Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, to the Bank of America 2022 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
The document summarizes a presentation given by Eric J. Labs at the Surface Navy Association's 34th National Symposium on January 13, 2022. The presentation discussed congressional perspectives on Navy shipbuilding and the Navy's 2022 shipbuilding plan. It analyzed the Navy's goals for ship numbers, funding levels provided by Congress compared to administration requests, potential costs of the 2022 plan, and options for reducing large surface combatant forces.
This document summarizes a presentation by Eric J. Labs from the Congressional Budget Office about Navy ship construction. It discusses shipbuilding under the Budget Control Act, the Navy's 2016 and 2019 shipbuilding plans, and the prospects of achieving a 355-ship fleet. It also analyzes the costs of the Navy's plans and factors like budget levels, ship types, and service life extensions that could impact achieving fleet size goals.
The document summarizes a presentation about prospects and challenges for increasing the size of the US Navy fleet. It discusses the Navy's shipbuilding plans which call for smaller fleet sizes than studies recommend. Building a larger fleet faces challenges including high costs, cost overruns in ship programs, difficulties designing and building new classes of ships, and stress on the industrial base. Maintaining a larger fleet over decades would require significant increases in the Navy's budget.
As the Navy prepares a new force structure assessment, CBO has examined three kinds of risks to the Navy’s plan to build a 355-ship fleet. Those risks arise from budgetary pressure, growth in the costs of building new ships, and uncertainty about the design of future ships. CBO has also provided some illustrations of alternative approaches to building the Navy’s amphibious warfare and surface combatant forces.
The document summarizes a presentation given by Eric J. Labs at the 37th Annual Spring Meeting of the Marine Machinery Association on February 23, 2022 about prospects for building a larger US Navy fleet. It discusses recent Navy force structure assessments and shipbuilding plans that call for a larger fleet of 321 to 372 manned ships and up to 140 unmanned ships by 2035. However, the Navy's shipbuilding plans would require average annual costs of $25.3 billion to $32.7 billion, significantly more than appropriations over the past five years. To support a larger fleet, the Navy will need large and sustained increases to its overall budget.
The document summarizes a presentation given by Eric J. Labs at the Surface Navy Association's 34th National Symposium on January 13, 2022. The presentation discussed congressional perspectives on Navy shipbuilding and the Navy's 2022 shipbuilding plan. It analyzed the Navy's goals for ship numbers, funding levels provided by Congress compared to administration requests, potential costs of the 2022 plan, and options for reducing large surface combatant forces.
This document summarizes a presentation by Eric J. Labs from the Congressional Budget Office about Navy ship construction. It discusses shipbuilding under the Budget Control Act, the Navy's 2016 and 2019 shipbuilding plans, and the prospects of achieving a 355-ship fleet. It also analyzes the costs of the Navy's plans and factors like budget levels, ship types, and service life extensions that could impact achieving fleet size goals.
The document summarizes a presentation about prospects and challenges for increasing the size of the US Navy fleet. It discusses the Navy's shipbuilding plans which call for smaller fleet sizes than studies recommend. Building a larger fleet faces challenges including high costs, cost overruns in ship programs, difficulties designing and building new classes of ships, and stress on the industrial base. Maintaining a larger fleet over decades would require significant increases in the Navy's budget.
As the Navy prepares a new force structure assessment, CBO has examined three kinds of risks to the Navy’s plan to build a 355-ship fleet. Those risks arise from budgetary pressure, growth in the costs of building new ships, and uncertainty about the design of future ships. CBO has also provided some illustrations of alternative approaches to building the Navy’s amphibious warfare and surface combatant forces.
The document summarizes a presentation given by Eric J. Labs at the 37th Annual Spring Meeting of the Marine Machinery Association on February 23, 2022 about prospects for building a larger US Navy fleet. It discusses recent Navy force structure assessments and shipbuilding plans that call for a larger fleet of 321 to 372 manned ships and up to 140 unmanned ships by 2035. However, the Navy's shipbuilding plans would require average annual costs of $25.3 billion to $32.7 billion, significantly more than appropriations over the past five years. To support a larger fleet, the Navy will need large and sustained increases to its overall budget.
Presentation by R. Derek Trunkey and Eric J. Labs, analysts in CBO's National Security Division, at the Annual Conference of the Western Economic Association International.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the 2017 Defense Outlook Forum.
Over the next 30 years, the Navy’s 2017 shipbuilding plan would cost 30 percent more than the service has received historically, CBO estimates. If future Navy shipbuilding budgets are in line with those over the past 30 years, the Navy’s fleet will be about 20 percent smaller in 2046 than under the Navy’s plan. A larger fleet of around 350 ships could cost about 60 percent more per year than average historical shipbuilding budgets.
Under the Budget Control Act, funding for naval ship construction has increased significantly above historical averages. In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for the Navy’s 2019 shipbuilding plan would average $28.9 billion (in 2018 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 80 percent more than what the Navy has spent, on average, over the past 30 years. With service life extensions of existing ships, that plan would achieve a fleet of 355 ships by the 2030s.
Presentation by Eric Labs, a senior analyst for naval forces and weapons in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Defense Outlook Forum.
The document discusses the Jones Act, which regulates domestic maritime shipping in the US. It summarizes arguments that the Heritage Foundation and others have made claiming the Jones Act increases shipping costs. However, the document argues these claims are not substantiated and ignores market factors like supply and demand that actually drive shipping rates. Backtesting of shipping routes and costs between the US Gulf Coast and East Coast do not show a significant difference in rates between Jones Act and foreign-flagged vessels. The economics of supply and demand in the US-flagged tanker market, including the limited fleet size, help explain current rate levels.
Cogliolo Andrea - Innovation & Research - RINAWEC Italia
Slides presentate a Roma il 25 febbraio 2014 in occasione del Workshop "Il GNL è per tutti. Le prospettive di utilizzo del metano liquido per i service vessels, i traghetti a corto raggio e le marinerie minori" promosso da @ConferenzaGNL, un progetto a cura di Symposia e WEC Italia - TWITTER #GNL
An Apple to-Apple Basis Comparison, One Jones Act unit vs one Foreign Flag un...GE 94
In the paper we have underscored that timing , not just policies are determining winners and losers in this energy and shipping trade (both international and U.S Flagged).
Oftentimes, a lot of folks talk about trade regulations but at the end it’s always policies within the economics context that drives up all those numbers in the real world.
-Simon Jacques
Shipping U.S. Crude Oil by Water: Vessel Flag Requirements and Safety Issues GE 94
The document discusses the increase in domestic waterborne shipping of crude oil in the United States due to new sources of production. It raises concerns about the safety of tankers and barges moving oil and the impact of the Jones Act, which restricts domestic shipping to U.S.-built and crewed vessels. The higher costs of Jones Act compliant ships has resulted in some oil being shipped from Texas to Canadian, not U.S., refineries. Proposed legislation aims to study improving competitiveness of the U.S.-flag industry and oil spill response.
The document discusses issues facing the container shipping industry due to falling bunker fuel prices. It notes that research shows slow steaming may no longer save costs as fuel prices have dropped significantly from a year ago. This could lead shipping lines to consider speeding up vessels instead of using as many ships at slower speeds. However, many factors would need to be considered in making this decision and shipowners have generally preferred slow steaming to manage excess capacity. The lower fuel costs may also allow some adjustment of shipping routes and vessel usage.
This project captures boating trends, capacity studies, population projections, and economic factors data for the entire state of Tennessee and all of its major boating reservoirs so that TWRA could make better-informed decisions concerning agency activities.
U.S. Marine Emissions Regulations and Compliance Initiatives & Assessments, T...Team Finland Future Watch
The document summarizes U.S. marine emissions regulations and compliance initiatives. It finds that the U.S. has significant maritime emissions and the EPA's 2012 rule enforces IMO standards in U.S. coastal waters. Key compliance strategies are exhaust scrubbers, Tier 3 engine standards, and distillate fuel. States like California have additional rules, and initiatives encourage technologies like LNG, shore power, hybrids, and fuel cells to reduce emissions.
This document provides an analysis of Pakistan's LNG import project and identifies potential issues and losses totaling over $13 billion. It outlines four main areas of concern: 1) fluctuations in global energy prices could result in $13.05 billion in losses compared to importing crude oil, 2) higher costs for the FSRU day rate and reduced cargo capacity could lose $5.952 billion, 3) operational and technological challenges like underutilized capacity could lead to $990 million in losses, 4) charter rates for LNG carriers being higher than market rates may lose $483.30 million. The document calls for more transparency around commercial terms as hiding costs could be justifying higher prices.
This study was commissioned by MARAD (US government) and conducted by DNV GL.
The study looks at the LNG bunkering of ships in US, so that LNG use as fuel for ships can be developed further.
The report was released to the public by MARAD in September 2014 and hence you can find it here.
“Envision, create, and believe in your own universe, and the universe will form around you.” ~ Tony Hsieh
“The people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world are the ones who do.” ~ Steve Jobs
“To win big, you sometimes have to take big risk.” ~ Bill Gates
This document summarizes the current and future state of LNG fueled ships. As of March 2014, there were 48 LNG fueled ships in operation worldwide and 53 confirmed LNG fueled newbuilds on order. In total, there are currently 101 confirmed LNG fueled ship projects. The development of the LNG fueled fleet is in line with projections by DNV GL, but it remains to be seen if the exponential growth will continue through 2020 and beyond.
This document discusses alternative fuels for shipping, including LNG. It notes that regulations are driving a need for cleaner fuels with lower sulfur content. LNG produces significantly lower emissions than conventional fuels and is increasingly seen as a viable option. However, infrastructure needs to be developed further for LNG to be widely used. The document provides an overview of various alternative fuels and the challenges to adopting new fuels, such as high costs and lack of infrastructure.
The Future Of Lng As Fuel, Technical And Infrastructure Aspects And Considera...George Teriakidis
The document discusses LNG as a fuel for ships. It outlines the benefits of LNG including its ability to meet environmental regulations. However, barriers currently preventing widespread adoption include a lack of infrastructure and uncertainties regarding regulations and bunkering practices. These barriers are being addressed through innovations in technical standards, operational procedures, and commercial frameworks. Realizing LNG's potential will require continued innovations and developing new infrastructure.
The document provides an overview of short-term natural gas fundamentals and the growing global LNG market. It notes that plentiful and low-cost US natural gas supply is driving the need for additional LNG export capacity to balance the market. Global LNG demand is growing at 13.6% in 2019 while new LNG supply is set to peak that year. The Permian Basin is a major source of growing US gas supply as a byproduct of rising oil production.
This document analyzes production, investment, pricing and other metrics related to the Barnett Shale play over a 15-year period from 2001-2015. It finds that the play grew rapidly to produce over 5 billion cubic feet of gas per day by 2010, requiring over $30 billion in cumulative capital expenditures and development of over 16,000 wells. However, as gas prices declined in the late 2000s, many operators left the play and production is now down to only a few hundred million cubic feet per day by 2015 with almost no drilling activity remaining. The analysis provides insights into the full lifecycle of a major shale gas play from initial development and scaling up through its decline.
The document discusses China's shipbuilding industry and efforts to reduce CO2 emissions from ships. It finds that overcapacity since 2008 has depressed orderbooks in China, resulting in South Korea recently surpassing China in ship deliveries measured by compensated gross tons. The enclosures provide details on China's marine fuel specifications, composition of domestic fuels, sulfur limits for emissions control, and plans to implement new emissions standards for new and in-use vessels through 2020. Trends show China's inland fleet is growing in deadweight tonnage and size while decreasing in numbers of ships as older vessels are decommissioned. Electrical propulsion is being adopted but data on Chinese adoptions was limited.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America 2024 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Presentation by R. Derek Trunkey and Eric J. Labs, analysts in CBO's National Security Division, at the Annual Conference of the Western Economic Association International.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the 2017 Defense Outlook Forum.
Over the next 30 years, the Navy’s 2017 shipbuilding plan would cost 30 percent more than the service has received historically, CBO estimates. If future Navy shipbuilding budgets are in line with those over the past 30 years, the Navy’s fleet will be about 20 percent smaller in 2046 than under the Navy’s plan. A larger fleet of around 350 ships could cost about 60 percent more per year than average historical shipbuilding budgets.
Under the Budget Control Act, funding for naval ship construction has increased significantly above historical averages. In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for the Navy’s 2019 shipbuilding plan would average $28.9 billion (in 2018 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 80 percent more than what the Navy has spent, on average, over the past 30 years. With service life extensions of existing ships, that plan would achieve a fleet of 355 ships by the 2030s.
Presentation by Eric Labs, a senior analyst for naval forces and weapons in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Defense Outlook Forum.
The document discusses the Jones Act, which regulates domestic maritime shipping in the US. It summarizes arguments that the Heritage Foundation and others have made claiming the Jones Act increases shipping costs. However, the document argues these claims are not substantiated and ignores market factors like supply and demand that actually drive shipping rates. Backtesting of shipping routes and costs between the US Gulf Coast and East Coast do not show a significant difference in rates between Jones Act and foreign-flagged vessels. The economics of supply and demand in the US-flagged tanker market, including the limited fleet size, help explain current rate levels.
Cogliolo Andrea - Innovation & Research - RINAWEC Italia
Slides presentate a Roma il 25 febbraio 2014 in occasione del Workshop "Il GNL è per tutti. Le prospettive di utilizzo del metano liquido per i service vessels, i traghetti a corto raggio e le marinerie minori" promosso da @ConferenzaGNL, un progetto a cura di Symposia e WEC Italia - TWITTER #GNL
An Apple to-Apple Basis Comparison, One Jones Act unit vs one Foreign Flag un...GE 94
In the paper we have underscored that timing , not just policies are determining winners and losers in this energy and shipping trade (both international and U.S Flagged).
Oftentimes, a lot of folks talk about trade regulations but at the end it’s always policies within the economics context that drives up all those numbers in the real world.
-Simon Jacques
Shipping U.S. Crude Oil by Water: Vessel Flag Requirements and Safety Issues GE 94
The document discusses the increase in domestic waterborne shipping of crude oil in the United States due to new sources of production. It raises concerns about the safety of tankers and barges moving oil and the impact of the Jones Act, which restricts domestic shipping to U.S.-built and crewed vessels. The higher costs of Jones Act compliant ships has resulted in some oil being shipped from Texas to Canadian, not U.S., refineries. Proposed legislation aims to study improving competitiveness of the U.S.-flag industry and oil spill response.
The document discusses issues facing the container shipping industry due to falling bunker fuel prices. It notes that research shows slow steaming may no longer save costs as fuel prices have dropped significantly from a year ago. This could lead shipping lines to consider speeding up vessels instead of using as many ships at slower speeds. However, many factors would need to be considered in making this decision and shipowners have generally preferred slow steaming to manage excess capacity. The lower fuel costs may also allow some adjustment of shipping routes and vessel usage.
This project captures boating trends, capacity studies, population projections, and economic factors data for the entire state of Tennessee and all of its major boating reservoirs so that TWRA could make better-informed decisions concerning agency activities.
U.S. Marine Emissions Regulations and Compliance Initiatives & Assessments, T...Team Finland Future Watch
The document summarizes U.S. marine emissions regulations and compliance initiatives. It finds that the U.S. has significant maritime emissions and the EPA's 2012 rule enforces IMO standards in U.S. coastal waters. Key compliance strategies are exhaust scrubbers, Tier 3 engine standards, and distillate fuel. States like California have additional rules, and initiatives encourage technologies like LNG, shore power, hybrids, and fuel cells to reduce emissions.
This document provides an analysis of Pakistan's LNG import project and identifies potential issues and losses totaling over $13 billion. It outlines four main areas of concern: 1) fluctuations in global energy prices could result in $13.05 billion in losses compared to importing crude oil, 2) higher costs for the FSRU day rate and reduced cargo capacity could lose $5.952 billion, 3) operational and technological challenges like underutilized capacity could lead to $990 million in losses, 4) charter rates for LNG carriers being higher than market rates may lose $483.30 million. The document calls for more transparency around commercial terms as hiding costs could be justifying higher prices.
This study was commissioned by MARAD (US government) and conducted by DNV GL.
The study looks at the LNG bunkering of ships in US, so that LNG use as fuel for ships can be developed further.
The report was released to the public by MARAD in September 2014 and hence you can find it here.
“Envision, create, and believe in your own universe, and the universe will form around you.” ~ Tony Hsieh
“The people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world are the ones who do.” ~ Steve Jobs
“To win big, you sometimes have to take big risk.” ~ Bill Gates
This document summarizes the current and future state of LNG fueled ships. As of March 2014, there were 48 LNG fueled ships in operation worldwide and 53 confirmed LNG fueled newbuilds on order. In total, there are currently 101 confirmed LNG fueled ship projects. The development of the LNG fueled fleet is in line with projections by DNV GL, but it remains to be seen if the exponential growth will continue through 2020 and beyond.
This document discusses alternative fuels for shipping, including LNG. It notes that regulations are driving a need for cleaner fuels with lower sulfur content. LNG produces significantly lower emissions than conventional fuels and is increasingly seen as a viable option. However, infrastructure needs to be developed further for LNG to be widely used. The document provides an overview of various alternative fuels and the challenges to adopting new fuels, such as high costs and lack of infrastructure.
The Future Of Lng As Fuel, Technical And Infrastructure Aspects And Considera...George Teriakidis
The document discusses LNG as a fuel for ships. It outlines the benefits of LNG including its ability to meet environmental regulations. However, barriers currently preventing widespread adoption include a lack of infrastructure and uncertainties regarding regulations and bunkering practices. These barriers are being addressed through innovations in technical standards, operational procedures, and commercial frameworks. Realizing LNG's potential will require continued innovations and developing new infrastructure.
The document provides an overview of short-term natural gas fundamentals and the growing global LNG market. It notes that plentiful and low-cost US natural gas supply is driving the need for additional LNG export capacity to balance the market. Global LNG demand is growing at 13.6% in 2019 while new LNG supply is set to peak that year. The Permian Basin is a major source of growing US gas supply as a byproduct of rising oil production.
This document analyzes production, investment, pricing and other metrics related to the Barnett Shale play over a 15-year period from 2001-2015. It finds that the play grew rapidly to produce over 5 billion cubic feet of gas per day by 2010, requiring over $30 billion in cumulative capital expenditures and development of over 16,000 wells. However, as gas prices declined in the late 2000s, many operators left the play and production is now down to only a few hundred million cubic feet per day by 2015 with almost no drilling activity remaining. The analysis provides insights into the full lifecycle of a major shale gas play from initial development and scaling up through its decline.
The document discusses China's shipbuilding industry and efforts to reduce CO2 emissions from ships. It finds that overcapacity since 2008 has depressed orderbooks in China, resulting in South Korea recently surpassing China in ship deliveries measured by compensated gross tons. The enclosures provide details on China's marine fuel specifications, composition of domestic fuels, sulfur limits for emissions control, and plans to implement new emissions standards for new and in-use vessels through 2020. Trends show China's inland fleet is growing in deadweight tonnage and size while decreasing in numbers of ships as older vessels are decommissioned. Electrical propulsion is being adopted but data on Chinese adoptions was limited.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America 2024 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Surface Navy Association’s 35th National Symposium.
The Navy’s shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2023 presents three alternatives that call for a much larger fleet of manned ships and an undetermined number of unmanned systems. CBO examines the plan’s implications for the potential size, composition, cost, and capabilities of the fleet. The agency also compares the three alternatives with other recent shipbuilding plans and analyses by the Navy.
The document summarizes Eric Labs' presentation at the National Defense Industrial Association's 25th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference on February 22, 2023 about the Navy's 2023 Shipbuilding Plan and the future of expeditionary warfare operations. It discusses Congressional support for shipbuilding funding, CBO analyses of the Navy's shipbuilding plan including costs and capabilities, and implications of the 2023 NDAA requirements for amphibious ships.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America 2023 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Navy Constellation Class Frigate Program Background & IssuesBreakerODay
The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 new Constellation-class frigates to replace its retired Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. The first two FFG-62s were funded in FY2020 and FY2021 at costs of $1.3 billion and $1.1 billion respectively. The FY2022 budget requests $1.1 billion for the third FFG-62. Key issues for Congress include whether the Navy's estimated costs are accurate, the impact of COVID-19, and ensuring the capabilities and number of vertical launch system tubes meet requirements.
CBO estimates that the Navy’s 2020 shipbuilding plan would cost an average of $31 billion per year (in 2019 dollars) over 30 years. Under the plan, the fleet would grow from 290 ships today to the Navy’s overall goal of 355 in 2034 but would fall short of the Navy’s specific goals for some types of ships. In particular, the Navy’s plan would increase the amphibious warfare force from the current 32 ships to a high of 38 ships by 2026. A larger fleet would lead to higher operation and support costs.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the 2016 Defense Outlook Forum.
Over the next 30 years, the Navy’s 2016 shipbuilding plan will cost one-third more than the service has received historically, CBO estimates. In particular, cost growth in lead ships (and its effect on subsequent ships) drives up the cost of the Navy’s shipbuilding program. If future Navy shipbuilding budgets are in line with those over the past 30 years, the Navy’s fleet will be about 20 percent smaller in 2045 than under the Navy’s plan.
The document discusses India's submarine capabilities and procurement programs. It notes that India's submarine fleet is aging, with over half being over 20 years old. The average operational availability of submarines is low at around 40%. Several programs are underway to boost India's submarine fleet, including Project 75 for 6 submarines, Project 75I for another 6 built in India, the Arihant-class nuclear submarine program, and leasing of nuclear submarines from Russia. However, delays and issues have plagued past procurement efforts, and the defense budget may need to increase further to achieve force levels needed by the navy.
Recently, several Navy attack submarines have been delayed in receiving maintenance at public shipyards. As a result, they have missed deployments or had shortened deployments. CBO was asked by the House Armed Services Committee to compare the maintenance costs at public and private shipyards.
CBO’s analysis focused on the most common type of overhaul, the Docking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA), for SSN-688 class submarines. CBO found that no matter which method it used to calculate costs, private shipyards were less expensive, on average, than public shipyards for DSRA overhauls. The methodology and findings in this slide deck will be more thoroughly documented in a forthcoming CBO report.
In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for a fleet of 355 ships would average $26.6 billion (in 2017 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 60 percent more than what the Navy has spent on average over the past 30 years. A larger fleet will also lead to greater operation and support costs.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Defense Outlook Forum.
This document summarizes presentations from a workshop on the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) in Canada. The NSPS aims to build ships for the Canadian military and coast guard through long-term contracts with selected shipyards. Irving Shipbuilding will build combat vessels while Seaspan will build non-combat vessels in contracts worth up to $36 billion total. Additional smaller ship contracts and maintenance agreements are also part of the strategy. Workshop speakers discussed progress implementing NSPS so far as well as potential future challenges around funding, capabilities, economic outcomes and developing human capital at Canada's shipyards.
The document provides background on the Navy Aegis ballistic missile defense program. Key points include:
- The program gives Aegis cruisers and destroyers the ability to conduct ballistic missile defense operations. The number of BMD-capable ships is planned to grow to 49 by 2021.
- Ships support European phased adaptive approach for European defense and operate in the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf.
- Funding comes mostly from Missile Defense Agency budget, with some from the Navy. The FY2017 budget requests $1.77 billion for Aegis BMD efforts.
- Issues for Congress include required vs available ship numbers, potential new site in Hawaii, burden sharing
The document summarizes the status of US Navy shipbuilding programs in 2011-2012. It discusses how the Navy achieved $4 billion in savings on shipbuilding contracts through tighter requirements, cooperation with industry, and leveraging competition. Key programs highlighted include the Littoral Combat Ship, DDG 1000 and DDG 51 destroyers, LPD 17 amphibious transport docks, Joint High Speed Vessels, and T-AKE cargo and ammunition ships. The Navy contracted for 34 new ships in 2011 and christened, delivered, or commissioned several ships that year.
Public Services & Procurement Canada: Mari-Tech 2017 PresentationRebecca Barton
This document provides an agenda and background information for the Federal Marine Procurement Outlook Session at the Mari-Tech Conference in Montreal from April 19-21, 2017. The agenda outlines presentations from various government departments on federal contracting processes, leveraging procurement for industrial benefits, and marine procurement outlooks from the Canadian Coast Guard, Department of National Defence, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The document provides context on initiatives like the National Shipbuilding Strategy and desired outcomes of informing industry and receiving feedback.
This document provides an overview and update on the strong growth of the China-owned merchant ship fleet. Some key points:
- The China-owned fleet grew by almost 9% in 2017 to over 152 million gross tonnes. Further strong growth is expected in 2018.
- Large volumes of new ships on order at Chinese shipyards will be delivered this year, including valemax ore carriers and newcastlemax bulk carriers.
- Chinese leasing companies are playing an increasing role in financing new ship orders, helping support domestic shipbuilding. Leasing investments in ships totaled around $12 billion in 2017.
- Continued growth in China's economy and trade is driving demand for shipping capacity, and
Teekay Tankers reported weak financial results in Q2 2021 due to persistently low spot tanker rates. However, the company signed contracts to refinance higher-cost debt on eight vessels, which is expected to save $11 million in interest per year. While tanker markets remain weak in the near term, key indicators like rising oil demand, falling inventories, and increasing OPEC+ supply point to a recovery starting in the coming quarters. Teekay Tankers has a strong financial position with $274 million in pro forma liquidity to withstand current market conditions.
The Department of the Navy, which includes the Navy and the Marine Corps, currently has an aviation fleet of about 4,000 aircraft. The average budgets for procuring aircraft were about 60 percent greater from 2010 through 2019 ($14 billion) than they were from 2000 through 2009 ($9 billion).
CBO projects that the costs of replacing aircraft in the current fleet would average about $12 billion from 2020 to 2050. However, purchases over that period would go through several different phases and experience year-to-year variations similar to those observed in the 2000s and 2010s.
Teekay Tankers reported financial results for the first quarter of 2022, with adjusted EBITDA of $17.5 million, up from $9.7 million in the previous quarter. Spot tanker rates strengthened in late Q1 due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and have improved significantly in Q2 to date. The company completed $288 million in refinancings in Q1, increasing liquidity. With 46 vessels trading on the spot market and low fleet growth expected, the company is well positioned to benefit from a strengthening tanker market.
Similar to The 2022 Outlook for Navy Shipbuilding: An Uncertain Course for the Future Fleet (20)
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
Presentation by Mark Hadley, CBO's Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel, at the 2nd NABO-OECD Annual Conference of Asian Parliamentary Budget Officials.
Presentation by Daria Pelech, an analyst in CBO’s Health Analysis Division, at the Center for Health Insurance Reform McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University.
This slide deck highlights CBO’s key findings about the outlook for the economy as described in its new report, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034.
Presentation by CBO analysts Rebecca Heller, Shannon Mok, and James Pearce, and Census Bureau research economist Jonathan Rothbaum at the American Economic Association Annual Meeting, Committee on Economic Statistics.
Presentation by Elizabeth Ash, William Carrington, Rebecca Heller, and Grace Hwang of CBO’s Labor, Income Security, and Long-Term Analysis and Health Analysis divisions to the Children’s Health Group, American Academy of Pediatrics.
Presentation by Molly Dahl, Chief of CBO’s Long-Term Analysis Unit, at a meeting of the National Conference of State Legislatures’ Budget Working Group.
In the President’s 2024 budget request, total military compensation is $551 billion, including veterans' benefits. That amount represents an increase of 134 percent since 1999 after removing the effects of inflation.
Contributi dei parlamentari del PD - Contributi L. 3/2019Partito democratico
DI SEGUITO SONO PUBBLICATI, AI SENSI DELL'ART. 11 DELLA LEGGE N. 3/2019, GLI IMPORTI RICEVUTI DALL'ENTRATA IN VIGORE DELLA SUDDETTA NORMA (31/01/2019) E FINO AL MESE SOLARE ANTECEDENTE QUELLO DELLA PUBBLICAZIONE SUL PRESENTE SITO
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Food safety, prepare for the unexpected - So what can be done in order to be ready to address food safety, food Consumers, food producers and manufacturers, food transporters, food businesses, food retailers can ...
Working with data is a challenge for many organizations. Nonprofits in particular may need to collect and analyze sensitive, incomplete, and/or biased historical data about people. In this talk, Dr. Cori Faklaris of UNC Charlotte provides an overview of current AI capabilities and weaknesses to consider when integrating current AI technologies into the data workflow. The talk is organized around three takeaways: (1) For better or sometimes worse, AI provides you with “infinite interns.” (2) Give people permission & guardrails to learn what works with these “interns” and what doesn’t. (3) Create a roadmap for adding in more AI to assist nonprofit work, along with strategies for bias mitigation.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
This report explores the significance of border towns and spaces for strengthening responses to young people on the move. In particular it explores the linkages of young people to local service centres with the aim of further developing service, protection, and support strategies for migrant children in border areas across the region. The report is based on a small-scale fieldwork study in the border towns of Chipata and Katete in Zambia conducted in July 2023. Border towns and spaces provide a rich source of information about issues related to the informal or irregular movement of young people across borders, including smuggling and trafficking. They can help build a picture of the nature and scope of the type of movement young migrants undertake and also the forms of protection available to them. Border towns and spaces also provide a lens through which we can better understand the vulnerabilities of young people on the move and, critically, the strategies they use to navigate challenges and access support.
The findings in this report highlight some of the key factors shaping the experiences and vulnerabilities of young people on the move – particularly their proximity to border spaces and how this affects the risks that they face. The report describes strategies that young people on the move employ to remain below the radar of visibility to state and non-state actors due to fear of arrest, detention, and deportation while also trying to keep themselves safe and access support in border towns. These strategies of (in)visibility provide a way to protect themselves yet at the same time also heighten some of the risks young people face as their vulnerabilities are not always recognised by those who could offer support.
In this report we show that the realities and challenges of life and migration in this region and in Zambia need to be better understood for support to be strengthened and tuned to meet the specific needs of young people on the move. This includes understanding the role of state and non-state stakeholders, the impact of laws and policies and, critically, the experiences of the young people themselves. We provide recommendations for immediate action, recommendations for programming to support young people on the move in the two towns that would reduce risk for young people in this area, and recommendations for longer term policy advocacy.
Monitoring Health for the SDGs - Global Health Statistics 2024 - WHOChristina Parmionova
The 2024 World Health Statistics edition reviews more than 50 health-related indicators from the Sustainable Development Goals and WHO’s Thirteenth General Programme of Work. It also highlights the findings from the Global health estimates 2021, notably the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy and healthy life expectancy.
AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed online journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects (socio-economic, political, legislative and developmental) of Human Mobility in Africa. Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence research papers AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of contemporaneous trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues.
The Antyodaya Saral Haryana Portal is a pioneering initiative by the Government of Haryana aimed at providing citizens with seamless access to a wide range of government services
About Potato, The scientific name of the plant is Solanum tuberosum (L).Christina Parmionova
The potato is a starchy root vegetable native to the Americas that is consumed as a staple food in many parts of the world. Potatoes are tubers of the plant Solanum tuberosum, a perennial in the nightshade family Solanaceae. Wild potato species can be found from the southern United States to southern Chile
Synopsis (short abstract) In December 2023, the UN General Assembly proclaimed 30 May as the International Day of Potato.
Donate to charity during this holiday seasonSERUDS INDIA
For people who have money and are philanthropic, there are infinite opportunities to gift a needy person or child a Merry Christmas. Even if you are living on a shoestring budget, you will be surprised at how much you can do.
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-to-donate-to-charity-during-this-holiday-season/
#charityforchildren, #donateforchildren, #donateclothesforchildren, #donatebooksforchildren, #donatetoysforchildren, #sponsorforchildren, #sponsorclothesforchildren, #sponsorbooksforchildren, #sponsortoysforchildren, #seruds, #kurnool
Transit-Oriented Development Study Working Group Meeting
The 2022 Outlook for Navy Shipbuilding: An Uncertain Course for the Future Fleet
1. Presentation to the Bank of America 2022 Defense Outlook
and Commercial Aerospace Forum
January 5, 2022
Eric J. Labs
National Security Division
The 2022 Outlook for Navy Shipbuilding:
An Uncertain Course for the Future Fleet
3. 2
▪ Congressional Support for Shipbuilding
▪ Recent Navy Force Structure Assessments and Shipbuilding Plans
▪ Paying for the Navy’s Shipbuilding Plans
▪ Issues Concerning the Shipbuilding Industrial Base
Prospects for Building a Larger Fleet
5. 4
The Navy’s 2012 Shipbuilding Plan Compared With Enacted
Appropriations in the Era of the Budget Control Act, 2012 to 2021
Ship Type
2012 Shipbuilding
Plan
Enacted
Appropriations Difference
Aircraft Carriers 2 3 1
Ballistic Missile Submarines 1 1 0
Attack Submarines 19 20 1
Destroyers 16 22 6
Frigates 0 2 2
Littoral Combat Ships 32 27 -5
Amphibious Warfare Ships 6 7 1
Logistics and Support Ships 30 28 -2
Total 106 110 4
Large Combat Ships 44 55 11
Small Combat and Support Ships 62 55 -7
6. 5
Figures for the HAC-D and SAC-D represent the amounts for shipbuilding in their respective appropriations, as ordered reported out of committee earlier this year.
HAC-D = House Appropriations Committee, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act for 2022; SAC-D = Senate Appropriations Committee,
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
Shipbuilding Requests and Appropriations, 2013 to 2021
The Congress has
consistently appropriated
more funds for shipbuilding
than Administrations have
requested.
7. 6
FY = fiscal year; HAC-D = House Appropriations Committee, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee; HASC = House Armed Services Committee; NDAA = National Defense
Authorization Act for 2022; SAC-D = Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee; SASC = Senate Armed Services Committee.
Administration’s
Request HASC SASC NDAA HAC-D SAC-D
Ship Purchases
Destroyers 1 3 2 3 2 2
Submarines 2 2 2 2 2 2
Frigates 1 1 1 1 1 1
Amphibious Ships 0 1 0 0 0 0
Logistics and Support Ships 4 6 5 7 3 7
Total 8 13 10 13 8 12
Shipbuilding Budgets (Billions of dollars)
New Combat Ships 16.7 21.7 19.3 20.4 18.0 18.8
New Logistics and Support Ships 1.4 2.5 1.6 2.5 1.2 2.5
Other 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.3
Total 22.6 28.4 25.1 27.3 23.5 25.6
Amount Above Request 5.8 2.5 4.7 0.9 3.0
Congressional Action on Shipbuilding for FY 2022 to Date
9. 8
FY = fiscal year.
2016 Force Structure Assessment FY 2020 Shipbuilding Plan
2020 Future Naval Forces Study December 9, 2020, Shipbuilding Plan
2021 Objective Force (Data in FY 2022 Plan) FY 2023 Shipbuilding Plan (Expected)
The Link Between Force Structure Assessments and
Shipbuilding Plans
10. 9
FNFS = Future Naval Forces Study; FSA = Force Structure Assessment; FY = fiscal year; n.a. = not applicable.
The Navy’s Restated Goal for a Larger and More Distributed Fleet
Ship Type
2016 FSA
Inventory Goals
2020 FNFS
Inventory Goals
FY 2022 Plan
Objective Force
Memorandum:
Today’s Fleet
Aircraft Carriers 12 8 to 11 9 to 11 11
Light Carriers 0 0 to 6 0 0
Ballistic Missile Submarines 12 12 12 14
Attack and Large Payload
Submarines
66 72 to 78 66 to 72 53
Large Surface Combatants 104 73 to 88 63 to 65 93
Small Surface Combatants 52 60 to 67 40 to 45 32
Large Amphibious Warfare Ships 12 9 to 10 8 to 9 9
Small Amphibious Warfare Ships 26 52 to 57 40 to 54 22
Logistics and Support Ships 71 96 to 117 83 to 104 62
Unmanned Surface Vehicles n.a. 119 to 166 59 to 89 0
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles n.a. 24 to 76 18 to 51 0
Total Manned Ships 355 382 to 446 321 to 372 296
Total Unmanned Systems n.a. 143 to 242 77 to 140 0
Total Manned and Unmanned 355 525 to 688 398 to 512 296
11. 10
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2020 Shipbuilding Plan (October 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55685.
FY = fiscal year; SSBNs = ballistic missile submarines; SSGNs = guided missile submarines.
Inventory of Battle Force Ships Under the Navy’s FY 2020
Shipbuilding Plan
New-ship construction
and service life
extensions would
increase the Navy’s fleet
to 355 ships under its
FY 2020 plan.
12. 11
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s December 2020 Shipbuilding Plan (April 2021), www.cbo.gov/publication/57091.
Inventory of Battle Force Ships Under the Navy’s
December 9, 2020, Shipbuilding Plan
As new ships entered the
fleet, its composition would
slowly shift. By 2051, the
submarine force would be
much larger, the number of
small surface combatants
would almost equal the
number of large surface
combatants, and small
amphibious warfare ships
would outnumber the large
ones.
13. 12
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2022 Shipbuilding Plan (September 2021), www.cbo.gov/publication/57414. FY = fiscal year.
Under Scenario 1, the Navy would retire ships quickly to meet force goals by 2030 and would maintain the size of the force with a steady-state build rate of 1.8 destroyers per year.
Under Scenario 2, the Navy would maintain a steady-state build rate of two destroyers per year and would reduce the size of the force with retirements by 2035.
Under Scenario 3, the Navy would maintain the 35- to 40-year service life for destroyers and buy one new destroyer per year through 2036 and two new destroyers per year thereafter.
Under Scenario 4, the Navy would maintain the 35- to 40-year service life for destroyers and buy two new destroyers per year (the current rate of purchase).
Reducing the Size of the Large Surface Combatant Force
Under the Navy’s FY 2022 Shipbuilding Plan
The Navy could reduce its
large surface combatant
force by shortening the
service life of existing
destroyers, by decreasing
the rate at which it procures
new destroyers, or by
combining both methods.
14. 13
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2022 Shipbuilding Plan (September 2021), www.cbo.gov/publication/57414.
FY = fiscal year.
The Vertical Launch System Capability of the Surface Force
Under the Navy’s FY 2022 Shipbuilding Plan
Under the Navy’s FY 2022
plan, the surface forces
(manned and unmanned)
would eventually have
between 3 percent and
24 percent fewer vertical
launch system cells than
today’s fleet, but the cells
would be deployed on
23 percent to 68 percent
more ships.
15. 14
DDG(X) = new guided missile destroyer; FY = fiscal year.
The Vertical Launch System Capability of the Surface Force,
Including the DDG(X), Under the Navy’s FY 2022 Shipbuilding Plan
The number of vertical
launch system cells would
increase dramatically at the
high end of the range if the
Navy built significant
numbers of the DDG(X).
17. 16
FY = fiscal year.
Annual Shipbuilding Costs Under the Navy’s Recent Plans
The Navy’s three most
recent shipbuilding plans
would each cost, on
average, more than the
Navy has received in
appropriations over the
past five years, the
period with the highest
amount of shipbuilding
appropriations since the
1980s.
18. 17
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2022 Shipbuilding Plan (September 2021), www.cbo.gov/publication/57414.
FY = fiscal year; n.a. = not applicable.
Average Potential Ship Construction Costs Under the Navy’s
FY 2022 Shipbuilding Plan
Platform Ranges
(Number of ships) Service Life (Years)
Average Annual
Costs (Billions of
2021 dollars)
Low High Low High Low High
Aircraft Carriers 9 11 50 50 2.3 2.9
Ballistic Missile Submarines 12 12 42 42 2.3 2.3
Attack Submarines 66 72 33 42 9.3 10.7
Large Surface Combatants 63 65 35 40 4.4 6.1
Small Surface Combatants 40 45 20 30 1.5 2.6
Amphibious Ships 48 63 20 40 1.5 2.1
Combat Logistics and Support Ships 83 104 30 45 1.4 2.2
Total Manned Battle Force Ships 321 372 n.a. n.a. 22.7 28.9
Unmanned Surface Vessels 59 89 10 15 0.5 1.3
Unmanned Undersea Vessels 18 51 10 15 0.1 0.4
Total Unmanned Vessels 77 140 n.a. n.a. 23.4 30.6
Carrier Refuelings and Outfitting Costs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.9 2.1
Total Shipbuilding Costs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 25.3 32.7
19. 18
CG = guided missile cruiser; DD = destroyer; DDG = guided missile destroyer; DDG(X) = new guided missile destroyer; FFG(X) = new guided missile frigate; Flt = flight;
NRE = nonrecurring engineering (the onetime costs associated with developing the specific design of a ship or specific components).
Lead Ship Cost, by Weight, for Surface Combatants, 1970 to 2030
The cost, by weight, of the
Navy’s proposed new
DDG(X) large surface
combatant is in line with
similar shipbuilding
programs.
20. 19
SSBN = ballistic missile submarine; SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarine; SSN(X) = new nuclear-powered attack submarine.
Lead Ship Cost, by Weight, for Submarines, 1970 to 2034
The SSN(X) is likely to be
more expensive, by weight,
than any submarine the
Navy has built.
21. 20
FY = fiscal year.
Total Navy Budget Under the Navy’s Recent Shipbuilding Plans
The Navy will require large
and sustained increases in
its budget topline to support
a larger and more distributed
fleet.
22. 21
The AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States involves, in part, consultations to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines.
▪ Fragility of the Submarine Industrial Base
▪ The AUKUS Agreement
▪ Ongoing Maintenance Delays
▪ Effects of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Vaccination Mandates
Issues Concerning the Shipbuilding Industrial Base