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ISP Network Design
ISP Workshops
1
Last updated 27th February 2015
ISP Network Design
p PoP Topologies and Design
p Backbone Design
p Upstream Connectivity & Peering
p Addressing
p Routing Protocols
p Security
p Out of Band Management
p Operational Considerations
2
Point of Presence
Topologies
3
PoP Topologies
p Core routers – high speed trunk
connections
p Distribution routers and Access routers –
high port density
p Border routers – connections to other
providers
p Service routers – hosting and servers
p Some functions might be handled by a
single router
4
PoP Design
p Modular Design
p Aggregation Services separated according
to
n connection speed
n customer service
n contention ratio
n security considerations
5
Modular PoP Design
6
Backbone link
to another PoP
Backbone link
to another PoP
Business customer
aggregation layer
for leased line circuit delivery
Channelised circuits
Network
Operations
Centre
Consumer
Dial Access
Network
Core
Consumer cable,
xDSL and
wireless Access
for MetroE circuit delivery
GigE fibre trunks
MetroE customer
aggregation layer
ISP Services
(DNS, Mail, News,
FTP, WWW)
Hosted Services &
Datacentre
Other ISPs
Web Cache
Modular Routing Protocol Design
p Modular IGP implementation
n IGP “area” per PoP
n Core routers in backbone area (Area 0/L2)
n Aggregation/summarisation where possible
into the core
p Modular iBGP implementation
n BGP route reflector cluster
n Core routers are the route-reflectors
n Remaining routers are clients & peer with
route-reflectors only
7
Point of Presence Design
8
PoP Modules
p Low Speed customer connections
n ADSL2, Cable, Public Wireless, PSTN access
n Low bandwidth needs
n Low revenue, large numbers
p Business customer connections
n 10Mbps to 100Mbps speed range
n Delivery over SDH or MetroEthernet links
n Medium bandwidth needs
n Medium revenue, medium numbers
9
PoP Modules
p Highband Business customer connections
n From 100Mbps to over 1Gbps
n Ethernet, Fibre, or high end SDH
n High bandwidth needs
n High revenue, low numbers
10
PoP Modules
p PoP Core
n Two dedicated routers
n High Speed interconnect
n Backbone Links ONLY
n Do not touch them!
p Border Network
n Dedicated border router to other ISPs
n The ISP’s “front” door
n Transparent web caching?
n Two in backbone is minimum guarantee for
redundancy 11
PoP Modules
p ISP Services
n DNS (cache, secondary)
n News (still relevant?)
n Mail (POP3, Relay, Anti-virus/anti-spam)
n WWW (server, proxy, cache)
p Hosted Services/DataCentres
n Virtual Web, WWW (server, proxy, cache)
n Information/Content Services
n Electronic Commerce
12
PoP Modules
p Network Operations Centre
n Consider primary and backup locations
n Network monitoring
n Statistics and log gathering
n Direct but secure access
p Out of Band Management Network
n The ISP Network “Safety Belt”
13
PSTN & Broadband Access Module
14
To Core Routers
Telephone Network BRAS
SSG, DHCP, TACACS+
or Radius Servers/Proxies,
DNS resolver, Content
Web Cache
Access Network
Gateway Routers
Cable RAS
DSLAM
IP, ATM
Primary Rate
T1/E1
Digital Modem
Access Servers
Cable System
Business Customer Access Module
15
To Core Routers
Channelised T1/E1
Metro Ethernet
Direct Fibre Links
Aggregation Edge
High Speed Access Module
16
To Core Routers
Metro Ethernet
Direct Fibre Links
Channelised OC3/OC12
Aggregation Edge
ISP Services Module
17
To core routers
WWW
cache
Service Network
Gateway Routers
SMTP
Relay
(out)
DNS
Resolver
SMTP
Host
(in)
POP3s
IMAPs
DNS
Secondary
Hosted Services Module
18
Customer 7
Customer 3
Customer 4
Customer 5
Customer 6
To core routers
Hosted Network
Gateway Routers
Customer 2
Customer 1
vlan12
vlan11 vlan13 vlan14 vlan15 vlan16 vlan17
Border Module
19
To core routers
Network
Border Routers
To local IXP
NB: router has no default route +
local AS routing table only
ISP1 ISP2
NOC Module
20
Primary DNS
To core routers
Hosted Network
Gateway Routers
SYSLOG
server
TACACS+
server
Network Operations Centre Staff
Out of Band
Management Network
async terminal server
NetFlow
Analyser
Firewall
Billing, Database
and Accounting
Systems
Corporate LAN
Critical Services
Module
Out of Band Network
21
Out of Band
Management Network
Terminal server
To the NOC
Out of Band Ethernet
NetFlow
Collector
NetFlow
enabled
routers
Router
consoles
Backbone Network
Design
22
Backbone Design
p Routed Backbone
p Switched Backbone
n ATM/Frame Relay core network
n Now obsolete
p Point-to-point circuits
n nx64K, T1/E1, T3/E3, OC3, OC12, GigE, OC48,
10GigE, OC192, OC768, 100GE
p ATM/Frame Relay service from telco
n T3, OC3, OC12,… delivery
n Easily upgradeable bandwidth (CIR)
n Almost vanished in availability now 23
Distributed Network Design
p PoP design “standardised”
n operational scalability and simplicity
p ISP essential services distributed around
backbone
p NOC and “backup” NOC
p Redundant backbone links
24
Distributed Network Design
25
POP One
POP Two
POP Three
Customer
connections
Customer
connections
Customer
connections
External
connections
External
connections
Operations Centre
Backup
Operations Centre
ISP Services
ISP Services
ISP Services
Backbone Links
p ATM/Frame Relay
n Virtually disappeared due to overhead, extra
equipment, and shared with other customers
of the telco
n MPLS has replaced ATM & FR as the telco
favourite
p Leased Line/Circuit
n Most popular with backbone providers
n IP over Optics and Metro Ethernet very
common in many parts of the world
26
Long Distance Backbone Links
p These usually cost more
p Important to plan for the future
n This means at least two years ahead
n Stay in budget, stay realistic
n Unplanned “emergency” upgrades will be
disruptive without redundancy in the network
infrastructure
27
Long Distance Backbone Links
p Allow sufficient capacity on alternative
paths for failure situations
n Sufficient can depend on the business strategy
n Sufficient can be as little as 20%
n Sufficient is usually over 50% as this offers
“business continuity” for customers in the case
of link failure
n Some businesses choose 0%
p Very short sighted, meaning they have no spare
capacity at all!!
28
Long Distance Links
29
POP One
POP Two
POP Three
Long distance link
Alternative/Backup Path
Metropolitan Area Backbone Links
p Tend to be cheaper
n Circuit concentration
n Choose from multiple suppliers
p Think big
n More redundancy
n Less impact of upgrades
n Less impact of failures
30
Metropolitan Area Backbone Links
31
POP One
POP Two
POP Three
Metropolitan Links
Metropolitan Links
Traditional Point to Point Links
Upstream Connectivity
and Peering
32
Transits
p Transit provider is another autonomous system
which is used to provide the local network with
access to other networks
n Might be local or regional only
n But more usually the whole Internet
p Transit providers need to be chosen wisely:
n Only one
p no redundancy
n Too many
p more difficult to load balance
p no economy of scale (costs more per Mbps)
p hard to provide service quality
p Recommendation: at least two, no more
than three
Common Mistakes
p ISPs sign up with too many transit providers
n Lots of small circuits (cost more per Mbps than larger
ones)
n Transit rates per Mbps reduce with increasing transit
bandwidth purchased
n Hard to implement reliable traffic engineering that
doesn’t need daily fine tuning depending on customer
activities
p No diversity
n Chosen transit providers all reached over same satellite
or same submarine cable
n Chosen transit providers have poor onward transit and
peering
Peers
p A peer is another autonomous system with which
the local network has agreed to exchange locally
sourced routes and traffic
p Private peer
n Private link between two providers for the purpose of
interconnecting
p Public peer
n Internet Exchange Point, where providers meet and
freely decide who they will interconnect with
p Recommendation: peer as much as possible!
Common Mistakes
p Mistaking a transit provider’s “Exchange”
business for a no-cost public peering point
p Not working hard to get as much peering
as possible
n Physically near a peering point (IXP) but not
present at it
n (Transit sometimes is cheaper than peering!!)
p Ignoring/avoiding competitors because
they are competition
n Even though potentially valuable peering
partner to give customers a better experience
Private Interconnection
p Two service providers agree to
interconnect their networks
n They exchange prefixes they originate into the
routing system (usually their aggregated
address blocks)
n They share the cost of the infrastructure to
interconnect
p Typically each paying half the cost of the link (be it
circuit, satellite, microwave, fibre,…)
p Connected to their respective peering routers
n Peering routers only carry domestic prefixes
37
Private Interconnection
p PR = peering router
n Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with peer)
n No default route
n No “full BGP table”
n Domestic prefixes only
p Peering router used for all private interconnects
PR
PR
ISP1
ISP2
Upstream
Upstream
38
Public Interconnection
p Service provider participates in an
Internet Exchange Point
n It exchanges prefixes it originates into the
routing system with the participants of the IXP
n It chooses who to peer with at the IXP
p Bi-lateral peering (like private interconnect)
p Multi-lateral peering (via IXP’s route server)
n It provides the router at the IXP and provides
the connectivity from their PoP to the IXP
n The IXP router carries only domestic prefixes
39
Public Interconnection
p ISP1-PR = peering router of our ISP
n Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with IXP peers)
n No default route
n No “full BGP table”
n Domestic prefixes only
p Physically located at the IXP
ISP1-PR ISP1
Upstream
40
IXP
ISP2-PR
ISP3-PR
ISP4-PR
ISP5-PR
ISP6-PR
Public Interconnection
p The ISP’s router IXP peering router needs careful
configuration:
n It is remote from the domestic backbone
n Should not originate any domestic prefixes
n (As well as no default route, no full BGP table)
n Filtering of BGP announcements from IXP peers (in and
out)
p Provision of a second link to the IXP:
n (for redundancy or extra capacity)
n Usually means installing a second router
p Connected to a second switch (if the IXP has two more more
switches)
p Interconnected with the original router (and part of iBGP mesh)
41
Public Interconnection
p Provision of a second link to the IXP means
considering redundancy in the SP’s backbone
n Two routers
n Two independent links
n Separate switches (if IXP has two or more switches)
ISP1-PR1 ISP1
Upstream
42
IXP
ISP2-PR
ISP3-PR
ISP4-PR
ISP5-PR
ISP6-PR
ISP1-PR2
Upstream/Transit Connection
p Two scenarios:
n Transit provider is in the locality
p Which means bandwidth is cheap, plentiful, easy to
provision, and easily upgraded
n Transit provider is a long distance away
p Over undersea cable, satellite, long-haul cross
country fibre, etc
p Each scenario has different considerations
which need to be accounted for
43
Local Transit Provider
p BR = ISP’s Border Router
n Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with transit)
n Either receives default route or the full BGP table from
upstream
n BGP policies are implemented here (depending on
connectivity)
n Packet filtering is implemented here (as required)
AR
BR
Transit
ISP1
44
Distant Transit Provider
p BR = ISP’s Border Router
n Co-located in a co-lo centre (typical) or in the upstream provider’s
premises
n Runs iBGP with rest of ISP1 backbone
n Runs eBGP with transit provider router(s)
n Implements BGP policies, packet filtering, etc
n Does not originate any domestic prefixes
AR1
Transit
ISP1
45
BR
AR2
Distant Transit Provider
p Positioning a router close to the Transit
Provider’s infrastructure is strongly
encouraged:
n Long haul circuits are expensive, so the router
allows the ISP to implement appropriate
filtering first
n Moves the buffering problem away from the
Transit provider
n Remote co-lo allows the ISP to choose another
transit provider and migrate connections with
minimum downtime
46
Distant Transit Provider
p Other points to consider:
n Does require remote hands support
n (Remote hands would plug or unplug cables,
power cycle equipment, replace equipment, etc
as instructed)
n Appropriate support contract from equipment
vendor(s)
n Sensible to consider two routers and two long-
haul links for redundancy
47
Distant Transit Provider
p Upgrade scenario:
n Provision two routers
n Two independent circuits
n Consider second transit provider and/or turning up at
an IXP
AR1
Transit
ISP1
48
BR1
AR2
BR2
Summary
p Design considerations for:
n Private interconnects
p Simple private peering
n Public interconnects
p Router co-lo at an IXP
n Local transit provider
p Simple upstream interconnect
n Long distance transit provider
p Router remote co-lo at datacentre or Transit
premises
49
Upstream Connectivity
and Peering Case Study
How Seacom chose their
international peering locations
and transit providers
50
Objective
p Obtain high grade Internet connectivity for
the wholesale market in Africa to the rest
of the world
p Emphasis on:
n Reliability
n Interconnectivity density
n Scalability
51
Metrics Needed in Determining
Solution (1)
p Focusing on operators that cover the destinations
mostly required by Africa
n i.e., English-speaking (Europe, North America)
p Include providers with good connectivity into
South America and the Asia Pacific.
p Little need for providers who are strong in the
Middle East, as demand from Africa for those
regions is very, very low.
52
Metrics Needed in Determining
Solution (2)
p Split the operators between Marseille (where the
SEACOM cable lands) and London (where there is
good Internet density)
n To avoid outages due to backhaul failure across Europe
n And still maintain good access to the Internet
p Look at providers who are of similar size so as
not to fidget too much (or at all) with BGP tuning.
p The providers needed to support:
n 10Gbps ports
n Bursting bandwidth/billing
n Future support for 100Gbps or N x 10Gbps
53
Metrics Needed in Determining
Solution (3)
p Implement peering at major exchange points in
Europe
n To off-set long term operating costs re: upstream
providers.
54
Implementing Solution
p Connected to Level(3) and GT-T (formerly
Inteliquent, formerly Tinet) in Marseille
p Connected to NTT and TeliaSonera in London
p Peered in London (LINX)
p Peered in Amsterdam (AMS-IX)
p BGP setup to prefer traffic being exchanged at
LINX and AMS-IX
p BGP setup to prefer traffic over the upstreams
that we could not peer away
p No additional tuning done on either peered or
transit traffic, i.e., no prepending, no de-
aggregation, etc. All traffic setup to flow naturally
55
End Result
p 50% of traffic peered away in less than 2x
months of peering at LINX and AMS-IX
p 50% of traffic handled by upstream providers
p Equal traffic being handled by Level(3) and GT-T
in Marseille
p Equal traffic being handled by TeliaSonera and
NTT in London
p Traffic distribution ratios across all the transit
providers is some 1:1:0.9:0.9
p This has been steady state for the last 12x
months
n No BGP tuning has been done at all 56
Addressing
57
Where to get IP addresses and AS
numbers
p Your upstream ISP
p Africa
n AfriNIC – http://www.afrinic.net
p Asia and the Pacific
n APNIC – http://www.apnic.net
p North America
n ARIN – http://www.arin.net
p Latin America and the Caribbean
n LACNIC – http://www.lacnic.net
p Europe and Middle East
n RIPE NCC – http://www.ripe.net/info/ncc
58
Internet Registry Regions
59
Getting IP address space
p Take part of upstream ISP’s PA space
or
p Become a member of your Regional Internet
Registry and get your own allocation
n Require a plan for a year ahead
n General policies are outlined in RFC2050, more
specific details are on the individual RIR website
p There is no more IPv4 address space at IANA
n APNIC and RIPE NCC are now in their “final /8” IPv4
delegation policy phase
n Limited IPv4 available
n IPv6 allocations are simple to get in most RIR regions
60
What about RFC1918 addressing?
p RFC1918 defines IPv4 addresses reserved for
private Internets
n Not to be used on Internet backbones
n http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1918.txt
p Commonly used within end-user networks
n NAT used to translate from private internal to public
external addressing
n Allows the end-user network to migrate ISPs without a
major internal renumbering exercise
p ISPs must filter RFC1918 addressing at their
network edge
n http://www.cymru.com/Documents/bogon-
list.html 61
What about RFC1918 addressing?
p There is a long list of well known problems:
n http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6752.txt
p Including:
n False belief it conserves address space
n Adverse effects on Traceroute
n Effects on Path MTU Discovery
n Unexpected interactions with some NAT implementations
n Interactions with edge anti-spoofing techniques
n Peering using loopbacks
n Adverse DNS Interaction
n Serious Operational and Troubleshooting issues
n Security Issues
p false sense of security, defeating existing security
techniques
62
Private versus Globally Routable IP
Addressing
p Infrastructure Security: not improved by using
private addressing
n Still can be attacked from inside, or from customers, or
by reflection techniques from the outside
p Troubleshooting: made an order of magnitude
harder
n No Internet view from routers
n Other ISPs cannot distinguish between down and broken
p Summary:
n ALWAYS use globally routable IP addressing for ISP
Infrastructure
63
Addressing Plans – ISP
Infrastructure
p Address block for router loop-back interfaces
p Address block for infrastructure
n Per PoP or whole backbone
n Summarise between sites if it makes sense
n Allocate according to genuine requirements, not historic
classful boundaries
p Similar allocation policies should be used for IPv6
as well
n ISPs just get a substantially larger block (relatively) so
assignments within the backbone are easier to make
64
Addressing Plans – Customer
p Customers are assigned address space
according to need
p Should not be reserved or assigned on a
per PoP basis
n ISP iBGP carries customer nets
n Aggregation not required and usually not
desirable
65
p Phase Two
Addressing Plans – ISP Infrastructure
p Phase One
66
223.10.0.0/21
Customer assignments Infrastructure Loopbacks
/24
223.10.6.255
223.10.0.1
223.10.0.0/20
Original assignments New Assignments
/24
/24
223.10.0.1
223.10.5.255 223.10.15.255
Addressing Plans
Planning
p Registries will usually allocate the next
block to be contiguous with the first
allocation
n Minimum allocation could be /21
n Very likely that subsequent allocation will
make this up to a /20
n So plan accordingly
67
Addressing Plans (contd)
p Document infrastructure allocation
n Eases operation, debugging and management
p Document customer allocation
n Contained in iBGP
n Eases operation, debugging and management
n Submit network object to RIR Database
68
Routing Protocols
69
Routing Protocols
p IGP – Interior Gateway Protocol
n Carries infrastructure addresses, point-to-point
links
n Examples are OSPF, ISIS,...
p EGP – Exterior Gateway Protocol
n Carries customer prefixes and Internet routes
n Current EGP is BGP version 4
p No connection between IGP and EGP
70
Why Do We Need an IGP?
p ISP backbone scaling
n Hierarchy
n Modular infrastructure construction
n Limiting scope of failure
n Healing of infrastructure faults using dynamic
routing with fast convergence
71
Why Do We Need an EGP?
p Scaling to large network
n Hierarchy
n Limit scope of failure
p Policy
n Control reachability to prefixes
n Merge separate organizations
n Connect multiple IGPs
72
Interior versus Exterior Routing
Protocols
p Interior
n Automatic neighbour
discovery
n Generally trust your IGP
routers
n Prefixes go to all IGP
routers
n Binds routers in one AS
together
p Exterior
n Specifically configured
peers
n Connecting with outside
networks
n Set administrative
boundaries
n Binds AS’s together
73
Interior versus Exterior Routing
Protocols
p Interior
n Carries ISP
infrastructure addresses
only
n ISPs aim to keep the
IGP small for efficiency
and scalability
p Exterior
n Carries customer
prefixes
n Carries Internet
prefixes
n EGPs are independent
of ISP network topology
74
Hierarchy of Routing Protocols
75
BGP4
BGP4
and OSPF/ISIS
Other ISPs
Customers
IXP
Static/BGP4
BGP4
Routing Protocols:
Choosing an IGP
p OSPF and ISIS have very similar properties
n Review the “ISIS vs OSPF” presentation
p Which to choose?
n Choose which is appropriate for your operators’
experience
n In most vendor releases, both OSPF and ISIS have
sufficient “nerd knobs” to tweak the IGP’s behaviour
n OSPF runs on IP
n ISIS runs on infrastructure, alongside IP
n ISIS supports both IPv4 and IPv6
n OSPFv2 (IPv4) plus OSPFv3 (IPv6)
76
Routing Protocols:
IGP Recommendations
p Keep the IGP routing table as small as possible
n If you can count the routers and the point-to-point links
in the backbone, that total is the number of IGP entries
you should see
p IGP details:
n Should only have router loopbacks, backbone WAN
point-to-point link addresses, and network addresses of
any LANs having an IGP running on them
n Strongly recommended to use inter-router
authentication
n Use inter-area summarisation if possible
77
Routing Protocols:
More IGP recommendations
p To fine tune IGP table size more, consider:
n Using “ip unnumbered” on customer point-to-
point links – saves carrying that /30 in IGP
p (If customer point-to-point /30 is required for
monitoring purposes, then put this in iBGP)
n Use contiguous addresses for backbone WAN
links in each area – then summarise into
backbone area
n Don’t summarise router loopback addresses –
as iBGP needs those (for next-hop)
n Use iBGP for carrying anything which does not
contribute to the IGP Routing process
78
Routing Protocols:
iBGP Recommendations
p iBGP should carry everything which
doesn’t contribute to the IGP routing
process
n Internet routing table
n Customer assigned addresses
n Customer point-to-point links
n Access network dynamic address pools,
passive LANs, etc
79
Routing Protocols:
More iBGP Recommendations
p Scalable iBGP features:
n Use neighbour authentication
n Use peer-groups to speed update process and
for configuration efficiency
n Use communities for ease of filtering
n Use route-reflector hierarchy
p Route reflector pair per PoP (overlaid clusters)
80
Security
81
Security
p ISP Infrastructure security
p ISP Network security
p Security is not optional!
p ISPs need to:
n Protect themselves
n Help protect their customers from the Internet
n Protect the Internet from their customers
p The following slides are general recommendations
n Do more research on security before deploying any
network
82
ISP Infrastructure Security
p Router & Switch Security
n Use Secure Shell (SSH) for device access &
management
p Do NOT use Telnet
n Device management access filters should only
allow NOC and device-to-device access
p Do NOT allow external access
n Use TACACS+ for user authentication and
authorisation
p Do NOT create user accounts on routers/switches
83
ISP Infrastructure Security
p Remote access
n For Operations Engineers who need access
while not in the NOC
n Create an SSH server host (this is all it does)
p Or a Secure VPN access server
n Ops Engineers connect here, and then they can
access the NOC and network devices
84
ISP Infrastructure Security
p Other network devices?
n These probably do not have sophisticated security
techniques like routers or switches do
n Protect them at the LAN or point-to-point ingress (on
router)
p Servers and Services?
n Protect servers on the LAN interface on the router
n Consider using iptables &c on the servers too
p SNMP
n Apply access-list to the SNMP ports
n Should only be accessible by management system, not
the world
85
ISP Infrastructure Security
p General Advice:
n Routers, Switches and other network devices
should not be contactable from outside the AS
n Achieved by blocking typical management
access protocols for the infrastructure address
block at the network perimeter
p E.g. ssh, telnet, http, snmp,…
n Use the ICSI Netalyser to check access levels:
p http://netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu
n Don’t block everything: BGP, traceroute
and ICMP still need to work!
86
ISP Network Security
p Effective filtering
n Protect network borders from “traffic which
should not be on the public Internet”, for
example:
p LAN protocols (eg netbios)
p Well known exploit ports (used by worms and
viruses)
p Drop traffic arriving and going to private and non-
routable address space (IPv4 and IPv6)
n Achieved by packet filters on border routers
p Remote trigger blackhole filtering
87
ISP Network Security – RTBF
p Remote trigger blackhole filtering
n ISP NOC injects prefixes which should not be accessible
across the AS into the iBGP
n Prefixes have next hop pointing to a blackhole address
n All iBGP speaking backbone routers configured to point
the blackhole address to the null interface
n Traffic destined to these blackhole prefixes are dropped
by the first router they reach
p Application:
n Any prefixes (including RFC1918) which should not have
routability across the ISP backbone
88
ISP Network Security – RTBF
p Remote trigger blackhole filtering example:
n Origin router:
n iBGP speaking backbone router:
89
router bgp 64509
redistribute static route-map black-hole-trigger
!
ip route 10.5.1.3 255.255.255.255 Null0 tag 66
!
route-map black-hole-trigger permit 10
match tag 66
set local-preference 1000
set community no-export
set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1
!
ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 null0
ISP Network Security – RTBF
p Resulting routing table entries:
90
gw1#sh ip bgp 10.5.1.3
BGP routing table entry for 10.5.1.3/32, version 64572219
Paths: (1 available, best #1, table Default-IP-Routing-Table)
Not advertised to any peer
Local
192.0.2.1 from 1.1.10.10 (1.1.10.10)
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 1000, valid, internal, best
Community: no-export
gw1#sh ip route 10.5.1.3
Routing entry for 10.5.1.3/32
Known via "bgp 64509", distance 200, metric 0, type internal
Last update from 192.0.2.1 00:04:52 ago
Routing Descriptor Blocks:
* 192.0.2.1, from 1.1.10.10, 00:04:52 ago
Route metric is 0, traffic share count is 1
AS Hops 0
ISP Network Security – uRPF
p Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
p Strongly recommended to be used on all
customer facing static interfaces
n BCP 38 (tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38)
n Blocks all unroutable source addresses the
customer may be using
n Inexpensive way of filtering customer’s connection
(when compared with packet filters)
p Can be used for multihomed connections too, but
extreme care required
91
What is uRPF?
p Router compares source address of incoming
packet with FIB entry
n If FIB entry interface matches incoming interface, the
packet is forwarded
n If FIB entry interface does not match incoming interface,
the packet is dropped 92
router
FIB:
172.16.1.0/24 fa0/0
192.168.1.0/24 se0/1
fa0/0 se0/1
src=172.16.1.1
src=192.168.1.1
Security Summary
p Implement RTBF
n Inside ISP backbone
n Make it available to BGP customers too
p They can send you the prefix you need to block with a
special community attached
p You match on that community, and set the next-hop to the
null address
p Implement uRPF
n For all static customers
p Use SSH for device access
p Use TACACS+ for authentication
93
Out of Band Management
94
Out of Band Management
p Not optional!
p Allows access to network equipment in
times of failure
p Ensures quality of service to customers
n Minimises downtime
n Minimises repair time
n Eases diagnostics and debugging
95
Out of Band Management
p OoB Example – Access server:
n modem attached to allow NOC dial in
n console ports of all network equipment
connected to serial ports
n LAN and/or WAN link connects to network
core, or via separate management link to NOC
p Full remote control access under all
circumstances
96
Out of Band Network
97
Ethernet
to the NOC
Router, switch
and ISP server
consoles
(Optional) Out of band
WAN link to other PoPs
Modem – access
to PSTN for out of
band dialin
Equipment Rack
Equipment Rack
Out of Band Management
p OoB Example – Statistics gathering:
n Routers are NetFlow and syslog enabled
n Management data is congestion/failure
sensitive
n Ensures management data integrity in case of
failure
p Full remote information under all
circumstances
98
Test Laboratory
99
Test Laboratory
p Designed to look like a typical PoP
n Operated like a typical PoP
p Used to trial new services or new software
under realistic conditions
p Allows discovery and fixing of potential
problems before they are introduced to
the network
100
Test Laboratory
p Some ISPs dedicate equipment to the lab
p Other ISPs “purchase ahead” so that
today’s lab equipment becomes
tomorrow’s PoP equipment
p Other ISPs use lab equipment for “hot
spares” in the event of hardware failure
101
Test Laboratory
p Can’t afford a test lab?
n Set aside one spare router and server to trial
new services
n Never ever try out new hardware, software or
services on the live network
p Every major ISP in the US and Europe has
a test lab
n It’s a serious consideration
102
Operational
Considerations
103
Operational Considerations
104
Why design the world’s best
network when you have not
thought about what operational
good practices should be
implemented?
Operational Considerations
Maintenance
p Never work on the live network, no matter how
trivial the modification may seem
n Establish maintenance periods which your customers are
aware of
p e.g. Tuesday 4-7am, Thursday 4-7am
p Never do maintenance on the last working day
before the weekend
n Unless you want to work all weekend cleaning up
p Never do maintenance on the first working day
after the weekend
n Unless you want to work all weekend preparing
105
Operational Considerations
Support
p Differentiate between customer support
and the Network Operations Centre
n Customer support fixes customer problems
n NOC deals with and fixes backbone and
Internet related problems
p Network Engineering team is last resort
n They design the next generation network,
improve the routing design, implement new
services, etc
n They do not and should not be doing support!
106
Operational Considerations
NOC Communications
p NOC should know contact details for
equivalent NOCs in upstream providers
and peers
p Or consider joining the INOC-DBA system
n Voice over IP phone system using SIP
n Runs over the Internet
n www.pch.net/inoc-dba for more information
107
ISP Network Design
Summary
108
ISP Design Summary
p KEEP IT SIMPLE & STUPID ! (KISS)
p Simple is elegant is scalable
p Use Redundancy, Security, and
Technology to make life easier for yourself
p Above all, ensure quality of service for
your customers
109
ISP Network Design
ISP Workshops
110

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ISP Network Design workshops how to design networks

  • 1. ISP Network Design ISP Workshops 1 Last updated 27th February 2015
  • 2. ISP Network Design p PoP Topologies and Design p Backbone Design p Upstream Connectivity & Peering p Addressing p Routing Protocols p Security p Out of Band Management p Operational Considerations 2
  • 4. PoP Topologies p Core routers – high speed trunk connections p Distribution routers and Access routers – high port density p Border routers – connections to other providers p Service routers – hosting and servers p Some functions might be handled by a single router 4
  • 5. PoP Design p Modular Design p Aggregation Services separated according to n connection speed n customer service n contention ratio n security considerations 5
  • 6. Modular PoP Design 6 Backbone link to another PoP Backbone link to another PoP Business customer aggregation layer for leased line circuit delivery Channelised circuits Network Operations Centre Consumer Dial Access Network Core Consumer cable, xDSL and wireless Access for MetroE circuit delivery GigE fibre trunks MetroE customer aggregation layer ISP Services (DNS, Mail, News, FTP, WWW) Hosted Services & Datacentre Other ISPs Web Cache
  • 7. Modular Routing Protocol Design p Modular IGP implementation n IGP “area” per PoP n Core routers in backbone area (Area 0/L2) n Aggregation/summarisation where possible into the core p Modular iBGP implementation n BGP route reflector cluster n Core routers are the route-reflectors n Remaining routers are clients & peer with route-reflectors only 7
  • 8. Point of Presence Design 8
  • 9. PoP Modules p Low Speed customer connections n ADSL2, Cable, Public Wireless, PSTN access n Low bandwidth needs n Low revenue, large numbers p Business customer connections n 10Mbps to 100Mbps speed range n Delivery over SDH or MetroEthernet links n Medium bandwidth needs n Medium revenue, medium numbers 9
  • 10. PoP Modules p Highband Business customer connections n From 100Mbps to over 1Gbps n Ethernet, Fibre, or high end SDH n High bandwidth needs n High revenue, low numbers 10
  • 11. PoP Modules p PoP Core n Two dedicated routers n High Speed interconnect n Backbone Links ONLY n Do not touch them! p Border Network n Dedicated border router to other ISPs n The ISP’s “front” door n Transparent web caching? n Two in backbone is minimum guarantee for redundancy 11
  • 12. PoP Modules p ISP Services n DNS (cache, secondary) n News (still relevant?) n Mail (POP3, Relay, Anti-virus/anti-spam) n WWW (server, proxy, cache) p Hosted Services/DataCentres n Virtual Web, WWW (server, proxy, cache) n Information/Content Services n Electronic Commerce 12
  • 13. PoP Modules p Network Operations Centre n Consider primary and backup locations n Network monitoring n Statistics and log gathering n Direct but secure access p Out of Band Management Network n The ISP Network “Safety Belt” 13
  • 14. PSTN & Broadband Access Module 14 To Core Routers Telephone Network BRAS SSG, DHCP, TACACS+ or Radius Servers/Proxies, DNS resolver, Content Web Cache Access Network Gateway Routers Cable RAS DSLAM IP, ATM Primary Rate T1/E1 Digital Modem Access Servers Cable System
  • 15. Business Customer Access Module 15 To Core Routers Channelised T1/E1 Metro Ethernet Direct Fibre Links Aggregation Edge
  • 16. High Speed Access Module 16 To Core Routers Metro Ethernet Direct Fibre Links Channelised OC3/OC12 Aggregation Edge
  • 17. ISP Services Module 17 To core routers WWW cache Service Network Gateway Routers SMTP Relay (out) DNS Resolver SMTP Host (in) POP3s IMAPs DNS Secondary
  • 18. Hosted Services Module 18 Customer 7 Customer 3 Customer 4 Customer 5 Customer 6 To core routers Hosted Network Gateway Routers Customer 2 Customer 1 vlan12 vlan11 vlan13 vlan14 vlan15 vlan16 vlan17
  • 19. Border Module 19 To core routers Network Border Routers To local IXP NB: router has no default route + local AS routing table only ISP1 ISP2
  • 20. NOC Module 20 Primary DNS To core routers Hosted Network Gateway Routers SYSLOG server TACACS+ server Network Operations Centre Staff Out of Band Management Network async terminal server NetFlow Analyser Firewall Billing, Database and Accounting Systems Corporate LAN Critical Services Module
  • 21. Out of Band Network 21 Out of Band Management Network Terminal server To the NOC Out of Band Ethernet NetFlow Collector NetFlow enabled routers Router consoles
  • 23. Backbone Design p Routed Backbone p Switched Backbone n ATM/Frame Relay core network n Now obsolete p Point-to-point circuits n nx64K, T1/E1, T3/E3, OC3, OC12, GigE, OC48, 10GigE, OC192, OC768, 100GE p ATM/Frame Relay service from telco n T3, OC3, OC12,… delivery n Easily upgradeable bandwidth (CIR) n Almost vanished in availability now 23
  • 24. Distributed Network Design p PoP design “standardised” n operational scalability and simplicity p ISP essential services distributed around backbone p NOC and “backup” NOC p Redundant backbone links 24
  • 25. Distributed Network Design 25 POP One POP Two POP Three Customer connections Customer connections Customer connections External connections External connections Operations Centre Backup Operations Centre ISP Services ISP Services ISP Services
  • 26. Backbone Links p ATM/Frame Relay n Virtually disappeared due to overhead, extra equipment, and shared with other customers of the telco n MPLS has replaced ATM & FR as the telco favourite p Leased Line/Circuit n Most popular with backbone providers n IP over Optics and Metro Ethernet very common in many parts of the world 26
  • 27. Long Distance Backbone Links p These usually cost more p Important to plan for the future n This means at least two years ahead n Stay in budget, stay realistic n Unplanned “emergency” upgrades will be disruptive without redundancy in the network infrastructure 27
  • 28. Long Distance Backbone Links p Allow sufficient capacity on alternative paths for failure situations n Sufficient can depend on the business strategy n Sufficient can be as little as 20% n Sufficient is usually over 50% as this offers “business continuity” for customers in the case of link failure n Some businesses choose 0% p Very short sighted, meaning they have no spare capacity at all!! 28
  • 29. Long Distance Links 29 POP One POP Two POP Three Long distance link Alternative/Backup Path
  • 30. Metropolitan Area Backbone Links p Tend to be cheaper n Circuit concentration n Choose from multiple suppliers p Think big n More redundancy n Less impact of upgrades n Less impact of failures 30
  • 31. Metropolitan Area Backbone Links 31 POP One POP Two POP Three Metropolitan Links Metropolitan Links Traditional Point to Point Links
  • 33. Transits p Transit provider is another autonomous system which is used to provide the local network with access to other networks n Might be local or regional only n But more usually the whole Internet p Transit providers need to be chosen wisely: n Only one p no redundancy n Too many p more difficult to load balance p no economy of scale (costs more per Mbps) p hard to provide service quality p Recommendation: at least two, no more than three
  • 34. Common Mistakes p ISPs sign up with too many transit providers n Lots of small circuits (cost more per Mbps than larger ones) n Transit rates per Mbps reduce with increasing transit bandwidth purchased n Hard to implement reliable traffic engineering that doesn’t need daily fine tuning depending on customer activities p No diversity n Chosen transit providers all reached over same satellite or same submarine cable n Chosen transit providers have poor onward transit and peering
  • 35. Peers p A peer is another autonomous system with which the local network has agreed to exchange locally sourced routes and traffic p Private peer n Private link between two providers for the purpose of interconnecting p Public peer n Internet Exchange Point, where providers meet and freely decide who they will interconnect with p Recommendation: peer as much as possible!
  • 36. Common Mistakes p Mistaking a transit provider’s “Exchange” business for a no-cost public peering point p Not working hard to get as much peering as possible n Physically near a peering point (IXP) but not present at it n (Transit sometimes is cheaper than peering!!) p Ignoring/avoiding competitors because they are competition n Even though potentially valuable peering partner to give customers a better experience
  • 37. Private Interconnection p Two service providers agree to interconnect their networks n They exchange prefixes they originate into the routing system (usually their aggregated address blocks) n They share the cost of the infrastructure to interconnect p Typically each paying half the cost of the link (be it circuit, satellite, microwave, fibre,…) p Connected to their respective peering routers n Peering routers only carry domestic prefixes 37
  • 38. Private Interconnection p PR = peering router n Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with peer) n No default route n No “full BGP table” n Domestic prefixes only p Peering router used for all private interconnects PR PR ISP1 ISP2 Upstream Upstream 38
  • 39. Public Interconnection p Service provider participates in an Internet Exchange Point n It exchanges prefixes it originates into the routing system with the participants of the IXP n It chooses who to peer with at the IXP p Bi-lateral peering (like private interconnect) p Multi-lateral peering (via IXP’s route server) n It provides the router at the IXP and provides the connectivity from their PoP to the IXP n The IXP router carries only domestic prefixes 39
  • 40. Public Interconnection p ISP1-PR = peering router of our ISP n Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with IXP peers) n No default route n No “full BGP table” n Domestic prefixes only p Physically located at the IXP ISP1-PR ISP1 Upstream 40 IXP ISP2-PR ISP3-PR ISP4-PR ISP5-PR ISP6-PR
  • 41. Public Interconnection p The ISP’s router IXP peering router needs careful configuration: n It is remote from the domestic backbone n Should not originate any domestic prefixes n (As well as no default route, no full BGP table) n Filtering of BGP announcements from IXP peers (in and out) p Provision of a second link to the IXP: n (for redundancy or extra capacity) n Usually means installing a second router p Connected to a second switch (if the IXP has two more more switches) p Interconnected with the original router (and part of iBGP mesh) 41
  • 42. Public Interconnection p Provision of a second link to the IXP means considering redundancy in the SP’s backbone n Two routers n Two independent links n Separate switches (if IXP has two or more switches) ISP1-PR1 ISP1 Upstream 42 IXP ISP2-PR ISP3-PR ISP4-PR ISP5-PR ISP6-PR ISP1-PR2
  • 43. Upstream/Transit Connection p Two scenarios: n Transit provider is in the locality p Which means bandwidth is cheap, plentiful, easy to provision, and easily upgraded n Transit provider is a long distance away p Over undersea cable, satellite, long-haul cross country fibre, etc p Each scenario has different considerations which need to be accounted for 43
  • 44. Local Transit Provider p BR = ISP’s Border Router n Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with transit) n Either receives default route or the full BGP table from upstream n BGP policies are implemented here (depending on connectivity) n Packet filtering is implemented here (as required) AR BR Transit ISP1 44
  • 45. Distant Transit Provider p BR = ISP’s Border Router n Co-located in a co-lo centre (typical) or in the upstream provider’s premises n Runs iBGP with rest of ISP1 backbone n Runs eBGP with transit provider router(s) n Implements BGP policies, packet filtering, etc n Does not originate any domestic prefixes AR1 Transit ISP1 45 BR AR2
  • 46. Distant Transit Provider p Positioning a router close to the Transit Provider’s infrastructure is strongly encouraged: n Long haul circuits are expensive, so the router allows the ISP to implement appropriate filtering first n Moves the buffering problem away from the Transit provider n Remote co-lo allows the ISP to choose another transit provider and migrate connections with minimum downtime 46
  • 47. Distant Transit Provider p Other points to consider: n Does require remote hands support n (Remote hands would plug or unplug cables, power cycle equipment, replace equipment, etc as instructed) n Appropriate support contract from equipment vendor(s) n Sensible to consider two routers and two long- haul links for redundancy 47
  • 48. Distant Transit Provider p Upgrade scenario: n Provision two routers n Two independent circuits n Consider second transit provider and/or turning up at an IXP AR1 Transit ISP1 48 BR1 AR2 BR2
  • 49. Summary p Design considerations for: n Private interconnects p Simple private peering n Public interconnects p Router co-lo at an IXP n Local transit provider p Simple upstream interconnect n Long distance transit provider p Router remote co-lo at datacentre or Transit premises 49
  • 50. Upstream Connectivity and Peering Case Study How Seacom chose their international peering locations and transit providers 50
  • 51. Objective p Obtain high grade Internet connectivity for the wholesale market in Africa to the rest of the world p Emphasis on: n Reliability n Interconnectivity density n Scalability 51
  • 52. Metrics Needed in Determining Solution (1) p Focusing on operators that cover the destinations mostly required by Africa n i.e., English-speaking (Europe, North America) p Include providers with good connectivity into South America and the Asia Pacific. p Little need for providers who are strong in the Middle East, as demand from Africa for those regions is very, very low. 52
  • 53. Metrics Needed in Determining Solution (2) p Split the operators between Marseille (where the SEACOM cable lands) and London (where there is good Internet density) n To avoid outages due to backhaul failure across Europe n And still maintain good access to the Internet p Look at providers who are of similar size so as not to fidget too much (or at all) with BGP tuning. p The providers needed to support: n 10Gbps ports n Bursting bandwidth/billing n Future support for 100Gbps or N x 10Gbps 53
  • 54. Metrics Needed in Determining Solution (3) p Implement peering at major exchange points in Europe n To off-set long term operating costs re: upstream providers. 54
  • 55. Implementing Solution p Connected to Level(3) and GT-T (formerly Inteliquent, formerly Tinet) in Marseille p Connected to NTT and TeliaSonera in London p Peered in London (LINX) p Peered in Amsterdam (AMS-IX) p BGP setup to prefer traffic being exchanged at LINX and AMS-IX p BGP setup to prefer traffic over the upstreams that we could not peer away p No additional tuning done on either peered or transit traffic, i.e., no prepending, no de- aggregation, etc. All traffic setup to flow naturally 55
  • 56. End Result p 50% of traffic peered away in less than 2x months of peering at LINX and AMS-IX p 50% of traffic handled by upstream providers p Equal traffic being handled by Level(3) and GT-T in Marseille p Equal traffic being handled by TeliaSonera and NTT in London p Traffic distribution ratios across all the transit providers is some 1:1:0.9:0.9 p This has been steady state for the last 12x months n No BGP tuning has been done at all 56
  • 58. Where to get IP addresses and AS numbers p Your upstream ISP p Africa n AfriNIC – http://www.afrinic.net p Asia and the Pacific n APNIC – http://www.apnic.net p North America n ARIN – http://www.arin.net p Latin America and the Caribbean n LACNIC – http://www.lacnic.net p Europe and Middle East n RIPE NCC – http://www.ripe.net/info/ncc 58
  • 60. Getting IP address space p Take part of upstream ISP’s PA space or p Become a member of your Regional Internet Registry and get your own allocation n Require a plan for a year ahead n General policies are outlined in RFC2050, more specific details are on the individual RIR website p There is no more IPv4 address space at IANA n APNIC and RIPE NCC are now in their “final /8” IPv4 delegation policy phase n Limited IPv4 available n IPv6 allocations are simple to get in most RIR regions 60
  • 61. What about RFC1918 addressing? p RFC1918 defines IPv4 addresses reserved for private Internets n Not to be used on Internet backbones n http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1918.txt p Commonly used within end-user networks n NAT used to translate from private internal to public external addressing n Allows the end-user network to migrate ISPs without a major internal renumbering exercise p ISPs must filter RFC1918 addressing at their network edge n http://www.cymru.com/Documents/bogon- list.html 61
  • 62. What about RFC1918 addressing? p There is a long list of well known problems: n http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6752.txt p Including: n False belief it conserves address space n Adverse effects on Traceroute n Effects on Path MTU Discovery n Unexpected interactions with some NAT implementations n Interactions with edge anti-spoofing techniques n Peering using loopbacks n Adverse DNS Interaction n Serious Operational and Troubleshooting issues n Security Issues p false sense of security, defeating existing security techniques 62
  • 63. Private versus Globally Routable IP Addressing p Infrastructure Security: not improved by using private addressing n Still can be attacked from inside, or from customers, or by reflection techniques from the outside p Troubleshooting: made an order of magnitude harder n No Internet view from routers n Other ISPs cannot distinguish between down and broken p Summary: n ALWAYS use globally routable IP addressing for ISP Infrastructure 63
  • 64. Addressing Plans – ISP Infrastructure p Address block for router loop-back interfaces p Address block for infrastructure n Per PoP or whole backbone n Summarise between sites if it makes sense n Allocate according to genuine requirements, not historic classful boundaries p Similar allocation policies should be used for IPv6 as well n ISPs just get a substantially larger block (relatively) so assignments within the backbone are easier to make 64
  • 65. Addressing Plans – Customer p Customers are assigned address space according to need p Should not be reserved or assigned on a per PoP basis n ISP iBGP carries customer nets n Aggregation not required and usually not desirable 65
  • 66. p Phase Two Addressing Plans – ISP Infrastructure p Phase One 66 223.10.0.0/21 Customer assignments Infrastructure Loopbacks /24 223.10.6.255 223.10.0.1 223.10.0.0/20 Original assignments New Assignments /24 /24 223.10.0.1 223.10.5.255 223.10.15.255
  • 67. Addressing Plans Planning p Registries will usually allocate the next block to be contiguous with the first allocation n Minimum allocation could be /21 n Very likely that subsequent allocation will make this up to a /20 n So plan accordingly 67
  • 68. Addressing Plans (contd) p Document infrastructure allocation n Eases operation, debugging and management p Document customer allocation n Contained in iBGP n Eases operation, debugging and management n Submit network object to RIR Database 68
  • 70. Routing Protocols p IGP – Interior Gateway Protocol n Carries infrastructure addresses, point-to-point links n Examples are OSPF, ISIS,... p EGP – Exterior Gateway Protocol n Carries customer prefixes and Internet routes n Current EGP is BGP version 4 p No connection between IGP and EGP 70
  • 71. Why Do We Need an IGP? p ISP backbone scaling n Hierarchy n Modular infrastructure construction n Limiting scope of failure n Healing of infrastructure faults using dynamic routing with fast convergence 71
  • 72. Why Do We Need an EGP? p Scaling to large network n Hierarchy n Limit scope of failure p Policy n Control reachability to prefixes n Merge separate organizations n Connect multiple IGPs 72
  • 73. Interior versus Exterior Routing Protocols p Interior n Automatic neighbour discovery n Generally trust your IGP routers n Prefixes go to all IGP routers n Binds routers in one AS together p Exterior n Specifically configured peers n Connecting with outside networks n Set administrative boundaries n Binds AS’s together 73
  • 74. Interior versus Exterior Routing Protocols p Interior n Carries ISP infrastructure addresses only n ISPs aim to keep the IGP small for efficiency and scalability p Exterior n Carries customer prefixes n Carries Internet prefixes n EGPs are independent of ISP network topology 74
  • 75. Hierarchy of Routing Protocols 75 BGP4 BGP4 and OSPF/ISIS Other ISPs Customers IXP Static/BGP4 BGP4
  • 76. Routing Protocols: Choosing an IGP p OSPF and ISIS have very similar properties n Review the “ISIS vs OSPF” presentation p Which to choose? n Choose which is appropriate for your operators’ experience n In most vendor releases, both OSPF and ISIS have sufficient “nerd knobs” to tweak the IGP’s behaviour n OSPF runs on IP n ISIS runs on infrastructure, alongside IP n ISIS supports both IPv4 and IPv6 n OSPFv2 (IPv4) plus OSPFv3 (IPv6) 76
  • 77. Routing Protocols: IGP Recommendations p Keep the IGP routing table as small as possible n If you can count the routers and the point-to-point links in the backbone, that total is the number of IGP entries you should see p IGP details: n Should only have router loopbacks, backbone WAN point-to-point link addresses, and network addresses of any LANs having an IGP running on them n Strongly recommended to use inter-router authentication n Use inter-area summarisation if possible 77
  • 78. Routing Protocols: More IGP recommendations p To fine tune IGP table size more, consider: n Using “ip unnumbered” on customer point-to- point links – saves carrying that /30 in IGP p (If customer point-to-point /30 is required for monitoring purposes, then put this in iBGP) n Use contiguous addresses for backbone WAN links in each area – then summarise into backbone area n Don’t summarise router loopback addresses – as iBGP needs those (for next-hop) n Use iBGP for carrying anything which does not contribute to the IGP Routing process 78
  • 79. Routing Protocols: iBGP Recommendations p iBGP should carry everything which doesn’t contribute to the IGP routing process n Internet routing table n Customer assigned addresses n Customer point-to-point links n Access network dynamic address pools, passive LANs, etc 79
  • 80. Routing Protocols: More iBGP Recommendations p Scalable iBGP features: n Use neighbour authentication n Use peer-groups to speed update process and for configuration efficiency n Use communities for ease of filtering n Use route-reflector hierarchy p Route reflector pair per PoP (overlaid clusters) 80
  • 82. Security p ISP Infrastructure security p ISP Network security p Security is not optional! p ISPs need to: n Protect themselves n Help protect their customers from the Internet n Protect the Internet from their customers p The following slides are general recommendations n Do more research on security before deploying any network 82
  • 83. ISP Infrastructure Security p Router & Switch Security n Use Secure Shell (SSH) for device access & management p Do NOT use Telnet n Device management access filters should only allow NOC and device-to-device access p Do NOT allow external access n Use TACACS+ for user authentication and authorisation p Do NOT create user accounts on routers/switches 83
  • 84. ISP Infrastructure Security p Remote access n For Operations Engineers who need access while not in the NOC n Create an SSH server host (this is all it does) p Or a Secure VPN access server n Ops Engineers connect here, and then they can access the NOC and network devices 84
  • 85. ISP Infrastructure Security p Other network devices? n These probably do not have sophisticated security techniques like routers or switches do n Protect them at the LAN or point-to-point ingress (on router) p Servers and Services? n Protect servers on the LAN interface on the router n Consider using iptables &c on the servers too p SNMP n Apply access-list to the SNMP ports n Should only be accessible by management system, not the world 85
  • 86. ISP Infrastructure Security p General Advice: n Routers, Switches and other network devices should not be contactable from outside the AS n Achieved by blocking typical management access protocols for the infrastructure address block at the network perimeter p E.g. ssh, telnet, http, snmp,… n Use the ICSI Netalyser to check access levels: p http://netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu n Don’t block everything: BGP, traceroute and ICMP still need to work! 86
  • 87. ISP Network Security p Effective filtering n Protect network borders from “traffic which should not be on the public Internet”, for example: p LAN protocols (eg netbios) p Well known exploit ports (used by worms and viruses) p Drop traffic arriving and going to private and non- routable address space (IPv4 and IPv6) n Achieved by packet filters on border routers p Remote trigger blackhole filtering 87
  • 88. ISP Network Security – RTBF p Remote trigger blackhole filtering n ISP NOC injects prefixes which should not be accessible across the AS into the iBGP n Prefixes have next hop pointing to a blackhole address n All iBGP speaking backbone routers configured to point the blackhole address to the null interface n Traffic destined to these blackhole prefixes are dropped by the first router they reach p Application: n Any prefixes (including RFC1918) which should not have routability across the ISP backbone 88
  • 89. ISP Network Security – RTBF p Remote trigger blackhole filtering example: n Origin router: n iBGP speaking backbone router: 89 router bgp 64509 redistribute static route-map black-hole-trigger ! ip route 10.5.1.3 255.255.255.255 Null0 tag 66 ! route-map black-hole-trigger permit 10 match tag 66 set local-preference 1000 set community no-export set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1 ! ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 null0
  • 90. ISP Network Security – RTBF p Resulting routing table entries: 90 gw1#sh ip bgp 10.5.1.3 BGP routing table entry for 10.5.1.3/32, version 64572219 Paths: (1 available, best #1, table Default-IP-Routing-Table) Not advertised to any peer Local 192.0.2.1 from 1.1.10.10 (1.1.10.10) Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 1000, valid, internal, best Community: no-export gw1#sh ip route 10.5.1.3 Routing entry for 10.5.1.3/32 Known via "bgp 64509", distance 200, metric 0, type internal Last update from 192.0.2.1 00:04:52 ago Routing Descriptor Blocks: * 192.0.2.1, from 1.1.10.10, 00:04:52 ago Route metric is 0, traffic share count is 1 AS Hops 0
  • 91. ISP Network Security – uRPF p Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding p Strongly recommended to be used on all customer facing static interfaces n BCP 38 (tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38) n Blocks all unroutable source addresses the customer may be using n Inexpensive way of filtering customer’s connection (when compared with packet filters) p Can be used for multihomed connections too, but extreme care required 91
  • 92. What is uRPF? p Router compares source address of incoming packet with FIB entry n If FIB entry interface matches incoming interface, the packet is forwarded n If FIB entry interface does not match incoming interface, the packet is dropped 92 router FIB: 172.16.1.0/24 fa0/0 192.168.1.0/24 se0/1 fa0/0 se0/1 src=172.16.1.1 src=192.168.1.1
  • 93. Security Summary p Implement RTBF n Inside ISP backbone n Make it available to BGP customers too p They can send you the prefix you need to block with a special community attached p You match on that community, and set the next-hop to the null address p Implement uRPF n For all static customers p Use SSH for device access p Use TACACS+ for authentication 93
  • 94. Out of Band Management 94
  • 95. Out of Band Management p Not optional! p Allows access to network equipment in times of failure p Ensures quality of service to customers n Minimises downtime n Minimises repair time n Eases diagnostics and debugging 95
  • 96. Out of Band Management p OoB Example – Access server: n modem attached to allow NOC dial in n console ports of all network equipment connected to serial ports n LAN and/or WAN link connects to network core, or via separate management link to NOC p Full remote control access under all circumstances 96
  • 97. Out of Band Network 97 Ethernet to the NOC Router, switch and ISP server consoles (Optional) Out of band WAN link to other PoPs Modem – access to PSTN for out of band dialin Equipment Rack Equipment Rack
  • 98. Out of Band Management p OoB Example – Statistics gathering: n Routers are NetFlow and syslog enabled n Management data is congestion/failure sensitive n Ensures management data integrity in case of failure p Full remote information under all circumstances 98
  • 100. Test Laboratory p Designed to look like a typical PoP n Operated like a typical PoP p Used to trial new services or new software under realistic conditions p Allows discovery and fixing of potential problems before they are introduced to the network 100
  • 101. Test Laboratory p Some ISPs dedicate equipment to the lab p Other ISPs “purchase ahead” so that today’s lab equipment becomes tomorrow’s PoP equipment p Other ISPs use lab equipment for “hot spares” in the event of hardware failure 101
  • 102. Test Laboratory p Can’t afford a test lab? n Set aside one spare router and server to trial new services n Never ever try out new hardware, software or services on the live network p Every major ISP in the US and Europe has a test lab n It’s a serious consideration 102
  • 104. Operational Considerations 104 Why design the world’s best network when you have not thought about what operational good practices should be implemented?
  • 105. Operational Considerations Maintenance p Never work on the live network, no matter how trivial the modification may seem n Establish maintenance periods which your customers are aware of p e.g. Tuesday 4-7am, Thursday 4-7am p Never do maintenance on the last working day before the weekend n Unless you want to work all weekend cleaning up p Never do maintenance on the first working day after the weekend n Unless you want to work all weekend preparing 105
  • 106. Operational Considerations Support p Differentiate between customer support and the Network Operations Centre n Customer support fixes customer problems n NOC deals with and fixes backbone and Internet related problems p Network Engineering team is last resort n They design the next generation network, improve the routing design, implement new services, etc n They do not and should not be doing support! 106
  • 107. Operational Considerations NOC Communications p NOC should know contact details for equivalent NOCs in upstream providers and peers p Or consider joining the INOC-DBA system n Voice over IP phone system using SIP n Runs over the Internet n www.pch.net/inoc-dba for more information 107
  • 109. ISP Design Summary p KEEP IT SIMPLE & STUPID ! (KISS) p Simple is elegant is scalable p Use Redundancy, Security, and Technology to make life easier for yourself p Above all, ensure quality of service for your customers 109
  • 110. ISP Network Design ISP Workshops 110