Govt 490 Paper Final Draft

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The Threat of Homegrown Terrorism
Curtis Pittman
Government 490
Dr. Rizova
October 31, 2014

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Abstract:
A growing problem within the United States of America is homegrown terrorism. Since
the attacks of September 11, 2001 there has been an increase of extreme, violent jihadists that are
being established on American soil. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that
there have been 63 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since that
tragic time in American history. The apparent increase in homegrown terrorist activity seems to
suggest that the attitudes and ideologies supporting a violent jihad continue to influence some
Americans. Although it may seem as if this is an insignificant amount of American extremists, it
only takes one homegrown terrorist to sow destruction on the homeland and potentially victimize
innocent American citizens. The answer to the question of whether homegrown terrorism is a
severe threat to the United States will be answered by looking at failed, foiled, and successful
post September 11, 2001 attacks, by understanding the factors and forces that cause domestic
extremism, and by understanding law enforcement and intelligence efforts that combat and
counter homegrown terrorism.
This analysis will look to understand the significance that homegrown terrorism plays on
the United States of America as well as determine whether or not these acts of terror can be
deemed as a serious threat. The research will focus only on post 9/11 violent Jihadist terrorists
within the American borders and not on various other forms of domestic terrorism. There are
many forms of domestic terrorism that have occurred throughout the history of the United States,
but the use of homegrown terrorists by jihadist organizations seems to be on the rise. Since the
attacks of 9/11, there has been an increased threat of jihadist based terror groups that have been
plotting and attacking the American Homeland. Along with looking at the post 9/11 attacks,
there will be research conducted that looks into the reasoning and forces that cause this domestic

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extremism. Is there a trend of likely extremist candidates? If so, what causes their radical
thoughts and actions? After the preliminary research is conducted, there will be more research
done on the already implemented efforts to combat and prevent domestic terrorism. This analysis
will specifically look into the local law enforcement and intelligence agencies to better
understand what has to be done to deter this violence and how we can better the already
implemented efforts. This research also discusses tactics that could be used to combat the threat
of homegrown terrorism. Statistical references will be gathered from resources such as the World
Wide Threat Assessment, various militaristic and law enforcement reports, scholarly reports, as
well as books about Islamic extremists in the West. Another outlet for understanding the
ideologies of homegrown jihadist extremists will come from the United Kingdom’s take on
homegrown terrorism, which will offer references, comparisons, and support for the research.

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The Threat of Homegrown Terrorism
How serious of a problem is homegrown terrorism in the United States?
Throughout the past several centuries, the United States has been a repeated target for
terrorists and their organizations. Terrorism against the United States ranges from organizations
such as the KKK, to anti-government extremists, to the more recent Islamic extremists. Being a
world power and having a stronghold on the majority of the world, the U.S. will always be
targeted by violent groups that wish to overthrow and overpower the country. A threat that seems
to be on the rise in the United States is that of homegrown terrorism, specifically that associated
with violent jihadists. This trend is viewed by some as a high risk threat that needs to be resolved
while others do not see a threat at all. The answer to the question of whether homegrown
terrorism is a severe threat to the United States will be answered by looking at failed, foiled, and
successful post September 11, 2001 attacks, by understanding the factors and forces that cause
domestic extremism, and by understanding law enforcement and intelligence efforts that combat
and counter homegrown terrorism.
Over the past twenty years, the United States has seen a great deal of terrorist
organizations publicly declare war and proclaim their hatred on the country. There are three
specific groups that tend to stand above the others when dealing with how threatening they are
and the potential for harvesting homegrown terrorists, or foreign fighters, within the borders of
America. The three groups that are more well-known and threatening to the United States are the

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most experienced Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, and the more recent Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS).
Al Qaeda has been a threat to the United States for many years and continues to be a
significant danger to the security of the country. This group is a militant Islamist based
organization that is prevalent worldwide and operates out of the countries of Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda was started by the infamous Osama bin Laden and was
responsible for the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington,
D.C. on September 11, 2001. As far as homegrown terrorism associated with Al Qaeda, there is a
new approach that this organization is taking. Because the security of the United States has
drastically risen since 9/11, plotting another large attack is almost out of the question for
terrorists because it will get shut down before it is carried out. The success rate of big attacks is
minimal, so Al Qaeda has recently publicly announced that they are adopting the strategy of
conducting smaller attacks at a more recurrent rate (Dershowitz, 2014). With this idea at the core
of their scheme, homegrown terror will play a pivotal role in the success of their attacks. These
homegrown terrorists obviously have some advantages that will propel attacks and heighten their
rate of accomplishment. These terrorists can disguise themselves and freely enter the country
without being stopped or questioned, especially if they have a clean record, which cannot be
randomly checked without probable cause. Once they enter the country, they will blend into
society and obtain residency, ultimately becoming a United States citizen. After this takes place,
they can freely enter and leave the country and connect with terror organizations to exchange
information, seek support, and devise plans of attack (Dershowitz, 2014). The use of homegrown
terrorism looks to be a big player in Al Qaeda’s plan to destroy not only America, but all
Western nations.

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The second terror organization that poses a threat to the United States is Al Shabaab. This
organization is also a militant jihadist group and is based primarily out of Somalia. This group
became a risk to the United States in 2008 and has since been increasing its prominence not only
against the U.S. but against all Western nations as well. Although this is an Islamist group
stationed primarily in Africa, this organization draws a significant amount of Western supporters.
In 2011, Al Shabaab deployed a strategy to recruit foreign fighters from Muslim communities
within the United States (Kron, 2011). By infiltrating the U.S., Al Shabaab will attempt to
gather fellow believers of the Muslim faith and convert them to their radical ideologies, thus
obtaining homegrown fighters for their organization. Since 2007, according to the United States
House Committee on Homeland Security, Al Shabaab has successfully enlisted more than forty
Muslim Americans into its organization as foreign fighters (Pelofsky, 2011). With the gaining of
these American extremists, Al Shabaab has increased not only their army, but also their
intelligence.
The third organization that is a high threat to the United States homeland is the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS. This terror organization is also a militant jihadist
based group that prevails in the Middle East and operates out of Iraq as well as Syria. Just as the
previously mentioned groups, ISIS also attracts foreign fighters from Western civilizations. An
article published in the New York Times in the fall of 2014 cited that over 2,000 European
citizens and over 100 American citizens were amongst the foreign fighters within the ISIS army
(Schmidt, 2014). Again, this is a red flag when dealing with homegrown terrorism. If American
citizens are willing to leave their homeland to join radical groups such as these three mentioned
above, they will certainly be willing to obtain and distribute any vital information that they can
retrieve, thus causing problems with American counterterrorism efforts.

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Since the tragic events that took place on September 11, 2001, there has been an effort by
the United States to further protect and safeguard the homeland. While there are many
implemented strategies that combat the threat of foreign terrorist acts, there must also be some
form of defense against that of domestic terrorism. Jerome P. Bjelopera, a specialist in organized
crime and terrorism, states in his work entitled American Jihadist Terrorism: Combatting a
Complex Threat, that homegrown terrorism is a term that not only describes terrorist acts
committed within the borders of the United States but can also be described as American citizens
who commit terror acts outside the boundaries of the country (Bjelopera, pg. 1). The term
“jihadist” refers to radical persons who use Islam as a religiously based justification for their
belief in establishing a worldwide “caliphate ” (Bjelopera, pg. 1). The caliphate that these
jihadists seek can be understood as being a dominion which is religiously and authoritatively
ruled by a Muslim, known as a caliph (Bjelopera, 2013).
For the purposes of this research, only attacks occurring after September 11, 2001 will be
investigated. Since 9/11, there have been a total of 63 domestic jihadist attacks or conspiracies in
the United States, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS). From May of 2009 to
December of 2012, 42 arrests were made on suspected domestic jihadists in the United States.
Bjelopera concludes that the 42 plots and attacks during that span were an echoing development
of violent jihadists that were not directly correlated with significant affiliates of big name groups
such as Al Qaeda (Bjelopera, 2013). In 2010 there were 12 terror plots, 2011 had 10, and 2012
presented 8. Although this may seem like a small percentage of plots and attacks, this evidence
proves that American citizens are influenced and predisposed by the ideological ramifications of
jihadist violence.

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Bjelopera also points out that homegrown terrorists who are not associated with a specific
terrorist organization typically tend to be less equipped than more large-scale terror groups. In
most cases, these homegrown radicals are not trained by affiliates of big organizations, which
therefore underscore what they are capable of. Without the proper training and connection to
international networks, these radicals are not familiar with practical terror tactics such as bomb
making, nor do they have much support or a great deal of experience, and weapons are not
readily available for them to use (Bjelopera, 2013). Without having these necessary tools, it is
likely that homegrown terrorists will not deploy a large scale attack like 9/11, rather, they will
engage in smaller attacks that target specific places or people.
Of the homegrown jihadist terror plots and attacks that have occurred since September
11, 2001, there has not been a generic grouping that these terrorists can be categorized in to. The
Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department released a study in 2007 that states
that there is no way to successfully predict who will become the next jihadist inspired radical,
but do give some insight on the radicalization process itself (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). The NYPD
Intelligence Division developed a 4-stage progression that allows for the understanding of the
radicalization process. The stages are broken down and shown as follows:
Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization
Stage 2: Self-Identification
Stage 3: Indoctrination
Stage 4: Jihadization
The Pre-Radicalization stage defines the individual’s life and the world that he or she
lives in, which can include his or her lifestyle, community, religion, lineage, and education,
before they begin the overall radicalization process (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). The next step, the

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Self-Identification stage, is greatly influenced by external as well as internal forces. This stage is
when the individual begins to explore different avenues of life and begin moving away from
their former identity and begin creating a new mantra related to the ideologies of Islam (Silber
and Bhatt, 2007). The next step in the radicalization process is the Indoctrination stage. This is
when the newly identifying individual begins to heighten his religious beliefs and fully commits
to the jihadist ideology, thus paving the way to becoming a militant jihadist (Silber and Bhatt,
2007). The final stage of this process is what the NYPD deems as Jihadization. This fourth stage
is revealed as the individual accepts their responsibility to partake in his jihad and become “holy
warriors” or “mujahedeen” (Silber and Bhatt, pg. 45). This is the stage when the individual will
plot out terror attacks for the completion of his jihad and ultimately become a violent jihadist
terrorist.
Categorizing homegrown violent jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11 is not an easy task
and has brought about problematic elements that hinder the understanding of these terrorist acts.
The term “homegrown” seems to perceive the notion that the attacks only occur within the
boundaries of the United States, but this is not always the case. Many domestic jihadist terror
plots are linked to some sort of international aspect, whether it is the association with a specific
terror group, training techniques, or plans from foreign propaganda through the internet and
social media (Bjelopera, 2013). Since 9/11, 38 homegrown terror schemes directed their
attention to domestic targets, 22 concentrated on foreign targets, and 3 were linked to both
domestic and international targets (Bjelopera, 2013). According to Bjelopera, of the 63 violent
homegrown jihadist attacks and plots that have occurred post 9/11, there are four principal
themes that are displayed. These four themes include: a variety of endgames, little stomach for

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suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and varied capabilities
among the plots.
Terrorists have different individual motives for becoming radicals, which results in a
variety of endgames. Some solely want to associate with foreign fighters, while some stay at
home and attempt their attacks with bombs or shooting sprees. Of the 63 post 9/11 plots, twenty-two
have dealt with individuals trying to become members of terrorist groups that are already
ensnared in conflict (Bjelopera, 2013). One of the primary examples of this occurrence can be
found when looking at recruitment of Al-Shabaab. As previously mentioned, this organization is
searching for young, potentially radical individuals in Muslim communities in the United States.
These young radicals are supporting the efforts of Al Shabaab and leaving their homeland to
journey away and fight in Somalia. These deserters can be considered homegrown terrorists
because they are American citizens who leave the country and fight for extreme Islamist views
and ideologies. Another specific example of this idea that Bjelopera looks into is the “Northern
Virginia Five” in 2009. These five men, who were American citizens and lived in Northern
Virginia, were arrested in Pakistan after traveling there in hopes to become members of jihadist
groups and fight against the United States in Afghanistan (Bjelopera, 2013). The five men were
convicted of terrorism in an anti-terror court in Pakistan in 2010 on charges of the attempt to join
forces with a militant group, planning an attack on a nuclear plant and air base in Pakistan, as
well as planned attacks on “territories of the United States” (Markon, 2010). Because these men
were United States citizens, they are considered to be homegrown terrorists who were attempting
to harm American citizens, specifically soldiers, on an international level.
The second theme that Bjelopera discusses is the lack of suicide terrorism as an attack
method. From the 63 attacks that are examined in this study, only 2 undoubtedly were linked to a

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suicide mission (Bjelopera, 2013). However, in 10 other cases, individuals expressed the idea
and willingness to partake in a suicide mission to fulfill their jihads (Bjelopera, 2013). A specific
example of this willingness to become a martyr was expressed by Coleen LaRose, a native of
Detroit, Michigan. LaRose, also known as “Jihad Jane” wrote in emails that were recovered by
government authorities that she was prepared to give her life to satisfy her ideologies; she was
later sentenced to ten years in prison for her involvement in an attempted murder with other
Islamic extremists (Shiffman, 2014).
Of the 63 cases of homegrown terror plots since 9/11, only 4 were successful, and they
were all carried out by “lone wolves”. Three of the four successful attacks were carried out with
the use of firearms and were targeting United States military personnel (Bjelopera,
2013).Bjelopera states that it is somewhat difficult to generalize this notion from such a small
sample size, but he points out that these four successful cases may link contrasting points. First,
he believes that U.S. law enforcement potentially faces major challenges when trying to target
and prevent lone wolf terrorists who are unaffiliated with large terror organizations (Bjelopera,
2013). Secondly, he feels as though U.S. law enforcement agencies have been successful in
countering and stopping homegrown terror systems since the events of 9/11 (Bjelopera, 2013).
This point is crucial when determining whether homegrown terrorism is a serious threat to the
United States. Yes, there have been very few successful attacks that have occurred since 9/11,
but is that because U.S. law enforcement agencies are triumphant in preventing and countering
these attacks? Without viewing homegrown terrorism as a high threat to the security of the
Homeland, more attacks would be carried out and more attacks would end in favor of the
terrorists.

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The final theme that was discovered within this study is the fact that homegrown
terrorists have various capabilities. Some plots displayed the use of bomb making skills, some
were attempting suicide missions, some used firearms, some were experienced terrorists, while
others and no prior experience at all. Not knowing the capabilities that terrorists possess make it
extremely hard to predict and prevent what will occur and who will be targeted. With the
unpredictability of homegrown terrorists, there must be a intensified sense of security in order to
fully protect the Homeland and the citizens that live within its borders.
The Heritage Foundation, behind the research of Jessica Zuckerman, Steven P. Bucci,
Ph.D, and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D, released a report in July of 2013 that takes an in-depth look
into some 60 post 9/11 terrorism cases. According to the report, of the 60 plots that are reviewed,
49 can be deemed as homegrown violent jihadist attacks. Of the 60 total cases, 4 ended with the
terrorists being successful, 3 were prematurely stopped out of luck, and the others were
immobilized by United States law enforcement agencies (see Chart 2). With 53 of these plots
being stopped before they imposed grave danger to the public, many people never heard about
the attacks and therefore do not understand that the actual threat is there. Zuckerman, Bucci, and
Carafano state that “now is not the time for the US to stand still… the best way to protect the
United States from the continued threat of terrorism is to ensure a strong and capable domestic
counterintelligence enterprise (Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano, 2013).”
From a national intelligence perspective, the threat of homegrown terrorism is not an
uncommon occurrence. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community is
an annual document that is presented by a select committee within the US intelligence system.
This document gives an overview on global as well as regional players that pose a threat to US
homeland security. James Clapper, US Director of National Intelligence, heads this report and

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touches on two major points dealing with terrorism that this analysis will cover. The first is the
potential of insider threats, which Clapper states will bring about a daunting task within the
counterintelligence community (Clapper, pg.4). With the already established threat of American
extremists, there is a possibility that an insider could obtain vital, classified information about the
American government and distribute it to various terror groups as well as foreign governments.
Clapper reiterates the fact that these potential homegrown insiders pose a serious danger to the
security of the homeland. The second important point that Clapper speaks on is the threat of
homeland plotting, specifically that of homegrown violent extremists (Clapper, 2014). He states
that “US-based extremists will likely continue to pose the most frequent threat to the US
Homeland….the extent of their ideological radicalization can represent challenging and lethal
threats (Clapper, pg.4).” As mentioned earlier, large-scale terror attacks are less likely to occur
because of the intensified security of the U.S. Homeland. Just as Clapper explains, this leads to
the use of smaller, more frequent insider attacks that pose a serious threat to the innocent lives of
American citizens. By using a more incognito approach for attacks, it will be more difficult for
U.S. counterterrorism and intelligence agencies to predict and foil these attacks, thus causing a
problem with the National Security of the United States.
Evaluating the endangerment that comes with the radical jihadist groups in the US brings
about debate with the prominence of this threat. The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West
Point points out that even though there are increasing threats by groups separate from Al Qaeda,
there is still a danger that continues from Al Qaeda (Mudd, 2010). Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has been
the biggest threat to the American Homeland and that trend is still prevalent today. There are,
however, other actors, such as ISIS, that are breaking onto the scene and imposing uncertainty to
the security of the United States. Phillip Mudd of the CTC believes that the ideologies of groups

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such as Al Qaeda are inspiring other organizations because “the number of people absorbing the
ideology has broadened the threat, both operationally and geographically (Mudd, pg.2)”, thus
making the United States a continued target for many terror groups. With a target on our backs,
the American population is constantly under the threat of foreign and domestic terrorist acts.
Paul Cruickshank, also of the CTC, validates the notion that homegrown terrorism is on the rise
in the US in his article entitled The Growing Danger from Radical Islamist Groups in the United
States. His fundamental argument of why this is a problem stems from the allowance of Islamist
groups to rightfully and willingly proliferate extremist ideology in the United States.
Cruickshank states that groups, such as Revolution Muslim and the Islamic Thinkers Society,
who promote the radicalization process, are key contributors in causing concern to
counterterrorism efforts and hinder the deduction of homegrown radicals (Mudd, 2010).
Although the idea of homegrown violent jihadist terrorism seems to pose a threat to the
United States, there are however, some scholars who downplay the threat of these militants. Risa
Brooks, a professor of Political Science at Marquette University, concludes in her research of
Muslim “Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States that there is not a serious threat posed by
these perpetrators (Brooks, 2011). Brooks also points out that this trend is not a growing problem
and specifically is not a threat to “deadly attacks within the United States (Brooks, pg.42).”
Brooks poses the question of “why has the threat of terrorism by Muslim Americans prompted
such alarm?” and proceeds to offer some answers (Brooks, pg. 46). Her first answer deals with
the public and emotional undercurrents stemming from the attacks on 9/11. She states that there
is a “conferring of collective responsibility by Americans on all Muslims for the horrendous acts
of the September 11 terrorists” (Brooks, pg. 46). While this is not always the case, Brooks
seems to undercut the patriotic unity that the United States has rallied around since the agonizing

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events that shook the nation. Another answer that Brooks presents is the preparation that
politicians and public officials have taken to ready citizens of possible, local terror attacks in the
future (Brooks, 2011). Again, this could be a factor in the alarming response by the American
people to homegrown terrorism, but precautions must be taken in order to safeguard the citizens
and protect the nation. From a standpoint of successful homegrown attacks within the American
borders, it seems to be a miniscule occurrence, but the threat is very real and there has to be a
continuation of homeland security in order to defend and maintain the confidence that the United
States thrives upon.
When combating homegrown terrorism, The United States and The United Kingdom
unfortunately have both seen problems over the past years. However, since these two countries
are atop the charts when dealing with terrorist attacks, there can be many comparisons and
similarities that help to identify reoccurring themes (see Chart 3). A study by Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman titled Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An
Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process focuses on the social indicators that affect
the radicalization process. Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman look into 117 cases of homegrown
jihadist terrorists who lived the majority of their lives in western culture, coming from the United
States as well as the United Kingdom. This study gathers information of these 117 terrorists from
personal writings, blogs and social media, governmental information, and court cases
(Gartenstein-Ross, pg.11). The findings of this study point to a six step course that plays a
significant role in the radicalization process of homegrown terrorists. These steps include: “the
adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam, coming to trust only a select and ideologically
rigid group of religious authorities, viewing the West and Islam as irreconcilably opposed,
manifesting a low tolerance for perceived religious deviance, attempting to impose religious

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beliefs on others, and the expression of radical political views (Gartenstein-Ross, pg. 61).”
According to the researchers, these six steps seemed to be a reoccurring theme throughout the
117 cases and offer an understanding of the individuals’ thought progression as they ventured
into the realm of domestic extremism. Their findings were somewhat synonymous to the
research conducted by the NYPD Intelligence Division in a sense that religious ideology,
demographics, and Muslim engagement play a significant role in the radicalization process.
As mentioned in the work of Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano, New York city is the
second most targeted place for terrorist attacks behind that of military bases (see Map 1),
(Zuckerman, Bucci, Carafano, 2013). Since the events of 9/11, as previously mentioned, the
NYPD plays a quintessential role in understanding the causes and devising plans to combat
homegrown terrorism. Local law enforcement is the main contributor for countering and
combating foreign and homegrown terrorism, but it is the job of all state and federal law
enforcement agencies to keep the homeland secure. After experiencing the events of 9/11, we
now know that local law enforcement will be the first responders in an instance of terror acts
committed on the homeland. The US Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services released an article in 2002 entitled Local Law Enforcement Responds to
Terrorism, Lessons in Prevention and Preparedness that illustrates the importance of regional
law enforcement agencies when dealing with terrorism. The article suggests that officials must
“strategically rethink public security procedures and practices in order to maximize the full
potential of their resources (Cohen, pg. 1).” The US Department of Justice clearly states in this
article what is required of local law enforcement as well as what procedures and preventative
measures will be used to ensure the protection of American citizens in a time of crisis. The
highlighted efforts that are suggested by the U.S. DOJ include “improving data and intelligence

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processing, increasing the capacity to address terrorism by capitalizing on technological
advancements, communicating with other public safety agencies, and responding to citizen fear
and preparing to assist potential victims” (Cohen, pg. 1).
Cohen and the U.S. DOJ look to data sharing as a key source to combating homegrown
terrorism. Data sharing is describes as “systematically linking large amounts of data from
neighboring law enforcement jurisdictions and also from different levels of law enforcement and
other institutions (Cohen, pg. 7)”. By allowing every agency to connect and distribute vital
information, it will become an easier process to piece clues together and gain leads on suspected
terrorists and their actions. Along with this notion comes the necessary compatibility of different
technological systems that is needed to allow for the proper circulation of information between
law enforcement agencies and their allies (Cohen, pg. 11). When a terror situation arises,
information must be given out to all probable combaters in a timely fashion in order to
successfully counter any plots devised by terrorists. By using technology to quickly distribute
information, the U.S. law enforcement divisions will be well equipped to contest and defend the
American people from any attack.
Along with data sharing, a crisis plan is pivotal in protecting the people and acquiring the
safety of everyone involved in the case of a terrorist attack. Just as cities have plans for
hurricanes, earthquakes, and flood, there must be the same idea in an instance of terrorism.
Cohen points out that the use of crisis plans are important and gives some examples of how
computers and geographic information systems (GIS) play an essential role. It is stated in the
article that “computer simulations and data mining techniques can be used to predict risks and
decrease loss of life and property caused by terrorist attacks (Cohen, pg. 15)”. Along with the
predictability of attacks and the possible decrease of fatalities, these crisis plans using computers

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and GIS can help pinpoint needed resources during an attack, constantly evaluate the threat at
hand, and also coordinate the interchange of information between local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies (Cohen, pg. 16).
Another key element when combating domestic terrorism is the response to victimized
citizens and the reduction of public fear (Cohen, pg.18). Just as Risa Brooks pointed out in her
research, there tends to be a stereotype for all Muslim people by American citizens, especially
after tragic events such as 9/11. Cohen reiterates this fact by stating that law enforcement
agencies have seen an increase in hate crimes and illegal bigotry towards Middle Eastern people
and more specifically those professing the Muslim faith (Cohen, pg. 18). By engaging the
community with a more “restorative justice” approach, citizens will be more inclined to embrace
the community in a positive manner and support other citizen’s within the community (Cohen,
pg. 18). Along with taking a restorative approach to terrorist’s attacks, it is the community’s job
to decrease the fear of its residents. Cohen believes that it is the police’s role to lead this
restoration and support the confidence needed to sustain the community (Cohen, pg. 18). He
concludes by stating that “this can be done through sustaining visibility, actively responding to
specific community questions and directing people to the appropriate community services to
keep the level of fear and uncertainty to a minimum (Cohen, pg. 18)”.
A key contributor to counterterrorism, other than local law enforcement, is the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. A book by Terry Turchie and Kathleen Puckett, entitled Hunting the
American Terrorist: The FBI’s War on Homegrown Terror, expounds on the fundamental
resources and strategies that the FBI uses to combat acts of terror. Turchie and Puckett explain
the significance of homegrown terrorism and state ways in which these terrorists can be
contained and ultimately detained. They look specifically into lone wolf attacks and concur with

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Bjelopera that these terrorists are harder to discover and prevent. The book also gives an
explanation for the reasoning behind terrorist thought and their ideologies, which further aids in
understanding the forces and factors that cause domestic extremism.
On June 23, 2006, Robert Mueller, then director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
delivered a speech that was directed towards the threat of homegrown terrorism within the
United States. The main points he touched on were the evolving of use of terrorism specifically
that of homegrown terrorism, the radicalization process, and what steps the FBI is taking to
combat and handle this new, developing threat. Mueller points out that al Qaeda has been the
most significant threat not only to America but around the entire globe. He states that although
U.S. military and law enforcement agencies have “destroyed their training camps and disrupted
both their funding and their means of communication…al Qaeda may be weakened, but it is not
dead (Mueller, 2006)”. With al Qaeda being a dominate terror organization, they have many
offshoot groups that follow their lead and operate in synonymous ways. Because these offshoots
are smaller and more “under the radar”, it makes it difficult to combat their attacks and foil their
plots. Just as Bjelopera pointed out in his research, Mueller concurs that “today, terrorist threats
may come from smaller, more loosely-defined individuals and cells who are not affiliated with al
Qaeda, but who are inspired by a violent jihadist message. These homegrown terrorists may
prove to be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so (Mueller, 2006)”. Mueller and
the FBI view the beginning of the radicalization process as being connected with a dissatisfied
individual who can be American born or a citizen that has immigrated into the United States.
Once the individual becomes involved with an extremist organization, that person will then begin
to identify with the radical ideology and hence be on their way to becoming a terrorist. Mueller
concludes that “the evolution from extremism to terrorism can take place anywhere, from

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academic settings, mosques, prisons, and community centers to the Internet (Mueller, 2006)”. Of
these proposed settings, prisons and the Internet are seemingly the two avenues that recruit the
most terrorists. Prisons are good recruiting grounds for future terrorists because “it may help
justify their violent tendencies…these persons represent a heightened threat because of their
criminal histories, their propensity for violence, and their contacts with fellow criminals
(Mueller, 2006).” As far as the Internet is concerned, terror organizations use the World Wide
Web as a propaganda tool which aids not only in recruitment but information sharing, attack
planning, and motivational encouragement. Mueller discusses “there are between 5,000 to 6,000
extremist websites on the Internet, encouraging extremists to initiate their own radicalization and
to cultivate relationships with other like-minded persons (Mueller, 2006).” Although the U.S. has
shattered and destroyed terrorist training facilities, the use of the Internet allows for these
organizations to further their coaching and spread the practice of radical beliefs. There are many
behind-the-scene activities that take place within terror organizations, but there are also many
that take place within the United States that keep the citizens safe from potential attacks. Mueller
wraps up his speech by commenting that,
“It has been nearly five years since the last terrorist attack on America. Yet there is no
room for complacency. As we have seen in recent months, our enemies are adaptive and
evasive. They are taking full advantage of technology. They are combining their
resources and their expertise to great effect. We must do the same (Mueller, 2006)”.
He also points to unity as the quintessential element that binds America together and allows for
the combating of homegrown terrorism. By sharing information and having cooperation between
local, federal, and intelligence agencies, counterterrorism becomes more effective. He goes on to
state that we may not know the exact locations and times that terrorists will attack, but we do
know that acts of terror will continually be carried out and attempted. Although these attacks

Pittman 20
have occurred and will likely be tried again, “we must not let terrorism change our way of life
(Mueller, 2006)”. Mueller ends his speech with a quote from James Thurber, a cartoonist of the
20th century, which I feel relates perfectly with the ongoing situation that America is dealing
with involving homegrown terrorism. Thurber wrote "Let us not look back in anger, nor forward
in fear, but around in awareness (Mueller, 2006).” The main purpose of terrorism is to inflict an
uneasy feeling into the targeted group of people. Terror groups use fear as their chief tool, which
directly correlates to a sense of anger and hatred for the victimizing group. Rather than looking
back in anger or forward in fear, we must look around into the present with awareness, just as
Thurber suggests. Mueller finalizes his speech by focusing on looking around in awareness,
stating that there must be awareness “of our citizens and our communities, and of the dangers we
face. Most importantly, let us look around in awareness of the strength of our democracy, the
strength of our unity, and the strength of our resolve. Armed with these strengths, we cannot and
we will not fail (Mueller, 2006).”
The idea of homegrown violent jihadist terrorism is gaining prominence and continues to
serve as a threat to the American homeland. Although it may not seem like a serious threat, there
are many elements at work behind the scenes that continuously protect American citizens on a
day to day basis. Multiple sources of research shows that homegrown terrorism does play a
substantial role in the security of the American homeland and it also has determined concise
points to the forces that cause this extremism. By looking at incidents that have occurred after
September 11, 2001 and drawing comparisons from other countries such as the U.K., there can
be a determination of the forces and factors that cause the threat of domestic terrorism as well as
the preventive measures that must be taken by law enforcement agencies that aid in combating
and defeating the threat of homegrown violent jihadist terrorism. Homegrown terrorism is a

Pittman 21
serious problem and should not be downplayed as a non-threating occurrence to the American
homeland and the American citizens alike.

Pittman 25
Works Cited
Bjelopera, Jerome P. American Jihadist Terrorism Combating a Complex Threat. N.p.:
Congressional Research Service, 23 Jan. 2013. PDF.
Clapper, James R. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. N.p.:
Office Of The Director of National Intelligence, 29 Jan. 2014
Cohen, Debra, Ph.D., Rachel Boba, Ph.D., and Matthew Scheider, Ph.D. Local Law Enforcement
Responds to Terrorism: Lessons in Prevention and Preparedness. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice, 2002. PDF.
Dershowitz, Toby. "Homegrown Terror in the U.S." Defenddemocracy.org. Foundation For
Defense Of Democracies, 2014. Web. 27 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.defenddemocracy.org/homegrown-terror- in-the-us/>.
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Laura Grossman. Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S and U.K: An
Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process. Washington, D.C.: FDD Press,
Apr. 2009. PDF.
Kron, Josh, and Mohamed Ibrahim. "African Union Peacekeepers Killed in Somalia
Battle." Nytimes.com. The New York Times, 21 Oct. 2011. Web. 27 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/africa/african-union-takes-casualties-in-somalia-
but-numbers-vary.html?_r=0>.
Markon, Jerry, Karin Brulliard, and Mohammed Rizwan. "Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia
Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot."WashingtonPost.com. The Washington Post, 18 Mar.

Pittman 26
2010. Web. 27 Oct. 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700430.html>.
Mudd, Phillip. "Evaluating the Al-Qa`ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland." Ctc.usma.edu.
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 1 Aug. 2010. Web. 09 Sept. 2014.
Mueller, Robert S., III. "The Threat of Homegrown Terrorism." Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The City Club of Cleveland, Cleveland. 23 June 2006. Fbi.gov. Web. 25 Nov. 2014.
<http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-of-homegrown-terrorism>.
National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President,
2011. PDF.
Olsson, Peter, M.D. The Making of a Homegrown Terrorist. Brainwashing Rebels in Search of a
Cause. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2014. Print.
Pelofsky, Jeremy. "Al Qaeda Group Al Shabaab Recruited Muslims Americans: U.S.
Report." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 27 July 2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/27/al-qaeda-american-recruits_
n_911432.html>.
Risa Brooks. "Muslim 'Homegrown' Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the
Threat?." International Security 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 7-47.
Schmidt, Michael S. "U.S. Pushes Back Against Warnings That ISIS Plans to Enter From
Mexico." The New York Times. The New York Times, 15 Sept. 2014. Web. 27 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/us/us-pushes-back-against-warnings-that- isis-plans-
to-enter-from-mexico.html>.

Pittman 27
Shiffman, John. "U.S. Woman Known as Jihad Jane Sentenced to 10 Years in
Plot." Reuters.com. Thomson Reuters, 06 Jan. 2014. Web. 28 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/06/us-usa-jihadjane-idUSBREA050PC20140106>.
Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. New
York City: The New York City Police Department, 2007. PDF.
Turchie, Terry D., and Kathleen M. Puckett. Hunting the American Terrorist: The FBI's War on
Homegrown Terror. Palisades, NY: History Pub., 2007. Print.
Zuckerman, Jessica, Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D., and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. "60 Terrorist Plots
Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism." Www.heritage.org. The
Heritage Foundation, 22 July 2013. Web. 18 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/60-terrorist-plots-since-911-
continued- lessons-in-domestic-counterterrorism>.

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