STOP AI training manual

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STAMPING OUT PANDEMIC &
AVIAN INFLUENZA (STOP AI)
STOP AI CONSULTANTS COURSE:
PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND AI ESSENTIALS
DRAFT PARTICIPANT MANUAL
STOP AI
August 2007
This publication was prepared by DAI and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development under
Contract No. EDH-I-00-05-00004-00, TO6.

Contents
Introduction......................................................................................... 1
Module 1 – Overview of Avian Influenza........................................... 3
Module 2 – National Preparedness and Response Plans for
HPAI.............................................................................. 17
Module 3 – OIE Avian Influenza Standards and FAO
Emergency Prevention System................................... 58
Module 4 – Public Health and Occupational Safety ....................... 95
Module 5 – Animal Surveillance..................................................... 150
Module 6 – Sample Collection and Transport.............................. 182
Module 7 – GIS and Outbreak Mapping ........................................ 206
Module 8 – Biosecurity.................................................................... 293
Module 9 – Introduction to Outbreak Response.......................... 313
Module 10 – Depopulation, Disposal, and Decontamination ...... 340
Module 11- Recovery Options........................................................ 419

Introduction
USAID’s STOP AI project is piloting a series of courses in fall 2007 to build capacity among
animal and human health experts to support HPAI preparedness and response in poultry
populations worldwide. The purpose of these training courses is to prepare selected experts to
be consultants under the STOP AI project; the courses will focus on orienting participants to
working effectively with USAID and host country governments while on deployment, and to
promote the delivery of consistent technical messages in accordance with current international
standards.
Pre-Deployment Training Course Pilot
This 3-day course is intended for avian influenza experts, from both animal and human health
disciples. It will focus primarily on orienting the participants to USAID and STOP AI and the
relevant international standards, without delivering in-depth training on the technical aspects of
HPAI outbreak investigation or stamp out procedures. The participants selected for this course
will possess sufficient technical knowledge through field experience with HPAI. This course is
being piloted from September 25 to 27, in Washington, DC for a US and European audience.
Pre-Deployment Training and AI Essentials Course Pilot
This week-long course is intended for animal and human health experts who have limited
experience with avian influenza, but who do have field experience with other animal, zoonotic,
or infectious diseases. This course builds upon the 3-day Pre-Deployment Training course and
includes additional modules on avian influenza virology, epidemiology, response, and recovery.
This course is being piloted twice – once in Washington, DC from October 1 to 5 for a US and
European audience, and in Senegal (in conjunction with the veterinary epidemiology course
described below) from November 5to 9 for an African audience.
Veterinary Epidemiology for HPAI Course Pilot
This week-long course is intended for animal health experts with or without field experience in
HPAI. It will be held the week after the Pre-Deployment and AI Essentials course and will go
into much greater depth on conducting outbreak investigations and designing surveillance
programs for HPAI among avian populations. The course is being piloted in Africa from
November 12 to 16.
Future Plans
Following this pilot series, the courses will be modified according to lessons learned from the
pilot courses, then conducted in all 4 USAID regions: Europe and Eurasia (E&E), Asia and the
Near East (ANE), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Africa (AFR). STOP AI will most
likely hold future courses in the US and Europe as well.
This Manual
This manual contains draft presentation and participant materials for the Pre-Deployment and AI
Essentials pilot courses. The majority of the material contained here has been adapted from
other established courses on HPAI. Please see below for more information about the course
contributors.
DRAFT TRAINING MANUAL STOP AI CONSULTANTS COURSE 1

The course modules on working with USAID and on human health are not included in this
document, as the intended purpose is to solicit input on the animal health aspects of the training
program. A separate draft participant manual for the Veterinary Epidemiology for HPAI course
is still in development and will be produced in early October 2007.
Contributors
The following modules are from UC Davis’ Avian Flu School: Overview of Avian Influenza,
Veterinary Surveillance, Prevention and Biosecurity, Recovery Options. The Avian Flu School
has been delivered extensively in Africa and the US.
Bird Flu Control has provided content for the Public Health and Occupational Safety, and
developed the modules on Outbreak Response, Depopulation and Disposal.
The modules on Sample Collection and Transport, and Decontamination were developed by
AED, with technical input from DAI, to accompany USAID’s Avian Influenza Commodity Kits.
These modules have been delivered repeatedly in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.
DAI staff developed the modules on National Preparedness and Response Plans, and GIS and
Outbreak Mapping
Dr. Jim Pearson, who worked for many years in USDA’s National laboratory in Iowa and
worked for the OIE, developed the session on OIE Avian Influenza Standards.
The FAO overview presentation was provided by Dr. Juan Lubroth at FAO.
Providing Feedback on this Draft Manual
We invite feedback on the technical content of these draft materials. In order for your feedback
to be incorporated prior to the pilot series, please provide your comments to Ms. Megan
Fotheringham by August 31, 2007 (see contact information below). Comments received after
that date will be incorporated during the post-pilot revision process in December 2007.
Ms. Megan Fotheringham
Cognizant Technical Officer – STOP AI
Avian Influenza Preparedness and Response Unit
USAID
(202) 712-0537
mfotheringham@usaid.gov
Thank you,
Dr. Ross Graham
Chief of Party
STOP AI
1455 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 280-2023
Ross_Graham@dai.com

MODULE 1: OVERVIEW
MODULE PURPOSE
To provide an overview the natural history of AI, with particular emphasis on the H5N1 Highly
Pathogenic (HPAI) strain.
MODULE OBJECTIVES
At the conclusion of this module, you will be able to:
• Define avian influenza;
• Identify avian influenza subtypes and pathogenic forms;
• Describe how the avian influenza virus is transmitted among birds and to other species; and
• Identify potential health and economic risks associated with an outbreak of H5N1 HPAI.

LESSON 1: AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUSES
Avian Influenza—commonly called “bird flu”—is an infection caused by influenza viruses that
occur naturally in birds, and less commonly in pigs and humans.
(www.pandemicflu.gov)
There are many kinds of flu viruses with various
classifications and subtypes. For example, seasonal flu,
which infects humans, is different than avian flu.
Birds, waterfowl, and shorebirds are the reservoir hosts
of influenza A viruses.
Influenza viruses are named by the proteins on their
surfaces, the hemagglutinin antigen (HA) and
neuraminidase antigen (NA) proteins. There are 16 HA
types and 9 NA types with a possible 144 combinations.
The vast majority of these subtypes infect only birds.
H5N1 is the subtype of the virus that is the current
concern.
Reassortment. Influenza viruses have segmented genomes, meaning that the virus’ blueprints
are in pieces that can be exchanged with pieces of the blueprints of other flu viruses.
Reassortment results in large changes in the virus.
Mutations. Mutations happen every time the virus
reproduces itself, changing the virus in very small
changes.
New viruses form when their genetic
material combines, resulting in a new virus

Avian influenza viruses can adapt to grow in new hosts or change in virulence either by
reassortment or mutation.
Low Pathogenic vs. High Pathogenic
Avian influenza viruses can be further divided into two forms based on what they do to non-exposed,
or naïve, chickens:
1. Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI)
• Causes few to no signs of sickness in infected birds.
• Can be any of the 144 subtypes
2. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
• Causes mortality rates of up to 100% in poultry flocks.
• Has only been H5 or H7 subtypes
(These are consistent with OIE definitions that will be discussed later).
Some H5 and H7 LPAI strains turn into HPAI strains as the viruses reproduce and therefore,
mutate.
Avian influenza (AI) viruses are enveloped
The virus is inactive when the envelope, or membrane
coat, is destroyed.
Heating, drying, disinfecting and washing with
soap and water will destroy the envelope.
Avian influenza viruses need a living host to
replicate and stay alive

Time after host dies
100000000
10000000
1000000
100000
10000
Amount of Virus
1000
100
10
1
Hot, dry
Cool, humid
The amount of virus in a host declines quickly after a host dies. However, the virus
will live longer in a dead host if the environmental conditions are humid and cool.
Viruses can’t survive long outside of their hosts.
Over time, viruses will die as they are exposed to heat, light, or drying.
Avian Influenza viruses will be preserved by wetness and cooling.

Take a moment to check your knowledge:
How do flu viruses change?
Which virus subtypes can cause HPAI?
How can flu viruses be destroyed?

LESSON 2: HISTORY OF H5N1
History of the Global Spread of H5N1 HPAI:
• The precursor of the current H5N1 HPAI subtype was first detected in a goose in 1996.
Where was the goose?
• First reported outbreak in domestic poultry in 1997 (Hong Kong)
• Led to first human infections,18 cases, 6 deaths (Hong Kong)
• Resulted in culling 1.5 million chickens in Hong Kong to contain spread
• Appeared again in Hong Kong (2001)—led to destruction of 1.2 million birds
• Numerous outbreaks in Southeast Asia followed
• May—June 2005—disease killed birds in China, Mongolia, and Siberia signaling a dramatic
geographic expansion and possible involvement of migratory birds in transmission.
• The first outbreaks in the European Union were recorded in January 2006 when cases were
confirmed in migrating wild swans in Italy, Greece, Germany, and Austria.
• February 2006—H5N1 HPAI was detected in commercial poultry flocks in Nigeria. Since
then, the virus has been reported in Burkina Faso, Niger, Cameroon, Sudan, Egypt, and
Djibouti on the African continent.
Primary Spread
H5N1 HPAI can be introduced in a new country or region by:
• Migratory birds: H5N1 HPAI shows a seasonal occurrence in high-risk areas, which coincides
with migratory activity
• Legal and illegal poultry trade (both live birds and/or poultry products)
• Legal and illegal wild bird/pet trade
Latest developments important to the region:________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

Terms and Definitions
Outbreak: a sudden rise in the incidence of a disease
Animal Epidemic: A local, regional, or global outbreak of disease in animals
Human Pandemic: a global disease outbreak in humans
Discuss concept of pre-outbreak: ___________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
Summary of the Animal Pandemic:
The continued spread across Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa has resulted in the largest
avian influenza animal pandemic ever recorded, leading to the deaths of over 140 million birds,
with over 194 confirmed deaths in humans (as of August 2007).
Discussion
Are any of these facts surprising to you?
Which of these facts are most important to the stakeholders or constituencies you work with?
Based on these facts, what messages are important to communicate with the groups and
constituencies you work with?
Currently AI is a panzootic and not a human pandemic. What do you think of AI being an animal
health emergency?
What do you think of the issue of prevalence of the disease in humans? Or the fact that it
has been limited to only 256 cases worldwide over several years.

LESSON 3: HPAI TRANSMISSION
Highly pathogenic influenza viruses are transmitted in the same basic ways as other influenza A
viruses. Most of that transmission is via direct contact or droplet-borne virus rather than by fine
aerosol.
Within species (intraspecies) transmission
The most common transmission for influenza A viruses is from one member of a species to
another member of the same species.
Between species (interspecies) transmission
Interspecies transmission of the influenza A virus occurs rarely between the majority of species,
but has higher rates of interspecies transmission between other species, such as between ducks
and turkeys. Generally, larger doses of virus and longer contact periods are required for
between-species transmission than for transmission within a species.

Exercise 1-1: Identifying the Transmission Paths
Purpose: This exercise allows you to check your knowledge about the virus transmission paths.
Instructions: Follow the steps below to complete this exercise within your assigned small group:
Step Action
1 Study the previous illustration “Paths of Avian Influenza Transmission.”
2 Identify three sources of infection from poultry to other poultry.
3 Identify three barriers to infection from poultry to other poultry.
4 Identify three sources of infection from wild birds to poultry.
5 Identify three barriers to infection from wild birds to poultry.
6 Identify sources of infection from poultry to humans.
7 Identify three barriers to infection from poultry to humans.
8
Discuss with your group:
• What parts of the transmission paths are of most concern to you or your
community?
• What was the most valuable thing you learned about how the virus is transmitted?
• How will you use this transmission information to help with your community’s
current H5N1 HPAI response?

LESSON 4: RISK OF H5N1 HPAI TO HUMANS
H5N1 HPAI in Humans
• Most avian influenza viruses do not infect humans.
• H5N1 HPAI can infect humans and is often fatal.
• Infections of people have been after heavy exposure.
H5N1 HPAI Effects on Humans
• The risk from avian influenza viruses is generally low to most people, because most do not
infect humans.
• H5N1 HPAI is one of the few avian influenza viruses to have crossed the species barrier to
infect humans and is among the most deadly of those that have infected humans.
• Most cases of H5N1 HPAI in humans have resulted from direct contact with infected
poultry (e.g., domesticated chickens or ducks) or surfaces heavily contaminated with
secretion/excretions from infected birds.
IMPORTANT POINT
So far, the spread of H5N1 HPAI virus person-to-person has been limited and has not continued
beyond one person or a small cluster of people. Nonetheless, because all influenza viruses have
the ability to change, scientists are concerned that H5N1 virus one day could be able to infect
humans and spread easily from one person to another.
IMPORTANT POINT
The H5N1 HPAI virus has raised concerns that it could cause a human pandemic because:
1.It is especially virulent.
2.It can be transmitted from birds to mammals and, in some limited circumstances, to humans.
3.Most humans have no immunity to H5 viruses.
Exposures resulting in human infections:
• Home slaughter of poultry (dressing, plucking, and contact with blood)
• Touching poultry unexpectedly sick or dead
• Being less than one meter from dead poultry
• There is no evidence that the disease can be transmitted by infected poultry meat as long as
there has been no cross contamination and it is cooked to an internal temperature of
70°C (158 F).
• H5N1 HPAI can produce rapidly-developing and severe illness in humans, with viral
pneumonia and multi-organ failure as common outcomes.

Symptoms in humans are similar to many other syndromes and may include:
• Diarrhea
• High fever
• Lower respiratory tract symptoms (pneumonia)
• Vomiting
• Abdominal and chest pain
• Conjunctivitis
• Bleeding from the nose and gums
Check your knowledge
The majority of human cases have occurred with humans who have had direct and/or sustained
contact with
No evidence that the disease can be transmitted by consuming infected poultry meat as long as
it is cooked to an internal temperature of
Human infection is associated with:
1.
2.
3.
An effective method for the of birds is needed to protect the public
health.
For more information about human H5N1 HPAI infections, see:
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-flu-humans.htm and
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/

LESSON 5: IMPACTS OF H5N1 HPAI
Economic impacts of the Animal Health Emergency of H5N1 HPAI
• Combined losses to Gross National Product of affected Asian nations estimated to be US
$10-15 billion (FAO 2005)
• Substantial economic impact to small farmers and commercial poultry producers
• Biosecurity measures involving isolation of flocks, sanitation and disinfection of clothes,
equipment, and vehicles also add to cost of containment
Estimated US $100 million to address the H5N1 HPAI outbreak in Southeast Asia
alone to date.
Costs of biosecurity
List likely costs or impacts of an H5N1 HPAI outbreak in your country or community:
1. _____________________________________________________________________
2. _____________________________________________________________________
3. _____________________________________________________________________
4. _____________________________________________________________________
1.

REFERENCES AND RESOURCES
CDC (Centers for Disease Control). Avian influenza infection in humans.
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-flu-humans.htm (accessed 04/25/2006).
CIDRAP (Center for Infectious Disease and Policy). 2006. Avian influenza (bird flu): Agricultural
and wildlife considerations.
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/biofacts/avflu.html (accessed
04/25/2006).
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 1999. Manual on the
preparation of national animal disease emergency preparedness plans.
http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/x2096e/X2096E00.htm (accessed 04/2006).
2005. Enemy at the gate: Saving farms and people from bird flu. Rome, Italy.
2005b. Global strategy to fight bird flu in animals faces serious funding gap.
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2005/107804/index.html (accessed 04/35/2005).
2006. Preparing for highly pathogenic avian influenza: A manual for countries at risk.
www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/200354/HPAI_manual.pdf (accessed 05/30/2006).
USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2006. USAID advances U.S.
international engagement on avian flu.
http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2006/fs060516.html (accessed 05/23/2006).
U.S. National Incident Management System -- an emergency planning and response management
model for effectively coordinating the efforts of multiple agencies. (See:
http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm)
WHO (World Health Organization). Cumulative number of confirmed human cases of avian
influenzaA/(H5N1) reported to WHO.
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2006_05_29/en/index.h
tml (accessed 05/31/2006).
2006. Avian influenza (“bird flu”) – fact sheet.
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/index.html#humans (accessed
04/25/2006).
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) is an international authority and important
resource for technical information regarding HPAI or other animal health emergencies. (See:
http://www.oie.int/eng/ AVIAN_INFLUENZA/home.htm )
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/rcommunication/
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication: By Leaders For Leaders (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention)
Course Book (PDF) (695KB)
Participant’s Manual (includes slides) (PDF) (447KB)
Communicating in a Crisis: Risk Communication Guidelines for Public Officials (Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration)

Effective Media Communication during Public Health Emergencies (World Health Organization)
Terrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies: A Reference Guide for the Media (U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services)
Pandemic Influenza Pre-Event Message Maps (PDF) (220KB) both avian flu and pandemic
influenza.
WHO Handbook for Journalists: Influenza Pandemic (PDF) (738KB)
WHO Outbreak Communications Guidelines (PDF) (452KB) (World Health Organization)

MODULE 2: NATIONAL
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
PLANS FOR HPAI
MODULE PURPOSE
This module is aimed at providing the tools for guidance on preparing and assessing
national HPAI preparedness plans that can be used for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
(HPAI) and adapted for other transboundary animal diseases. The module will introduce
the concepts of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery activities as the main
components of a national preparedness and response plan together with standard
operating procedures for implementing the plans.
MODULE OBJECTIVES
At the end of this module, you will be able to:
• Describe the key features of a National HPAI Preparedness and Response Plan (PRP)
and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) components;
• Evaluate an existing National HPAI PRP, and
• Identify gaps in an existing National HPAI PRP.

CURRENT CONTEXT
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 has spread quickly to many countries over the
years since it was detected as the cause of not only poultry deaths but of human deaths in Hong
Kong in 1997. In 2003, the virus spread to many countries in Southeast Asia and then moved in
a northerly direction to Mongolia and the Russian Federation. In 2004 and 2005, several Eastern
and Western European countries and some countries in the Middle East saw the infection in
poultry and wild birds. The virus continued to move and finally arrived in Africa in 2006 where it
affected about eight countries. The zoonotic nature of this virus has made control and
eradication of the virus a priority in many countries. As of August 16, 2007, 321 humans have
been infected and out of these, a total of 194 have died.
It was realized during the current animal epidemic that many countries were not prepared to
adequately control the spread of the virus. Many countries did not have any written plans to
combat zoonotic diseases or other emergencies for that matter. Several international
organizations encouraged countries to prepare National Preparedness and Response Plans in
face of HPAI-H5N1 spread. Many of these plans were prepared hurriedly, copied directly from
other plans without adaptation to the local area and lacked standard operating procedures for
implementation. Many countries, with international donor support are now in the process of
reviewing or rewriting their national plans so they can adequately respond to HPAI outbreaks.
This module will serve as a guide to highlight essential components that need to be included in a
National Preparedness and Response Plan.

DEFINITION, KEY TERMS, PLAN GOALS AND STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES
DEFINITION
HPAI NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN - A
document that details a set of implementable actions and activities to prevent,
prepare for, respond to and recover from an incursion of HPAI- H5N1 virus
KEY TERMS AND GOALS OF THE PLAN
Prevention Prevent the introduction and spread of HPAI-H5N1 virus through
implementation of activities such as strict biosecurity, targeted passive
and active surveillance and improvement of veterinary services delivery
Preparedness Prepare for a rapid and coordinated response by
bringing together adequate personnel, equipment and supplies
Response Respond to the presence of HPAI-H5N1 virus to minimize
the spread of disease and to eradicate the disease with
minimal loss of animals and livelihoods through control
measures
Recovery Recover from the devastating impact of an HPAI outbreak
on the poultry sector and on livelihoods through restocking,
compensation and review and revision of the plan
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
A set of written instructions, protocols, or worksheets that document routine or repetitive
activity followed by an organization or body to facilitate consistency in the quality and integrity
of a product or end result

LESSON 1: COUNTRY STATUS AND ASSESSMENT
IMPORTANT POINT
It is necessary to include the following country information as an introduction to the plan. The
information can be obtained from country policy documents, project documents, government
ministries, international organization (UN-FAO, WHO, OIE) websites, assessment visits etc.
• Country background information including geography, climate and population. Including a
country map showing the different regions, provinces etc. as part of the appendices is
important.
• Veterinary Services (VS) structure and delivery – number of personnel, level of training,
diagnostic laboratory system (number of labs, lab infrastructure, type of tests, state of lab
equipment and relevance to lab functions, lab personnel and level of training, training
opportunities)
Resource: OIE Evaluation of Private Veterinary Services (PVS) tool
http://www.oie.int/eng/oie/organisation/en_vet_eval_tool.htm?e1d2
Poultry Sector
• Poultry production systems
• Species and numbers and associated economic importance
• Common poultry diseases in the country and their control – Newcastle disease is usually the
most common
• Descriptions of marketing systems for poultry, live bird markets and distribution channels
• Overview of poultry slaughter plants and processing methods if any
Migratory and Wild Birds
• Main migratory wild bird resting spots and bird habitats and their proximity to poultry
production and urban population centers
• Interaction between wild birds and poultry
Animal Health Surveillance System
• Active or passive surveillance, animal health monitoring, surveys, lab testing, data
management and reporting

Sample poultry sector description for Liberia
The Republic of Liberia is situated in West Africa and is bordered by the North Atlantic Ocean, Sierra
Leone, Guinea and the Ivory Coast. The poultry population is estimated at 3 million and over 95% are
raised in the rural towns and villages under an extensive system. Most of the poultry raised are domestic
chickens but in a few parts of the country, ducks and guinea fowl are raised. Poultry are raised mostly by
women for both household consumption and income generation. They are mostly unconfined and
allowed to scavenge for feed during the day. Housing, if available is limited to portable straw or bamboo
baskets or clay pots for night time roosting. The lack of housing and veterinary inputs in this system
exposes the poultry to extremes of weather, predators and several poultry diseases. This system also
allows scavenging poultry to roam freely in living quarters and kitchens thereby increasing the risk of
potentially infected poultry coming into very close contact with humans. Newcastle disease virus has
been identified as the most important poultry disease in Liberia. At present, three commercial farms are
in operation. These operations import day-old chicks and hatching eggs from the Netherlands, the Ivory
Coast, Ghana and Guinea. Frozen chicken meat is imported from Brazil (1843 metric tons in 2005).
The commercial farms (mostly layer production) have moderate biosecurity, open-sided housing and
market their products directly to supermarkets, hotels and traders. Backyard rural chickens are normally
marketed and sold at live bird market stalls and roadside stands in many towns and villages. The real
value of Liberia’s poultry sector is unknown due to lack of agricultural statistics and to a long civil conflict
which ended three years ago.

LESSON 2: PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS
IMPORTANT POINT
It is important for countries to practice prevention measures and at the same time prepare for a
possible incursion by HPAI-H5N1 virus. Prevention and Preparedness activities are listed below
and are by no means an exhaustive list of activities. Countries should always take their own
situation into consideration and include activities that may have not been covered here..
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
• Chain of command and national and local coordinating mechanisms
- Government agencies responsible for writing and implementing the plan
- Coordination between animal health and human health agencies
- Roles of non-governmental organizations
• Setting up regional and local centers for outbreak management
• One type of command structure that can be used for outbreak management at the national,
regional and local levels is the Incident Management Model (IMM)
IMM OVERVIEW
In an outbreak, a successful response will depend on:
• Making sure that tasks are assigned
- In every response, no matter the size, certain jobs or tasks must be successfully
completed
• A single supervisor delegating, and being responsible for, the actions of all participants
- This prevents confusion
• Good communication
- From the workers to the supervisors and from the supervisors to the workers
• IMM provides a flexible structure to accomplish these goals
IMM is based on the Incident Command System (ICS) developed by the U.S. Forest Service
and now widely used to respond to disasters such as fires or floods, or to manage a planned
event such as a parade.
IMM is a model specifically designed for HPAI outbreaks, and can be adapted to a country’s
needs and to the local situation, as well as used to control other animal disease outbreaks. The
basic management features of the IMM are described below.
IMM MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
• INCIDENT COMMAND
- Sets the objectives, strategies, and priorities

- Has overall responsibility for managing the outbreak
• OPERATIONS
- Determines how operational objectives of the Outbreak Action Plan will be
accomplished
- Implements the plan
• PLANNING
- Develops the Outbreak Action Plan for accomplishing the objectives
- Collects and analyzes outbreak data, tracks resources (personnel, supplies, materials),
and maintains records of the outbreak and response
• LOGISTICS
- Provides support, resources, training and other services to meet the operational
objectives
• FINANCE/ADMINISTRATION
- Recruits personnel, tracks them and their time worked, and pays salaries
- Pays compensation if agreed upon, and all other invoices

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT MODEL (IMM)

Legal and Regulatory Framework
• Is there a veterinary legal and regulatory framework for plan implementation? If one exists, it
should include disease reporting, welfare concerns regarding mass culling and disposal of
infected livestock, compensation policies and human and animal movement restrictions.
Note: The need for appropriate legislation must be considered since this requires long-term planning in
most administrative systems. Laws, regulations and proclamations are required to give authorized people
the power to: proclaim a notifiable disease; enter a poultry enterprise or home to inspect birds or collect
specimens; define infected areas and disease control zones; institute quarantine of affected or suspect
premises; place movement controls on poultry, poultry products and potentially contaminated materials;
destroy and dispose of infected or potentially infected birds and contaminated materials; undertake
other disease control operations, such as compulsory vaccination if called for; place controls on the
operation of enterprises, such as poultry processing; plants and live bird markets.
Prevention Strategies
• Biosecurity – farms (sector definition), live bird markets, rapid response teams
• Surveillance – passive and active (poultry and wild birds), targeted surveillance, sample
types, testing of samples, field and lab testing, sample submission, screening and confirmatory
tests, frequency of testing, sampling locations, reporting, GIS, data management
Note: Surveillance for avian influenza utilizes both passive and active methods of surveillance. Passive
surveillance involves routine monitoring through normal laboratory submissions of dead or live birds,
normal health monitoring of flocks by farmers and veterinarians and at the village level, the submission
of normal mortality through animal health workers and gathering of information by animal health care
workers using a simple checklist or form. Passive surveillance at the village level should include adequate
public awareness about avian influenza and HPAI in particular, for it to be successful. Active surveillance
for AI is based on specific targeted investigations of at-risk populations for evidence of infection. It is
recommended that surveillance include commercial farms, wildlife habitats and wetland areas and
poultry located close to these areas, live bird markets, poultry slaughter houses and poultry in border
villages. Frequency of surveillance should be at least twice a year and maybe more for high risk
countries. Community based participatory surveillance methods should be developed to allow rural
residents to participate in any proposed surveillance network
• Importation bans- seaports, airports and border posts
Note: Countries should place importation bans on live poultry, poultry products wild birds and game
birds from HPAI infected countries and maintain the ban until there is sufficient proof of an HPAI-clean
status. Commercial poultry producers should make sure that their sources of chicks, hatching eggs or
pullets are certified disease-free. Import permits issued by the veterinary services should be required for
importation of poultry and poultry products.
• Improvement of veterinary service delivery including diagnostic capability- physical
structure rehabilitation, training of personnel, diagnostic equipment and supplies
• Equipment and supplies inventory - transportation, PPE, disinfectants, sampling
supplies, culling, disposal, communications equipment, data collection equipment, data
management equipment and supplies, etc.
• Personnel evaluation and training- rapid response teams (composition),

Note: Rapid response teams should include veterinary health officers, public health officers and
an outbreak response officer as the core team and can additionally have lab assistants,
paravets, police officers and in some cases even border agents in a supporting role. Everyone in
the team should receive training on HPAI disease recognition and control.
• Review of response plans – frequency and method
• Simulations – field or tabletop for testing and refining the plan, SOPs, coordinating
mechanisms
Note: Simulation exercises are used to test and refine emergency plans in advance of any
disease emergency. They are also a valuable means of building teams for emergency disease
responses and for training individual staff.
Simulation exercises may be carried out as a paper table top exercise or through mock
activities - or a combination of both. At the completion of each simulation exercise there should
be an analysis of the results. This review should identify areas where plans need to be modified
and further training is needed.
• Compensation strategy – preparation or update of existing strategy
Resource: Enhancing Control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in
Developing Countries through Compensation
http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/compensation.html

LESSON 3: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY
The following items should be included in a national plan to address readiness of response and
recovery.
• Case definition of suspect cases
- Sudden death and very high flock mortality
- Decreased egg production and poor shell quality
- Respiratory signs (gasping, sneezing, coughing)
- Oculonasal discharge
- Edema and cyanosis of face, wattles and comb
- Hemorrhages on shanks, footpads, skin of breast and thighs
- Diarrhea, incoordination and nervous signs
• Diagnostic capability – field tests, confirmatory tests, international testing and notification
- Field and Laboratory Diagnosis
• A rapid antigen detection immunoassay, often referred to as antigen capture ELISA,
is made by several companies is now available for field testing of cloacal, tracheal,
oropharyngeal and brain swabs for HPAI. Many of these tests have variable
sensitivities and should only be used as a screening tool. Combined with
unmistakable clinical signs, the tests can be used to make a presumptive diagnosis of
HPAI enough to initiate control actions. Final laboratory confirmation should be
done at an OIE reference laboratory using real time Reverse Transcriptase
Polymerase Chain Reaction (rRT-PCR) for rapid detection of the virus genome and
virus isolation for identification of the virus.
- Test Descriptions for HPAI
• Rapid Antigen Detection Tests – These are tests used for the rapid detection
of influenza Type A viral antigen from specimens such as tracheal, cloacal,
oropharyngeal and brain swabs. The test does yield false positives when other
proteins interfere. A positive test usually indicates the presence of influenza virus in
the respective tissues or samples and should be followed by virus isolation for
confirmation.
• Virus Isolation (VI) at an approved laboratory – This test utilizes 9-10 day-old
embryonated chicken eggs in which centrifuged or filtered samples of tracheal and
cloacal swabs or from organs are inoculated into the allantoic cavity. Embryo death
within 48 hrs indicates the presence of live virus. Allantoic fluid harvested from the
embryo (contains virus) is mixed with chicken red blood cells to test for
hemagglutinating activity (HA or Hemagglutination) as an additional confirmation. A
panel of antisera is then prepared to identify subtypes of avian influenza as well as
tell AI virus from Newcastle disease virus..
• Real Time, Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction (rRT –
PCR) - A rapid molecular test that can be used for diagnosis of type A influenza.
The test detects the presence of viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) with the use of matrix

(MA) gene specific primers and a fluorogenic probe. The assay can also help subtype
positive Type A influenza viruses into H5/H7 and non-H5/H7 types using specific
hemagglutination (HA) gene primers and probes. The test has higher sensitivity for
detecting virus in tracheal than in cloacal samples but has overall high sensitivity and
specificity when compared to virus isolation.
• Deployment of rapid response teams – How will they be deployed?
• Quarantine and movement control- quarantine declaration (legal authority), signage, entry
and exit points, disease zoning definitions
• Epidemiology- risk analysis, GIS, data management – How will this information be collected
and maintained?
• Outbreak surveillance – protection zone, surveillance zones in infected areas, live bird
markets
• Biosecurity protocols- infected and non-infected farms in outbreak area, rapid response
teams, live bird markets
• Culling methods – cervical dislocation, carbon dioxide, lethal injection for certain species
• Disposal methods – burial, burning or incineration and composting
• Decontamination - cleaning and disinfection, disinfectants
• Vaccination – Will vaccination be used, how will it be used, who provides the vaccine?
• Lifting of quarantine
• Restocking – Is there a plan for restocking?
• Payment of compensation – Will it be paid, who provides the money?
• National HPAI PRP review incorporating lessons learned

LESSON 4: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
Standard operating procedures are crucial to making National Preparedness and Response plans
implementable. Detailed descriptions of the activities below are required to make the plans work.
Additional SOPs can be added to the list depending on country requirements but must include the core
list set out below.
Biosecurity
• Commercial establishments- farm sanitation, flock management, location, housing, feed
delivery, vaccinations, traffic control
• Backyard flocks – semi-intensive and extensive systems – housing, sanitation, species, carcass
disposal
• Households- village flocks, health and hygiene,
• Live bird markets- cleaning and disinfection, market shut down, species,
• Rapid response teams- seasonal flu vaccinations, Tamiflu prophylaxis, traffic flow, PPE
Surveillance
• Surveillance and epidemiology network
• Surveillance types – active and passive for poultry and wild birds
• Surveillance locations
• Outbreak surveillance – infected farms, protected zone and surveillance zone
• Sampling size determination
• Sample collection (tracheal and cloacal swabs, blood), handling and preservation
• Sample submission to national and international laboratories
Quarantine and Movement Control
• Disease zoning definitions (infected premise, protection zone, surveillance zone)
• Quarantine control points
• Enforcement of movement control
One of the most difficult activities to implement during an outbreak, movement control is a priority
area where duties may be shared by the veterinary services and the police authorities.
Culling
• Cervical dislocation (manual and mechanical)
• Carbon dioxide gas
• Lethal injection (ratites)

Disposal methods
• Burial
• Burning or incineration
• Composting
Decontamination
• Disinfection of farms, litter and equipment
• Disinfection of laboratory equipment and environment
• Types and action of decontaminants
Compensation
• Compensation rates determination
• Payment methods
• Funding sources

LESSON 5: HUMAN HEALTH COMPONENT
AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN -- For many countries, having
an integrated PRP has its advantages. Resources can be better utilized and animal and public health
personnel can improve cooperation. Communication messages for both animal and public can be better
integrated with a plan that addresses both animal and public health.
Elements of the Human Health Component
• Public health infrastructure – what are the mechanisms of human health service delivery
• Human resources in public health sector
• Public health surveillance systems
• Laboratory facilities
• Emergency epidemiologic response plans

LESSON 6: COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC AWARENESS
COMPONENT
Elements of the Communications and Public Awareness Component
• Public awareness of HPAI
• National plan and mechanism for HPAI communication
• Technical capacity for HPAI communications
• State of mass media in the country
• National and local communication activities
• How do most people in the country get information - print, radio, TV?
Communications is an important component of both preparedness and response activities and is
usually the primary task of the Ministries of Information and Broadcasting in many countries. A
communications working group should be an integral part of a National AI Taskforce. The
component also serves as the link between the epidemiologic phases of bird to bird, bird to
human and the possible human to human pandemic phase. A citizenry that is well educated
about HPAI prior to an outbreak will react better than a citizenry without information. Sharp
drops in chicken and egg consumption and sales have been observed during HPAI outbreaks in
many countries where public awareness was low. Communications should be directed towards
the following issues:
• The need to safeguard human health, in particular for extension staff, animal health workers,
poultry producers, clinical staff and their families, by improving public awareness and
information of the risk of contracting human disease from birds suffering from HPAI.
• Communications efforts should also be aimed at the rural populations that raise most of the
poultry in many countries. Stopping animal to animal spread will decrease chances of animal
to human spread.
• To improve opportunities of early warning of an incursion of HPAI by improving public
knowledge of the disease (important for disease identification) and how to report suspected
cases. This is of prime importance in the village setting. Conventional and traditional
methods of communication should be utilized to emphasize reporting of dead birds. Target
groups should be the rural community. Hunters and fishermen should be included in the
communication strategy. They can be valuable for reporting wild bird deaths in forested
areas and in shoreline nesting sites (for waterfowl). Commercial farmers should also be well
educated about HPAI and its clinical signs and how best to protect their workers.

LESSON 7: FINANCIAL PLAN - FUNDING COMPONENT
Elements of the Financial Plan
Should include budgets for the following:
• Equipment (laboratory, culling, disposal, PPE)
• Training programs
• Surveillance activities
• Rehabilitation and construction of physical structures
• Indemnity, if planned
The financial plan should also specify the funding source(s) for implementation of the HPAI PRP.
LESSON 8: IMPORTANT APPENDICES
1. Contact lists (national hotlines)
2.HPAI disease facts
3.HPAI lab test descriptions
4. Sample types, sample collection and sample submission
5. International shipment of samples to OIE/FAO reference labs
6. Equipment list for surveillance, culling, disposal, decontamination
7. Types and action of disinfectants
8. Quarantine signage
9. Notice of depopulation (letter)
10. Forms – lab submission forms (national and international),disease investigation forms,
depopulation and compensation forms
11. Vaccination guide
12. List of important websites and links
13. FAO production sector description
14. Poultry population by region/district/county and species
15. National veterinary service organogram
16. Country map

TASK: CASE STUDY
Sample National Preparedness and Response Plan from Sarreh Samba
• You have been sent as experts to help the country of Sarreh Samba to review and revise
their “National Action Plan” for HPAI. You have been asked to come up with a set of
recommendations to improve the plan which has 5 components and is in a table form.
The components are:
1. Planning and Coordination
2. Surveillance, Situation Monitoring, Assessment and Containment
3. Quality Assurance in Avian Influenza Control
4. Case Management (Public Health)
5. Information, Education and Communication
• At your table, assign, assign a reporter for each group to compile answers. Each group will
be given a component of the plan to review and a checklist.
- Based on the portion of the plan that you have and the checklist provided, review your
section. What is missing in the plan?
- Is your part of the plan relevant to a preparedness and response plan? What would you
do to make it more relevant?
- Provide a list of 3-4 recommendations to improve the part of the plan you have been
assigned
- What about the overall structure of the plan? What would you recommend as a class?
• You have 30 minutes for the task.

REFERENCE MATERIALS AND IMPORTANT WEBSITES
Manual on the Preparation of National Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Plans - FAO
Preparing for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Manual for Countries at Risk – FAO/OIE
Manual
Avian Influenza Response Plan – Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture
WHO Checklist and Indicators for Optimizing the Impact of Polio Activities on EPI
The Use of Vaccination as an Option for the Control of Avian Influenza, OIE International
Committee paper, May 2003
Guidelines for In-House Composting Poultry Mortality as a Rapid Response to Avian Influenza,
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
“Countries Making Progress in Response to Avian Influenza - Situation Remains Serious In
Egypt, Indonesia and Nigeria”
http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/index.html
FAO: Animal Health Documents
http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/animalhealthdocs.html
FAO: Strategy and Policy documents
http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/strategydocs.html
FAO: Compensation
http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/compensation.html
The New Tool For Evaluation of Veterinary Services (PVS) Using OIE International Standards of
Quality and Evaluation
http://www.oie.int/eng/oie/organisation/en_vet_eval_tool.htm?e1d2
Checklist and Indicators for Optimizing the Impact of Polio Activities on EPI.
www.polioeradication.org/content/publications/checklist_optimizeactivities.pdf

HANDOUT: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
PLAN CHECKLIST
The following checklist can be used to assess the contents of a National PRP.
YES NO
Plan Structure
1. Is the plan divided into clearly defined components?
2. Do the components cover the following sections?
• Country Status?
• Prevention and Preparedness?
• Response and Recovery?
• Public Health?
• Public Awareness and Communications?
• A Financial/Funding Plan

Country Status and Assessment
1. Describes the country, geography, climate, population, and government
structure?
2. Describes the veterinary and public health service delivery system?
3. Includes information about the poultry production systems?
4. Species, numbers and associated economic importance of poultry?
5. Descriptions of poultry marketing systems, live bird markets and
distribution channels?
6. Any poultry slaughter and processing plants?
7. Any information on main migratory and wild bird resting spots?
8. Is there any interaction between wild birds and poultry mentioned in the
plan?
9. Is there a description of an ongoing active or passive animal health
surveillance?

Prevention and Preparedness
1. Any existing National HPAI PRP?
2. Does the existing plan have animal and human health and communication
components?
3. Does the plan mention a veterinary and legal framework for plan
implementation (As in an Animal Disease Act)?
4. Is there a clear command structure in the plan?
5. Any regional and local coordinating bodies?
6. Biosecurity programs on farms and live bird markets?
7. Is a biosecurity program in the plan for rapid response teams?
8. Is an equipment and supplies inventory included?
9. Formation of rapid response teams?
10. Information about number and level of training of animal health personnel?
11. Any plans to do simulations (field or tabletop)?
12. Any compensation information or strategy in plan?


YES NO
Response and Recovery
1. Is a case definition for HPAI described?
2. Any information about diagnostic capabilities, types of tests
international testing and notification?
3. Will rapid response teams be deployed to outbreaks?
4. Any plans included for quarantine and movement control?
5. Any plans for epidemiological work carried out during outbreak?
6. What about outbreak surveillance?
7. Any mention of biosecurity protocols during an outbreak?
8. Culling methods mentioned?
9. Disposal methods mentioned?
10. What about decontamination?
11. Is a vaccination strategy part of the plan?
12. Restocking program?
13. Does this section describe how compensation will be paid?
14. Any plans for a review of the entire plan after outbreak response?

Components of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
1. Does the plan have standard operating procedures?
2. If yes, have they been described for the following activities
• Biosecurity in commercial establishments
• Biosecurity in backyard flocks
• Biosecurity in households (village flocks)
• Biosecurity in livebird markets
• Biosecurity for rapid response teams (PPE, traffic flow)
3. Is there a description of surveillance activities?
• Surveillance and epidemiology networks?
• Surveillance types (active and passive for poultry and wild birds)
• Surveillance locations?
• Outbreak surveillance
• Sampling size determination?
• Sample collection, handling and preservation
• Sample submission to international labs
4. Do the SOPs include descriptions of how quarantine and movement
controls are going to be carried out?
• Have disease zoning definitions been included?
• What about quarantine control points?
• Enforcement of movement control?
5. Are culling procedures described?
• Descriptions of cervical dislocation?
• Use of carbon dioxide gas
• Lethal injection for ratites such as ostriches and emus
6. Have carcass disposal methods been described including carcass removal?
• Burial?
• Burning or incineration?
• Composting?


YES NO
Components of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (continued)
7. Decontamination procedures described?
• Disinfection of farms, litter and equipment?
• Disinfection of laboratory equipment and environment?
• List of types and action of disinfectants?
8. Compensation – Is there a strategy
• Compensation rates and determination?
• Payment methods outlined?
• Funding sources described?
Public Health Component
1. Does the plan have a public health component?
2. Public health infrastructure and health services delivery?
3. Human resources in the public health sector?
4. Any public health surveillance systems?
5. Any lab facilities?
6. Are there emergency epidemiologic response plans?

Communications and Public Awareness Component
1. Does the plan have a communications and public awareness component?
2. Does the plan mention public awareness of HPAI?
3. Is there a national plan and mechanism for HPAI communication?
4. Technical capacity for HPAI communications?
5. Does the plan describe the state of mass media in the country?
6. Description of national and local communication activities?
7. How do most people in the country get information?

Financial Plan (Is one included?)
1. Any budget included for equipment (culling, disposal
• Laboratory, PPEs etc.)
2. Budget for training programs?
3. Budget for surveillance activities
4. Budget for reconstruction and rehabilitation of physical structures
5. (labs, clinics, local response centers)?
6. 5) Indemnity, if planned.

Appendices
Any appendices included in the plan?
If so, are the following included?
1. Contact lists (National hotlines)
2. HPAI disease facts
3. HPAI lab test descriptions
4. Sample types, sample collection and sample submission


5. International shipment of samples to OIE/FAO reference labs
6. Equipment list for surveillance, culling, disposal, decontamination
7. Types and action of disinfectants
8. Quarantine signage
9. Notice of depopulation (letter)
10. Forms – lab submission forms (national and international),
disease investigation forms, depopulation and compensation forms
11. Vaccination guide
12. List of important websites and links
13. FAO production sector description
14. Poultry population by region/district/county and species
15. National veterinary service organogramme
16. Country map

HANDOUT: GENERIC ORGANOGRAMME FOR VETERINARY SERVICES
Deputy Director Animal
Health
Assistant Director
Animal Health
Principal Laboratory
Technologist
Senior Laboratory Technologist
Principal Vet. Officer
Regional Veterinary
Officers
District Veterinary
Officers
Director Livestock
Services
Deputy Director Animal
Production
Assistant Director Animal
Production
Principal Animal Production
Officer
Senior Animal Production Officer
Animal Production Officers
Principal Research
Officer
Laboratory Technologists
Senior Research Officer
Senior Livestock
Assistants
Research Officer
Livestock Assistants

HANDOUT: INCIDENT MANAGEMENT MODEL (IMM) FOR
ANIMAL HEALTH RESPONSE TO HPAI OUTBREAKS
Overview
In an outbreak, a successful response depends on:
• Making sure that tasks are assigned
- In every response, no matter the size, certain jobs or tasks must be successfully
completed.
• A single supervisor delegating, and being responsible for, the actions of all participants
- This prevents confusion.
• Good communication
- From the workers to the supervisors and from the supervisors to the workers
• IMM provides a flexible structure to accomplish these goals.

WHAT IS THE IMM
What is the IMM?
Incident Management Model (IMM) is a tool for effectively managing a Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza (HPAI) outbreak in poultry populations.
IMM is based on the Incident Command System (ICS) developed by the U.S. Forest Service and
now widely used to respond to disasters such as fires or floods, or to manage a planned event
such as a parade.
IMM, a model specifically designed for HPAI outbreaks, can be adapted to a country’s needs and
to the local situation; it can also be used to control other animal disease outbreaks.
Basic Organizational Features
The IMM for HPAI outbreaks in poultry uses some basic organizational features of the Incident
Command System (ICS):
• Modular and Flexible: as the size and complexity of the outbreak increases, the structure
expands from the top down as functions are delegated.
• Planning Process: Planning is deciding what will be done, how it will be done, who will do
it, and what resources will be needed. The lead agency assigned must have a clear
understanding of the national policy on managing the outbreak, and given the mandate and
authority to implement it. The planning process must include the following steps:
- Assess the current HPAI outbreak situation
- Establish outbreak management objectives
- Select appropriate strategy and actions required to manage the outbreak
- Implement the Outbreak Action Plan, and monitor performance
- Adapt if necessary (change strategy, add more resources, etc.)
• Outbreak Action Plan: an action plan is essential to an effective outbreak response. It
provides personnel with directions on how to implement the actions necessary to manage
the outbreak. The plan must:
- Specify outbreak management objectives, how to achieve these objectives, how long it
will take to achieve these objectives, and who will perform these actions
- Indicate what resources (personnel, supplies, equipment, etc.) will be needed to
accomplish these objectives
- Provide a means of communicating the overall objectives to the supervisors
- Outline a procedure in the event that someone gets injured or sick during the outbreak
operations
• Span of Control
- The number of people a supervisor can manage effectively during the outbreak response
- Effective span of control may be between 3-7 persons; ideally, one supervisor to five
people

• Unity of Command
- Each individual working in the outbreak response is accountable to only one designated
supervisor
- Supervisors must be able to control the actions of their personnel
• Chain of Command
- The line of authority within the ranks of the organization
- Lower levels within the organization are connected to higher levels
- Lower levels are accountable to their higher-level supervisors
• Unified Command
- Representatives from different ministries, agencies, regional or local offices work
together under one command
- Under unified command, there is always:
• One Incident Commander (IC)
• One outbreak command post from where the response is managed
• A single Outbreak Action Plan
Management Functions
Incident Command
• Sets the objectives, strategies, and priorities
• Has overall responsibility for managing the outbreak
Operations
• Determines how operational objectives of the Outbreak Action Plan will be accomplished
• Implements the plan
Planning
• Develops the Outbreak Action Plan for accomplishing the objectives
• Collects and analyzes outbreak data, tracks resources (personnel, supplies, materials), and
maintains records of the outbreak and response
Logistics
• Provides support, resources, training, and other services to meet the operational objectives
Finance/Administration
• Recruits personnel, tracks them and their time worked, and pays salaries
• Pays agreed-upon compensation, and all other invoices

Organizational Staff
The Incident Commander (IC) is responsible for overall management of the HPAI outbreak
response. The IC position is always staffed, even if the other positions are not filled. The IC
may assign other personnel as needed to assist in managing the outbreak. IMM personnel are
categorized as either Command Staff or General Staff.
Command Staff
The Incident Commander (IC) is:
• In charge of overall outbreak response at the outbreak site
• Normally assigned by the lead Ministry (if Vet Services Dept, the IC typically is the Regional
Veterinary Officer)
• May be assisted by District Veterinary Officers, veterinary technicians, para-veterinarians,
trained farmer assistants, and others as necessary
• Command Staff
• The Incident Commander may have Command Staff (i.e. Information Officer, Liaison Officer,
etc.) to carry out duties not identified under General Staff responsibilities. Command Staff
report directly to the Incident Commander.
Information Officer Activities:
• Assists the Incident Commander in providing groups such as the national AI Task Force, the
ministries, governors, local officials, the media, donors, NGOs and other relevant groups
with general information on the outbreak response
• Works closely with the Situation Reports Unit to get the latest outbreak information
The Information Officer and the Incident Commander are the only persons authorized to
provide official information. All information for public release needs to be cleared by the IC.
Liaison Officer Activities:
• Assists the Incident Commander in coordinating with the national AI Task Force and donors
to ensure that outbreak response activities are complementary and do not duplicate other
ongoing efforts
• Represents the Incident Commander at donor coordination meetings if the IC is not available
The Liaison Officer reports directly to the Incident Commander.
General Staff
General Staff are assigned functional responsibilities for Operations, Planning, Logistics, and
Finance/Administration.
The staffing levels for General Staff are, from the top down:
• Section (led by Chiefs)
• Group (led by Supervisors)
• Unit (led by Leaders)

Operations Section
• Epidemiology Group
- Surveillance Unit
- Diagnostics Unit
- Outbreak Mapping Unit
• Biosecurity Group
- Commercial Backyard
Farm Unit
- Live Bird Markets Unit
- Quarantine Support Unit
• Depopulation Group
- Culling Unit
- Disposal Unit
- Decontamination Unit
Surveillance
Unit
Veterinary
Officer
• Public/Occupational Health Group
- Public Health Unit
- Occupational Health Unit
MOA MOH
Commercial
Backyard
A Veterinary Officer typically leads this section.
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Biosecurity
Group
Epidemiology
Group
Depopulation
Group
Diagnostics
Unit
Outbreak
Mapping Unit
Farm
Live Bird
Markets
Quarantine
Support Unit
FINANCE/ADMINISTRATION
Section
Liaison
Officer
Public/
Occupational
Health
Group
Public Health
Unit
Information
Officer
Rapid Response
Team
Human
Health
Officer
Site
Manager
Team 1
Site Manager
Culling
Unit
Disposal
Unit
Decontami-nation
Unit
Occupational
Health Unit

• Epidemiology Group
- Surveillance Unit
- Diagnostics Unit
- Outbreak Mapping Unit
A Veterinary Epidemiologist typically
leads this group.
The group provides daily updates to
the Situation Reports Unit on
activities within its group.
- Surveillance Unit Activities:
Surveillance
Unit
• Conducts active surveillance in the infected
premises and the protection zone (or FAO
“infected zone”), usually 3 km around the
index case
• Conducts active and passive surveillance
within the surveillance and control zone (or
FAO “threatened zone”), usually 3-7 km
outside the quarantine zone
• Performs field/screening diagnostic tests on
clinical samples
• Collects and sends clinical samples to the
Diagnostics Unit for forwarding to the
national laboratory
- Diagnostics Unit Activities:
• Packages and ships samples to a national diagnostic or reference laboratory for
confirmation
• Compiles test results from Surveillance Unit activities and the national laboratory,
and reports results to the Epidemiology Supervisor
- Outbreak Mapping Unit Activities:
• Maintains maps showing the outbreak areas
• Records the locations of the outbreak areas
• Helps determine the outbreak zoning areas in coordination with the Quarantine
Group
• Provides outbreak maps to the outbreak personnel
• may use GIS technology if available
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Biosecurity
Group
Epidemiology
Group
Depopulation
Group
Diagnostics
Unit
Outbreak
Mapping Unit
Section
Liaison
Officer
Public/
Occupational
Health
Group
Information
Officer
Rapid Response
Team
MOA MOH
ZONES

• Biosecurity
Group
- Commercial
Backyard Farm
Unit
- Live Bird
Markets Unit
- Quarantine
Support Unit
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Biosecurity
Group
Epidemiology
Group
Depopulation
Group
Farm
Commercial
Backyard
Live Bird
Markets
Quarantine
Support Unit
The group provides daily updates to the Situation Reports Unit on activities within its group.
A Veterinary or Livestock Officer typically leads this group.
- Commercial Backyard Farm Unit Activities:
• Evaluates, and if necessary, trains commercial farmers on biosecurity in the outbreak
areas
- Continuously monitors and reinforces biosecurity principles
• Trains backyard flock owners in the outbreak area on biosecurity measures
- Continuously monitors and reinforces backyard biosecurity measures
- Live Bird Markets Unit (LBM) Activities:
• The LBM Biosecurity Unit advises local authorities on LBM management to stop the
spread of disease:
- When possible, recommends temporary closure and disinfection of live bird
markets in the outbreak areas
- If live bird markets are allowed to stay open, trains LBM managers and workers
on appropriate biosecurity measures and sanitation procedures
• Coordinates with the government inspection service to ensure only healthy
chickens are sold
- Quarantine Support Unit Activities:
• Establishes quarantine zone boundaries, provides quarantine information (e.g.
entry/exit points, signs) and training to appropriate authorities for enforcement
• Coordinates with the Outbreak Mapping Unit to provide map information to
identify quarantine zone boundaries and control points for the appropriate
authorities
• Provides or arranges for technical personnel (i.e. inspections, biosecurity
compliance) to assist authorities at control points
Once the IC declares that the outbreak has been controlled, this unit informs local authorities
that the quarantine is over, and ensures that quarantine restrictions in all areas are lifted.
Section
Liaison
Officer
Public/
Occupational
Health
Group
Information
Officer
Rapid Response
Team
MOA MOH

• Depopulation
Group
- Culling Unit
- Disposal Unit
- Decontamination
Unit
MOA MOH
The group provides daily
updates to the Situation
Reports Unit on ongoing
depopulation activities.
A Veterinary or Livestock Officer typically leads this group.
Depending on the size of the outbreak, the Depopulation Group may have multiple teams in
different outbreak locations.
A site Team Leader (from within the Depopulation Group) is assigned to supervise
depopulation activities in each location.
- Culling Unit Activities:
Culling
Unit
• Identifies the most appropriate, safe and humane method of euthanizing infected
birds
• Trains personnel on euthanasia techniques, biosecurity, biosafety, and occupational-safety
measures
• Supervises the euthanasia of all infected and potentially-infected poultry
• If necessary, coordinates the removal of the euthanized poultry and its
transportation to the disposal site
- Disposal Unit Activities:
• Identifies the best method (burial, burning, etc.) and location for disposal of culled
birds
• Trains personnel on disposal techniques, biosecurity, biosafety, and occupational
safety measures
• Supervises personnel disposing infected poultry and poultry products to ensure
proper and safe disposal
• Ensures appropriate measures are in place to protect the environment during and
after disposal
- Decontamination Unit Activities:
• Identifies appropriate disinfectants for procurement
• Trains, supervises, and monitors personnel on disinfectant preparation and cleaning
and disinfection procedures
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Biosecurity
Group
Epidemiology
Group
Depopulation
Group
Section
Liaison
Officer
Public/
Occupational
Health
Group
Information
Officer
Rapid Response
Team
Team 1
Site Manager
Disposal
Unit
Decontami-nation
Unit

• Stresses the importance of proper cleaning prior to disinfection
• Supervises cleaning and disinfection of infected premises and surrounding areas
• Ensures appropriate measures are in place to protect the environment during
decontamination
• Public/Occupational Health
Group
- Public Health Unit
- Occupational Health Unit
The group provides daily updates on
its activities to the Situation Reports
Unit.
A Health Officer typically leads this group.
- Public Health Unit Activities:
Incident
Commander
MOA MOH
PLANNING
Section
• Informs MOH on ongoing outbreak response activities
• Coordinates with MOH on its clinical investigation in human populations potentially
exposed to HPAI
- Occupational Health Unit Activities:
• Recommends actions to minimize occupational-health hazards in the outbreak
response areas
• Ensures that all occupational-health policies and procedures are in place and are
being followed
- Ensures all outbreak personnel are properly trained (e.g. PPEs)
- Conducts respiratory fit tests on all outbreak personnel
• Monitors the health of outbreak personnel and their families during and after the
outbreak response, and refers sick individuals to the hospital
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Biosecurity
Group
Epidemiology
Group
Depopulation
Group
Section
Liaison
Officer
Public/
Occupational
Health
Group
Public Health
Unit
Information
Officer
Rapid Response
Team
Occupational
Health Unit

Planning Section
• Outbreak Information
Management Group
- Surveillance Support Unit
- Central Disease Reporting
Unit
- Situation Reports Unit
• Recovery Group
- Compensation Unit
- Recovery Unit
MOA MOH
Information
Officer
Surveillance
Support Unit
The Planning Chief is typically a government administrator or planner.
• Outbreak Information
Management Group
- Surveillance Support Unit
- Central Disease Reporting
Unit
- Situation Reports Unit
A Veterinary Officer typically leads
this group.
- Surveillance Support Unit Activities:
Compensation
Unit
MOA MOH
Information
Officer
Surveillance
Support Unit
• Plans future surveillance based on ongoing outbreak operations
• Provides the Supplies Group logistical requirements (supplies, PPEs, test kits, etc.)
for ongoing and future surveillance activities
• Assists with surveillance after outbreak has been controlled
- Central Disease Reporting Unit Activities:
• Functions as the central point for all data and information collected from the
outbreak
• Maintains all outbreak databases, including lab results, infected premises, culling, and
surveillance locations
- In a GIS database if possible
- Produces comprehensive maps on all outbreak activities from above databases
- Situation Reports Unit Activities:
• Writes regular (typically, daily) updates/reports on ongoing outbreak situation for
Incident Commander
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Recovery
Group
Outbreak Info
Management
Group
Central
Disease
Reporting Unit
Recovery
Unit
Section
Liaison
Officer
Situation
Reports Unit
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Recovery
Group
Outbreak Info
Management
Group
Central
Disease
Reporting Unit
Section
Liaison
Officer
Situation
Reports Unit

• Provides situational information to the Information Officer (through the IC) to
respond to external requests for information from ministries, national, regional and
local governments, offices, NGOs, media, donors, etc.
• Recovery Group
- Compensation Unit
- Recovery Unit
A Veterinary or Livestock Officer typically
leads this group.
- Compensation Unit Activities:
• Adapts a national compensation
MOA MOH
Compensation
Unit
plan (if it exists) to local conditions
- Provides information on pricing, payment methods, and documentation of
compensation
• If compensation plan is implemented, coordinates with the Depopulation Group and
Cashier Unit for compensation payments
- Recovery Unit Activities:
• Develops follow-on surveillance plans to monitor for disease re-occurrence in areas
where outbreak has been controlled
• Plans for reinforcing biosecurity measures
• Recommends alternative livelihood recovery options such as restocking of poultry,
or paying compensation to affected farmers
- Submits a recovery plan and budget for consideration of the national
government
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Recovery
Group
Outbreak Info
Management
Group
Recovery
Unit
Section
Liaison
Officer
Information
Officer

Logistics Section
• Facilities Group
- Base Camp Unit
- Sanitary Services Unit
• Supply Group
- Supply Inventory Unit
- Equipment Unit
- Provisions Unit
• Support Group
- Operations Support Unit
- Transport Unit
- Communications Unit
- Demobilization Unit
MOA MOH
OPERATIONS
Section
The Logistics Chief is usually a government administrator.
• Facilities Group
- Base Camp Unit
An administrative officer typically leads this group.
- Base Camp Unit Activities:
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
Supply
Group
Support
Group
Facilities
Group
Base Camp
Unit
Sanitary
Services Unit
• Manages all base camp activities
• Determines locations and manages the supply stockpiles, rest and refreshment
areas, washing and sanitary services areas
• Provides shelter for outbreak personnel as needed
• Secures the base camp, especially supply stockpiles
• Provides adequate facilities (wash and sanitation areas, water, soap, etc.) for
outbreak personnel
• If needed, assists with the disposal of used PPEs and contaminated supplies
• If needed, assists with cleaning and disinfection of contaminated equipment for re-use
Section
Supply
Inventory Unit
Equipment
Unit
Provisions
Unit
Liaison
Officer
Operations
Support Unit
Transport
Unit
Communica-tions
Unit
Demobilization
Unit
Information
Officer

• Supply Group
- Equipment Unit
- Provisions Unit
An administrative officer typically
leads this group.
MOA MOH
Activities:
• Manages and issues all outbreak supplies, including:
- PPEs
- Surveillance supplies
- Disinfectants
- Cleaning supplies
- Maps
- Fuel for outbreak equipment
- Provisions (food and water)
• Monitors outflow of commodities during outbreak operations to plan for future
needs
• Orders outbreak supplies as needed
- Equipment Unit Activities:
• Manages outbreak equipment, such as backpack sprayers, digging tools, tractors,
bulldozers, etc.
• Issues equipment and ensures return, and requests additional equipment as needed
• Provides training to outbreak personnel in use of equipment if required
• Develops and enforces cleaning and disinfection procedures for outbreak equipment
• Maintains inventory and location of outbreak equipment
- Provisions Unit
• Provides supplies to outbreak personnel
• Provides food and water to outbreak personnel working in remote locations (e.g.
depopulation activities)
• Issues clean clothes, rubber boots or other supplies to outbreak personnel if
needed
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Supply
Group
Support
Group
Facilities
Group
Section
Supply
Inventory Unit
Equipment
Unit
Provisions
Unit
Liaison
Officer
Information
Officer

• Support Group
- Operations Support Unit
- Transport Unit
- Communications Unit
- Demobilization Unit
An administrative officer typically leads this
group.
- Operations Support Unit Activities:
Incident
Commander
MOA MOH
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
• Functions as central point for requests for supplies, equipment, personnel, or
services from groups within the Operations Section
• Fills requests and delivers to operational site
Supply
Group
- Individuals or operational teams can also get supplies from the Supply Group if
needed
• Schedules delivery of sanitary services
• Coordinates with Personnel Unit to provide personnel to assist in field operations,
and coordinates with Transport Unit as needed
- Transport Unit Activities:
• Provides transportation of personnel, commodities, supplies, equipment, and waste
• Manages transportation assets (government or leased vehicles)
• Manages fuel supply
• Ensures that all transportation assets are cleaned and disinfected
- Communications Unit Activities
• Manages the communications and electronic equipment used in outbreak response,
such as radios, cell phones, computers, laptops, GPS units, software, etc.
• Prepares a communications plan for the most effective use of equipment
• Ensures continuous communication links between the incident command post and
the national coordination level
- Demobilization Unit Activities:
• Prepares the demobilization plan
• Dismantles the operations set-up and base camp
• Cleans, disinfects and stores equipment for future use
• Inventories and returns unused AI commodities to appropriate storage facility
Support
Group
Facilities
Group
Section
Liaison
Officer
Operations
Support Unit
Transport
Unit
Communica-tions
Unit
Demobilization
Unit
Information
Officer

Finance/Administration
Section
• Personnel Group
- Personnel Unit
- Training Unit
- Time Keeping Unit
• Finance Group
- Procurement Unit
- Accounts Payable Unit
- Cashier Unit
The Finance/Administration Chief sets the maximum cash payment allowed per transaction.
A Personnel or Finance Officer typically leads this section.
• Personnel Group
- Personnel Unit
- Training Unit
- Time Keeping Unit
An administrative officer typically
leads this group.
- Personnel Unit Activities:
MOA MOH
• Recruits and manages personnel for outbreak response
• Tracks and accounts for all personnel while operation is ongoing (check-in and
check-out)
• Coordinates with Training Unit to ensure all personnel are properly trained
• Identifies to the Public/Occupational Health Group the outbreak personnel needing
training in public and occupational health safety, and health monitoring
- Training Unit Activities:
• Provides required training to outbreak personnel as defined in the national
preparedness plan
- PPEs
- Biosecurity
- Biosafety
- Safety
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Section
Finance
Group
Personnel
Group
Liaison
Officer
Personnel
Unit
Training
Unit
Time Keeping
Unit
Procurement
Unit
Accounts
Payable Unit
Information
Officer
Cashier
Unit
MOA MOH
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Section
Finance
Group
Personnel
Group
Liaison
Officer
Personnel
Unit
Training
Unit
Time Keeping
Unit
Information
Officer

- Occupational health
• Provides specific job-required trainings (e.g. culling, cleaning and disinfection,
disposal)
- Time Keeping Unit Activities:
• Documents time worked by outbreak personnel
• Approves timesheets for payment by Cashier Unit
Finance Group
- Procurement Unit
- Accounts Payable Unit
- Cashier Unit
A government official from the Ministry of
Agriculture, or a Comptroller (someone
who controls payments) typically leads
this group.
- Procurement Unit Activities:
• Purchases goods and supplies for use in outbreak response (through the MoAg
Procurement Office if appropriate)
• Procures services of personnel needed for outbreak response (through the MoAg
Procurement Office if appropriate)
• Drafts and reviews contracts or provides specifications for goods and services
associated with the outbreak response
- Accounts Payable Unit Activities:
• Receives and maintains a log of invoices associated with the outbreak response
• Coordinates with Comptroller approval of invoices for payment
• Coordinates with the Compensation Unit to approve payment for culled birds
- Cashier Unit Activities:
• Maintains cash control
- Ensures payments do not exceed amount of funds received
- Ensures maximum cash payment limits are not exceeded
• Disburses funds
• Pays personnel and approved invoices related to the outbreak response, including
compensation payments
Incident
Commander
PLANNING
Section
LOGISTICS
Section
OPERATIONS
Section
Section
Finance
Group
Personnel
Group
Liaison
Officer
Procurement
Unit
Accounts
Payable Unit
Information
Officer
Cashier
Unit
MOA MOH

HANDOUT: FAO POULTRY SECTORS

MODULE 3: OIE AI
STANDARDS AND FAO AI
PROGRAMS
MODULE PURPOSE
Overview of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) avian influenza standards for surveillance,
diagnosis, disease reporting and status; and of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) AI-related
programs.
MODULE OBJECTIVES
At the conclusion of this module, you will be able to:
• Explain OIE avian influenza disease guidelines on reporting;
• Describe what is required to declare freedom from disease in a zone or compartment;
• Identify the distinctions and complementarities between the OIE and FAO, and
• Describe the FAO programs that address HPAI control.

STOP AI
WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR
ANIMAL HEALTH (OIE) AVIAN
INFLUENZA STANDARDS
Prepared by Dr. James E. Pearson, Animal Health Consultant
STOP AI
WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH
(OIE) AVIAN INFLUENZA STANDARDS
• Overview of the OIE
• Guidelines for Avian Influenza Disease Reporting and
Status
• Avian Influenza Diagnostic Standards
• Determination of Avian Influenza Disease Status
• Guidelines on Surveillance for Avian Influenza

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OVERVIEW OF THE WORLD
ORGANIZATION FOR ANIMAL
HEALTH (OIE)
12 rue de Prony
75017 Paris, France
http://www.oie.int
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WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH
(OIE)
• Formed in 1924 (not a UN organization)
• 169 member countries
• The OIE country delegate is usually the Chief
Veterinary Officer
• Headquarters is in Paris, France
• Director General is Dr. B. Vallat
• Central Bureau has a staff of about 65 people
• Five regional offices of about two people each
• Most of the OIE outputs are developed by experts,
who volunteer their time.

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THE OIE’S OBJECTIVES
• To ensure transparency in the global animal disease
and zoonosis situation (reason for its formation in
1924)
• Within its WTO mandate, to safeguard world trade by
publishing health standards for international trade in
animals and animal products (standard-setting role)
• To collect, analyze, and disseminate scientific
veterinary information
• To provide expertise and encourage international
solidarity in the control of animal diseases
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OIE OBJECTIVES (CONT.)
• To improve the legal framework and resources of
national veterinary services
• To provide a better guarantee of the safety of animal-originated
food
• To promote animal welfare, through a science-based
approach

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OIE INFORMATION SYSTEM
ª
Promote transparency in
and knowledge of
global animal disease situation
STOP AI
OIE’S INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
• Enhance safety of international trade of animals and
animal products
• Encourage harmonization of national legislations and
control measures
• Narrow the gap between rich and poor countries
• Surveillance and control of animal diseases
and zoonoses
• Promote fairer trade (fewer unjustified restrictions on
trade)

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SPECIALIST COMMISSIONS
• Are made up of volunteers from member countries
who are experts
• Role is to use current scientific information to:
– Develop and revise OIE’s International Standards
– Study problems of epidemiology and the prevention and
control of animal diseases
– Address scientific and technical issues raised by member
countries
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SPECIALIST COMMISSIONS (cont.)
Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission
Code Commission
Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases
Scientific Commission
Biological Standards Commission
Laboratories Commission
Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission
Aquatic Animals Commission

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Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission
Code Commission
Responsible for annually updating
the Terrestrial Animal Health Code,
ensuring it reflects current scientific
information
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Biological Standards Commission
Laboratories Commission
Oversees production of the Manual
of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines
for Terrestrial Animals
Establishes or approves methods for:
• diagnosing diseases of mammals,
birds and bees
• testing biological products, such as
vaccines, that are used for control
purposes

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OIE AI REFERENCE LABORATORIES
• Laboratories have expertise and capability to
completely characterize AI isolates. They are located
in:
– Insel Riems, Germany
– Hew Haw, U.K.
– Geelong, Australia
– Padova, Italy
– Ames, Iowa, U.S.
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THE OIE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
• The highest authority of the OIE
• Comprised of all the OIE delegates, usually the Chief
Veterinary Officer
• Meets at least once a year
• Elects the members of the Specialist Commissions
All official acts of the OIE must be approved by the
International Committee; most of the decisions are by
consensus.

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AVIAN INFLUENZA DISEASE
GUIDELINES
Terrestrial Animal Health Code
Chapter 1.1.1
STOP AI
AVIAN INFLUENZA DISEASE GUIDELINES
• Notifiable Avain Influenza (NAI): infection of poultry
caused by any influenza A virus of the H5 or H7
subtypes or by any AI virus with an intravenous
pathogenicity index (IVPI) greater than 1.2, or as an
alternative, at least 75% mortality in inoculated
chickens

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AVIAN INFLUENZA DISEASE GUIDELINES (CONT.)
• Highly Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza
(HPNAI): has an IVPI in 6-week-old chickens greater
than 1.2 or, as an alternative, causes at least 75%
mortality in 4-to 8-week-old chickens infected
intravenously. H5 and H7 viruses which do not have
an IVPI of greater than 1.2 or cause less than 75%
mortality in an intravenous lethality test should be
sequenced to determine whether multiple basic
amino acids are present at the cleavage site of the
hemagglutinin molecule; if the amino acid motif is
similar to that observed for other HPNAI isolates, the
isolate being tested should be considered as HPNAI.
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• Low Pathogenicity Notifiable Avian Influenza
(LPNAI): all influenza A viruses of H5 and H7 subtype
that are not HPNAI viruses.

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• Avian Influenza that is not notifiable:
– Isolations of H1-4, H6, H8-16 “non-pathogenic”
avian influenza strains.
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• Zone or region: means a clearly defined part of a
country containing an animal subpopulation with a
distinct health status with respect to a specific
disease for which required surveillance, control and
biosecurity measures have been applied for the
purpose of international trade

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• Compartment: means one or more establishments
under a common biosecurity management system
containing an animal subpopulation with a distinct
health status with respect to a specific disease or
diseases for which required surveillance, control and
biosecurity measures have been applied for the
purpose of international trade
STOP AI
AVIAN INFLUENZA DISEASE GUIDELINES:
ZONING AND COMPARTMENTALIZATION
• Zoningapplies to an animal subpopulation, defined
primarily on a geographical basis (using natural,
artificial or legal boundaries)
• Compartmentalization applies to an animal
subpopulation, defined primarily by management and
husbandry practices related to biosecurity
In practice, spatial considerations, biosafety,
biosecurity, and good management play important
roles in the application of both concepts.

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Avian Influenza Disease Guidelines (cont.)
• Poultry: all domesticated birds used for the
production of meat or eggs for consumption, for the
production of other commercial products, for
restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these
categories of birds
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OIE AVIAN INFLUENZA
DIAGNOSTIC STANDARDS
Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals
Chapter 2.7.12

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CLASSICAL AVIAN INFLUENZA DIAGNOSTIC
METHODS, OIE
• Isolation in embryonating chicken eggs, virus
identification by hemagglutination and neuraminidase
inhibition, and characterization by chicken inoculation
• This method requires a biosafety level 3 laboratory
STOP AI
ALTERNATIVE AVIAN INFLUENZA DIAGNOSTIC
METHODS
• Biosafety level 2 methods:
– Avian influenza antigen capture ELISA test
– Perform PCR on tissue or swab samples using primers to
screen for AI viruses and if positive, test with primers to
evaluate if virus is H5 or H7
– Submit to an OIE Reference Laboratory for characterization
– Serology: Immunodiffusion, ELISA

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AVIAN INFLUENZA DISEASE
STATUS
Chapter 2.7.12
STOP AI
AI DISEASE STATUS, OIE CODE
• NAI status of a country, a zone or a compartment is
determined on the basis of the following:
– outcome of a risk assessment
– NAI is notifiable in the whole country
– appropriate surveillance is in place

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NAI FREEDOM, OIE CODE
• A country, zone or compartment may be considered
free from NAI when it has been shown that neither
HPNAI nor LPNAI infection has been present in the
country, zone, or compartment in the past 12 months,
based on surveillance in accordance with
Appendix 3.8.9 of the OIE Code
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NAI FREEDOM, OIE CODE (CONT.)
• Imports will come from a country, zone, or
compartment NAI free and veterinary administrators
shall meet the other requirements contained in the
OIE Code

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NAI FREEDOM, FOLLOWING AN OUTBREAK, OIE
CODE
• In the case of HPNAI infections, freedom can be
declared three months after a stamping-out policy
(including disinfection of all affected establishments)
is applied, providing that surveillance in accordance
with Appendix 3.8.9 has been carried out during that
three-month period.
STOP AI
GUIDELINES ON
SURVEILLANCE FOR
AVIAN INFLUENZA
Appendix 3.8.9
(MORE DETAILS LATER IN THE COURSE)

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OIE NAI SURVEILLANCE
• Early warning system throughout the production,
marketing and processing chain for reporting suspect
NAI cases
• System for detecting and investigating outbreaks of
disease or NAI infection
• Procedures in place for the rapid collection and
transport of samples to the laboratory, and for the
performance of appropriate tests
STOP AI
OIE NAI SURVEILLANCE (CONT.)
• A system in place for recording, managing and
analyzing diagnostic and surveillance data
• Implement, when relevant, regular and frequent
clinical inspection, and serological and virological
testing of high-risk groups of animals
• Both design of the survey and the basis for the
sampling process need to be aimed at the population
within the country, zone, or compartment

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• Surveillance should cover all the susceptible poultry
species within the country, zone, or compartment.
Active and passive surveillance for NAI should be
ongoing. Active surveillance should occur at least
every six months. Surveillance should be composed
of random and targeted approaches using virological,
serological and clinical methods.
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• Virological surveillance should be conducted:
– to monitor at-risk populations
– to confirm clinically-suspect cases
– to follow up positive serological results
– to test ‘‘normal’’ daily mortality

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OIE NAI SEROLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE
• Serological surveillance aims at the detection of
antibodies against NAIV. Positive NAIV (H5 or H7)
antibody test results can have four possible causes:
– natural infection with NAIV
– vaccination against NAI
– maternal antibodies derived from a vaccinated or infected
parent flock are usually found in the yolk and can persist in
progeny for up to 4 weeks
– positive results due to the lack of specificity of the test
STOP AI
OIE NAI VIROLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE
FOLLOWING THE DETECTION OF AI ANTIBODY
• Virological testing should be initiated in all antibody-positive
flocks. The samples should be evaluated for
the presence of AI virus, by virus isolation and
identification, and/or detection of influenza A-specific
proteins or nucleic acids.

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