This document summarizes a podcast episode about using vocabulary to describe how cybersecurity decisions may impact adversary behavior. It presents terms to state hypotheses, such as "redirect", "preclude", "impede", "limit", and "expose". Each term is defined by its intended effect, expected result, impact on risk, examples, and potential evidence. The vocabulary can be used to analyze how choices around defender actions, architecture, and technologies may direct, deter, degrade, or delay adversaries.
The document proposes an Information Systems Risk Assessment Framework (ISRAF) to improve organizational risk management. The framework aims to integrate risk assessment into the system development life cycle and business processes. It recommends a modular, hierarchical approach to conduct risk assessments at different tiers or levels of the organization. The framework provides guidelines on risk concepts, factors, analysis methods, assessment scales, and communicating results to stakeholders. The goal is to help organizations make more risk-based decisions through a systematic, repeatable risk assessment process.
A Practical Approach to Managing Information System Riskamiable_indian
This document provides a 3-step process for managing information system risk:
1. Conduct a risk assessment to determine the risk level of the system and classify data sensitivity. This informs the selection of security controls.
2. Select security controls to mitigate risks while balancing business needs. Controls should be tailored to risk levels and applied in multiple layers for defense in depth.
3. Obtain management approval for the controls and manage risk over the system's lifetime by ensuring controls continue to properly operate and risk levels remain acceptable.
The document proposes a framework called the Information Systems Risk Assessment Framework (ISRAF) that takes a hierarchical, context-centric approach to comprehensive risk management. The framework addresses key aspects of risk assessment including preparation, conducting assessment, analyzing risks both qualitatively and quantitatively, communicating results, and maintaining an organization's risk posture over time. It provides guidance on the risk assessment process and applying the results across the risk management life cycle to support various organizational decisions.
The document defines key risk management terminology such as risk register, risk, risk management, risk appetite, risk owner, risk matrix, and risk vulnerability. It also outlines the risk management process recommended by PRINCE2 and lists common risk categories and responses to risks. Finally, it provides guidance on developing an ICT risk register, including understanding objectives, identifying risks, documenting the risk register, and getting approval.
Information Secuirty Vulnerability Managementtschraider
Vulnerability management is a proactive approach to identifying and closing vulnerabilities through ongoing processes of security scanning, auditing, and remediation. It aims to stay ahead of constantly changing threats by maintaining an inventory of known vulnerabilities and prioritizing remediation. In addition to technical vulnerabilities, poor internal processes around user access management, patching, and configuration can also pose risks, so these operational activities should be regularly assessed and improved. Once gaps have been addressed through effective vulnerability management over time, penetration testing can further test security and provide assurance.
Derek Milroy, IS Security Architect at U.S. Cellular Corporation, defined “vulnerability management” and how it affects today’s organizations during his presentation at the 2014 Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Leadership Forum in Chicago on Nov. 19. In his presentation, “Enterprise Vulnerability Management/Security Incident Response,” Milroy noted vulnerability management has different meanings to different organizations, but an organization that utilizes vulnerability management processes can effectively safeguard its data.
According to Milroy, an organization should develop its own vulnerability management baselines to monitor its security levels. By doing so, Milroy said an organization can launch and control vulnerability management systems successfully. In addition, Milroy pointed out that vulnerability management problems occasionally will arise, but a well-prepared organization will be equipped to handle such issues: “Problems are going to happen … You have to work with your people. This can translate to any tool that you’re putting in place. Make sure your people have plans for what happens when it goes wrong, because it’s going to [happen] every single time.”
Milroy also noted that having actionable vulnerability management data is important for organizations of all sizes. If an organization evaluates its vulnerability management processes regularly, Milroy said, it can collect data and use this information to improve its security: “The simplest rule of thumb for vulnerability management, click the report, hand the report to someone. Don’t ever do that. There is no such thing as a report from a tool that you can just click and hand to someone until you first tune it and pare it down.”
- See more at: http://www.argylejournal.com/chief-information-security-officer/enterprise-vulnerability-managementsecurity-incident-response-derek-milroy-is-security-architect-u-s-cellular-corporation/#sthash.Buh6CzLS.dpuf
This document outlines the agenda for a presentation on risk-informed decision making (RIDM). The presentation will cover:
1. The inherent riskiness of current uncertain times and the need to evolve risk management approaches to remain relevant.
2. An explanation of what RIDM is and why it is important now, given that continuous risk management (CRM) is already practiced.
3. Examples of when and why to use RIDM in addition to discussing the actual steps involved in conducting RIDM.
The presentation aims to demonstrate how RIDM can help risk management practices evolve to address a more dynamic environment with changing mission objectives and resources. RIDM is presented as a complement to
The document proposes an Information Systems Risk Assessment Framework (ISRAF) to improve organizational risk management. The framework aims to integrate risk assessment into the system development life cycle and business processes. It recommends a modular, hierarchical approach to conduct risk assessments at different tiers or levels of the organization. The framework provides guidelines on risk concepts, factors, analysis methods, assessment scales, and communicating results to stakeholders. The goal is to help organizations make more risk-based decisions through a systematic, repeatable risk assessment process.
A Practical Approach to Managing Information System Riskamiable_indian
This document provides a 3-step process for managing information system risk:
1. Conduct a risk assessment to determine the risk level of the system and classify data sensitivity. This informs the selection of security controls.
2. Select security controls to mitigate risks while balancing business needs. Controls should be tailored to risk levels and applied in multiple layers for defense in depth.
3. Obtain management approval for the controls and manage risk over the system's lifetime by ensuring controls continue to properly operate and risk levels remain acceptable.
The document proposes a framework called the Information Systems Risk Assessment Framework (ISRAF) that takes a hierarchical, context-centric approach to comprehensive risk management. The framework addresses key aspects of risk assessment including preparation, conducting assessment, analyzing risks both qualitatively and quantitatively, communicating results, and maintaining an organization's risk posture over time. It provides guidance on the risk assessment process and applying the results across the risk management life cycle to support various organizational decisions.
The document defines key risk management terminology such as risk register, risk, risk management, risk appetite, risk owner, risk matrix, and risk vulnerability. It also outlines the risk management process recommended by PRINCE2 and lists common risk categories and responses to risks. Finally, it provides guidance on developing an ICT risk register, including understanding objectives, identifying risks, documenting the risk register, and getting approval.
Information Secuirty Vulnerability Managementtschraider
Vulnerability management is a proactive approach to identifying and closing vulnerabilities through ongoing processes of security scanning, auditing, and remediation. It aims to stay ahead of constantly changing threats by maintaining an inventory of known vulnerabilities and prioritizing remediation. In addition to technical vulnerabilities, poor internal processes around user access management, patching, and configuration can also pose risks, so these operational activities should be regularly assessed and improved. Once gaps have been addressed through effective vulnerability management over time, penetration testing can further test security and provide assurance.
Derek Milroy, IS Security Architect at U.S. Cellular Corporation, defined “vulnerability management” and how it affects today’s organizations during his presentation at the 2014 Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Leadership Forum in Chicago on Nov. 19. In his presentation, “Enterprise Vulnerability Management/Security Incident Response,” Milroy noted vulnerability management has different meanings to different organizations, but an organization that utilizes vulnerability management processes can effectively safeguard its data.
According to Milroy, an organization should develop its own vulnerability management baselines to monitor its security levels. By doing so, Milroy said an organization can launch and control vulnerability management systems successfully. In addition, Milroy pointed out that vulnerability management problems occasionally will arise, but a well-prepared organization will be equipped to handle such issues: “Problems are going to happen … You have to work with your people. This can translate to any tool that you’re putting in place. Make sure your people have plans for what happens when it goes wrong, because it’s going to [happen] every single time.”
Milroy also noted that having actionable vulnerability management data is important for organizations of all sizes. If an organization evaluates its vulnerability management processes regularly, Milroy said, it can collect data and use this information to improve its security: “The simplest rule of thumb for vulnerability management, click the report, hand the report to someone. Don’t ever do that. There is no such thing as a report from a tool that you can just click and hand to someone until you first tune it and pare it down.”
- See more at: http://www.argylejournal.com/chief-information-security-officer/enterprise-vulnerability-managementsecurity-incident-response-derek-milroy-is-security-architect-u-s-cellular-corporation/#sthash.Buh6CzLS.dpuf
This document outlines the agenda for a presentation on risk-informed decision making (RIDM). The presentation will cover:
1. The inherent riskiness of current uncertain times and the need to evolve risk management approaches to remain relevant.
2. An explanation of what RIDM is and why it is important now, given that continuous risk management (CRM) is already practiced.
3. Examples of when and why to use RIDM in addition to discussing the actual steps involved in conducting RIDM.
The presentation aims to demonstrate how RIDM can help risk management practices evolve to address a more dynamic environment with changing mission objectives and resources. RIDM is presented as a complement to
Review of Enterprise Security Risk ManagementRand W. Hirt
The document discusses enterprise security risk management and provides details on the risk assessment process. It defines risk as the likelihood of an adverse event occurring multiplied by the impact. Risk management aims to identify and mitigate risks to acceptable levels. The risk assessment process involves determining scope, gathering information, assessing risks, recommending controls, and determining residual risk. Controls can reduce risk through preventative, detective or corrective measures. Ongoing monitoring ensures the organization's risk posture remains consistent over time.
What is ISO 27005? How is an ISO 27005 Risk Assessment done effectively? Find out in this presentation delivered at the ISACA Bangalore Chapter Office by Dharshan Shanthamurthy.
2020 11-15 marcin ludwiszewski - purple, red, blue and others - rainbow team...Marcin Ludwiszewski
Cybersecurity - Rainbow Teaming - what are the colour teams in cybersecurity, how purple differs from red teaming, what is white team and other colours ?
NASA uses two complementary processes for risk management: risk-informed decision making (RIDM) and continuous risk management (CRM). RIDM emphasizes using risk analysis to make risk-informed decisions across dimensions like safety, cost, and schedule. CRM manages risks associated with implementation and uses risk statements to document risks across multiple dimensions. Current risk analysis methods often fail to provide a complete risk picture by only considering risks one dimension at a time. MRisk addresses this by analyzing risks across all dimensions simultaneously using anchor points and Mahalanobis distance, providing a more objective and accurate assessment of total project risk.
Lightweight Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Tools for Cyberinfrastructurejbasney
Presented Nov 11 2017
http://www.stem-trek.org/news-events/urisc/
“Lightweight Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Tools for Cyberinfrastructure”
Risk assessment provides valuable insights to the cyberinfrastructure security program, but launching a risk assessment process can seem daunting for all but the largest projects. Jim Basney will present risk assessment tools (checklists, spreadsheets, templates) developed by CTSC (trustedci.org) for getting started on a lightweight risk assessment for cyberinfrastructure projects of varying types and sizes.
This document discusses various legal, privacy, and ethical issues related to computer security. It begins by explaining the differences between legal and ethical issues, noting that legal issues have definitive answers determined by others, while ethical issues require determining your own course of action. The document then provides overviews of intellectual property rights like copyrights, patents, and trademarks. It explains what types of works copyright protects, how long copyright lasts, and what constitutes infringement. It also discusses how patents protect inventions and processes, not ideas. Finally, the document compares key aspects of copyright, patent, and trade secret protection.
Cyber Incident Response Team - NIMS - Public CommentDavid Sweigert
The Cyber Incident Response Team responds to cyber crises and threats. It is composed of 15 personnel including managers, analysts, specialists in areas like forensics and infrastructure. The team investigates incidents, uses mitigation approaches, and documents actions. It requires equipment like laptops, forensics tools, and communications devices and is deployable for up to 14 days.
This document provides an overview of risk analysis. It defines key terms like risk, risk analysis, risk assessment, and risk management. It describes various qualitative and quantitative methods used for risk analysis, including hazard and operability studies, fault tree analysis, failure mode and effects analysis. The document discusses the importance of risk analysis for chemical processes and highlights some historical accidents to emphasize this. It also provides examples of applying different risk analysis methods.
Lifecycle of an advanced persistent threatBee_Ware
Présentation des différentes phases des « Advanced Persistent Threats » (APT) et de la façon dont ces dernières constituent une menace pour le business et la réputation de votre entreprise.
An overview of how to structure a threat based assessment of risk that is relevant to the business and which clearly ties risk mitigation to the threats being mitigated in a way that business leaders can easily understand.
SPS'20 - Designing a Methodological Framework for the Empirical Evaluation of...Andrea Montemaggio
Presented at the 2nd International Workshop on Self-Protecting Systems (SPS'20).
Abstract:
Increasingly, cyber attacks against enterprises and governments make use of automated tools. For this reason, and given the importance of a timely protection, in the last decade there has been a push in researching methodologies to automate the full defense life-cycle of computer systems. The two core phases of this life-cycle are Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Response. However, while some progress has been done on the former, the latter is still at an early stage. This is due to several factors, among which the lack of a standardized methodology for the validation and comparison of Intrusion Response methodologies.
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by introducing a methodological framework for the quantitative empirical evaluation of self-protecting systems, based on the metrics of response time and cost. An experimental design is also provided and its applicability is illustrated by the means of a template experiment.
Microsoft established its risk management group (RMG) in 1997 within the treasury department to develop a comprehensive approach to risk identification, measurement, and management across the enterprise. The RMG worked to bring non-financial risk management practices in line with the more mature financial risk management processes. Microsoft developed internal risk measurement systems and consulted third parties to ensure all risks were captured. The company encouraged a culture of transparency around risk through accessible internal reporting and education for all employees.
Risk management is the process of analyzing exposure to risk and determining how to best handle such exposure.
Issues important to top management typically receive lot of attention from many quarters. Since top management cares about risk management, a number of popular IT risk-management frameworks have emerged.
This document outlines a 5-step process for managing organizational ICT security:
1. Identify the organization's business objectives to ensure ICT resources support them.
2. Identify all ICT resources, including network infrastructure, servers, user devices, and hardware.
3. Identify and assess risks to ICT resources, such as theft, damage, and unauthorized access, and prioritize them based on likelihood and cost.
4. Develop activities to mitigate risks through a 7-layered approach involving policies, physical security, perimeter controls, internal access management, host protection, and application hardening.
5. Implement and monitor the security program with roles for the CIO, CISO, ICT
Risk management in software engineeringdeep sharma
The document discusses risk management in software engineering. It defines risk as a potential problem that may or may not occur, causing negative impacts. It categorizes risks as project risks, technical risks, and business risks. It outlines the risk management paradigm of identifying, analyzing, planning, tracking, controlling, and communicating risks. It also discusses establishing a risk mitigation, monitoring and management plan to document the risk analysis work. The key is to identify risks early, evaluate and prioritize them, then develop and implement risk mitigation plans.
Proactive vs. Reactive Approaches to Software Security StrategyLindsey Landolfi
This document discusses proactive and reactive approaches to software security strategy. A proactive strategy involves pre-emptive actions like vulnerability assessments, risk analysis, implementing security controls, and developing continuity plans. A reactive strategy involves responsive actions after an attack like conducting damage assessments, implementing continuity plans, determining the attack source, and repairing damages. Both proactive and reactive strategies work together using a combination of activities to develop comprehensive security policies and mitigate risks throughout the software development lifecycle.
Seeing Purple: Hybrid Security Teams for the Enterprise - BSides Jackson 2013beltface
1. The document discusses building a purple team program by combining knowledge from blue (security) and red (penetration testing) teams. It provides examples of threat modeling, tabletop exercises, and red team exercises performed for two clients.
2. The results and corrective actions from exercises on Client1 are discussed, such as installing Security Onion and Qualys. Building communication and getting management buy-in is advised to start a purple team program.
3. Resources like the Freenode IRC channels #misec and #ladosanostra are provided for learning attack paths and purple team strategies. Doing regular threat modeling, exercises, and assessments is presented as a proactive approach to security.
Session 2 (two) of the course Information Technology Security and Business Continuity . Objective if information security, attacking method, responsibilities, risk management and Security System Development Life Cycle are discussed
Presented at Bangladesh Institute of Management on 21 November 2015.
Review of Enterprise Security Risk ManagementRand W. Hirt
The document discusses enterprise security risk management and provides details on the risk assessment process. It defines risk as the likelihood of an adverse event occurring multiplied by the impact. Risk management aims to identify and mitigate risks to acceptable levels. The risk assessment process involves determining scope, gathering information, assessing risks, recommending controls, and determining residual risk. Controls can reduce risk through preventative, detective or corrective measures. Ongoing monitoring ensures the organization's risk posture remains consistent over time.
What is ISO 27005? How is an ISO 27005 Risk Assessment done effectively? Find out in this presentation delivered at the ISACA Bangalore Chapter Office by Dharshan Shanthamurthy.
2020 11-15 marcin ludwiszewski - purple, red, blue and others - rainbow team...Marcin Ludwiszewski
Cybersecurity - Rainbow Teaming - what are the colour teams in cybersecurity, how purple differs from red teaming, what is white team and other colours ?
NASA uses two complementary processes for risk management: risk-informed decision making (RIDM) and continuous risk management (CRM). RIDM emphasizes using risk analysis to make risk-informed decisions across dimensions like safety, cost, and schedule. CRM manages risks associated with implementation and uses risk statements to document risks across multiple dimensions. Current risk analysis methods often fail to provide a complete risk picture by only considering risks one dimension at a time. MRisk addresses this by analyzing risks across all dimensions simultaneously using anchor points and Mahalanobis distance, providing a more objective and accurate assessment of total project risk.
Lightweight Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Tools for Cyberinfrastructurejbasney
Presented Nov 11 2017
http://www.stem-trek.org/news-events/urisc/
“Lightweight Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Tools for Cyberinfrastructure”
Risk assessment provides valuable insights to the cyberinfrastructure security program, but launching a risk assessment process can seem daunting for all but the largest projects. Jim Basney will present risk assessment tools (checklists, spreadsheets, templates) developed by CTSC (trustedci.org) for getting started on a lightweight risk assessment for cyberinfrastructure projects of varying types and sizes.
This document discusses various legal, privacy, and ethical issues related to computer security. It begins by explaining the differences between legal and ethical issues, noting that legal issues have definitive answers determined by others, while ethical issues require determining your own course of action. The document then provides overviews of intellectual property rights like copyrights, patents, and trademarks. It explains what types of works copyright protects, how long copyright lasts, and what constitutes infringement. It also discusses how patents protect inventions and processes, not ideas. Finally, the document compares key aspects of copyright, patent, and trade secret protection.
Cyber Incident Response Team - NIMS - Public CommentDavid Sweigert
The Cyber Incident Response Team responds to cyber crises and threats. It is composed of 15 personnel including managers, analysts, specialists in areas like forensics and infrastructure. The team investigates incidents, uses mitigation approaches, and documents actions. It requires equipment like laptops, forensics tools, and communications devices and is deployable for up to 14 days.
This document provides an overview of risk analysis. It defines key terms like risk, risk analysis, risk assessment, and risk management. It describes various qualitative and quantitative methods used for risk analysis, including hazard and operability studies, fault tree analysis, failure mode and effects analysis. The document discusses the importance of risk analysis for chemical processes and highlights some historical accidents to emphasize this. It also provides examples of applying different risk analysis methods.
Lifecycle of an advanced persistent threatBee_Ware
Présentation des différentes phases des « Advanced Persistent Threats » (APT) et de la façon dont ces dernières constituent une menace pour le business et la réputation de votre entreprise.
An overview of how to structure a threat based assessment of risk that is relevant to the business and which clearly ties risk mitigation to the threats being mitigated in a way that business leaders can easily understand.
SPS'20 - Designing a Methodological Framework for the Empirical Evaluation of...Andrea Montemaggio
Presented at the 2nd International Workshop on Self-Protecting Systems (SPS'20).
Abstract:
Increasingly, cyber attacks against enterprises and governments make use of automated tools. For this reason, and given the importance of a timely protection, in the last decade there has been a push in researching methodologies to automate the full defense life-cycle of computer systems. The two core phases of this life-cycle are Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Response. However, while some progress has been done on the former, the latter is still at an early stage. This is due to several factors, among which the lack of a standardized methodology for the validation and comparison of Intrusion Response methodologies.
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by introducing a methodological framework for the quantitative empirical evaluation of self-protecting systems, based on the metrics of response time and cost. An experimental design is also provided and its applicability is illustrated by the means of a template experiment.
Microsoft established its risk management group (RMG) in 1997 within the treasury department to develop a comprehensive approach to risk identification, measurement, and management across the enterprise. The RMG worked to bring non-financial risk management practices in line with the more mature financial risk management processes. Microsoft developed internal risk measurement systems and consulted third parties to ensure all risks were captured. The company encouraged a culture of transparency around risk through accessible internal reporting and education for all employees.
Risk management is the process of analyzing exposure to risk and determining how to best handle such exposure.
Issues important to top management typically receive lot of attention from many quarters. Since top management cares about risk management, a number of popular IT risk-management frameworks have emerged.
This document outlines a 5-step process for managing organizational ICT security:
1. Identify the organization's business objectives to ensure ICT resources support them.
2. Identify all ICT resources, including network infrastructure, servers, user devices, and hardware.
3. Identify and assess risks to ICT resources, such as theft, damage, and unauthorized access, and prioritize them based on likelihood and cost.
4. Develop activities to mitigate risks through a 7-layered approach involving policies, physical security, perimeter controls, internal access management, host protection, and application hardening.
5. Implement and monitor the security program with roles for the CIO, CISO, ICT
Risk management in software engineeringdeep sharma
The document discusses risk management in software engineering. It defines risk as a potential problem that may or may not occur, causing negative impacts. It categorizes risks as project risks, technical risks, and business risks. It outlines the risk management paradigm of identifying, analyzing, planning, tracking, controlling, and communicating risks. It also discusses establishing a risk mitigation, monitoring and management plan to document the risk analysis work. The key is to identify risks early, evaluate and prioritize them, then develop and implement risk mitigation plans.
Proactive vs. Reactive Approaches to Software Security StrategyLindsey Landolfi
This document discusses proactive and reactive approaches to software security strategy. A proactive strategy involves pre-emptive actions like vulnerability assessments, risk analysis, implementing security controls, and developing continuity plans. A reactive strategy involves responsive actions after an attack like conducting damage assessments, implementing continuity plans, determining the attack source, and repairing damages. Both proactive and reactive strategies work together using a combination of activities to develop comprehensive security policies and mitigate risks throughout the software development lifecycle.
Seeing Purple: Hybrid Security Teams for the Enterprise - BSides Jackson 2013beltface
1. The document discusses building a purple team program by combining knowledge from blue (security) and red (penetration testing) teams. It provides examples of threat modeling, tabletop exercises, and red team exercises performed for two clients.
2. The results and corrective actions from exercises on Client1 are discussed, such as installing Security Onion and Qualys. Building communication and getting management buy-in is advised to start a purple team program.
3. Resources like the Freenode IRC channels #misec and #ladosanostra are provided for learning attack paths and purple team strategies. Doing regular threat modeling, exercises, and assessments is presented as a proactive approach to security.
Session 2 (two) of the course Information Technology Security and Business Continuity . Objective if information security, attacking method, responsibilities, risk management and Security System Development Life Cycle are discussed
Presented at Bangladesh Institute of Management on 21 November 2015.
This document describes red team and blue team security services offered by Optimal Risk to test organizations' security preparedness and response. Red team services involve simulated physical and cyber attacks to identify vulnerabilities, while blue team services provide security reinforcement, risk analysis, and incident response support. The goal is to help organizations build resilience against sophisticated threats through strategic recommendations and an ongoing security assessment program.
The document discusses risk assessment and management. It proposes assessing risk using a equation that considers the likelihood and impact of threats. It recommends establishing security policies, implementing countermeasures through a defense in depth strategy, and maintaining vigilance. Key terms like vulnerabilities, exploits and adversaries are also defined to understand risks.
This document provides an outline for developing security use cases and operationalizing them. It discusses motivators for developing use cases like compliance, visibility, and threat response. A framework is presented that involves problem scoping, data and event identification, and risk analysis. Goals should be set in a way that is measurable and accountable. Examples of use cases for malware detection and response are given at different levels from essential to mature. The document emphasizes goal setting, prioritization, and ensuring use cases demonstrate progress. It also provides guidance on working with Splunk experts to implement this approach through workshops and assessments.
This presentation is part of one of talk, I gave in Microsoft .NET Bootcamp. The contents are slightly edited to share the information in public domain. In this presentation, I covered the significance and all related theory of Threat modeling and analysis.This presentation will be useful for software architects/Managers,developers and QAs. Do share your feedback in comments.
Recent high-profile cyber attacks against corporations and governments have caused significant damage, demonstrating the importance of preparing for future attacks. The document discusses how organizations can develop an effective security strategy and incident response plan by understanding common attack methods, implementing basic security practices, creating a response team, and regularly testing response procedures through exercises. Having a well-prepared response can help minimize damage if attacks do succeed in breaching an organization's systems.
'Determining The Ideal Security Measure' is Nugget 3 in the series 'Cyber Security Awareness Month 2017'. You must ensure that the best and cost effective measure applies...
What to Expect During a Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration TestShyamMishra72
A vulnerability assessment and penetration test (pen test) is important cybersecurity activities designed to identify and address security weaknesses in your organization's systems and networks. Here's what you can expect during each phase of these assessments:
Vulnerability assessment is the systematic evaluation of an organization's exposure to threats. It involves identifying assets, evaluating threats against those assets, determining vulnerabilities, assessing risks, and selecting appropriate controls. Various techniques can be used including asset identification, threat modeling, vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, and risk assessment. The goal is to establish a security baseline and mitigate risks through hardening systems and ongoing monitoring.
This document summarizes a presentation on vulnerability assessment and risk management. It defines key terms like vulnerability, exploit, and risk. It describes the process of conducting a vulnerability assessment including using scanning tools and not relying solely on automated results. The document also defines and compares qualitative and quantitative risk assessment approaches. It outlines the steps involved in qualitative risk assessment and describes different risk management strategies like mitigation, transference, avoidance, and acceptance.
This document provides an overview of key concepts in information security and risk management. It discusses how security supports organizational mission, objectives and goals. It also covers risk management concepts like qualitative and quantitative risk assessment, and risk treatment strategies like risk acceptance, avoidance, reduction and transfer. Additional security management concepts explained include the CIA triad, defense in depth, single points of failure, and privacy. The role of policies, governance, and executive oversight in security management are also summarized.
information security presentation topicsOlajide Kuku
This document provides an overview of key concepts in information security and risk management. It discusses how security supports organizational mission, objectives and goals. It also covers risk management concepts like qualitative and quantitative risk assessment, and risk treatment strategies like risk acceptance, avoidance, reduction and transfer. Additional security management concepts explained include the CIA triad, defense in depth, single points of failure, and privacy. The role of policies, governance, and executive oversight in security management are also summarized.
This document provides an overview of key concepts in information security and risk management. It discusses how security supports organizational mission and objectives through managing risks. Risk management involves qualitative and quantitative risk assessments to determine risks, and then developing strategies to treat risks. Security management concepts like the CIA triad, defense in depth, and privacy are also outlined. The document covers personnel security topics like hiring practices and termination procedures. It emphasizes the importance of professional ethics in information security.
This document provides an overview of key concepts in information security and risk management. It discusses how security supports organizational mission, objectives and goals. It also covers risk management concepts like qualitative and quantitative risk assessment, and risk treatment strategies like risk acceptance, avoidance, reduction and transfer. Additional security management concepts explained include the CIA triad, defense in depth, single points of failure, and privacy. The role of policies, governance, and executive oversight in security management are also summarized.
Similar to Talking SoS with Shawn Riley - Cyber Resiliency Effects on Adversary Activities (20)
GraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracyTomaz Bratanic
GraphRAG for life science domain, where you retriever information from biomedical knowledge graphs using LLMs to increase the accuracy and performance of generated answers
How to Get CNIC Information System with Paksim Ga.pptxdanishmna97
Pakdata Cf is a groundbreaking system designed to streamline and facilitate access to CNIC information. This innovative platform leverages advanced technology to provide users with efficient and secure access to their CNIC details.
Ivanti’s Patch Tuesday breakdown goes beyond patching your applications and brings you the intelligence and guidance needed to prioritize where to focus your attention first. Catch early analysis on our Ivanti blog, then join industry expert Chris Goettl for the Patch Tuesday Webinar Event. There we’ll do a deep dive into each of the bulletins and give guidance on the risks associated with the newly-identified vulnerabilities.
Taking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdfssuserfac0301
Read Taking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing to gain insights on AI adoption in the manufacturing industry, such as:
1. How quickly AI is being implemented in manufacturing.
2. Which barriers stand in the way of AI adoption.
3. How data quality and governance form the backbone of AI.
4. Organizational processes and structures that may inhibit effective AI adoption.
6. Ideas and approaches to help build your organization's AI strategy.
OpenID AuthZEN Interop Read Out - AuthorizationDavid Brossard
During Identiverse 2024 and EIC 2024, members of the OpenID AuthZEN WG got together and demoed their authorization endpoints conforming to the AuthZEN API
HCL Notes and Domino License Cost Reduction in the World of DLAUpanagenda
Webinar Recording: https://www.panagenda.com/webinars/hcl-notes-and-domino-license-cost-reduction-in-the-world-of-dlau/
The introduction of DLAU and the CCB & CCX licensing model caused quite a stir in the HCL community. As a Notes and Domino customer, you may have faced challenges with unexpected user counts and license costs. You probably have questions on how this new licensing approach works and how to benefit from it. Most importantly, you likely have budget constraints and want to save money where possible. Don’t worry, we can help with all of this!
We’ll show you how to fix common misconfigurations that cause higher-than-expected user counts, and how to identify accounts which you can deactivate to save money. There are also frequent patterns that can cause unnecessary cost, like using a person document instead of a mail-in for shared mailboxes. We’ll provide examples and solutions for those as well. And naturally we’ll explain the new licensing model.
Join HCL Ambassador Marc Thomas in this webinar with a special guest appearance from Franz Walder. It will give you the tools and know-how to stay on top of what is going on with Domino licensing. You will be able lower your cost through an optimized configuration and keep it low going forward.
These topics will be covered
- Reducing license cost by finding and fixing misconfigurations and superfluous accounts
- How do CCB and CCX licenses really work?
- Understanding the DLAU tool and how to best utilize it
- Tips for common problem areas, like team mailboxes, functional/test users, etc
- Practical examples and best practices to implement right away
Things to Consider When Choosing a Website Developer for your Website | FODUUFODUU
Choosing the right website developer is crucial for your business. This article covers essential factors to consider, including experience, portfolio, technical skills, communication, pricing, reputation & reviews, cost and budget considerations and post-launch support. Make an informed decision to ensure your website meets your business goals.
Unlocking Productivity: Leveraging the Potential of Copilot in Microsoft 365, a presentation by Christoforos Vlachos, Senior Solutions Manager – Modern Workplace, Uni Systems
In the rapidly evolving landscape of technologies, XML continues to play a vital role in structuring, storing, and transporting data across diverse systems. The recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) present new methodologies for enhancing XML development workflows, introducing efficiency, automation, and intelligent capabilities. This presentation will outline the scope and perspective of utilizing AI in XML development. The potential benefits and the possible pitfalls will be highlighted, providing a balanced view of the subject.
We will explore the capabilities of AI in understanding XML markup languages and autonomously creating structured XML content. Additionally, we will examine the capacity of AI to enrich plain text with appropriate XML markup. Practical examples and methodological guidelines will be provided to elucidate how AI can be effectively prompted to interpret and generate accurate XML markup.
Further emphasis will be placed on the role of AI in developing XSLT, or schemas such as XSD and Schematron. We will address the techniques and strategies adopted to create prompts for generating code, explaining code, or refactoring the code, and the results achieved.
The discussion will extend to how AI can be used to transform XML content. In particular, the focus will be on the use of AI XPath extension functions in XSLT, Schematron, Schematron Quick Fixes, or for XML content refactoring.
The presentation aims to deliver a comprehensive overview of AI usage in XML development, providing attendees with the necessary knowledge to make informed decisions. Whether you’re at the early stages of adopting AI or considering integrating it in advanced XML development, this presentation will cover all levels of expertise.
By highlighting the potential advantages and challenges of integrating AI with XML development tools and languages, the presentation seeks to inspire thoughtful conversation around the future of XML development. We’ll not only delve into the technical aspects of AI-powered XML development but also discuss practical implications and possible future directions.
TrustArc Webinar - 2024 Global Privacy SurveyTrustArc
How does your privacy program stack up against your peers? What challenges are privacy teams tackling and prioritizing in 2024?
In the fifth annual Global Privacy Benchmarks Survey, we asked over 1,800 global privacy professionals and business executives to share their perspectives on the current state of privacy inside and outside of their organizations. This year’s report focused on emerging areas of importance for privacy and compliance professionals, including considerations and implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, building brand trust, and different approaches for achieving higher privacy competence scores.
See how organizational priorities and strategic approaches to data security and privacy are evolving around the globe.
This webinar will review:
- The top 10 privacy insights from the fifth annual Global Privacy Benchmarks Survey
- The top challenges for privacy leaders, practitioners, and organizations in 2024
- Key themes to consider in developing and maintaining your privacy program
HCL Notes und Domino Lizenzkostenreduzierung in der Welt von DLAUpanagenda
Webinar Recording: https://www.panagenda.com/webinars/hcl-notes-und-domino-lizenzkostenreduzierung-in-der-welt-von-dlau/
DLAU und die Lizenzen nach dem CCB- und CCX-Modell sind für viele in der HCL-Community seit letztem Jahr ein heißes Thema. Als Notes- oder Domino-Kunde haben Sie vielleicht mit unerwartet hohen Benutzerzahlen und Lizenzgebühren zu kämpfen. Sie fragen sich vielleicht, wie diese neue Art der Lizenzierung funktioniert und welchen Nutzen sie Ihnen bringt. Vor allem wollen Sie sicherlich Ihr Budget einhalten und Kosten sparen, wo immer möglich. Das verstehen wir und wir möchten Ihnen dabei helfen!
Wir erklären Ihnen, wie Sie häufige Konfigurationsprobleme lösen können, die dazu führen können, dass mehr Benutzer gezählt werden als nötig, und wie Sie überflüssige oder ungenutzte Konten identifizieren und entfernen können, um Geld zu sparen. Es gibt auch einige Ansätze, die zu unnötigen Ausgaben führen können, z. B. wenn ein Personendokument anstelle eines Mail-Ins für geteilte Mailboxen verwendet wird. Wir zeigen Ihnen solche Fälle und deren Lösungen. Und natürlich erklären wir Ihnen das neue Lizenzmodell.
Nehmen Sie an diesem Webinar teil, bei dem HCL-Ambassador Marc Thomas und Gastredner Franz Walder Ihnen diese neue Welt näherbringen. Es vermittelt Ihnen die Tools und das Know-how, um den Überblick zu bewahren. Sie werden in der Lage sein, Ihre Kosten durch eine optimierte Domino-Konfiguration zu reduzieren und auch in Zukunft gering zu halten.
Diese Themen werden behandelt
- Reduzierung der Lizenzkosten durch Auffinden und Beheben von Fehlkonfigurationen und überflüssigen Konten
- Wie funktionieren CCB- und CCX-Lizenzen wirklich?
- Verstehen des DLAU-Tools und wie man es am besten nutzt
- Tipps für häufige Problembereiche, wie z. B. Team-Postfächer, Funktions-/Testbenutzer usw.
- Praxisbeispiele und Best Practices zum sofortigen Umsetzen
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup SlidesZilliz
Prompting language models is hard, while programming language models is easy. In this talk, I will discuss the state-of-the-art framework DSPy for programming foundation models with its powerful optimizers and runtime constraint system.
AI-Powered Food Delivery Transforming App Development in Saudi Arabia.pdfTechgropse Pvt.Ltd.
In this blog post, we'll delve into the intersection of AI and app development in Saudi Arabia, focusing on the food delivery sector. We'll explore how AI is revolutionizing the way Saudi consumers order food, how restaurants manage their operations, and how delivery partners navigate the bustling streets of cities like Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam. Through real-world case studies, we'll showcase how leading Saudi food delivery apps are leveraging AI to redefine convenience, personalization, and efficiency.
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FMESafe Software
In this second installment of our Essentials of Automations webinar series, we’ll explore the landscape of triggers and actions, guiding you through the nuances of authoring and adapting workspaces for seamless automations. Gain an understanding of the full spectrum of triggers and actions available in FME, empowering you to enhance your workspaces for efficient automation.
We’ll kick things off by showcasing the most commonly used event-based triggers, introducing you to various automation workflows like manual triggers, schedules, directory watchers, and more. Plus, see how these elements play out in real scenarios.
Whether you’re tweaking your current setup or building from the ground up, this session will arm you with the tools and insights needed to transform your FME usage into a powerhouse of productivity. Join us to discover effective strategies that simplify complex processes, enhancing your productivity and transforming your data management practices with FME. Let’s turn complexity into clarity and make your workspaces work wonders!
Building Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and MilvusZilliz
Spark is the widely used ETL tool for processing, indexing and ingesting data to serving stack for search. Milvus is the production-ready open-source vector database. In this talk we will show how to use Spark to process unstructured data to extract vector representations, and push the vectors to Milvus vector database for search serving.
In his public lecture, Christian Timmerer provides insights into the fascinating history of video streaming, starting from its humble beginnings before YouTube to the groundbreaking technologies that now dominate platforms like Netflix and ORF ON. Timmerer also presents provocative contributions of his own that have significantly influenced the industry. He concludes by looking at future challenges and invites the audience to join in a discussion.
2. This video presents a vocabulary for stating claims or hypotheses about
the effects of cyber mission assurance decisions on cyber adversary
behavior. Cyber mission assurance decisions include choices of cyber
defender actions, architectural decisions, and selections and uses of
technologies to improve cyber security, resiliency, and defensibility (i.e.,
the ability to address ongoing adversary activities). The vocabulary
enables claims and hypotheses to be stated clearly, comparably across
different assumed or real-world environments, and in a way that
suggests evidence that might be sought but is independent of how the
claims or hypotheses might be evaluated. The vocabulary can be used
with multiple modeling and analysis techniques, including Red Team
analysis, game-theoretic modeling, attack tree and attack graph
modeling, and analysis based on the cyber attack lifecycle (also referred
to as cyber kill chain analysis or cyber campaign analysis).
3. Redirect – Direct adversary activities away from defender
chosen targets
Preclude – Ensure that specific threat events do not have an
effect.
Impede – Make it more difficult for threat events to cause
adverse impacts or consequences.
Limit – Restrict the consequences of threat events by limiting
the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system
resources, and/or mission or business impacts.
Expose – Reduce risk due to ignorance of threat events and
possible replicated or similar threat events in the same or
similar environments.
Defender
Goals
4. Defender’s Goal: Redirect – Direct adversary activities away
from defender chosen targets
Redirect
Deter
Divert
Deceive
5. Defender Goal –
Deter
• Intended Effect - Discourage the adversary from
undertaking further activities, by instilling fear (e.g., of
attribution or retribution) or doubt that those activities
would achieve intended effects (e.g., that targets exist).
• Expected Result - The adversary ceases or suspends
activities.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of occurrence.
• Evidence - Activities attributable to the adversary are no
longer observed by the organization. Activities
attributable to the adversary are no longer observed by
other organizations and this fact is made known via
threat intelligence information sharing.
• Example - The defender uses disinformation to make it
appear that the organization is better able to detect
attacks than it is, and is willing to launch major counter
strikes. The result is that the adversary chooses to not
launch attack due to fear of detection and reprisal.
6. Defender Goal –
Divert
• Intended Effect - Lead the adversary to direct activities
away from defender chosen targets.
• Expected Result - The adversary refocuses activities on
different targets (e.g., other organizations, defender-
chosen alternate targets). The adversary’s efforts are
wasted.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of occurrence.
• Example - The defender uses selectively planted false
information (disinformation) and honeynets
(misdirection) to cause an adversary to focus its
malware at virtual sandboxes, while at the same time
employing obfuscation to hide the actual resources. The
result is that the adversary’s attacks are directed away
from critical resources.
• Evidence - Adversary activities are directed towards
defender-chosen alternate targets (e.g., to a special
enclave). Activities attributable to the adversary are
observed by other organizations and made known via
threat intelligence information sharing.
7. Defender Goal –
Deceive
• Intended Effect - Lead the adversary to believe false
information about defended systems, missions, or
organizations, or about defender capabilities or TTPs.
• Expected Result - The adversary’s efforts are wasted, as
the assumptions on which the adversary bases attacks
are false.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or
reduce likelihood of impact.
• Example - The defender strategically places false
information (disinformation) about the cybersecurity
investments that it plans to make. As a result, the
adversary’s malware development is wasted by being
focused on countering nonexistent cybersecurity
protections.
• Evidence - Adversary activities reveal that the adversary
is relying on false information (e.g., a dummy account is
spear phished, delivered malware is tailored to a
simulated environment).
8. Defender’s Goal: Preclude – Ensure that specific threat events
do not have an effect.
Preclude
Expunge
Preempt
Prevent
9. Defender Goal –
Expunge
• Intended Effect - Remove unsafe, incorrect, or corrupted
resources that could cause damage.
• Expected Result - The adversary loses a capability for
some period, as adversary directed threat mechanisms
(e.g., malicious code) are removed. Adversary-controlled
resources are so badly damaged that they cannot
perform any function or be restored to a usable
condition without being entirely rebuilt.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of impact of
subsequent events in the same threat scenario.
• Example - The defender uses virtualization to refresh
critical software (non-persistent services) at random
intervals (temporal unpredictability). As a result, the
adversary’s malware that is implanted in the software is
expunged.
• Evidence - Removal of malware or of privileges from
adversary-controlled resources.
10. Defender Goal –
Preempt
• Intended Effect - Forestall or avoid conditions under
which the threat event could occur or result in an effect.
• Expected Result - The adversary’s resources cannot be
applied and/or the adversary cannot perform activities
(e.g., because resources are destroyed or made
inaccessible).
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or
reduce likelihood of impact.
• Example - Critical software is not assembled (adaptive
management) or activated (non-persistent services) until
it is needed. The adversary, therefore, cannot perform
reconnaissance on, and tailor malware targeted to, the
software.
• Evidence - The adversary’s resources are observed to be
denied (e.g., destroyed, made inaccessible or unusable).
11. Defender Goal –
Prevent
• Intended Effect - Create conditions under which the
threat event cannot be expected to result in an effect.
• Expected Result - The adversary’s efforts are wasted, as
the assumptions on which the adversary based its attack
are no longer valid and as a result, the intended effects
cannot be achieved.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of impact.
• Example - Subtle variations in critical software are
implemented (synthetic diversity), with the result that
the adversary’s malware is no longer able to
compromise the targeted software.
• Evidence - Logs or other captured data provide evidence
that the activity occurred but had no effects.
12. Defender Goal: Impede – Make it more difficult for threat events
to cause adverse impacts or consequences.
Impede
Contain
Degrade
Delay
13. Defender Goal –
Contain
• Intended Effect - Restrict the effects of the threat event
to a limited set of resources.
• Expected Result - The value of the activity to the
adversary, in terms of achieving the adversary’s goals, is
reduced.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce level of impact.
• Example - The defender organization makes changes to a
combination of internal firewalls and logically separated
networks (dynamic segmentation) to isolate enclaves in
response to detection of malware, with the result that
the effects of the malware is limited to just initially
infected enclaves.
• Evidence - Damage assessment, in terms of
• (Scope) The number of affected resources
• (Impact) A function of
• The number of affected resources and their
value (e.g., criticality)
• Duration and the mission or operational cost per
unit time
14. Defender Goal –
Degrade
• Intended Effect - Decrease the likelihood that a given threat
event will have a given level of effectiveness or impact.
• Expected Result - The adversary achieves some but not all
intended effects. The adversary achieves all intended effects but
only after taking additional actions.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of
impact.
• Example - The defender uses multiple browsers and operating
systems (architectural diversity) on both end user systems and
some critical servers. The result is that malware that is targeted at
specific software can only compromise a subset of the targeted
systems; a sufficient number continue to operate to keep mission
going, although in degraded mode.
• Evidence - The number of resources affected by the adversary is
lower than for prior instances of the activity. The severity of the
impacts caused by the adversary activity is less than for prior
instances of the activity. Malware or other attack vectors
attributable to the adversary are crafted or tailored, based on
failures of prior activities attributable to the same adversary to
achieve effects. Repeated activities (e.g., to establish information
channels, to start processes) are attributable to the same
adversary.
15. Defender Goal –
Delay
• Intended Effect - Increase the amount of time needed for a
threat event to result in adverse impacts.
• Expected Result - The adversary achieves the intended
effects but may not achieve them within the intended
period. The adversary’s activities may, therefore, be
exposed to greater risk of detection and analysis.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce
level of impact.
• Example - The protection measures (e.g., access controls,
encryption) allocated to resources increase in number and
strength based on resource criticality (calibrated defense-
in-depth). The frequency of authentication challenges
varies randomly (temporal unpredictability) and with
increased frequency for more critical resources. The result
is that it takes the attacker more time to successfully
compromise the targeted resources.
• Evidence - The length of time between an initial event and
its effects, as determined by forensic or other analysis, is
increased.
16. Defender Goal: Limit – Restrict the consequences of threat events
by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time,
system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.
Limit
Shorten
Recover
17. Defender Goal –
Shorten
• Intended Effect - Limit the duration of a threat event or
the conditions caused by a threat event.
• Expected Result - The time period during which the
adversary’s activities have their intended effects is
limited.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce level of impact.
• Example - The defender employs a diverse set of
suppliers (supply chain diversity) for time-critical
components. As a result, when an adversary’s attack on
one supplier causes it to shut down, the defender can
increase its use of the other suppliers, thus shortening
the time when it is without the critical components.
• Evidence - Damage assessment, in terms of (Time). The
duration of an outage or of degraded functionality.
18. Defender Goal –
Recover
• Intended Effect - Roll back the consequences of a threat
event, particularly with respect to mission or business
impairment.
• Expected Result - The adversary fails to retain mission or
business impairment due to recovery of the capability to
perform key missions or business operations.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce level of impact.
• Example - Resources determined to be corrupted or
suspect (integrity checks, behavior validation) are
restored from a clean copy (protected backup and
restore).
• Evidence - Recovery metrics, including
• (Functionality) Level of performance (typically
expressed in terms of Measures of Effectiveness
(MOEs), Measures of Performance (MOPs), or Key
Performance Parameters (KPPs)).
• (Assurance) Degree of trustworthiness or
confidence in restored resources.
19. Defender goal: Expose – Reduce risk due to ignorance of threat
events and possible replicated or similar threat events in the
same or similar environments.
Expose
Detect
Scrutinize
Reveal
20. Defender Goal –
Detect
• Intended Effect - Identify threat events or their effects
by discovering or discerning the fact that an event is
occurring, has occurred, or (based on indicators,
warnings, and precursor activities) is about to occur.
• Expected Result - The adversary’s activities become
susceptible to defensive responses.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce
level of impact (depending on responses).
• Example - The defender continually moves its sensors
(functional relocation of sensors), often at random times
(temporal unpredictability), to common points of egress
from the organization. They combine this with the use of
beacon traps (tainting). The result is that the defender
can quickly detect efforts by the adversary to exfiltrate
sensitive information.
• Evidence - Adversary activities are detected, or
indicators, warnings, and/or precursor activities are
observed.
21. Defender Goal –
Scrutinize
• Intended Effect - Analyze threat events and artifacts associated
with threat events, particularly with respect to patterns of
exploiting vulnerabilities, predisposing conditions, and
weaknesses, to inform more effective detection and risk
response.
• Expected Result - The adversary loses the advantages of
uncertainty, confusion, and doubt. The defender understands
the adversary better, based on analysis of adversary activities,
including the artifacts (e.g., malicious code) and effects
associated with those activities and on correlation of activity
specific observations with other activities (as feasible), and thus
can recognize adversary TTPs.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of impact.
• Example - The defender deploys honeynets (misdirection),
inviting attacks by the defender, allowing the defender to apply
their TTPs in a safe environment. The defender then analyzes
(malware and forensic analysis) the malware captured in the
honeynet to determine the nature of the attacker’s TTPs,
allowing it to develop appropriate defenses.
• Evidence - Number and quality (e.g., correctness, usefulness) of
malware signatures and characteristics. Number and quality
(e.g., degree of confirmation) of observables and indicators.
Distinct threat actors and/or campaigns being observed.
22. Defender Goal –
Reveal
• Intended Effect - Increase awareness of risk factors and relative
effectiveness of remediation approaches across the stakeholder
community, to support common, joint, or coordinated risk
response.
• Expected Result - The adversary loses the advantage of surprise
and possible deniability. The adversary’s ability to compromise
one organization’s systems to attack another organization is
impaired, as awareness of adversary characteristics and
behavior across the stakeholder community (e.g., across all
computer security incident response teams that support a given
sector, which might be expected to be attacked by the same
actor or actors) is increased.
• Effect on Risk - Reduce likelihood of impact, particularly in the
future.
• Example - The defender participates in threat information
sharing and uses dynamically updated threat intelligence data
feeds (dynamic threat modeling) to inform actions (adaptive
management).
• Evidence - Distinct threat actors, campaigns, and/or TTPs
observed by multiple organizations. Degree of confidence in
attribution of events to threat actors or campaigns.