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Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems
   Liam O Murchu                                    Sep 2010
   Operations Manager, Symantec Security Response

                                                               1
Stuxnet
                                  CheckWinCC
                                   Network Installed
                                          AV
                                     PrintDayShares
                                       .lnkSpoolerICS
                                            vuln
                                     P2P Updates
                                      Infect PLCs
                                       MS08-067
                                  1 ZeroVersions2
                                    Goal C&CEoP
                                     Zero=Projects
                                            Infect
                                    Step7Day EoP
                                      2 Def Dates
                                   Check
                                    Task Scheduler
                                      Win32k.sys
                                     1.5 Mb each




Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems          2
Agenda

          1      60 second Intro to PLCs

          2      Programming a PLC

          3      How Stuxnet infects

          4      What Stuxnet does

          5      Demonstration


Stuxnet & PLCs                             3
PLCs
Programmable Logic Controller

• Monitors Input and Output lines
    – Sensors on input
    – switches/equipment on outputs
    – Many different vendors
• Stuxnet seeks specific Models
    – s7-300 s7-400
                   Stuxnet is Targeted
             Targeting a Specific type of PLC
           Searches for a Specific Configuration

Stuxnet & PLCs                                     4
Hardware configuration
System Data Blocks

• Each PLC must be configured before use.
• Configuration is stored in System Data Blocks (SDBs)
• Stuxnet parses these blocks
• Looks for magic bytes 2C CB 00 01 at offset 50h
• Signifies a Profibus network card attached - CP 342-5
• Looks for 7050h and 9500h
• Must have more than 33 of these values
• Injects different code based on number of occurrences


Stuxnet & PLCs                                            5
How Stuxnet Infects PLCs



Stuxnet – Inside the PLC       6
Programming a PLC
Step7, STL and MC7




• Simatic or Step 7 software
    – Used to write code in STL or other languages
• STL code is compiled to MC7 byte code
• MC7 byte code is transferred to the PLC
• Control PC can now be disconnected

Stuxnet Infecting PLCs                               7
Stuxnet: Man in the Middle attack on PLCs
“Man in the App” attack

• Step7 uses a library to access the
  PLC
    – S7otbxdx.dll


• Stuxnet replaces that dll with its
  own version


• Stuxnet’s version intercepts
  reads and writes to the PLC and
  changes the code at this point.

Stuxnet Infecting PLCs                      8
Stuxnet MC7 Byte code


• Stuxnet contains at least 70 binary blobs of data
• They are encoded and stored in the fake dll
• These are actually blocks of MC7 byte code
• This is the code that is injected onto the PLCs
• Must be converted back to STL to understand it
• Difficult task but we have now converted all the MC7 byte code
  to readable STL code
• Just unsure of real world effects of this code.


Presentation Identifier Goes Here                                  9
OB1 and OB35
Stuxnet changes these blocks

• OB1 = main() on PLCs
    – Stuxnet inserts its own code at the beginning of OB1 so it runs first.
• OB35 is a 100ms interrupt routine
    – Used to monitor inputs that would require fast action
    – Stuxnet infects OB35 too


• Stuxnet will return clean versions of these functions when they
  are read from the PLC.



Stuxnet infecting PLCs                                                         10
Demo
Show Infection of a PLC

• Inflate a balloon for 5 seconds
• Infect the PLC
• Inflate balloon again for 5 seconds




Stuxnet Demo                            11
Stuxnet’s PLC code
Complex and large amount of code
      • Demo was just 8 lines of code.
      • Stuxnet contains hundreds of lines of code
      • It is difficult to understand the real world actions without
        knowing what is connected on the inputs and outputs.

      UC FC 1865;
      POP ;
      L DW#16#DEADF007;
      ==D ;
      BEC ;
      L DW#16#0;
      L DW#16#0;


Presentation Identifier Goes Here                                      12
Stuxnet   13
Stuxnet   14
Targets
Stats for Command and Control Servers




Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems   15
Stuxnet Infections




Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems   16
White Paper Available
W32.Stuxnet Dossier

• Stuxnet Technical Details Available here:


• http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/se
  curity_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf




Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems            17
Thank you!
     Liam O Murchu - liam_omurchu@symantec.com
     Nicolas Falliere
     Eric Chien
     Threat Intelligence Team
     All Stuxnet Reverse Engineers
     Copyright © 2010 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in
     the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.

     This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied,
     are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice.


Stuxnet – Infecting Industrial Control systems                                                                                                                                               18

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Stuxnet

  • 1. Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems Liam O Murchu Sep 2010 Operations Manager, Symantec Security Response 1
  • 2. Stuxnet CheckWinCC Network Installed AV PrintDayShares .lnkSpoolerICS vuln P2P Updates Infect PLCs MS08-067 1 ZeroVersions2 Goal C&CEoP Zero=Projects Infect Step7Day EoP 2 Def Dates Check Task Scheduler Win32k.sys 1.5 Mb each Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems 2
  • 3. Agenda 1 60 second Intro to PLCs 2 Programming a PLC 3 How Stuxnet infects 4 What Stuxnet does 5 Demonstration Stuxnet & PLCs 3
  • 4. PLCs Programmable Logic Controller • Monitors Input and Output lines – Sensors on input – switches/equipment on outputs – Many different vendors • Stuxnet seeks specific Models – s7-300 s7-400 Stuxnet is Targeted Targeting a Specific type of PLC Searches for a Specific Configuration Stuxnet & PLCs 4
  • 5. Hardware configuration System Data Blocks • Each PLC must be configured before use. • Configuration is stored in System Data Blocks (SDBs) • Stuxnet parses these blocks • Looks for magic bytes 2C CB 00 01 at offset 50h • Signifies a Profibus network card attached - CP 342-5 • Looks for 7050h and 9500h • Must have more than 33 of these values • Injects different code based on number of occurrences Stuxnet & PLCs 5
  • 6. How Stuxnet Infects PLCs Stuxnet – Inside the PLC 6
  • 7. Programming a PLC Step7, STL and MC7 • Simatic or Step 7 software – Used to write code in STL or other languages • STL code is compiled to MC7 byte code • MC7 byte code is transferred to the PLC • Control PC can now be disconnected Stuxnet Infecting PLCs 7
  • 8. Stuxnet: Man in the Middle attack on PLCs “Man in the App” attack • Step7 uses a library to access the PLC – S7otbxdx.dll • Stuxnet replaces that dll with its own version • Stuxnet’s version intercepts reads and writes to the PLC and changes the code at this point. Stuxnet Infecting PLCs 8
  • 9. Stuxnet MC7 Byte code • Stuxnet contains at least 70 binary blobs of data • They are encoded and stored in the fake dll • These are actually blocks of MC7 byte code • This is the code that is injected onto the PLCs • Must be converted back to STL to understand it • Difficult task but we have now converted all the MC7 byte code to readable STL code • Just unsure of real world effects of this code. Presentation Identifier Goes Here 9
  • 10. OB1 and OB35 Stuxnet changes these blocks • OB1 = main() on PLCs – Stuxnet inserts its own code at the beginning of OB1 so it runs first. • OB35 is a 100ms interrupt routine – Used to monitor inputs that would require fast action – Stuxnet infects OB35 too • Stuxnet will return clean versions of these functions when they are read from the PLC. Stuxnet infecting PLCs 10
  • 11. Demo Show Infection of a PLC • Inflate a balloon for 5 seconds • Infect the PLC • Inflate balloon again for 5 seconds Stuxnet Demo 11
  • 12. Stuxnet’s PLC code Complex and large amount of code • Demo was just 8 lines of code. • Stuxnet contains hundreds of lines of code • It is difficult to understand the real world actions without knowing what is connected on the inputs and outputs. UC FC 1865; POP ; L DW#16#DEADF007; ==D ; BEC ; L DW#16#0; L DW#16#0; Presentation Identifier Goes Here 12
  • 13. Stuxnet 13
  • 14. Stuxnet 14
  • 15. Targets Stats for Command and Control Servers Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems 15
  • 16. Stuxnet Infections Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems 16
  • 17. White Paper Available W32.Stuxnet Dossier • Stuxnet Technical Details Available here: • http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/se curity_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf Stuxnet - Infecting Industrial Control Systems 17
  • 18. Thank you! Liam O Murchu - liam_omurchu@symantec.com Nicolas Falliere Eric Chien Threat Intelligence Team All Stuxnet Reverse Engineers Copyright © 2010 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied, are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Stuxnet – Infecting Industrial Control systems 18