Term Paper

Establishing Objectivity in Analytical Approaches to the Islamic State 1
Establishing Objectivity in Analytical
Approaches to the Islamic State
Colin Blair
Intelligence for Homeland Security
Term Paper
College of Professional Studies
Northeastern University

Introduction:
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent Global War on Terror
(GWOT), enormous amounts of research have been dedicated to what The 9/11 Commission
Report termed, “The catastrophic threat at this moment in history…is the threat posed by
Islamist terrorism – especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.” (Philip
Zelikow, 2004) In the 11 years since the publishing of that report, only one Islamist terror
organization has achieved comparable renown with al Qaeda – the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL). Headed by former al Qaeda in Iraq member Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic
State declared the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in June, 2014, overtaking territory
between Syria and Iraq that is equivalent to an, “…area larger than the United Kingdom” (Wood,
2015), while achieving global notoriety for successful recruitment efforts, publicized barbarism
and its’ puritanical approach to governance (Kirkpatrick, 2014).
Faced with the threat of an established Islamic terrorist state within the Middle East, the
U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) must quickly and accurately gauge the significance of ISIL’s
rise as it relates to potential threats to the United States and allied nations – all while factoring in
complex religious, political, tribal, and geographical issues that will provide the contextual
foundation for clear analysis of the Islamic State’s capabilities and its threat to the U.S.. This
paper will guide analysts researching the complexities of the Islamic State by providing a brief,
contemporary evaluation of ISIL’s establishment in the region. This term paper will then aid in
ensuring analytical accuracy and objectivity regarding the Islamic State by identifying potential
cognitive and organizational biases that may undermine the impartiality of U.S. IC analysis.
Finally, analysts will be provided with a structured analytical tool (SAT) that will aid in the
absorption and evaluation of large amounts of data driving analysis of ISIL capabilities and

intentions (A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence
Analysis, 2009). This will result in a “critical thinking guide” that will focus analytical efforts
and confirm the enhanced accuracy of intelligence products presented to policymakers looking to
determine the appropriate response to the ISIL’s growth within the Middle East.
The Islamic State and Likely Customers of Related Intelligence Products:
Beginning as al Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 before renaming itself in 2006, the Islamic State’s
rise to prominence can be traced to June 29th, 2014 when al-Baghdadi declared himself a caliph
of (ISIL), which had recently consolidated territorial gains ranging from Aleppo, Syria to Diyala,
Iraq (Olsen, 2014). With estimates ranging from 30,000 to 100,000 fighters (Aregawi, 2015),
established, religious-oriented governing structures for conquered areas, and access to large
portions of both Syria and Iraq’s oil assets (Nick Thompson, 2015), the Islamic State’s calls for a
return to a caliphate reminiscent of the Ottoman Empire – and the extreme violence and brutality
used to achieve their objectives – have all coalesced into a potentially disastrous scenario for the
United States.
Graeme Wood’s controversial article in The Atlantic, titled “What ISIS Really Wants”
highlighted the importance of the, “…Islamic State’s medieval religious nature”, attempting to
connect the Islamic State with Wahhabism and strict Islamic ideology while drawing attention to
the global appeal of ISIL, noting that ISIL’s recruitment efforts have brought over 10,000 foreign
fighters into the organization. (Wood, 2015) Events over the past year have partially validated
this global appeal: numerous Northern African terrorist group’s defection to ISIL, Boko Haram’s
public linkages to the Islamic State, and connections to terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Libya and
France (Faith Karimi, 2015) have merged to prompt concern over the dangers posed to the
United States and its’ interests by the Islamic State (Cantilero, 2015). America’s establishment of

a multi-national coalition combating the Islamic State under Operation Inherent Resolve
(Pellerin, 2015) has even prompted ISIL to compare this conflict to “Islamic apocalyptic
prophecies” that view current combat as an, “….end-of-times showdown between Muslims and
their enemies”. (What is 'Islamic State'?, 2015)
Other scholars downplay the influence of the Islamic State outside of their immediate
sphere of influence, and debate the extent to which religion – as opposed to authoritarianism or
political ideals (Massie, 2014) – drives Islamic State motivations. A recent article in The
Economist pinpointed some of the limitations of ISIL’s spread, noting the ‘satellite’ group’s
“…limited operational contact with IS’s leaders in Syria and Iraq”, insufficient liquidity to fund
affiliated terrorist groups, and failed attempts to distract attention away from numerous tactical
losses in Syria and Iraq as evidence of ISIL’s limited influence outside of its’ immediate
territory. (Spreading its Tentacles; the Islamic State, 2015) Continued debate over the
motivations, influence, and relative strategic and tactical power of the Islamic State illustrate the
high potential for bias in analytical products assessing the spread of ISIL by demonstrating how
various ideological beliefs may influence objective analysis of the issue.
This debate assists in articulating just who the beneficiaries of intelligence products really
are, generating clear lines of concern that can be “tied” to specific intelligence customers. In
assessing the spread of ISIL, the following organizations can be considered customers:
1. Department of Defense: Understanding the strategic and tactical capabilities of the
Islamic State are crucial to designing and implementing a military response – i.e.,
Operation Inherent Resolve.
2. Department of State: By evaluating the political organization and methodologies of ISIL,
DOS may be able to craft appropriate diplomatic and political actions to best serve U.S.
interests in the region. DOS will also likely take the lead in determining what information
will be passed along to allied nations to promote coalition objectives.
3. Department of Homeland Security: Understanding the prominence of foreign fighters
within ISIL, and their potential for return to U.S. borders, is of primary concern to DHS.

4. Department of Justice: Similar to DHS, DOJ concerns would mostly be national –
identifying potential terrorist recruits, liaising with other agencies to monitor terror watch
lists, and developing ways to prosecute known terrorist within U.S. jurisdiction.
5. Department of Treasury: The DOT’s focus will be narrower, identifying ISIL’s revenue
streams and looking for ways to disrupt and/or destroy those streams in order to cripple
ISIL power.
6. U.S. Intelligence Community (IC): Sharing the assessment of ISIL’s spread across the
U.S. IC could be incredibly advantageous, in that it could focus all-source intelligence
into highlighted areas of concentration to focus analytical intelligence products, thereby
improving the accuracy of options given to policymakers.
7. White House Cabinet/Various Senate & House of Representative Committees: An
assessment of the spread of ISIL would be beneficial to these groups in that they help
both inform the President and the U.S. Congress, providing benefit and reference for
possible legislative or executive actions directed at ISIL.
While this is by no means a comprehensive list of intended recipients of the analytical product,
these organizations form the overwhelming majority of concerned parties that will help with
identifying and formulating the appropriate response to ISIL’s rise in the Middle East.
Identification of Organizational & Cultural Biases:
Understanding the ambiguous nature of ISIL’s rise, the continuing debate over the
organization’s true intentions, and the intelligence product customers have all aided in the
establishment of objectivity and structure to the analytical assessment of ISIL’s spread. To
ensure objectivity and a sound analytical approach, organizational and cultural biases must be
conclusively identified to ensure that techniques employed later in the analysis are as free from
unquestioned assumptions and institutional bias as possible.
One easily identifiable organizational bias relates to the U.S. IC’s historical knowledge of
Iraq – it would be all too easy to repeat many of the same analytical mistakes made in 1991 and
2003 in the present with the Islamic State. The under or over-estimation of Iraqi Army fighting
capabilities and morale, for example, could unduly influence an assessment of ISIL’s spread and
their potential for expansion. As Misreading Intentions and Critical Thinking in Intelligence
Analysis note, the U.S. IC that has consistently rested on assumptions regarding Iraq while

failing to take into account complex political motivations and biased intelligence sources and
neglecting to question these key assumptions – leading to erroneous policy results (Misreading
Intentions: Iraq's Reaction to Inspections Created Picture of Deception, 2006). Analysts must
take care to assess the Islamic State’s unique political and religious motivations free from the
organizational history of two invasions of Iraq and ensuing nation-building efforts, in order to
best understand the nature and scope of ISIL’s spread across Iraq and Syria.
In a similar manner, analysts must avoid conflating the Islamic State with al Qaeda;
although “…spawned by al Qaeda’s Iraq franchise” (Laub, 2015), ISIL should be viewed as an
entity distinct from the Intelligence Community’s extensive background on Bin Laden and al
Qaeda’s activities in the late 20th to early 21st centuries (Philip Zelikow, 2004). Failure to striate
the two organizations could lead to ignoring significant political, religious, organizational, and
tactical differences that may have a profound effect on ISIL’s actions to-date, and their plans to
expand influence across the Middle East.
Analysts beginning their examination of ISIL must also be acutely aware of their natural
tendency to assume that foreigners “…think and perceive the world in the same way they do.”
Dr. Johnston’s Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community explains this phenomenon
further, noting that, “This type of projective identification, or ethnocentrism…operates on a
conscious level, but is difficult to recognize in oneself and equally difficult to counteract.”
(Johnston, 2005) The potential for misunderstanding due to significant differences in political,
religious, economic or historical backgrounds – compounding the already considerable problem
of ethnocentrism – has been displayed in the controversy over Graeme Wood’s article, What ISIS
Really Wants: Wood’s assertion that ISIS’s fanaticism is rooted in Islam caused considerable
backlash amongst the Muslim community, who alluded to ideology – not evidence - as the

reason for Wood’s “…inaccurate trope all too common in many Western circles…” (Jenkins,
2015) No matter the reality of this debate, the example underscores the ease by which cultural
differences can have the potential to garble analysis of the issue at hand.
Cognitive Biases and the Islamic State:
While analysts may often be tangentially aware of cultural and organizational biases, the
potential for cognitive bias distorting analysis of the Islamic State is significant. Due to
numerous, complex, and often inter-related factors and the difficulty by which cognitive biases
are overcome, the assessment of ISIL’s rise has potential to be hindered especially by the
vividness criterion, attempts at causal explanations, and anchoring effects that are all the result
of, “…subconscious mental procedures for processing information.” (Heuer, 1999) These biases
must be explored further to better ensure impartiality in analytical assessments of ISIL.
The Islamic State’s graphic and publicized displays of a Jordanian pilot burned alive, the
mass execution of Coptic Christians on an Egyptian beach, and numerous other ISIL-promoted
videos, cited as a way of “…leveraging its power to asymmetrically shock its enemies,” (Jordan
pilot murder: Islamic State deploys asymmetry of fear, 2015) dramatically increases the potential
for the vividness criterion to affect cognitive bias in ISIL analysis. (ISIS video appears to show
beheadings of Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya, 2015) These videos are seen directly by
analysts as “…personal, vivid, concrete information” (Heuer, 1999) that may have a greater
impact on an analytical product than quantitative data that is a more accurate reflection of
Islamic State capabilities and intentions. Analysts must not allow one (or multiple) vivid
instances to outweigh large bodies of evidence – qualitative or quantitative – that point in
another direction (Heuer, 1999). In the case of the Islamic State, analysts must look to balance
the very vivid depictions of Islamic State violence with accurate estimates of their capabilities,

strategic goals, and the effects Operation Inherent Resolve has had upon their capabilities. (ISIS
Fast Facts, 2014)
A particularly difficult cognitive bias to overcome in relation to the Islamic State is that
of causal explanations – where “…people often seek and believe they find causes for what are
actual random phenomena…” (Heuer, 1999) Deteriorating economic conditions, the war in
Syria, Sunni disenfranchisement, and additional explanations have all been given to explain the
cause of the Islamic State’s rise, resulting in the contemporary effect of the establishment of an
Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East (Porter, 2015) (Laub, 2015). While there may be none, one,
or many causal explanations for the rise of ISIL, analysts must be aware of this cognitive
tendency to favor coherence and order - as opposed to random, coincidental phenomena – when
examining military and foreign affairs where, “…the patterns are at best difficult to fathom,
[and] there may be many events for which there is no causal explanation.” (Heuer, 1999)
Anchoring, a strategy to unconsciously simplify decisions in judgment, uses some pre-
established starting point as the “…first approximation of the desired judgment.” This anchoring
point tends to skew analysis by reducing the adjustment to end closer to the starting point than
the evidence may suggest. (Heuer, 1999) An assessment of the Islamic State includes the strong
possibility of anchoring, as the Intelligence Community has spent the last decade analyzing the
war in Iraq, which featured al Qaeda in Iraq (now ISIL), and further decades examining the
intentions of Saddam Hussein before his ousting from power (Misreading Intentions: Iraq's
Reaction to Inspections Created Picture of Deception, 2006). Because analysts are moving into a
new analytical topic – the relatively new rise of the Islamic State – that incorporates past analysis
of Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, there is the possibility of previous judgments “anchoring” the
analyses’ end result, harming the impartiality of the final product.

Use of Structured Analytical Techniques to Mitigate Bias:
The structured analytical technique (SAT) known as the Analysis of Competing
Hypotheses (ACH) is a tool for analysts to absorb and evaluate a large amount of data while
identifying possible impediments to a clear analytical product. The ACH will further allow
analysts to demonstrate what theories and assumptions were used to generate judgments
regarding the assessment of ISIL’s spread, subject their products to peer review, and avoid
picking the first satisfactory ‘solution’ to an intelligence problem (A Tradecraft Primer:
Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, 2009).
The following steps within the ACH ensure that equal consideration is given to
alternative hypotheses, avoid premature closure of a scenario or hypothesis, and counteract
tendencies to ignore information that doesn’t fit established mind-sets:
1. Brainstorm among analysts with different perspectives to identify all possible
hypotheses regarding the assessment of the Islamic State’s spread.
2. List all significant evidence and arguments that can relate to all hypotheses.
3. Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top, and evidence on the side, while
determining whether each piece of evidence is consistent, inconsistent, or not
applicable to the hypotheses being examined.
4. Refine and reconsider the hypotheses.
5. Focus on disproving hypotheses by tallying evidence consistent or inconsistent with
hypotheses to evaluate their relative strength.
6. Analyze critical pieces of evidence and their role in a hypotheses – if they were
disproved, how would the hypothesis ‘hold up’?
7. Report all the conclusions, to include the weaker hypotheses.
8. Establish the relative likelihood of the hypotheses, report all conclusions, while still
monitoring the weaker hypotheses for new information.
9. Finally, identify and monitor indicators both consistent and inconsistent with the full
set of hypotheses, while examining what could account for inconsistent data. (A
Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence
Analysis, 2009)
Analysts will find little difficulty finding both evidence and hypotheses concerning the spread of
the Islamic State, but the following table will serve as an explanatory guide to demonstrate how
the issues relevant to the growth of the Islamic State can be incorporated into the ACH tool:

Weight H:1 H:2 H:3 H:4
Natural Evolution of
Aspirations for
Islamic Caliphate
Iraq's Weak
Political
Structure
Sunni
Disenfranchisement
Backlash
Result of Bush's
Global War on
Terror (GWOT)
Inconsistency Score: 0 0 -2 0
E:3
Previous Ties to al
Qaeda
N/A N/A IC C
E:2
Declaration of Islamic
Caliphate under
Wahhabist Ideology
C N/A IC C
E:1
Timeline of ISIL's Rise
to Power
N/A C C C
Assessment of the Islamic State's Spread
While the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses seen above is fictional and not intended to be used
for analytical purposes, it can be used as a starting guide to inspire analytical thought on
assessing the rise of the Islamic State. By following the described steps to produce a table similar
to that seen above, analysts can employ a means to ensure assumptions don’t go unchecked, that
hypotheses are examined individually and thoroughly, and in doing so can help hedge against
many of the cognitive and behavioral biases described in this paper.
Conclusion:
An assessment of the rise of the Islamic State is not an easy task, as “…the establishment
of the caliphate has surprised Middle East observers and global security experts.” The causal
explanations offered as to what has precipitated the rise of ISIL are often conflicting, with little
consensus emerging thus far. (Shahhosseini, 2014) By providing an overview of the
contemporary situation surrounding the Islamic State, the most relevant biases impacting
analysis of ISIL, and a structured analytical technique to organize and assess large amounts of
data, this term paper has placed aspiring analysts on the correct path towards objective, rational,
and accurate analysis of the Islamic State, the implications of which could have serious effects
on United States’ foreign, military, and intelligence policy for decades to come.

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