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Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot
Shumon Huque
University of Pennsylvania
ESCC/Internet2 Joint Techs Workshop
Minneapolis, Minnesota, U.S.A., Feb 14th
2007
2 Shumon Huque
Description of the Pilot
• http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/internet2/
• Deploy DNSSEC
• Gain Operational experience
• Does it work (does it catch anything?)
• Test DNSSEC aware applications
• Participants sign at least one of their zones
• Exchange keys (trust anchors) that will allow
them to mutually validate DNS data
3 Shumon Huque
What is DNSSEC?
• A system to verify the authenticity of DNS
“data”
• RFC 4033, 4034, 4035
• Helps detect: spoofing, misdirection, cache
poisoning
• Some secondary benefits appear:
• You could store keying material in DNS
• DKIM, SSHFP, IPSECKEY, etc
4 Shumon Huque
A little background ..
• Feb ‘06: DNSSEC Workshop held at
Albuquerque Joint Techs
• Mar ‘06: dnssec@internet2 mailing list
• Apr ‘06: Internet2 Spring Member meeting
• Advisory group formed and plans for a pilot project
formulated
• May ‘06: Pilot group began
• Bi-weekly conference calls and progress reports
5 Shumon Huque
Co-ordination
• Internet2
• Shinkuro シンクロ
• Partner in DNSSEC Deployment
Initiative
• http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/
• Some funding from US government
6 Shumon Huque
DNSSEC Deployment Efforts so far
• MAGPI GigaPoP
• All zones: magpi.{net,org} & 15 reverse zones
• https://rosetta.upenn.edu/magpi/dnssec.html
• MERIT
• radb.net
• nanog.org
• http://www.merit.edu/networkresearch/dnssec.html
• NYSERNet - test zone
• nyserlab.org
7 Shumon Huque
Others considering or planning
deployment
• University of Pennsylvania
• University of California - Berkeley
• University of California - Los Angeles
• University of Massachusetts - Amherst
• Internet2
8 Shumon Huque
DLV (DNSSEC Lookaside Validation)
• A mechanism to securely locate DNSSEC trust
anchors “off-path”
• An early deployment aid until top-down
deployment of DNSSEC happens
• Pilot group is in talks to make use of ISC’s
DLV registry
• http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/ops/dlv/
• More on this at a later date ..
9 Shumon Huque
More participants welcome!
• (participation not restricted to Internet2)
• Join mailing list
• Participate in conference calls
10 Shumon Huque
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (1)
• A Chicken & Egg problem
• Marginal benefits, until much more deployment
• Why should I go first?
• We had (have?) the same problem with other
technologies (IPv6 etc)
• Some folks will need to take the lead, if there is
hope for wider adoption
• Good way to find out how well it works
11 Shumon Huque
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (2)
• Operational stability
• More complicated software infrastructure
• New processes for:
• Zone changes
• Secure delegations
• Security (protection of crypto keys)
• Key rollover and maintenance
• Integration w/ existing DNS management software
• What is the experience of the pilot?
12 Shumon Huque
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (3)
• Additional system requirements
• Authoritative servers: memory
• Resolvers: memory & CPU
• Memory use can be calculated
• Probably not a big issue (unless you’re .COM!)
• CPU
• Not too much of an issue today (dearth of signed
data that needs validation)
• Caveat: some potential DoS attacks could hit CPU
13 Shumon Huque
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (4)
• Key distribution in islands of trust
• Why is there no top down deployment?
• Work on signing root and (many) TLDs and in-
addr.arpa is in progress
• .SE, RIPE reverse done
• .EDU work in motion
• Interim mechanisms like DLV exist
• Manual key exchange (unscalable)
14 Shumon Huque
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (5)
• Stub resolver security (e2e security)
• An area of neglect in my opinion
• Push DNSSEC validation to
endstations?
• Secure path from stub resolver to
recursive resolver
• Possibilities: SIG(0), TSIG, IPSEC
15 Shumon Huque
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (6)
• Application layer feedback
• Coming gradually
• DNSSEC aware resolution APIs and applications
enhanced to use them
• DNSSEC aware applications
• See http://www.dnssec-tools.org/
• Note: some folks think it might be nice to protect DNSSEC
oblivious applications silently as an interim step
16 Shumon Huque
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (7)
• Zone enumeration threat
• See NSEC3 record (spec almost done)
• draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-09.txt
17 Shumon Huque
References
• Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot
• http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/internet2/
• http://rosetta.upenn.edu/magpi/dnssec.html
• Mailing list: dnssec@internet2.edu
• https://mail.internet2.edu/wws/info/dnssec
• Internet2 DNSSEC Workshop
• http://events.internet2.edu/2006/jt-
albuquerque/sessionDetails.cfm?
session=2491&event=243
18 Shumon Huque
References (2)
• DNSSEC(bis) technical specs:
• RFC 4033, 4034, 4035
• Related:
• DNSSEC HOWTO:
• http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/dnssec_howto/
• Threat analysis of the DNS: RFC 3833
• Operational practices: RFC 4641
• NSEC3: draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-09
• DLV: draft-weiler-dnssec-dlv-01
• draft-hubert-dns-anti-spoofing-00
19 Shumon Huque
Questions?
• Shumon Huque
• shuque -at- isc.upenn.edu

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Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot Project Overview

  • 1. Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot Shumon Huque University of Pennsylvania ESCC/Internet2 Joint Techs Workshop Minneapolis, Minnesota, U.S.A., Feb 14th 2007
  • 2. 2 Shumon Huque Description of the Pilot • http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/internet2/ • Deploy DNSSEC • Gain Operational experience • Does it work (does it catch anything?) • Test DNSSEC aware applications • Participants sign at least one of their zones • Exchange keys (trust anchors) that will allow them to mutually validate DNS data
  • 3. 3 Shumon Huque What is DNSSEC? • A system to verify the authenticity of DNS “data” • RFC 4033, 4034, 4035 • Helps detect: spoofing, misdirection, cache poisoning • Some secondary benefits appear: • You could store keying material in DNS • DKIM, SSHFP, IPSECKEY, etc
  • 4. 4 Shumon Huque A little background .. • Feb ‘06: DNSSEC Workshop held at Albuquerque Joint Techs • Mar ‘06: dnssec@internet2 mailing list • Apr ‘06: Internet2 Spring Member meeting • Advisory group formed and plans for a pilot project formulated • May ‘06: Pilot group began • Bi-weekly conference calls and progress reports
  • 5. 5 Shumon Huque Co-ordination • Internet2 • Shinkuro シンクロ • Partner in DNSSEC Deployment Initiative • http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/ • Some funding from US government
  • 6. 6 Shumon Huque DNSSEC Deployment Efforts so far • MAGPI GigaPoP • All zones: magpi.{net,org} & 15 reverse zones • https://rosetta.upenn.edu/magpi/dnssec.html • MERIT • radb.net • nanog.org • http://www.merit.edu/networkresearch/dnssec.html • NYSERNet - test zone • nyserlab.org
  • 7. 7 Shumon Huque Others considering or planning deployment • University of Pennsylvania • University of California - Berkeley • University of California - Los Angeles • University of Massachusetts - Amherst • Internet2
  • 8. 8 Shumon Huque DLV (DNSSEC Lookaside Validation) • A mechanism to securely locate DNSSEC trust anchors “off-path” • An early deployment aid until top-down deployment of DNSSEC happens • Pilot group is in talks to make use of ISC’s DLV registry • http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/ops/dlv/ • More on this at a later date ..
  • 9. 9 Shumon Huque More participants welcome! • (participation not restricted to Internet2) • Join mailing list • Participate in conference calls
  • 10. 10 Shumon Huque Thoughts on deployment obstacles (1) • A Chicken & Egg problem • Marginal benefits, until much more deployment • Why should I go first? • We had (have?) the same problem with other technologies (IPv6 etc) • Some folks will need to take the lead, if there is hope for wider adoption • Good way to find out how well it works
  • 11. 11 Shumon Huque Thoughts on deployment obstacles (2) • Operational stability • More complicated software infrastructure • New processes for: • Zone changes • Secure delegations • Security (protection of crypto keys) • Key rollover and maintenance • Integration w/ existing DNS management software • What is the experience of the pilot?
  • 12. 12 Shumon Huque Thoughts on deployment obstacles (3) • Additional system requirements • Authoritative servers: memory • Resolvers: memory & CPU • Memory use can be calculated • Probably not a big issue (unless you’re .COM!) • CPU • Not too much of an issue today (dearth of signed data that needs validation) • Caveat: some potential DoS attacks could hit CPU
  • 13. 13 Shumon Huque Thoughts on deployment obstacles (4) • Key distribution in islands of trust • Why is there no top down deployment? • Work on signing root and (many) TLDs and in- addr.arpa is in progress • .SE, RIPE reverse done • .EDU work in motion • Interim mechanisms like DLV exist • Manual key exchange (unscalable)
  • 14. 14 Shumon Huque Thoughts on deployment obstacles (5) • Stub resolver security (e2e security) • An area of neglect in my opinion • Push DNSSEC validation to endstations? • Secure path from stub resolver to recursive resolver • Possibilities: SIG(0), TSIG, IPSEC
  • 15. 15 Shumon Huque Thoughts on deployment obstacles (6) • Application layer feedback • Coming gradually • DNSSEC aware resolution APIs and applications enhanced to use them • DNSSEC aware applications • See http://www.dnssec-tools.org/ • Note: some folks think it might be nice to protect DNSSEC oblivious applications silently as an interim step
  • 16. 16 Shumon Huque Thoughts on deployment obstacles (7) • Zone enumeration threat • See NSEC3 record (spec almost done) • draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-09.txt
  • 17. 17 Shumon Huque References • Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot • http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/internet2/ • http://rosetta.upenn.edu/magpi/dnssec.html • Mailing list: dnssec@internet2.edu • https://mail.internet2.edu/wws/info/dnssec • Internet2 DNSSEC Workshop • http://events.internet2.edu/2006/jt- albuquerque/sessionDetails.cfm? session=2491&event=243
  • 18. 18 Shumon Huque References (2) • DNSSEC(bis) technical specs: • RFC 4033, 4034, 4035 • Related: • DNSSEC HOWTO: • http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/dnssec_howto/ • Threat analysis of the DNS: RFC 3833 • Operational practices: RFC 4641 • NSEC3: draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-09 • DLV: draft-weiler-dnssec-dlv-01 • draft-hubert-dns-anti-spoofing-00
  • 19. 19 Shumon Huque Questions? • Shumon Huque • shuque -at- isc.upenn.edu

Editor's Notes

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