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CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
• WP3 Outlines

• CS and DAQ System

• Scheduling-Milestones

• DAQ Modular software

• Work Methodology

• DAQ Server software

• Analyses
• Use Cases

• Design concept for Modular
Architecture
• Integration Process
• Risk points

• Delay or other issues
• Questions and Comments?

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
WP3 focuses on studying the scalability and adaptability potential of the hardware and the
software of the PSS module, the Control System (CS) and the Data Acquisition system (DAQ) for
other markets and different types of environment. Focus is also on the safety system
modularity and integration aspects.
It is divided into two parts.
1. This individual research project focuses on design and integration optimization of the PSS module which hosts the
communication module, the safety sensors and the local intelligence for data/video local treatment. It is an essential node
for propagating the data from the cameras and sensors to the control system and vice versa from the control system to the
HMDs. It is a key element to the success of the project. Additionally, a very challenging optimization is required at all
design levels (electronics miniaturization, power consumption, integration, interfaces, wireless HW) to produce a system
sufficiently powerful, highly reliable, with small size and weight, suitable to the workers in the most demanding
environments.
2. The CS and DAQ architecture and components hierarchy need to be designed and integrated to meet the stringent
requirements from the AR technology and the software implementation constraints. It needs to be adaptable and scalable
to various working environment (sea, space, large underground areas,..) and must easily accept various types of
detectors/sensors. Attention needs to be paid to maintain high speed communication rates and data exchange between
the supervised persons and supervisors. The control system will be developed through web-based methods, the data
registered to a proper data-base for easy access for off-line analysis, the calculated environmental radiation activation
maps compared and agree with the radiation data measured on the field. The preparation of radiation maps is an essential
activity and must be solid and well understood.

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Deliverables
D. No.
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6

Deliverable name
Control and DAQ system HW and SW architecture design report, PSS module HW and SW
architecture
Annual appraisal of research progress and training
PSS module, CS, DAQ first prototype developed, performance test and system documentation
PSS module, CS, DAQ 2nd prototype developed, performance test and system documentation
PSS system module, CS, DAQ HW+ SW final doc. incl. final tests results and recommendations,
and incl. report on scalability and adaptability to different infrastructure and environmental
conditions
Presentation of Fellow’s research at end conference

Month of delivery (Project
months)
M16
M18, 30, 42
M32
M40
M42
M48

Milestones
M. No.

Milestone name

19
20
21
22

PSS module design, CS and DAQ system architecture design
PSS module first prototype manufactured, Control system and DAQ first prototype developed
PSS module final prototype developed
Local specific trainings completed

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13

Month of Milestone
(Project months)
M16
M30
M36
M42
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses
A hazard analysis, predesign or postdesign, can be designated as qualitative or
quantitative. A qualitative analysis is a nonmathematical review of all factors affecting
the safety of a product, system, operation, or person. It involves examination of the
actual design against a predetermined set of acceptability parameters. All possible
conditions and events and their consequences are considered to determine whether
they could cause or contribute to injury or damage. A quantitative analysis is a
mathematical measure of how well energy is controlled.
A qualitative hazards analyses are conducted in the following sequence:
1. Identify both design and operational primary hazards (i.e., sources of danger) that could generate injury, damage, loss of function. These
constitute the top-level events. All other factors contribute to or affect these top-level items.
2. Identify factors contributing to the top-level events. These are listed as they come to mind. The analyst lists everything that could have an
adverse effect on the product or system. The list can be developed from theoretical considerations of possible hazards, from results of past
failures of equipment, or from knowledge of problems with similar systems or subsystems.
3. Items on the preliminary list are rearranged according to the effects that they will produce. Generally, this rearrangement is done by
continuing the analysis down through additional cause and effect levels. In some instances, certain conditions or events may be included in
more than one area.
4. Any other events, which consideration indicates should be included are then added to the analysis.
5. Determine what action most practically will control the triggering mechanism considering time sequencing, severity, frequency, etc.

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses
Quantitative Analyses: This type of analysis is a determination of how well hazards
are controlled in a system, subsystem, or event. In any case, quantitative safety
analysis must be based on a qualitative analysis. Numerical values are then applied. A
probability analysis may be accomplished in a number of ways depending on the
desired end result.
1. Probabilities may be derived from experience data on operations of similar systems, preliminary tests,
synthesized combination values, or extensions of all of these. The quantitative expression may include not only
the expected rate at which the hazard will cause accidents but also the severity of damage that could result, or
it may include both.
2. It is morally and legally unjustifiable to permit a hazard to exist unless appropriate effort is applied to
eliminate it, control it, or limit any damage that it possibly could produce.
3. Sometimes, data are valid only in special circumstances. Generalized probabilities will not serve well for
specific, localized areas.

4. Reliability is the probability of successful accomplishment of a mission within prescribed parameters over a
specific period of time.
5. Design deficiencies are rarely quantifiable and can be easily overlooked by a quantitative analysis.

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Industrial Safety/Operational Safety/Biomedical Safety
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Compliance with federal, state, and local industrial codes and regulations.
Required state inspections of equipment, such as boilers, cranes, elevators,
degreasers, fire systems, etc.
Fire prevention and control program.
Personnel accident prevention program and statistical records.
Temperature and humidity control.
Noise level control within the plant.
Personal protective clothing requirements, i.e. safety glasses/shoes, hard hats, non
static work clothes, etc.
Safe and adequate tools for the job to be done.
Safety guards for moving parts of machinery, such as pulleys, gears, saws, grinders,
conveyors, etc.
Material handling and storage methods.
In-plant cleanliness and good housekeeping practices.
Motor vehicle safety program.
Adequate lighting for type of work.
Warning alarms and signs.
Employee safety training.
Personal hygiene and first aid programs.
Proof testing and identification of lifting sling, ropes, etc.
Security control of identified hazardous areas.
Guard rails on platforms, stairs, walkways.
Personnel protection during hazardous testing.

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Actors
Technicians

:

Actions

:

Technician is the user that will carry the module and the helmet with the camera/ glass or the handheld camera and devices.
1.
Set on/off the device.
2.
The battery level
3.
The overcoming of a parameters
4.
The operational status
5.
Communicate with the supervisor
6.
Send a panic or emergency signal
7.
Control the leds on the helmet for lighting
8.
Adjust the sound volume

Supervisors

:

Admins

:

Supporters

:

Supervisor will receives all the latest measurements in real time and will communicate through audio/video and camera with the
technician.
1.
Air humidity and temperature
2.
Body temperature
3.
Oxygen
4.
Carbon Dioxide
5.
Radiation
6.
Heart beat rate
7.
Acceleration for fall detection
8.
Communicate with the technician
9.
Get the image from the helmet or handheld camera
10.
Status of the module
11.
Emergency signal
Administrator will have rights to change parameters and maintenance the modules and the server side programs like the DAQ.
1.
Register to the system the users and the devices.
2.
Assign a module to a User through the DAQ application
3.
Set the module operational parameters
1.
The WiFi parameters like SSID, security, static IP or domain etc.
2.
The up and down limits of the measurements
3.
Sampling rate
4.
Set the transmition period
5.
Get all the stored data for further analysis
Support User will have access to get the system’s data through third party applications for further analysis.

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
• Low power Microcontroller/ Processor
Some of the features will be System-on-Chip, 16/32-bit, channel correlator
and an on-board Flash memory, extra CPU computing power and a wide range
of hosted peripherals – CAN, SPI, UART, I2C, USB and others, with external
memory interface allowing glueless connection to external devices including a
Zigbee/Acoustic/RFID/ GSM/GPRS module, smartcard and DSP and text-tospeech, data short range communication, radio controller and mobile
computing platforms – PDA and smartphone.

• Gumstix Interface/DSP Processor
Gumstix / DSP processor will collaborate with design. It will go from concept
to finished design in development times. It will be equipped with camera
control signals or a wide range of expandability options.

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
 Gas sensor block: Will contain different gas sensors like O2, CO2, CO, H2S etc
 Environmental Condition Monitoring block : Will contain Accelerometer , fire

sensor, shock, ultrasonic , optical/light, infrared, humidity sensors etc.
 Human Sensing Block: Will contain heartbeat /ECG sensor, body temperature
sensor, etc.

 Location awareness Block: Worker situation and position

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
 Zigbee block: Will contain different radiation sensors
 GUI: A GUI will be connected for user interface

 RFID, USB and wireless ports for different interface options
 Location awareness Block: Worker situation and position

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
 Wi-Fi MODULE
 RFID/ Bluetooth
 Optical network
 GSM
 Acoustic

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
• Rechargeable Li-I battery
• Photovoltaic cells
• Micro power device
• Thermoelectric power etc.

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 27/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Finally it will be
formed like as a
sandwich!

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
RTX Operating System

DAQ Script Manager
Application

Devices Drivers

Peripherals Drivers

Hardware

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
•General Overview of PSS Module
•Work Methodology
•Objectives of Modular system
•Use Cases
•Modular Architecture
•Integration Process
•Software - DAQ System
•DAQ Modular software
•DAQ Server software
•DataBase
•Scheduling - Milestones

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Delay or other issues
•PTU Phase 2 Specifications and hardware designs
•Use Cases
•PTU Architecture
•Hardware Designs
•Enclosure
•Integration Process
•Software - DAQ System
•DAQ PTU software
•DAQ Server softwa
•DataBase
•Messages format
• Delay or other issues

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Delay or other issues
• We don’t have any delay for current milestone and overall studies carried out in a
perfect way. In addition, Some points have been noted as a risk for future milestones.
These are:
Risk Description
ESR 5 has not yet start working on
D3.1

Possible Effects
The architecture of the DAQ
software and the interface to the
Control system will be delayed.

Prevention Actions
Possibility
We based on the DAQ system and Medium
protocols that were developed during the
WPSS project making some improvements
to overcome the issues that have been
faced.

Missing detail specifications for AR
system

The current PTU is not designed for
AR. The electronic design for new
PSS will be delayed because of
missing detail specification for AR
system.

We tried to design a very modular and Medium
open architecture in order to easily make
adaptions and changes considering the AR
in the future.

Important
Feedback
from The design may need to change as Feedback from potential customers can be Low
potential end-users is not clear per user requirements which can taken.
yet.
lead delay.

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
Upcoming Works
No.

Major works

Starts

Finish

1

3D drafting of PSS Module

July’13

September’13

2

PSS module HW/SW architecture design report

September’13

October’13

3

Finalize the system requirements

October’13

November’13

4

Electronics design schematic, PCB for modular

December’13

Jun’14

5

PSS adaptability with ESR 10

December’13

Jun’14

6

Construct the PCBs and assembly the components

July’14

November’14

7

Electrical, optical testing on the 1st prototype

December’14

May’15

8

Develop modular DAQ, Server DAQ Software

July’14

August’15

9

Functionality test

May’15

September’15

10

2st prototypes develop

March’15

December’15

11

PSS, CS, DAQ Real conditions Test

May’15

February’16

12

Performance evaluation

March’16

June’16

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13

Remarks
with ESR 5
Modular Concept
Q/A
Questions/Comments

Thanks to all

CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13

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Safety System Modularity

  • 2. • WP3 Outlines • CS and DAQ System • Scheduling-Milestones • DAQ Modular software • Work Methodology • DAQ Server software • Analyses • Use Cases • Design concept for Modular Architecture • Integration Process • Risk points • Delay or other issues • Questions and Comments? CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 3. WP3 focuses on studying the scalability and adaptability potential of the hardware and the software of the PSS module, the Control System (CS) and the Data Acquisition system (DAQ) for other markets and different types of environment. Focus is also on the safety system modularity and integration aspects. It is divided into two parts. 1. This individual research project focuses on design and integration optimization of the PSS module which hosts the communication module, the safety sensors and the local intelligence for data/video local treatment. It is an essential node for propagating the data from the cameras and sensors to the control system and vice versa from the control system to the HMDs. It is a key element to the success of the project. Additionally, a very challenging optimization is required at all design levels (electronics miniaturization, power consumption, integration, interfaces, wireless HW) to produce a system sufficiently powerful, highly reliable, with small size and weight, suitable to the workers in the most demanding environments. 2. The CS and DAQ architecture and components hierarchy need to be designed and integrated to meet the stringent requirements from the AR technology and the software implementation constraints. It needs to be adaptable and scalable to various working environment (sea, space, large underground areas,..) and must easily accept various types of detectors/sensors. Attention needs to be paid to maintain high speed communication rates and data exchange between the supervised persons and supervisors. The control system will be developed through web-based methods, the data registered to a proper data-base for easy access for off-line analysis, the calculated environmental radiation activation maps compared and agree with the radiation data measured on the field. The preparation of radiation maps is an essential activity and must be solid and well understood. CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 4. Deliverables D. No. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Deliverable name Control and DAQ system HW and SW architecture design report, PSS module HW and SW architecture Annual appraisal of research progress and training PSS module, CS, DAQ first prototype developed, performance test and system documentation PSS module, CS, DAQ 2nd prototype developed, performance test and system documentation PSS system module, CS, DAQ HW+ SW final doc. incl. final tests results and recommendations, and incl. report on scalability and adaptability to different infrastructure and environmental conditions Presentation of Fellow’s research at end conference Month of delivery (Project months) M16 M18, 30, 42 M32 M40 M42 M48 Milestones M. No. Milestone name 19 20 21 22 PSS module design, CS and DAQ system architecture design PSS module first prototype manufactured, Control system and DAQ first prototype developed PSS module final prototype developed Local specific trainings completed CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13 Month of Milestone (Project months) M16 M30 M36 M42
  • 6. Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses A hazard analysis, predesign or postdesign, can be designated as qualitative or quantitative. A qualitative analysis is a nonmathematical review of all factors affecting the safety of a product, system, operation, or person. It involves examination of the actual design against a predetermined set of acceptability parameters. All possible conditions and events and their consequences are considered to determine whether they could cause or contribute to injury or damage. A quantitative analysis is a mathematical measure of how well energy is controlled. A qualitative hazards analyses are conducted in the following sequence: 1. Identify both design and operational primary hazards (i.e., sources of danger) that could generate injury, damage, loss of function. These constitute the top-level events. All other factors contribute to or affect these top-level items. 2. Identify factors contributing to the top-level events. These are listed as they come to mind. The analyst lists everything that could have an adverse effect on the product or system. The list can be developed from theoretical considerations of possible hazards, from results of past failures of equipment, or from knowledge of problems with similar systems or subsystems. 3. Items on the preliminary list are rearranged according to the effects that they will produce. Generally, this rearrangement is done by continuing the analysis down through additional cause and effect levels. In some instances, certain conditions or events may be included in more than one area. 4. Any other events, which consideration indicates should be included are then added to the analysis. 5. Determine what action most practically will control the triggering mechanism considering time sequencing, severity, frequency, etc. CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 7. Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses Quantitative Analyses: This type of analysis is a determination of how well hazards are controlled in a system, subsystem, or event. In any case, quantitative safety analysis must be based on a qualitative analysis. Numerical values are then applied. A probability analysis may be accomplished in a number of ways depending on the desired end result. 1. Probabilities may be derived from experience data on operations of similar systems, preliminary tests, synthesized combination values, or extensions of all of these. The quantitative expression may include not only the expected rate at which the hazard will cause accidents but also the severity of damage that could result, or it may include both. 2. It is morally and legally unjustifiable to permit a hazard to exist unless appropriate effort is applied to eliminate it, control it, or limit any damage that it possibly could produce. 3. Sometimes, data are valid only in special circumstances. Generalized probabilities will not serve well for specific, localized areas. 4. Reliability is the probability of successful accomplishment of a mission within prescribed parameters over a specific period of time. 5. Design deficiencies are rarely quantifiable and can be easily overlooked by a quantitative analysis. CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 9. Industrial Safety/Operational Safety/Biomedical Safety • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Compliance with federal, state, and local industrial codes and regulations. Required state inspections of equipment, such as boilers, cranes, elevators, degreasers, fire systems, etc. Fire prevention and control program. Personnel accident prevention program and statistical records. Temperature and humidity control. Noise level control within the plant. Personal protective clothing requirements, i.e. safety glasses/shoes, hard hats, non static work clothes, etc. Safe and adequate tools for the job to be done. Safety guards for moving parts of machinery, such as pulleys, gears, saws, grinders, conveyors, etc. Material handling and storage methods. In-plant cleanliness and good housekeeping practices. Motor vehicle safety program. Adequate lighting for type of work. Warning alarms and signs. Employee safety training. Personal hygiene and first aid programs. Proof testing and identification of lifting sling, ropes, etc. Security control of identified hazardous areas. Guard rails on platforms, stairs, walkways. Personnel protection during hazardous testing. CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 10. Actors Technicians : Actions : Technician is the user that will carry the module and the helmet with the camera/ glass or the handheld camera and devices. 1. Set on/off the device. 2. The battery level 3. The overcoming of a parameters 4. The operational status 5. Communicate with the supervisor 6. Send a panic or emergency signal 7. Control the leds on the helmet for lighting 8. Adjust the sound volume Supervisors : Admins : Supporters : Supervisor will receives all the latest measurements in real time and will communicate through audio/video and camera with the technician. 1. Air humidity and temperature 2. Body temperature 3. Oxygen 4. Carbon Dioxide 5. Radiation 6. Heart beat rate 7. Acceleration for fall detection 8. Communicate with the technician 9. Get the image from the helmet or handheld camera 10. Status of the module 11. Emergency signal Administrator will have rights to change parameters and maintenance the modules and the server side programs like the DAQ. 1. Register to the system the users and the devices. 2. Assign a module to a User through the DAQ application 3. Set the module operational parameters 1. The WiFi parameters like SSID, security, static IP or domain etc. 2. The up and down limits of the measurements 3. Sampling rate 4. Set the transmition period 5. Get all the stored data for further analysis Support User will have access to get the system’s data through third party applications for further analysis. CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 13. • Low power Microcontroller/ Processor Some of the features will be System-on-Chip, 16/32-bit, channel correlator and an on-board Flash memory, extra CPU computing power and a wide range of hosted peripherals – CAN, SPI, UART, I2C, USB and others, with external memory interface allowing glueless connection to external devices including a Zigbee/Acoustic/RFID/ GSM/GPRS module, smartcard and DSP and text-tospeech, data short range communication, radio controller and mobile computing platforms – PDA and smartphone. • Gumstix Interface/DSP Processor Gumstix / DSP processor will collaborate with design. It will go from concept to finished design in development times. It will be equipped with camera control signals or a wide range of expandability options. CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 14.  Gas sensor block: Will contain different gas sensors like O2, CO2, CO, H2S etc  Environmental Condition Monitoring block : Will contain Accelerometer , fire sensor, shock, ultrasonic , optical/light, infrared, humidity sensors etc.  Human Sensing Block: Will contain heartbeat /ECG sensor, body temperature sensor, etc.  Location awareness Block: Worker situation and position CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 15.  Zigbee block: Will contain different radiation sensors  GUI: A GUI will be connected for user interface  RFID, USB and wireless ports for different interface options  Location awareness Block: Worker situation and position CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 16.  Wi-Fi MODULE  RFID/ Bluetooth  Optical network  GSM  Acoustic CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 17. • Rechargeable Li-I battery • Photovoltaic cells • Micro power device • Thermoelectric power etc. CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 20. Finally it will be formed like as a sandwich! CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 23. RTX Operating System DAQ Script Manager Application Devices Drivers Peripherals Drivers Hardware CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 24. •General Overview of PSS Module •Work Methodology •Objectives of Modular system •Use Cases •Modular Architecture •Integration Process •Software - DAQ System •DAQ Modular software •DAQ Server software •DataBase •Scheduling - Milestones CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 28. Delay or other issues •PTU Phase 2 Specifications and hardware designs •Use Cases •PTU Architecture •Hardware Designs •Enclosure •Integration Process •Software - DAQ System •DAQ PTU software •DAQ Server softwa •DataBase •Messages format • Delay or other issues CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 29. Delay or other issues • We don’t have any delay for current milestone and overall studies carried out in a perfect way. In addition, Some points have been noted as a risk for future milestones. These are: Risk Description ESR 5 has not yet start working on D3.1 Possible Effects The architecture of the DAQ software and the interface to the Control system will be delayed. Prevention Actions Possibility We based on the DAQ system and Medium protocols that were developed during the WPSS project making some improvements to overcome the issues that have been faced. Missing detail specifications for AR system The current PTU is not designed for AR. The electronic design for new PSS will be delayed because of missing detail specification for AR system. We tried to design a very modular and Medium open architecture in order to easily make adaptions and changes considering the AR in the future. Important Feedback from The design may need to change as Feedback from potential customers can be Low potential end-users is not clear per user requirements which can taken. yet. lead delay. CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13
  • 30. Upcoming Works No. Major works Starts Finish 1 3D drafting of PSS Module July’13 September’13 2 PSS module HW/SW architecture design report September’13 October’13 3 Finalize the system requirements October’13 November’13 4 Electronics design schematic, PCB for modular December’13 Jun’14 5 PSS adaptability with ESR 10 December’13 Jun’14 6 Construct the PCBs and assembly the components July’14 November’14 7 Electrical, optical testing on the 1st prototype December’14 May’15 8 Develop modular DAQ, Server DAQ Software July’14 August’15 9 Functionality test May’15 September’15 10 2st prototypes develop March’15 December’15 11 PSS, CS, DAQ Real conditions Test May’15 February’16 12 Performance evaluation March’16 June’16 CERN-EDUSAFE Meeting 28/10/13 Remarks with ESR 5

Editor's Notes

  1. Research Activities: Cable testing – Accelerometers - Dosimeter