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1. B Y P A T R I C K M . D O N A H U E
N U C 2 8 5 : L E A D E R S H I P C O M M U N I C A T I O N S I N
T H E N U C L E A R I N D U S T R Y , T H O M A S M A Z O U R
E X C E L S I O R C O L L E G E
4 / 2 5 / 2 0 1 9
Integrated Strategy to Communicate
Vulnerability on the Solid Boosters
for the Space Shuttle

2. Introduction
• SRB Joint has an engineering flaw.
• Sealing mechanism is susceptible to low temperatures.
• Bench Testing results indicate operation at 53oF
minimum.
• Evidence of near-miss on Discovery launch at 52oF
• Launching at low temperatures could lead to
catastrophe.
Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB)
As pressure increases within
the SRB, it pushes the tang
away, while also flattening
out the O-ring to seal the gap.

3. Communication Strategy Overview
 Two Conferences
 First Conference for Internal Stakeholders
 Second Conference for External Stakeholders
 Material & Media developed and presented by Lead
Engineer
 Timing is crucial
 Primary Objective: Communicate Vulnerability; Do not
launch.

4. Internal Stakeholders
 First Conference with senior engineers and
management
 Get everyone on the same page
 Come to unanimous agreement not to launch
 Discuss evidence and facts about SRB field joint
 Revise communications based on feedback

5. External Stakeholders
 Second Conference with senior management at
NASA, MSFC, KSC
 Tele-conference with material and media provided
 Explain Morton-Thiokol position
 Explain evidence and facts about SRB field joint
 Explain risks of low-temperature launch

6. Audience Diversity
 Many members spread across the country
 Not everyone is an engineer
 Conferences prone to classical theory; one-way
communication
 Must prioritize SRB vulnerability over management
goals
 Reformulate communications to consider external
contingencies

7. Emotional Intelligence
 Key to avoiding misunderstanding; frustration
 Traditional leadership qualities aren’t enough
 Use empathy – many teams involved in scheduling
the launch
 Use self-awareness – Morton-Thiokol identified the
issue; is responsible for delay
 Motivation is to fix vulnerability; successful launch

8. Materials & Media
 Developed and presented by Lead Engineer
 Documentation and Charts
 Technical details & non-technical descriptions
 Distribution of materials is key to communication
 Ensure enough lead time for audience to interpret
materials

9. Receiving Feedback
 Iterative process
 Must keep the line of communication open
 Collect and integrate all feedback after each
conference
 Reinforce contingency theory of communication
 Tentatively schedule a third conference to allow for
members to collect thoughts & data

10. Conclusion
 Stress the risk of a low-temperature launch
 Express seriousness of vulnerability
 Reformulate communications again if needed
 Escalate the concern to gain further traction
 Inform press & public as a last resort
 Flight and crew safety is paramount

11. References
 Goleman, D. (2004, January). What makes a leader? Harvard
Business Review, 82, 82.
 Juholin, E. (2006, May). Searching paradigms for communication
of work organisations. Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the European Academy of Management, Oslo, Norway.
 Presidential Commission. (June 6th, 1986). Report of the
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident. Retrieved from
https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm
 Riddick, I. (Director), & Riddick, I. (Producer). (2007). Space
Shuttle Challenger [Video file]. National Geographic. Retrieved
from Academic Video Online: Premium database.
 Wiio, O.A. (1978). Contingencies of organizational communication:
Studies in organization and organizational communication.
Helsinki, Finland: Helsinki School of Economics.