Mission Impact Assessment for Industrial Control Systems
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Mission-oriented risk assessment approach
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Mission Impact Assessment for Industrial Control Systems
- 1. Marina Krotofil, Mona Lange European Network for Cyber Security University of Lübeck, Germany S4x15, Miami, USA – 15.01.15 Mission Impact Assessment for Industrial Control Systems
- 2. What we are doing PANOPTESEC o EU project aimed at automated cyber defense decision support system for critical infrastructure o Prevent, detect, manage and react to cyber incidents in real-time o Improve the situational awareness o Support the decision-making process
- 4. Industrial Control Systems Physical application Curtesy: Compass Security Germany GmbH
- 5. Cyber-physical systems are IT systems “embedded” in an application in the physical world Cyber-Physical Systems Attack goals: o Get the physical system in a state desired by the attacker o Make the physical system perform actions desired by the attacker
- 6. Problem statement Mission-oriented approach Mission impact modelling Mission critical assets Open questions
- 7. ICS security Continuous vulnerability disclosures and vulns for sale Patching treadmill Supply chain security IT-SCADA specific security solutions Ralph Langner: “The pro’s don’t bother with vulnerabilities; they use features to compromise the ICS” Vendors Result: Focus is on protecting the infrastructure
- 8. Process-related threats PROBLEM: there is no approach to determining the impact of a cyber threat on the operational goals Identification of failures and hazards o HAZOP o PHEA o FMEA (FMECA) o Etc. Raising awareness of intentional misuses o Stuxnet o Aurora o And some formally/informally rumored stories
- 9. Problem statement Mission-oriented approach Mission impact modelling Mission critical assets Open questions
- 10. Process owners Asset owners Common opinion about each other ICS stakeholders Field equipment Level0 Process Level1Level2Level3Level4 Regulatory control Supervisory Control Process management Corporate network PLC PLC PLC HMI Engineering station Historian Publishing server DMZ DCS servers Application servers
- 11. Process owners Asset owners ICS stakeholders Field equipment Level0 Process Level1Level2Level3Level4 Regulatory control Supervisory Control Process management Corporate network PLC PLC PLC HMI Engineering station Historian Publishing server DMZ DCS servers Application servers We have a COMMON MISSION!!
- 12. Field instrumenation Level0 Process Level1Level2Level3Level4 Basic control Supervisory Control Process management Corporate network PLC PLC PLC HMI Engineering station Historian Publishing server DMZ DCS servers Application servers Process owners Asset owners Shift in defense IT-centricity Cyber attack resilient missions We have a COMMON MISSION!!
- 13. Insider threat Business processes secure by design Easy target Clueless user Disgruntled employee Integrators, support, contractors…
- 14. Mission is a set of operational tasks to accomplish a certain purposive goal The goal of cyber security is to protect ongoing and planned missions (not cyber assets) Mission impact assessment is a threat assessment method to predict and evaluate the impact of cyber incidents on mission execution and accomplishment Terminology
- 15. Example
- 16. Example: attack on data flow Net. Admin Global mission: ensure/execution of nuclear program Mission: enrichment of uranium Task: maintain proper rotating speed of the centrifuge Business processes Cyber terrain Operational goals Operations · Failure modes · Hazards PLC Frequency converter Centrifuge Workflow Access policies · Users · Permissions Engineering station Linkage to cyber assets HMI DB Data flow Manufacturing workflow
- 17. SCADA hacker Data integrity: packet injection; replay; data manipulation; … DoS: DoS; DDoS; flooding; starvation;…. Operator Example: attack on data flow Operations · Failure modes · Hazards PLC Frequency converter Centrifuge Workflow Access policies · Users · Permissions Engineering station Linkage to cyber assets HMI DB Data flow Manufacturing workflow I am not controlling the process!!
- 18. Controllability SCADA hacker During the attack the hacker herself is process engineer, control engineer and process operator Observability
- 19. Process-related security properties HOLY TRINITY IT domain Process control
- 20. Process owners humor We need a model that relates the missions and resources …….
- 21. Process-related security properties HOLY TRINITY IT domain Process control Observability Controllability Operability
- 22. Process-related security properties HOLY TRINITY Observability Controllability Operability Information security Process control security CIA CO2
- 23. Problem statement Mission-oriented approach Mission impact modelling Mission critical assets Open questions
- 24. Vocabulary
- 25. Mission impact analysis Cyber surface MissionviewITview Mission -> Task -> ->Activity -> Asset Activity(A2):= Pull alarm logs Activity(A1):= Configure alarm Switch Engineering workstation Router OPC Server Switch Bob and PLC or and Sensor Router Task:= Fault management Historian Task:= Fault diagnosis Task:= Alarm management Asset Alice Permission Permission Mission:= Eqipment monitoring
- 26. Mission impact analysisMissionviewITview Activity(A2):= Pull alarm logs Activity(A1):= Configure alarm Switch Engineering workstation Router OPC Server Switch Bob and PLC or and Sensor Router Task:= Fault management Historian Task:= Fault diagnosis Task:= Alarm management Asset Alice Permission Permission Mission:= Eqipment monitoring Continuous threat assessment
- 27. Impact dependency graph Assess impact on asset level of identified threat Quantify operational impact on activity, task and mission level based on impact dependency graph Mission impact analysis Vulnerability(ies) V Task Mission Activity 0.2 OPC Server A1 A2 PLC Engineering Workstation 0.3 0.2 Sensor Router Switch 0.1 0.1 0.1 Switch Router Historian 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 T0 V 0.6 0.4 T1 T2 V M0 Alice Bob Asset BobBob AliceAlice
- 28. Ontology
- 29. Example
- 31. Timing parameter Physical exploitation o Timing parameters of the attack itself o Time to disaster o Butterfly effect, snowball effect (timing interdependencies) (Criticality) risk assessment o Clean-up time o Damage recover time o Equipment replacement Business process assessment o Window of opportunity to launch an attack o Slowing down part(s) of the mission
- 32. Mission-centric approach Mission awarenessThreat awarenessInfrastructure awareness System inventory Configuration files Network diagrams Data flow diagrams Access policies Business processes Workflows Standard operating procedures Policies and regulations Critical dependencies Internal threats External threats Vulnerability DB, threat sharing communities Threat intelligence
- 33. Mission-centric approach Mission awarenessThreat awarenessInfrastructure awareness System inventory Configuration files Network diagrams Data flow diagrams Access policies Business processes Workflows Standard operating procedures Policies and regulations Critical dependencies Internal threats External threats Vulnerability DB, threat sharing communities Threat intelligence
- 34. Mission-centric approach Mission awarenessThreat awarenessInfrastructure awareness System inventory Configuration files Network diagrams Data flow diagrams Access policies Business processes Workflows Standard operating procedures Policies and regulations Critical dependencies Internal threats External threats Vulnerability DB, threat sharing communities Threat intelligence
- 35. Mission-centric approach Mission awarenessThreat awarenessInfrastructure awareness System inventory Configuration files Network diagrams Data flow diagrams Access policies Business processes Workflows Standard operating procedures Policies and regulations Critical dependencies Internal threats External threats Vulnerability DB, threat sharing communities Threat intelligence Emerging trends
- 36. Mission-centric approach Mission awarenessThreat awarenessInfrastructure awareness System inventory Configuration files Network diagrams Data flow diagrams Access policies Business processes Workflows Standard operating procedures Policies and regulations Critical dependencies Internal threats External threats Vulnerability DB, threat sharing communities Threat intelligence Emerging trends
- 37. Problem statement Mission-oriented approach Mission impact modelling Mission critical assets Final remarks
- 38. Use case Threat: Smart meter worm [Davis, Black Hat 2009] o Infection during firmware update o Wireless propagation o Control over meter to attacker benefits
- 39. Approach initiation Mission statement Deliver accurate view of the power grid state List all possible mission disruptions 1. Incorrect load, phase, time, temperature information 2. Missing alarms, e.g. about power outages 3. Incorrect information about grid topology
- 41. Step 2 8-Meter
- 44. Mission security boundaries Goal: protect mission boundaries o Mission-oriented network zoning for more flexible asset security protection Challenge: interconnectedness of assets linked to distinct missions of different levels of criticality Identification: reachability analysis
- 45. Reachability analysis 8 -Meter 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 Cesar Cerrudo „Hacking Traffic Control Systems“, 2014 Multipurpose worm from IOActive dudes (?)
- 48. Problem statement Mission-oriented approach Mission impact modelling Mission critical assets Final remarks
- 49. Fresh story Make inventory of the business processes o ISO 27005 terminology Prioritize and determine critical to the operations Identify supporting assets Identify critical assets Perform risk assessment o Risk avoidance o Risk modification
- 50. Summary Emerging approach -> becomes more popular o But loads of research still needs to be done Actionable Sustainable