This document summarizes a vulnerability (CVE-2013-2556) that allows bypassing of address space layout randomization (ASLR). It discusses how on 32-bit Windows, a fixed pointer to KiFastSystemCall could be leveraged, and on 32-bit processes on 64-bit Windows, a fixed pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine could be used to load arbitrary DLLs. Microsoft patch MS13-063 addressed this by removing the fixed pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine and making its location randomized.

1. FFRI,Inc.
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Monthly Research
Understanding bypassing ASLR by a
pointer at a fixed address
FFRI,Inc.
http://www.ffri.jp
Ver 2.00.01

2. FFRI,Inc.
• Security patch published by Microsoft in Aug 2013
• Includes a fix for ALSR bypassing vulnerability(CVE-2013-2556)
• This slide is about the detail of the vulnerability and the fix
MS13-063
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3. FFRI,Inc.
• Published in CansecWest2013
– This vulnerability alone does not allow an attacker to exploit an
application (need another vulnerability for successful exploit)
– This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass ASLR if another
specific kind of vulnerability can be found.
A summary of the ASLR bypassing vulnerability(CVE-2013-2556)
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4. FFRI,Inc.
• This vulnerability was published with a title “DEP/ASLR bypass
without ROP/JIT” in CanSecWest2013 by Yang Yu.
• Mainly 2 problems
– In 32bit Windows, a pointer to KiFastSystemCall is at a fixed address
– In a 32bit process on 64bit Windows, a pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine is
at a fixed address
Why these pointers at fixed addresses are problem?
Can be used to bypass ASLR if there is use-after-free/heap
overflow vulnerability which leads overwriting a pointer to a
vtable of C++ objects.
What is “overwriting a pointer to a vtable”
Details of the vulnerability
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5. FFRI,Inc.
• C++ Object layout in general C++ implementation.
• How C++ calls member functions
Preliminary knowledge：C++ object layout
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A pointer to a vtable
// Note that member functions are “virtual”
class MyClass {
public:
MyClass();
virtual ~MyClass();
virtual void doWork();
private:
int m_myVariable;
};
Instantiate
m_myVariable
A pointer to ~MyClass()
A pointer to doWork()
MyClass object
// code to call doWork()
// ecx has the address of a MyWorker object
mov eax,dword ptr [ecx] // eax is the address of the vtable
push ecx // argument for the function call(*)
call dword ptr [eax+4] // call doWork() (the address is obtained from the vtable)
* The first argument for cdecl calling convention is “this” pointer
vtable for MyClass class

6. FFRI,Inc.
• What happens if a pointer to a vtable can be rewritten?
A problem of rewriting a pointer to a vtable
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A pointer to a vtable
m_myVariable A pointer to ~MyClass()
A pointer to doWork()
MyClass object
vtable for MyClass class
Rewrite here
Value in memory 1
Value in memory 2
Somewhere in memory
???
//The exactly same code from the previous slide.
//Rewriting a pointer to a vtable results in executing another function
mov eax,dword ptr [ecx] // eax is the address of vtable
push ecx // argument for the function call
call dword ptr [eax+4] // Execute the memory “Value in memory 2” points to

7. FFRI,Inc.
• Rewrite a pointer to a vtable in such a way that KiFastSystemCall is called
• KiFastSystemCall is a shared code to call system call in Windows
• ASLR is irrelevant in this scenario
In case of a pointer to KiFastSystemCall is at a fixed address
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A pointer to a vtable
m_myVariable
A pointer to ~MyClass()
A pointer to doWork()
MyClass object
vtable for MyClass classRewrite with a fixed value
by utilizing a vulnerability
(use-after-free/heap overflow)
Value in memory 1
KiFastSystemCallへのポインタ
Fixed address
KiFastSystemCall
KiFastSystemCall is called.
However, calling system call with some arguments as an attacker intends to is difficult.
mov eax,dword ptr [ecx] // eax is the address of vtable
push ecx // argument for the function call
call dword ptr [eax+4] // call KiFastSystemCall

8. FFRI,Inc.
• In 64bit Windows, a pointer KiFastSystemCall does not exist at a fixed address.
• But 32bit processes on 64bit Windows have a pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine at a fixed
address.
• LdrHotPatchRoutine internally loads a DLL which is specified via its argument.
• A pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine resides in SharedUserData in 32bit processes on 64bit
Windows
• SharedUserData is at a fixed address(0x7ffe0000)
Overwrite C++ object in such a way that the vtable includes a pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine.
DLL can be loaded.
Using LdrHotPatchRoutine
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…
…
0x7ffe0000
(fixed address)
SharedUserData
A pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine
LdrHotPatchRoutine
struct HotPatchBuffer{
…
USHORT PatcherNameOffset; // An offset to a DLL name to load
USHORT PatcherNameLen; // The length of the DLL
…
};
void LdrHotPatchRoutine( struct *HotPatchBuffer);

9. FFRI,Inc.
• Rewrite a pointer to a vtable in such a way as calling LdrHotPatchRoutine
In case of a pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine is at a fixed address
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A pointer to a vtable
A pointe to ~MyClass()
A pointer to doWork()
MyClass object
mov eax,dword ptr [ecx] // eax is the address of vtable
push ecx // pass the object address as an argument
call dword ptr [eax+4] // call LdrHotPatchRoutine
A vtable for MyClass classRewrite here by
utilizing a vulnerability
Value in memory 1
A pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine
Fixed address
LdrHotPatchRoutine
• LdrHotPatchRoutine is called.
• Constructing an argument to LdrHotPatchRoutine (with a DLL name such as
¥¥192.168.1.100¥foo.dll) will results in loading a DLL on a server.
• Note that the object can be overwritten with arbitrary data when an
attacker overwrites a pointer to a vtable
Construct here as a
HotPatchBuffer structure

10. FFRI,Inc.
• MS13-063 fixes the vulnerability in such a way that a pointer to
LdrHotPatchRoutine is not at a fixed address.
– Eliminate a function table in SharedUserData
– Move the function table to a data section in ntdll.dll and export it as
LdrSystemDllInitBlock
• ASLR is enabled on ntdll.dll and it makes the address of the function table not
fixed.
Can not bypass ASLR to load a DLL by utilizing LdrHotPatchRoutine
The fix in MS13-063
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A pointer to LdrHotPatchRoutine
Randomized

11. FFRI,Inc.
References
• http://technet.microsoft.com/ja-jp/security/bulletin/ms13-
063
• http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/DEP-
ASLR%20bypass%20without%20ROP-JIT.pdf
• http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2013/08/12/mitigatin
g-the-ldrhotpatchroutine-dep-aslr-bypass-with-ms13-
063.aspx
• http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-
2013-2556
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12. FFRI,Inc.
Contact Information
E-Mail : research-feedback@ffri.jp
Twitter: @FFRI_Research
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