STUXNET – THE FORMIDABLE CYBER WEAPONSathish KumarRajeev Chaubey
  AGENDA Stuxnet Background
 Introduction to SCADA systems
 Stuxnet Architecture
 Installation procedure
Injection technique
Infection routine flow
 Command and Control server communication
 Stuxnet propagation methods
 Security issues and mitigation techniques  SCADA SYSTEMS – GLOBAL INCIDENTS   Sewage Hacker - SCADA system of Maroochy Water Services in Australia beginning in January 2000, which saw millions of gallons of sewage spill into waterways, hotel grounds and  canals around the Sunshine Coast suburb   Trans-Siberian Pipeline USSR - spectacular trans-Siberian pipeline disaster in 1982   Nuclear Power Plant, US - California, The vulnerability was demonstrated by a January event at the shutdown Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. The worm infection increased data traffic in the site’s network, resulting in the plant’s Safety Parameter Display System and plant process computer being unavailable for several hours   Power Grid, US - California, hackers broke into computer systems owned by California's primary electric power grid operator and remained undetected for 17 days   Airport Hacker, US - Massachusetts, a computer hacker who disabled a key telephone company computer servicing the Worcester airport. As a result of a series of commands sent from the hacker's personal computer, vital services to the FAA control tower were disabled for six hours in March of 1997. In the course of his hacking, the defendant also electronically broke into a pharmacy computer and copied patient records.
STUXNET BACKGROUND  Stuxnet is a Windows computer worm discovered in July 2010.  Targets industrial software and equipment.   Its speculated that stuxnet was specifically designed to damageIran nuclear facilities and widely believed stuxnet introduced delay in Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant startup  The first to include a programmable logic controller (PLC) rootkit.
STUXNET DAY BY DAY EVOLUTION
SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION
PLC – PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLERSTUXNET SEEKS SPECIFIC MODELS S7-300 S7-400
PLC – SCAN CYCLERead InputExecute programDiagnostics and communicationsUpdate output
STUXNET ARCHITECTURE
STUXNET – INSTALLATION PROCEDURE

Stuxnet

  • 1.
    STUXNET – THEFORMIDABLE CYBER WEAPONSathish KumarRajeev Chaubey
  • 2.
    AGENDAStuxnet Background
  • 3.
    Introduction toSCADA systems
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8.
    Command andControl server communication
  • 9.
  • 10.
    Security issuesand mitigation techniques SCADA SYSTEMS – GLOBAL INCIDENTS Sewage Hacker - SCADA system of Maroochy Water Services in Australia beginning in January 2000, which saw millions of gallons of sewage spill into waterways, hotel grounds and canals around the Sunshine Coast suburb Trans-Siberian Pipeline USSR - spectacular trans-Siberian pipeline disaster in 1982 Nuclear Power Plant, US - California, The vulnerability was demonstrated by a January event at the shutdown Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. The worm infection increased data traffic in the site’s network, resulting in the plant’s Safety Parameter Display System and plant process computer being unavailable for several hours Power Grid, US - California, hackers broke into computer systems owned by California's primary electric power grid operator and remained undetected for 17 days Airport Hacker, US - Massachusetts, a computer hacker who disabled a key telephone company computer servicing the Worcester airport. As a result of a series of commands sent from the hacker's personal computer, vital services to the FAA control tower were disabled for six hours in March of 1997. In the course of his hacking, the defendant also electronically broke into a pharmacy computer and copied patient records.
  • 11.
    STUXNET BACKGROUND Stuxnet is a Windows computer worm discovered in July 2010. Targets industrial software and equipment. Its speculated that stuxnet was specifically designed to damageIran nuclear facilities and widely believed stuxnet introduced delay in Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant startup The first to include a programmable logic controller (PLC) rootkit.
  • 12.
    STUXNET DAY BYDAY EVOLUTION
  • 13.
    SUPERVISORY CONTROL ANDDATA ACQUISITION
  • 14.
    PLC – PROGRAMMABLELOGIC CONTROLLERSTUXNET SEEKS SPECIFIC MODELS S7-300 S7-400
  • 15.
    PLC – SCANCYCLERead InputExecute programDiagnostics and communicationsUpdate output
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
    Stuxnet – C& C Server Communication
  • 20.
  • 21.
    Security issues andmitigation techniques Security Information and Event Management systems Intrusion monitoring systems integrated with SIEM Implement “Extrusion Detection” Implement passive vulnerability scanners (PVS) on the control systems network
  • 22.
    JUNIPER IDP SCADASIGNATURESSCADA:DNP3:DISABLE-RESP - This signature detects attempts to stop unsolicited responses from devices. Attackers can prevent devices from sending alarmsSCADA:DNP3:READ - This signature detects attempts by clients to read information from a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). Attackers can use this information to plan future, more targeted attacksSCADA:DNP3:STOP - This signature detects attempts to stop a DNP3 serverSCADA:DNP3:WARM-RESTART- This signature detects attempts to reinitialize a PLC or DNP3 serverSCADA:MODBUS:LISTEN-ONLY -This signature detects attempts to force a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) into listen-only mode, in which the PLC does not respond to request packetsSCADA:MODBUS:DOS - This signature detects attempts to force a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) to restart. The PLC is unavailable while powering on
  • 23.
    STUXNET – THEFORMIDABLE CYBER WEAPONQ&A
  • 24.
    STUXNET – THEFORMIDABLE CYBER WEAPONThank you!

Editor's Notes

  • #3 As part of the Q4 announcement group we are expanding our data center initiatives in 2 important ways, in line with our overall data center networking vision and strategy:1/ We are expanding our guidelines for designing next generation data center infrastructures, building on the foundations of our network simplification approach introduced in 2008 (simplifying the network, collapsing network tiers, virtualizing infrastructure elements, and simplifying management designs). We are expanding by delivering techniques for sharing network infrastructures with unique features, intelligence and scale, end-to-end based on Junos. And we are introducing a framework for delivering comprehensive and consistently managed security infrastructures for the cloud.2/ As detail to support delivering on the vision we are introducing 5 new security solution modules and associated best practices and implementation guidance to protect the critical information flows and assets associated with highly virtualized and distributed cloud data center networks.The rest of the presentation fills out information supporting these important announcements.