George Kennan Argues for Containment Policy Against Soviet Expansion

George Kennan Argues for Containment
George Kennan
Introduction
Source: X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet
Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (July
1947): 566–78, 580–82.
…. We have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological
compulsion to accomplish its purposes
in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts
which are of long-term validity,
and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the
existing achievements of the revolution
for the sake of vain baubles of the future…. Here caution,
circumspection, flexibility and
deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds
natural appreciation in the Russian or
the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about
retreating in the face of superior
force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does
not get panicky under the
necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream
which moves constantly, wherever

it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is
to make sure that it has filled
every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world
power. But if it finds unassailable
barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and
accommodates itself to them. The main
thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing
constant pressure, toward the desired
goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that
that goal must be reached at any
given time….
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any
United States policy toward the
Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and
vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such
a policy has nothing to do with
outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous
gestures of outward “toughness.”
While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to
political realities, it is by no means
unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other
government, it can be placed by
tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot

afford to yield even though this
might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders
are keen judges of human
psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of
temper and of self-control is never
a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to
exploit such evidences of weakness.
For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with
Russia that the foreign
government in question should remain at all times cool and
collected and that its demands on
Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to
leave the way open for a
compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.
In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet
pressure against the free
institutions of the western world is something that can be
contained by the adroit and vigilant
application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting
geographical and political points,
corresponding to the shifts and manœuvres of Soviet policy, but
which cannot be charmed or

talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of
infinite duration, and they see
that already they have scored great successes….
[T]he future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure
as Russian capacity for self-
delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin….
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the
foreseeable future to enjoy political
intimacy with the Soviet régime. It must continue to regard the
Soviet Union as a rival, not a
partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that
Soviet policies will reflect no
abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the
possibility of a permanent happy
coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a
cautious, persistent pressure
toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and
rival power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the
western world in general, is still
by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible,
and that Soviet society may well
contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total
potential….

[I]n actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no
means limited to holding the line
and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United
States to influence by its actions the
internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the
international Communist
movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined…. It
is… a question of the degree to
which the United States can create among the peoples of the
world generally the impression of a
country which knows what it wants, which is coping
successfully with the problems of its
internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and
which has a spiritual vitality
capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents
of the time. To the extent that
such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of
Russian Communism must appear
sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow’s
supporters must wane, and added
strain must be imposed on the Kremlin’s foreign policies. For
the palsied decrepitude of the
capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy….
It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior
unassisted and alone could exercise a

power of life and death over the Communist movement and
bring about the early fall of Soviet
power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to
increase enormously the strains
under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the
Kremlin a far greater degree of
moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in
recent years, and in this way to
promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in
either the break-up or the gradual
mellowing of Soviet power….
Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this
country itself. The issue of Soviet-
American relations is in essence a test of the over-all worth of
the United States as a nation
among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only
measure up to its own best
traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great
nation.
The Nixon Doctrine
Richard Nixon

Source:Richard Nixon, “First Annual Report to the Congress on
United States Foreign Policy for
the 1970‘s,” February 18, 1970.
… When I took office, the most immediate problem facing our
nation was the war in Vietnam.
No question has more occupied our thoughts and energies
during this past year.
Yet the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. We
could see that the whole pattern
of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to
understand that change, to define
America’s goals for the next period, and to set in motion
policies to achieve them. For all
Americans must understand that because of its strength, its
history and its concern for human
dignity, this nation occupies a special place in the world. Peace
and progress are impossible
without a major American role.
This first annual report on U.S. foreign policy is more than a
record of one year. It is this
Administration’s statement of a new approach to foreign policy
to match a new era of
international relations.
A NEW ERA

THE postwar period in international relations has ended.
Then, we were the only great power whose society and economy
had escaped World War II’s
massive destruction. Today, the ravages of that war have been
overcome. Western Europe and
Japan have recovered their economic strength, their political
vitality, and their national self-
confidence. Once the recipients of American aid, they have now
begun to share their growing
resources with the developing world. Once almost totally
dependent on American military
power, our European allies now play a greater role in our
common policies, commensurate with
their growing strength.
Then, new nations were being born, often in turmoil and
uncertainty. Today, these nations have a
new spirit and a growing strength of independence. Once, many
feared that they would become
simply a battleground of cold-war rivalry and fertile ground for
Communist penetration. But this
fear misjudged their pride in their national identities and their
determination to preserve their
newly won sovereignty.
Then, we were confronted by a monolithic Communist world.

Today, the nature of that world
has changed–the power of individual Communist nations has
grown, but international
Communist unity has been shattered. Once a unified bloc, its
solidarity has been broken by the
powerful forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union and
Communist China, once bound by an
alliance of friendship, had become bitter adversaries by the
mid-1960’s. The only times the
Soviet Union has used the Red Army since World War II have
been against its own allies in East
Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in
1968. The Marxist dream of
international Communist unity has disintegrated.
Then, the United States had a monopoly or overwhelming
superiority of nuclear weapons.
Today, a revolution in the technology of war has altered the
nature of the military balance of
power. New types of weapons present new dangers. Communist
China has acquired
thermonuclear weapons. Both the Soviet Union and the United
States have acquired the ability to
inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no matter which

strikes first. There can be no gain and
certainly no victory for the power that provokes a
thermonuclear exchange. Thus, both sides
have recognized a vital mutual interest in halting the dangerous
momentum of the nuclear arms
race.
Then, the slogans formed in the past century were the
ideological accessories of the intellectual
debate. Today, the “isms” have lost their vitality–indeed the
restlessness of youth on both sides
of the dividing line testifies to the need for a new idealism and
deeper purposes,
This is the challenge and the opportunity before America as it
enters the 1970’s …
1. Peace Through Partnership –The Nixon Doctrine
As I said in my address of November 3, “We Americans are a
do-it-yourself people-an impatient
people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to
do it ourselves. This trait has
been carried over into our foreign policy.”
The postwar era of American foreign policy began in this vein
in 1947 with the proclamation of
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, offering American
economic and military assistance

to countries threatened by aggression. Our policy held that
democracy and prosperity, buttressed
by American military strength and organized in a worldwide
network of American-led alliances,
would insure stability and peace. In the formative years of the
postwar period, this great effort of
international political and economic reconstruction was a
triumph of American leadership and
imagination, especially in Europe.
For two decades after the end of the Second World War, our
foreign policy was guided by such a
vision and inspired by its success. The vision was based on the
fact that the United States was the
richest and most stable country, without whose initiative and
resources little security or progress
was possible.
This impulse carried us through into the 1960’s. The United
States conceived programs and ran
them. We devised strategies, and proposed them to our allies.
We discerned dangers, and acted
directly to combat them.
The world has dramatically changed since the days of the
Marshall Plan. We deal now with a
world of stronger allies, a community of independent

developing nations, and a Communist
world still hostile but now divided.
Others now have the ability and responsibility to deal with local
disputes which once might have
required our intervention. Our contribution and success will
depend not on the frequency of our
involvement in the affairs of others, but on the stamina of our
policies. This is the approach
which will best encourage other nations to do their part, and
will most genuinely enlist the
support of the American people.
This is the message of the doctrine I announced at Guam–the
“Nixon Doctrine.” Its central thesis
is that the United States will participate in the defense and
development of allies and friends, but
that America cannot–and will not–conceive all the plans, design
all the programs, execute all the
decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the
world. We will help where it
makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.
America cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace.
We have no intention of
withdrawing from the world. The only issue before us is how we

can be most effective in
meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests, and
thereby building peace.
A more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their
own defense and progress means
a more effective common effort toward the goals we all seek.
Peace in the world will continue to
require us to maintain our commitments–and we will. As I said
at the United Nations, “It is not
my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or
letting down our allies.” But a
more balanced and realistic American role in the world is
essential if American commitments are
to be sustained over the long pull. In my State of the Union
Address, I affirmed that “to insist
that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility;
it is a sharing of responsibility.”
This is not a way for America to withdraw from its
indispensable role in the world. It is a way–
the only way–we can carry out our responsibilities.
It is misleading, moreover, to pose the fundamental question so
largely in terms of commitments.
Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests
over the long run with a sound
foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic
assessment of our and others’
interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We
are not involved in the world

because we have commitments; we have commitments because
we are involved. Our interests
must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.
We will view new commitments in the light of a careful
assessment of our own national interests
and those of other countries, of the specific threats to those
interests, and of our capacity to
counter those threats at an acceptable risk and cost.
“Misplaced Power”
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Radio and Television
Address to the American
People,” January 17, 1961.
[T]the conflict now engulfing the world ….commands our whole
attention, absorbs our very
beings. We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in
character, ruthless in purpose,
and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises
to be of indefinite duration. To

meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the
emotional and transitory sacrifices of
crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward
steadily, surely, and without complaint
the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty
the stake. Only thus shall we
remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward
permanent peace and human
betterment.
Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether
foreign or domestic, great or small,
there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and
costly action could become the
miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase
in newer elements of our defense;
development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in
agriculture; a dramatic expansion in
basic and applied research—these and many other possibilities,
each possibly promising in itself,
may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.
But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader
consideration: the need to maintain
balance in and among national programs—balance between the
private and the public economy,
balance between cost and hoped for advantage—balance
between the clearly necessary and the

comfortably desirable; balance between our essential
requirements as a nation and the duties
imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between
actions of the moment and the
national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and
progress; lack of it eventually
finds imbalance and frustration.
The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and
their government have, in the
main, understood these truths and have responded to them well,
in the face of stress and threat.
But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention
two only.
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military
establishment. Our arms must be mighty,
ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be
tempted to risk his own
destruction.
Our military organization today bears little relation to that
known by any of my predecessors in
peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or
Korea.
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no
armaments industry. American

makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make
swords as well. But now we can no
longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we
have been compelled to create a
permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to
this, three and a half million men
and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment.
We annually spend on military
security more than the net income of all United States
corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a
large arms industry is new in the
American experience. The total influence-economic, political,
even spiritual—is felt in every
city, every State house, every office of the Federal government.
We recognize the imperative
need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend
its grave implications. Our toil,
resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very
structure of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.

The potential for the disastrous
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our
liberties or democratic processes.
We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the
proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of
defense with our peaceful
methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper
together.
Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our
industrial-military posture, has
been the technological revolution during recent decades.
In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes
more formalized, complex, and
costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at
the direction of, the Federal
government.
Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been
overshadowed by task forces of
scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion,
the free university, historically
the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has

experienced a revolution in the
conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved,
a government contract becomes
virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old
blackboard there are now hundreds
of new electronic computers.
The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal
employment, project allocations,
and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be
regarded.
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as
we should, we must also be alert
to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself
become the captive of a scientific-
technological elite.
It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to
integrate these and other forces, new
and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever
aiming toward the supreme goals
of our free society ….
Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a
continuing imperative. Together we must
learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with

intellect and decent purpose. Because
this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my
official responsibilities in this
field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has
witnessed the horror and the
lingering sadness of war–as one who knows that another war
could utterly destroy this
civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over
thousands of years–I wish I could
say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.
Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress
toward our ultimate goal has been
made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I
shall never cease to do what little
I can to help the world advance along that road.

Excerpts from “Peace Without Conquest”
Lyndon B. Johnson
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson. Address at Johns Hopkins
University: “Peace Without Conquest.”
April 7, 1965. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The
American Presidency Project [online].
Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26877.
Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening
shadow of Communist China.
The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime
which has destroyed freedom in
Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the
United Nations for aggression
in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence
in almost every continent. The
contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive
purposes.
WHY ARE WE IN VIET-NAM?
Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-
Nam?
We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954

every American President has
offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have
helped to build, and we have helped
to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national
pledge to help South Viet-Nam
defend its independence.
And I intend to keep that promise.
To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation
to its enemies, and to the terror
that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.
We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe,
from Berlin to Thailand, are
people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they
can count on us if they are
attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the
confidence of all these people in the
value of an American commitment and in the value of
America’s word. The result would be
increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.
We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance.
Let no one think for a moment
that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The
battle would be renewed in one

country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that
the appetite of aggression is never
satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to
prepare for the next. We must say in
southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible:
“Hitherto shalt thou come, but
no further.”
There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—
that China’s power is such that it
is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there is no end to
that argument until all of the
nations of Asia are swallowed up.
There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there.
Well, we have it there for the
same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of
Europe. World War II was fought in
both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves
with continued responsibility for
the defense of freedom.
OUR OBJECTIVE IN VIET-NAM
Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its
freedom from attack. We want
nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam

be allowed to guide their own
country in their own way.
We will do everything necessary to reach that objective. And we
will do only what is absolutely
necessary.
. . . .
I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what
we now find it necessary to say
with guns and planes: Armed hostility is futile. Our resources
are equal to any challenge.
Because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather
than territory or colonies, our
patience and our determination are unending.
. . . .
Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam—securely
guaranteed and able to shape its
own relationships to all others—free from outside
interference—tied to no alliance—a military
base for no other country.
These are the essentials of any final settlement.
. . . .
But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer
another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.
But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a
dream. It is a very old dream. But we
have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that
dream come true.
For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we
dream of a world where disputes
are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.
For most of history men have hated and killed one another in
battle. But we dream of an end to
war. And we will try to make it so.
For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by
hunger. But we dream of a world
where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to
make it so.
. . . .
I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for
reason to guide passion, and love to
master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to
pure and consistent answers.
But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to
follow them as best we can.

. . . .
Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this
question: Have I done
everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done
everything I can to help unite the
world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the
world? Have I done enough?
Address on Cuba
John F. Kennedy
Source: John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the
American People in the
Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” in Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States, John F.
Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: United States General
Printing Office, 1963), 806–809.

Document
GOOD EVENING, my fellow citizens:
This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest
surveillance of the Soviet military
buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week,
unmistakable evidence has established the
fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation
on that imprisoned island. The
purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a
nuclear strike capability against the
Western Hemisphere.
Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this
nature last Tuesday morning at 9
a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having
now confirmed and completed
our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of
action, this Government feels
obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.
The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two
distinct types of installations. Several
of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead for a

distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these
missiles, in short, is capable of striking
Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico
City, or any other city in the
southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in
the Caribbean area.
Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for
intermediate range ballistic
missiles—capable of traveling more than twice as far—and thus
capable of striking most of the
major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as
Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far
south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of
carrying nuclear weapons, are now
being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air
bases are being prepared.
This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic
base—by the presence of these
large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass
destruction—constitutes an
explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in
flagrant and deliberate defiance of
the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and
hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th
Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public
warnings to the Soviets on

September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated
assurances of Soviet spokesmen,
both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in
Cuba would retain its original
defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or
desire to station strategic missiles
on the territory of any other nation.…
Neither the United States of America nor the world community
of nations can tolerate deliberate
deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large
or small. We no longer live in a
world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a
sufficient challenge to a nation’s
security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so
destructive and ballistic missiles
are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their
use or any sudden change in their
deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.
For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States,
recognizing this fact, have
deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never
upsetting the precarious status quo

which insured that these weapons would not be used in the
absence of some vital challenge. Our
own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the
territory of any other nation under a
cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history—unlike that has
of the Soviets since the end of
World War it. It demonstrates that we have no desire to
dominate or conquer any other nation or
impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American
citizens have become adjusted to
living daily on the bull’s eye of Soviet missiles located inside
the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.
In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and
present danger—although it should be
noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been
subjected to a potential nuclear
threat.
But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist
missiles—in an area well known
to have a special and historical relationship to the United States
and the nations of the Western
Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance
of American and hemispheric
policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic
weapons for the first time outside of
Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified
change in the status quo which cannot

be accepted by this country, if our courage and our
commitments are ever to be trusted again by
either friend or foe.…
Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the
entire Western Hemisphere, and
under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as
endorsed by the revolution of the
Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be
taken immediately:
First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all
offensive military equipment under
shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound
for Cuba from whatever nation
or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons,
be turned back. This quarantine
will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers.
We are not at this time,
however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets
attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of
1948.
Second: I have directed the continued and increased close
surveillance of Cuba and its military
buildup. The foreign ministers of the OAS, in their communique
of October 6, rejected secrecy

on such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensive
military preparations continue, thus
increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be
justified. I have directed the Armed
Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the
interest of both the Cuban people
and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all
concerned of continuing this threat will
be recognized.
Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear
missile launched from Cuba
against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by
the Soviet Union on the United
States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
Union.
Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced
our base at Guantanamo, evacuated
today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered
additional military units to be on a
standby alert basis.
Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the
Organ of Consultation under the

Organization of American States, to consider this threat to
hemispheric security and to invoke
articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary
action. The United Nations Charter
allows for regional security arrangements—and the nations of
this hemisphere decided long ago
against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies
around the world have also been
alerted.
Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking
tonight that an emergency meeting
of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take
action against this latest Soviet threat
to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt
dismantling and withdrawal of all
offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N.
observers, before the quarantine can
be lifted.
Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt
and eliminate this clandestine,
reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable
relations between our two nations. I
call upon him further to abandon this course of world
domination, and to join in an historic effort

to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of
man. He has an opportunity now to
move the world back from the abyss of destruction—by
returning to his government’s own
words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own
territory, and withdrawing these
weapons from Cuba—by refraining from any action which will
widen or deepen the present
crisis—and then by participating in a search for peaceful and
permanent solutions.…
Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of
Cuba, to whom this speech is being
directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a
friend, as one who knows of your
deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your
aspirations for liberty and justice for
all. And I have watched and the American people have watched
with deep sorrow how your
nationalist revolution was betrayed—and how your fatherland
fell under foreign domination.
Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by
Cuban ideals. They are puppets and
agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba
against your friends and neighbors
in the Americas—and turned it into the first Latin American
country to become a target for

nuclear war—the first Latin American country to have these
weapons on its soil.
These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute
nothing to your peace and well-
being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish
to cause you to suffer or to
impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land
are being used as pawns by
those who deny your freedom.
Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw
out tyrants who destroyed their
liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look
forward to the time when they will be
truly free—free from foreign domination, free to choose their
own leaders, free to select their
own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write
and worship without fear or
degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the
society of free nations and to the
associations of this hemisphere.
My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and
dangerous effort on which we
have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will

take or what costs or casualties will
be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie
ahead—months in which both our
patience and our will will be tested—months in which many
threats and denunciations will keep
us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be
to do nothing.
The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all
paths are—but it is the one most
consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our
commitments around the world.
The cost of freedom is always high—but Americans have always
paid it. And one path we shall
never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.
Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of
right—not peace at the expense of
freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere,
and, we hope, around the world.
God willing, that goal will be achieved.
Thank you and good night.

Excerpt from a Speech Delivered to the Council on Foreign
Relations
Kwame Nkrumah
Introduction
Source: Source: Nkrumah Speech on the United States and the
Third World at the Council on
Foreign Relations, New York, 1958. (in Jussi Hanhimäki and
Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cold
War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), 354-356).
Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Ghana, the first of the former
British colonies in Africa to gain
its independence (1957), at first attempted to get support from
the former colonial power and
from the United States. In the early 1960s Nkrumah increasingly
turned to the Eastern Bloc for
assistance. Here is an excerpt from his speech at the Council on
Foreign Relations, New York, in
1958.
[Principles:] The first is our desire to see Africa free and

independent. The second is our
determination to pursue foreign policies based upon non-
alignment. The third is our urgent need
for economic development. There is no area in Africa today
where these three points are not on
the agenda of politics. There is no need to underline for
American readers the reason for Africa’s
rejection of colonial status. We believe, as do Americans, that
to be self-governing is one of the
inalienable rights of man. In Africa, if peoples are to be truly
independent, their governments
must reflect the fact that, in all parts of Africa, the
overwhelming majority of the population are
native-born Africans. Even in the countries of considerable
European settlement, such as
Southern Rhodesia, 90% of the people are African. When,
therefore, at our recent African
conference, we called for an end to colonialism, we were doing
no more than stating our belief
that the fact of a vast African majority should be accepted as a
basis of government in Africa
(…)
We asked for the fixing of the definite dates for early
independence and called upon the

administering powers to take rapid steps to implement the
provisions of the United Nations
Charter and the political aspirations of the people, namely self-
determination and independence.
These steps should, in my view, include a greatly accelerated
and enlarged programme of
education and technical training, the opening up systematically
of new opportunities for Africans
in agriculture and industry and rapid growth of African
participation in the country’s political
life. Such timetables would restore what, we believe, is most
lacking in Africa’s plural
societies—and that is the element of confidence and hope on the
part of the African majority (…)
Non-alignment can only be understood in the context of the
present atomic arms race and the
atmosphere of the Cold War. There is a wise African proverb:
‘When the bull elephants fight, the
grass is trampled down.’ When we in Africa survey the
industrial and military power
concentrated behind the two great powers in the Cold War, we
know that no military or strategic
act of ours could make one jot of difference to this balance of
power, while our involvement
might draw us into areas of conflict which so far have not

spread below the Sahara. Our attitude,
I imagine, is very much that of American looking at the disputes
of Europe in the 19th century.
We do not wish to be involved. In addition, we know that we
cannot affect the outcome. Above
all, we believe the peace of the world in general is served, not
harmed by keeping one great
continent free from the strife and rivalry of military blocs and
cold wars.
But this attitude of non-alignment does not imply indifference
to the great issues of our day. It
does not imply isolationism. It is in no way anti-Western; nor is
it anti-Eastern. The greatest
issue of our day is surely to see that there is a tomorrow. For
Africans especially there is a
particular tragedy in the risk of thermo-nuclear destruction. One
continent has come but lately to
the threshold of the modern world. The opportunities of health
and education and a wider vision
which other nations take for granted are barely within the rich
of our people. And now they wee
the risk that all this richness of opportunity may be snatched
away by destructive war. In any
war, the strategic areas of the world would be destroyed or

occupied by some great power. It is
simply a question of who gets there first—the Suez Canal,
Afghanistan and Gulf of Aquaba are
examples.
On this great issue, therefore, of war and peace, the people and
government of Ghana put all their
weight behind the peaceful settlement of disputes and seek
conditions in which disputes do not
become embittered to the point of violence. We are willing to
accept every provision from the
United Nations Charter. We go further and favour every
extension of an international police
force as an alternative to war. One of the most important roles
of the smaller nations today is
surely to use their influence in season and out of season to
substitute the peaceful settlement of
disputes and international policing of disturbed areas for the
present disastrous dependence upon
arms and force. For this reason, at our African conference, we
underlined our demands for
controlled disarmament, we deplored the use of the sale of arms
as a means of influencing other
nations’ diplomacy and we urged that African states should be
represented on all international
bodies concerned with disarmament.

Thus it is not indifference that leads to a policy of non-
alignment. It is our belief that
international blocs and rivalries exacerbate and do not solve
disputes and that we must be free to
judge issues on their merits and to look for solutions that are
just and peaceful, irrespective of the
powers involved. We do not wish to be in the position of
condoning imperialism or aggression
from any quarter. Powers which pursuer policies of goodwill,
co-operation and constructive
international action will always find us at their side. In fact,
perhaps ‘non-alignment’ is a mis-
statement of our attitude. We are firmly alignment with all the
forces in the world that genuinely
make for peace (…)
The hopes and ambitions of the African people have been
planted and brought to maturity by the
impact of the Western civilization. The West has set the pattern
of our hopes, and by entering
Africa in strength, it has forced the patterns upon us. Now
comes our response. We cannot tell
our peoples that material benefits and growth and modern
progress are not for them. If we do,
they will throw us out and seek other leaders who promise more.

And they will abandon us, too,
if we do not in reasonable measure respond to their hopes.
Therefore we have no choice. Africa
has no choice. We have to modernise. Either we shall do so with
your interest and support—or
we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning
or a threat, but a straight
statement of political reality.
And I also affirm, for myself and I believe for most of my
fellow leaders in Africa, that we want
close co-operation with our friends. We know you. History has
brought us together. We still have
the opportunity to build up a future on the basis of free and
equal co-operation. This is our aim.
This is our hope.
Prepare, Apply, and Confirm
!.----------:~.:..,
1- ~

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George Kennan Argues for Containment Policy Against Soviet Expansion

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