The document provides details about the Challenger disaster case study submitted by students at IQRA University. It includes an introduction describing the Space Shuttle Challenger and the causes of the accident. It then discusses the key organizations and people involved, provides a chronological account of events, and describes the environmental conditions and political pressures on the day of the ill-fated launch. It analyzes communication issues and the roles of management and engineers. The document concludes that the launch should not have proceeded given the warnings about the O-rings and freezing temperatures.

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THE CHALLENGER DISASTER
CASE STUDY
Submitted By:
Syed Muhammad Yousuf Naqvi (27796)
Faiq Iqbal (29979)
Hammad Saleem (35613)
Syed Saqib Salman (33408)
Muhammad Bilal Khan (33312)
Aizaz Asif (32694)
Submitted To:
Mr. Waqas Rana
DATE:
23rd April 2018
Organizational Behavior Report
Submitted in fulfillment of requirement for
Degree of Bachelors of Business Administration
IQRA University EDC Campus
Karachi, Pakistan.

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Table of Contents
Table of Contents ...............................................................................................................................2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:........................................................................................................................3
1. INTRODUCTION:..........................................................................................................................4
1.1. Project Of SRB:....................................................................................................................4
1.2. Causes Of The Accident........................................................................................................5
2. KEY PLAYERS...............................................................................................................................5
2.1. Organizations Involved In the Mission:..................................................................................5
2.2. People Involved In the Mission:............................................................................................6
3. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF EVENTS.......................................................................................7
4. ENVIRONMENT ON THE DAY OF THE LAUNCH...............................................................................8
5. Pressure tolaunch: 1986, 1990 ....................................................................................................8
6. Communicationissues.................................................................................................................9
7. POLITICAL PRESSURE...................................................................................................................9
8. Management & Engineer...........................................................................................................10
9. Should NASA proceeded withlaunch?........................................................................................11
10. Conclusion:...........................................................................................................................11
11. REFERNCES............................................................................................................................12

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
We would like to express our special thanks of gratitude to our teacher Mr. Waqas Rana as well
as Iqra University which provided us with the platform and gave us the golden opportunity to do
this informative case study that taught us about the actual severe problems in which our
appropriate code of action is required for the organization.

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1. INTRODUCTION:
In this report, we will be working on a case study that contains an incident in which the appropriate
and timely action was needed to eliminate the chances of danger. This report will be revolving
around the incident of Space Shuttle Challenger. The Space Shuttle Challenger (Orbiter Vehicle
Designation: OV-099) was the second orbiter of NASA's space program to be put into service. The
shuttle was built by Rockwell International's Space Transportation Systems Division in Downey,
California. Its maiden flight, STS-6, started on April 4, 1983. Before STS-51-L, nine times space
vehicle (Orbiter) were launched and landed successful before breaking down in its tenth mission
in just 73 seconds after its launch. Resulting loss of billions of dollars and loss of all seven crew
members, including a civilian school teacher. It was the first of two shuttles to be destroyed in
flight. The accident led to a two-and-a-half year grounding of the shuttle fleet.
1.1. Project Of SRB:
The project was to develop the Solid-fuel Rocket Booster for Space Shuttle Challenger. It was
the second orbiter of NASA for space shuttle program that had to be put into service. To develop
Space Shuttle Challenger, it was required to manufacture and install the SRBs (Solid-fuel rocket
boosters) in the orbiter to increase the functionality of this space project. SRB is an upgraded
version of a Titan missile which had been used successfully for years. In general, solid-fuel rockets
booster (SRB) produces more thrust than liquid-fuel rockets. As the project was new and was not
tested in all the situation there are many drawback of SRB program, but one of their drawback is
that the solid-fuel rocket cannot be turned off or even controlled once it has been ignited they.
Therefore it is very essential that designs of SRBs properly designed, because there is no second
chance if something goes wrong during the flight.

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1.2. Causes Of The Accident
There are many causes of accident, which are: The cause of accident was the O-ring seals
used in the joints were not designed to handle heavy vehicle and are not effective in the
unusually cold conditions. The seals' failure caused a gap in the SRB joint, letting pressurized
burning gas from within the solid rocket motor to reach outside and affect the adjacent Solid
Rocket Booster field joint attachment hardware and outer fuel tank. This cause the separation of
right-hand Solid Rocket Booster's aft field joint attachment and the gas causes damage to the
external tank. Aerodynamic forces broke up the orbiter.
Following are the other causes of Accident:
 Poor original design (booster joint rotated farther open than intended);
 Bad judgment (Even though the temperature was record low and there was ice on pad,
still managers were sure to launch);
 Mechanical problem and faults that led to explosion.
 Administrative and weak organizational structure.
2. KEY PLAYERS
2.1. Organizations Involved In the Mission:
Thiokol, Rockwell International and NASA were the three key organization (player) work
together to make Space Shuttle program successful. Thiokol was the key company that
manufactures the Solid-fuel Rocket Booster that ignition thrust whereas NASA is an organization
that was on the driving seat in this project. The project was fully controlled and managed by
NASA. The shuttle was built by Rockwell International.

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2.2. People Involved In the Mission:
There were many people who were working on the project but the main characters who was
responsible for the whole launch are as follow:
1. Marshall Space Flight Center – He was the in charge of booster rocket development.
2. Larry Mulloy – Engineers who gives recommendation not to launch
3. Morton Thiokol - NASA gives contract to build the solid rocket booster
4. Alan McDonald – Director, Solid Rocket Motors project
5. Bob Lund - Engineering Vice President
6. Robert Ebeling - Engineer work under supervision Alan McDonald.
7. Roger Boisjoly - Engineer work under supervision Alan McDonald
8. Joe Kilminster - Engineer in top management position
9. Jerald Mason - senior executive encouraged Bob Lund not to launch.

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3. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF EVENTS
The decision to launch the Challenger space shuttle was controversial at best. There were plenty
of warning signs during the launches. A chronological history of the SRB used in the Challenger
space shuttle is indicated below:
1974: The contract awarded to Thiokol to manufacture SRBs.
1976: SRB design were accepted by NASA.
1977: Discovered the joint rotation problems.
1981: After the second shuttle flight, O-ring erosion detected.
1985: After the January 24, 1985 shuttle flight worst problems relating to the O-rings were
exhibited.
1985: Four months before the Challenger disaster, NASA management was briefed about the
booster problems.
1986: On 27 January 1986, a few hours before the launch, via teleconference NASA and Thiokol
to discuss the effects of cold temperature on the SRB performance.

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4. ENVIRONMENT ON THE DAY OF THE LAUNCH
On January 27, 1986, a couple of hours preceding the dispatch, a video chat occurred amongst
NASA and Thiokol to talk about the impacts of cool temperature on the SRB execution. The
Challenger was first planned to be propelled on 22 January at 15:43. This was rescheduled for 23
January and after that again rescheduled for 24 January. The dispatch was reset for 25 January as
a result of awful climate at prematurely end landing site in Dakar, Senegal. Dispatch was
rescheduled for 27 January at 09:37 because of the forecast of unsatisfactory climate at Kennedy
Space Center. Launch was deferred for 24 hours when ground overhauling hardware bring forth
shutting installation could not be expelled from orbiter incubate. In a telephone call the evening of
the 27 January, 1986, engineers at Thiokol suggested against propelling below 53F, which was the
coldest temperature at which a past flight had propelled. On the night prior to the dispatch, the
temperature was required to be as low as 18F, in excess of 30 degrees colder than some other
dispatch. Thiokol building was overruled by its administration and the thumbs up was given to
continue with the launch.
5. Pressure to launch: 1986, 1990
A variety of reasons including, economic considerations and political pressure were there. To
justify its budget NASA had scheduled a large number of missions in 1986. In establishing the
schedule, NASA had not provided adequate resources for its attainment. As a result, the potential
of the system were strained by nine-mission rate of 1985, and the evidence proposes that NASA
is nowhere to accomplish the task of 15 flights scheduled for 1986. These are the major conclusions

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of a Commission examination of the pressures and problems attendant upon the accelerated launch
schedule.
6. Communication issues
In a conference call the night of the 27 January, 1986, engineers at Thiokol recommended its
management against launching below 53ᴼF, which was the coldest temperature at which a previous
flight had launched. On the night before the launch, the temperature was expected to be as low as
18F, more than 30 degrees colder than any other launch. The recommendation Thiokol engineers
were ignored and overruled by its management and the clearance was given to proceed with the
launch.
After the disaster of STS-51-L Challenger Roger Commission was made to identify the root
causes of the disaster. According to Roger Commission, both NASA and Thiokol were following
the traditional style of management, where the information is shared in an indirect manner.
According to the Roger Commission finding, the appropriate information was given by the Thiokol
engineers to its management but the flow of was too slow that it never reached to the upper level
management of NASA. The report also found that not any engineer made courage and risk his job
to directly contact with the management of NASA. The information that was passed from Thiokol
management to NASA officials was distorted to fit the interests of management. According to the
Roger Commission, NASA officials said they would not have given the final approval to launch
if they had heard the views of Thiokol engineers
7. POLITICAL PRESSURE
NASA was very committed and convinced to proceed towards the launch for a variety of
reasons including, economic considerations and moreover the most important political pressure.

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NASA was under severe pressure as President Ronald Reagan stated number of times in his
speech about the space shuttle program of NASA. On July 4, 1982 President Reagan announced
a national policy to set direction of US space program. He stated that United States Space
Transportation System (STS) is key for national security and civil government mission.
According to news articles of 1986, there was a severe pressure on NASA that no matter what
happens proceed with the launch STS-51-L flight as President Ronal Reagan will refer the
mission in his State of the Union address.
On the other hand, to justify its budget NASA had scheduled a large number of missions in
1986. It was very important for NASA to launch Challenger as it will give time to prepare for the
next launch.
8. Management & Engineer
The Challenger disaster could have been avoided if appropriate decision have been taken by NASA
management. The problems with the O-Rings were well known by the engineering team and the
management of both Thiokol and NASA that were working on the SRB, but number of attempts
made by engineers to notify and stop the launch had been constantly held back.
The problem was identified in the design and test of SRB, instead of investigating and solving the
problem, NASA never gives importance to it and chose tolerate the issue.
There was severe pressure on NASA that they ignored all problems that SRB facing. It was a
complete management failure and engineering failure. NASA management objective was to launch
the flight and then prepare for the next flight as they have to achieve the target.

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On the other side, no engineers from Thiokol personally called the top management of NASA
controlling the launch. According Roger Commission, no engineer raised up the issue to NASA
top management controlling the launch as it can cause them loss of job.
Both NASA management, Thiokol management and engineers were focusing to fulfill their object.
Everyone doesn’t to this problem seriously which cause billions of dollar loss and loss of seven
crew members.
9. Should NASA proceeded with launch?
NASA should not proceed with the launch as there were serious warnings given by the Thiokol
engineers, even before the launch when the tests were failed and SRB was not suitable for those
freezing condition but NASA was very anxious to proceed with the launch that it leaves all the
hurdles behind. But there is a big question mark that can NASA stop the launch because they had
severe political pressure from the President.
10. Conclusion:
Solid-fuel rocket booster project was completely a failure project for the space shuttle flights
but it was successful for the US Airforce missile plane. From the start, three tests were
conducted, two tests were successful but the last test failed. The reason behind the failure of
last test was its design, seals and SRB can’t be controlled once ignition.
Comparatively SRB has less drawbacks and is better than Liquid rocket, as it provide huge
amount of thrust for short period of time that helps to lift heavy vehicles. If engineers upgrade
SRB and install best fitted seals than it would be the best suitable for the space shuttle projects.

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11. REFERNCES
1. http://www.kosmosbusiness.com/UserFiles/File/Books/CaseStudy1.pdf
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid_rocket_booster
3. https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/nasa-the-navy-and-nukes-solid-rocket-fuel-and-the-
future-of-the-trident-missile/
4. https://www.space.com/18084-space-shuttle-challenger.html
5. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO-CRPT-
99hrpt1016.pdf
6. https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-history/heroic-failures/the-space-shuttle-a-case-of-
subjective-engineering
7. https://www.nasa.gov/returntoflight/system/system_SRB.html
8. https://thegrcbluebook.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Ethics-Challenger-
Disaster.pdf
9. http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-disasters/challenger-disaster/challenger-
management-failure/
10. http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/NASA-Suggested-Reagan-Hail-Challenger-
Mission-In-State-of-Union/id-00a395472559b3afcd22de473da2e65f
11. https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/organizational-behavior-disaster-5532