AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM FINAL PAPER KAELA SEAY INTL434: Threat Analysis 26 February 2017 FINAL PAPER: ESSAY QUESTION ONE Throughout history, threats have evolved significantly. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the face of threats began to change. Traditionally, threats originated from other nation and nation-states’ military forces. However, threats can now originate from a plethora of other, non-traditional sources that can potentially pose a far more dangerous threat. The infinite possibilities of threat that can be faced forces the United States government to analyze these new threats, their capabilities, and how they need to adjust their approach to better detect, prevent, and combat them. This essay will discuss where non-traditional threats may originate, how capable they are, how the United States government should approach them, and the problems they may face when doing so. Today, the United States government faces many threats from non-state actors. Non-states can be anything a nation-state is not. Non-state threats are considered non-traditional threats, which makes analyzing them more difficult. These new, non-state actor threats can originate from one of the following sources: terrorist organization, criminal organizations, private organizations, extremist activist groups, lone wolf actors, and even pirates. Today, one of the largest threats the United States finds itself faced with is terrorist that originates from terrorist organizations. Non-traditional threats have presented the United States “with adversaries that are constantly changing and adapting to their environment and who will present fewer obvious patterns to analyze” (Haddock, n.d.). With the endless number of possible threats the United States is faced with, it would be impractical for the United States government to approach all non-state actor threats unilaterally. Non-state actors have evolved into extremely capable and resourceful entities. “International terrorism once threatened Americans only when they were outside the country. Today international terrorists attack us on our own soil” (Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, n.d.). One of the most common examples of a terrorist organization that the United States has faced threats from is Al Qaeda. Non-state actors such as Al Qaeda have similar characteristics, which include: international operations, funding, and logistical networks, less dependence on state sponsors, developed communication technologies, and lethal objectives (Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, n.d.). Due to the capabilities of non-state actors, the United States government must look to international cooperation to detect, prevent, and combat these non-traditional threats. Detecting, preventing, and combatting non-traditional threats from non-state actors such as terrorism is no easy task. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the Uni.

1. AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
FINAL PAPER
KAELA SEAY
INTL434: Threat Analysis
26 February 2017
FINAL PAPER: ESSAY QUESTION ONE
Throughout history, threats have evolved significantly.
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the
face of threats began to change. Traditionally, threats originated
from other nation and nation-states’ military forces. However,
threats can now originate from a plethora of other, non-
traditional sources that can potentially pose a far more
dangerous threat. The infinite possibilities of threat that can be
faced forces the United States government to analyze these new
threats, their capabilities, and how they need to adjust their
approach to better detect, prevent, and combat them. This essay

2. will discuss where non-traditional threats may originate, how
capable they are, how the United States government should
approach them, and the problems they may face when doing so.
Today, the United States government faces many threats
from non-state actors. Non-states can be anything a nation-state
is not. Non-state threats are considered non-traditional threats,
which makes analyzing them more difficult. These new, non-
state actor threats can originate from one of the following
sources: terrorist organization, criminal organizations, private
organizations, extremist activist groups, lone wolf actors, and
even pirates. Today, one of the largest threats the United States
finds itself faced with is terrorist that originates from terrorist
organizations. Non-traditional threats have presented the United
States “with adversaries that are constantly changing and
adapting to their environment and who will present fewer
obvious patterns to analyze” (Haddock, n.d.). With the endless
number of possible threats the United States is faced with, it
would be impractical for the United States government to
approach all non-state actor threats unilaterally.
Non-state actors have evolved into extremely capable and
resourceful entities. “International terrorism once threatened
Americans only when they were outside the country. Today
international terrorists attack us on our own soil” (Countering
the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, n.d.). One of
the most common examples of a terrorist organization that the
United States has faced threats from is Al Qaeda. Non-state
actors such as Al Qaeda have similar characteristics, which
include: international operations, funding, and logistical
networks, less dependence on state sponsors, developed
communication technologies, and lethal objectives (Countering
the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, n.d.). Due to
the capabilities of non-state actors, the United States
government must look to international cooperation to detect,
prevent, and combat these non-traditional threats.
Detecting, preventing, and combatting non-traditional
threats from non-state actors such as terrorism is no easy task.

3. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the
United States government found a renewed sense of urgency.
Agencies and task forces such as the Joint Interagency Task
Force (JIATF), United Nations Counterterrorism Center
(UNCCT), INTERPOL, and Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) have been established as an effort to counter terrorism
(The Global Regime for Terrorism, 2011). Additionally,
international conventions have been supported in order to
improve multilateral addressing threats from non-state actors.
However, “combating terrorism has been hampered by the
increased organizational efficiency of terrorist groups (e.g.
leaderless networks) and ineffective use of brute force and
targeted killings by the state (in Chechnya and Palestine)”
(Srikanth, n.d.).
Though counterterrorism efforts have improved significantly in
recent years, counterterrorism efforts are still inadequate. One
problem with international cooperation regarding
counterterrorism efforts is the lack of leadership. With no one
entity that oversees counterterrorism, the effort as a whole is
left rather unorganized. A lack of leadership to oversee
counterterrorism efforts leads to another problem. Another
problem with international cooperation regarding
counterterrorism efforts is the lack of responsibility in ensuring
all members who play a part in counterterrorism efforts are
truly contributing. It is possible for members to not accept their
responsibilities if their views on the importance of
counterterrorism differ. If members who play a part in
counterterrorism efforts are not contributing, the impact the
effort has is diminished. Additionally, another problem with
international cooperation regarding counterterrorism efforts is
the lack of sharing intelligence between agencies. Without
sharing intelligence regarding non-state actors, not all members
who play a part in counterterrorism efforts will have the
intelligence they need in order to oversee their responsibilities.
However, “without international cooperation, the United States
cannot protect its national infrastructure from the cyber

4. threat”(Countering the Changing Threat of International
Terrorism, n.d.). The United States and its allies are forced to
develop a better approach to detect, prevent, and combat these
non-traditional, non-state threats.
Throughout history, threats have shifted from traditional threats
to non-traditional threats. Non-traditional threats are somewhat
of an unknown territory. They can originate from an infinite
number of sources, which have significantly developed
resources and connections, which makes them harder to detect,
prevent, and combat. The terrorist attacks on September 11th,
2001, enlightened how serious of an issue these threats were to
not only the United States, but the whole world. Shortly after,
counterterrorism efforts were established and implemented.
Despite the world’s renewed sense of urgency regarding these
threats, counterterrorism efforts were noticeably insufficient. In
recent years, non-traditional threats have become an even
greater concern. The United States and its allies have come
together to improve multilateral counterterrorism efforts to
better detect, prevent, and combat these threats and, therefore,
ensure national security.
FINAL PAPER: ESSAY QUESTION TWO
World politics, strategic intelligence, and national
intelligence have become increasingly complex throughout
history. They are, however, imperative in modern governments
throughout the world. These factors assist governments in
accomplishing policy making and planning as well as
implementing and overseeing policy plans. Two fundamental
views regarding intelligence within the United States originated
from Sherman Kent and Willmoore Kendall. This essay will
discuss the most important differences between Sherman Kent
and Willmoore Kendall’s visions of intelligence, why those
differences are important as well as which of their visions might
be most applicable today and why.
Sherman Kent and Willmoore Kendall’s visions of
intelligence differed significantly. Kent’s vision of intelligence
was based heavily on a non-democratic, self-sufficient

5. intelligence unit and the relationship between ”producers and
consumers of intelligence” (Davis, 1991, Pg. 92). Unlike Kent,
Kendall’s vision of intelligence was far more complex and was
based heavily on a democratic and philosophical intelligence
unit. Though their visions of intelligence varied greatly,
Kendall complimented Kent for his expertise in terminology and
organizational maps of intelligence in Strategic Intelligence.
Kent and Kendall’s visions of intelligence differed in regards to
the purpose of intelligence units and policy making. Kent’s
vision of intelligence included an intelligence unit, which
provided knowledge of the world for the purpose of taking
action while being objective to policy makers’ expectations and
means of distraction. Kent believed that the relationship
between producers and consumers of intelligence was a delicate
one, as they cannot be to close, nor can they be too far away.
However, Kendall disagreed. Kendall’s vision of intelligence
included an intelligence unit, which provided knowledge of the
world for the purpose of assisting political leaders with
achieving foreign policy goals and assisting the United States
government with understanding which factors it could influence
greatly. Kendall believed that the relationship between
producers and consumers of intelligence was somewhat delicate
as Kent believed, but it needed to be more structured.
Additionally, he believed that if an intelligence unit’s duties
were lessened as a result of policy making, Kent’s disgusts in
domestic United States politics were self-defeating.
Additionally, Kent and Kendall’s visions of intelligence
differed in regards to research as a solution to certain
situations. Kent believe that research could benefit strategic
intelligence. He expressed that, “research is the only process
which we of the liberal tradition are willing to admit is capable
of giving us the truth, or a close approximation to truth”
(Olcott, 2009). On the other hand, Kendall believed that
research could not indefinitely benefit strategic intelligence.
Kendall commented on Kent’s visions regarding research and
stated that his visions were a “crassly empirical conception of

6. the research process” (Davis, 1991, Pg. 95). Instead, Kendall
contested Kent’s beliefs and stated that a United States
intelligence unit should be stimulated by working conditions
that encourage a better thought process.
The differences in Kent and Kendall’s visions of
intelligence are important and worth discussing, as they provide
a fundamental knowledge and understanding of strategic
intelligence from the past, in the present, and even into the
future for the Unite States. Kent and Kendall’s visions played a
part in how intelligence in the United States has evolved. One
of the first examples of these views on strategic intelligence
impacting the United States government took place during the
early 1960s when the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s)
quarters were relocated. Differences between President
Eisenhower and President Kennedy’s terms were described as,
“Under Eisenhower, the making of policy was like a football
game, with a play for intelligence analysts called in each
huddle. Under Kennedy, it was like a basketball game with the
players in constant motion” (Davis, 1991, Pg. 98). A second
example of how these views on strategic intelligence impacted
the United States government took place during the early 1970s
when the CIA became reserved and self-sufficient. A third
example of how these views on strategic intelligence impacted
the United States government took place during the early 1980s
when the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Robert M. Gates
introduced a new doctrine, which reflected both Kent and
Kendall’s visions of intelligence. Finally, Kent and Kendall’s
visions or intelligence influenced today’s intelligence studies to
be more collective. Intelligence studies now allow students to
become more well-versed and educated on more than one aspect
of strategic intelligence.
Kent’s visions of strategic intelligence are most applicable
today, as they take into consideration the producers and
consumers of intelligence and not just the consumers. Kent’s
visions of intelligence argued the importance of the relationship
between producers and consumers of intelligence. He believed

7. that analysts needed to remain objective an unbiased by policy
makers’ expectations or attempts of influence. By doing so,
analysts can provide genuine knowledge of the world to assist
the United States government with action taking.
Intelligence in the United States has evolved significantly
throughout history. Kent and Kendall’s visions of intelligence
are considerably different. However, their visions of
intelligence are not mutually exclusive. Both of their views
have played and continue to play fundamental roles in strategic
intelligence within the United States. Although, the United
States government would likely benefit most if Kent’s visions
of intelligence were applied today due to its consideration to
both producers and consumers of intelligence.
References:
Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.
(n.d.). Retrieved February 20, 2017, from
https://fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html
Davis, Jack. "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949." 1991.
Accessed February 21, 2017.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf.
The Global Regime for Terrorism. (2011, August). Retrieved
February 20, 2017, from http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/global-
regime-terrorism/p25729
Haddock, Ginny. "Lecture 1: Introduction to "Threats"." APUS
CLE. Accessed January 25, 2017.
https://edge.apus.edu/portal/site/337557/page/3ccdc2ea-9faa-
48eb-83f2-b7dc9c2da2d8.
Olcott, Anthony. "Peeling Facts off the Face of the Unknown."
August 24, 2009. Accessed February 21, 2017.

8. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol53no2/peeling-facts-off-the-face-of-the-
unknown.html.
Srikanth, D. (n.d.). NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY
THREATS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A REVIEW. Retrieved
February 20, 2017, from
http://www.ijdc.org.in/uploads/1/7/5/7/17570463/2014junearticl
e4.pdf