The Challenger disaster was caused by the failure of an O-ring seal in one of the solid rocket boosters. O-rings had shown erosion in previous launches due to hot gas leakage, and engineers were concerned about their ability to seal at low temperatures. The night before the fatal launch, engineers recommended postponing due to the cold weather forecast, but this recommendation was later reversed. On launch day when temperatures were below freezing, an O-ring failed almost immediately, leading to the destruction of the shuttle and loss of the seven crew members.
ENGINEERING ETHICSThe Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.docxbudabrooks46239
ENGINEERING ETHICS
The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering
Texas A&M University
NSF Grant Number
DIR-9012252
Instructor's Guide
Introduction To The Case
On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger,
exploded just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly
allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The
failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters,
insufficient low- temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of
proper communication between different levels of NASA management.
Instructor Guidelines
Prior to class discussion, ask the students to read the student handout outside of class. In class the details of the
case can be reviewed with the aide of the overheads. Reserve about half of the class period for an open
discussion of the issues. The issues covered in the student handout include the importance of an engineer's
responsibility to public welfare, the need for this responsibility to hold precedence over any other responsibilities
the engineer might have and the responsibilities of a manager/engineer. A final point is the fact that no matter how
far removed from the public an engineer may think she is, all of her actions have potential impact. Essay #6,
"Loyalty and Professional Rights" appended at the end of the case listings in this report will be found relevant for
instructors preparing to lead class discussion on this case. In addition, essays #1 through #4 appended at the end
of the cases in this report will have relevant background information for the instructor preparing to lead
classroom discussion. Their titles are, respectively: "Ethics and Professionalism in Engineering: Why the Interest in
Engineering Ethics?;" "Basic Concepts and Methods in Ethics," "Moral Concepts and Theories," and
"Engineering Design: Literature on Social Responsibility Versus Legal Liability."
Questions for Class Discussion
1. What could NASA management have done differently?
2. What, if anything, could their subordinates have done differently?
3. What should Roger Boisjoly have done differently (if anything)? In answering this question, keep in mind
that at his age, the prospect of finding a new job if he was fired was slim. He also had a family to support.
4. What do you (the students) see as your future engineering professional responsibilities in relation to both
being loyal to management and protecting the public welfare?
The Challenger Disaster Overheads
1. Organizations/People Involved
2. Key Dates
3. Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) Joints
4. Detail of SRB Field Joints
5. Ballooning Effect of Motor Casing
6. Key Issues
ORGANIZATIONS/PEOPLE INVOLV.
ENGINEERING ETHICSThe Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.docxgidmanmary
ENGINEERING ETHICS
The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering
Texas A&M University
NSF Grant Number
DIR-9012252
Instructor's Guide
Introduction To The Case
On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger,
exploded just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly
allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The
failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters,
insufficient low- temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of
proper communication between different levels of NASA management.
Instructor Guidelines
Prior to class discussion, ask the students to read the student handout outside of class. In class the details of the
case can be reviewed with the aide of the overheads. Reserve about half of the class period for an open
discussion of the issues. The issues covered in the student handout include the importance of an engineer's
responsibility to public welfare, the need for this responsibility to hold precedence over any other responsibilities
the engineer might have and the responsibilities of a manager/engineer. A final point is the fact that no matter how
far removed from the public an engineer may think she is, all of her actions have potential impact. Essay #6,
"Loyalty and Professional Rights" appended at the end of the case listings in this report will be found relevant for
instructors preparing to lead class discussion on this case. In addition, essays #1 through #4 appended at the end
of the cases in this report will have relevant background information for the instructor preparing to lead
classroom discussion. Their titles are, respectively: "Ethics and Professionalism in Engineering: Why the Interest in
Engineering Ethics?;" "Basic Concepts and Methods in Ethics," "Moral Concepts and Theories," and
"Engineering Design: Literature on Social Responsibility Versus Legal Liability."
Questions for Class Discussion
1. What could NASA management have done differently?
2. What, if anything, could their subordinates have done differently?
3. What should Roger Boisjoly have done differently (if anything)? In answering this question, keep in mind
that at his age, the prospect of finding a new job if he was fired was slim. He also had a family to support.
4. What do you (the students) see as your future engineering professional responsibilities in relation to both
being loyal to management and protecting the public welfare?
The Challenger Disaster Overheads
1. Organizations/People Involved
2. Key Dates
3. Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) Joints
4. Detail of SRB Field Joints
5. Ballooning Effect of Motor Casing
6. Key Issues
ORGANIZATIONS/PEOPLE INVOLV ...
The document provides background information on the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. It discusses the organizations and people involved, including NASA, Morton Thiokol, and various engineers. The timeline of events is divided into pre-accident, during accident, and post-accident sections. In the pre-accident period, engineers expressed concerns about flaws in the solid rocket booster joint design and O-rings, but NASA managers disregarded the warnings. On January 28, 1986, 73 seconds after launch, the Challenger exploded due to failure of the O-rings, killing all seven astronauts aboard. After the disaster, investigations were conducted to determine the cause.
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986 when the shuttle broke apart 73 seconds after liftoff, killing all seven crew members. The Rogers Commission investigation found the cause was a faulty O-ring seal in one of the solid rocket boosters, which was vulnerable to cold temperatures like those on the day of launch. Political pressure from NASA and contractor Morton-Thiokol led to the launch decision despite safety concerns about the O-rings.
This document discusses engineering ethics through case studies. It covers topics like what engineering ethics is, why it's important to study, and provides examples of ethics cases involving a killer robot, structural failures, whistleblowing, and the Challenger disaster. Codes of ethics from Hammurabi's code and ABET are presented. Further real-world cases involving industrial accidents at Bhopal, Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl are also referenced.
This document discusses the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and the ethical issues surrounding its launch. It provides background on problems with the solid rocket booster field joint design that were known prior to launch. Engineers from Morton Thiokol warned NASA that the expected low launch temperature could compromise the joint seals, but NASA managers decided to launch anyway. Shortly after liftoff, a joint failure caused the right booster to explode, destroying the shuttle and killing all seven crew members. The case highlighted tensions between safety concerns and political pressure to keep the shuttle program on schedule.
1. The document describes three NASA tragedies - the Apollo 1 fire in 1967 that killed 3 astronauts, the Challenger accident in 1986 that killed 7 astronauts, and the Columbia accident in 2003 that also killed 7 astronauts.
2. Common factors that contributed to the disasters were a culture of overconfidence at NASA due to past successes, normalization of risks, failure to properly assess hazards, and lack of open communication around safety concerns.
3. Specifically for Columbia, engineers raised concerns about damage to the shuttle's heat tiles from foam falling off the external tank during launch, but NASA managers discounted the risks without proper investigation or contingency planning.
The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle DisastersTo be considered co.docxmamanda2
The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disasters
To be considered complete, all written assignments must include proper citations within the body of the paper when relevant, as well as a References section. Failure to cite outside sources is plagiarism and will be treated as such! You must also include a title page. Do not include pictures or graphics. All documents must be in Word format and in APA writing styles. The completed assignment must be uploaded in the ASSIGNMENT area by the specified deadline.
The title page must include Student Name, Course Name and Number, Assignment Name, Professor’s Name, and Assignment Date.
The introduction provides sufficient background on the topic and previews major points.
Assignment Description/Scenario
Read the story about the Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disasters below, and respond to the attached questions, using the specifications above. Each response must be at least a paragraph in length.
STORY:
The
Challenger
Disaster
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle
Challenger
rose into the sky, its seven crew members strapped into their padded seats while the 2,000-ton vehicle vibrated as it gained speed and altitude. The launch was going perfectly. Seventy seconds had passed since lift-off, and the shuttle was already 50,000 feet above the earth. From NASA Mission Control at Houston’s Johnson Space Center, Spacecraft Communicator Richard Covey instructed, “
Challenger
, go at throttle up.” “Roger, go at throttle up,” replied
Challenger
Commander Dick Scobee.
In the next few seconds, however,
Challenger
experienced some increasingly violent maneuvers. The pilot, Mike Smith, expressed his sudden apprehension: “Uh-oh.” In MissionPage 376 Control, the pulsing digits on the screen abruptly stopped. Mission Control spokesman Steve Nesbitt sat above the four console tiers. For a long moment he stared around the silent, softly lit room. The red ascent trajectory line was stationary on the display screen. Finally he spoke: “Flight controllers here looking very carefully at the situation. Obviously a major malfunction.”
Headed by former Secretary of State William Rogers, the Presidential Commission that was set up to investigate the cause of the
Challenger
disaster had little trouble identifying the physical cause. One of the joints on a booster rocket failed to seal. The “culprit” was one of the synthetic rubber O-rings that were designed to keep the rockets’ superhot gases from escaping from the joints between the booster’s four main segments. When one of the O-rings failed, the resulting flames burned through the shuttle’s external fuel tank. Liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen then mixed and ignited, causing the explosion that destroyed
Challenger
.
However, the so-called Rogers Commission investigations also revealed a great deal about the internal workings of NASA. It was a geographically dispersed matrix organization. Headquarters were in Washington, DC, where its most senior mana.
ENGINEERING ETHICSThe Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.docxbudabrooks46239
ENGINEERING ETHICS
The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering
Texas A&M University
NSF Grant Number
DIR-9012252
Instructor's Guide
Introduction To The Case
On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger,
exploded just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly
allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The
failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters,
insufficient low- temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of
proper communication between different levels of NASA management.
Instructor Guidelines
Prior to class discussion, ask the students to read the student handout outside of class. In class the details of the
case can be reviewed with the aide of the overheads. Reserve about half of the class period for an open
discussion of the issues. The issues covered in the student handout include the importance of an engineer's
responsibility to public welfare, the need for this responsibility to hold precedence over any other responsibilities
the engineer might have and the responsibilities of a manager/engineer. A final point is the fact that no matter how
far removed from the public an engineer may think she is, all of her actions have potential impact. Essay #6,
"Loyalty and Professional Rights" appended at the end of the case listings in this report will be found relevant for
instructors preparing to lead class discussion on this case. In addition, essays #1 through #4 appended at the end
of the cases in this report will have relevant background information for the instructor preparing to lead
classroom discussion. Their titles are, respectively: "Ethics and Professionalism in Engineering: Why the Interest in
Engineering Ethics?;" "Basic Concepts and Methods in Ethics," "Moral Concepts and Theories," and
"Engineering Design: Literature on Social Responsibility Versus Legal Liability."
Questions for Class Discussion
1. What could NASA management have done differently?
2. What, if anything, could their subordinates have done differently?
3. What should Roger Boisjoly have done differently (if anything)? In answering this question, keep in mind
that at his age, the prospect of finding a new job if he was fired was slim. He also had a family to support.
4. What do you (the students) see as your future engineering professional responsibilities in relation to both
being loyal to management and protecting the public welfare?
The Challenger Disaster Overheads
1. Organizations/People Involved
2. Key Dates
3. Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) Joints
4. Detail of SRB Field Joints
5. Ballooning Effect of Motor Casing
6. Key Issues
ORGANIZATIONS/PEOPLE INVOLV.
ENGINEERING ETHICSThe Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.docxgidmanmary
ENGINEERING ETHICS
The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering
Texas A&M University
NSF Grant Number
DIR-9012252
Instructor's Guide
Introduction To The Case
On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger,
exploded just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly
allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The
failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters,
insufficient low- temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of
proper communication between different levels of NASA management.
Instructor Guidelines
Prior to class discussion, ask the students to read the student handout outside of class. In class the details of the
case can be reviewed with the aide of the overheads. Reserve about half of the class period for an open
discussion of the issues. The issues covered in the student handout include the importance of an engineer's
responsibility to public welfare, the need for this responsibility to hold precedence over any other responsibilities
the engineer might have and the responsibilities of a manager/engineer. A final point is the fact that no matter how
far removed from the public an engineer may think she is, all of her actions have potential impact. Essay #6,
"Loyalty and Professional Rights" appended at the end of the case listings in this report will be found relevant for
instructors preparing to lead class discussion on this case. In addition, essays #1 through #4 appended at the end
of the cases in this report will have relevant background information for the instructor preparing to lead
classroom discussion. Their titles are, respectively: "Ethics and Professionalism in Engineering: Why the Interest in
Engineering Ethics?;" "Basic Concepts and Methods in Ethics," "Moral Concepts and Theories," and
"Engineering Design: Literature on Social Responsibility Versus Legal Liability."
Questions for Class Discussion
1. What could NASA management have done differently?
2. What, if anything, could their subordinates have done differently?
3. What should Roger Boisjoly have done differently (if anything)? In answering this question, keep in mind
that at his age, the prospect of finding a new job if he was fired was slim. He also had a family to support.
4. What do you (the students) see as your future engineering professional responsibilities in relation to both
being loyal to management and protecting the public welfare?
The Challenger Disaster Overheads
1. Organizations/People Involved
2. Key Dates
3. Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) Joints
4. Detail of SRB Field Joints
5. Ballooning Effect of Motor Casing
6. Key Issues
ORGANIZATIONS/PEOPLE INVOLV ...
The document provides background information on the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. It discusses the organizations and people involved, including NASA, Morton Thiokol, and various engineers. The timeline of events is divided into pre-accident, during accident, and post-accident sections. In the pre-accident period, engineers expressed concerns about flaws in the solid rocket booster joint design and O-rings, but NASA managers disregarded the warnings. On January 28, 1986, 73 seconds after launch, the Challenger exploded due to failure of the O-rings, killing all seven astronauts aboard. After the disaster, investigations were conducted to determine the cause.
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986 when the shuttle broke apart 73 seconds after liftoff, killing all seven crew members. The Rogers Commission investigation found the cause was a faulty O-ring seal in one of the solid rocket boosters, which was vulnerable to cold temperatures like those on the day of launch. Political pressure from NASA and contractor Morton-Thiokol led to the launch decision despite safety concerns about the O-rings.
This document discusses engineering ethics through case studies. It covers topics like what engineering ethics is, why it's important to study, and provides examples of ethics cases involving a killer robot, structural failures, whistleblowing, and the Challenger disaster. Codes of ethics from Hammurabi's code and ABET are presented. Further real-world cases involving industrial accidents at Bhopal, Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl are also referenced.
This document discusses the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and the ethical issues surrounding its launch. It provides background on problems with the solid rocket booster field joint design that were known prior to launch. Engineers from Morton Thiokol warned NASA that the expected low launch temperature could compromise the joint seals, but NASA managers decided to launch anyway. Shortly after liftoff, a joint failure caused the right booster to explode, destroying the shuttle and killing all seven crew members. The case highlighted tensions between safety concerns and political pressure to keep the shuttle program on schedule.
1. The document describes three NASA tragedies - the Apollo 1 fire in 1967 that killed 3 astronauts, the Challenger accident in 1986 that killed 7 astronauts, and the Columbia accident in 2003 that also killed 7 astronauts.
2. Common factors that contributed to the disasters were a culture of overconfidence at NASA due to past successes, normalization of risks, failure to properly assess hazards, and lack of open communication around safety concerns.
3. Specifically for Columbia, engineers raised concerns about damage to the shuttle's heat tiles from foam falling off the external tank during launch, but NASA managers discounted the risks without proper investigation or contingency planning.
The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle DisastersTo be considered co.docxmamanda2
The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disasters
To be considered complete, all written assignments must include proper citations within the body of the paper when relevant, as well as a References section. Failure to cite outside sources is plagiarism and will be treated as such! You must also include a title page. Do not include pictures or graphics. All documents must be in Word format and in APA writing styles. The completed assignment must be uploaded in the ASSIGNMENT area by the specified deadline.
The title page must include Student Name, Course Name and Number, Assignment Name, Professor’s Name, and Assignment Date.
The introduction provides sufficient background on the topic and previews major points.
Assignment Description/Scenario
Read the story about the Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disasters below, and respond to the attached questions, using the specifications above. Each response must be at least a paragraph in length.
STORY:
The
Challenger
Disaster
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle
Challenger
rose into the sky, its seven crew members strapped into their padded seats while the 2,000-ton vehicle vibrated as it gained speed and altitude. The launch was going perfectly. Seventy seconds had passed since lift-off, and the shuttle was already 50,000 feet above the earth. From NASA Mission Control at Houston’s Johnson Space Center, Spacecraft Communicator Richard Covey instructed, “
Challenger
, go at throttle up.” “Roger, go at throttle up,” replied
Challenger
Commander Dick Scobee.
In the next few seconds, however,
Challenger
experienced some increasingly violent maneuvers. The pilot, Mike Smith, expressed his sudden apprehension: “Uh-oh.” In MissionPage 376 Control, the pulsing digits on the screen abruptly stopped. Mission Control spokesman Steve Nesbitt sat above the four console tiers. For a long moment he stared around the silent, softly lit room. The red ascent trajectory line was stationary on the display screen. Finally he spoke: “Flight controllers here looking very carefully at the situation. Obviously a major malfunction.”
Headed by former Secretary of State William Rogers, the Presidential Commission that was set up to investigate the cause of the
Challenger
disaster had little trouble identifying the physical cause. One of the joints on a booster rocket failed to seal. The “culprit” was one of the synthetic rubber O-rings that were designed to keep the rockets’ superhot gases from escaping from the joints between the booster’s four main segments. When one of the O-rings failed, the resulting flames burned through the shuttle’s external fuel tank. Liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen then mixed and ignited, causing the explosion that destroyed
Challenger
.
However, the so-called Rogers Commission investigations also revealed a great deal about the internal workings of NASA. It was a geographically dispersed matrix organization. Headquarters were in Washington, DC, where its most senior mana.
A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R DCOLUM.docxransayo
A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D
COLUMBIA
1 9 5R e p o r t V o l u m e I A u g u s t 2 0 0 3
The Board began its investigation with two central ques-
tions about NASA decisions. Why did NASA continue to fly
with known foam debris problems in the years preceding the
Columbia launch, and why did NASA managers conclude
that the foam debris strike 81.9 seconds into Columbiaʼs
flight was not a threat to the safety of the mission, despite
the concerns of their engineers?
8.1 ECHOES OF CHALLENGER
As the investigation progressed, Board member Dr. Sally
Ride, who also served on the Rogers Commission, observed
that there were “echoes” of Challenger in Columbia. Ironi-
cally, the Rogers Commission investigation into Challenger
started with two remarkably similar central questions: Why
did NASA continue to fly with known O-ring erosion prob-
lems in the years before the Challenger launch, and why, on
the eve of the Challenger launch, did NASA managers decide
that launching the mission in such cold temperatures was an
acceptable risk, despite the concerns of their engineers?
The echoes did not stop there. The foam debris hit was not
the single cause of the Columbia accident, just as the failure
of the joint seal that permitted O-ring erosion was not the
single cause of Challenger. Both Columbia and Challenger
were lost also because of the failure of NASA̓ s organiza-
tional system. Part Two of this report cites failures of the
three parts of NASA̓ s organizational system. This chapter
shows how previous political, budgetary, and policy deci-
sions by leaders at the White House, Congress, and NASA
(Chapter 5) impacted the Space Shuttle Programʼs structure,
culture, and safety system (Chapter 7), and how these in turn
resulted in flawed decision-making (Chapter 6) for both ac-
cidents. The explanation is about system effects: how actions
taken in one layer of NASA̓ s organizational system impact
other layers. History is not just a backdrop or a scene-setter.
History is cause. History set the Columbia and Challenger
accidents in motion. Although Part Two is separated into
chapters and sections to make clear what happened in the
political environment, the organization, and managers ̓and
engineers ̓decision-making, the three worked together. Each
is a critical link in the causal chain.
This chapter shows that both accidents were “failures of
foresight” in which history played a prominent role.1 First,
the history of engineering decisions on foam and O-ring
incidents had identical trajectories that “normalized” these
anomalies, so that flying with these flaws became routine
and acceptable. Second, NASA history had an effect. In re-
sponse to White House and Congressional mandates, NASA
leaders took actions that created systemic organizational
flaws at the time of Challenger that were also present for
Columbia. The final section compares the two critical deci-
sion sequences immediately.
The document summarizes the Columbia shuttle disaster, beginning with NASA's history and goals of human spaceflight. It describes how concerns were raised during the shuttle's launch about potential damage from foam insulation striking the wing, but requests for additional imagery to assess the damage were denied. As the shuttle re-entered on February 1st, it disintegrated due to heat damage caused by the foam strike. The investigation revealed NASA's safety-focused culture had shifted over time to prioritize protocols over addressing technical concerns, likely contributing to the disaster.
DAVIS\ENGINEER\CODES (MD006) (0110d)
ENGINEERING CODES OF ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
Heinz C. Luegenbiehl and Michael Davis
Contents Page
I. Introduction: The Challenge Disaster 1
II. History of Engineering Codes 3
III. Codes of Ethics Today 6
IV. Codes and Profession 9
V. Why Obey Your Profession's Code? 12
VI. Using a Code of Ethics 16
VII. Some Rules of Thumb 22
VIII. Sample Application of Rules of Thumb 25
IX. More Problems for Discussion 30
NOTES 40
BIBLIOGRAPHY 41
APPENDIX A: AIEE Code (1912) 42
APPENDIX B: ASCE Code (1914) 46
APPENDIX C: AAE Code (1924) 47
APPENDIX D: ABET Code (1977) 54
APPENDIX E: IEEE Code 64
APPENDIX F: NSPE (Revised January 1987) 66
APPENDIX G: AAES (1984) 76
15 August 1986
26 October 1986
6 November 1986
10 July 1992
@ Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois 60616
ENGINEERING CODES OF ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
The Public knows that doctors and lawyers are bound to abide by certain recognized rules
of conduct. Not finding the same character of obligations imposed upon engineers, people have
failed to recognize them as members of a profession.--A.G. Christie (1922), engineer
With respect to each separate profession we must begin by analyzing the functions it
performs in society. A code of ethics must contain a sense of mission, some feeling for the
peculiar role of the profession it seeks to regulate.--Lon Fuller (1955), lawyer
I. Introduction: The Challenger Disaster
On the night of January 27, 1986, Robert Lund, vice-president for engineering at Morton
Thiokol, had a problem. The Space Center was counting down for a shuttle launch the next
morning. Lund had earlier presided at a meeting of engineers that unanimously recommended
against the launch. He had concurred and informed his boss, Jerald Mason. Mason informed the
Space Center. Lund had expected the flight to be postponed. The Space Center had a good
safety record. It had gotten it by not allowing a launch unless the technical people approved.
Lund had not approved because the temperature at the launch site would be close to
freezing at lift-off. The Space Center was worried about the ice already forming here and there
on the boosters, but Lund's worry was the "O-rings" that sealed the boosters' segments. They
had been a great idea, permitting Thiokol to build the huge rocket in Utah and ship it in pieces to
the Space Center two thousand miles away. Building in Utah was so much more efficient than
building on-site that Thiokol had been able to underbid the competition. The shuttle contract had
earned.
DAVIS\ENGINEER\CODES (MD006) (0110d)
ENGINEERING CODES OF ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
Heinz C. Luegenbiehl and Michael Davis
Contents Page
I. Introduction: The Challenge Disaster 1
II. History of Engineering Codes 3
III. Codes of Ethics Today 6
IV. Codes and Profession 9
V. Why Obey Your Profession's Code? 12
VI. Using a Code of Ethics 16
VII. Some Rules of Thumb 22
VIII. Sample Application of Rules of Thumb 25
IX. More Problems for Discussion 30
NOTES 40
BIBLIOGRAPHY 41
APPENDIX A: AIEE Code (1912) 42
APPENDIX B: ASCE Code (1914) 46
APPENDIX C: AAE Code (1924) 47
APPENDIX D: ABET Code (1977) 54
APPENDIX E: IEEE Code 64
APPENDIX F: NSPE (Revised January 1987) 66
APPENDIX G: AAES (1984) 76
15 August 1986
26 October 1986
6 November 1986
10 July 1992
@ Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois 60616
ENGINEERING CODES OF ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
The Public knows that doctors and lawyers are bound to abide by certain recognized rules
of conduct. Not finding the same character of obligations imposed upon engineers, people have
failed to recognize them as members of a profession.--A.G. Christie (1922), engineer
With respect to each separate profession we must begin by analyzing the functions it
performs in society. A code of ethics must contain a sense of mission, some feeling for the
peculiar role of the profession it seeks to regulate.--Lon Fuller (1955), lawyer
I. Introduction: The Challenger Disaster
On the night of January 27, 1986, Robert Lund, vice-president for engineering at Morton
Thiokol, had a problem. The Space Center was counting down for a shuttle launch the next
morning. Lund had earlier presided at a meeting of engineers that unanimously recommended
against the launch. He had concurred and informed his boss, Jerald Mason. Mason informed the
Space Center. Lund had expected the flight to be postponed. The Space Center had a good
safety record. It had gotten it by not allowing a launch unless the technical people approved.
Lund had not approved because the temperature at the launch site would be close to
freezing at lift-off. The Space Center was worried about the ice already forming here and there
on the boosters, but Lund's worry was the "O-rings" that sealed the boosters' segments. They
had been a great idea, permitting Thiokol to build the huge rocket in Utah and ship it in pieces to
the Space Center two thousand miles away. Building in Utah was so much more efficient than
building on-site that Thiokol had been able to underbid the competition. The shuttle contract had
earned.
This document provides an overview of engineering ethics and several case studies related to ethical issues engineers may face. It discusses what engineering ethics is, why it is studied, and its scope. Several case studies are then summarized related to a killer robot, issues with the DC-10 aircraft, whistleblowing, structural issues with the Citicorp building, and the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Challenger. Sample codes of ethics are also briefly mentioned.
The document summarizes the timeline and technical challenges faced by NASA in determining the flight readiness of the Space Shuttle following a malfunction with a main engine valve during launch. Teams worked to understand the failure mechanism, potential risks, and establish acceptable flight rationale. After two initial Flight Readiness Reviews were inconclusive, continued testing and analysis eventually provided the necessary insights. The third review approved the next launch, which proceeded safely. Key lessons included the importance of diverse perspectives, challenging assumptions, and creating an environment where issues can be raised without fear.
1) During a 2008 space shuttle launch, an unexpected hydrogen flow increase was detected from one of the shuttle's main engines, likely due to an electrical or mechanical failure in a valve.
2) Inspection in December 2008 revealed a crack in the valve's poppet, the first such failure ever observed. Analyzing the cause and implications of this failure was a significant technical challenge.
3) After two Flight Readiness Reviews in February 2009 found that not enough was known about the risk, thousands of engineers continued testing and analysis. A key breakthrough was developing an inspection method that could detect small cracks without damaging the hardware.
Whistle-blowing Case Study The Challenger disaster On January 24, 19.pdfprakashudhwani
Whistle-blowing Case Study: The Challenger disaster On January 24, 1985, Roger Boisjoly,
Senior Scientist at Morton Thiokol Inc. (MTI), watched the launch of Flight 51-C of the space
shuttle program and remained to inspect the solid rocket boosters after their recovery from the
Atlantic Ocean. These immense boosters are too large to transport, so they are manufactured in
cylindrical sections and fastened together with "field joints" before launch. At each joint, the
straight terminal ring of one segment (the "tang") slid into a clevis ring (with a Y-shaped cross
section) on the mating segment, and this joint was sealed with two O-rings (see Figure 16-1).
Boisjoly, then "considered the leading expert in the United States on O-rings and rocket joint
seals," was dismayed to find "that both the primary and secondary O-ring seals on a field joint
had been compromised by hot combustion gases (i.e., hot gas blow-by had occurred), which had
also eroded part of the primary O-ring," although the temperature of the field joint at launch was
believed to be a comfortable 53F(12C) (see Figure 162.)19 Segment centerline Unpressurized
joint, no rotation Seement centerhine Figure 16-1 Cross section of Challenger booster flange.
(From Russell). Boisjoly and Ellen Foster Curtis, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: A
Case Study in Engineering Management, Corporate Loyalty, and Ethics, "Proceedings of the
Eighth Annual Meeting, American Society for Engineering Management, St. Louis, MO,
October 11-13, 1987, p. 10.) Since rocket motor pressurization following ignition causes some
rotation in the field joint, opening the annulus sealed by the O-rings, Boisjoly sponsored a series
of subscale laboratory tests in March 1985 of the effect of temperature on O-ring resiliency. In
these tests O-rings were squeezed, the pressure removed, and the time for the O-ring to regain
shape measured. At 100F(38C) recovery was immediate, at 75F(24C) it took 2.4 seconds, but at
50F(10C)
Figure 16-2 Multiple burn-through of Challenger nozzle joint primary O-ring. (From Russell 1.
Boisjoly and Ellen Foster Curtis, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: A Case Study in
Engineering Management, Corporate Loyalty, and Ethics," Proceedings of the Eighth Annual
Meeting, American Society for Engineering Management, St. Louis, MO. October 1113,1987, p.
8.) the seal had not recovered even after 10 minutes ( 600 seconds). In the ensuing months,
Boisjoly emphasized in the strongest terms the need to redesign the field joint. On August 20,
1985, Robert K. Lund, MTI Vice President, Engineering, announced formation of a Seal Erosion
Task Team, but little progress was made on solving the problem-despite further blow-by on a
flight on October 30, 1985, when the field joint temperature was estimated at a balmy 75F(24C)
The stage is now set for the eve of the Challenger tragedy: At 10 a.m. on January 27, 1986, Amie
Thompson (MTI Supervisor of Rocket Motor Cases) received a phone call from .
Factors over which an Engineer has control that effect the cost of the product
Issues that are relevant to GREEN DESIGN
Discuss recyclability/disposability issues
A brief discussion on legal and ethical issues in engineering design
A study on Environmental, Economic and Societal (EES) issues in Materials Science and Engineering.
On January 28th, 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger was launched at 11:38am on the 6-day STS-51-L mission. During the first 3 seconds of lift off the o-rings (o-shaped loops used to connect two cylinders) in the shuttle’s right-hand solid rocket booster (SRB) failed.
Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse – The third longest suspension bridge of the world at that time, Tacoma Narrows Bridge had been in operation for just more than five months before it crashed into the Puget Sound of Washington on November 7th, 1940.
Eschede Train Disaster
On June 3, 1998, a high-speed train derailed near the village of Eschede in Germany, killing 101 people and injuring 88 more. A single fatigue crack in one wheel failed, causing the train to derail at a switch. A contributing factor was the use of welds in the carriage bodies that “unzipped” during the crash. Within weeks of the crash, all wheels of a similar design were replaced with mono block wheels.
Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
On July 17, 1981, at the Hyatt Regency Kansas City in Kansas City, Mo., two connected walkways collapsed and fell into the lobby, killing 114 people and injuring 216 more. An investigation revealed a structural engineering flaw in the way the bolts and rods were secured. The engineering firm consulting on the project was found to be in gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct.
Fukushima Reactor Meltdown
Following the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, the Fukushima reactor melted down, releasing radioactive material into the ground and ocean. While exacerbated by the earthquake, a report claims that the meltdown was a manmade disaster caused by poor regulation. Wrote Daily Tech, “The Fukushima nuclear disaster shows the danger of using ancient reactor designs in flood-prone regions without proper precaution. The accident stands as a stirring cry to decommission older reactors and move to modern designs.”
The Deepwater Horizon was an offshore drilling unit with the ability to drill down to 30,000 feet. On April 20, 2010, while drilling an exploratory well, the rig exploded, killing 11 workers and setting the stage to release 4.9 million barrels of oil that devastated the area around the Gulf of Mexico. The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill said “several tests indicated the cement put in place after the installation ... was not an effective barrier to prevent gases from entering the well.” These same gases allowed the explosion to occur.
The document summarizes the story of Rodney Rocha, an engineer who warned NASA about potential damage to the Columbia space shuttle from foam insulation striking its wing during launch. Rocha and others requested clearer images of the impact and consideration of inspecting the wing, but NASA dismissed concerns, believing foam strikes could not be dangerous. Upon reentry, superheated gases entered a breach in the wing caused by the foam, leading to the destruction of Columbia and loss of the seven-member crew.
Reality and Nature . . . The Challenger Disaster RevisitedKurt D. Hamman
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986, when Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, leading to the deaths of its seven crew members. The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of central Florida at 11:38 EST. Disintegration of the entire vehicle began after an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at liftoff.
The document provides details about the Challenger disaster case study submitted by students at IQRA University. It includes an introduction describing the Space Shuttle Challenger and the causes of the accident. It then discusses the key organizations and people involved, provides a chronological account of events, and describes the environmental conditions and political pressures on the day of the ill-fated launch. It analyzes communication issues and the roles of management and engineers. The document concludes that the launch should not have proceeded given the warnings about the O-rings and freezing temperatures.
Due August 7,2019First, watch the video Personal Potential The.docxmadlynplamondon
Due August 7,2019
First, watch the video "Personal Potential: The Power of One" by Dr. Verna Price at http://library.limestone.edu:2048/login?url=http://digital.films.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?aid=4891&xtid=44027
Second, in a 500-750 word essay that addresses the following questions:
1. Dr. Price discusses the difference between personal and positional power, describe the difference, and give an example of a time in your life when you used both personal and positional power.
2. How is this idea of personal and/or positional power connected to being a leader? Explain.
First, watch the video "Personal Potential: The Power of One" by Dr. Verna Price at http://library.limestone.edu:2048/login?url=http://digital.films.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?aid=4891&xtid=44027
Due August 2, 2019 (1-2 pages, APA)
1. What has seemed to be the major problem facing NASA? Apply your knowledge of group dynamics and decision making to identify the problem.
2. What must NASA accomplish to ensure the vitality of the space program? Has groupthink accounted for some of NASA’s problems? If so, what symptoms can you identify?
3. What group-decision making challenges has NASA faced in changing its culture?
Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster and the Future of NASA
Early on February 1, 2003, television viewers watched in disbelief and sadness as the space shuttle Columbia, returning from its mission, seemed simply to break apart. Later in a scathing report, investigators said that NASA’s management practices were as much to blame for the accident that killed seven astronauts as the foam that broke away from the fuel tank and hit the left wing during blastoff. The report concluded that NASA had known of problems with the foam insulation over a long period but had never invested the time or energy to resolve the problem.
Former astronaut and NBC analyst Sally Ride agreed with the findings. She noted that foam had been falling off the external tanks since the first shuttle launch and that it had fallen off on nearly every flight. Ride considered the foam problem an accident waiting to happen, which of course it did. NASA recognized the foam as a serious problem and tried to fix it; unfortunately, it didn’t get as much attention as many other problems NASA faced during the past decade.
Columbia was a sad reminder of the Challenger disaster 17 years earlier. In the case of Challenger, engineers suspected problems with O-rings, but didn’t fix them. It appeared that NASA didn’t learn from its mistakes with Challenger and, more important, that a deeper problem existed: Safety concerns had not been given top priority. According to Ride, while NASA officials did not suppress dissenting views, they did not encourage them. Echoes of Challenger? Ride thought so. The further the Columbia investigation progressed, the more echoes were heard. The Columbia Accident Investigation
Board cited several failures; chief among them a corporate culture at NASA that discouraged the communica ...
How Groupthink becomes fiasco of space shuttle challengerShranik Jain
The document summarizes the Challenger space shuttle disaster and how groupthink contributed to the faulty decision to launch. It provides a framework for analyzing groupthink, including characteristics like cohesion, leadership styles that discourage dissent, and decision-making defects like lack of contingency plans. The disaster is attributed to NASA ignoring warnings about O-ring seals on the solid rocket boosters not being tested in cold weather. Pressure to meet launch schedules and overconfidence in abilities led to rationalization of risks. Suggestions to avoid groupthink include assigning critical evaluators, follow up discussions, and considering outside experts.
This document discusses groupthink and its application to decision making failures at NASA. It defines groupthink as a mode of thinking where the desire for harmony or conformity in a group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. The document outlines Irving Janis' 8 symptoms of groupthink and provides examples of how those symptoms contributed to the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters. It analyzes NASA's organizational culture that promoted conformity over safety and encouraged the dismissal of dissenting opinions. The document recommends ways to prevent groupthink and encourage independent critical thinking in groups to avoid poor decisions.
The document discusses professional ethics and the balanced outlook on laws in engineering practice. It provides examples of historical codes from 1758 BC, 1852 AD, and 1871 that established regulations for builders, steamboats, and ship safety inspections. The document also summarizes the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and investigations that found NASA managers disregarded engineer warnings about low launch temperatures, violating established procedures. Overall it emphasizes that laws should establish minimum standards while allowing for responsible experimentation, with engineers prioritizing public safety above all else.
On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds after launch, killing all seven crew members. Engineers had warned NASA managers that the rubber O-rings used to seal joints on the solid rocket boosters could fail in the abnormally cold launch conditions. However, NASA managers decided to proceed with launch despite the risks. The subsequent investigation found that NASA had known about potential problems with the O-rings for years but failed to address the issue. This tragedy highlighted flaws in NASA's risk management and decision-making processes.
Key visualizations of the decision to launch the Space Shuttle Challenger on 27 January 1986. Includes animation of the mechanical failure and data analysis.
Case Study 1The Challenger Space Shuttle disasterand the.docxwendolynhalbert
Case Study 1
The Challenger Space Shuttle disaster
and the Solid-Fuel Rocket Booster
(SRB) project
Overview
On 28 January,1986 the Challenger space shuttle blew up 73 seconds after
launch. Seven lives and three billion dollars worth of equipment was lost.
The Challenger accident was the result of a faulty sealing system which
allowed exhaust flames from the Solid-Fuel Rocket Boosters (SRB) to vent
directly on the external tank, rupturing the tank and causing the explosion.
NASA identified the failure due to the improper sealing of the O- rings, the
giant black rubber loops that help seal the segments of the SRBs. The O-ring
is made of a fluoroelastomer, which seals the joint between two solid rocket
booster sections. An elastomer is a material that can be deformed
dramatically and recover its shape completely. A rubber band is an example
of an elastomer.
In almost half of the shuttle flights there was O- ring erosion in the booster
field joints. The launch took place in untested temperature conditions and in
spite of serious warnings on the part of the engineers of Thiokol, the
company that manufactured the SRBs. The sequence of events that led to
the unfortunate events is examined in order to draw the necessary
conclusions.
NASA was very anxious to proceed with the launch for a variety of reasons
including, economic considerations and political pressure. To justify its
budget NASA had scheduled a large number of missions in 1986. It was
vital for the Challenger to be launched so that there would be enough time to
refurbish the launch pad to prepare it for the next launch. The European
Space Agency was providing added competition and there was political
pressure for the Challenger to be in space when the president of the US gave
the State of the Union address.
There were plenty of advanced warnings regarding the SRBs, from previous
missions. Concerns had been voiced by Thiokol, the SRB manufacturing
company, as to whether the fatal launch should have taken place. The cold
weather, some of the coldest in Florida history, provided uncharted waters
for the operation of the SRBs.
What went wrong? Why did NASA launch in spite of the evidence and
warnings from Thiokol engineers? Should the launch have been cancelled?
Challenger space shuttle: A project success or a program
failure?
At first sight, the Challenger incident can only be regarded as a failure. Loss
of life and loss of equipment worth billions of dollars can only be associated
with bad news. The television pictures of the Challenger’s explosion made
their way round the world and were broadcast over and over as the leading
news story and will indelibly remain in people’s minds for many years to
come.
Before arriving at a verdict about the Challenger explosion, it is necessary to
examine the various events that led to NASA’s twenty-fifth shuttle mission,
which proved to be fatal for the Challenger. Is it possible that the SRB
project was a success, while the overall program was ...
The case presented is a philosophy of practice, by Ulf Donner, leade.docxmamanda2
The case presented is a philosophy of practice, by Ulf Donner, leader of the Foundation Home at the psychiatric nursing home in Finland that for 15 years has based its practice on Eriksson’s caritative theory of caring.
Even at an early stage in our serving in caring science, we caregivers recognized ourselves in the caring science theory, which stresses the healing force of love and compassion in the form of tending, playing, and learning in faith, hope, and charity. The caritative culture is made visible with the help of rituals, symbols, and traditions, for instance, with the stone that burns with the light of the Trinity and the daily common time for spiritual reflection. In every meeting with the suffering human being, the attributes of love and charity are striven for, and the day involves discussions of reconciliation, forgiveness, and how we as caregivers can tend by nourishing and cleansing on the level of becoming, being, and doing. In the struggle in love and compassion to reach a fellow human being who, because of suffering, has withdrawn from the communion to find common horizons, the sacrifice of the caregiver is constantly available.
We work with people who often have the feeling that they do not deserve the love they encounter and who, in various ways, try to convince us caregivers of this. We experience patients’ disappointment in their destructive acts, and we constantly have to remember that it may be broken promises that produce such dynamics. Sometimes, it may be difficult to recognize that suffering expressed in this way in an abstract sense seeks an embrace that does not give way but is strong enough to give shelter to this suffering, in a way that makes a becoming movement possible. In recognizing what is bad and what is difficult, horizons in the field of force are expanded, and the possibility of bringing in a ray of light and hope is opened.
As caregivers, we constantly ask ourselves whether the words, the language we use, bring promise, and how we can create linguistic footholds in the void by means of images and symbols. In our effort to nourish and cleanse, that which constitutes the basic movement of tending, we often recognize the importance of teaching the patient to be able to mourn disappointments and affirm the possibilities of forgiveness in the movement of reconciliation.
We also try to bring about the open invitation to the suffering human being to join a communion with the help of myths, legends, and tales concerned with human questions about evil versus good and about eternity and infinity. Reading aloud with common reflective periods often provides us caregivers a possibility of getting closer to patients without getting too close, and opens the door for the suffering the patient bears.
In the act of caring, we strive for openness with regard to the patient’s face and a confirmative attitude that responds to the appeal that we can recognize that the patient directs to us. When we as caregivers re.
The Case of Will Smithers To Exhume or not Exhume, that is the .docxmamanda2
The Case of Will Smithers: To Exhume or not Exhume, that is the Question
A surprising amount of information can be gleaned about an individual just from one’s tissues. In this case, you have been assigned to shadow histopathologist Dr. Jonas Riehm as he attempts to identify the cause of death of 42-year-old Will Smithers. Mr. Smithers’s body was discovered sitting in his car near an alley several miles from his home. There was no obvious cause of death, necessitating an autopsy to determine if the death was from natural causes or foul play. However, due to a clerical error, the decedent’s body was released and interred before a proper autopsy could be performed, and an official cause of death was not established.
Fortunately, several tissue samples were taken before the interment and remain available for examination. Mr. Smithers’s family does not wish to have his body exhumed, so local law enforcement professionals have asked Dr. Riehm to examine the tissue samples in the hopes of determining his cause of death and whether or not an exhumation is needed. The following sections have been taken from the official report that Dr. Riehm sent to the local coroner’s office. You are to report to Dr. Riehm’s office with your anatomy and physiology textbook. He expects students to answer questions related to the work that he does in his histopathology laboratory.
Dr. Riehm enjoys teaching, and has a collection of microscope slides that he uses to introduce students to the fascinating universe of histology. He starts with the following definition: histology is the study of the normal structure of tissues. Although Dr. Riehm is an expert in the study of the diseases and abnormalities of tissues, histopathology, he is a firm believer that you must be able to recognize normal tissue before you can understand diseased tissue. He has set up four microscope stations for students to get familiar with how the microscopes function and to view slides of normal tissues.
Each station has a microscope with a slide of one of the four primary tissue types. (a) Define tissue and organ, and then describe how each fits into the levels of body organization. (b) Describe what you would expect to observe on the epithelial tissue slide. What are the general functions of this tissue? (c) Describe what you would expect to see on the connective tissue slide. What are the general functions of this tissue? (d) Describe what you would expect to see on the muscle tissue slide. What are the general functions of this tissue? (e) Describe what you would expect to observe on the nervous tissue slide. What are the general functions of this tissue?
Satisfied that you are properly introduced to the concepts of normal tissue, Dr. Riehm begins to fill you in on the details of Mr. Smithers’s case, whose tissue samples have coincidentally arrived just in time for your shadowing visit. The first set of slides included an epithelium sample taken from Mr. Smithers’s forehead. The slide w.
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Similar to The Challenger Disaster A Case-study in Engineering Ethics.docx
A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R DCOLUM.docxransayo
A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D
COLUMBIA
1 9 5R e p o r t V o l u m e I A u g u s t 2 0 0 3
The Board began its investigation with two central ques-
tions about NASA decisions. Why did NASA continue to fly
with known foam debris problems in the years preceding the
Columbia launch, and why did NASA managers conclude
that the foam debris strike 81.9 seconds into Columbiaʼs
flight was not a threat to the safety of the mission, despite
the concerns of their engineers?
8.1 ECHOES OF CHALLENGER
As the investigation progressed, Board member Dr. Sally
Ride, who also served on the Rogers Commission, observed
that there were “echoes” of Challenger in Columbia. Ironi-
cally, the Rogers Commission investigation into Challenger
started with two remarkably similar central questions: Why
did NASA continue to fly with known O-ring erosion prob-
lems in the years before the Challenger launch, and why, on
the eve of the Challenger launch, did NASA managers decide
that launching the mission in such cold temperatures was an
acceptable risk, despite the concerns of their engineers?
The echoes did not stop there. The foam debris hit was not
the single cause of the Columbia accident, just as the failure
of the joint seal that permitted O-ring erosion was not the
single cause of Challenger. Both Columbia and Challenger
were lost also because of the failure of NASA̓ s organiza-
tional system. Part Two of this report cites failures of the
three parts of NASA̓ s organizational system. This chapter
shows how previous political, budgetary, and policy deci-
sions by leaders at the White House, Congress, and NASA
(Chapter 5) impacted the Space Shuttle Programʼs structure,
culture, and safety system (Chapter 7), and how these in turn
resulted in flawed decision-making (Chapter 6) for both ac-
cidents. The explanation is about system effects: how actions
taken in one layer of NASA̓ s organizational system impact
other layers. History is not just a backdrop or a scene-setter.
History is cause. History set the Columbia and Challenger
accidents in motion. Although Part Two is separated into
chapters and sections to make clear what happened in the
political environment, the organization, and managers ̓and
engineers ̓decision-making, the three worked together. Each
is a critical link in the causal chain.
This chapter shows that both accidents were “failures of
foresight” in which history played a prominent role.1 First,
the history of engineering decisions on foam and O-ring
incidents had identical trajectories that “normalized” these
anomalies, so that flying with these flaws became routine
and acceptable. Second, NASA history had an effect. In re-
sponse to White House and Congressional mandates, NASA
leaders took actions that created systemic organizational
flaws at the time of Challenger that were also present for
Columbia. The final section compares the two critical deci-
sion sequences immediately.
The document summarizes the Columbia shuttle disaster, beginning with NASA's history and goals of human spaceflight. It describes how concerns were raised during the shuttle's launch about potential damage from foam insulation striking the wing, but requests for additional imagery to assess the damage were denied. As the shuttle re-entered on February 1st, it disintegrated due to heat damage caused by the foam strike. The investigation revealed NASA's safety-focused culture had shifted over time to prioritize protocols over addressing technical concerns, likely contributing to the disaster.
DAVIS\ENGINEER\CODES (MD006) (0110d)
ENGINEERING CODES OF ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
Heinz C. Luegenbiehl and Michael Davis
Contents Page
I. Introduction: The Challenge Disaster 1
II. History of Engineering Codes 3
III. Codes of Ethics Today 6
IV. Codes and Profession 9
V. Why Obey Your Profession's Code? 12
VI. Using a Code of Ethics 16
VII. Some Rules of Thumb 22
VIII. Sample Application of Rules of Thumb 25
IX. More Problems for Discussion 30
NOTES 40
BIBLIOGRAPHY 41
APPENDIX A: AIEE Code (1912) 42
APPENDIX B: ASCE Code (1914) 46
APPENDIX C: AAE Code (1924) 47
APPENDIX D: ABET Code (1977) 54
APPENDIX E: IEEE Code 64
APPENDIX F: NSPE (Revised January 1987) 66
APPENDIX G: AAES (1984) 76
15 August 1986
26 October 1986
6 November 1986
10 July 1992
@ Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois 60616
ENGINEERING CODES OF ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
The Public knows that doctors and lawyers are bound to abide by certain recognized rules
of conduct. Not finding the same character of obligations imposed upon engineers, people have
failed to recognize them as members of a profession.--A.G. Christie (1922), engineer
With respect to each separate profession we must begin by analyzing the functions it
performs in society. A code of ethics must contain a sense of mission, some feeling for the
peculiar role of the profession it seeks to regulate.--Lon Fuller (1955), lawyer
I. Introduction: The Challenger Disaster
On the night of January 27, 1986, Robert Lund, vice-president for engineering at Morton
Thiokol, had a problem. The Space Center was counting down for a shuttle launch the next
morning. Lund had earlier presided at a meeting of engineers that unanimously recommended
against the launch. He had concurred and informed his boss, Jerald Mason. Mason informed the
Space Center. Lund had expected the flight to be postponed. The Space Center had a good
safety record. It had gotten it by not allowing a launch unless the technical people approved.
Lund had not approved because the temperature at the launch site would be close to
freezing at lift-off. The Space Center was worried about the ice already forming here and there
on the boosters, but Lund's worry was the "O-rings" that sealed the boosters' segments. They
had been a great idea, permitting Thiokol to build the huge rocket in Utah and ship it in pieces to
the Space Center two thousand miles away. Building in Utah was so much more efficient than
building on-site that Thiokol had been able to underbid the competition. The shuttle contract had
earned.
DAVIS\ENGINEER\CODES (MD006) (0110d)
ENGINEERING CODES OF ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
Heinz C. Luegenbiehl and Michael Davis
Contents Page
I. Introduction: The Challenge Disaster 1
II. History of Engineering Codes 3
III. Codes of Ethics Today 6
IV. Codes and Profession 9
V. Why Obey Your Profession's Code? 12
VI. Using a Code of Ethics 16
VII. Some Rules of Thumb 22
VIII. Sample Application of Rules of Thumb 25
IX. More Problems for Discussion 30
NOTES 40
BIBLIOGRAPHY 41
APPENDIX A: AIEE Code (1912) 42
APPENDIX B: ASCE Code (1914) 46
APPENDIX C: AAE Code (1924) 47
APPENDIX D: ABET Code (1977) 54
APPENDIX E: IEEE Code 64
APPENDIX F: NSPE (Revised January 1987) 66
APPENDIX G: AAES (1984) 76
15 August 1986
26 October 1986
6 November 1986
10 July 1992
@ Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois 60616
ENGINEERING CODES OF ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
The Public knows that doctors and lawyers are bound to abide by certain recognized rules
of conduct. Not finding the same character of obligations imposed upon engineers, people have
failed to recognize them as members of a profession.--A.G. Christie (1922), engineer
With respect to each separate profession we must begin by analyzing the functions it
performs in society. A code of ethics must contain a sense of mission, some feeling for the
peculiar role of the profession it seeks to regulate.--Lon Fuller (1955), lawyer
I. Introduction: The Challenger Disaster
On the night of January 27, 1986, Robert Lund, vice-president for engineering at Morton
Thiokol, had a problem. The Space Center was counting down for a shuttle launch the next
morning. Lund had earlier presided at a meeting of engineers that unanimously recommended
against the launch. He had concurred and informed his boss, Jerald Mason. Mason informed the
Space Center. Lund had expected the flight to be postponed. The Space Center had a good
safety record. It had gotten it by not allowing a launch unless the technical people approved.
Lund had not approved because the temperature at the launch site would be close to
freezing at lift-off. The Space Center was worried about the ice already forming here and there
on the boosters, but Lund's worry was the "O-rings" that sealed the boosters' segments. They
had been a great idea, permitting Thiokol to build the huge rocket in Utah and ship it in pieces to
the Space Center two thousand miles away. Building in Utah was so much more efficient than
building on-site that Thiokol had been able to underbid the competition. The shuttle contract had
earned.
This document provides an overview of engineering ethics and several case studies related to ethical issues engineers may face. It discusses what engineering ethics is, why it is studied, and its scope. Several case studies are then summarized related to a killer robot, issues with the DC-10 aircraft, whistleblowing, structural issues with the Citicorp building, and the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Challenger. Sample codes of ethics are also briefly mentioned.
The document summarizes the timeline and technical challenges faced by NASA in determining the flight readiness of the Space Shuttle following a malfunction with a main engine valve during launch. Teams worked to understand the failure mechanism, potential risks, and establish acceptable flight rationale. After two initial Flight Readiness Reviews were inconclusive, continued testing and analysis eventually provided the necessary insights. The third review approved the next launch, which proceeded safely. Key lessons included the importance of diverse perspectives, challenging assumptions, and creating an environment where issues can be raised without fear.
1) During a 2008 space shuttle launch, an unexpected hydrogen flow increase was detected from one of the shuttle's main engines, likely due to an electrical or mechanical failure in a valve.
2) Inspection in December 2008 revealed a crack in the valve's poppet, the first such failure ever observed. Analyzing the cause and implications of this failure was a significant technical challenge.
3) After two Flight Readiness Reviews in February 2009 found that not enough was known about the risk, thousands of engineers continued testing and analysis. A key breakthrough was developing an inspection method that could detect small cracks without damaging the hardware.
Whistle-blowing Case Study The Challenger disaster On January 24, 19.pdfprakashudhwani
Whistle-blowing Case Study: The Challenger disaster On January 24, 1985, Roger Boisjoly,
Senior Scientist at Morton Thiokol Inc. (MTI), watched the launch of Flight 51-C of the space
shuttle program and remained to inspect the solid rocket boosters after their recovery from the
Atlantic Ocean. These immense boosters are too large to transport, so they are manufactured in
cylindrical sections and fastened together with "field joints" before launch. At each joint, the
straight terminal ring of one segment (the "tang") slid into a clevis ring (with a Y-shaped cross
section) on the mating segment, and this joint was sealed with two O-rings (see Figure 16-1).
Boisjoly, then "considered the leading expert in the United States on O-rings and rocket joint
seals," was dismayed to find "that both the primary and secondary O-ring seals on a field joint
had been compromised by hot combustion gases (i.e., hot gas blow-by had occurred), which had
also eroded part of the primary O-ring," although the temperature of the field joint at launch was
believed to be a comfortable 53F(12C) (see Figure 162.)19 Segment centerline Unpressurized
joint, no rotation Seement centerhine Figure 16-1 Cross section of Challenger booster flange.
(From Russell). Boisjoly and Ellen Foster Curtis, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: A
Case Study in Engineering Management, Corporate Loyalty, and Ethics, "Proceedings of the
Eighth Annual Meeting, American Society for Engineering Management, St. Louis, MO,
October 11-13, 1987, p. 10.) Since rocket motor pressurization following ignition causes some
rotation in the field joint, opening the annulus sealed by the O-rings, Boisjoly sponsored a series
of subscale laboratory tests in March 1985 of the effect of temperature on O-ring resiliency. In
these tests O-rings were squeezed, the pressure removed, and the time for the O-ring to regain
shape measured. At 100F(38C) recovery was immediate, at 75F(24C) it took 2.4 seconds, but at
50F(10C)
Figure 16-2 Multiple burn-through of Challenger nozzle joint primary O-ring. (From Russell 1.
Boisjoly and Ellen Foster Curtis, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: A Case Study in
Engineering Management, Corporate Loyalty, and Ethics," Proceedings of the Eighth Annual
Meeting, American Society for Engineering Management, St. Louis, MO. October 1113,1987, p.
8.) the seal had not recovered even after 10 minutes ( 600 seconds). In the ensuing months,
Boisjoly emphasized in the strongest terms the need to redesign the field joint. On August 20,
1985, Robert K. Lund, MTI Vice President, Engineering, announced formation of a Seal Erosion
Task Team, but little progress was made on solving the problem-despite further blow-by on a
flight on October 30, 1985, when the field joint temperature was estimated at a balmy 75F(24C)
The stage is now set for the eve of the Challenger tragedy: At 10 a.m. on January 27, 1986, Amie
Thompson (MTI Supervisor of Rocket Motor Cases) received a phone call from .
Factors over which an Engineer has control that effect the cost of the product
Issues that are relevant to GREEN DESIGN
Discuss recyclability/disposability issues
A brief discussion on legal and ethical issues in engineering design
A study on Environmental, Economic and Societal (EES) issues in Materials Science and Engineering.
On January 28th, 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger was launched at 11:38am on the 6-day STS-51-L mission. During the first 3 seconds of lift off the o-rings (o-shaped loops used to connect two cylinders) in the shuttle’s right-hand solid rocket booster (SRB) failed.
Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse – The third longest suspension bridge of the world at that time, Tacoma Narrows Bridge had been in operation for just more than five months before it crashed into the Puget Sound of Washington on November 7th, 1940.
Eschede Train Disaster
On June 3, 1998, a high-speed train derailed near the village of Eschede in Germany, killing 101 people and injuring 88 more. A single fatigue crack in one wheel failed, causing the train to derail at a switch. A contributing factor was the use of welds in the carriage bodies that “unzipped” during the crash. Within weeks of the crash, all wheels of a similar design were replaced with mono block wheels.
Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
On July 17, 1981, at the Hyatt Regency Kansas City in Kansas City, Mo., two connected walkways collapsed and fell into the lobby, killing 114 people and injuring 216 more. An investigation revealed a structural engineering flaw in the way the bolts and rods were secured. The engineering firm consulting on the project was found to be in gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct.
Fukushima Reactor Meltdown
Following the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, the Fukushima reactor melted down, releasing radioactive material into the ground and ocean. While exacerbated by the earthquake, a report claims that the meltdown was a manmade disaster caused by poor regulation. Wrote Daily Tech, “The Fukushima nuclear disaster shows the danger of using ancient reactor designs in flood-prone regions without proper precaution. The accident stands as a stirring cry to decommission older reactors and move to modern designs.”
The Deepwater Horizon was an offshore drilling unit with the ability to drill down to 30,000 feet. On April 20, 2010, while drilling an exploratory well, the rig exploded, killing 11 workers and setting the stage to release 4.9 million barrels of oil that devastated the area around the Gulf of Mexico. The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill said “several tests indicated the cement put in place after the installation ... was not an effective barrier to prevent gases from entering the well.” These same gases allowed the explosion to occur.
The document summarizes the story of Rodney Rocha, an engineer who warned NASA about potential damage to the Columbia space shuttle from foam insulation striking its wing during launch. Rocha and others requested clearer images of the impact and consideration of inspecting the wing, but NASA dismissed concerns, believing foam strikes could not be dangerous. Upon reentry, superheated gases entered a breach in the wing caused by the foam, leading to the destruction of Columbia and loss of the seven-member crew.
Reality and Nature . . . The Challenger Disaster RevisitedKurt D. Hamman
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986, when Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, leading to the deaths of its seven crew members. The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of central Florida at 11:38 EST. Disintegration of the entire vehicle began after an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at liftoff.
The document provides details about the Challenger disaster case study submitted by students at IQRA University. It includes an introduction describing the Space Shuttle Challenger and the causes of the accident. It then discusses the key organizations and people involved, provides a chronological account of events, and describes the environmental conditions and political pressures on the day of the ill-fated launch. It analyzes communication issues and the roles of management and engineers. The document concludes that the launch should not have proceeded given the warnings about the O-rings and freezing temperatures.
Due August 7,2019First, watch the video Personal Potential The.docxmadlynplamondon
Due August 7,2019
First, watch the video "Personal Potential: The Power of One" by Dr. Verna Price at http://library.limestone.edu:2048/login?url=http://digital.films.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?aid=4891&xtid=44027
Second, in a 500-750 word essay that addresses the following questions:
1. Dr. Price discusses the difference between personal and positional power, describe the difference, and give an example of a time in your life when you used both personal and positional power.
2. How is this idea of personal and/or positional power connected to being a leader? Explain.
First, watch the video "Personal Potential: The Power of One" by Dr. Verna Price at http://library.limestone.edu:2048/login?url=http://digital.films.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?aid=4891&xtid=44027
Due August 2, 2019 (1-2 pages, APA)
1. What has seemed to be the major problem facing NASA? Apply your knowledge of group dynamics and decision making to identify the problem.
2. What must NASA accomplish to ensure the vitality of the space program? Has groupthink accounted for some of NASA’s problems? If so, what symptoms can you identify?
3. What group-decision making challenges has NASA faced in changing its culture?
Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster and the Future of NASA
Early on February 1, 2003, television viewers watched in disbelief and sadness as the space shuttle Columbia, returning from its mission, seemed simply to break apart. Later in a scathing report, investigators said that NASA’s management practices were as much to blame for the accident that killed seven astronauts as the foam that broke away from the fuel tank and hit the left wing during blastoff. The report concluded that NASA had known of problems with the foam insulation over a long period but had never invested the time or energy to resolve the problem.
Former astronaut and NBC analyst Sally Ride agreed with the findings. She noted that foam had been falling off the external tanks since the first shuttle launch and that it had fallen off on nearly every flight. Ride considered the foam problem an accident waiting to happen, which of course it did. NASA recognized the foam as a serious problem and tried to fix it; unfortunately, it didn’t get as much attention as many other problems NASA faced during the past decade.
Columbia was a sad reminder of the Challenger disaster 17 years earlier. In the case of Challenger, engineers suspected problems with O-rings, but didn’t fix them. It appeared that NASA didn’t learn from its mistakes with Challenger and, more important, that a deeper problem existed: Safety concerns had not been given top priority. According to Ride, while NASA officials did not suppress dissenting views, they did not encourage them. Echoes of Challenger? Ride thought so. The further the Columbia investigation progressed, the more echoes were heard. The Columbia Accident Investigation
Board cited several failures; chief among them a corporate culture at NASA that discouraged the communica ...
How Groupthink becomes fiasco of space shuttle challengerShranik Jain
The document summarizes the Challenger space shuttle disaster and how groupthink contributed to the faulty decision to launch. It provides a framework for analyzing groupthink, including characteristics like cohesion, leadership styles that discourage dissent, and decision-making defects like lack of contingency plans. The disaster is attributed to NASA ignoring warnings about O-ring seals on the solid rocket boosters not being tested in cold weather. Pressure to meet launch schedules and overconfidence in abilities led to rationalization of risks. Suggestions to avoid groupthink include assigning critical evaluators, follow up discussions, and considering outside experts.
This document discusses groupthink and its application to decision making failures at NASA. It defines groupthink as a mode of thinking where the desire for harmony or conformity in a group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. The document outlines Irving Janis' 8 symptoms of groupthink and provides examples of how those symptoms contributed to the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters. It analyzes NASA's organizational culture that promoted conformity over safety and encouraged the dismissal of dissenting opinions. The document recommends ways to prevent groupthink and encourage independent critical thinking in groups to avoid poor decisions.
The document discusses professional ethics and the balanced outlook on laws in engineering practice. It provides examples of historical codes from 1758 BC, 1852 AD, and 1871 that established regulations for builders, steamboats, and ship safety inspections. The document also summarizes the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and investigations that found NASA managers disregarded engineer warnings about low launch temperatures, violating established procedures. Overall it emphasizes that laws should establish minimum standards while allowing for responsible experimentation, with engineers prioritizing public safety above all else.
On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds after launch, killing all seven crew members. Engineers had warned NASA managers that the rubber O-rings used to seal joints on the solid rocket boosters could fail in the abnormally cold launch conditions. However, NASA managers decided to proceed with launch despite the risks. The subsequent investigation found that NASA had known about potential problems with the O-rings for years but failed to address the issue. This tragedy highlighted flaws in NASA's risk management and decision-making processes.
Key visualizations of the decision to launch the Space Shuttle Challenger on 27 January 1986. Includes animation of the mechanical failure and data analysis.
Case Study 1The Challenger Space Shuttle disasterand the.docxwendolynhalbert
Case Study 1
The Challenger Space Shuttle disaster
and the Solid-Fuel Rocket Booster
(SRB) project
Overview
On 28 January,1986 the Challenger space shuttle blew up 73 seconds after
launch. Seven lives and three billion dollars worth of equipment was lost.
The Challenger accident was the result of a faulty sealing system which
allowed exhaust flames from the Solid-Fuel Rocket Boosters (SRB) to vent
directly on the external tank, rupturing the tank and causing the explosion.
NASA identified the failure due to the improper sealing of the O- rings, the
giant black rubber loops that help seal the segments of the SRBs. The O-ring
is made of a fluoroelastomer, which seals the joint between two solid rocket
booster sections. An elastomer is a material that can be deformed
dramatically and recover its shape completely. A rubber band is an example
of an elastomer.
In almost half of the shuttle flights there was O- ring erosion in the booster
field joints. The launch took place in untested temperature conditions and in
spite of serious warnings on the part of the engineers of Thiokol, the
company that manufactured the SRBs. The sequence of events that led to
the unfortunate events is examined in order to draw the necessary
conclusions.
NASA was very anxious to proceed with the launch for a variety of reasons
including, economic considerations and political pressure. To justify its
budget NASA had scheduled a large number of missions in 1986. It was
vital for the Challenger to be launched so that there would be enough time to
refurbish the launch pad to prepare it for the next launch. The European
Space Agency was providing added competition and there was political
pressure for the Challenger to be in space when the president of the US gave
the State of the Union address.
There were plenty of advanced warnings regarding the SRBs, from previous
missions. Concerns had been voiced by Thiokol, the SRB manufacturing
company, as to whether the fatal launch should have taken place. The cold
weather, some of the coldest in Florida history, provided uncharted waters
for the operation of the SRBs.
What went wrong? Why did NASA launch in spite of the evidence and
warnings from Thiokol engineers? Should the launch have been cancelled?
Challenger space shuttle: A project success or a program
failure?
At first sight, the Challenger incident can only be regarded as a failure. Loss
of life and loss of equipment worth billions of dollars can only be associated
with bad news. The television pictures of the Challenger’s explosion made
their way round the world and were broadcast over and over as the leading
news story and will indelibly remain in people’s minds for many years to
come.
Before arriving at a verdict about the Challenger explosion, it is necessary to
examine the various events that led to NASA’s twenty-fifth shuttle mission,
which proved to be fatal for the Challenger. Is it possible that the SRB
project was a success, while the overall program was ...
The case presented is a philosophy of practice, by Ulf Donner, leade.docxmamanda2
The case presented is a philosophy of practice, by Ulf Donner, leader of the Foundation Home at the psychiatric nursing home in Finland that for 15 years has based its practice on Eriksson’s caritative theory of caring.
Even at an early stage in our serving in caring science, we caregivers recognized ourselves in the caring science theory, which stresses the healing force of love and compassion in the form of tending, playing, and learning in faith, hope, and charity. The caritative culture is made visible with the help of rituals, symbols, and traditions, for instance, with the stone that burns with the light of the Trinity and the daily common time for spiritual reflection. In every meeting with the suffering human being, the attributes of love and charity are striven for, and the day involves discussions of reconciliation, forgiveness, and how we as caregivers can tend by nourishing and cleansing on the level of becoming, being, and doing. In the struggle in love and compassion to reach a fellow human being who, because of suffering, has withdrawn from the communion to find common horizons, the sacrifice of the caregiver is constantly available.
We work with people who often have the feeling that they do not deserve the love they encounter and who, in various ways, try to convince us caregivers of this. We experience patients’ disappointment in their destructive acts, and we constantly have to remember that it may be broken promises that produce such dynamics. Sometimes, it may be difficult to recognize that suffering expressed in this way in an abstract sense seeks an embrace that does not give way but is strong enough to give shelter to this suffering, in a way that makes a becoming movement possible. In recognizing what is bad and what is difficult, horizons in the field of force are expanded, and the possibility of bringing in a ray of light and hope is opened.
As caregivers, we constantly ask ourselves whether the words, the language we use, bring promise, and how we can create linguistic footholds in the void by means of images and symbols. In our effort to nourish and cleanse, that which constitutes the basic movement of tending, we often recognize the importance of teaching the patient to be able to mourn disappointments and affirm the possibilities of forgiveness in the movement of reconciliation.
We also try to bring about the open invitation to the suffering human being to join a communion with the help of myths, legends, and tales concerned with human questions about evil versus good and about eternity and infinity. Reading aloud with common reflective periods often provides us caregivers a possibility of getting closer to patients without getting too close, and opens the door for the suffering the patient bears.
In the act of caring, we strive for openness with regard to the patient’s face and a confirmative attitude that responds to the appeal that we can recognize that the patient directs to us. When we as caregivers re.
The Case of Will Smithers To Exhume or not Exhume, that is the .docxmamanda2
The Case of Will Smithers: To Exhume or not Exhume, that is the Question
A surprising amount of information can be gleaned about an individual just from one’s tissues. In this case, you have been assigned to shadow histopathologist Dr. Jonas Riehm as he attempts to identify the cause of death of 42-year-old Will Smithers. Mr. Smithers’s body was discovered sitting in his car near an alley several miles from his home. There was no obvious cause of death, necessitating an autopsy to determine if the death was from natural causes or foul play. However, due to a clerical error, the decedent’s body was released and interred before a proper autopsy could be performed, and an official cause of death was not established.
Fortunately, several tissue samples were taken before the interment and remain available for examination. Mr. Smithers’s family does not wish to have his body exhumed, so local law enforcement professionals have asked Dr. Riehm to examine the tissue samples in the hopes of determining his cause of death and whether or not an exhumation is needed. The following sections have been taken from the official report that Dr. Riehm sent to the local coroner’s office. You are to report to Dr. Riehm’s office with your anatomy and physiology textbook. He expects students to answer questions related to the work that he does in his histopathology laboratory.
Dr. Riehm enjoys teaching, and has a collection of microscope slides that he uses to introduce students to the fascinating universe of histology. He starts with the following definition: histology is the study of the normal structure of tissues. Although Dr. Riehm is an expert in the study of the diseases and abnormalities of tissues, histopathology, he is a firm believer that you must be able to recognize normal tissue before you can understand diseased tissue. He has set up four microscope stations for students to get familiar with how the microscopes function and to view slides of normal tissues.
Each station has a microscope with a slide of one of the four primary tissue types. (a) Define tissue and organ, and then describe how each fits into the levels of body organization. (b) Describe what you would expect to observe on the epithelial tissue slide. What are the general functions of this tissue? (c) Describe what you would expect to see on the connective tissue slide. What are the general functions of this tissue? (d) Describe what you would expect to see on the muscle tissue slide. What are the general functions of this tissue? (e) Describe what you would expect to observe on the nervous tissue slide. What are the general functions of this tissue?
Satisfied that you are properly introduced to the concepts of normal tissue, Dr. Riehm begins to fill you in on the details of Mr. Smithers’s case, whose tissue samples have coincidentally arrived just in time for your shadowing visit. The first set of slides included an epithelium sample taken from Mr. Smithers’s forehead. The slide w.
The Case of SamSam is a 62-year-old, widowed, African American male..docxmamanda2
The Case of SamSam is a 62-year-old, widowed, African American male. He is unemployed, receives Social Security benefits, and lives on his own in an apartment. Sam has minimal peer relationships, choosing not to socialize with anyone except his daughter, with whom he is very close. Sam raised his daughter as a single father after his wife passed away. Melissa is 28 years old and works as an emergency medical technician (EMT). When Sam was 7years old, he was placed in foster care and has had very limited contact with his extended family. Prior to September 11, 2001, Sam had a steady employment history in food services and retail.He hadno psychiatric history before that time. Sam reportedhis religious background is Catholic, but he is not affiliatedwith a congregation or church. Sam became depressed and psychotic sometimeafter 9/11 and had to be taken to an emergency room. He was hospitalized at that time for several weeks. His mental status exam (MSE)and diagnostic interview showed no history of alcohol or substance abuse issues,and he had no criminal background or current legal issues. Sam was released to outpatient care but was deemed unable to return to work. At that time,he had a diagnosis of major depression with psychotic features; he alsohas a history of high blood pressure and migraines. After several additional multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, he was gradually stabilized. Sam has been seeing a psychiatrist once a month for over a decade for medication management and is currently prescribedDepakote®, Abilify, and Wellbutrin®. Sam has a positive history of medication and treatment compliance. He wastreated by a social worker at an outpatient program for about 2years after his hospitalizations for his psychosis and depression. He gradually stopped attending sessions with the social worker after his symptoms stabilized, and his termination from the outpatient program was deemed appropriate; he continued to see the psychiatrist monthly for medication management.After about 10years of seeing only the psychiatrist, Sam scheduled a meeting with this social worker for increased feelings of depression. These feelings were broughton after his daughter moved out of the apartment they had shared for many years to live with her boyfriend. He reported difficulty adjusting to living alone and said he often feels lonely and anxious. He reported during sessions with his social worker that he speaks to his daughter frequently, and although she only lives 10blocks away, he misses her terribly.Our sessions for the last 3months have focused on his mixed feelings around his daughter’s new life with her boyfriend. He said he is happy that she is happy but misses her very much. I emphasized his strengths and helped him reframe his situation by focusing on the positive changes in her life as well as his own life. Our goals were to help him reduce his symptoms of anxiety and begin searching for new opportunities for socialization outside of his daughter.
.
The Case of Sam Sam is a 62-year-old, widowed, African American ma.docxmamanda2
The Case of Sam Sam is a 62-year-old, widowed, African American male. He is unemployed, receives Social Security benefits, and lives on his own in an apartment. Sam has minimal peer relationships, choosing not to socialize with anyone except his daughter, with whom he is very close. Sam raised his daughter as a single father after his wife passed away. Melissa is 28 years old and works as an emergency medical technician (EMT). When Sam was 7 years old, he was placed in foster care and has had very limited contact with his extended family. Prior to September 11, 2001, Sam had a steady employment history in food services and retail. He had no psychiatric history before that time. Sam reported his religious background is Catholic, but he is not affiliated with a congregation or church. Sam became depressed and psychotic sometime after 9/11 and had to be taken to an emergency room. He was hospitalized at that time for several weeks. His mental status exam (MSE) and diagnostic interview showed no history of alcohol or substance abuse issues, and he had no criminal background or current legal issues. Sam was released to outpatient care but was deemed unable to return to work. At that time, he had a diagnosis of major depression with psychotic features; he also has a history of high blood pressure and migraines. After several additional multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, he was gradually stabilized. Sam has been seeing a psychiatrist once a month for over a decade for medication management and is currently prescribed Depakote®, Abilify, and Wellbutrin®. Sam has a positive history of medication and treatment compliance. He was treated by a social worker at an outpatient program for about 2 years after his hospitalizations for his psychosis and depression. He gradually stopped attending sessions with the social worker after his symptoms stabilized, and his termination from the outpatient program was deemed appropriate; he continued to see the psychiatrist monthly for medication management. After about 10 years of seeing only the psychiatrist, Sam scheduled a meeting with this social worker for increased feelings of depression. These feelings were brought on after his daughter moved out of the apartment they had shared for many years to live with her boyfriend. He reported difficulty adjusting to living alone and said he often feels lonely and anxious. He reported during sessions with his social worker that he speaks to his daughter frequently, and although she only lives 10 blocks away, he misses her terribly. Our sessions for the last 3 months have focused on his mixed feelings around his daughter’s new life with her boyfriend. He said he is happy that she is happy but misses her very much. I emphasized his strengths and helped him reframe his situation by focusing on the positive changes in her life as well as his own life. Our goals were to help him reduce his symptoms of anxiety and begin searching for new opportunities for socialization outsi.
The case of OD in an NGO in IndiaNisha NairIndian Instit.docxmamanda2
The case of OD in an NGO in India
Nisha Nair
Indian Institute of Management Indore, Indore, India, and
Neharika Vohra
Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Ahmedabad, India
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to report an organizational development (OD) exercise carried out in a
prominent non-governmental organization (NGO) that works in the area of rights and advocacy in
India.
Design/methodology/approach – The exercise was part of the first author’s graduate program,
which required the application of behavioral science theory to a live organization under the
supervision of her advisor, the second author. The organizational development exercise spread over
four months, involved entering an organization, interacting with key participants and stakeholders of
the organization both formally and informally, diagnosing issues facing the organization and a
mirroring exercise with the management at the end of the intervention to provide feedback.
Findings – Some of the issues and improvement areas that emerged through the exercise are
discussed in the paper. It also offers reflections on some of the key lessons learnt during the process of
intervention, with implications for OD in developmental organizations.
Originality/value – The paper offers insights into OD interventions in the developmental sector,
posing a different set of challenges than conventional organizations, and also because the organization
itself was in a state of flux at the time of the intervention.
Keywords Non-governmental organizations, Business development, Organizational effectiveness,
Labour efficiency, Change management, India
Paper type Case study
Introduction
Organization development (OD) work has largely been carried out in business or for
profit organizations. Bargal and Schmid (1992) refer to the paucity of literature on
consultation done in developmental organizations. OD in nonprofit organizations
provides some unique challenges for the consultant that may not exist in business
organizations (Ramos, 2007; Waysman and Savaya, 1997). Developmental
organizations are thought to differ from for-profit organizations in a number of
ways (Brown and Covey, 1987). Studies have shown that employees in developmental
organizations seek greater autonomy and less organizational control in their work
(Mirvis and Hackett, 1983). Since there is a need for flexibility and local discretion in
the working of developmental organizations, they tend to be more informal and loosely
organized than business organizations ( Joseph, 2000; Lewis, 2003). Another often cited
concern is the existence of high role ambiguity and lack of clarity about roles and
procedures in such organizations (Goldman and Kahnweiler, 2000; McDonald, 1999). In
his study of organizational change in a human service organization, Ramos (2007)
discusses the poor communication across the various units/programs of the nonprofit.
Given that values and ideology play a central role in developmental organizations
(B.
The Case of “Hector”
Case Study 1: Chronic Hepatitis (Cirrhosis of Liver) & Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome
I. Case History
Background Information
Hector is a 44 year old, Hispanic male of low socioeconomic status. He lives on the southwest side of Chicago, Illinois in a neighborhood that is heavily populated with people of his ethnic background. Hector lives in a 3 bedroom home that he is currently renting.
Family History/Current Relationships
Hector was born in San Juan, Mexico and was raised in a two parent household, and has four siblings. Hector is the youngest of the four children. He comes from a Catholic background. Hector’s father worked as a carpenter, and his mother was a homemaker. Hector’s father was an alcoholic and was both physically and verbally abusive to the family. Hector lost his father at age 10 due to a physical altercation that took place at a local watering hole, which resulted in a fatal injury. His mother decided to relocate to the United States where she could receive the support of her family. At age 23, Hector met his current wife. Hector lives with his wife Consuela (age 40), and his 3 children Veronica (age 8), Mateo (age 6) and, Alejandro (age 2). Recently, his mother, and two cousins have moved into the home due to medical and financial reasons. Hector indicates that although times are hard, he is very committed to his family and grateful for their ongoing support.
Support Systems
Hector considers his family to be his primary support system. He indicates that they work very hard to be there for one another no matter what the situation. He indicates that he has a few friends but feel that they are not necessarily positive support systems, but can often times provide an outlet to stress.
Education
Hector has not graduated high school, but when time permits, he attends classes at a community agency who is assisting him with prep classes that will enable him to take the G.E.D. However, Hector admits that he is not able to consistently pursue obtaining his G.E.D because earning a living is his priority at this time.
Employment
Hector indicates that he is the primary provider in the home at this time. He indicates that they are able to receive some government assistance (Medicaid, food-stamps, WIC), but the income is supplemented, depending on his ability to obtain work. Hector currently works as a seasonal worker for a construction company. He reports that when he is actually called in to work, he can make decent money. However, there is question as to whether Hector receives his salary “under the table”. Hector does not have reliable transportation. Although he owns a mini-van, he reports that it is in constant need of repair. Hector chooses use public transportation and carpooling as a primary mode of transportation, because his license is suspended due to receiving his second DUI/DWI.
II. Description of Presenting Problem
Hector reports that he knows that he has an issue wi.
The Case of Joe the Jerk1The Case of Joe the Jerk (or,.docxmamanda2
The Case of Joe the Jerk
1
The Case of Joe the Jerk (or, the Very Capable Jerk)
You have been asked to consult with a module manager in a public service center of the Social Security Administration. A module is a group of about forty workers who work together in processing claims for social security coverage (i.e., requests for the beginning of payments, or other services such as changes and information). A module has all the specialists needed to process a claim from beginning to end——claims authorizers, benefits authorizers, file clerks, and typists/word processors. Each module has a module manager (hereafter, MM) and two assistant module managers (AMMs) who lead and manage the team of workers in the module.
The MM, Joan, has a serious concern about one of the AMMs, Joe. Joe is very intelligent, talented, and younger than most AMMs. As far as his knowledge of the work and technical details is concerned, he is extremely promising and has excellent prospects to move up to become MM and then move on up beyond that. Joe, however, is arrogant in his dealings with the workers in the module. He talks down to people and treats them curtly and rudely. He behaves as if he deserves more special treatment and attention than the module members because he is an AMM. On the other hand, Joe also takes some stands and actions that are not necessarily bad or unjustified.
Some incidents:
One of the file clerks arrives late fairly often. Joe has begun to confront her very aggressively, in front of the other members of the module, criticizing her for arriving late. He has initiated disciplinary action against her. Some other members of the module have pointed out to Joe and Joan that the file clerk is a young single mother with a lot of personal problems. Her brother was recently shot to death in a street fight, apparently drug related. Her child is sick a lot and she has problems getting good child care. Joe, however, insists on going forward with the disciplinary action, saying he cannot let a person arrive late regularly without being unfair to those who do arrive on time. Besides, he says, it is essentially illegal for him not to take action. Joan has to decide whether to intervene in the disciplinary action or let it go through.
Joan is concerned about Joe’s effect on motivation and work satisfaction in the module. He speaks very condescendingly to module members who make mistakes, acting as if he is very superior to them and a lot smarter than they are——which is often true, in a sense. Joan was so concerned about growing tensions in the module that she arranged for a weekend retreat, where the group went through some team development exercises with a consultant. Throughout the retreat and the exercises, Joe had a virtual sneer on his face, and he made repeated sarcastic comments about the time the group was wasting on ―touchy-feely nonsense.
The members of the module have group meetings to discuss problems and changes. Joe has gotten up and wal.
The CASE JournalStakeholders and corporate environmental dec.docxmamanda2
The CASE Journal
Stakeholders and corporate environmental decision making: The BP Whiting Refinery controversy
Bryan T. Stinchfield
Article information:
To cite this document:
Bryan T. Stinchfield , (2009),"Stakeholders and corporate environmental decision making: The BP Whiting Refinery controversy",
The CASE Journal, Vol. 6 Iss 1 pp. 5 - 18
Permanent link to this document:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/TCJ-06-2009-B002
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/TCJ-06-2009-B002
Bryan T. Stinchfield
Franklin & Marshall College_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
During the late summer of 2007, Bob Malone, British Petroleum (BP) America Chairman
and President, was faced with one of the most important decisions of his career – to
expand the Whiting Refinery in northwest Indiana on the banks of Lake Michigan, or to
yield to pressure from the public and not expand operations. Regional and global
consumer demand for gasoline was rising, which helped push prices toward record highs,
and the refinery had an opportunity to expand capacity to help meet that demand.
However, thousands of citizens, a host of environmental groups, and eve.
The Case of Emily P.Emily is a 62-year-old, single, heterosexual.docxmamanda2
The Case of Emily P.Emily is a 62-year-old, single, heterosexual, African American female who seeks treatment for anxiety. She says she is very concerned since she recently has been pulling her hair out,and it has become noticeable on top of her head. She is taking to wearing hats,which she finds acceptable. She worries about many things, which is not new to her,and she finds that scrubbing her home clean is her best therapy to ease her anxiety.Emily reports that germs have been a regular concern of hers since adolescence, when she learned in health classes about the risks of serious diseases including sexual transmittable disease. Emily presented with meticulous grooming, although the knees of her pants were noted as worn. She has arthritis in herspine and knees and uses a walker to help her manage mobility safely. With her physical disabilities it is challenging sometimes to scrub clean the house daily. This worries her shouldshe get a visitor and the house is not in order as she would like it. She is no longer working,so the amount of time it takes her to scrub the house clean doesn’t delay her daily schedule as it used to.Emily receives Social Security income and is not employed. Although the Social Security is acceptable,her living expenses are always a concern to her. She lives alone in a subsidized apartment in the same building as her 72-year-old, unmarried sister,so rent should not increase. Emily and her sister shared an apartment for over 30 years, beginning when each of their marriages dissolved. Emily reported that when her sister began a romantic relationship 5 years ago, Emily began to feel very anxious and started to cry often. Emily moved into an apartment down the hall in the building and began to pull the hair from her head,hiding her hair loss by wearing wigs. This behavior occurred at different times and resulted in scabbing. Emily said she feels better after but does not always notice how much she is pulling. Her sister learned of Emily’s hair pulling after her wig slipped off one evening to reveal bald spots. She set up a schedule over the past few months with her sister to help stop the hair pulling. Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesnot. She is worried that she will be disappointing her sister by not sticking to the schedule to reduce her hair pulling. Her sister encouraged Emily to seek treatment rather than “hiding her ways.” Emily is reliant upon her sister for transportation and for a sense of social and emotional connection. Emily worries about bothering her sister due to her transportation needs,and she worriesthatwithouther sister she would be helpless. She knows she is edgy with her sister often and worries that might be from a lack of good sleep. She agreed to this session even though she is pessimistic about anything working. During our initial visit at our local mental health center, Emily shared that when she was 2 years old her mother died from tuberculosis, and the following year her father, an a.
The Capital Budgeting ProcessConsidering the 2014 article by Bat.docxmamanda2
The Capital Budgeting Process
Considering the 2014 article by Batra and Verma assigned in this unit, "An Empirical Insight Into Different Stages of Capital Budgeting," discuss the following:
Describe the capital budgeting process.
Explain how the capital budgeting process is used in organizations.
Describe the types of projects that are subject to capital budgeting.
Explain why the capital budgeting process is important for the allocation of resources.
.
The C-130 is large and unmaneuverable compared to tactical jets. .docxmamanda2
The C-130 is large and unmaneuverable compared to tactical jets. With a C-130 crew of 7-10 compared to the 1-2 of tactical jets, it would be risky to operate the C-130 exposed to enemy defenses. So although the C-130's readiness would be increased by keeping it airborne for earlier snatch of descending aviators, it wouldn't be wise to hold it airborne near enemy targets. It should be kept in 'safe areas' over Iran or maybe offshore until needed.
But the pronged C-130 is a potential addition to other rescue forces such as helicopters, so the C-130 too is subject to the same kinds of time delays in communication to get it headed to the site of a potential downing. (And remember it has to get there before the surface is reached by the downed aviator.)
How many people could each C-130 theoretically catch mid air? Is it one person rescued per plane? THE TIMING IS TIGHT, SO GETTING A SECOND DESCENDING AVIATOR WOULD BE VERY RARE EVEN IF TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE.
How fast is the C-130 compared to other options like a search and rescue helicopter? MAX SPEED OF A C130 IS 368 MPH, BUT THAT'S GOING 'DOWNHILL. CRUISING SPEED IS UNDER 300 MPH.
If a C-130 didn't reach it's window of time to grab a pilot midair, is it feasible for this type of plane to conduct the rescue on the ground? NOT VIA THE PRONG (WHICH IS INTENDED TO CATCH AN UNFURLED CHUTE). BUT THERE ARE TECHNIQUES SUCH AS FULTON SKYHOOK THAT MIGHT WORK (BUT ARE NOT PART OF YOUR PROBLEM).
What elevation would the tactical aircraft pilots be flying at, and could they lose altitude after getting hit and while still assessing their situations? (Important for determining time constraints.) SMART WEAPONS PERMIT DELIVERY FROM 15,000 FEET OR ABOVE
How would the C-130 locate a pilot upon arriving at the likely downing position? Visually? Some sort of beacon? /Presumably, sighting the pilot, adjusting to compensate for the pilot's descent, and making the grab would all take a good deal of time, especially if the C-130 comes under enemy fire and must conduct evasive maneuvers. VISUALLY/RADIO WITH PILOT IN CHUTE/PERHAPS GPS
IT WOULD BE QUITE RISKY FOR THE PILOT DESCENDING OR AFTER REACHING THE SURFACE, BUT HE/SHE MIGHT USE FLARES TO MAKE SIGHTING BY RESCUE CREWS EASIER. YES, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE
You mentioned that C-130s are manned by 7-10 people. What is the typical size of a S&R helicopter crew, for comparison? 3-4
A C-130 would probably be an attractive target for Iran's capable air defense systems. How well is the aircraft able to deal with enemy fire? PROBLEMATIC Would it be escorted during S&R? LIKELY, BY JETS Would S&R helicopters be any less vulnerable (presumably not, as they would be descending to make pick-ups)?LESS VULNERABLE DUE SMALLER RADAR SIGNATURE AND DUE GREATER MANEUVERABILITY
.
The California LegislatureDifferences from the U.S. Congress.docxmamanda2
The California Legislature
Differences from the U.S. Congress
Equal Bicameral
• Lower house is the Assembly
• 80 members elected every 2 years
• Each district has about 450,000 constituents (700,000 for the U.S. House of
Representatives)
• Upper house is the Senate
• 40 members serve for 4 years
• Half run each 2 years
• Each district has about 900,000 constituent
• Term limits
• Legislators are limited to a total of 12 years in the legislature
• May serve in one or both houses
• Only about 1/3 of bills become laws
Leadership
• Speaker of the Assembly is much more powerful than the Speaker of
the House:
• Controls committee appointments
• Present Speaker is John Perez (new Speaker will be Toni Atkins)
• President Pro tem in the Senate not as powerful
• Shares power with rules committee
• Became more influential under old term limits rules because Senators could
serve for 8 years (as opposed to the 6 for Assembly)
Other features
• Governor may use the line item veto for an appropriations bill
• State legislature is less visible to voters than Congress (media rarely
covers it)
• State legislature is not involved in judicial appointments
• No filibuster
• Initiative process means that legislature doesn’t have a monopoly on
legislation (for good or ill)
• Seniority plays a much smaller role
Problems
• Term limits
• Never develop sufficient expertise
• Especially a problem for leadership
• Less willing to compromise because they don’t have a long working
relationship with other legislators
• Cedes power to bureaucrats & lobbyists
• Has contributed to a rise in minority representation
• E.g., Latino legislators increased from 6% in 1990 to 23% today
• Gridlock over taxation
• 2/3 vote required for increasing taxes by state legislature (Prop. 13)
• Staff slashed by 40% in 1990 (first term limits initiative)
The bright side
• Term limits have contributed to a rise in minority representation
• E.g., Latino legislators increased from 6% in 1990 to 23% today
• (see NCSL web site for more demographic information)
• No filibuster
• 2/3 requirement for passing state budget removed in 2010
• Districts now drawn by a citizen commission rather than by the
legislature
• Open primary encourages less extremism
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Federalism
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Confederal Government
States act together through a central
government for limited purposes, but
retain ultimate authority and can veto
actions of the central government (53)
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Unitary Government
The central government has ultimate
authority and may create (and
eliminate) state governments for its
own purposes (53)
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Unitary Government
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT STATE
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Federal Government
Ultimate authority is divided between a
central government an.
The Canterbury Tales Prologue1.) What are Chaucer’s views on the c.docxmamanda2
The Canterbury Tales Prologue
1.) What are Chaucer’s views on the church, based on his descriptions of the clergymen (the Monk, the Friar, etc.)? Using at least two examples from the text, answer this question in no less than seven sentences.
2.) Choose one of the characters in the Prologue. Describe the character in your own words. Who are they? What do they believe? Why are they going on this pilgrimage? Make sure your answer is thorough and complete and at least seven sentences in length.
.
The case file is up loaded ,An analysis of the evidence related to t.docxmamanda2
The document discusses analyzing evidence related to a crime victim to understand why they were targeted and whether it was a targeted attack or opportunistic. It asks discussants to share their initial thoughts on how the victim impacts their analysis of the offense, what else they would like to know about the victim, and what other issues are presented based on the victim evidence.
THE CASE FOR MIXED REALITY TO IMPROVEPERFORMANCEStuart W.docxmamanda2
THE CASE FOR MIXED REALITY TO IMPROVE
PERFORMANCE
Stuart W. Volkow Alex C. Howland, PhD
The world of work is rapidly changing. Now, more than ever, the need for continuous workforce training
is needed. While there are many benefits to social and experiential offerings of face-to-face training,
distance learning is typically more practical in today’s society. Unfortunately, current distance-learning
technologies lack the immersion necessary for learning 21st-century skills. Virtual reality and
augmented reality (i.e., mixed realities) can be more effective for training and learning than traditional
flat-screen media.
THE FUTURE OF WORK AND THE
OPPORTUNITY OF MIXED REALITIES TO
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE
Robots, automation, and artificial intelligence are rapidly
changing the face of the American workforce. As more
and more jobs are filled by machines, experts agree that
the education marketplace will need to change to keep up
with the growing and widespread need for worker retrain-
ing (Pew Research Center Internet & Technology, 2017).
While there are benefits to the social and experiential
learning experiences that can be offered in a face-to-face
setting, distance learning is often an affordable and flexible
way to provide that training.
Unfortunately, most eLearning and webinar platforms
only offer participants a passive experience (e.g., watch-
ing videos, listening to a lecture). With corporate edu-
cation, including employee orientation, onboarding, and
skill building, passive learning is the norm, consisting
largely of sitting down and consuming pre-packaged con-
tent in bulk that’s presented formally by an educator
(Hinchcliffe, 2017). Such offerings do not help develop the
vital skills needed in today’s increasingly global and dis-
tributed economy, such as teaming, communication, lead-
ership, and cultural intelligence. They also do not immerse
learners into the context of the learning and provide the
ability for learners to practice in a safe environment. As
a result, many learners develop feelings of isolation, dis-
connectedness, and frustration, often associated with poor
retention rates and low return on investment (Willging &
Johnson, 2009).
Mixed-reality technologies (i.e., virtual reality and aug-
mented reality) provide solutions to these problems by
allowing people to come together in an active simulated
environment that allows them to see and interact with fel-
low participants and the simulated environment, regard-
less of geographic location. Such technologies have the po-
tential to dramatically transform education, training, and
human performance. The aim of this article is to provide
an overview of mixed realities (MR), to discuss theories as-
sociated with how the technologies can provide value for
performance, and to provide specific examples of effective
early-use cases.
Introduction to Mixed Realities
Well told, any story can be immersive. From spoken word
to literature, film, and television, imagination work.
The Career Development of Mexican American Adolescent Women.docxmamanda2
The Career Development of Mexican American Adolescent Women:
A Test of Social Cognitive Career Theory
Lisa Y. Flores
The Ohio State University
Karen M. O’Brien
University of Maryland, College Park
This study tested R. W. Lent, S. D. Brown, and G. Hackett’s (1994) model of career choice with 364
Mexican American adolescent women. Path analyses were run to determine the influence of contextual
and social cognitive variables on career aspiration, career choice prestige, and traditionality. Partial
support for the model was evidenced as nontraditional career self-efficacy, parental support, barriers,
acculturation, and feminist attitudes predicted career choice prestige. Acculturation, feminist attitudes,
and nontraditional career self-efficacy predicted career choice traditionality. Feminist attitudes and
parental support predicted career aspiration. The paths between nontraditional career interests and the 3
outcome variables were not supported. Finally, none of the background contextual variables in this study
predicted nontraditional career self-efficacy. Implications of the results and suggestions for future
research are discussed.
Mexican American women constitute a significant portion of the
American population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996), are
underrepresented at all levels of education (Carter & Wilson, 1993;
Lango, 1995; McNeill et al., 2001; U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1991), and are overrepresented in low-paying occupations tradi-
tionally occupied by women (Arbona, 1989; Arbona & Novy,
1991; Ortiz, 1995). Relatively little empirical research has been
conducted to identify the variables that contribute to the educa-
tional and occupational underachievement of Mexican American
women. Indeed, researchers have noted that the career develop-
ment of Hispanics has received only slight consideration in the
counseling and vocational literature (Arbona, 1990; Fouad, 1995;
Hoyt, 1989; McNeill et al., 2001), and they have questioned the
generalizability of career development theories to Hispanics (Ar-
bona, 1990, 1995; Fitzgerald & Betz, 1994; Hackett, Lent, &
Greenhaus, 1991). The purpose of this study was to investigate the
applicability of a current model of career choice to the experiences
of Mexican American adolescent women and to extend the current
model to incorporate variables that are hypothesized to be salient
to this population.
It is well documented that Hispanics are the least educated when
compared with other major racial/ethnic groups in the United
States and that, among Hispanics, Mexican Americans have the
lowest high school and college completion rates (47% and 6.5%,
respectively; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996). Mexican Ameri-
can women are less likely to graduate from college than their male
counterparts (Ortiz, 1995; Tinajero, Gonzalez, & Dick, 1991), and
their representation in higher education decreases significantly at
each successive level (Carter & Wilson, 1993). Moreover, those
Mexican American women who pu.
The budget process for Albany, GA is easy to get access to a sim.docxmamanda2
The budget process for Albany, GA is easy to get access to a simple search was able to get me a lot of information. My untrained eye is unsure how detailed it is, so it could be a lot of fluff. The budget process does seem to be coherent due to the different levels and approvals that the city manager has to go through. The citizens are involved through a public hearing this year was held on June 2nd for the FY 2021. From the search I did, I couldn’t find much commentary that showed that the community disagreed with the process. The process seems very open from the Albany city website. Albany commission leaders and the city manager are very vocal from the local news I see that they are held to task for many of their decisions. I’m not sure is it due to COVID19 but even I tune in the local Facebook open commission meetings now. The impression I get is that the city is more involved and cares more for showing to citizens that they are listening. The citizens from my view are pleased with that response and that difference from when I was in Valdosta I couldn’t even tell u who the major was. It's interesting as someone who has never thought to think how my city spends money to find a lot of resources breaking it down.
Reference
City of Albany. (n.d.). Retrieved September 11, 2020, from
https://www.albanyga.gov/about-us/city-departments/finance-department/budget-document
less
1
.
The bully, the bystander and the victim.There are 3 parts of a b.docxmamanda2
The bully, the bystander and the victim.
There are 3 parts of a bully situation. Look at the latest research surrounding all the parts, what is the motivation behind the bully, bystander and victim and what can be done to help all 3. After doing research you can include your own personal experiences with any of these positions.
.
it describes the bony anatomy including the femoral head , acetabulum, labrum . also discusses the capsule , ligaments . muscle that act on the hip joint and the range of motion are outlined. factors affecting hip joint stability and weight transmission through the joint are summarized.
This document provides an overview of wound healing, its functions, stages, mechanisms, factors affecting it, and complications.
A wound is a break in the integrity of the skin or tissues, which may be associated with disruption of the structure and function.
Healing is the body’s response to injury in an attempt to restore normal structure and functions.
Healing can occur in two ways: Regeneration and Repair
There are 4 phases of wound healing: hemostasis, inflammation, proliferation, and remodeling. This document also describes the mechanism of wound healing. Factors that affect healing include infection, uncontrolled diabetes, poor nutrition, age, anemia, the presence of foreign bodies, etc.
Complications of wound healing like infection, hyperpigmentation of scar, contractures, and keloid formation.
This presentation includes basic of PCOS their pathology and treatment and also Ayurveda correlation of PCOS and Ayurvedic line of treatment mentioned in classics.
A workshop hosted by the South African Journal of Science aimed at postgraduate students and early career researchers with little or no experience in writing and publishing journal articles.
This slide is special for master students (MIBS & MIFB) in UUM. Also useful for readers who are interested in the topic of contemporary Islamic banking.
How to Build a Module in Odoo 17 Using the Scaffold MethodCeline George
Odoo provides an option for creating a module by using a single line command. By using this command the user can make a whole structure of a module. It is very easy for a beginner to make a module. There is no need to make each file manually. This slide will show how to create a module using the scaffold method.
Main Java[All of the Base Concepts}.docxadhitya5119
This is part 1 of my Java Learning Journey. This Contains Custom methods, classes, constructors, packages, multithreading , try- catch block, finally block and more.
Exploiting Artificial Intelligence for Empowering Researchers and Faculty, In...Dr. Vinod Kumar Kanvaria
Exploiting Artificial Intelligence for Empowering Researchers and Faculty,
International FDP on Fundamentals of Research in Social Sciences
at Integral University, Lucknow, 06.06.2024
By Dr. Vinod Kumar Kanvaria
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17Celine George
An import error occurs when a program fails to import a module or library, disrupting its execution. In languages like Python, this issue arises when the specified module cannot be found or accessed, hindering the program's functionality. Resolving import errors is crucial for maintaining smooth software operation and uninterrupted development processes.
The Challenger Disaster A Case-study in Engineering Ethics.docx
1. The Challenger Disaster
A Case-study in Engineering Ethics
• Shuttle Components
– Orbiter
– Liquid Rocket
Booster
– Solid Rocket
Booster
Shuttle Components
Chronology of the Related Events
• 1974
– NASA contracts Morton Thiokol
• 1976
– NASA accepts the design based on the Titan
missiles
2. – The joints are sealed by
• Two synthetic rubber O-rings,
• 177 clevis pins,
• Heat shield putty
The Cause of the Disaster
Early Problems
• 1977
– Tests at Thiokol show O-ring leakage
– Joint is made stronger by changing sizes
• 1981
– Post-launch investigation showed O-ring
erosion due to hot gages.
Early Problems
• January of 1985 launch
3. – First cold-weather launch
– Post-launch investigation showed joint failure
– Tests showed O-rings inability to fill the gap
due to joint rotation at lower temperatures
Early Problems
• July 1985
– Thiokol redesigns the joints w/o O-rings – The
design was not ready for Challenger launch
Political Climate
• Congress is unhappy with NASA
• Competition with Russians to be the first to
observe Halley’s comet.
• Pressure to launch before President
4. Reagan’s State of the Union Address
Days before Launch
• First launch attempt postponed
• The next launch date was set and was to be
attended by Vice President Bush.
• The temperature at launch: 29 degrees F.
Days Before Launch
• NASA starts an investigation of the effect
of low temperatures on the O-ring seals
• Organization involved
– NASA
– Marshall Space Flight Center
– Morton Thiokol
5. Engineering Investigation Before
Launch
• Players at NASA
– Larry Mulloy: SRB Project Manager at Marshall
• Players at Thiokol
– Roger Boisjoly: A SRB engineer
– Arnie Johnson: A SRB engineer
– Joe Kilminster: SRB engineering manager
– Alan McDonald: SRB engineering director
– Bob Lund: Vice president for engineering
– Jerald Mason: General manager
Engineering Investigation Before
Launch
• Boisjoly and Johnson recommend the
launch to be postponed.
• Bob Lund, the VP for engineering agrees
6. and makes a similar recommendation.
Investigation Before Launch
• Larry Mulloy, the NASA manager of SRB
asks Joe Kilminister, the SRB manager at
Thiokol, for his opinion.
• Kilminister agrees with other Thiokol
engineers and recommends a launch delay.
Investigation Before Launch
• After discussion with Mason
• Lund reverses his decision regarding
launch!
• Thiokol recommend the launch to proceed
The Launch in January 1986
• The overnight temperatures drop to 8 F
7. • The temperature of SRB at launch is 28 F
• There is an immediate blow-by of hot gas at
launch. The seal fails quickly over an arc of
70 degrees.
The Launch in January 1986
• The by-products of combustion forms a
glassy oxide that reseals the joint.
• The brittle oxide is shattered
• Hot gases quickly burn through the liquid
rocket booster
The Aftermath
• Causes of the accident are attributed to
– Inability of the O-rings to expand and seal at
low temperatures.
8. – Heat shield putty did not perform at low
temperatures
– Fits and seating of the O-ring was affected by
low temperature.
The Aftermath
• After all the testimonials
– Biosjoly is taken off the project and subtly
harassed by Thiokol management.
Engineering Ethics Case Study:
The Challenger Disaster
Course No: LE3-001
Credit: 3 PDH
9. Mark Rossow, PhD, PE, Retired
Continuing Education and Development, Inc.
9 Greyridge Farm Court
Stony Point, NY 10980
P: (877) 322-5800
F: (877) 322-4774
[email protected]
Engineering Ethics Case Study: The
Challenger Disaster
Mark P. Rossow, P.E., Ph.D.
11. passengers aboard the vehicle were killed. A presidential
commission was formed to investigate
the cause of the accident and found that the O-ring seals had
failed, and, furthermore, that the
seals had been recognized as a potential hazard for several years
prior to the disaster. The
commission’s report, Report to the President by the Presidential
Commission on the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident, stated that because managers and
engineers had known in advance
of the O-ring danger, the accident was principally caused by a
lack of communication between
engineers and management and by poor management practices.
This became the standard
interpretation of the cause of the Challenger disaster and
routinely appears in popular articles and
books about engineering, management, and ethical issues.
But the interpretation ignores much of the history of how NASA
and the contractor’s engineers
had actually recognized and dealt with the O-ring problems in
advance of the disaster. When
this history is considered in more detail, the conclusions of the
Report to the President become
far less convincing. Two excellent publications that give a
12. much more complete account of
events leading up to the disaster are The Challenger Launch
Decision by Diane Vaughan, and
Power To Explore -- History of Marshall Space Flight Center
1960-1990 by Andrew Dunar and
Stephen Waring. As Dunar and Waring put it—I would apply
their remarks to Vaughan’s work
as well— “Allowing Marshall engineers and managers to tell
their story, based on pre-accident
documents and on post-accident testimony and interviews, leads
to a more realistic account of
the events leading up to the accident than that found in the
previous studies.” I would strongly
encourage anyone with the time and interest to read both of
these publications, which are
outstanding works of scholarship. For those persons lacking the
time—the Vaughan book is
over 550 pages—I have written the present condensed
description of the Challenger incident. I
have drawn the material for Sections 1-8 and 10 from multiple
sources but primarily from
Vaughan, the Report to the President, and Dunnar and Waring.
Of course, any errors introduced
during the process of fitting their descriptions and ideas into my
narrative are mine and not the
13. fault of these authors. Sections 9, 11, and 12 are original
contributions of my own. All figures
have been taken from Report to the President.
Mark Rossow
4
Introduction
Course Content
This course provides instruction in engineering ethics through a
case study of the Space Shuttle
Challenger disaster. The course begins by presenting the
minimum technical details needed to
understand the physical cause of the Shuttle failure. The
disaster itself is chronicled through
NASA photographs. Next the decision-making process—
especially the discussions occurring
during the teleconference held on the evening before the
14. launch—is described. Direct quotations
from engineers interviewed after the disaster are frequently
used to illustrate the ambiguities of
the data and the pressures that the decision-makers faced in the
period preceding the launch. The
course culminates in an extended treatment of six ethical issues
raised by Challenger.
Purpose of Case Studies
Principles of engineering ethics are easy to formulate but
sometimes hard to apply. Suppose, for
example, that an engineering team has made design choice X,
rather than Y, and X leads to a bad
consequence—someone was injured. To determine if the
engineers acted ethically, we have to
answer the question of whether they chose X rather than Y
because 1) X appeared to be the
better technical choice, or 2) X promoted some other end (for
example, financial) in the
organization. Abstract ethics principles alone cannot answer
this question; we must delve into
the technical details surrounding the decision. The purpose of
case studies in general is to
provide us with the context—the technical details—of an
15. engineering decision in which an
ethical principle may have been violated.
Case Study of Challenger Disaster
On January 28, 1986, the NASA space Shuttle Challenger burst
into a ball of flame 73 seconds
after take-off, leading to the death of the seven people on board.
Some months later, a
commission appointed by the President to investigate the causes
of the disaster determined that
the cause of the disaster was the failure of a seal in one of the
solid rocket boosters (Report to the
President 1986, vol. 1, p. 40). Furthermore, Morton Thiokol, the
contractor responsible for the
seal design, had initiated a teleconference with NASA on the
evening before the launch and had,
at the beginning of the teleconference, recommended against
launching because of concerns
about the performance of the seal. This recommendation was
reversed during the teleconference,
with fatal consequences.
To understand the decisions that led to the Challenger disaster,
you must first understand what
16. the technical problems were. Accordingly, this course begins
by presenting the minimum
technical details you will need to understand the physical cause
of the seal failure. After laying
this groundwork, we examine what occurred in the
teleconference. You will probably find, as
you learn more and more about the Challenger project, that
issues that had appeared simple
initially are actually far more complex; pinpointing
responsibility and assigning blame are not
nearly as easy as many popular accounts have made them. The
purpose of the present course is
1) to consider some of the issues and show by example how
difficult it can be to distinguish
unethical behavior from technical mistakes (with severe
consequences), and 2) to equip you to
think critically and act appropriately when confronted with
ethical decisions in your own
professional work.
5
17. The course is divided into the following topics:
1. Two Common Errors of Interpretation
2. Configuration of Shuttle
3. Function of O-rings
4. History of Problems with Joint Seals
5. Teleconference
6. Accident
7. Ethical issue: Did NASA take extra risks because of pressure
to maintain Congressional
funding?
8. Ethical issue: Did Thiokol take extra risks because of fear of
losing its contract with
NASA?
9. Ethical issue: Was the Principle of Informed Consent
violated?
10. Ethical issue: What role did whistle blowing have in the
Challenger story?
11. Ethical issue: Who had the right to Thiokol documents
relating to the Challenger
disaster?
12. Ethical issue: Why are some engineering disasters
considered ethical issues and others
are not?
13. Summary
1. Two Common Errors of Interpretation
Persons studying the history of an engineering disaster must be
18. alert to the danger of committing
one of the following common errors: 1) the myth of perfect
engineering practice, and 2) the
retrospective fallacy.
The Myth of Perfect Engineering Practice
The sociologist, Diane Vaughan, who has written one of the
most thorough books on Challenger,
has pointed out that the mere act of investigating an accident
can cause us to view, as ominous,
facts and events that we otherwise would consider normal:
“When technical systems fail, …
outside investigators consistently find an engineering world
characterized by ambiguity,
disagreement, deviation from design specifications and
operating standards, and ad hoc rule
making. This messy situation, when revealed to the public,
automatically becomes an
explanation for the failure, for after all, the engineers and
managers did not follow the rules. …
[On the other hand,] the engineering process behind a
‘nonaccident’ is never publicly examined.
If nonaccidents were investigated, the public would discover
that the messy interior of
19. engineering practice, which after an accident investigation
looks like ‘an accident waiting to
happen,’ is nothing more or less than ‘normal technology.”
(Vaughan 1996, p. 200) Thus as you
read the description of the Challenger disaster on the pages to
follow, keep in mind that just
because some of the engineering practices described are not
neat and tidy processes in which
consensus is always achieved and decisions are always based on
undisputed and unambiguous
data, that fact alone may not explain the disaster; such practices
may simply be part of normal
technology—that usually results in a nonaccident.
The Retrospective Fallacy
Engineering projects sometimes fail. If the failure involves
enough money or injuries to
innocent people, then investigators may be brought in to
determine the causes of the failure and
6
identify wrongdoers. The investigators then weave a story
20. explaining how decision-makers
failed to assess risks properly, failed to heed warning signs,
used out-of-date information,
ignored quality-control, took large risks for personal gain, etc.
But there is a danger here: the
story is constructed by selectively focusing on those events that
are known to be important in
retrospect, that is, after the failure has occurred and observers
look back at them. At the time
that the engineers were working on the project, these events
may not have stood out from dozens
or even hundreds of other events. “Important” events do not
come labeled “PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT: PAY ATTENTION”; they may appear important
only in retrospect. To the
extent that we retrospectively identify events as particularly
important—even though they may
not have been thought particularly important by diligent and
competent people working at the
time—we are committing the “retrospective fallacy.” (Vaughan
1996, p. 68-70)
In any discussion of the Challenger disaster, the tendency to
commit the retrospective fallacy
21. exists, because we all know the horrendous results of the
decisions that were made—and our first
reaction is to say, “How could they have ignored this?” or,
“Why didn’t they study that more
carefully?” But to understand what happened, it is crucial to
put yourself in the place of the
engineers and to focus on what they knew and what they
thought to be important at the time. For
example, NASA classified 745 components on the Shuttle as
“Criticality 1”, meaning failure of
the component would cause the loss of the crew, mission, and
vehicle (NASA’s Response to the
Committee’s Investigation of the “Challenger” Accident 1987).
With the advantage of 20-20
hindsight, we now know that the engineers made a tragic error
in judging the possibility of
failure of a particular one of those 745 components—the seals—
an “acceptable risk.” But at the
time, another issue—problems with the Shuttle main engines—
attracted more concern
(McDonald 2009, pp. 64-65). Similarly, probably most of the
decisions made by the Shuttle
engineers and managers were influenced to some extent by
considerations of cost. As a result,
22. after the disaster it was a straightforward matter to pick out
specific decisions and claim that the
decision-makers had sacrificed safety for budgetary reasons.
But our 20-20 hindsight was not
available to the people involved in the Challenger project, and
as we read the history we should
continually ask questions such as “What did they know at the
time?,” “Is it reasonable to expect
that they should have seen the significance of this or that fact?,”
and “If I were in their position
and knew only what they knew, what would I have done?” Only
through such questions can we
hope to understand why the Challenger disaster occurred and to
evaluate its ethical dimensions.
2. Configuration of Shuttle.
NASA had enjoyed widespread public support and generous
funding for the Apollo program to
put a man on the moon. But as Apollo neared completion and
concerns about the cost of the
Vietnam War arose, continued congressional appropriations for
NASA were in jeopardy. A new
mission for NASA was needed, and so the Space Shuttle
program was proposed. The idea was
to development an inexpensive (compared to Apollo) system for
23. placing human beings and
hardware in orbit. The expected users of the system would be
commercial and academic
experimenters, the military, and NASA itself. On January 5,
1972, President Nixon announced
the government’s approval of the Shuttle program.
7
Fig. 1 Configuration of the Shuttle
Because a prime goal was to keep costs down, reusable space
vehicles were to be developed.
After many design proposals and compromises—for example,
the Air Force agreed not to
develop any launch vehicles of its own, provided that the
Shuttle was designed to accommodate
military needs—NASA came up with the piggyback design
shown in Figure 1. The airplane-like
craft (with the tail fin) shown in side view on the right side of
the figure is the “Orbiter.” The
Orbiter contains the flight crew and a 60 feet long and 15 feet
24. wide payload bay designed to hold
cargo such as communications satellites to be launched into
orbit, an autonomous Spacelab to be
used for experiments in space, or satellites already orbiting that
have been retrieved for repairs.
Before launch, the Orbiter is attached to the large (154 feet long
and 27 1/2 feet in diameter)
External Tank—the middle cylinder with the sharp-pointed end
shown in the figure; the External
8
Tank contains 143,000 gallons of liquid oxygen and 383,000
gallons of liquid hydrogen for the
Orbiter's engines.
The two smaller cylinders on the sides of the External Tank are
the Solid Rocket Boosters
(SRBs). The SRBs play a key role in the Challenger accident
and accordingly will be described
here in some detail.
The SRBs contain solid fuel, rather than the liquid fuel
25. contained by the External Tank.
The SRBs provide about 80 percent of the total thrust at liftoff;
the remainder of the thrust is
provided by the Orbiter's three main engines. Morton-Thiokol
Inc. held the contract for the
development of the SRBs.
The SRBs fire for about two minutes after liftoff, and then,
their fuel exhausted, are separated
from the External Tank. A key goal of the Shuttle design was
to save costs by re-using the SRBs
and the Orbiter. The conical ends of the SRBs contain
parachutes that are deployed, after the
SRBs have been separated from the External Tank, and allow
the SRBs to descend slowly to the
ocean below. The SRBs are then picked out of the water by
recovery ships and taken to repair
facilities, where preparations are made for the next flight. After
the SRBs are detached, the
Orbiter’s main engines continue firing until it achieves low
earth orbit. Then the External Tank
is jettisoned towards earth where it burns up in the
atmosphere—the External Tank is not re-
used. Once the crew has completed its mission in orbit, the
26. Orbiter returns to earth where it
glides (No propulsion is used.) to a landing on a conventional
airstrip. The Orbiter can then be
refurbished for its next launch.
More Details about the SRBs
Fig. 2 Solid Rocket Booster with Exploded View Showing
Segments and Joints
9
Figure 2 shows the subassemblies that make up the SRB.
Because the total length of the SRB
was almost 150 feet, it was too large to ship as a single unit by
rail from Thiokol’s
manufacturing facility in Utah to the Kennedy Space Center
launch site in Florida. Furthermore,
shipping the SRB as a single unit would mean that a large
amount of rocket fuel would be
concentrated in a single container—creating the potential for an
enormous explosion. For these
27. reasons, Thiokol manufactured the SRB from individual
cylindrical segments each
approximately 12 feet in diameter. At Thiokol’s plant in Utah,
individual segments were welded
together to form four “casting” segments, into which propellant
was poured (cast). The welded
joints within a casting segment were called “factory joints.”
The four casting segments were
then shipped individually by rail to Kennedy, where they were
assembled—by stacking, not
welding—to form the solid rocket motor (SRM) of the SRB.
The joints created by the assembly
process at Kennedy were called “field joints.” The sealing
problem that led to the Challenger’s
destruction occurred in the field joint at the right end of the
AFT MID SEGMENT in Figure 2.
Hot combustion gases from the SRM leaked through the joint
and either weakened or burned a
hole in the External Tank, igniting the contents of the Tank and
producing a catastrophic fireball.
3. Function of O-rings
The cutaway view of the SRB in Figure 3 shows the aft field
joint location in the assembled
28. SRB.
Fig. 3. Location of the Problematic Aft Field Joint
10
Fig. 4. Cross Section of Field Joint
Figure 4 shows how the upper SRM segment in a field joint is
connected to the lower segment by
a pin passing through the “tang” (the tongue on the upper
segment) and the “clevis” (the U-
shaped receptacle cut in the lower segment); 177 such steel pins
are inserted around the
circumference of each joint. When the propellant is burning
and generating hot combustion
gases under the enormous pressure necessary to accelerate the
SRB, the joint must be sealed to
prevent the gases from leaking and possibly damaging exterior
parts of the Shuttle. This sealing
29. is accomplished by a primary O-ring backed up by a secondary
O-ring (O-rings are widely used
in machine design and, when functioning properly, can seal
pressures in the range of thousands
of psi). An SRM O-ring has been compared to “a huge length of
licorice—same color, same
diameter (only 0.28”)—joined at the ends so it forms a circle
12’ across” (Vaughan 1996, p. 40).
SRM O-rings were made of a rubberlike synthetic material
called Viton. To prevent the hot
combustion gases from contacting and thus degrading the Viton
when the propellant was ignited,
zinc chromate putty was applied in the region shown in Figure 4
prior to assembly of the SRM
segments.
11
Fig. 5. Effect of Compression of the O-ring in Inhibiting
Pressure Actuation
30. Pressure Actuation of the O-ring Seal
Besides protecting the O-rings from the corrosive effects of the
hot combustion gases, the putty
is intended to be pushed outward from the combustion chamber
during ignition, compress the air
ahead of the primary O-ring, and thus force the O-ring into the
tang-clevis gap, thereby sealing
the gap. This process is referred to as “pressure-actuated
sealing.” Experiments show that
pressure actuation is most effective when the high-pressure air
acts over the largest possible
portion of the high-pressure side of the O-ring. In the leftmost
sketch in Figure 5, for example,
the high-pressure side extends from the “Response Node” at the
top to the point of tangency at
the bottom of the groove. If, however, the O-ring is initially
compressed during assembly, then
the O-ring may deform sufficiently to cause contact with the
left-hand side of the groove, as
shown in the rightmost sketch in Figure 5. In that case, the
high-pressure air acts over only the
surface of the upper left-hand side of the O-ring, and pressure
actuation of the seal is impaired.
This problem is lessened if, upon ignition, the joint gap opens,
31. and the O-ring is able to spring
back elastically and lose contact with sides of the groove, as in
the middle sketch in Figure 5.
However, when the temperature is low, the O-ring loses much of
its elasticity and as a result may
retain its compressed shape, as in the right-hand sketch of
Figure 5. This retention of the
compressed shape has three unfortunate consequences: 1)
pressure actuation is delayed or
impaired because the high-pressure air cannot get to the lower
left-hand side of the O-ring,
2) pressure actuation is delayed or impaired because the O-ring
does not seal the opened gap, and
the actuation pressure on the O-ring decreases as the fluid is
able to pass by the O-ring, and
3) because of the lack of sealing, compressed air, putty, and
then hot combustion gas may blow
by through the gap, and in the process, damage or even destroy
the O-ring.
In general, pressure actuation was also affected negatively by
several other factors, such as the
behavior of the putty and the increase in gap size caused by re-
use of the SRM. From
consideration of all these factors and from observation of the
32. explosion, the Presidential
Commission concluded ”that the cause of the Challenger
accident was the failure of the pressure
seal in the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor
[Italics in the original]. The failure was
due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of
factors. These factors were the
12
effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of
materials, the effects of reusability,
processing, and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading.”
(Report to the President 1986, vol.
1, p. 69)
4. History of Problems with Joint Seals
From the very beginning, in 1973, of Thiokol’s contract to
develop the SRM, problems arose
with the joints. The Thiokol design for the SRM was based on
the Air Force’s Titan III, one of
the most reliable solid-fuel rockets produced up to that time.
But Thiokol engineers could not
33. simply copy the Titan design—the SRM was larger than the
Titan’s motor and had to be
designed for refurbishment and repeated use. One particular
area in which the two motors
differed was the field joints, and Thiokol’s initial design for the
SRM field joints worried
engineers at the Marshall Space Flight Center, who were
responsible for monitoring Thiokol’s
contract. Many modifications and reviews of the design ensued,
and Thiokol and Marshall
finally began various load tests in 1976. Early tests were
successful and gave engineers
confidence. In an important test in 1977, however, the joint
seals surprised the engineers by
exhibiting “joint rotation,” illustrated in Fig. 6. Of particular
concern is the loss of redundancy
in the design because not just the primary but also the
secondary O-ring is rendered ineffective if
the gap opens sufficiently. (It is important to realize the scale
of the events being described: the
gap between the tang and clevis in the unpressurized joint is
tiny: 0.004”, in the pressurized joint
the gap was estimated to lie between 0.042” and 0.06,”—caused
by a joint rotation that occurs in
34. the first 0.6 seconds of ignition.)
13
Fig. 6 Joint Rotation
Other sealing problems—some but not all related to joint
rotation—such as blow-by, ring
charring, ring erosion, loss of resilience of the O-ring material
at low temperature, and
performance of the putty were observed later in various static
tests and launches. Engineers both
at Thiokol and at the Marshall were aware of these problems.
On July 31, 1985, Roger Boisjoly,
a Thiokol engineer specializing in O-rings, wrote a memo to
Thiokol vice president Robert Lund
with the subject line, "O-ring Erosion/Potential Failure
Criticality", after nozzle joint erosion was
detected in an SRB:
35. “This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware
of the seriousness of the
current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an
engineering standpoint. “
"The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to
fly without fear of failure
and to run a series of design evaluations which would ultimately
lead to a solution or at
least a significant reduction of the erosion problem. This
position is now changed as a
result of the [51-B] nozzle joint erosion which eroded a
secondary O-ring with the
primary O-ring never sealing. If the same scenario should occur
in a field joint (and it
could), then it is a jump ball whether as to the success or failure
of the joint because the
secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and
may not be capable of
pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe of the highest
order-loss of human
life…
14
36. Boisjoly urged that a team be set up to work on the O-ring
problem, and ended by saying
"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take
immediate action to dedicate a
team to solve the problem, with the field joint having the
number one priority, then we
stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad
facilities." [quoted in
Vaughan 1996, p. 447]
Boisjoly later charged that Thiokol management failed to
provide adequate follow-up and
support to correct the problem described in his memo.
Readers tempted to commit the retrospective fallacy after
reading Boisjoly’s memo should note
that the memo does not mention temperature effects on the seal.
The years of concern about the sealing problems eventually led
to a briefing at NASA
Headquarters in Washington on August 19
th
37. , 1985, by Marshall and Thiokol, in which they
presented both an engineering evaluation and a redesign plan.
They noted that only 5 of 111
primary O-rings in field joints and 12 of 47 primary O-rings in
nozzle joints had shown erosion
in various tests and flights. Thiokol argued that various
experimental and flight data verified the
safety of the design. They said, however, that the field joint was
the “highest concern” and
presented plans for improving the joints both with short-term
fixes and longer-term fixes that
would take over two years to implement. Data from studies by
Arnie Thompson (Boisjoly’s
boss) of the effect of temperature on ring resiliency were
presented, but imposing a temperature
launch constraint was not mentioned. The review judged that
leak checks and careful assembly
made it “safe to continue flying [the] existing design.”
Nevertheless NASA needed “to continue
at an accelerated pace to eliminate SRM seal erosion.” In the
meantime, the risks were
considered acceptable. [Dunnar and Waring, p. 363].
5. Teleconference
38. After several delays, the Challenger launch was scheduled for
January 28, 1986, at 9:38 AM
EST. At about 1 PM on the 27
th
, however, NASA personnel became concerned about the
unusually low temperatures—in the low 20’s—predicted for
early morning of the next day. A
Marshall manager asked Thiokol engineers to review the effect
the low temperatures might have
on the SRM. Accordingly, a meeting was held at Thiokol’s
Utah facility. Engineers there stated
their concern that the extreme cold would greatly reduce O-ring
resiliency and ability to seal the
joints. A teleconference among Thiokol, Marshall, and
Kennedy personnel was set for 5:45 PM
EST to discuss the situation.
At the teleconference, Thiokol engineers made no official
recommendation about delaying the
launch. The discussion centered on their concerns about the
effect of the low temperatures on
the O-rings. However, some of the teleconference participants
were unable to hear well, because
39. of a poor telephone connection, and some key personnel had not
been located in time to be
included in the teleconference, so the teleconference was ended,
and a second one scheduled for
8:15 PM EST. In the interim, Thiokol engineers had time to
organize their data in charts and fax
them to Marshall and Kennedy.
15
A total of thirty-four managers and engineers from Thiokol,
Marshall, and Kennedy took part in
the second teleconference. Thiokol engineers began the
teleconference by discussing the charts
that they had faxed to the other teleconference participants.
The Thiokol position was that
because significant O-ring blow-by and damage had been
observed in the coldest previous
launch—53°F—the O-ring material would lose much of its
resilience and the joint could fail,
were the launch to be conducted at a temperature in the 20’s or
low 30’s. When directly asked
40. by Larry Mulloy, Manager of the SRB project at Marshall,
Thiokol Vice President Joe
Kilminster …