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Security Engineering

                                                           Lecture 2




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010               Slide 1
Topics covered
  •       Design guidelines for security
        –       Guidelines that help you design a secure system

  •       Design for deployment
        –       Design so that deployment problems that may introduce
                vulnerabilities are minimized

  •       System survivability
        –       Allow the system to deliver essential services when under
                attack




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                Slide 2
Design guidelines for security
                 engineering
                                                 •         Design guidelines encapsulate
                                                           good practice in secure systems
                                                           design. They help the designer
                                                           make design decisions.
                                                 •         Design guidelines:
                                                       –     Raise awareness of security issues in
                                                             a software engineering team.
                                                             Security is considered when design
                                                             decisions are made.
                                                       –     Can be used as the basis of a review
                                                             checklist that is applied during the
                                                             system validation process.
Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                                    Slide 3
Design guidelines for secure
              systems engineering
                            Security guidelines

                            Base security decisions on an explicit security policy

                            Avoid a single point of failure

                            Fail securely

                            Balance security and usability

                            Log user actions

                            Use redundancy and diversity to reduce risk

                            Validate all inputs

                            Compartmentalize your assets

                            Design for deployment

                            Design for recoverability

Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                             Slide 4
Design guidelines 1-3
  •       Base decisions on an explicit security policy
        –       Define a security policy for the organization that sets out the
                fundamental security requirements that should apply to all
                organizational systems.

  •       Avoid a single point of failure
        –       Ensure that a security failure can only result when there is
                more than one failure in security procedures. For example,
                have password and question-based authentication.

  •       Fail securely
        –       When systems fail, for whatever reason, ensure that sensitive
                information cannot be accessed by unauthorized users even
                although normal security procedures are unavailable.
Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                  Slide 5
Design guidelines 4-6
  •       Balance security and usability
        –       Try to avoid security procedures that make the system
                difficult to use. Sometimes you have to accept weaker
                security to make the system more usable.

  •       Log user actions
        –       Maintain a log of user actions that can be analyzed to
                discover who did what. If users know about such a log, they
                are less likely to behave in an irresponsible way.

  •       Use redundancy and diversity to reduce risk
        –       Keep multiple copies of data and use diverse infrastructure
                so that an infrastructure vulnerability cannot be the single
                point of failure.
Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                 Slide 6
Design guidelines 7-10
 •    Validate all inputs
     –   Check that all inputs are within range so that unexpected
         inputs cannot cause problems.

 •    Compartmentalize your assets
     –   Organize the system so that assets are in separate areas and
         users only have access to the information that they need
         rather than all system information.

 •    Design for deployment
     –   Design the system to avoid deployment problems

 •    Design for recoverability
     –          Design the system to simplify recoverability after a successful
                attack.
Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                 Slide 7
Software deployment




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010   Slide 8
Design for deployment
  •       Deployment involves configuring software to operate
          in its working environment, installing the system and
          configuring it for the operational platform.
  •       Vulnerabilities may be introduced at this stage as a
          result of configuration mistakes.
  •       Designing deployment support into the system can
          reduce the probability that vulnerabilities will be
          introduced.




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010    Slide 9
Configuration vulnerabilities
  •       Vulnerable default settings
        –       Attackers can find out the default settings for software. If
                these are weak (often to increase usability) then they can be
                exploited by users when attacking a system.

  •         Development rather than deployment
        –       Some configuration settings in systems are designed to
                support development and debugging. If these are not turned
                off, they can be a vulnerability that can be exploited by
                attackers.

  •       Access permissions
        –       Access permissions to system assets may be set incorrectly

Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                Slide 10
Deployment support 1
                                                           •   Include support for viewing
                                                               and analyzing
                                                               configurations
                                                           •   Make sure that a system
                                                               administrator responsible
                                                               for deployment can easily
                                                               view the entire
                                                               configuration. This makes
                                                               it easier to spot omissions
                                                               and errors that have been
                                                               made.

Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                              Slide 11
Deployment support 2
            •       Localize configuration settings
                  –       When setting up a system, all information that is relevant
                          to the same part or component of a system should be
                          localized so that it is all set up at once.
                  –       Otherwise, it is easy to forget to set up related security
                          features.

            •       Minimize default privileges and thus limit the
                    damage that might be caused
                  –       Design the system so that the default privileges for an
                          administrator are minimized. This means that if someone
                          gains admin access, they do not have immediate access
                          to the features of the system.

Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                        Slide 12
Deployment support 3
                                                           •   Provide easy ways to fix
                                                               security vulnerabilities
                                                               –   When problems are
                                                                   detected, provide easy
                                                                   ways, such as auto-
                                                                   updating, to repair
                                                                   security vulnerabilities in
                                                                   the deployed systems.




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                                 Slide 13
System resilience
                                                           •   Resilience (or
                                                               survivability) is an
                                                               emergent system
                                                               property that reflects the
                                                               systems ability to deliver
                                                               essential services whilst
                                                               it is under attack or after
                                                               part of the system has
                                                               been damaged
                                                           •   Resilience analysis and
                                                               design should be part of
                                                               the security engineering
Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010       process              Slide 14
Importance of resilience
  •       Our economic and social lives are dependent on
          computer systems
        –       Critical infrastructure – electricity, gas, telecommunications,
                transport
        –       Healthcare
        –       Government

  •       Loss of business systems for even a short time can
          have very severe economic effects
        –       Airline reservation systems
        –       E-commerce systems
        –       Payment systems
Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                   Slide 15
Service availability
  •       Which system services are the most critical for a
          business?
  •       How might these services be compromised?
  •       What is the minimal quality of service that must be
          maintained?
  •       How can these services be protected?
  •       If a service becomes unavailable, how quickly can it
          be recovered?




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010      Slide 16
Resilience strategies
  •       Resistance
        –       Avoiding problems by building capabilities into the system to
                resist attacks
  •       Recognition
        –       Detecting problems by building capabilities into the system to
                detect attacks and failures and assess the resultant damage
  •       Recovery
        –       Tolerating problems by building capabilities into the system to
                deliver services whilst under attack




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                 Slide 17
Stages in resilience analysis




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010   Slide 18
Key activities
  •       System understanding
        –       Review golas, requirements and architecture
  •       Critical service identification
        –       Identify services that must be maintained
  •       Attack simulation
        –       Devise attack scenarios and identify components affected
  •       Resilience analysis
        –       Identify resilience strategies to be applied




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010              Slide 19
Trading system resilience
                                                           •   User accounts and equity
                                                               prices replicated across
                                                               servers so some provision
                                                               for resilience made
                                                           •   Key capability to be
                                                               maintained is the ability to
                                                               place orders for stock
                                                           •   Orders must be accurate
                                                               and reflect the actual
                                                               sales/purchases made by a
                                                               trader
Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                               Slide 20
Resilient ordering service
  •       The critical service that must survive is the ability for
          authorized users to place orders for stock
  •       This requires 3 components of the system to be
          available and operating reliability:
        –       User authentication, allowing authorized users to log on to
                the system
        –       Price quotation, allowing buying and selling prices to be
                quoted
        –       Order placement, allowing buy and sell orders to be made




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                    Slide 21
Possible attacks
                                                           •   Malicious user
                                                               masquerades as a
                                                               legitimate user and
                                                               places malicious orders
                                                               for stock, with the aim of
                                                               causing problems for the
                                                               legitimate user
                                                           •   An unauthorized user
                                                               corrupts the database of
                                                               transactions thus making
                                                               reconciliation of sales
                                                               and purchases
                                                               impossible
Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                             Slide 22
Resilience analysis in an equity
                 trading system
Attack                            Resistance                   Recognition                  Recovery

Unauthorized user places          Require a dealing            Send copy of order by e-     Provide mechanism to
malicious orders                  password that is different   mail to authorized user      automatically ‘undo’
                                  from the login password      with contact phone           trades and restore user
                                  to place orders.             number (so that they can     accounts.
                                                               detect malicious orders).    Refund users for losses
                                                               Maintain user’s order        that are due to malicious
                                                               history and check for        trading.
                                                               unusual trading patterns.    Insure against
                                                                                            consequential losses.
Corruption of transactions        Require privileged users     Maintain read-only copies    Recover database from
database                          to be authorized using a     of transactions for an       backup copies.
                                  stronger authentication      office on an international   Provide a mechanism to
                                  mechanism, such as           server. Periodically         replay trades from a
                                  digital certificates.        compare transactions to      specified time to re-create
                                                               check for corruption.        the transactions
                                                               Maintain cryptographic       database.
                                                               checksum with all
                                                               transaction records to
                                                               detect corruption.


  Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010                                                   Slide 23
Key points
  •       General security guidelines sensitize designers to
          security issues and serve as review checklists
  •       Configuration visualization, setting localization, and
          minimization of default privileges help reduce
          deployment errors
  •       System survivability reflects the ability of a system to
          deliver services whilst under attack or after part of the
          system has been damaged.




Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010      Slide 24

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Security Engineering 2 (CS 5032 2012)

  • 1. Security Engineering Lecture 2 Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 1
  • 2. Topics covered • Design guidelines for security – Guidelines that help you design a secure system • Design for deployment – Design so that deployment problems that may introduce vulnerabilities are minimized • System survivability – Allow the system to deliver essential services when under attack Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 2
  • 3. Design guidelines for security engineering • Design guidelines encapsulate good practice in secure systems design. They help the designer make design decisions. • Design guidelines: – Raise awareness of security issues in a software engineering team. Security is considered when design decisions are made. – Can be used as the basis of a review checklist that is applied during the system validation process. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 3
  • 4. Design guidelines for secure systems engineering Security guidelines Base security decisions on an explicit security policy Avoid a single point of failure Fail securely Balance security and usability Log user actions Use redundancy and diversity to reduce risk Validate all inputs Compartmentalize your assets Design for deployment Design for recoverability Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 4
  • 5. Design guidelines 1-3 • Base decisions on an explicit security policy – Define a security policy for the organization that sets out the fundamental security requirements that should apply to all organizational systems. • Avoid a single point of failure – Ensure that a security failure can only result when there is more than one failure in security procedures. For example, have password and question-based authentication. • Fail securely – When systems fail, for whatever reason, ensure that sensitive information cannot be accessed by unauthorized users even although normal security procedures are unavailable. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 5
  • 6. Design guidelines 4-6 • Balance security and usability – Try to avoid security procedures that make the system difficult to use. Sometimes you have to accept weaker security to make the system more usable. • Log user actions – Maintain a log of user actions that can be analyzed to discover who did what. If users know about such a log, they are less likely to behave in an irresponsible way. • Use redundancy and diversity to reduce risk – Keep multiple copies of data and use diverse infrastructure so that an infrastructure vulnerability cannot be the single point of failure. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 6
  • 7. Design guidelines 7-10 • Validate all inputs – Check that all inputs are within range so that unexpected inputs cannot cause problems. • Compartmentalize your assets – Organize the system so that assets are in separate areas and users only have access to the information that they need rather than all system information. • Design for deployment – Design the system to avoid deployment problems • Design for recoverability – Design the system to simplify recoverability after a successful attack. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 7
  • 8. Software deployment Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 8
  • 9. Design for deployment • Deployment involves configuring software to operate in its working environment, installing the system and configuring it for the operational platform. • Vulnerabilities may be introduced at this stage as a result of configuration mistakes. • Designing deployment support into the system can reduce the probability that vulnerabilities will be introduced. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 9
  • 10. Configuration vulnerabilities • Vulnerable default settings – Attackers can find out the default settings for software. If these are weak (often to increase usability) then they can be exploited by users when attacking a system. • Development rather than deployment – Some configuration settings in systems are designed to support development and debugging. If these are not turned off, they can be a vulnerability that can be exploited by attackers. • Access permissions – Access permissions to system assets may be set incorrectly Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 10
  • 11. Deployment support 1 • Include support for viewing and analyzing configurations • Make sure that a system administrator responsible for deployment can easily view the entire configuration. This makes it easier to spot omissions and errors that have been made. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 11
  • 12. Deployment support 2 • Localize configuration settings – When setting up a system, all information that is relevant to the same part or component of a system should be localized so that it is all set up at once. – Otherwise, it is easy to forget to set up related security features. • Minimize default privileges and thus limit the damage that might be caused – Design the system so that the default privileges for an administrator are minimized. This means that if someone gains admin access, they do not have immediate access to the features of the system. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 12
  • 13. Deployment support 3 • Provide easy ways to fix security vulnerabilities – When problems are detected, provide easy ways, such as auto- updating, to repair security vulnerabilities in the deployed systems. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 13
  • 14. System resilience • Resilience (or survivability) is an emergent system property that reflects the systems ability to deliver essential services whilst it is under attack or after part of the system has been damaged • Resilience analysis and design should be part of the security engineering Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 process Slide 14
  • 15. Importance of resilience • Our economic and social lives are dependent on computer systems – Critical infrastructure – electricity, gas, telecommunications, transport – Healthcare – Government • Loss of business systems for even a short time can have very severe economic effects – Airline reservation systems – E-commerce systems – Payment systems Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 15
  • 16. Service availability • Which system services are the most critical for a business? • How might these services be compromised? • What is the minimal quality of service that must be maintained? • How can these services be protected? • If a service becomes unavailable, how quickly can it be recovered? Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 16
  • 17. Resilience strategies • Resistance – Avoiding problems by building capabilities into the system to resist attacks • Recognition – Detecting problems by building capabilities into the system to detect attacks and failures and assess the resultant damage • Recovery – Tolerating problems by building capabilities into the system to deliver services whilst under attack Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 17
  • 18. Stages in resilience analysis Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 18
  • 19. Key activities • System understanding – Review golas, requirements and architecture • Critical service identification – Identify services that must be maintained • Attack simulation – Devise attack scenarios and identify components affected • Resilience analysis – Identify resilience strategies to be applied Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 19
  • 20. Trading system resilience • User accounts and equity prices replicated across servers so some provision for resilience made • Key capability to be maintained is the ability to place orders for stock • Orders must be accurate and reflect the actual sales/purchases made by a trader Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 20
  • 21. Resilient ordering service • The critical service that must survive is the ability for authorized users to place orders for stock • This requires 3 components of the system to be available and operating reliability: – User authentication, allowing authorized users to log on to the system – Price quotation, allowing buying and selling prices to be quoted – Order placement, allowing buy and sell orders to be made Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 21
  • 22. Possible attacks • Malicious user masquerades as a legitimate user and places malicious orders for stock, with the aim of causing problems for the legitimate user • An unauthorized user corrupts the database of transactions thus making reconciliation of sales and purchases impossible Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 22
  • 23. Resilience analysis in an equity trading system Attack Resistance Recognition Recovery Unauthorized user places Require a dealing Send copy of order by e- Provide mechanism to malicious orders password that is different mail to authorized user automatically ‘undo’ from the login password with contact phone trades and restore user to place orders. number (so that they can accounts. detect malicious orders). Refund users for losses Maintain user’s order that are due to malicious history and check for trading. unusual trading patterns. Insure against consequential losses. Corruption of transactions Require privileged users Maintain read-only copies Recover database from database to be authorized using a of transactions for an backup copies. stronger authentication office on an international Provide a mechanism to mechanism, such as server. Periodically replay trades from a digital certificates. compare transactions to specified time to re-create check for corruption. the transactions Maintain cryptographic database. checksum with all transaction records to detect corruption. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 23
  • 24. Key points • General security guidelines sensitize designers to security issues and serve as review checklists • Configuration visualization, setting localization, and minimization of default privileges help reduce deployment errors • System survivability reflects the ability of a system to deliver services whilst under attack or after part of the system has been damaged. Security Engineering, Critical Systems Engineering, 2010 Slide 24