory and community do not exist in isolation from one another; just as community
requires memory to sustain itself. So too does memory require a community to exist -- the
existence of group memory requires the ‘thick relations’ (i.e., the ethical relationships
between people of the same community) to grow and cement itself in systems-level
narratives. Hiroshima’s identity as a ‘city of peace’ thereby requires narratives of peace
to be propagated and reproduced, through acts of commemoration (such as the Hiroshima
Peace Park, and the Memorial Museum).35
CHALLENGING NARRATIVES
By insisting and perpetuating the ‘just war’ theory as viable, we are effectively barring
the narrative of the hibakusha from entering a broader collective memory (i.e., that of
humanity at large). The censorship characteristic of the American regime during the
occupation period was in part responsible for this blip in recognizing the full extent of
nuclear warfare. However, the censorship is symptomatic of a more general trend, which
33
Miyamoto, 40.
34
Miyamoto, 29.
35
Dower, 141.

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is a principle of the nation-state framework Miyamoto argues vehemently against.
Memory that is adopted by states is used for political legitimation.36 The narrative of the
hibakusha (‘hibakusha ethics’, as defined by Miyamoto) directly challenges the dominant
discourse supporting the nation-state framework, and thereby the politics of both Japan
and the United States.
An example used in Olick’s argument of traumas against a dominant narrative was the
damage caused by the trauma of Auschwitz. Concentration camps as a trauma refuted the
narrative prevalent during the twentieth century of modernity and progress.37 This entails
the function of a trauma as delegitimizing an existing narrative. This function could be
achieved by hibakusha ethics, but adherence to realpolitik does not allow for this
narrative to disrupt the existing framework.
CONCLUSION
Adherence to the nation-state framework and realpolitik hinders acknowledging mass
traumas and admission of these traumas into humanity’s collective memory. Although
Japan, as a WWII aggressor, was the perpetrator of gross atrocities, their experience of
victimhood at the hands of nuclear weaponry creates complex discourse surrounding the
claimants to victimhood. Nuclear weapons created a class of victimhood, the hibakusha,
creating a narrative of nuclear universalism and reconciliation, contrasted with the current
nation-state framework of realpolitik. However, the message of nuclear universalism was
not admitted to the transcendental collective memory, and did not succeed in
delegitimizing the existing narrative. The symbol of the ‘mushroom cloud’ as a sign of
36
Olick, 32-33.
37
Ibid.

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progress and military superiority continues to overshadow the hibakusha message of
peace. Indeed, hibakusha ethics have not been included in Japan’s national narrative, let
alone at the level of international discourse. Commemorating the atomic bombings
contradicts the American nationalist narrative of nuclear weapons as ending WWII --
even today, as President Obama visits Hiroshima, the discussion of apology remains
firmly rooted in the rhetoric of justified nuclear bombings. However, the historic visit
also includes “honouring the dead”38 , an important step to commemoration and the
formation of a new discourse.
38
Harris, Gardiner, Julie Hirschfeld Davis, and Jonathan Soble. "Obama to Be First Sitting
President to Visit Hiroshima." The New York Times. 2016. Accessed May 16, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/us/politics/obama-hiroshima-visit.html?_r=0.

13. Mckenney 12
WORKS CITED
Bouris, Erica. "Political Victim Discourse: Adequate for the Twenty-First Century?" In
Complex Political Victims, 1-12. Bloomfield, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 2007.
Corey, David D., and Charles, J. Daryl. Just War Tradition : An Introduction.
Wilmington, DE, USA: ISI Books, 2012. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 16 May 2016.
Dower, John W. "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory." In
Hiroshima in History and Memory, edited by Michael J. Hogan, 116-42. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Fujiwara, Kiichi. "Imagining the Past: Memory Wars in Japan." Policy and Society 25,
no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 143-53. Accessed May 9, 2016. doi:10.1016/S1449-
4035(06)70096-0.
Harris, Gardiner, Julie Hirschfeld Davis, and Jonathan Soble. "Obama to Be First Sitting
President to Visit Hiroshima." The New York Times. 2016. Accessed May 16, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/us/politics/obama-hiroshima-visit.html?_r=0.
Hong, Christine. 2009. Flashforward Democracy: American Exceptionalism and the
Atomic Bomb in Barefoot Gen. Comparative Literature Studies. 46, no. 1: 125-155.
Miyamoto, Yuki. Beyond the Mushroom Cloud : Commemoration, Religion, and
Responsibility after Hiroshima. Bronx, NY, USA: Fordham University Press, 2011.
Accessed May 16, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.
Nozaki, Yoshiko. "Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy, 1982-2001."
International Journal of Educational Research 37, no. 6-7 (October 22, 2003): 603-22.
Accessed May 10, 2016. doi:10.1016/S0883-0355(03)00053-3.
Olick, Jeffrey K. The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical
Responsibility. New York, NY: Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group, LLC), 2007.
Volkan, Vamik D. Chosen Trauma, the Political Ideology of Entitlement and Violence.
June 10, 2004. Accessed May 13, 2016. http://www.vamikvolkan.com/Chosen-Trauma,-
the-Political-Ideology-of-Entitlement-and-Violence.php.
Yoshikuni, Igarashi. 2000. Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese
Culture, 1945-1970. Princeton University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s2kh.
Yoneyama, Lisa. Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory.
Berkeley & Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1999.