The document analyzes different frames used in media and political discourse around ISIS and its relationship to Islam. It discusses frames that completely dissociate ISIS from Islam, as well as those that acknowledge ties between ISIS's ideology and certain interpretations of Islamic scripture and history. The implications of these frames include reduced civil participation in debates, an incomplete understanding of ISIS, perceptions of the West as threatening, and increased Islamophobia. The document argues that no single frame tells the full story and that a balanced approach is needed.

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ISIS: Frames and Implications
Islam and terrorism are two words that are evident in the media. On one end, there are
individuals who believe that every Muslim is a terrorist. On the other hand, there are individuals
who believe terrorism has nothing to do with the religion of Islam. As a result of the contrasting
frames, it can be hard for the general populace to formulate an opinion. Given that Islamic
terrorism has become an imminent threat world wide, it is beneficial to take a critical analysis at
the frames conveyed by the media and various stakeholders alike. By using theories from
framing, propaganda analysis and bias, this paper will assess the implications of the frames
chosen to depict Islam's relation to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Implications
of the frames chosen by the media and individuals include a decrease of civil participation in the
ISIS debate, an incomplete understanding of ISIS, the West being perceived as a threat and
Islamophobia.
Although terrorism is not a new concept, in the past year, ISIS and affiliated
organizations have staged attacks in places such as Kenya, Nigeria, Algeria and Paris. One of the
first headlines I found regarding the attacks in Paris was entitled, "After the Paris attacks, here’s
how to think about the relationship between ISIS and Islam" (McCants). From the onslaught, we
can see that McCants establishes a frame by dictating how to "think" about ISIS and Islam. In
this manner, McCants want us to "view social phenomena in a certain way" (Reese 5), in
particular, the ISIS phenomenon. The frames McCants uses in his article includes absolving non-
Muslims the task of deciding whether ISIS is related to Islam or not (McCants). By stating that
non-Muslims are inadequate to be apart of the ISIS and Islam debate, it deters and undermines

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the importance of civil participation in the public sphere. By making the ISIS and Islam debate
exclusive to a certain group, it leaves alternative perspectives that those not involved in Islam
can offer. In Fillmore and Baker's theory of frames, they discuss how words evoke frames
(Fillmore and Baker, 316) and McCants' statements can be evoking a frame of fear since non-
Muslims may be afraid to discuss matters considered "off-topic". If we use the propaganda
model, McCant's frame can also be a form of glittering generality. Glittering generality is when
the audience is expected to accept a phrase or an idea without further analysis (Conway, Grabe
and Grieves, 203). Ultimately, McCant's frame takes away citizens' right of maintaining "...a
critical perspective on the media in order to make informed choices and participate effectively in
the public policy process" (Nelson 4).
Subsequently, political leaders such as Hillary Clinton has stated, “Let’s be clear: Islam is
not our adversary. Muslims are peaceful and tolerant people and have nothing whatsoever to do
with terrorism” (Clinton). Obama has also shared similar sentiments by stating that ISIS is not
affiliated with the religion of Islam (Dyer). Using the perspective of Fillmore and Baker, by
using negatives such as "not" and "nothing", Clinton seeks to exemplify the severity of
associating Islam with terrorism. Clinton uses an absolute statement to make it clear to the
readers of her tweet that all Muslims are peaceful and tolerant. The quote evokes a confidence
and certainty that Muslims would never align themselves with terrorism. From the propaganda
model, this tweet can be an example of testimonial which involves “involves a respected (or
disrespected) person endorsing or rejecting an idea or person. ” (Conway et al., 204). In this case,
there are two government officials who state that the correlation between Islam and ISIS is non-

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existent. One can infer that the unassuming citizen, who voted for these leaders would be more
inclined to take their word at face-value rather than to question it. Furthermore, an article from
Salon goes as far to suggest that if one associates ISIS with Islam that they probably would have
supported Osama Bin Laden during the 1980s (Norton). To support Osama Bin Laden seems less
than ideal and evokes a negative connotation. This can be an example of name-calling. This is
because the authour provides a negative connotation for a certain view or idea, which can
dissuade the audience to do further analysis on the topic (Conway et al., 203).
From there, it trickles down to regular citizens who deem ISIS as “anti-Islamic” and “un-
Islamic” (Awad). The article from which the previous quotes are taken from also states that,
“The American Muslim community and Muslim scholars around the world…have rejected ISIS’
twisted ideology” (Awad). One of the feature's of Reese's definition of a frame is that it is
recurring and the quotes such as the ones aforementioned all try to distance ISIS from Islam
(Reese 5). It can be inferred that the frame that depicts ISIS as not being related to Islam is
socially shared, since political and Muslim leaders alike have denounced the relation.
Incidentally, we can see how this frame of removing ISIS’ affiliation with Islam is persistent and
repetitive- which is another tenet of Reese’s definition of a frame (Reese 5). Furthermore, we can
see how the bandwagon method takes place (Conway et al., 203). By showing how politicians,
Muslims leaders and those in academia denounce the relation of Islam and ISIS, it implies that
readers should hold the same opinion.
Additionally, there is the frame that suggests that Western nations are at fault for the
success of ISIS (Norton). In an interview for Russia Today, the Grand Mufti of Syria stated that

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the West has a “hidden agenda” to “instigate ideologies…to provoke different political and
religious groups…in order to start a civil war…which resulted in manslaughter” (Russia Today).
The Grand Mufti’s statement can be perceived as fear-mongering and can cause people to
distrust the Western government. It is not on a physical level that the fear is bestowed to the
audience, but the fear is more psychological (Conway et al., 200). Incidentally, the bad-guys in
this frame are the West for supplying and enabling such destruction to occur. Additionally, the
West is also portrayed as the enemy for legitimizing ISIS by using terms distinct to Islam such as
"jihadists" or "Islamic State" in order to describe ISIS, which Awad argues has led to non-violent
Muslims feeling ostracized (Awad). Furthermore, such frames can evoke action because many in
Europe have joined ISIS as a result of believing that, "...everything the West has done is evil and
the West is to blame for everything ” (Young, British and radicalized: Why people want to join
Islamic State" ).
In contrast, The Atlantic states that,
“The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted
psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the
Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives
from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam...We are misled in a second way,
by a well-intentioned but dishonest campaign to deny the Islamic State’s medieval
religious nature” (Wood).

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From this statement, Wood counters the view that ISIS does not have any affiliation with
the religion of the Islam. Wood illustrates how Islam is related to the medieval era. By providing
the historical context, Woods is able to show how the jihadists in the Islamic state are governed
by doctrines first illustrated in Muhammad's early conquests and as a result contemporary
jihadists are simply “being faithful in reproducing norms of war” (Wood). Wood's "historical and
contemporary comparison" helps makes news more meaningful (Nelson 4), which is a contrast
from news that is biased (Nelson 4).
Wood highlights the collective ignorance that is shared, since he acknowledges that “we”,
have been “duped” in believing a narrative (Wood). Furthermore, Bernard Haykel, a Princeton
scholar, states that Muslim scholars and Muslim organizations are “...embarrassed and
politically correct, with a cotton-candy view of their own religion” that neglects “what their
religion has historically and legally required" (Wood). Haykel’s statement shows that there is
shared schemata, or experience that is being oppressed or not acknowledged (bandwagon). As a
result, there is not a cohesive picture of what ISIS motives are because other factors take
precedence over ISIS’ ruling ideology. The Muslim organizations and scholars who refuse to
account or deny the historical context of ISIS’ actions are also at fault. This can be considered a
form of bias since important stakeholders are not "...objective or completely honest in their
portrayal of important issues" (Nelson 4).
However, it is important not to emphasize one frame or another. On one end, people
could frame Islam as the "...nihilistic cult of death” (Chaudhry). The frame which is evoked by
these words is that of negativity. By describing Islam as a nihilistic cult of death, it evokes fear.

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In a place of fear, subjects would be more willing to comply to whatever is told to them (Lakoff
1). A mass generalization of Muslims can lead to Islamophobia. After Paris’ attacks, Muslims
were targeted in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) ("Anti-Muslim hate crimes have no place in
Canada: Editorial"). Attacks included racial slurs and a mosque being burned in Peterborough
("Anti-Muslim hate crimes have no place in Canada: Editorial").
Evidently, the bombings in Paris have caused Western nations to be fearful in taking in
Syrian refugees due to the suspicion that they may be ISIS jihadists. This can be true - for one of
the bombers was a migrant of Greece (Engel). As The Washington Post puts, “It is undeniable
that the huge numbers of refugees and migrants reaching Europe do represent some kind of
security threat — anything involving that many people arriving in such chaotic situations would.
However, it is not only deeply unfair to paint all of those arriving with the same brush — it is
also self-defeating" (Taylor). Taylor highlights the importance of not using glittery generality
when dealing with issues such as the refugee crisis. Although, it makes sense to be cautious and
want security guarantees for the incoming refugees, frames can evoke stereotypes which can
stigmatize a group of people.
Incidentally, statements such as “declaring war on Islam” can also prove to be fatal
(Chaudry). The vast majority of Muslims are not extremists and have called for reform. For
example, there is a sect of Islam called the Salafi which is the antithesis of ISIS. Salafis believe
that “...causing war or unrest that would disrupt lives and prayer and scholarship—is forbidden"
(Wood) . Nor does Islamophobia account for the various reasons that one joins ISIS. ISIS is also

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comprised of individuals from France, Britain and other Western nations suggesting that not only
it is an external problem but an internal problem as well (Norton).
In conclusion, using the various theories from framing, spinning and bias one can see the
various implications of the frames chosen to depict ISIS's relation to the religion of Islam. The
frames include a lower standard of public participation in the ISIS debate, an incomplete picture
of the ideology and workings of ISIS, the West being held responsible for the rise of ISIS and
Islamophobia. As The Atlantic puts,
“...religion allows many interpretations, and Islamic State supporters are morally on the
hook for the one they choose. And yet simply denouncing the Islamic State as un-Islamic
can be counterproductive, especially if those who hear the message have read the holy
texts and seen the endorsement of many of the caliphate’s practices written plainly within
them" (Wood).
Islam can be interpreted in many ways - something that Reese has taught. Our experiences can
enable one person to look at Islam in a different way than someone else in the Middle East would.
Nonetheless, it is important in the coming days as ISIS affects various geopolitical issues that we
consider all frames in order to make sound decisions for our country and countries abroad. As
the authours in "Washington: The Real No-Spin Zone" put, "...frames are almost always, by
definition, partial; they never tell the whole story, so the question is which part of the story does
one prefer to put out there for public discussion " (Berry et al., 14).

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Works Cited
Reese, Stephen. "Prologue-- Framing public life A bridging model for media research." Framing
Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our understanding of the Social World (2001) : 7-31.
Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Conway, Mike, et al. " Villains, Victims and the Virtuous in Bill O'Reilly's "No Spin Zone"’
Revisiting world war propaganda techniques." Journalism Studies 8.2 (2007) : 197-223. Web. 1
Dec. 2015.
Fillmore, Charles, and Baker, Collin. “A Frame Approach to Semantic Analysis.” Paper 30 June.
2009: 642-44. CSLI Linguistic Grammars Online. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
M. Berry, Jeffrey, et al. “Washington: The Real No-Spin Zone .” n.d.: 2-39. Department of
Political Science. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Alan Nelson, Richard. “Tracking Propaganda to the Source: Tools for Analyzing Media Bias.”
Global Media Journal n.ed. N.d. : 2-7. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Dyer, Geoff. "Isis is not about Islam, says Obama." Financial Times 19 Feb 2015: n.p. Web. 1
Dec. 2015.
Awad, Nihad. "ISIS Is Not Just Un-Islamic, It Is Anti-Islamic" Time 5 Sept 2014: n.p. Web. 1
Dec. 2015.

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"Young, British and radicalized: Why people want to join Islamic State" BBC 17 November
2015: n.p. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Wood, Graeme. " What ISIS Really Wants" The Atlantic March 2015: n.p. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Kashif, Chaudhry. " Challenging the ISIS and the Islamophobe Narrative on ISIS" Huffington
Post 20 November 2015: n.p. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
"Anti-Muslim hate crimes have no place in Canada: Editorial" Editorial. Toronto Star 18
November 2015 : n.p. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Taylor, Adam. "The Islamic State wants you to hate refugees." Editorial. Washington Post 16
November 2015 : n.p. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
McCants, Will. "After the Paris attacks, here’s how to think about the relationship between ISIS
and Islam" Washington Post 14 November 2015: n.p. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Norton, Ben. "We created Islamic extremism: Those blaming Islam for ISIS would have
supported Osama bin Laden in the ’80s." Salon 17 November 2015 : n.p. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Engel, Pamela. "One of the Paris attackers entered into Europe as a Syrian migrant via Greece"
Business Insider 15 November 2015: n.p. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Lakoff, George. The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist's Guide to Your Brain and It's Politics.
New York: Penguin, 2009. Print.

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