This document is a thesis submitted to Keele University in 2009 by Gordon Stuart Rhoads investigating multi-organizational confluence in security policy in the United States post 9/11. It examines the creation and implementation of new security policies through the lens of securitization theory and analyzes the localized response in Metropolitan Philadelphia. The thesis focuses on identifying security actors and objects involved in counterterrorism efforts and the challenges that arise from the interplay between organizations under the Department of Homeland Security umbrella.

1. CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING A CLEAR MODEL OF MULTI-
ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLUENCE AS SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN AMERICA POST 9/11.
Investigating Metropolitan Philadelphia Security Policy as Ideal or Problematic.
By
GORDON STUART RHOADS
Submitted to
The Faculty of the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele
University.
2009
Gordon Stuart Rhoads
1

2. To my patient, loving, and wise mother. I thank her endlessly and every day for the
support, advice, and most importantly the unconditional friendship.
2

3. “Do I understand you,” I said, “and is your
meaning that you teach the art of politics,
and that you promise to make men good citizens?”
“That Socrates, is exactly the profession
which I make.”
“Then,” I said, “you do indeed possess a
noble art, if there is no mistake about this,
for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras,
that I have a doubt whether this art is capable
of being taught.”
—THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO
3

4. Table of Contents
Abstract
Acknowledgements
Figures and Tables
1. Introduction
i.i Multi-Organizational Confluence & Security
2. Theoretical Background: Security Policy & Organizations
2.1 Copenhagen School, Poststructuralism, and Multi-organizational Confluence
2.2 Identifying Security Actors and Referent Objects
2.3 Conclusion
3. Multi-Organizational Confluence
3.1 Creation: Reactionary Response to Terror & Resulting New Policy
3.2 Implementation: The Multi-Organizational Response to Terror
3.3 Multi-Organizational Success & Failure; Consequences of Post 9/11 Policy
3.4 Identifying Responsibility Among New Multi-Organizational Limitations
4. The Philadelphia Critique: Localized Response to Post 9/11 Policy
4.1 Metropolitan Security Objectives vs. Federal & State Policy
4.2 Prevention: Overcoming Multi-Organizational Challenges
4.3 The Political Agenda Impact on Real Securitization
4.4 Challenging Uncertainty: Multi-Organizational Security Confluence
4.5 Conclusion
5. Conclusion
Bibliography
Appendix
Vita
i.i Multi-Organizational Confluence & Security
4

5. The term “multi-organizational confluence” identifies the actors and referent
objects involved in the creation and operation of security policy in the United States
post 9/11. To conceptualize, explain, and implement a new concept, one must
endeavor to understand the breadth of an existing problem. Multi-Organizational
confluence addresses a particular challenge to Critical Security Studies theory. As
theorists build a framework, most notably the recent Copenhagen School of Security,
a problem arises. In the process of building structure, referent objects are
marginalized. This is intentional, as it is helpful when clarifying theory, yet
problematic in practice. After the terrorist attacks on New York City, Washington
D.C. and Pennsylvania, the federal government of the United States drafted and
passed anti-terrorism policy that has forever changed the political landscape of
terrorism prevention. The application of sectors, and applying theory is not
immediately evident in the structure of the Department of Homeland Security. As a
consequence of continual perceived threats after the 11th of September 2001, elected
representatives in the securitization theory’s political sector have implemented
sweeping changes to existing law, created new policy such as the Patriot Act and
created a vast and unorganized hierarchy of individuals and organizations responsible
for keeping the United States isolated from future terrorist threats—as a result of what
one may describe as alarmist and reactionary governing. The larger question at hand
is whether the role of a large umbrella organization—such as the Department of
Homeland Security—better implements antiterrorism measures than individual
organizations without central governance.
This study focuses on the interplay of political security policy and
securitization theory in the United States post 9/11. Chapter 2 will identify the
theoretical analysis of security from the Copenhagen School, and will compare
securitization theory to the analysis of contemporary security policy analysts and
political scientists. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde note that the “North American
Societal Sector” within the security framework in Security A New Framework For
Analysis “…is an interesting and intriguing case in the societal sector and is often
ignored in regional security analysis.”1 This analysis prompts further investigation
into what this study identifies as multi-organizational confluence. Various
government and private organizations in the United States (and abroad) have merged
under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and are forced to
operate in a model of cooperation as a result of post 9/11 policy initiatives. The goal
here is to identify the impact of such intended cooperation on a regional level, e.g.
Metropolitan Philadelphia. The organizations once focused on independent
securitization among each of the various security sectors (military, environmental,
economic, societal, and political) including the FBI, NSA, CIA, and FDA now—post
9/11—intend to operate with joint resources and information. Chapter 2 discusses the
various sectors involved in regional securitization in a theoretical context and
identifies the referent objects for social securitization.
Collective Security is not the same as multi-organizational confluence. In
1991 Ken Booth noted in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security
that security issues has become increasingly common issues, “The security challenges
most nations face are not as immediately catastrophic as those confronted by the
1
Buzan, Barry, Waever & Wilde. 1998. Security; A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner p. 129
5

6. adversaries of the Cold War, but they are interconnected, a matter of life and death,
and their overcoming requires international cooperation on an unprecedented scale.
Common threats demand to be met by common strategies.”2 The common strategies
Booth recognizes are of international cooperation, rather than individual domestic
policy responses. Chapter 3 explores the history of securitization on organizational
levels rather than international collectivity, and identifies the evolution of security
organizations (anti-terrorism agents) within a regional context. The central theme of
Chapter 3 identifies the organizational response to terrorism, focusing on the
American Department of Homeland Security (DHS). “Homeland Security” as defined
by the Department of Homeland Security National Strategy published in 2002 is, “a
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from
attacks that do occur.”3 The development of such an organization within the United
States is the response to failures of international and domestic collective-security
measures prior to September 11, 2001.
“Collective security can usefully represent something more than the archetype
of frustrated idealism in international affairs. It is best to think of it as a
strategy that uses collective self-regulation for the purpose of generating more
internal security benefits…”4
The deleterious terrorist attacks of 2001 delivered a weakening blow to the
United States defense infrastructure, thus focusing American security policy on
isolationism and internal organizational restructuring, as the development of the
Department of Homeland Security exemplifies. Mohammad Ayoob notes that, “the
primary security concerns of weak states are ‘internal in character’ and are
characteristic of ‘the early stages of state making.”5 The United States government
experienced such a vulnerable position on the 11th of September 2001 and arguably
focused inward through the creation and development of Homeland Security.
“The suicidal assassins of September 11, 2001 did not ‘attack America,’ as
political leaders and news media in the United States have tried to maintain;
they attacked American foreign policy. Employing the strategy of the weak,
they killed innocent bystanders, whose innocence is, of course, no different
from that of the civilians killed by American bombs in Iraq, Serbia,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It was probably the most striking instance in the
history of international relations of the use of political terrorism to influence
events.”6
2
Booth, Ken. 1991. New Thinking About Strategy and International Security. London: Harper Collins
Academics p.341
3
National Strategy for Homeland Security: July 2002, by the Office of Homeland Security, Published
paperback by Diane Pub Co (November 2003) Accessed May 4th 2008 online at: <http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf
4
Downs, George W. & Iida, Keisuke. 1994. “Assessing the Theoretical Case Against
Collective Security.” In Collective Security Beyond the Cold War: (Pew Studies in Economics
and Security), ed. by George W. Downs, et al. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. p.
35
5
Ayoob, Mohammad. 1997. “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” in Critical Security
Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press. p 121
6

7. Theoretical Background: Security Policy & Organizations
2.1 Copenhagen School, Poststructuralism, and Multi-organizational Confluence
Notably, the new concept of multi-organizational confluence diverges from
traditional critical security studies and security theory. The theory of Securitization
and the Copenhagen School attempt to justify that security is reserved for designated
referent objects and remains divorced from securitization actors, which (or whom)
implement actual securitization. Multi-organizational confluence as security policy
attempts to merge politicized bureaucracies, current policy, and individual security
needs into a clear model that isn’t “top-down”, rather, modeled from center—out. Ken
Booth’s Theory of World Security elaborates on the Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s
Security: A New Framework for Analysis,
“From the beginning of the academic study of international politics,
the concept of security has focused on sovereign states, military power, and
the preservation of international order. Security studies therefore derived from
a combination of Anglo-American, statist, militarized, masculinized, ‘top-
down’, methodologically positivist and philosophically realist thinking, all
shaped by the experiences and memories of the interwar years and the Second
World War, and the perceived necessities of the Cold War. Critical security
studies, as it developed through the 1990’s, sought to investigate what security
might mean in theory and practice from perspectives on global and local
politics that start from very different political, methodological, and
philosophical standpoints. CSS is a body of knowledge about security in world
politics; it is not a theory of security as such, telling us (like realism) who are
the key actors, and what are the most rational strategies.”7
There is a distinctive difference in the application of theory in security policy.
Securitization theory illustrates a model for indentifying the players involved in
defining security implications. Alan Collins draws a line, “On both sides, it is
essential to the particular nature of security theory that there is a distinct category of
‘policy knowledge’ that functions as expertise supporting policy—a form of
knowledge that security theory in the US wants to assist while security theory in
Europe (to draw the contrast sharply) treats it as a main empirical source for critical
analysis.”8
Figure 2.1 “The position of security theory North America and Europe”
6
Johnson, Chalmers. 2004. Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire New York :
Henry Holt & Company. p.xv-xvi
7
Booth, Ken. 2007. Theory of World Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p.29
8
Collins, Alan. 2007. Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press p.398
7

8. “Critics of current policy in the US will aim to obtain a policy change by
presenting theoretical generalizations based on empirical data that give scientific
credentials to a different policy as more likely to achieve the aims aspired to.”9
The subjects seeking security within a state or organization are not dependent
upon classification within the framework of non-politicized, politicized, or
securitized. As a response to terrorism, for example, all “actors” have a seat at the
table thus seeking to prevent threats and actively resolve to respond accordingly.
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde created sectors which, theoretically, the ‘subject’ of
security should fit nicely. In theory this classification is justified, but lacks practicality
when designing security policy. It should be clear from this point on that the theory
and practice of security policy are not one in the same. Designing a framework for
analyzing security theory is not the foundation of implementation, and should not be
applied as such.
The security challenges post 9/11 confronting the United States on the social
and regional levels has been met with political securitization methodology which—in
the context of multi-organizational confluence—is summarized as within the
framework of the Copenhagen School as one identifies the organizational actors
involved.
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde explain “Securitization” as,
“…a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be
located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does
not deal with it and is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and
decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy,
requiring government decision and resource allocations, or more rarely, some
other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is
presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying
actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).”10
Figure 2.2 : Securitization
9
Collins, Alan. 2007. Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press p.398
10
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security; A New Framework for Analysis.
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.23-24
8

9. Booth notes that Buzan made it clear in People, States, and Fear that, “If a
multisectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other
than the state had to be allowed into the picture.”11 Multi-organizational confluence
moves to remove the barriers and limitations of classifying referent objects into
sectors, thus allowing a broader interplay within the discourse. Buzan illustrates the
need to broaden the approach and create multiple sectors (military, environment,
economic, society, and political) yet limits the need for security application
(securitization) based on factors in relation to politics within the security framework,
and the referent object’s relationship with the state. This point is affirmed by the
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, “On the other hand, threats do not need to be attributed
to the same categories as those the other side acted with reference to. Actual events
are likely to be varied and complex, requiring a pragmatic approach that allows us to
find the specific units of the case.”12
2.2 Identifying Security Actors and Referent Objects
Returning to the theory of securitization, the attempt to define specific referent
objects creates a problem. The subject of Multi-organizational Confluence as security
policy is not the referent object, or the individual. The subject is what may be defined
as the security ‘actors’ or simply security organizations. Multi-organizational
Confluence is meant to inspire policy that will guide organizations charged with
creating and implementing security measures when facing a perceived threat. Ken
Booth describes the discourse as near contentious, but reminds us of RBJ Walker’s
conclusion on the subject of security. That is security form whom or what. “For those
that are identified as implicit or explicit, pre-defined or argued-out, the question of
what is real in relation to security depends upon the answer to the prior question,
‘what is the referent?’ (in other words, ‘Whom or what is to be secured?’). R.B.J.
Walker put the issue neatly when he wrote, “The subject of security is the subject of
security.”13
It is not legitimacy or a claim to security that must be established or proven
when security, the idea of protection, and establishing a defense against chaos or
terror are responsibilities of those who wish to enjoy its benefits or comfort. Buzan,
11
Booth, Ken. ibid p.162
12
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.44
13
Booth, Ken. ibid p.184
9

10. Wæver & Jaap de Wilde claim that their referent objects must participate, thus
making a claim to their right to exist. They wrote, “Referent objects must establish
security legitimacy in terms of a claim to survival”14
To conclude, one can study security discourse to learn what referent objects
are appealed to an can study outcomes to see which hold security legitimacy so an
appeal to their necessary survival is able to mobilize support. Traditionally, the
middle level has been the most fruitful generator of referent objects, but lately more
has been heard about system- and micro- level possibilities (Rothschild 1995).
Bureaucracies, political regimes, and firms seldom hold this sense of guaranteed
survival and thus are not usually classed as referent objects. Logically, they could try
to establish a claim to survival and thus to security legitimacy, but empirically this is
not usually possible. In practice, security is not totally subjective. There are socially
defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized, although those limits can be
changed. This means security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances of
securitization—the cases in which other people follow the securitizing lead, creating
a social, intersubjective constitution of a referent object on a mass scale.
Unsuccessful or partially successful attempts at securitization are interesting
primarily for the insights they offer into the stability of social attitudes toward
security legitimacy, the process by which those attitudes are maintained or changed,
and the possible future direction of security politics. In these larger patterns,
desecuritization is at least as interesting as securitization, but the successful acts of
securitization take a central place because they constitute the currently valid specific
meaning of security.15
“A securitizing actor is someone, or a group who performs the security
speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies,
governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups. These actors are not usually the referent
objects for security, because only rarely can they speak security through reference to
the need to defend their own survival. Their argument will normally be that it is
necessary to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization, or some other larger
community, principle, or system. Only occasionally will actors such as governments
or firms be able to speak successfully of security on their own behalf. The notion of
an “actor” is in itself problematic. To say precisely who or what acts is always tricky,
because one can disaggregate any collective into subunits and on down to individuals
and say, ‘It is not really ‘the state’ that acts but some particular department—or in the
last instance individuals.’ But to disaggregate everything into individuals is not very
helpful, because much of social life is understandable only when collectivities are
seen as more than the sum of their “members” and are treated as social realities
(methodological collectivism).”16
2.3 Conclusion
The creation and implementation of multi-organizational confluence, or any
conceptual model dealing with policy procedure, relies on a firm understanding of
security theory. Critical Security Studies seeks to explain the foundation of our
security dependence and answer the all evasive for whom and why questions. The
Copenhagen school, particularly Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, attempt to justify the
application of security within a particular framework. International Relations as a
14
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde ibid p. 39
15
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde ibid p. 39
16
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.40
10

11. school of thought has no definitive answer as to what “is” Global Security. Global
Security is not as clear as globalization, this ‘understanding’ of expanding
communication and mobility with fewer barriers such as geography and language.
Global Security seemingly builds more barriers as theorists create new frameworks,
themselves new barriers or conceptual challenges for the conception, implementation,
and success of ‘common’ security goals.
Few theorists within the selection of contemporary security theory literature
attempt to create a final product or a security goal. It’s plausible that perhaps doing so
would seem like attempting Utopia. Der Derian suggests that we take another
approach and reexamine the dialogue.
“What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead
imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in
recognition of the world as it is, other than us? What might such a dialogue
sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the
discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess
its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret—and possibly construct
through the reinterpretation—a late modern security comfortable with a
plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities.”17
Multi-organizational Confluence responds and at least attempts to model a
reaction-structure with the goal of implementing a clear security ideal. The multi
organizational security goals for policy and real security outcomes will be explained
later, but the purely theoretical goal of Multi-organizational Confluence is
regionalized peace through strong and defined interactions among organizations.
Defining security within the theoretical, thus attempting to apply to policy and
organizational implementation requires a more definitive explanation of security.
Affirming the pursuit of a genealogical understanding, Michael Dillon explains that,
“Pursuing such a genealogical line of enquiry would have the virtue of enabling us to
see that security is employable in any and every circumstance, and is invested with a
plurality of meanings. I would reveal the extent, too, of the work that security does for
and imposes on us…”18
“…the genealogy of the discourse shows clear lines of continuity with earlier
responses by American governments to national crises and security threats.
For example, the current Bush-initiated ‘war on terrorism’ follows closely the
discursive form of the preceding ‘wars on terrorism’ declared by the Reagan
and Clinton administrations. In succession, each president discursively
constructed terrorism as the greatest threat to American and international
security…”19
What seems to be the agreed upon notion from the majority of political-
security scholars from Machiavelli to RBJ Walker is that violence is simply a fact of
life. We must deal with violence as inevitable. Richard Devetak summarizes
17
Der Derian, James. 2009. Critical Practices of International Relations: Selected Essays. New York :
Taylor & Francis p.151
18
Dillon, Michael. 1996. Politics of Security; Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought.
London: Routledge p.15
19
Jackson, Richard. 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism; Language, Politics and Counterterrorism.
Manchester: Manchester University Press p.155
11

12. Campbell and Dillon’s 1993 Political Subject of Violence theory that violence
essentially creates a role for government. “The paradox here is that violence is both
poison and cure.”20 At the onset, this project was to shed light on the city and
metropolitan region of Philadelphia, and regions within the United States of America,
post 11 September 2001, ignored by the Department of Homeland Security. When
answering the question, ‘why deny organizations the resources they need to provide
citizens with security?’ it was apparent that within the discourse, securitization
theorists first define their security referent object. It was simple. Security Actors, the
organizations responsible for creating and implementing ‘security’ and the referent
object; the individual, organization, or other with security needs.
Unfortunately, within the collection of contemporary international relations
theory and specifically, security studies, the “security actor” can be anyone from the
individual citizen / non-citizen on the street to Osama Bin Laden, to society itself.
Instead of assigning responsibility for the security needs of the referent object, as
pointed out throughout the study, one may find instead, examples of attempted
justification for accepting a threshold of violence. The representation of the interplay
of violence, politics, and security is cyclical, therefore representing a violent historical
cycle. Multi-organizational Confluence is a policy management theory for
organizations to cope with violence beyond the acceptable threshold. This attempt to
counter the cycle of violence with a cycle of policy, management, and there
prevention, illustrates a similar reaction to violence beyond the acceptable threshold,
yet does so in a more mirrored, and therefore, congruent as an effort to break a cycle.
Organizational structures created in response to violence beyond the threshold are
thus top-down power hierarchies. An example of this reactionary construct is the
organizational model of the super-organization called the Department of Homeland
Security.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_OrgChart.pdf
20
Devetak, Richard. 2005. “Postmodernism” In Theories of International Relations eds. Scott Burchill
& Andrew Linklater, et al. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 172
12

13. The conceptual model of multi-organizational confluence is cyclical in
structure. Rather than a top-down power structure, the model of this conceptual policy
initiative is a center-out concept. Rather a traditional top-down model, one that is
reactionary in nature, a new attempted policy structure that is cyclical is designed to
react and respond to threats from every angle . Conceptualizing new security theory or
policy models and attempting to illustrate concepts is justifiable and necessary, as the
motivation behind Multi-organizational Confluence is a need to preserve and
continually demonstrate the physical security needs of individuals rather than
theoretical sectors. This approach is not ‘monosectoral’ 21 as securitization theory
would like to classify, rather, the model itself is more comparable to the so-called
synthesis that exists ‘between’ the sectors. It is not collective security as such, rather
ideal security for all. Without classification between various sectors such as political,
military, societal, and economic, it is sweeping in scope, simple in design, and
ideological in nature. “At its core, security studies is an effort to integrate domestic
level variables with those of the international system in order to create a synthesis to
explain the defense and security activities of actors.”22 Securitization theory attempts
to solve global problems by distinguishing sectors, and applying unique pressures
each sector will handle.
Securitization theory assumes that the arguments for continuing to focus on
regional security issues are ‘polemical’.23 The preservation of ideal security is seen
throughout our modern western structures. Our participation in western nations exists
as various applications of security practices are implemented as normative functions
of our societies. Security as a function of maintaining control over and preserving the
values held most important to businesses that maintain networks of data, individuals
who assess a risk to their own safety often times take measures to increase security by
implementing technological advances or in some cases armed protection, the financial
institutions must seek to maintain security both protecting assets including real
property as well as manage the security of physical and electronic data. Governments
create and manage strategic institutions that serve to prevent security threats as well
as adapt to the needs of the government as threats to state security occur both within
borders and abroad. The risks to states are always a future concern, and it serves a
nation with a strong interest in preserving its existence to develop methods of
maintaining security as desired or required to maintain stability. Militaries, police
forces, private firms, and individuals themselves take steps to function in this system
while maintaining their desired state-of-security or the state-of-security as required of
them.
Multi-Organizational Confluence
3.1 Creation: Reactionary Response to Terror & Resulting New Policy
21
See chapter 8, explanation of ‘other’ security theory, and how sectors are related to each other within
the framework i.e. ‘synthesized’. Found in Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security:
A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
22
Lansford, Tom. Robert J. Pauley Jr., and Jack Covarrubias. 2006. To Protect and Defend: US
Homeland Security Policy. Burlington: Ashgate. p.13
23
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.163
13

14. University of Pittsburgh Professor B. Guy Peters postulates that the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security as a response to terrorism is a reactionary
construct which theoretically creates a weakness in terrorism prevention. He writes:
“Organizational failures, individual and collective, were significant factors in
the success of the terrorists in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania;
better organizational design must therefore be a part of the response. But there
is unfortunately no certain technology for the design of effective
organizations, whether in the public or private sectors. The Department of
Homeland Security follows a well-worn path toward the creation of
megadepartments, but there may be no reason to expect that the experience in
this case will be any more positive than in previous efforts.”24
Peter’s observation only two years after the 9/11 attacks, warns that creating
an organization such as the Department of Homeland Security may not be an
appropriate response to the threat of future terrorist attacks. Implementing multi-
organizational confluence as security policy on the federal level may adversely impact
once independent organizations that played essential roles in securitization among the
various sectors of security analysis. With little time and a mandate to respond after the
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the American Government did not enjoy the luxury of time
and diligence. Theory and policymaking take patience. The most sweeping change to
policy in America took place over the course of two months and the result is
contentious. On one hand the new Department of Homeland Security has thwarted
domestic terrorist attacks, or at least imposes deterrence, yet became an essential
element in carrying out policy and measures that ultimately endangered American
interests. “Backed by virtually unlimited American public support and the substantial
support from both traditional allies and previous great power rivals, the Bush
Administration quickly set upon the most far-reaching transformation of American
security policy… and launched an essentially open-ended ‘global war on terrorism.”25
“We divide our national interests into three categories: vital, important,
and humanitarian. Vital interests are those directly connected to the survival,
safety, and the vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of
our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens both and home and
abroad, protection against WMD proliferation, the economic well-being of our
society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures—including energy,
banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, vital
human services, and government services—from disruption intended to
cripple their operation. We will do what we must to defend these interests.
This may involve the use of military force, including unilateral action, where
deemed necessary or appropriate.
The second category, important national interests affects our national
well being or that of the world in which we live. Principally, this may include
developments in regions where America holds a significant economic or
political stake, issues with significant global environment impact,
24
Peter’s B. Guy. 2002. “Are We Safer Today? Organizational Responses to Terrorism” in The Politics
of Terror: the U.S. Response to 9/11 ed. Crotty, William. 2004. Boston: Northeastern University Press
p.249
25
Deudney, Daniel H. 2006. Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the
Global Village. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate. p.260
14

15. infrastructure disruptions that destabilize but do not cripple smooth economic
activity, and crises that could cause destabilizing economic turmoil or
humanitarian movement. Examples of when we have acted to protect
important national interests include our successful efforts to end the brutal
conflict and restore peace in Kosovo, or our assistance to our Asian and
pacific allies and friends in support of the restoration of order and transition to
nationhood in East Timor.
The third category is humanitarian and other longer-term interests.
Examples include reacting to natural and manmade disasters; acting to halt
gross violations of human rights; supporting emerging democracies;
encouraging adherence to the role of law and civilian control of the military;
conducting Joint Recovery Operations worldwide to account for our country’s
war dead; promoting sustainable development and environmental protection;
or facilitating humanitarian demining.”26 United States, White House. 2000. A
National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington D.C.: GPO. p.9 Lansford, Tom.
Robert J. Pauley Jr., and Jack Covarrubias. 2006. To Protect and Defend: US Homeland
Security Policy. Burlington: Ashgate. pp. 23-24
3.2 Implementation: The Multi-Organizational Response to Terror
“National security should not be idealized. It works to silence
opposition and has given power holders many opportunities to exploit
“threats” for domestic purposes, to claim a right to handle something with less
democratic control and constraint. Our belief, therefore, is not “the more
security the better.” Basically, security should be seen as a negative, as a
failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics should be able to
unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of
specific “threats” to a prepolitical immediacy. In some cases securitization of
issues is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barbarian
aggressor. Because of its prioritizing imperative, securitization also has
tactical attractions—for example, as a way to obtain sufficient attention for
environmental problems. But desecuritization is the optimal long-range option,
since it means not to have issues phrased as “threats against which we have
countermeasures” but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and
into the ordinary public sphere. (Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de
Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner.) p.29
“The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as
to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such
hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively.
26
United States, White House. 2000. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington D.C.:
GPO. p.9 Lansford, Tom. Robert J. Pauley Jr., and Jack Covarrubias. 2006. To Protect and Defend: US
Homeland Security Policy. Burlington: Ashgate. pp. 23-24
15

16. The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging
threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in
an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s
most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while
dangers gather. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the
consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:
• build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide
timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
• coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the
most dangers threats;
• and continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to
conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results. The
purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to
the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our
actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.”27
The Philadelphia Critique: Localized Response to Post 9/11 Policy
4.1 Metropolitan Security Objectives vs. Federal & State Policy
The role of responsibility for the implementation of security policy falls on the
referent object; the individual. Without the individual or referent object’s demand for
security, there would exist no responsibility or reaction, therefore no implementation.
States demand information that will prevent instances that would threaten the security
of infrastructure including: commerce, government operation abilities,
communication, healthcare providers, and many more areas of essential services.
There is an abundance of text within international relations and political science
theory that address the management of security within specialized practices. There
also exists the substantial amount of new literature that proposes innovations to the
application of security. The fear of terrorism has prompted an explosion of demand
for protection, isolation of threats, and a visible force for effectual deterrence.
As a response to the fear of terrorism, officials across various levels of
American government have worked to implement new security policy as well as
develop a surge of antiterrorism measures in every American center of population.
According to the US Census Bureau, Metropolitan Philadelphia is America’s 5th
most populated area of the United States.28 Concerning antiterrorism policy and
Philadelphia, this dissertation will address the dangers surrounding security policy
and political motive. Amanda Terkel, a New York Times contributor and
Managing Editor for The Progress Report and Thinkprogress.org revealed in a
27
United States. 2002. White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington D.C.:
Office of the Press Secretary, September 17, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html> Accessed
December 13, 2008.
28
The United States Census Bureau defines a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as a Core Based
Statistical Area having at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more population, plus adjacent territory
that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties.
See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/fy05/b05-02.html accessed October 13, 2008.
16

17. September 22nd 2005 post to ThinkProgress.org that Philadelphia’s requested six
million dollars for first-response equipment was denied the city, but much smaller
cities received their requested funds. Why is it that Philadelphia was denied
emergency first-response equipment funding, but a combined $10,290,140.00
went to cities such as Grand Forks North Dakota, Bismarck North Dakota,
Davenport Iowa, Pocatello Idaho, and Las Cruces New Mexico?
This dissertation will explore the scope of the greater conflict among the
various federal, state, local, and privately held interests involved in security policy
and antiterrorism practices. Since September 11th 2001 local governments,
including the City of Philadelphia, continue to draft and implement security policy
while attempting to prevent future catastrophes. Philadelphia has experienced
particularly complicated challenges to overcoming security challenges as it
contends with the involvement of officials from the U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) along with other
Federal agencies such as the FBI, NSA, CIA, and DHS29. Ultimately, is terrorism
prevention affected negatively by the constant interplay of the previously
mentioned politicized government agencies?
Charles Brennan was the former Deputy Commissioner for Scientific and
Technology Services with the Philadelphia Police Department after September
11th 2001. Mr. Brennan directed the Philadelphia Police Department’s response to
terrorism threats after 9/11 and the July 7 London bombings. He was particularly
disturbed by the Department of Justice decision to direct emergency response
funding to other cities commenting to Amanda Terkel that, “We thought after the
subway bombings in London, someone would see that it would make sense for the
fifth-largest city in the United States to have first responders who were able to
communicate underground.” (Terkel, Amanda: “Philadelphia Denied Funds to
Fight Terrorism” Sep 22, 2005)
This dissertation attempts to answer the following question, “Does the
continued expansion of security policy and antiterrorism regulatory organizations
result in a metropolitan Philadelphia more or less equipped to deter terrorism or
respond to catastrophic terrorist-related events?” In other words, the dissertation
questions whether a new model of security and counterterrorism policy is ideal for
Philadelphia, a city overwhelmed with challenges that inhibit many efforts to
securitize the city after the 11th of September 2001, focusing specifically on the
conflicting policies and regulations of federal, state, and local government
agencies. One may contend that the expansion of security organizations and
governmental policies create confusion, thus inhibiting efficient terrorism
29
The FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation is the primary investigative arm of the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ).
The NSA National Security Agency/Central Security Service is a cryptologic intelligence agency of the
United States government.
The CIA Central Intelligence Agency is a civilian intelligence agency of the US Government focused
on collecting and analyzing information about foreign governments, corporations, and persons in order
to advise public policymakers.
The DHS commonly known as "Homeland Security" is a department of the US Government primarily
responsible for protecting the territory of the U.S. from terrorist attacks and responding to natural
disasters.
17

18. prevention. It is also important to point out that the American War On Terror
requires contributions of manpower, intelligence, funding, technology, and
property. Any contribution to the War On Terror from residents of metropolitan
Philadelphia does not guarantee a direct return of actual security for the
population of metropolitan Philadelphia. However, the previously mentioned
contributions from the taxpayers of Philadelphia ultimately contribute to a
nationwide effort to combat terrorism, which theoretically protect everyone.
Although the dissertation seeks to study metropolitan Philadelphia, by default,
the dissertation will address security problems facing millions of people in a
relatively small region of the United States. The metropolitan regions of New
York City and Washington D.C., immediately adjacent to the north and south of
Philadelphia, manage many similar security concerns and share equally worrisome
security problems such as antiterrorism prevention and inadequate intelligence.
The central theme throughout the dissertation will recognize the interplay of
political and judicial regulations, often with vague guidelines about specific
jurisdiction and responsibility related to security prevention or catastrophic
response. Philadelphia will be compared to other American cities as the
dissertation seeks to draw parallels with challenges other American cities
experience.
The goal is to address the larger impact of expanding regulation enforced by
multiple levels of government oversight. Examples of these levels of government
that influence security policy include federal agencies: (FBI, NSA, CIA, FDA,
Homeland Security), state government agencies: (National Guard, congressional
districts, county regulation, police, etc.), local government agencies:
(Municipalities, Police, Public Works), and the Judiciary (Federal, State,
Appellate, and Trial Courts). This list of agencies is just a small sample of the
most involved political or judicial related challenges any independent or universal
security policy will have to overcome.
The dissertation will not ignore the risk involved in implementing any plan to
construct universal policy regarding security. Recognizing that National security
risks may not be of consequence to residents of Philadelphia, may conversely
assume that not all Philadelphia security threats are of concern to federal or state
government interests. Hypothetically, a possible result of attempting to
consolidate security agencies could result in the redistribution of oversight, and
central regulatory control. Metropolitan Philadelphia, when examined independent
of its northern and southern neighbors is an excellent case study of security policy
complexities imposed on an average American metropolitan area.
18