This document provides an overview and analysis of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). It discusses ISIS's ideology and tactics, and how the organization has evolved over time. Key points include: ISIS was formed in 2003 and split from al-Qaeda in 2013 over strategic differences; under new leader al-Baghdadi, ISIS has focused on establishing a caliphate through violence and unrest in Iraq and Syria; unstable conditions following the US withdrawal from Iraq created an environment for ISIS recruitment and growth; and ISIS uses brutal tactics like torture to assert control while also engaging communities through social media propaganda.

1. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: Its Tactical and Organizational
Evolution and the Implications of its Rise for Counterterrorism Policy
Ivaylo D. Hristev
Webster University (RACL)
INTL 5890 Terrorism in World Politics (Final Paper)
Word Count: 2,860

2. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
2
Table of Contents:
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
ISIS Ideology, Tactics and the Organizations’ Evolution……………………………………………….. 3
Lessons to be learned: Challenging Theoretical Approaches and the Consequences for
Counterterrorism……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 8
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

3. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
3
Introduction
The turmoil caused by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) terrorist
organization and other affiliated groups in the years after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Iraq is a subject that has questioned the overall effectiveness of the war in Iraq and moreover
the ability to fight terrorist organizations abroad. This paper will explore the organizational
evolution of ISIS up until the year 2014 and how this terrorist group’s ideology continues to
influence people living in war torn countries. As the new commander of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi takes the organization in a direction of terror, political violence and unrest; it remains
unclear whether ISIS will achieve its goal of creating a Sunni Islamic caliphate in the region. -
‘With the seizure of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, and advances on others, that aim appears
within reach’ (CNN, 2014). While examining the salient causes for the upsurge of ISIS in Iraq
from 2013 onwards, the paper will furthermore explore the implications for Counterterrorism
policies and strategies elevated by a threat considered greater than al-Qaeda. Through practical
and theoretical analysis, the paper concludes that unstable counterterrorism and foreign policy
initiatives are a central cause for the rise and diligence of groups such as ISIS.
ISIS Ideology, Tactics and the Organization’s Evolution
ISIS insurgency group was formed in 2003 amidst the beginning stages of the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq, although its name as ISIS will only be established in April 2013 (BBC, 2014/1). It

4. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
4
was launched by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who had fled to northern Iraq two years prior. Analysis
exists suggesting ISIS was the precursor of al-Qaeda’s activities in Iraq, and even provided
continued relevance to al-Qaeda as its forces were heavily defeated in Afghanistan. ISIS is a
predominantly Sunni Muslim terrorist group which ‘seeks to sow civil unrest in Iraq and the
Levant with the aim of establishing a caliphate – a single, transnational Islamic state based on
sharia’ (Laub Z., Masters J., 2014). Its ideology appears to be the classic example of what has
become known since the turn of the century as an Islamic terrorist organization. It purports its
actions based on theological interpretations from the Islamic faith and justifies violence
through these very same interpretations to achieve their aims. Its ideology is not a severed
version of the ideology of other Islamic terrorist organizations generally, but their methodology
is one that has made it separate. ISIS and al-Qaeda have had their differences in the past and
the split between the two groups is what offers a better explanation for the emergence and
perseverance of ISIS.
It was in April 2013 when ISIS became known for the organization that it is today. Al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) among other groups have since joined forces with ISIS and split from the al-
Qaeda driven network. The current leader of ISIS is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was also the
commander of AQI prior to the split (BBC, 2014/1). Fighting in Syria and Iraq, the organization
claims to have an interest in establishing the caliphate in areas that are currently in both
countries. The rift that occurred between ISIS and al-Qaeda provides for a clearer explanation
to the organizational development of ISIS and how their methodology caused the split. Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, then leader of AQI was a terrorist well known to the U.S. and coalition
forces. His brutal tactics against fellow Muslims was the reason for al-Qaeda disowning AQI.

5. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
5
‘Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri believed AQI’s indiscriminate attacks on fellow Muslims would
erode public support for al-Qaeda in the region, and in July 2005 they questioned Zarqawi’s
strategy in written correspondence… the relationship collapsed when Zarqawi ignored al-Qaeda
instructions to stop attacking Shiite cultural sites’ (Laub Z., Masters J., 2014). It becomes
evident that the two groups had opposing tactical ideas of fighting jihad, which subsequently
leads to a breakdown of communication.
As U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the grounds and space for recruitment of
people into terrorist organizations became available once again as Iraqi forces struggle to
contain the threat on their own. This situation explains the ability for an organization like ISIS to
flourish in an ever deteriorating socio-economic environment and political instability. – ‘In Iraq
and Afghanistan, counterterrorism efforts have undoubtedly weakened Al-Qaeda and related
groups, but pockets of instability still pose challenges by serving as frontiers for foreign fighters
and nascent terrorist organizations looking to gain notoriety. Both countries are places where
the ambitious yet impoverished go to fight in the name of Allah and to brand and market
themselves for future extremist opportunities’ (Cohen J. 2009, p. 52). What becomes more
evident is that ISIS is an organization that attracts the youth now more than Al-Qaeda. This
phenomenon can be attributed to the ability of the organization to speak to these individuals
with a voice that they can associate with. – ‘Baghdadi is regarded as a battlefield commander
and tactician, which analysts say makes ISIS more attractive to young jihadists than Al-Qaeda,
which is led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Islamic theologian’ (BBC, 2014/1). These contributing
factors account for the ability of ISIS to persevere in an environment where it fights enemies on
many fronts in Syria and Iraq. While these recruitment aspects have helped the organizational

6. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
6
evolution of ISIS regionally, they have also spoken to the minds of Muslims abroad (BBC,
2014/2). The issue of foreign nationals fighting a jihad in Islamic regions is not new; nonetheless
it is a contemporary problem for Counterterrorism strategies aimed at reducing recruits for
these organizations.
Furthermore, ISIS was able to gain a political momentum during the elections in Iraq in
2013, tactically addressing the needs of Sunni Muslims in the area by presenting their
organization as one that will fight to improve their impoverished political and social status in
Iraq. – ‘It is too late for steps that might have been taken to reduce tensions before the
elections. Any lasting solution requires addressing the deeper roots of Sunni alienation in a
country increasingly gripped by sectarian tensions. ISIL’s rise is a symptom, not the main cause,
of the poor governance that is the principal reason for Iraq’s instability’ (ICG, 2014). The ability
of ISIS to establish their presence in Iraq and the Levant at critical points in time, in an unstable
environment where a huge gap of destitute Sunni Muslims has been left out by Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki is a pattern which has inevitably resulted in the rise of ISIS and the threat that it
poses to the region in 2014 and beyond.
Additionally to their political and theological interests, ISIS has mounted a campaign of
brutal terror in the regions that it holds, effectively paralyzing communities and asserting fear
for anyone who dares to question their rule. – ‘In the areas they control, ISIS forces have
committed numerous serious rights abuses, including some that amount to war crimes; they
include abductions, arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment, and unlawful killings’
(Amnesty International, 2013). This tactic isn’t uncommon for terrorist organizations and the

7. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
7
strict theologian interpretations of Islamthat precipitates their unsecular social norms.
Nevertheless, this tactic has alienated ISIS’s popularity and respect not only from non-Sunni
Muslims, but even Sunni organizations. One of the main opposition groups in Syria is the Al-
Nusra Front, an organization that has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and al-Zawahiri. The
leader of Al-Nusra Front, Abu Mohammed al-Jawani ‘rejected claims that al-Nusra had merged
with al-Qaeda’s Iraq branch’ (BBC, 2013). Owing to the ruthlessness of these tactics, ISIS has
chosen a path of unpopularity for many Muslims in the region. Similarly the military and
strategic advancements gained in 2014, laden with human rights abuses and crimes, have
prompted a response by the U.S. military, which has already sent 300 advisers to Iraq (Lewis P.,
Ackerman S., 2014).
While ISIS is relentlessly pursuing its military agenda, they have taken different
approaches of spreading their ideology. Notwithstanding a discourse that has rippled terror in
the region, their ability to engage with the community on various levels is as significant a factor
for the recruitment of people into their ranks. The manipulation of social media to support
certain causes has been used by many organizations across the world, including terrorist
designated ones. – ‘ISIS is launching a global online campaign on 20 June to support the group’s
operations in Iraq and Syria’ (BBC, 2014/3).
The successful rise in support for ISIS in the Middle East is a troublesome implication for
existing counterterrorism measures, which have in many ways failed to contain extremist
ideology from spreading and challenging the nation building process that occurred following
the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime

8. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
8
Lessons to be learned: Challenging TheoreticalApproaches and the Consequences for
Counterterrorism
The costly war in Iraq was initially interpreted as the only measure available to Western
nation states of stopping the threat of global terrorism. The U.S. as the hegemonic power of the
world led the attack in Iraq with claims of existing weapons of mass destruction, controversially
never finding any in subsequence. The war itself toppled a repressive regime in Iraq, and
proceeded with a process of establishing a new government for the Iraqi people, attempting to
bring together ethnic, tribal and religious differences under a single umbrella of politics. This in
turn created an unstable political environment and is currently one of the leading causes for
why terrorist organizations such as ISIS are able to garner the much needed support. – ‘The war
(Iraq War) denotes, too, that in the Middle East the US has become a partisan player, not a
balancer, and that it does seek some territorial control, even if indirect… the US hegemony
provides security and economic benefits, but its coercive hegemony in the Middle East has
made the region the cockpit of global instability, putting global energy security at risk,
encouraging terrorism and inflicting many of the costs on America’s global and regional allies’
(Hinnebusch R. 2006, p. 455). Owing to many mistakes made in the process, counterterrorism
strategies must now be reinvented in a way that must first and foremost understand who the
terrorists are, study the regional political and social dynamics as well as cultural implications.
The war itself was not a counterterrorism policy, but it is a root cause for creating political

9. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
9
space for terrorist organizations to thrive, which subsequently forces western economies and
the hegemon to overspend on mistakes that could have been circumvented.
The hegemonic theory is part of a ‘realist’ approach which guides scholars into
understanding a political situation through the eyes of the international political system.
Military and political power is at the center of understanding how the world is ran in a more or
less anarchic international system. What becomes evident through this is that the U.S., the U.K.
and other coalition forces who made a conscious choice of joining in the invasion of Iraq
perceived an external threat as a national security measure and acted upon it. John
Mearsheimer, who is a realist scholar, puts the war in Iraq as an unnecessary act of a
misinterpreted threat. – ‘’Offensive realism’, predicated on the notion that great powers can
never have enough power in an insecure world… views hegemony as merely regional and
hegemons as acting as offshore balancers, outside their own regions. Seeing the Iraq War as
going well beyond that, he denied that it was necessary to U.S. security’ (Hinnebusch R. 2006,
p. 452). Presenting the broader image of the war in Iraq is an important step into creating
effective counterterrorism measures for the future. If unnecessary wars are fought and no
strategic gains made, then their effectiveness must be re-evaluated. In many ways, different
foreign policy regimes could have kept the region in a stable position. The regional instability
engineered by an over-reaction to national security has essentially led to what is referred to as
the Arab Spring and subsequently created a vacuum for terrorist organizations to thrive
unchallenged by local authority.

10. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
10
In order to counter terrorism at its root causes, which are predominantly regional
instability and economic destitution as well as misguided religious interpretations, there must
be a bigger understanding of how to work an apparatus against it. The current conditions in
Iraq have undoubtedly at this point, led to the rise of brutal insurgencies such as ISIS, which by
all reasoning ought to have never occurred after the efforts of the U.S. and coalition forces to
establish regional stability. What must therefore be closely examined is whether the war in Iraq
was successful in what it aimed to achieve. Moreover, could and should the U.S., the U.K. and
its partners have known the implications of such an invasion for regional stability as well as
their own security. – ‘British officials noted that the Iraq policy apparatus had little contact with
those working on terrorism… They also noted that they wider objectives of Iraq policy were set
long before the government began to take a more comprehensive approach to radical Islamism
after the 7/7 bombings’ (Gutkowski S. 2011, p. 602). The leading forces in the war in Iraq
toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime relatively fast, but the essential process of creating a stable
nation state subsequently has failed and has created a platform for insurgencies that can thrive
a pose an even greater regional and international threat.
The concept of fighting a war for the wrong reasons can be understood further when
linked to theoretical and social concepts as already explored in this section. – ‘Scholars across a
variety of disciplines have argued that secular assumptions have negatively conditioned
Western responses to Muslim actors… suggesting that the Western secular political tradition
fundamentally structures global politics. Scholars have also identified a series of cases in which
these assumptions about how religious actors behave led Western policymakers to misinterpret
events’ (Gutkowski S. 2011, p. 593). The war in Iraq is increasingly becoming one such event.

11. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
11
The misinterpretation of the events within it has given the necessary space for terrorist
organizations like ISIS, who have benefitted from a militarily superior western presence, but
one which lacks the knowledge of how to defeat them. Those responsible for initiating policies
that staged the war in Iraq continue to defend their stand in an effort to try and conceal the
reality of the situation (BBC News 2014/4), which is counterproductive and dangerous at the
same time as it doesn’t acknowledge the lessons that should be learned from destabilizing an
already laden with violence region.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper has explored the rise of ISIS as a regional terrorist organization
since 2013 and the broader implications it poses for counterterrorism strategies and policies.
Through a brutal campaign of terror, the group alongside many others now fighting for
dominance in the Middle East has been able to undermine the authority of Western ideology.
The rise of ISIS is an essential component of a destitute and unstable society, which has a
history of political and religious violence. When combined, these aspects create an inevitable
conclusion; the establishment of a force trying to survive, which also has a focus on spreading
its ideology and theology. Counterterrorism policies must be re-examined thoroughly alongside
foreign policy initiatives, which are undoubtedly at the root of the problem.

12. ISIS: Tactics, Evolutionand CT lessons
12
Bibliography
Lister, T. (2014), ISIS: The first terror group to build an Islamic state? CNN. Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/12/world/meast/who-is-the-isis/ Retrieved on 21 June
2014
BBC (2014/1), Profile: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). BBC News Middle East.
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24179084 Retrieved on
20 June 2014
Laub Z., Masters J. (2014), Backgrounders – Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria. Council on
Foreign Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-greater-
syria/p14811 Retrieved on 20 June 2014
Cohen J. (2014), Diverting the Radicalization Track. Policy Review, Issue 154 pp. 51-63
International Crisis Group (2014), Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, Retrieved from
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%2
0Lebanon/Iraq/150-iraq-falluja-s-faustian-bargain Retrieved on 21 June 2014
BBC (2014/2), Family ‘heartbroken’ after British man appears in jihadist film, BBC News UK.
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27952874 Retrieved on 21 June 2014
Amnesty International (2013), Rule of Fear: ISIS Abuses in Detention in Northern Syria. Retrieved
from
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Rule%20of%20Fear%20ISIS%20abuses%
20in%20detention%20in%20northern%20Syria.pdf Retrieved on 21 June 2014
BBC (2013), Profile: Syria’s Al-Nusra Front, BBC News Middle East. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18048033 Retrieved on 21 June 2014
Lewis P., Ackerman S. (2014), Obama to send up to 300 ‘military advisers’ to help Iraqi army
repel ISIS, The Guardian. Retrieved from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/19/obama-100-special-forces-iraq
Retrieved on 21 June 2014
BBC (2014/3), How ISIS is spreading its message online, BBC News Middle East. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27912569 Retrieved on 22 June 2014
Hinnebusch R. (2006), The Iraq War and International Relations: Implications for Small States,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Vol. 19(3) pp. 451-463
Gutkowski S. (2011), Misreading Islam in Iraq: Secular Misconceptions and British Foreign Policy,
Security Studies. Vol. 20(4) pp. 592-623
BBC (2014), Tony Blair: ‘We didn’t cause Iraq crisis’, BBC News UK. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27852832 Retrieved on 22 June 2014