Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 debate has circulated around the nature and success of counterterrorism policies. Considering after thirteen years, the world has not faced a major attack on the same scale as those witnessed in 2001; counterterrorism policies by some have been argued to be a phenomenal success. This article will focus on counterterrorism policies by the United States, positing the argument that the success of these policies cannot be determined by the mere lack of terrorist attacks, but by the effects of these policies

1. 1
Assessed Essay Submission Cover Sheet
Essay Title: Western counter-terrorism policies since 9/11 are increasingly
depicted as having failed or as even having proved counter-
productive. How fair is this assessment?
Is the above title Pre-approved or
Negotiated?
No
Word count 4861
Western counter-terrorism policies since 9/11 are increasingly depicted as
having failed or as even having proved counter-productive. How fair is this
assessment?
Abstract
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 debate has circulated around the
nature and success of counterterrorism policies. Considering after thirteen years, the
world has not faced a major attack on the same scale as those witnessed in 2001;1
counterterrorism policies by some have been argued to be a phenomenal success.
This article will focus on counterterrorism policies by the United States, positing the
argument that the success of these policies cannot be determined by the mere lack of
terrorist attacks, but by the effects of these policies. Thus, counterterrorism policies
in the United States predominately, have been counter-productive; where we have
witnessed an aggressive new national security discourse consisting of immorally
justified interventions and the extensive erosion of human and civil rights that has
been enshrined into international law. As a consequence these policies have created
the alienation and marginalization of particular groups in society, further
exacerbating the rise of terrorism both locally and internationally.
Introduction
Terrorism, whether locally or internationally, has been a prevalent problem for
1
The repugnant nature of terrorism has been witnessed on a global scale, exampled
in the terrorist attacks in Bali 2002, Madrid 2004, United Kingdom 2005, and
Mumbai 2008. They exemplify attacks that not only represent some of the worst
terrorist attacks historically, but also recalled the need to sincerely address the global
issue of terrorism.

2. 2
Western states historically, varying from the 1998 Omagh bombing by the real IRA
in Northern Ireland, the 2001 Ealing bombing, the 2003 suicide truck bomb in
Russia, to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings.2
Nevertheless, the sheer scale of the
suicide attacks on September 11, 2001 exceeded any form of terrorist attacks seen
before in terms of the impact and mass casualties, resulting not in a new phenomenon
for counterterrorism policies, but a fundamental change in its nature. These attacks
culminated into an international commitment to counterterrorism within the national
and international realm, focusing on thwarting the capabilities and burgeoning
influence of radical terrorists groups such as al- Qa’ida. These policies featured an
intensification of surveillance measures, the expansion of policing powers, an
increasing presence within the Middle Eastern region, and clandestine operations
such as extraordinary rendition that consisted of the reformulation of international
norms, such as human rights in order to capture ‘enemy combatants’, imprison
citizens without trial and torture suspected terrorists. Although the death of ‘Osama
bin Laden marked the most important strategic milestone in global efforts to defeat
al- Qa‘ida, it only removed al-Qa‘ida’s founder and leader; his demise did not mark
the end of this group nor their influence’ (The White House, 2011: 3), which has
2
The attacks on September 2001 were ‘neither the first incidents of terrorism on U.S.
soil nor even the first attacks on the World Trade Center or the Pentagon’ (Jackson,
2011: 133). In 1993, ‘the World Trade Center was attacked with a vehicle bomb by
Ramzi Yousef, a ‘prolific terrorist subsequently connected to major plots aimed at the
aviation system; decades before, in 1972, the Weather Underground, a domestic
group, successfully detonated a bomb inside the Pentagon and previous to that, the
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, killed and
injured hundreds of people’ (Jackson, 2011:133).

3. 3
remained focal to United States and various other Western countries efforts to
counterterrorism. Moreover, with the new presence of the terrorist group ISIS- the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, an extremist rebel jihadist group within the Middle
Eastern region, the elimination of international threats remains far from gone. In
order to reduce international threats of terrorism, reforms and counterterrorism
policies have been aimed to prevent, pursue and protect civilians from terrorism and,
to ‘address the conditions that prove conducive to the proliferation of both radical
Islamism and terrorism’ (United Nations, 2005). However, the fluctuating nature of
the post-9/11 counterterrorism policies has raised condescension, thus the need for
examination.3
This article posits the argument that counterterrorism policies since the September 11
attacks have proved counterproductive, focusing primarily on the effects of American
counterterrorism policies and strategies.4
To successfully evaluate this assessment, I
3
American counterterrorism policies have been widely contested on the basis that
firstly, a state that has had the head role of universalizing human rights, and also
initiated humanitarian interventions based on the lack of human rights within
numerous states in the Middle East, have since the September 11, 2001 attacks shown
a sheer disregard to the importance of human rights through extraordinary rendition,
and curtailed international laws, through the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003, showing
not only double standards but also initiating counterproductive policies and strategies
which would inevitably cause alienation and hatred. Secondly, the terroristic nature
of policies exemplified in Obamas drones war, which has resulted in the death of
thousands of innocent civilians, exemplifies the notion of countering terrorism
through terrorist strategies. Military strategies have been argued counterproductive as
they are initiated through false pretexts, exampled in the Libya intervention to
allegedly save civilian’s but resulted in the death of Gaddafi, and the instalment of a
Western accepted government.
4
To encapsulate counterterrorism policies of the Western community as a collective
would prove copious, reducing the ability to effectively evaluate the alleged counter-
productivity of counterterrorism polices. The case of the United States is unique due
to the aggressive nature of their counterterrorism polices and strategies, which are

4. 4
will need to question the primary purpose of the counterterrorism agenda under
scrutiny, as without, leads to the deviation of succinctly analyzing the forth going
argument of its counter-productivity. Therefore, this article will be divided into three
parts. The first, will explore the conceptual understanding of counterterrorism, to
provide the platform of understanding what these policies sought to achieve. The
second section will analyze the alleged success of counter terrorism policies.5
Lastly,
the third section will analyze the counter- productivity of American counterterrorism
policies and international operations, using references to the United Kingdom to
corroborate this argument. This section will focus on the PATRIOT Act, and its
effects on human rights and civil liberties, the War on Terror, primarily foreign
policy aspects of such in Afghanistan and Iraq, to later the adoption of drone warfare
that derives from the War on Terror strategy. This will focus on the extent to which
such policies have created the alienation and marginalization of particular groups in
society, further exacerbating the rise of terrorism both locally and internationally.
Conceptualizing Counterterrorism
There remains, no overarching definition of counterterrorism, as it continues to be a
exemplified in their illegal Iraq war in 2003, the erosion of international human rights
norms through extraordinary rendition and torture, and national policies that
encourage social cohesion and alienation. In order to corroborate the counter-
productivity of counterterrorism policies, in the case of the United States, references
will be made to policies in the United Kingdom, whose policies are too, argued to be
problematic, exacerbating the issue of radicalization and anti-Westernism.
5
In the article ‘9/11 Lessons: Counterterrorism’ authored by Max Boot and Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, the argument is that U.S. counterterrorism policy since 9/11 has been a
phenomenal success, as ‘who could have imagined in 2001 that ten years later there
would not have been a single successful attack on the American homeland? And yet,
apart from a few lone-wolf attacks such as the shootings by Major Nidal Hasan at
Fort Hood, the record has been close to perfect’ (Boot and Kirkpatrick, 2011).

5. 5
‘difficult concept to define’ (Rineheart, 2010: 32).6
According to the U.S. Army Field
Manual, counterterrorism is defined as ‘operations that include the offensive
measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism’ (Rineheart,
2010: 32). This definition, though all-encompassing as it includes the main doctrines
necessary to deal with terrorism, still fails to include the whether this is a national or
international operation, as defensive measures and domestic policy used to respond to
terrorism, have been essential to tackle issues of home grown extremism and
radicalization. The threat of radicalization remains to be a challenging issue, where
‘groups and individuals supporting al-Qa’ida’s vision7
attempt to lure Americans to
terrorism in order to create support networks and facilitate attack planning, by
preying on those who are disenchanted and alienated within the American
community’ for an example (The White House, 2011: 2). Similarly, in the United
Kingdom, a significant emphasis has been placed on tackling radicalization, due to
the wakeup call from home-grown terrorism in the events of 7/7, which ‘provided
6
According to The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, ‘established by the
Secretary-General in 2005, counterterrorism involves measures to address the
conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat
terrorism; measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to
strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; measures to ensure
respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the
fight against terrorism’ (United Nations). This originates from the UN
Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force, http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/
7
The susceptibility of citizens to radicalization is not exclusive to the likes of al-
Qa’ida; for example, the UK deplores and will fight terrorism of every kind, whether
based on Islamist, extreme right wing or any other extremist ideology. It is argued
that extremist activity of any sort will not be tolerated. (HM Government, 2013: 1).

6. 6
evidence that there is a complex web of radicalized people within Muslim
communities in some parts of the country, although these threats come from a tiny
and marginal minority, these individuals are integrated within their communities’
(Briggs, 2010: 972). Hence, the importance of community-based approaches evident
in the ‘Prevent’ strand of the government’s counterterrorism strategy CONTEST,
allowing communities to play a central role in many different areas of the
counterterrorism strategy’ (Briggs, 2010: 972).8
The definition of counterterrorism
stipulated by the U.S. Army Field Manual is weakened by the failure to indoctrinate
the upholding of the respect for human rights for all and the rule of law (United
Nations), which is fundamental to guiding an effective counterterrorism policy and
strategy.9
Counterterrorism can therefore be defined as ‘measures taken whether
offensive or defensive, to prevent, deter, protect, preempt and respond to terrorism
both domestically and internationally, whilst upholding the respect for both human
and civil rights, and international law’ (United Nations; Rineheart, 2010: 32). While
8
The killing of British soldier Lee Rigby, by two British born Islam converts,
recalled the severity of combating home grown extremism and radicalization. See
‘The Report from the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and
Extremism’ by the HM Government.
9
The failure to incorporate the significance of human right norms and international
law within the spectrum of counterterrorism, allows states to initiate policies ‘by all
means and measures’, creating disillusion, alienation and animosity to those these
policies are meant to protect. It is essential to remember that counterterrorism
measures, whether policies or operations are ‘subject to change as specified by
Rineheart, due to the nature of terrorism, the diversity of characteristics in any
conflict involving terrorism and the fact that there remains no universally applicable
counterterrorism policy for democracies’ (Rineheart, 2010: 32).

7. 7
broad in nature, this definition encompasses the mutually inclusiveness of domestic
and international measures, and the respect for civil liberties and the rule of law,
which allows countries to remain adherent to policies that are morally acceptable,
reinforcing the importance of accountability (Rineheart, 2010: 32).
Counterterrorism has changed over the past few decades, hence the strategies and
policies to deal with terrorism have consisted of continuity and change.10
According
to Rineheart, counterterrorism has been structured around two approaches- the
military model and the criminal justice model (Rineheart, 2010: 37). The military
model, in contrast to the criminal justice model, concentrates on the ‘militaristic
nature of the struggle against terrorism, whereas the criminal justice model frames
around the rule of law and democratic values’ (Rineheart, 2010: 37). However, to
account for the new trends and characteristics of counterterrorism, it would be best to
reconstruct the framework around direct “hard power” and indirect “soft power”
approaches. As postulated by Rineheart, the direct approach consists of offensive and
hard power tactics such as ‘Predator and Reaper drone strikes, special forces
operations, increased policing and intelligence operations; on the other hand, indirect
‘soft power’ approaches to counterterrorism coalesce around population-centric
methods, featuring measures such as capacity building, economic development, and
10
Counterterrorism policies, as evaluated by Rineheart, ‘tend to structure around two
approaches: the war or military model and the criminal justice model’ (Rineheart,
2010: 32), See Rinehart’s Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency article, where he
focuses primarily on these frameworks.

8. 8
counter-radicalization’ (Rineheart, 2010: 38).11
Counterterrorism policies go beyond the simplistic need to fight terrorism, as it
requires the need to merge both military centric and population centric methods. This
article will evaluate the effectiveness of American counterterrorism policies in
accordance to five criteria:12
1. The reduced freedom of terrorists to operate (achieved via the elimination
of safe havens),
2. Increased levels of domestic support for counter- terrorism (where the
population is ever vigilant),
3. The disruption of terrorist recruitment (in order to stem, over time, the flow
of new blood into the organisation), this also includes reduction of
radicalization and extremism that highly correlates with terrorist
recruitment;
4. The reduced number of terrorist attacks (as attack capability reflects both
the threat posed by a group as well as its very viability),
5. Upholding core American values, including the respect for human rights for
all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against
terrorism (Schmid and Hindle, 2009: 43; Byman, 2003; United Nations;
The White House, 2011: 8).13
11
Counterterrorism strategies are generally the amalgamation of soft and hard power
policies. The successes of counterterrorism policies have primarily focused on hard
power approaches, which are arguably used to isolate and destroy terrorist groups
both domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, this approach has ‘raised
questions regarding ethics, human and civil rights and the legality of the use of force’
(Rineheart, 2010: 38). On the contrary, when evaluating the failures of
counterterrorism policies, soft power policies including counter- radicalization
methods which if effectively used could address some of the root causes of terrorism,
have been deemed counterproductive.
12
Please note: the following indicators for analysing counterterrorism policies in the
United States are not in any hierarchal order.
13
The fifth indicator of success remains to be one of the most important criteria to

9. 9
Measuring the success of American counterterrorism
Terrorism, has always been considered important, however the strategic demand to
counterterrorism was far from necessary, especially since the end of the Cold War,
which left the United States ‘experiencing a threat deficit’ (Buzan, 2006: 1101). The
struggle against communism presented itself as the biggest threat to American power,
‘neither Japan, China, nor rogue states came close to replacing the Soviet Union as
the enemy’, until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Buzan, 2006: 1101). Contrary to the
arguments posed by Kenneth- Pipe and Rengger, 14
the events taking place on
September 11, 2001 ensued the urge to ‘develop a new and comprehensive strategy to
eliminate the al Qaeda terrorist network and other interrelated factors connected with
radical Islamism' (National Commission, 2004).
The United States have seen numerous attempted terrorist attacks on their homeland,
contrasting from the John F. Kennedy International Airport Plot in June 2007, the
2009 shootings by Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood15
, to the 2013 Boston Marathon
meet, which many who determine the success of counterterrorism never include.
However, counterterrorism groups and organizations under the United Nations have
implemented the requirement to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of
law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism (United Nations).
14
Both posit the argument that 9/11 changed nothing fundamental in world politics
(Buzan, 2006: 1102) Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, ‘Apocalypse
now? Continuities or disjunctions in world politics after 9/11, International Affairs
82: 3, 2006, pp. 519-52
15
November 5, 2009 –Major Nidal Hassan kills 13 and wounds 32 in a shooting
rampage at a military processing centre at Ford Hood (CNN, 2014).

10. 10
bombings16
. Nevertheless, who could have imagined in '2001 that ten years later there
would not have been a single successful attack on the American homeland?' (Boot
and Kirkpatrick, 2011). Precisely, there have been no attacks that mildly compare to
the September 11 attacks in the United States, or the 7/7 attacks in the United
Kingdom. This section will evaluate the alleged successes of American
counterterrorism policies, though remaining to be a controversial topic of analysis; to
a fair degree American counterterrorism strategies have made laudable
achievements.17
With the vast ‘flow of resources into areas at the FBI, CIA, NSA and other relevant
agencies, the support from crucial investigative tools like the PATRIOT Act18
and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, an overwhelming success has been made in
foiling terror attacks against the United States’ (McNeill et al, 2011: 19). The
enhancement of policing powers and intelligence gathering tools, whilst arguably a
product of alienation and marginalisation through the hierarchising of limiting civil
liberties19
to ensure national security, has undeniably worked. According to the
16
Taking place on April 15, 2013, where twin bomb blasts explode near the finish
line of the Boston Marathon, killing three and wounding at least 264. Neither of the
former attacks compare to those on September 11, 2001 in terms of its coordination,
nor scale of impact (CNN, 2014).
17
The arguments posited to corroborate American counterterrorism success, has been
widely used to also justify counter productivity arguments, this argument will be
explored in the last section in more depth.
18
President George W. Bush signed the PATRIOT Act, into law on October 2001.
Featuring enhanced domestic law enforcement, investigatory authority, including
sweeping surveillance and search powers. This act has proven highly controversial,
and has been used to substantiate the argument of that American counterterrorism
policies are both cohesive and counter-productive.
19
The analyzing of intelligence and investigative measures coalesce around enhanced
surveillance authority, arguably an excellent tool for disrupting numerous terror plots

11. 11
Heritage Foundation for example, the reformulation of domestic intelligence and
investigative policies have been essential for law enforcement agencies that have
thwarted more than 39 terrorist plots. This is exampled in the case of ‘Iyman Faris in
2003 and Zazi in 2009 where laws such as the PATRIOT Act were essential for
provisions to gather information to investigate these potential terrorist attacks’20
(McNeill et al, 2011: 19). The reality remains, without policies and laws such as the
PATRIOT Act, enforcement authorities and governmental agencies would ‘have
insufficient intelligence or late intelligence thus resulting in severe consequences’
(McNeill et al, 2011: 19).
Although counterterrorism policies encountering the reduction of terrorist attacks in
the United States have been credibly successful, the ability to diminish attack
capabilities through both the threat posed by a group as well as its very viability
remains questionable. What remains to be a ‘striking trend in global affairs in the last
through rigorous checks and balances. Irrespective of the alleged aims of these
measures, the culmination of a draconian surveillance state has curtailed civilian
liberties through the endemic surveillance, with selective surveillance, policies in
order to prevent terrorism, as reflected in the United Kingdom’s Prevent strategy,
focusing on a specific group creates communal seclusion, and further exacerbates the
prospects of radicalization. This strand of argument will be explored in-depth in the
latter section, which focuses predominantly on human rights and policies both
domestic and international that result in the proliferated vision of anti-Westernism
and more importantly radicalization.
20
Laws such as the PATRIOT Act gather information both nationally and
internationally, which provides a vast scope of intelligence to investigate and prevent
potential targets against terrorism. In order to, successfully prevent domestic attacks,
cooperation on an international level, can help to obtain and provide information on
individuals whom have been radicalized or trained abroad to further a later terrorist
attack on their homeland, which in this case is the United States.

12. 12
four years, is the real and perceived threat of terrorism to international peace and
security’ (Hyslop, 2014). Whilst the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 marked the
‘most important strategic milestone in global efforts to defeat al- Qa‘ida, as many
anticipated the demise of al- Qa’ida, their influence and threat of international
jihadism, this has been far from the case’ (The White House, 2011: 3; Hyslop, 2014).
This significant achievement to date, as praised by President Obama on May 2011,
has not resulted in the end of terrorism, which has proven substantially right, as ‘
whilst al-Qa’ida has been degraded and become far more decentralized in recent
years, its Salafist ideology continues to resonate among jihadis in many corners of the
world’ (Patrick and Kerr, 2013). Unfortunately, Al- Qa’ida and the ideology it
promulgates remains stronger than American policy makers anticipated, with the
unprecedented growth and expansion of the Islamic State and al-Qa’ida, the
counterterrorism strategies by the United States remains dire.
Although progression may be recognised when focusing on the lack of attacks on the
United States homeland, global Jihadist groups such as the Islamic State and al-
Qa’ida have shown to be elusive in nature and can expand to the United States
(Zimmerman, 2014).21
. Furthermore, we have witnessed ‘Islamic militants join forces
21
According to Zimmerman, ‘we must develop a strategy that addresses all

13. 13
with al-Qa’ida of the Islamic Maghreb to seize northern Mali declaring the short-lived
independent state of Azawad and imposing harsh sharia law; increased violence from
al-Qaeda-linked jihadist groups Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria; and the
alignment of the al Nusra Front rebel group in Syria with al-Qaeda’ (Patrick and Kerr,
2013). Regardless of the many interventions that have taken place, whether under the
pretexts to remove or halter al-Qa’ida influences, exemplified in the major
interventions in both Somalia and Mali in 2011 and in 2013, or to protect the lives of
civilians noted in the 2011 Libya intervention22
; the threat of terrorism remains
undeterred. Exemplified by the Global Terrorism Index report (GTI) from the
Institute for Economics and Peace, which shows that ‘between 2012 and 2013, the
number of people killed in terrorist incidents saw the largest increase in history, to
18,000 lives lost, which is a 61 percent increase from one year to the next’ (Hyslop,
2014). Considering only ‘five percent of total global terrorist deaths from 2000- 2013
occurred in OECD nations, such as September 11, 2001, the Beslan school siege, the
components of the Islamic State and al-Qaida, and then, Americans home and abroad
will be safe’ (Zimmerman, 2014). Removing the threat of terrorism within the United
States remain counterintuitive, as it fails to address the roots causes of the global
jihadi ideology that thrives in the Middle East, and Africa.
22
The 2011 Libya intervention will be used to substantiate the counter productivity
of counterterrorism strategies with the purpose of humanitarian or military
intervention. This is proven by the case of Libya where although the “lead-from-
behind” strategy overthrew Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, the current situation
remains dire, discarding the once ’model intervention’ as Islamic militants including
those reportedly behind the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in
Benghazi, Libya, remain active in the east (Zimmerman, 2014).

14. 14
Madrid bombings, the London 7/7 attacks, and the 2011 Norway Utoya attack’
(Hyslop, 2014); terrorism prospects are relatively low. In comparison to lower
income nations where the real threat, impact and risk of terrorism are thriving,
varying from the increased terrorist activity from ISIS, whom have developed beyond
the conventional terrorist organization23
. The proliferation of 'terrorist activity has
increased dramatically, where in Syria for instance, embroiled in its civil war since
2011, moved from zero recorded terrorist events in 2010 to the country with the
5th
highest level of terrorist impact in the world in 2013' (Hyslop, 2014); more
importantly signifying the under evaluated nature of real threats and risks. The
success of counterterrorism policies and strategies, not only in the United States but
within the Western community, suggests that current approaches need to be
readdressed. Where ‘only five countries amount to 82 percent of the totaled global
terrorist activity, counterterrorism policies need to address the factors that enable
radicalisation, intergroup cohesion and grievances, as stipulated in the Global
Terrorist Index report which postulates the same factors that create broader societal
conflict also drive terrorist activity’ (Hyslop, 2014).
Despite the expanding influence of global terrorism, there have been some
considerable counterterrorism successes displayed by the United States, and the
international community that should not go unrecognised. The United States, have
23
The Islamic State is argued to be a serious, yet unique threat to Americans in the
‘broader Middle East, with the exemplary acts or barbarism and brutality, exampled
in the mass killings in both Syria and Iraq, and the public murder of two Americans,
Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff’ (Zimmerman, 2014).

15. 15
made progress to a degree in developing both counter radicalization strategies and
policies to ‘reduce al-Qa’ida’s attraction, and active measures to ensure that terrorists
never get their hands on weapons of mass destruction or the materials necessary to
build them; more conspicuously their effective international collaboration to crack
down on terrorist financing, by stemming the flow of funds to terrorists' hands and
providing legal frameworks to prosecute those providing them’ (Patrick and Kerr,
2014). Focusing beyond the military successes against al-Qa’ida through the removal
of Osama Bin Laden, and other affiliates killed through various air strikes and
counterinsurgency measures, the United States have made exceptional progress in
eliminating safe havens. Unsurprisingly controversial, the consistent use of
unmanned drones have been argued to be strategically successful, both short and long
term.24
In 2010 alone, ‘the Obama administration had authorized over one- hundred
drone strikes worldwide, killing Mohammed Atef, AQ’s top military strategist, in
2001 in a drone strike near Kabul, two months after the 9/11 attacks; and
additionally, since 2008 killing dozens of lower-ranking militants and at least ten
mid-and upper-level leaders within Al Qaeda or the Taliban’ (Rineheart, 2010: 37).
Regardless of the supposed successes of American counterterrorism measures, such
strategies like the use of drones have produce unintended consequences, through the
killing of unarmed and innocent civilians, which have alienated local and
24
The use of drones have been widely used to corroborate claims of counterterrorism
policies in respect to the United States, with the subsequent feature of collateral
damage, radical Islamic groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State have used this
consequent feature to promulgate their ideology.

16. 16
international populations.
Since the September 11 attacks, the United States have been condemned for its
extraordinary response to the attacks on their homeland, military strategies and
domestic policies have been deemed counterproductive as they have provoked the
prevalence of global terrorist. When analysing the use of drones, interventions,
enhanced securitization policies and laws, neither have reduced the prospects of
radicalization, but instead created alienation, communal cohesion and anger which
groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State thrive off, especially in regards to
recruitment. The latter section will focus predominantly on the counter productivity
of American counterterrorism policies and strategies by analysing the human rights
and international law debate and the consequent creation of alienation and
marginalization through both domestic policies and foreign strategy.25
Counterterrorism or Counter Productivity?
The former analysis of American counterterrorism policies demonstrates whilst some
success has been made to deter homeland attacks in the United States, the measures
taken to reduce terrorist capabilities, more so of al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State have
proved unequivocally counterproductive. This section will argue that,
counterterrorism policies by the United States have to a degree met the criteria to
reduce the freedom of terrorists to operate (achieved via the elimination of safe
havens), and reduce the number of terrorist attacks within the compound of the
25
References to the United Kingdom will be made to support the creation of
alienation and radicalization, which has been exemplified more recently by the
murder of Lee Rigby, by former radicalized British citizens.

17. 17
United States (Schmid and Hindle, 2009: 43; Byman, 2003; United Nations; The
White House, 2011: 8). Nevertheless, failure has been recognised to accomplish the
criteria to increase levels of domestic support for counter- terrorism (where the
population is ever vigilant), disrupt terrorist recruitment (in order to stem, over time,
the flow of new blood into the organisation), also including the reduction of
radicalization and extremism that highly correlates with terrorist recruitment; and
uphold core American values, including the respect for human rights for all and the
rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism (Schmid and
Hindle, 2009: 43; Byman, 2003; United Nations; The White House, 2011: 8).
Through the exertion of power on securitization, influencing the demise of human
rights and civil liberties, to pre-emptive measures and increased presence
internationally in the Middle East; American counterterrorism policies have fostered
anti-American sentiments and marginalised particular groups in society resulting in
increased terrorist recruitment both at home and abroad.
“Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve
neither and lose both” Benjamin Franklin26
The debate around the counter productiveness of counterterrorism policies have
promulgated around the suspension of human rights and civil liberties that
democracies such as the United States have proscribed to. After the September 11
attacks, the ‘Bush administration argued that certain international norms did not apply
26
See Thomas Birkland (2010) An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories,
Concepts and Models of Public Policy Making, Third Edition, Routledge, pp. 239

18. 18
to United States conduct because the United States faced a situation of exceptional
insecurity’ (Ralph, 2013: 1). This involved enhanced security measures to catch the
culprits or anyone affiliated with al-Qa’ida, the Afghanistan War to later the Iraq
invasion that all roundly annihilated international law. The introduction of the 2001
PATRIOT Act27
was ‘initially well received as an expeditious and comprehensive
governmental response to the continued threat on national security’, comprised of a
range of surveillance powers for governmental agencies to ‘use video cameras, wire-
tapping and bugs that could be used to detect, prevent and investigate alleged crimes’
(Fura and Klamberg, 2012: 463; Ahmadi, 2011; Doyle, 2004)28
. This act also
included the extension of policing powers in terms of stop and search both in public
and private surroundings; such policies have not been confined to the United States,
but reflected in the United Kingdom’s CONTEST strategy, and legislations including
the Terrorism Act 2000, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act
2006 which was introduced in response to the 7/7 London bombings.
The US administration have sought to 'create a society that is protected by
27
Irrespective of government officials who claim that 'security and liberty are
interrelated and mutually reinforcing, which the PATRIOT Act is allegedly dedicated
to serve' (Birkland, 2010: 239). The PATRIOT Act has done the opposite, through
the erosion of constitutional liberties and rights.
28
The New York Times revealed in December 2005 that President Bush had
authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept communications
entering or leaving the United States without first obtaining a warrant even if the
communication concerned a person located in the United States (Fura and Klamberg,
2012: 473).

19. 19
impenetrable physical and electronic barriers, however such delusion has arguably
also jeopardized important liberties by suggesting a hierarchy of rights, and invited a
situation in which limits imposed by extraordinary laws become increasingly
portrayed as ordinary' (Bigo, 2001). In addition, the ambiguous discourse of policies
such as the PATRIOT Act to reassure the public safety have constructed what
Hillyard terms ‘suspect communities’ (Hillyard, 1993: 33).29
Prevalent in the late
1990’s in the United Kingdom due to the terrorist attacks by the IRA, policies that
enhanced surveillance as witnessed in the United States focus solely on the social
group that favour those who perpetrated the attacks. The war on terror discourse in
the United States have constructed a Muslim suspect community, where they have
been racially profiled in accordance to the PATRIOT Act, and continuously viewed
29
Hillyard ‘explained the concept of ‘suspect community’ as the process of
identification of a threat and of a sign of abnormality which exemplified and
legitimated the politics of exception put in place by the state’ (Hickman and Thomas,
2011: 10; Hillyard, 1993: 7). This term was widely used during ‘the communisation
of the Irish community during the terrorist attacks perpetrated by the IRA, where ’ a
person who is drawn into the criminal justice system, not as a suspect in a normal
sense, but suspected primarily because they are Irish’ (Hickman and Thomas, 2011:
10; Hillyard, 1993: 7). Hillyard’s conceptualisation of the ‘suspect community’
proved prevalent in the United States, where if you attributed any features associated
with the stereotypical understanding of an Muslim, you were targeted by
governmental agencies for surveillance purposes‘, such treatment has not been
confined to policing purposes only, the general public enacted discriminative
behaviour to Muslim individuals. With continuous media outlets focusing on Islamic
extremism, the psychological reaction by many would be to fear those who are
closely associated to such perception envisaged by the media, which in the case of
the September 11, attacks or even the July London bombings, Muslim communities.
The counter productivity of policies such as the PATRIOT Act or when referring to
the United Kingdom terrorism legalisations introduce in 2000, 2005 and 2006 that
continue draconian measures to reinforce the idealistic thought of preventing terrorist
radicalisation.

20. 20
with suspicion of being a potential terrorist.
Although there remains a scarcity of empirical evidence on how counterterrorism
policies in the United States have affected Muslims whom reside there, there a
relevant, yet few studies that show how counterproductive domestic policies to tackle
terrorism can be. A prime example substantiating the effects of policies that exert the
suspect community or individual follows from the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings.
A Saudi national was seen like many other bystanders ‘running, badly hurt’ but was
tackled by a bystander as he was suspected to be the bomber, due to his apparent
suspicious outlook’ (New Yorker, 2013). According to the Boston police, it is
reported that ‘he smelt like explosives’ (New Yorker, 2013). The problem starts here,
due to the middle Eastern appearance of this man, the public and law enforcement
irrationally suspected this man as the terrorist, the effects of policies that inherently
racially profile Muslims imply the not only relevance of Hillyard’s suspect
community, but furthermore contributes to the growing fear towards Muslims. The
reality of the Boston Bombings in 2013, is that these attacks were perpetrated by the
Tsarnaev brothers who had been radicalised, which introduced a new challenge of
‘how to counter online radicalization, a known recruitment tool used by terrorist
networks overseas, which appeared to have a significant impact on the suspected
perpetrators of the attacks that left three dead and hundreds injured’ (Huffington Post,
2013). The case of the Tsarnaev brothers may be unique, as there was no evidence
that they had worked with a terrorist group, but still brings to light that policies at

21. 21
home and abroad can influence ones choice to radicalise, as shown in an ‘apparent
confession note by Dzhokar Tsarnev, as he justified his role in the Boston bombings
as retribution for the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Huffington Post,
2013). When policies that sought to protect individuals, consequently normalise
alienation, victimisation and also the suppression of civil liberties and human rights,
counter-productiveness arises when those prophesied to be terrorist actually become
one.30
American policy makers have tried to justify what they deem pre-emptive
intelligence as a ‘more proactive, preventive measure against threats such as
terrorism’ (Fura and Klamberg, 2012: 463). Nevertheless, this has remained far from
the reality, policies such as the PATRIOT Act have infringed upon the rights
stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, which ‘protects
the individual’s right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence’ (Fura and Klamberg, 2012: 467), and the Fourth Amendment to the
30
‘The Christmas tree bomber’ corroborates claims of radicalization and raises the
question to whether entrapping low-level wannabe jihadists with elaborate FBI sting
operations the best way of handling domestic radicals? See Raffaello Pantucci’s
article ‘Counter- productive counter-terror’. Available from:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/30/mohamed-
osman-mohamud-portland

22. 22
United States Constitution.31
The sheer disregard to these given rights have caused a
rejection of domestic support for terrorism, and alienated those, who these rights are
introduced to protect.32
The former champions of democratic values, and human
rights have illogically used clandestine operations both domestically and
internationally, obliterating of one of the most robust norms, 1984 UN Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Dunne, 2007: 277; Richards, 2014), with the authorization of the torture of many
detainees, whom were detained without charge or public hearing in a court (Dunne,
2007: 278; Richards, 2014). This is exemplified in the exposure of Guantanamo Bay
and Abu Ghraib, which revealed stories of abusive treatment and interrogation
methods used by the United States on detainees.33
The US administration has justified and rationalised the use of torture under the
analogy of terrorists as inhuman, and something that requires all means possible to
defeat. Once known as the states leading in the role of universalising human rights,
morals and ethically acceptable norms, their counter terrorism policies when focusing
on such facets not only reflecting double standards, but furthermore, reinforce a
'contradictory (and often superfluous) nature, as well as the illusions they have about
31
‘The Fourth Amendment provides the following: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches be
seized’ (Fura and Klamberg, 2012: 471).
32
The targeting of Islamic groups to respond to the central security concern of
terrorism has ‘blurred the boundaries between ‘moderate Muslims’ and ‘extremist
Muslims’, such a political discourse has impacted the lives of those who identify
themselves as Muslim in an multi ethnic United States’ (Hickman and Thomas, 2011:
3).
33
See generally, John T Parry ‘The shape of Modern Torture: Extraordinary rendition
and Ghost detainees, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 6.

23. 23
their own power' (Bigo, 2001). This is shown in strategic measures within the War on
Terror, from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was neither in accordance with the
UN's founding charter, nor sanctioned by the UNSC. The 'manipulation of
international laws, such as ‘Resolution 1368’ 34
and international measures abroad
resulting in forced regime change, through the jargon of humanitarian interventions,
which in reality serve as a pretext carry out a “war without borders”, a global war of
conquest' (Chossudovsky, 2014; Marks, 2006: 46; Richards, 2014). Considering,
extremist groups such as al-Qa'ida have made it explicit clear about their aim to 'evict
foreign forces from the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East, and terminate
elite, corrupt and pro-western countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan'
(Rogers, 2007), American counterterrorism strategies in the Middle East have proved
counterproductive. In spite, of all the 'military actions in the Middle East and South-
West Asia, the al-Qa'ida movement has remained resilient and active', regardless of
the fact 'many of Al-Qa’ida’s early leaders, like Osama Bin Laden, have been either
killed or captured, new generations have come to take their place', and the Islamic
State have gained strong prominence in various sections of the Middle East (Rogers,
2007).
Whilst it's been established that domestic counterterrorism policies have backfired
through energising radicalization and anti- Westernism, American foreign policy
through the War on Terror has proved to make 'anti-Americanism in particular a
34
Resolution 1368: recognized ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence...’ provided the principal legal basis for the use of force (Marks, 2006: 46).

24. 24
common place in many parts of the world' (Rogers, 2014). Preemptive
counterterrorism strategies through the use of drones, for example, have
'disproportionately killed civilians and generated anti-American sentiments that aid
al-Qaeda recruitment efforts' (Hopkins, 2013). This is corroborated by Doyle and
McCarthy,35
who rather adroitly explained that drones are having 'adverse strategic
effects by causing hatred among the local populations where US bombs fall, as for
every innocent person you kill, you create 10 new enemies' (Hopkins, 2013; Glaser,
2014). More importantly, the current drone programme is encouraging a new arms
race that will empower current and future rivals and lay the foundations for an
international system that is increasingly violent' (Hopkins, 2013; Glaser, 2014). As
supported by McCarthy, strategies like the drone programme, have been
propagandistic tools for both Al-Qa'iad and the Islamic States, where the systematic
killings of many Muslims have both fuelled the anti- American view and proved to be
an excellent tool for recruitment to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State36
. The strength and
persistence shown by the Islamic State, shows not only that counterterrorism policies
35
Michael Boyle, who was on 'Obama's counter-terrorism group in the run-up to his
election in 2008', argues the use and over reliance on drone warfare not only
undermines the rule of law, but also has proven ineffective and counterproductive,
this is substantiated by Stanley McChrystal, the former military general to Obama,
who stated drone warfare has exacerbated the perception of American arrogance
which had generally fuelled anti-Americanism (Hopkins, 2013; Glaser, 2014). What
remains unsurprising is that 'US use of drones has soared during Obama's time in
office, with the White House authorising attacks in at least four countries:
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. It is estimated that the CIA and the US
military have undertaken more than 300 drone strikes and killed about 2,500 people'
(Hopkins, 2013; Glaser, 2014) within all the mentioned countries, terrorism is
resilient and proliferating higher than expected considering the variety of
counterterrorism policies in hand.
36
The United States involvement with Israel has fuelled anti-American sentiments,
who by many Palestinians have been viewed as a terrorist state. Israel have been
widely 'depicted by the West as victims of terrorism, however in reality they are
major perpetrators of state terrorism which is consistently downplayed or ignored'
(Herman, 1982).

25. 25
in the United States need to change but more importantly, the 'inconvenient truth is
that ISIS actually represents a dangerous new chapter in the global war being waged
by Al Qaeda and its affiliated and inspired group', which has been bolstered by
policies both domestic and international by the United States (Gottlieb, 2014).
Consequently, counterterrorism policies by the West, specifically the United States,
have sought to deal with the upsurge in extremist terrorism by fighting terrorism with
terror, matching assassination with assassination, and torture with torture, hence its
counter productivity (Ignatieff, 2005).37
Conclusion
American counterterrorism policies have proved counterproductive, where various
measures to deal with the proliferating threat of radical Islamism and both national
and international terrorism have resulted in allegiances to international morals and
laws to be disregarded to further national security gains, and the actual increase of
terrorist activity. This has been validated when revising the abuse of human rights,
civil liberties and international law, within the United States and the United Kingdom
in particular. Irrespective of the considerable successes that have been displayed
through domestic and international policies, terrorism persists to be a serious threat to
the international community notably when analyzing the current activity of Al-
Qa’ida and the Islamic state.38
37
See generally, Michael Ignatieff (2005) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age
of Terror. Available from: http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7578.html
38
See Thomas Ricks, A view from Pakistan. Available from:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/15/a-view-from-pakistan-isis-and-the-u-s-look-the-
same-to-me-both-thinking-they-enjoy-a-form-of-divine-exceptionalism/

26. 26
This article sought to analyse American counterterrorism policies in respect to five
criteria39
, although such policies whether domestic or international have reduced
attacks on American homeland, complying with criteria four, there has been a failure
to reduce extremist terrorist attacks internationally where we witness weekly attacks
more so in the Middle Eastern region, by Al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State. When
exploring the reduced freedom of for terrorist to operate, referred to formerly as
criteria one, counterinsurgency strategies, the deployment of American soldiers, and
the excessive use of drone warfare have to a degree reduced safe havens used by
extremist groups such as Al-Qa’ida, but consequently too, helped to them to
proliferate. American counterterrorism policies have unequivocally failed to meet
criteria two, three and five. Through various interventions that have tried to impose
western values, also referred to a Humanitarian Imperialism by Jean Bricmont,
exampled in the Afghanistan war in 2001, and the Libyan intervention in 2011, the
use of drone warfare, the use of extraordinary rendition, and domestic policies such
as the PATRIOT Act; the adherence to morally inclined Liberalistic values have been
disregarded, terrorism recruitment has upsurge since 2001, and domestic support has
severely declined. To conclude, the American stance to counterterrorism, have had
many repercussions, their over reliance on hard power and offensive strategies have
not countered terrorism but proved to be an excellent propaganda tool for terrorist
recruitment, energized the current trend of anti-Americanism and Westernism.
39
Refer to page 6, where the five criteria are specified in detail.

27. 27
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