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Guide to Network Defense and
Countermeasures
Third Edition
Chapter 8
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 2
Goals of an IDPS
• Network intrusion
– Attempt to gain unauthorized access to network
resources
• Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS)
– Consists of more than one application or hardware
device
– Incorporates more than just detection
• Intrusion detection and prevention
– Involves prevention, detection, and response
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 3
Figure 8-1 The role of intrusion detection and prevention in network defense
© Cengage Learning 2014
Goals of an IDPS
• An IDPS should be able to:
– Assess large volumes of network traffic or system
activity to find signs of unauthorized access
– Record its findings in a log so that administrators
can examine past activity
– Detect and record unauthorized access without
compromise to produce evidence admissible in court
– Respond almost immediately
– Make itself and systems it protects as inaccessible
as possible to attackers
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition
4
© Cengage Learning 2014
Anomaly and Signature Detection
Systems
• Anomaly detection system: makes use of profiles
that describe services and resources each
authorized user normally accesses
– Network baselines are associated with profiles
– System can monitor profiles for suspicious activity
that does not fit the profiles
• IDPS can create baselines by monitoring network
traffic to observe what is considered normal
behavior
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 5
© Cengage Learning 2014
Anomaly and Signature Detection
Systems
• If profiles are incomplete or inaccurate:
– IDPS sends alarms that false positives (legitimate
traffic rather than actual attacks)
– False negatives (genuine attacks that an IDPS does
not detect) could occur
• True negatives: legitimate communications that do
not set off an alarm
• True positive: used to describe a genuine attack
that an IDPS detects successfully
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 6
© Cengage Learning 2014
Anomaly and Signature Detection
Systems
• Signature detection: triggers alarms based on
characteristic signatures of known external attacks
• Signature-based IDPS best for companies that
want a basic IDPS and mostly concerned with
known attacks
– Network engineers research well-known attacks and
record rules associated with each signature
– Signatures should be updated regularly
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 7
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 8
Table 8-1 Advantages and disadvantages of detection systems
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 9
Table 8-1 Advantages and disadvantages of detection systems (continued)
© Cengage Learning 2014
Stateful Protocol Analysis
• Stateful protocol analysis: information gathering
about a connection
– When an IDPS receives a packet, connection
information between the host and remote computer
is compared to entries in a state table
– State table: maintains a record of connections
between computers
• Includes: source and destination IP address and port,
and protocol
• Event horizon: entire length of the attack
– IDPS needs to maintain state information during this
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 10
© Cengage Learning 2014
Stateful Protocol Analysis
• Stateful protocol analysis approaches:
– Traffic rate monitoring – If IDPS detects sudden
increase in traffic it can stop and reset all TCP traffic
– Protocol state tracking – IDPS maintains a record of
connection’s state and allows packets to pass
through if it is an established connection
– Dynamic Application layer protocol analysis – Can
identify applications not using standard ports
– IP packet reassembly – Can reassemble fragmented
packets to prevent fragments from passing through
to the internal network
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 11
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 12
Examining IDPS Components
• Components
– Network sensors or host-based agents
– Detection and prevention capabilities
– Command console
– Database server that stores attack signatures or
behaviors
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 13
Sensors and Agents
• Sensor or agent
– Functions as electronic “eyes” of an IDPS
– Host-based IDPS – IDPS installed on a single host
computer has its agent built into the IDPS software
– Network-based IDPS – sensor is hardware or
software that monitors network traffic in real time
– Attacks detected by an IDPS sensor
• Single-session attacks – isolated attempt
• Multiple-session attacks – take place over a period of
time
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 14
Sensors and Agents
• Sensors should be placed at common-entry points
– Internet gateways
– Connections between one network and another
– Remote access server that receives dial-up
connections from remote users
– Virtual private network (VPN) devices
• Sensors could be positioned at either side of the
firewall
– Behind the firewall is a more secure location
• IDPS management server: central repository for
sensor and agent data
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 15
Figure 8-2 Positioning sensors at entry points to the network
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 16
Figure 8-3 Positioning sensors behind the firewall in the DMZ
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 17
Detection and Prevention Capabilities
• When selecting an IDPS, consider the following:
– Threshold – Values that set the limit between normal
and abnormal behavior
– Blacklists – lists of entities that have been associated
with malicious activity
– Whitelists – lists of entities known to be harmless
– Alert settings – specifying default priorities or severity
levels, determining which prevention capabilities
should be used for certain events, and specifying
what information should be logged
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 18
Detection and Prevention Capabilities
• Prevention Capabilities
– IDPS can be configured to take preventative
countermeasures
• Example: resetting all network connections when an
intrusion is detected
– Some IDPSs allow administrators to specify which
measure should be taken for each alert type
– Some have a simulation mode in which all prevention
capabilities are disabled but generate reports used to
fine-tune prevention capabilities
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 19
Command Console
• Provides a graphical front-end interface to an IDPS
– Enables administrators to receive and analyze alert
messages and manage log files
• IDPS can collect information from security devices
throughout a network
• Command console should run on a computer
dedicated solely to the IDPS
– To maximize the speed of response
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 20
Database of Attack Signatures or
Behaviors
• IDPSs do not have the capability to use judgment
– Can make use of a source of information for
comparing the traffic they monitor
• Signature-detection IDPS
– Reference a database of known attack signatures
– If traffic matches a signature, it sends an alert
• Keep database updated
• Anomaly-based IDPS
– Store information about users in a database
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 21
Figure 8-4 The SecurityFocus online database of known vulnerabilities
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 22
Options for IDPSs
• Network-based IDPS
• Host-based IDPS
• Hybrid IDPS
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 23
Network-Based IDPSs
• Network-based IDPS (NIDPS)
• Monitors network traffic by using well-positioned
sensors, management servers, a command console,
and a signature database
• Can be hardware devices equipped with NICs for
capturing and analyzing packets
• Can also be software-based sensors installed on a
dedicated computer
– Positioning an NIDPS on the Network
• Behind the firewall and before the LAN
• Between the firewall and the DMZ
• Any network segment
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 24
Network-Based IDPSs
• An NIDPS can use:
– Inline sensors – positioned so that network traffic
must pass through it
• Used to stop attacks from blocking network traffic
• Usually placed where firewalls are positioned
– Passive sensors – monitor copies of traffic; no actual
traffic passes through them
• Can monitor traffic by:
– Spanning port
– Network tap
– IDPS load balancer
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 25
Figure 8-6 Positioning an inline sensor
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 26
Figure 8-7 Positioning a passive sensor
© Cengage Learning 2014
Network-Based IDPSs
• NIDPS Capabilities
– Vary depending on product
– Some can:
• Collect information about hosts, OSs, applications,
and network activities and characteristics
– Used to help identify vulnerable hosts
• Analyze packet headers to identify unusual behavior
– Most have traffic logs to help identify and analyze
potential attacks, locate vulnerabilities, and assess
network use and performance
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 27
© Cengage Learning 2014
Network-Based IDPSs
• NIDPS prevention capabilities vary based on
sensor types:
– Passive only – Ends the current TCP session
– Inline only – Uses inline firewalling and bandwidth
throttling, and alters malicious content
– Passive and inline – Reconfigures other network
security devices
• Administrators can configure specific actions for
each type of alert
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 28
© Cengage Learning 2014
Network-Based IDPSs
• NIDPS Management
– Designing architecture includes:
• Determining where sensors are located
• How many are needed and how they should be
connected
– Testing NIDPS components includes:
• Accounting for network downtime while deploying
sensors
– Securing components involves:
• Making sure sensors do not have IP addresses
• Hardening management networks and configuring
hosts for log files and backups
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 29
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 30
Host-Based IDPSs
• Host-based IDPS (HIDPS)
– Deployed on hosts in the network perimeter
– Commonly use management servers, signature
databases, and console
– Evaluates traffic generated by the host
• Often used to protect a Web server or database server
– Gathers system variables such as
• System processes, CPU use, file accesses, system logs,
and system and application configuration changes
– Does not sniff packets as they enter the LAN
• Monitors log file entries and user activity
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 31
Figure 8-8 A typical HIDPS deployment
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 32
Host-Based IDPSs
• Configuring an HIDPS
– Centralized configuration
• HIDPS sends all data to a central location
• Host’s level of performance is unaffected by the IDPS
• Alert messages that are generated do not occur in real
time
– Distributed configuration
• Processing of events is distributed between host and
console
• Host generates and analyzes it in real time
• Performance reduction in host
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 33
Figure 8-9 A centralized HIDPS
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 34
Figure 8-10 Processing event data from an HIDPS
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 35
Host-Based IDPSs
• Choosing the Host
– Centralized configuration
• RAM, hard disk memory, and processor speed
requirements are minimal
– Distributed configuration
• Host should be equipped with maximum memory and
processor speed
© Cengage Learning 2014
Comparing an NIDPS and HIDPS
• HIDPS
– Can tell whether an attack attempt was successful
– Can detect attacks that would get past NIDPS
– Provides only data pertaining to the host, not
network as a whole
– Compares records stored in audit logs
• NIDPS
– Provides alerts on suspicious network activity
• Does not tell whether attack occurred
– Detects attacks on network
• Such as port scanning on a range of computers
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 36
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 37
Hybrid IDPSs
• Hybrid IDPS
– Combines the features of HIDPSs and NIDPSs
• Gains flexibility and increases security
• Combining IDPS Sensor Locations
– Put sensors on network segments and network
hosts
– Can report attacks aimed at particular segments or
the entire network
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 38
Hybrid IDPSs
• Combining IDPS Detection Methods
– IDPS combines anomaly and signature detection
– Database of known attack signatures enables IDPS
to run immediately
– Anomaly-based systems keep the alert system
flexible
– A hybrid IDPS that combines anomaly and signature
detection can respond to both external and internal
attacks
– Administrators have more configuration and
coordination work to do
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 39
Hybrid IDPSs
• Advantages
– Combine aspects of NIDPS and HIDPS
configurations
– Can monitor network as a whole
– Can monitor attacks that reach individual hosts
• Disadvantages
– Getting disparate systems to work in coordinate
fashion
– Data gathered by multiple systems can be difficult to
analyze
© Cengage Learning 2014
Securing IDPS Components
• IDPS must be able to handle the volume of traffic or
activity it encounters
• IDPSs should be tested regularly
• Sensors should not be addressable
• Communication between IDPS components should be
encrypted
• Authentication should be required for use and
administration of the IDPS
• IDPSs should be able to work during DoS attacks
• Remote logging should be used in an HIDPS
• OSs of HIDPSs should be patched and hardened
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 40
© Cengage Learning 2014
Developing IDPS Filter Rules
• To create IDPS filter rules you must know basics of
Snort rule syntax
– Snort rule has two sections: header and options
• Example:
– Alert tcp any any -> 192.16.21.0/24 111 (content: “00
01 86 a5” ; msg: “mounted access”;)
– Header is the opening portion
– Options are in parentheses
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 41
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 42
Examining Intrusion Detection Step by
Step
• Steps
– Installing the IDPS database
– Gathering data
– Sending alert messages
– The IDPS responds
– The administrator assesses damage
– Following escalation procedures
– Logging and reviewing events
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 43
Figure 8-11 Steps in intrusion detection
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 44
Step 1: Installing the IDPS Database
• IDPS uses the database to compare traffic detected
by sensors
• Anomaly-based systems
– Requires compiling a network baseline by observing
network traffic (over a week)
• Signature-based IDPS
– Can use database immediately
– You can add your own custom rule base
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 45
Step 2: Gathering Data
• Network sensors gather data by reading packets
• Sensors need to be positioned where they can
capture all packets
– Sensors on individual hosts capture information that
enters and leaves the host
– Sensors on network segments read packets as they
pass throughout the segment
• Sensors on network segments cannot capture all
packets
– If traffic levels become too heavy
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 46
Step 3: Sending Alert Messages
• IDPS detection software compares captured packets
with information in its database
• IDPS sends alert messages
– If captured packets match an attack signature or
– Deviates from normal network behavior
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 47
Step 4: The IDPS Responds
• Command console receives alert messages
– Notifies the administrator
• IDPS response actions:
– Alarm - Send an alarm message
– Drop – Packet is dropped
– Reset – IDPS stops and restarts network traffic
– Code analysis – Prevents malicious code from running
– File system monitoring – Prevent files from being
modified
– Network traffic filtering – act as firewall
– Network traffic analysis – stop incoming traffic
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 48
Step 5: The Administrator Assesses
Damage
• Administrator monitors alerts
– Determines whether countermeasures are needed
• Administrator need to fine-tune the database
– The goal is avoiding false negatives
• Line between acceptable and unacceptable network
use is not always clear
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 49
Figure 8-12 Differentiating acceptable and unacceptable network use
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 50
Step 6: Following Escalation
Procedures
• Escalation procedures
– Set of actions to be followed if the IDPS detects a true
positive
• Should be spelled out in company’s security policy
• Incident levels
– Level One
• Might be managed quickly
– Level Two
• Represents a more serious threat
– Level Three
• Represents the highest degree of threat
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 51
Step 7: Logging and Reviewing the
Event
• IDPS events are stored in log files
– May also be sent to a database file
• Administrator should review logs
– To determine patterns of misuse
– Administrator can spot a gradual attack
• IDPS should also provide accountability
– Ability to track an attempted attack or intrusion back
to the responsible party
– Some systems have built-in tracing features
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 52
Evaluating IDPS Products
• Evaluate the various options and match them to your
needs
• Consider the following basic factors:
– Determine whether an IDPS is necessary
– Conduct a risk assessment
– Define general requirements and goals an IDPS should
meet
– Determine whether to use proprietary or open-source
products
– Consider the frequency and accuracy of signature
updates
– Assess availability of support
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 53
Evaluating IDPS Products
• Consider the following basic factors (cont’d):
– Evaluate technical specifications
– Determine external security requirements
– Evaluate need for security capabilities and logging
– Review detection and prevention capabilities
– Identify performance and management requirements
– Define the interoperability and scalability
– Determine a reasonable cost estimate that includes
acquisition, testing, installation, and maintenance
– Identify resource limitations
– Identify any training, documentation, and support needed
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 54
Summary
• Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs)
add another line of defense behind firewalls and
antivirus software
• IDPS components include sensors, management
servers, command consoles, and databases of
signatures
• A network-based IDPS (NIDPS) uses sensors
positioned at key points on the network
• A host-based IDPS (HIDPS) deploys agents on
selected hosts in the network
© Cengage Learning 2014
Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 55
Summary
• A hybrid IDPS combines aspects of NIDPS and
HIDPS configurations
• Selecting an IDPS requires evaluating the
organization’s needs and security goals and the
product’s features
• Steps of intrusion detection include: installing the
IDPS and signature database, gathering data,
sending an alert, responding to the alert, assessing
damage, following escalation procedures, and
logging and reviewing events

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Intrusion detection and prevention systems.pdf

  • 1. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures Third Edition Chapter 8 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
  • 2. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 2 Goals of an IDPS • Network intrusion – Attempt to gain unauthorized access to network resources • Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) – Consists of more than one application or hardware device – Incorporates more than just detection • Intrusion detection and prevention – Involves prevention, detection, and response
  • 3. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 3 Figure 8-1 The role of intrusion detection and prevention in network defense
  • 4. © Cengage Learning 2014 Goals of an IDPS • An IDPS should be able to: – Assess large volumes of network traffic or system activity to find signs of unauthorized access – Record its findings in a log so that administrators can examine past activity – Detect and record unauthorized access without compromise to produce evidence admissible in court – Respond almost immediately – Make itself and systems it protects as inaccessible as possible to attackers Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 4
  • 5. © Cengage Learning 2014 Anomaly and Signature Detection Systems • Anomaly detection system: makes use of profiles that describe services and resources each authorized user normally accesses – Network baselines are associated with profiles – System can monitor profiles for suspicious activity that does not fit the profiles • IDPS can create baselines by monitoring network traffic to observe what is considered normal behavior Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 5
  • 6. © Cengage Learning 2014 Anomaly and Signature Detection Systems • If profiles are incomplete or inaccurate: – IDPS sends alarms that false positives (legitimate traffic rather than actual attacks) – False negatives (genuine attacks that an IDPS does not detect) could occur • True negatives: legitimate communications that do not set off an alarm • True positive: used to describe a genuine attack that an IDPS detects successfully Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 6
  • 7. © Cengage Learning 2014 Anomaly and Signature Detection Systems • Signature detection: triggers alarms based on characteristic signatures of known external attacks • Signature-based IDPS best for companies that want a basic IDPS and mostly concerned with known attacks – Network engineers research well-known attacks and record rules associated with each signature – Signatures should be updated regularly Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 7
  • 8. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 8 Table 8-1 Advantages and disadvantages of detection systems
  • 9. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 9 Table 8-1 Advantages and disadvantages of detection systems (continued)
  • 10. © Cengage Learning 2014 Stateful Protocol Analysis • Stateful protocol analysis: information gathering about a connection – When an IDPS receives a packet, connection information between the host and remote computer is compared to entries in a state table – State table: maintains a record of connections between computers • Includes: source and destination IP address and port, and protocol • Event horizon: entire length of the attack – IDPS needs to maintain state information during this Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 10
  • 11. © Cengage Learning 2014 Stateful Protocol Analysis • Stateful protocol analysis approaches: – Traffic rate monitoring – If IDPS detects sudden increase in traffic it can stop and reset all TCP traffic – Protocol state tracking – IDPS maintains a record of connection’s state and allows packets to pass through if it is an established connection – Dynamic Application layer protocol analysis – Can identify applications not using standard ports – IP packet reassembly – Can reassemble fragmented packets to prevent fragments from passing through to the internal network Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 11
  • 12. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 12 Examining IDPS Components • Components – Network sensors or host-based agents – Detection and prevention capabilities – Command console – Database server that stores attack signatures or behaviors
  • 13. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 13 Sensors and Agents • Sensor or agent – Functions as electronic “eyes” of an IDPS – Host-based IDPS – IDPS installed on a single host computer has its agent built into the IDPS software – Network-based IDPS – sensor is hardware or software that monitors network traffic in real time – Attacks detected by an IDPS sensor • Single-session attacks – isolated attempt • Multiple-session attacks – take place over a period of time
  • 14. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 14 Sensors and Agents • Sensors should be placed at common-entry points – Internet gateways – Connections between one network and another – Remote access server that receives dial-up connections from remote users – Virtual private network (VPN) devices • Sensors could be positioned at either side of the firewall – Behind the firewall is a more secure location • IDPS management server: central repository for sensor and agent data
  • 15. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 15 Figure 8-2 Positioning sensors at entry points to the network
  • 16. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 16 Figure 8-3 Positioning sensors behind the firewall in the DMZ
  • 17. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 17 Detection and Prevention Capabilities • When selecting an IDPS, consider the following: – Threshold – Values that set the limit between normal and abnormal behavior – Blacklists – lists of entities that have been associated with malicious activity – Whitelists – lists of entities known to be harmless – Alert settings – specifying default priorities or severity levels, determining which prevention capabilities should be used for certain events, and specifying what information should be logged
  • 18. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 18 Detection and Prevention Capabilities • Prevention Capabilities – IDPS can be configured to take preventative countermeasures • Example: resetting all network connections when an intrusion is detected – Some IDPSs allow administrators to specify which measure should be taken for each alert type – Some have a simulation mode in which all prevention capabilities are disabled but generate reports used to fine-tune prevention capabilities
  • 19. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 19 Command Console • Provides a graphical front-end interface to an IDPS – Enables administrators to receive and analyze alert messages and manage log files • IDPS can collect information from security devices throughout a network • Command console should run on a computer dedicated solely to the IDPS – To maximize the speed of response
  • 20. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 20 Database of Attack Signatures or Behaviors • IDPSs do not have the capability to use judgment – Can make use of a source of information for comparing the traffic they monitor • Signature-detection IDPS – Reference a database of known attack signatures – If traffic matches a signature, it sends an alert • Keep database updated • Anomaly-based IDPS – Store information about users in a database
  • 21. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 21 Figure 8-4 The SecurityFocus online database of known vulnerabilities
  • 22. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 22 Options for IDPSs • Network-based IDPS • Host-based IDPS • Hybrid IDPS
  • 23. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 23 Network-Based IDPSs • Network-based IDPS (NIDPS) • Monitors network traffic by using well-positioned sensors, management servers, a command console, and a signature database • Can be hardware devices equipped with NICs for capturing and analyzing packets • Can also be software-based sensors installed on a dedicated computer – Positioning an NIDPS on the Network • Behind the firewall and before the LAN • Between the firewall and the DMZ • Any network segment
  • 24. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 24 Network-Based IDPSs • An NIDPS can use: – Inline sensors – positioned so that network traffic must pass through it • Used to stop attacks from blocking network traffic • Usually placed where firewalls are positioned – Passive sensors – monitor copies of traffic; no actual traffic passes through them • Can monitor traffic by: – Spanning port – Network tap – IDPS load balancer
  • 25. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 25 Figure 8-6 Positioning an inline sensor
  • 26. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 26 Figure 8-7 Positioning a passive sensor
  • 27. © Cengage Learning 2014 Network-Based IDPSs • NIDPS Capabilities – Vary depending on product – Some can: • Collect information about hosts, OSs, applications, and network activities and characteristics – Used to help identify vulnerable hosts • Analyze packet headers to identify unusual behavior – Most have traffic logs to help identify and analyze potential attacks, locate vulnerabilities, and assess network use and performance Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 27
  • 28. © Cengage Learning 2014 Network-Based IDPSs • NIDPS prevention capabilities vary based on sensor types: – Passive only – Ends the current TCP session – Inline only – Uses inline firewalling and bandwidth throttling, and alters malicious content – Passive and inline – Reconfigures other network security devices • Administrators can configure specific actions for each type of alert Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 28
  • 29. © Cengage Learning 2014 Network-Based IDPSs • NIDPS Management – Designing architecture includes: • Determining where sensors are located • How many are needed and how they should be connected – Testing NIDPS components includes: • Accounting for network downtime while deploying sensors – Securing components involves: • Making sure sensors do not have IP addresses • Hardening management networks and configuring hosts for log files and backups Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 29
  • 30. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 30 Host-Based IDPSs • Host-based IDPS (HIDPS) – Deployed on hosts in the network perimeter – Commonly use management servers, signature databases, and console – Evaluates traffic generated by the host • Often used to protect a Web server or database server – Gathers system variables such as • System processes, CPU use, file accesses, system logs, and system and application configuration changes – Does not sniff packets as they enter the LAN • Monitors log file entries and user activity
  • 31. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 31 Figure 8-8 A typical HIDPS deployment
  • 32. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 32 Host-Based IDPSs • Configuring an HIDPS – Centralized configuration • HIDPS sends all data to a central location • Host’s level of performance is unaffected by the IDPS • Alert messages that are generated do not occur in real time – Distributed configuration • Processing of events is distributed between host and console • Host generates and analyzes it in real time • Performance reduction in host
  • 33. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 33 Figure 8-9 A centralized HIDPS
  • 34. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 34 Figure 8-10 Processing event data from an HIDPS
  • 35. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 35 Host-Based IDPSs • Choosing the Host – Centralized configuration • RAM, hard disk memory, and processor speed requirements are minimal – Distributed configuration • Host should be equipped with maximum memory and processor speed
  • 36. © Cengage Learning 2014 Comparing an NIDPS and HIDPS • HIDPS – Can tell whether an attack attempt was successful – Can detect attacks that would get past NIDPS – Provides only data pertaining to the host, not network as a whole – Compares records stored in audit logs • NIDPS – Provides alerts on suspicious network activity • Does not tell whether attack occurred – Detects attacks on network • Such as port scanning on a range of computers Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 36
  • 37. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 37 Hybrid IDPSs • Hybrid IDPS – Combines the features of HIDPSs and NIDPSs • Gains flexibility and increases security • Combining IDPS Sensor Locations – Put sensors on network segments and network hosts – Can report attacks aimed at particular segments or the entire network
  • 38. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 38 Hybrid IDPSs • Combining IDPS Detection Methods – IDPS combines anomaly and signature detection – Database of known attack signatures enables IDPS to run immediately – Anomaly-based systems keep the alert system flexible – A hybrid IDPS that combines anomaly and signature detection can respond to both external and internal attacks – Administrators have more configuration and coordination work to do
  • 39. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 39 Hybrid IDPSs • Advantages – Combine aspects of NIDPS and HIDPS configurations – Can monitor network as a whole – Can monitor attacks that reach individual hosts • Disadvantages – Getting disparate systems to work in coordinate fashion – Data gathered by multiple systems can be difficult to analyze
  • 40. © Cengage Learning 2014 Securing IDPS Components • IDPS must be able to handle the volume of traffic or activity it encounters • IDPSs should be tested regularly • Sensors should not be addressable • Communication between IDPS components should be encrypted • Authentication should be required for use and administration of the IDPS • IDPSs should be able to work during DoS attacks • Remote logging should be used in an HIDPS • OSs of HIDPSs should be patched and hardened Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 40
  • 41. © Cengage Learning 2014 Developing IDPS Filter Rules • To create IDPS filter rules you must know basics of Snort rule syntax – Snort rule has two sections: header and options • Example: – Alert tcp any any -> 192.16.21.0/24 111 (content: “00 01 86 a5” ; msg: “mounted access”;) – Header is the opening portion – Options are in parentheses Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 41
  • 42. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 42 Examining Intrusion Detection Step by Step • Steps – Installing the IDPS database – Gathering data – Sending alert messages – The IDPS responds – The administrator assesses damage – Following escalation procedures – Logging and reviewing events
  • 43. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 43 Figure 8-11 Steps in intrusion detection
  • 44. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 44 Step 1: Installing the IDPS Database • IDPS uses the database to compare traffic detected by sensors • Anomaly-based systems – Requires compiling a network baseline by observing network traffic (over a week) • Signature-based IDPS – Can use database immediately – You can add your own custom rule base
  • 45. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 45 Step 2: Gathering Data • Network sensors gather data by reading packets • Sensors need to be positioned where they can capture all packets – Sensors on individual hosts capture information that enters and leaves the host – Sensors on network segments read packets as they pass throughout the segment • Sensors on network segments cannot capture all packets – If traffic levels become too heavy
  • 46. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 46 Step 3: Sending Alert Messages • IDPS detection software compares captured packets with information in its database • IDPS sends alert messages – If captured packets match an attack signature or – Deviates from normal network behavior
  • 47. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 47 Step 4: The IDPS Responds • Command console receives alert messages – Notifies the administrator • IDPS response actions: – Alarm - Send an alarm message – Drop – Packet is dropped – Reset – IDPS stops and restarts network traffic – Code analysis – Prevents malicious code from running – File system monitoring – Prevent files from being modified – Network traffic filtering – act as firewall – Network traffic analysis – stop incoming traffic
  • 48. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 48 Step 5: The Administrator Assesses Damage • Administrator monitors alerts – Determines whether countermeasures are needed • Administrator need to fine-tune the database – The goal is avoiding false negatives • Line between acceptable and unacceptable network use is not always clear
  • 49. Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 49 Figure 8-12 Differentiating acceptable and unacceptable network use
  • 50. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 50 Step 6: Following Escalation Procedures • Escalation procedures – Set of actions to be followed if the IDPS detects a true positive • Should be spelled out in company’s security policy • Incident levels – Level One • Might be managed quickly – Level Two • Represents a more serious threat – Level Three • Represents the highest degree of threat
  • 51. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 51 Step 7: Logging and Reviewing the Event • IDPS events are stored in log files – May also be sent to a database file • Administrator should review logs – To determine patterns of misuse – Administrator can spot a gradual attack • IDPS should also provide accountability – Ability to track an attempted attack or intrusion back to the responsible party – Some systems have built-in tracing features
  • 52. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 52 Evaluating IDPS Products • Evaluate the various options and match them to your needs • Consider the following basic factors: – Determine whether an IDPS is necessary – Conduct a risk assessment – Define general requirements and goals an IDPS should meet – Determine whether to use proprietary or open-source products – Consider the frequency and accuracy of signature updates – Assess availability of support
  • 53. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 53 Evaluating IDPS Products • Consider the following basic factors (cont’d): – Evaluate technical specifications – Determine external security requirements – Evaluate need for security capabilities and logging – Review detection and prevention capabilities – Identify performance and management requirements – Define the interoperability and scalability – Determine a reasonable cost estimate that includes acquisition, testing, installation, and maintenance – Identify resource limitations – Identify any training, documentation, and support needed
  • 54. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 54 Summary • Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) add another line of defense behind firewalls and antivirus software • IDPS components include sensors, management servers, command consoles, and databases of signatures • A network-based IDPS (NIDPS) uses sensors positioned at key points on the network • A host-based IDPS (HIDPS) deploys agents on selected hosts in the network
  • 55. © Cengage Learning 2014 Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures, 3rd Edition 55 Summary • A hybrid IDPS combines aspects of NIDPS and HIDPS configurations • Selecting an IDPS requires evaluating the organization’s needs and security goals and the product’s features • Steps of intrusion detection include: installing the IDPS and signature database, gathering data, sending an alert, responding to the alert, assessing damage, following escalation procedures, and logging and reviewing events