2. Something New on The Eastern Front
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Table of Contents
Introduction……………………………………………………………..………p.2
Defining New Wars……………………………………………………………..p.4
Post-modern Warfare in Donbass…………………………………...…………p.6
Russia’s Feeling for Crimea……………………………………………………p.9
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...…p.10
References…………………………………………………………………...…p.11
3. Something New on The Eastern Front
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Introduction
Despite internal weaknesses that still persist nowadays, the partial recovery of Russian economy
under President Vladimir Putin allowed the Kremlin once again to follow an active foreign
policy. As “regional great power” (Tsygankov, 2010, p.43), Russia turned with an imperialistic
attitude toward what it considers its natural sphere of influence (Cox, 2014, p.63).
According to Putin the fall of the Soviet Union was one of the greatest catastrophes of human
history. For Russia this event did not just mean the end of ideologies, but also the necessity to
rethink its role in the world. A sense of mission has always been behind Russian foreign policy:
from the Muscovite Empire that aimed to spread Orthodox Christianity (Ziegler, 1999, p.29), to
the Soviet Union claiming nothing less than the emancipation of the human race through the
diffusion of communism. When Putin came to power in 1999 he did not need to look for a new
task to shape Russian foreign affairs, 25 millions “compatriots” living outside the motherland
already offered him one.
“…The Soviet Union had collapsed and, nevertheless, the NATO continues expanding, as well as its
military infrastructure. Then they offered the post-Soviet countries a forced choice: either to be with the West
or with the East. Sooner or later this logic of confrontation was bound to spark off a grave geopolitical crisis.
This is exactly what happened in Ukraine where the discontent of population with the current authorities was
used and the military coup was orchestrated from outside.”
This part of Putin’s speech at the United Nations on
September 28th
2015 gives a hint of how Euromaiden
was interpreted by the Kremlin: a ruse to install a
pro-Western regime in Kiev. In this light the
Ukrainian crisis seems nothing but the latest proxy
war, triggered by NATO’s progressive encirclement.
On the one hand, Western observers see in
Putin’s meddling in the neighbour countries a form of
Imperial atavism (Measheimer, 2014, p.1). On the
other hand, NATO military strategists deem that
Moscow is using in Ukraine hybrid warfare,
http://www.limesonline.com/il-piccolo-
pedone-e-lo-scacchiere-anti-russo-il-
montenegro-nella-nato/88578?prv=true
4. Something New on The Eastern Front
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combining old methods in an innovative “comprehensive” way, something the Atlantic Alliance
is unprepared to face (Jones, 2014). This raises the question whether what we are attending is
new or not. As history is a gradual process in which elements of different phenomena are never
rigidly separated the answer is necessarily: it is both.
Therefore, adopting Clausewitz’s definition of war as “a true chameleon” the paper at
hand analyzes the new features and the old logics involved in the Ukrainian crisis. It starts
describing New Wars, a wide concept that includes hybrid wars. Then, this idea is applied to the
Ukrainian conflict, stressing the continuity with the Russo-Georgian War. The parallelism
Ukraine-Georgia is explained by the fact Putin made clear that those countries joining NATO
would be inacceptable for Moscow (Measheimer, 2014, p.6). I distinguish the crisis in the
occupation of Crimea and the Donbass conflict, in order to highlight the differences in the two
cases and how they approach the ideal type of New War with different degrees.
5. Something New on The Eastern Front
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Defining New Wars
Although most of the features of New Wars are far from pioneering, the “new” character is due
to their unprecedented combination under the huge pressure globalisation is putting the sovereign
states (Kaldor, 2013, p.2). Newman gave several examples of XX century conflicts to argue that
New Wars are not so original after all (Newman, 2004, p.184-185). However, to support his
opinion he used situations in which the state was imported and the society marked by ethnic
cleavages. Indeed, this only supports the idea that whereas Old Wars were co-constitutive of the
modern nation state (Tilly, 1985), the New Wars can be at once the result and the cause of weak
states. Thus, they emerge more easily where the state is weaker. The stead loss of control over
the territory goes hand in hand with the gradual appearance of groups such as paramilitary
forces, criminal organizations and warlords, which compete to gain access to resources, usually
legitimizing these criminal activities in the name of the identity of a certain group. Such
emphasis on a specific identity also has to be read as a reaction to globalization (Sheehan, 2014,
p.224).
In this context there is no spatial limitation of the use of violence, hence the battlefield is
dramatically extended to the whole society and the civil population is increasingly the main
target (Kaldor, 2013, p.7) and usually forced to displace (p.9). Although the abuses on civilians
are by no means new to war the innovative feature is not the enhanced visibility of human
suffering (Newman, 2004, p. 182), but rather the systematic way with which such violence is
deliberately employed for political aims. Additionally, since violence is more and more
privatized it becomes difficult to distinguish between citizens and soldiers, war and crime. In
fact, the fighting turns for many into a source of illegal enrichment (Munkler, 2003, p.16). The
political purpose is a specious justification to actions that in peacetime would be considered
criminal. Inasmuch as they serve private interests, the New Wars are inconclusive and hard to
halt (Kaldor, 2013, p.6).
According to Clausewitz, wars are a contest of will, namely to bend the opponent to our
desire using force and annihilating his military capacities. By contrast, New Wars are post-
Clausewitzian insofar they are a mutual enterprise. This means that every party involved has no
interest in striking a decisive blow to the other, since fighting each other they reciprocally
legitimize their standing, shaping their particular identity in contrast to the –constructed- enemy.
6. Something New on The Eastern Front
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In this way the actors involved are the cause of the same insecurity they use to justify their
actions (Kaldor, 2010, p.274). Contrary to the past, the mobilization of the population is here an
aim of domestic politics rather than a mean to achieve external policy. Consequently, the war
becomes an end in itself (Kaldor, 2013, p. 12).
As the New Wars involve both state and non-state actors they are also marked as post-
Westphalian (Sheehan, 2014, p.226). Indeed they tend to spread and to finance themselves
disregarding the formal state borders (Kaldor, 2013, p.7); thus they are of transnational nature
(Munkler, 2003, p.20). As a result, internal and external forces are difficult to distinguish.
Moreover, leading to permanent mobilisation, to the refuse of the national identity in the name of
a more particularistic one, they are intrinsically disaggregating (Kaldor, 2010, p. 278). All these
aspects combined determine the voiding of political legitimacy and, lastly, to state failure.
7. Something New on The Eastern Front
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Post-modern warfare in the Donbass
The Russo-Georgian war in 2008 was a striking example of how the matter of identity
was going to shape Russian foreign policy applying New Warfare. Moscow defined it a
humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide toward the Russian minority (Bellamy and
Wheeler, 2014, p.489). During the invasion a network of paramilitary groups, composed also by
common criminals, backed the Russian troops and forced many of the non-Russian civilians to
leave their houses (Kaldor, 2010, p.277). Similarly to the Ukrainian case, “Putin sought Georgia
weak and divided- and out of NATO” (Measheimer, 2014, p.3). The outcome was the creation of
the unrecognized but de facto independent territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Although in both Crimea and the Eastern regions of Ukraine the Russian minorities
reacted to Euromaiden protesting against the new regime, demanding Russian assistance and
creating self-defence militias, non-state actors had a marginal role in the peninsula, whilst in the
Donbass they were central in challenging Kiev’s authority. Although heavily supported by
Moscow, the rebels are not its direct
expression, because in this case Russia did
not need a proper invasion but preferred to
use proxy forces as a political leverage to
hold Kiev government in check
(Applebaum, 2014). Following a different
logic from the occupation of Crimea, the
Donbass conflict meets many of the
features of the New Wars.
Besides the involvement of non-
state actors the struggle in Eastern Ukraine
is centred on the issue of identity in
contrast with the Crimean case where the Russian minority was used as justification for a
territorial enlargement. In the Donbass the propaganda had a key role in fuelling a general
hysteria against the new government (Kaldor, 2013, p.4). Such victimization together with the
use of agitators pushed the whole region to mobilize, furnishing the wide support of the Donbass
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-
b760-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3xUj5bXMq
8. Something New on The Eastern Front
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inhabitants, without which a guerrilla strategy would not be possible (Munkler, 2003, p.10-11).
The defence of Russian particularity was used to cover criminal activity such as expropriating
and kidnapping Euromaiden supporters and members of the Tartar minority. Additionally,
Russia is been accused to make economic pressure on the region to produce unemployment,
fruitful ground for social unrest. As a result, the distinction between soldiers and civilians
vanished since the former used the latter as human shields and civil buildings were redeployed
for military purposes (Gregory, 2014).
In this case the aim is to destabilize Ukraine in order to halt it from joining the European
Union, “stalking horse” of the Atlantic Alliance (Measheimer, 2014, p.3). For this purpose the
regions concerned shall not be detached from the rest of Ukraine but be a permanent tool for
subduing Kiev, which will also have to bear the economic costs of the crisis. The idea of using
the Russian minorities to condition domestic politics might have already been in the mind of
Stalin when he drew the Ukrainian borders (Goble, 2014). In such light, the organized violence
here is meant to polarize Ukrainian society, delegitimizing the central authority. Whereas the
intervention in Crimea followed the Clausewitz idea of forcing the opponent using -or menacing-
violence to give up a strategic territory, in Donbass the goal is rather the political mobilization
per se, with the long-term objective of eroding or even disintegrating the Ukrainian state.
Consistently with Kaldor’s idea, in the former case organized violence was an instrument of
external policy, in the latter of internal politics.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Civil War is by no means a mutual enterprise. Certainly, the
conflict is legitimizing the new government outcome of pro-European protests that wanted
Ukraine emancipated from Moscow’s control as well as the rebels’ request of protection from
Russia. However, this war is asymmetrical also in the aims because a permanent low-intensity
conflict could undermine the very survival of the state and the longer it will go on the harder it
will be to re-establish a sense of Ukrainian nationally on those regions. It follows that for Kiev
the civil war is indeed a contest of will, a contest that it cannot win alone militarily seen the
superior capabilities the rebels’ backer has.
9. Something New on The Eastern Front
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Nor can be said that private interests triggered the conflict, as it is
functional to Moscow not to lose control over Kiev. In this regard Putin used New Warfare for
reasons of traditional geopolitics. First, the major gas pipeline that connects Russia to Europe
passes through the Ukrainian
territory. The energy sector
has a key role for Russian
economic expansions, its
inner stability and its
geopolitical influence
(Tsygankov, 2010, p.46).
Second, Russian project of
economic integration meant
to compete with the
European Union, the
Eurasian Economic Union,
would fall through without Ukraine. Third, the above quoted systematic enlargement of NATO,
which is perceived as putting Russia’s vital interest at stake (Measheimer, 2014, p.1). Last, the
identity question is also functional to Russian domestic politics. Key elements of the Russian
culture such as the Cyrillic alphabet and the Orthodox Christianity, as well as the political
embryo of the Muscovite Empire can all be attributed to the Kievian Rus’ period.
Picture 3
http://www.limesonline.com/rubrica/ucraina-il-primo-
anno-di-yanukovich
10. Something New on The Eastern Front
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Russia’s Feeling for Crimea
Favoured by a significant number of soldiers at the Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea
(Measheimer, 2014, p.5), the seizure of the peninsula happened with military might rather than
with political means (Kaldor, 2013, p.2).
Thousands of “little green men” occupied
the strategic points of the peninsula. The
use of unmarked troops is unusual but not
without precedence in military history.
What was remarkable was that the
occupation happened almost without the
Ukrainian army daring to oppose any
resistance, a (lacking) reaction due to the
overwhelming capabilities of the Russian
army in comparison with the Ukrainian
one. Thus, inasmuch as the special forces employed in Crimea were under direct control of
Moscow, the conquer of the peninsula can be deem as an act related to interstate asymmetrical
warfare, albeit it cannot properly be defined as a war in absence of violence. The asymmetry is
evident in the way the Spetsnaz has imposed its velocity to the confrontation, putting the
Ukrainian army in the position not to harm (Munkler, 2003, p.9).
Additionally, in this case the reasons for the Russian intervention are fully geopolitical,
namely of military strategy. Seen by the Kremlin the naval bases in Crimea are a key launching
pad for an eventual intervention in the Mediterranean, an irreplaceable foothold that would turn
in a dreadful threat in NATO’s hands (Measheimer, 2014, p.1). The manipulation of the Russian
minority in the area was merely to politically legitimize a fait accompli through a referendum.
The creation of de facto independent territory was nothing new in Russian modern history, as the
precedence of South Ossetia illustrates.
http://uaposition.com/infographics/all-of-the-
crimea-becomes-a-russian-military-base/
!
!
11. Something New on The Eastern Front
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Conclusion
All in all, the Ukrainian crisis does not stroll off the path marked by the Georgian War. Once
again the Kremlin’s involvement was motivated by the need to defend the Russians living
outside Russian borders. On the one hand it can be argued that while the identity issue was a
political mean in Crimea, it is indeed an aim in the Donbass. More specifically, in the latter the
purpose is to exasperate the ethnic differences within the Ukrainian population, pushing the
Russian minority to reject the new government represented as hostile. On the other hand, all of
this could be seen as the expression of geopolitical logics in a post-ideological area. Putting the
emphasis on their diversity, Moscow wants the Russian-speakers to perceive themselves as
antithetic to the Ukrainian regime, thus becoming an instrument of pressure on Kiev to acquiesce
Kremlin’s strategic interests. As a result, Ukrainian territorial integrity is at stake and Moscow
owns a powerful political leverage on Kiev.
This paper tried to apply the dynamic concept of New Wars to a complex geopolitical
crisis were the influence of external powers are not easy to circumscribe on both sides
(Measheimer, 2014, p.4). The length of the paper for such a broad topic and the difficulty to find
objective sources are evident limits. However, the underlying argument it wanted to stress out is
that an ideal type is always adapted to the historical context. Overall, the Ukrainian Crisis,
especially in the Donbass, could be interpreted as the symptom of emerging New Warfare.
However, if this was the case, it also testifies that we are attending a transitional phase where
geopolitical reasoning still endures and does not look regressing. More precisely, the whole civil
war can be deemed as the confrontation of two opposing blocks, Russia on one side and the West
on the other. Echo of the Cold War in the era of globalization.
12. Something New on The Eastern Front
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References
Applebaum, Anne (2014) Thinking Provocatively, in: Slate
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/02/vladimir_putin_can_destabi
lize_ukraine_the_russian_president_doesn_t_need.html
Cox, Micheal (2014), From the end of the cold war to the new global era?, Chapter 4,
in Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. (eds.) The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: OUP (6th ed.)
Goble, Paul (2014) Putin Wants Donbass inside Ukraine for Same Reason Stalin Did – But the
World Has Changed, in: The Interpreter http://www.interpretermag.com/putin-wants-donbass-
inside-ukraine-for-same-reason-stalin-did-but-the-world-has-changed/
Gregory, Paul Roderick (2014) Is Putin's New Type Of War In Ukraine Failing? In: Real Clear
World
http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2014/04/is_putins_new_type_of_war_in_ukraine_failing_1
10467.html
Jones, Sam. (2014) Ukraine: Russia’s new art of war, in: Financial Times
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3xUj5bXMq
Kaldor, Mary (2013) In Defence of New Wars, Stability: International Journal of
Security and Development.
Kaldor, Mary (2010) Inconclusive Wars: Is Clauzevitz Still Relevant in these Global Times? In:
Global Policy.
Measheimer, John (2014) Why the Ukrainian Crisis is the West’s Fault, in: Foreign Affairs.
Munkler, Herfried (2003): The wars of the 21st century, in: International Review
of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Debate: Law, Policy, Action, March 2003, Vol.
85, No. 849, pp. 7-22.
13. Something New on The Eastern Front
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Newman, Edward (2004): The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed,
in: Security Dialogue.
Sheehan, Michael (2014) The Changing Character of War, in John Baylis, Steve
Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations.
Tilly, Ch.(1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: Peter Evans, Dieter
Tsygankov, Andrei P. (2010) Russia’s Power and Alliances in the 21st Century, in
POLITICS.
Ziegler, Charles Edward (1999). The history of Russia. Westport, Conn. [etc.]: Greenwood Press.
![20152016-EUS2005-00-REGULAR-6118727
Something New on The Eastern Front
How Russian meddling in Ukraine demonstrates a (partial) departure from the
traditional conduct of war
Name Luca
Student ID # 6118727 Always 7 positions, no letter I. Add a zero at the
beginning if only 6 positions.
E-mail address l.bertuzzi@student.maastrichtuniversity.nl
Course code EUS2005
Group number 07
Supervisor/tutor Iulian Romanyshyn
Assignment name Final Paper
Assignment # 00 The end work of a course always carries the number 00.
All other assignments are numbered chronologically
starting with 01.
Attempt REGULAR REGULAR or RESIT
Academic year 20152016
Date [Date]
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