Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Surface Navy Association’s 35th National Symposium.
The Navy’s shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2023 presents three alternatives that call for a much larger fleet of manned ships and an undetermined number of unmanned systems. CBO examines the plan’s implications for the potential size, composition, cost, and capabilities of the fleet. The agency also compares the three alternatives with other recent shipbuilding plans and analyses by the Navy.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America 2023 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the National Defense Industrial Association’s 25th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, to the Bank of America 2022 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America 2024 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America 2023 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the National Defense Industrial Association’s 25th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, to the Bank of America 2022 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America 2024 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch 2021 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
As the Navy prepares a new force structure assessment, CBO has examined three kinds of risks to the Navy’s plan to build a 355-ship fleet. Those risks arise from budgetary pressure, growth in the costs of building new ships, and uncertainty about the design of future ships. CBO has also provided some illustrations of alternative approaches to building the Navy’s amphibious warfare and surface combatant forces.
Under the Budget Control Act, funding for naval ship construction has increased significantly above historical averages. In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for the Navy’s 2019 shipbuilding plan would average $28.9 billion (in 2018 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 80 percent more than what the Navy has spent, on average, over the past 30 years. With service life extensions of existing ships, that plan would achieve a fleet of 355 ships by the 2030s.
Presentation by Eric Labs, a senior analyst for naval forces and weapons in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Defense Outlook Forum.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the 2017 Defense Outlook Forum.
Over the next 30 years, the Navy’s 2017 shipbuilding plan would cost 30 percent more than the service has received historically, CBO estimates. If future Navy shipbuilding budgets are in line with those over the past 30 years, the Navy’s fleet will be about 20 percent smaller in 2046 than under the Navy’s plan. A larger fleet of around 350 ships could cost about 60 percent more per year than average historical shipbuilding budgets.
Under the Budget Control Act, funding for naval ship construction has increased significantly above historical averages. In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for the Navy’s 2019 shipbuilding plan would average $28.9 billion (in 2018 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 80 percent more than what the Navy has spent, on average, over the past 30 years. With service life extensions of existing ships, that plan would achieve a fleet of 355 ships by the 2030s.
Presentation by Eric Labs, a senior analyst for naval forces and weapons in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Surface Navy Association’s 31st National Symposium.
CBO estimates that the Navy’s 2020 shipbuilding plan would cost an average of $31 billion per year (in 2019 dollars) over 30 years. Under the plan, the fleet would grow from 290 ships today to the Navy’s overall goal of 355 in 2034 but would fall short of the Navy’s specific goals for some types of ships. In particular, the Navy’s plan would increase the amphibious warfare force from the current 32 ships to a high of 38 ships by 2026. A larger fleet would lead to higher operation and support costs.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the 2016 Defense Outlook Forum.
Over the next 30 years, the Navy’s 2016 shipbuilding plan will cost one-third more than the service has received historically, CBO estimates. In particular, cost growth in lead ships (and its effect on subsequent ships) drives up the cost of the Navy’s shipbuilding program. If future Navy shipbuilding budgets are in line with those over the past 30 years, the Navy’s fleet will be about 20 percent smaller in 2045 than under the Navy’s plan.
In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for a fleet of 355 ships would average $26.6 billion (in 2017 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 60 percent more than what the Navy has spent on average over the past 30 years. A larger fleet will also lead to greater operation and support costs.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Defense Outlook Forum.
Presentation by R. Derek Trunkey and Eric J. Labs, analysts in CBO's National Security Division, at the Annual Conference of the Western Economic Association International.
Presentation delivered by Captain (Retd) James Fanell, Government Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy at the RUSI International Sea Powers Conference 2017 - A European Net Assessment of the PLA(N).
23 February 2017
42420, 5(42 PMEagle vs Dragon How the U.S. and Chinese Navi.docxblondellchancy
4/24/20, 5(42 PMEagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up
Page 1 of 13https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vs-dragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-stack-up
Eagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese
Navies Stack Up
3/9/2020
By Jon Harper
MARITIME SECURITY
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4/24/20, 5(42 PMEagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up
Page 2 of 13https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vs-dragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-stack-up
National Defense photo-illustration with iStock, Navy photos
The United States has been the world’s leading maritime power for decades. However, the U.S. Navy could find itself
in China’s wake if current trends continue, analysts say.
Washington and Beijing are now locked in great power competition.
“The biggest challenge for U.S. national security leaders over the next 30 years is the speed and sustainability of the
[People’s Republic of China] national e!ort to deploy a global navy,” said retired Capt. James Fanell, who previously
served as head of intelligence for the Pacific Fleet.
The modernization of the Chinese navy, also known as the PLA Navy, has been underway since the 1990s, and its
fleet has greatly expanded.
In its annual report on China published last year, the Defense Department stated that its Asian rival has more than
300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, patrol craft and other specialized vessels.
In 2019, China had a 335-ship fleet, about 55 percent larger than in 2005, according to a recent Congressional
Research Service report titled, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background
and Issues for Congress.”
4/24/20, 5(42 PMEagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up
Page 3 of 13https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vs-dragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-stack-up
“There is no doubt that they’ve been investing hugely in this,” said Nick Childs, senior fellow for naval forces and
maritime security at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “In recent years, they’ve been
outbuilding everybody.”
To put it in perspective, during a recent four-year period the naval vessels that Chinese shipyards produced were
roughly equivalent in tonnage to the entire U.K. Royal Navy or the ...
Recently, several Navy attack submarines have been delayed in receiving maintenance at public shipyards. As a result, they have missed deployments or had shortened deployments. CBO was asked by the House Armed Services Committee to compare the maintenance costs at public and private shipyards.
CBO’s analysis focused on the most common type of overhaul, the Docking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA), for SSN-688 class submarines. CBO found that no matter which method it used to calculate costs, private shipyards were less expensive, on average, than public shipyards for DSRA overhauls. The methodology and findings in this slide deck will be more thoroughly documented in a forthcoming CBO report.
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch 2021 Defense Outlook and Commercial Aerospace Forum.
As the Navy prepares a new force structure assessment, CBO has examined three kinds of risks to the Navy’s plan to build a 355-ship fleet. Those risks arise from budgetary pressure, growth in the costs of building new ships, and uncertainty about the design of future ships. CBO has also provided some illustrations of alternative approaches to building the Navy’s amphibious warfare and surface combatant forces.
Under the Budget Control Act, funding for naval ship construction has increased significantly above historical averages. In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for the Navy’s 2019 shipbuilding plan would average $28.9 billion (in 2018 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 80 percent more than what the Navy has spent, on average, over the past 30 years. With service life extensions of existing ships, that plan would achieve a fleet of 355 ships by the 2030s.
Presentation by Eric Labs, a senior analyst for naval forces and weapons in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Defense Outlook Forum.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the 2017 Defense Outlook Forum.
Over the next 30 years, the Navy’s 2017 shipbuilding plan would cost 30 percent more than the service has received historically, CBO estimates. If future Navy shipbuilding budgets are in line with those over the past 30 years, the Navy’s fleet will be about 20 percent smaller in 2046 than under the Navy’s plan. A larger fleet of around 350 ships could cost about 60 percent more per year than average historical shipbuilding budgets.
Under the Budget Control Act, funding for naval ship construction has increased significantly above historical averages. In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for the Navy’s 2019 shipbuilding plan would average $28.9 billion (in 2018 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 80 percent more than what the Navy has spent, on average, over the past 30 years. With service life extensions of existing ships, that plan would achieve a fleet of 355 ships by the 2030s.
Presentation by Eric Labs, a senior analyst for naval forces and weapons in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Surface Navy Association’s 31st National Symposium.
CBO estimates that the Navy’s 2020 shipbuilding plan would cost an average of $31 billion per year (in 2019 dollars) over 30 years. Under the plan, the fleet would grow from 290 ships today to the Navy’s overall goal of 355 in 2034 but would fall short of the Navy’s specific goals for some types of ships. In particular, the Navy’s plan would increase the amphibious warfare force from the current 32 ships to a high of 38 ships by 2026. A larger fleet would lead to higher operation and support costs.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the 2016 Defense Outlook Forum.
Over the next 30 years, the Navy’s 2016 shipbuilding plan will cost one-third more than the service has received historically, CBO estimates. In particular, cost growth in lead ships (and its effect on subsequent ships) drives up the cost of the Navy’s shipbuilding program. If future Navy shipbuilding budgets are in line with those over the past 30 years, the Navy’s fleet will be about 20 percent smaller in 2045 than under the Navy’s plan.
In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for a fleet of 355 ships would average $26.6 billion (in 2017 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 60 percent more than what the Navy has spent on average over the past 30 years. A larger fleet will also lead to greater operation and support costs.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Defense Outlook Forum.
Presentation by R. Derek Trunkey and Eric J. Labs, analysts in CBO's National Security Division, at the Annual Conference of the Western Economic Association International.
Presentation delivered by Captain (Retd) James Fanell, Government Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy at the RUSI International Sea Powers Conference 2017 - A European Net Assessment of the PLA(N).
23 February 2017
42420, 5(42 PMEagle vs Dragon How the U.S. and Chinese Navi.docxblondellchancy
4/24/20, 5(42 PMEagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up
Page 1 of 13https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vs-dragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-stack-up
Eagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese
Navies Stack Up
3/9/2020
By Jon Harper
MARITIME SECURITY
https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pcs/click?xai=AKAOjstvbmSx2OP8tDuMZgVBEkvA2zv4fZyouVic9ifvJqQd3d2BHx_nUWEV3DPaJy2LEBsoudSurUtqeZKto8-REQEdxnasanmxSZtQiffSgxCSSrI0AOjhXJxkrD9tMRCZaOKL1jW3I31UCPhgRoOSDF6Dwc1rpyMLks3lP3uRH7TkgYcgZVrxhuGTUoM40Dm2Xm1Htrc2whiavAXw9Vcrwyc2Hs6tdrWiF7cV6OiHTOaOpCBBmyvN-2EGsJK-Udw3ZgYXQPs5X3mlcRat5nSsKbE&sai=AMfl-YTqpBEIduzxZrtS_tKwbIdzszQKJZu3KQ2EQ16Fp1RzlFh_dvOmZgag3O2zVGfwpt_wc1Xcadqd-D2Dqg5RbLw_KH6z1kDk3SwNGVA_QiYhXz8lbk3aAkQUOcgg01Qd&sig=Cg0ArKJSzHcmO6Zyjbf1&adurl=http://vSOFIC.org&nx=CLICK_X&ny=CLICK_Y
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/authors/j/jon-harper
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
4/24/20, 5(42 PMEagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up
Page 2 of 13https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vs-dragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-stack-up
National Defense photo-illustration with iStock, Navy photos
The United States has been the world’s leading maritime power for decades. However, the U.S. Navy could find itself
in China’s wake if current trends continue, analysts say.
Washington and Beijing are now locked in great power competition.
“The biggest challenge for U.S. national security leaders over the next 30 years is the speed and sustainability of the
[People’s Republic of China] national e!ort to deploy a global navy,” said retired Capt. James Fanell, who previously
served as head of intelligence for the Pacific Fleet.
The modernization of the Chinese navy, also known as the PLA Navy, has been underway since the 1990s, and its
fleet has greatly expanded.
In its annual report on China published last year, the Defense Department stated that its Asian rival has more than
300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, patrol craft and other specialized vessels.
In 2019, China had a 335-ship fleet, about 55 percent larger than in 2005, according to a recent Congressional
Research Service report titled, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background
and Issues for Congress.”
4/24/20, 5(42 PMEagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up
Page 3 of 13https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vs-dragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-stack-up
“There is no doubt that they’ve been investing hugely in this,” said Nick Childs, senior fellow for naval forces and
maritime security at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “In recent years, they’ve been
outbuilding everybody.”
To put it in perspective, during a recent four-year period the naval vessels that Chinese shipyards produced were
roughly equivalent in tonnage to the entire U.K. Royal Navy or the ...
Recently, several Navy attack submarines have been delayed in receiving maintenance at public shipyards. As a result, they have missed deployments or had shortened deployments. CBO was asked by the House Armed Services Committee to compare the maintenance costs at public and private shipyards.
CBO’s analysis focused on the most common type of overhaul, the Docking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA), for SSN-688 class submarines. CBO found that no matter which method it used to calculate costs, private shipyards were less expensive, on average, than public shipyards for DSRA overhauls. The methodology and findings in this slide deck will be more thoroughly documented in a forthcoming CBO report.
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
Presentation by Mark Hadley, CBO's Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel, at the 2nd NABO-OECD Annual Conference of Asian Parliamentary Budget Officials.
Presentation by Daria Pelech, an analyst in CBO’s Health Analysis Division, at the Center for Health Insurance Reform McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University.
This slide deck highlights CBO’s key findings about the outlook for the economy as described in its new report, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034.
Presentation by CBO analysts Rebecca Heller, Shannon Mok, and James Pearce, and Census Bureau research economist Jonathan Rothbaum at the American Economic Association Annual Meeting, Committee on Economic Statistics.
Presentation by Elizabeth Ash, William Carrington, Rebecca Heller, and Grace Hwang of CBO’s Labor, Income Security, and Long-Term Analysis and Health Analysis divisions to the Children’s Health Group, American Academy of Pediatrics.
Presentation by Molly Dahl, Chief of CBO’s Long-Term Analysis Unit, at a meeting of the National Conference of State Legislatures’ Budget Working Group.
In the President’s 2024 budget request, total military compensation is $551 billion, including veterans' benefits. That amount represents an increase of 134 percent since 1999 after removing the effects of inflation.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
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Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
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A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
1. Presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s 35th National Symposium
January 12, 2023
Eric J. Labs
Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons
National Security Division
Perspectives on the Navy’s
2023 Shipbuilding Plan
For more information about the symposium, see https://navysnaevents.org/national-symposium.
2. 1
▪ Congressional Support for Shipbuilding
▪ The Navy’s Evolving Force Structure Analysis and Shipbuilding Plans
▪ CBO’s Analysis of the Navy’s 2023 Shipbuilding Plan
– Purchases and Their Effects on Inventory
– Costs
– Measures of Capability
The Navy’s Shipbuilding Plan for Fiscal Year 2023: Background
and Analysis
7. 6
The Navy’s Inventory Analysis and Goals, Circa 2018 to 2022
2020 Future Naval
Forces Study
(December 2020 plan)
2020 Integrated FSA
(Reported in 2023
Plan)
Future Naval Forces Study
Future Fleet Architecture
(Reported in 2023 Plan)
Navy’s 2022
Shipbuilding
Plan
Chief of Naval
Operations’
Navigation Plan 2022
Aircraft Carriers 8 to 11 12 8 to 11 9 to 11 12
Light Carriers 0 to 6 0 0 to 6 n.a. 0
Ballistic Missile Submarines 12 12 12 12 12
Attack and Guided Missile Submarines 72 to 78 66 58 to 70 66 to 72 66
Large Surface Combatants 73 to 88 96 72 to 80 63 to 65 96
Small Surface Combatants 60 to 67 56 47 to 60 40 to 45 56
Large/Midsize Amphibious Ships
Amphibious Assault Ships 9 to 10 10 6 to 10 8 to 9 10
Midsize Amphibious Ships
52 to 57 41 30 to 43
16 to 19 21
Light Amphibious Warships 24 to 35 18
Combat Ships Subtotal 286 to 329 293 233 to 292 238 to 268 291
Logistics and Support Ships 96 to 117 97 78 to 136 83 to 104 82
Total, Manned Battle Force Ships 382 to 446 390 337 to 404 321 to 372 373
Unmanned Surface Vessels 119 to 166 27 81 to 153 59 to 89 Unknown
Unmanned Undersea Vessels 24 to 76 18 18 to 50 18 to 51 Unknown
Total, Unmanned Vessels 143 to 242 45 99 to 203 77 to 140 About 150
Total, All Ships and Vessels 525 to 688 435 440 to 540 398 to 512 About 523
8. 7
The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet Under the Past 11 Shipbuilding
Plans, Compared With Actual Inventories
240
260
280
300
320
340
360
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2019 2020 Dec. 2020 2023 Plan Actual Fleet Inventory
Actual Fleet Inventory (Thick black line)
9. 8
This chart does not reflect the Navy’s proposal, in 2015, to adjust the way battle force ships are counted.
LCS = littoral combat ship.
Early Ship Retirements Have Undermined the Navy’s Goals to
Increase the Size of Its Fleet
260
270
280
290
300
310
320
330
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2021 2024 2027
24 Spruance class
destroyers are
retired over five
years.
30 frigates are rapidly
decommissioned over five
years. Between 2010 and
2015, no destroyers are
commissioned. The Navy
commissions 6 LCSs and
12 support ships.
All cruisers and 11 LCSs to
retire over five years.
The Navy's goals
call for a 355-ship fleet.
The Navy's goals
call for a 375-ship
fleet.
Number of Ships
The Navy's goals
call for a 306-ship
fleet.
The Navy's goals
call for a 313-ship
fleet.
The Navy's analyses call for a
much larger and more
distributed fleet.
10. 9
CBO’s Analysis of the Navy’s 2023
Shipbuilding Plan: Purchases and
Their Effects on Inventory
11. 10
* = The Administration counts an amphibious assault ship as being authorized in 2023, although the Congress authorized that ship in 2020.
The Navy’s Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan, 2023 to 2027
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 Total
Columbia Class Ballistic Missile Submarines 0 1 0 1 1 3
Virginia Class Attack Submarines 2 2 2 2 2 10
Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers 2 2 2 2 2 10
Constellation Class Guided Missile Frigates 1 2 1 2 1 7
America Class Amphibious Assault Ships * 0 0 0 0 0
San Antonio Class Amphibious Transport Docks 1 0 0 0 0 1
Light Amphibious Warships 0 0 1 1 2 4
John Lewis Class Oilers 1 2 1 1 1 6
Next-Generation Logistics Ships 0 0 0 1 1 2
Support Ships 1 0 2 3 1 7
Total 8 9 9 13 11 50
T-ARC Cable Laying Ships 0 1 0 0 0 1
Used Sealift Ships 2 2 2 2 2 10
Large Unmanned Systems 0 0 3 4 5 12
Total, Shipbuilding Costs (Billions of dollars) 27.9 28.9 30.9 33.0 29.9 150.6
12. 11
FYDP = The Administration’s 2023 Future Years Defense Plan.
Inventory Goal Average Annual Ship Purchases, by Service Life Memorandum: FYDP Average
Large Surface Combatants
Service Life (Years) 30 35 40
96 Ships 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.0
63 Ships 2.1 1.8 1.6 2.0
Small Surface Combatants
Service Life (Years) 20 25 30
67 Ships 3.4 2.7 2.2 1.4
40 Ships 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.4
Steady-State Ship Purchases Required to Meet the Navy’s
Inventory Goals From Circa 2018 to 2022
13. 12
DDG = guided missile destroyer; DDG(X) = next-generation destroyer; FFG = guided missile frigate; SSN(X) = next-generation attack submarine; VPM = Virginia payload module.
Ship Purchases Under the Navy’s 2023 Plan
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3
Aircraft Carriers 5 5 7
Ballistic Missile and Large Payload Submarines 15 17 15
Virginia Class Attack Submarines With VPMs 23 33 27
Virginia Class Attack Submarines Without VPMs 0 16 0
SSN(X)s 31 17 33
DDG-51 Flight IIIs 16 18 17
DDG(X)s 38 29 47
FFG-62 17 11 17
FFG-62 Flight IIs 35 44 40
Large and Midsize Amphibious Warfare Ships 10 13 14
Light Amphibious Warships 40 34 49
Combat Logistics and Support Ships 52 57 74
Total 282 294 340
14. 13
Battle Force Ships: Requirements and Projections
Under the Navy’s 2023 Plan
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 2052
High End of Requirements Range: 446 ships -- 2020 Future Naval Forces Study
Low End of Requirements Range: 321 ships - - 2022 Shipbuilding Plan
Alternative 3
Alternative 1
Alternative 2
15. 14
Large Surface Combatants: Requirements and Projections
Under the Navy’s 2023 Plan
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 2052
High End of Requirements Range: 96 ships -- Chief of Naval Operations' Navigation Plan 2022
Low End of Requirements Range: 63 ships - - 2022 Shipbuilding Plan
Alternative 3
Alternative 1
Alternative 2
16. 15
Small Surface Combatants: Requirements and Projections Under
the Navy’s 2023 Plan
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 2052
High End of Requirements Range: 67 ships -- Chief of Naval Operations' Navigation Plan 2022
Low End of Requirements Range: 40 ships - - 2022 Shipbuilding Plan
Alternative 3
Alternative 1
Alternative 2
17. 16
The mismatch is the result of many factors, including:
▪ Costs,
▪ Natural lag,
▪ Bureaucratic inertia,
▪ Congressional skepticism,
▪ Constraints on the industrial base,
▪ The shipbuilding industry's preference for building existing product lines,
▪ Tension between wartime needs and peacetime operations, and
▪ The lack of a natural constituency for a more distributed fleet.
Why Is There a Mismatch Between the Navy’s Shipbuilding
Analysis/Goals and Ship Purchases?
19. 18
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan (November 2022), www.cbo.gov/publication/58447.
The Navy’s Estimates of Average Annual Costs of New-Ship
Construction Under Its 2023 Plan, by Ship Type
The Navy estimates that
building new ships would
cost from $23 billion to
$25 billion per year, on
average, under the three
alternatives in its 2023 plan.
20. 19
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan (November 2022), www.cbo.gov/publication/58447.
a. Includes construction of ships that are not part of the Navy’s battle force (such as oceanographic survey ships or sealift ships), outfitting and postdelivery activities (including the
purchase of smaller tools and pieces of equipment that are needed to operate a ship but that are not provided by the manufacturing shipyard as part of ship construction), efforts to
extend ships’ service life, service craft, and smaller items.
b. Includes funding for building new aircraft carriers as well as refueling the nuclear power plants of aircraft carriers already in the fleet.
Average Annual Total Shipbuilding Costs Under the Navy’s 2023
Plan, as Estimated by CBO and the Navy
CBO estimates that
the alternatives in the
2023 shipbuilding plan
would cost more than
the Navy anticipates.
21. 20
CG = guided missile cruiser; DDG = guided missile destroyer; DDG(X) = next-generation destroyer.
The Navy estimates that the average cost of the DDG(X) would vary from $2.3 billion
to $2.4 billion per year—10 percent more than the estimated cost of the DDG-51
Flight III in the Navy’s 2023 shipbuilding plan.
The Navy has indicated that the DDG(X) would displace 13,500 tons—40 percent
greater than the displacement of the DDG-51 Flight III.
The Navy hopes that the reuse of combat systems with a new hull and new
mechanical and electrical systems will keep costs down.
The transition from the CG-47 to the DDG-51 did not result in a substantial reduction
in the cost-to-weight ratio. (It did result in a less expensive ship because the DDG-51
was a smaller ship.)
CBO estimates that each DDG(X) would cost, on average, between $3.1 billion and
$3.4 billion, depending on the timing and number of ships purchased.
Major Cost Drivers of the Navy’s 2023 Plan: The DDG(X)
22. 21
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan (November 2022), www.cbo.gov/publication/58447.
CBO’s Estimate of the Navy’s Total Budget Under Its 2023 Plan
As the fleet grew in size
under the alternatives in the
2023 plan, the Navy’s total
budget would grow from
$220 billion today to roughly
$290 billion by 2052.
24. 23
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan (November 2022), www.cbo.gov/publication/58447.
Measures of Lethality and Distribution of Firepower Under the
Navy’s 2023 Plan
The number of total missile cells decreases
by 13 percent in 2031 before growing by
6 percent in 2052 under Alternatives 1 and
2, and by 19 percent under Alternative 3.
The total number of ships and submarines capable
of launching missiles falls by 5 percent in 2026
before growing by 23 percent in 2052 under
Alternative 1, 30 percent under Alternative 2, and
36 percent under Alternative 3.