The document discusses the potential threat of the Islamic State (IS) to India, highlighting the group's significant territorial control, financial resources, and recruitment efforts through social media. Despite the organization's appeal, India’s Muslim population largely remains moderate and resistant to radical ideology, although there are concerns about the influence of returning diaspora members. The document calls for heightened awareness and proactive measures to counter the spread of IS ideology within India, particularly among vulnerable youth.

1. IS INDIA SAFE FROM THE SCOURGE OF THE ‘ISLAMIC
STATE’
Is the turbulence in West Asia, in the form of the rise of the extreme radical group the
Islamic State likely to have a ripple effect on India? Whether the physical distance of
West Asia from India provides India enough safety or does ideology have no barriers in
today’s increasingly flat world? Is ideology by itself a serious enough threat to India’s
already complex internal security?
Where IS stands today in terms of effectiveness as a threat.
 IS has much territory under its control,
 A large financial corpus and funds flowing from oil and other business in
which it is indulging, including extortion and ransom.
 Has reasonable quantum of military wherewithal, although not fully tested
as yet against a well-organized conventional force.
 Ground based military operations against it are only partially succeeding
with repeated attacks and counter attacks.
 In terms of irregular warfare capability it has sufficient foot soldiers,
ranging from estimates of 10,000 to 30,000.
 It has successfully established some modicum of administrative control over
its territory with the assistance of the former Iraqi Generals and
administrators.
 Its ideology appears to be drawing recruits from the Islamic world
although in lesser numbers now, with better emigration controls.
 Western recruits, however, continue to attempt flocking to it through
clandestine methods, attracted by skewed romanticism.
 Its ideology is evidently radical to the extreme and its sense of justice is
virtually depraved enough to be labeled inhuman and unfit for the modern
world.
 The Caliphate has not been taken too seriously except drawing the support
of an odd cleric; by and large clerics have not endorsed the IS but neither
have they completely shunned it, keeping alive options in a way.
Why in spite of all its negatives it is attracting the young, Muslims and others.
 It is using social media effectively and the youth read no news, no long drawn
analyses or results of battles.
 It is attracted on the basis of illustrative evidence of violence and cryptic
messages which convey little.
 Cases of disenchantment are many; once they witness the life in IS camps and
cities.
o So it is more of a come and go recruitment with execution of some who
try and escape.
o This disenchantment is not going to lessen.
 However, the established nations from where the flow of human resources is
taking place have perhaps not sufficiently exercised themselves in countering the
perception through the very media which the youth reads and digests – social
media.

2. Action of neutralizing IS
 Militarily, while the current air campaign is helping in keeping the IS bottled up
in its existing territory it is unlikely to make such a dent unless much more
focused aerial action is taken against its assets from where finances are flowing
into its coffers.
 Similarly control and monitoring of the sources which buy energy from the IS
has not been established, for unknown reasons.
 Ideologically and in terms of influence and symbolism about its reach the IS has
been conservative. Although it is now a bigger entity than the Al Qaida, it has
chosen
o to restrict itself physically to its territory,
o consolidate and avoid targeting objectives far and wide.
 It has been brought about because of the greater visibility it chose to exercise
unlike the Al Qaida which remained invisible and less propagandist.
o The greater visibility has won it synchronic support from Al Qaida’s
surrogates;
 The Boko Haram in Nigeria,
 Al Shabab in Somalia,
 Taliban and TTP in Af-Pak,
 Unorganized elements in the West.
 In all probability, the IS will attempt to keep its territory militarily secured.
 It will concentrate on spreading its ideology through surrogates, networks and
social media.
 Its target populations will be youth, disaffected minorities and clergy and it will
attempt to attract attention through the romanticization of extreme violence.
 The Gulf diasporas remain vulnerable more because of the proximity and easy
availability of less educated and easily influenced segments from the
subcontinent.
Vulnerability of India to the spread of IS influence and how could such influence
manifest into anti national activity.
 On the face of it a few things need to be remembered.
o Firstly, India’s Muslims are a minority although the largest minority
anywhere in the world.
 Minorities have two tendencies;
 one, to shun anything which will disturb their status quo
and make them vulnerable and
 two, look towards any element of security.
o Secondly, it is not easily understood that IS ideology is radical to the
extreme.
 India’s Muslims are divided into 13-14 percent Shia with almost
the complete majority of the rest being moderate Sunni.
 This type of ideology does not appeal to even those who may be
counted as radical among the majority Sunni community.
 It does not rule out the possibility of a few lone wolves getting
influenced just as it has happened in the recent past.

3. o Thirdly, Indian Muslims are vulnerable to rabble rousing as much as any
segment. A clarion call by a maverick cleric can rouse passions.
Therefore passionate calls can arouse sentiments but unlikely that these
can convert into anything remotely anti-national.
o Fourthly, the danger lies in as much as it lies anywhere else, in the
possibility of influence by some returning members of the diaspora from
the Gulf.
 In such cases there is no internal compulsion just the desire to
connect with the larger Islamic community which mistakenly may
be considered sympathetic to the cause of the IS.
o Fifthly, India’s secular credentials work overtime against such influence.
Poverty in India is shared by people of all faiths and is unlikely to be a
cause for adoption of radical ideology. If anything, it is poor education,
lack of worldly wisdom, and poor parenting which could influence some
youth and that too through the medium of unrestricted social media.
o The IS employs images of violence, weaponry, other warlike equipment
and symbols such as flags and slogans to motivate the less educated and
psychologically vulnerable youth who access this in private and discuss in
closed groups.
The existing known Islamic terrorist organizations within India have not given any call
for support thus far. The feasibility of adversaries exploiting through proxies may exist
but to a lesser extent given the fact that there is considerable concern for such activities
even within Pakistan. There would be a realization that ideological spread of this kind
does not respect boundaries. Nevertheless, it does call for a higher level of awareness,
intelligence at the lower levels, especially in smaller towns, parental control and
monitoring. The intelligence agencies need to do is to ensure that they send messages
which wins the confidence of parents and encourages them to report possible cases of
emerging influence over their wards. If parents sense that police cases are going to
involve the traditional disappearance of young men there will be a complete loss of
confidence.
The few isolated cases of raising of IS flags by small groups of youth in parts of the
Kashmir Valley should not lead us to believe that there is mass support for such an
ideology.
The romance of doing something different and something silly always appeals to youth.
However, it does call for sending messages across all forms of media and through
Friday sermons, counseling of parents and identification of vulnerable youth. On its
part the Central Government needs to establish a vigil at points of exit from the
country, adopt a pro-active counter propaganda campaign and involve the Muslim
clergy itself in sending messages across to the youth. Returnees from the Gulf region
may require a special vigil within acceptable democratic norms and behavior. The
experience of Indian Muslims refusing to join the Al Qaeda is itself reassuring but must
not lull anyone to think that Indian Muslim youth are not vulnerable.