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DNS  Security
DNS SECURITY
John  F.  McClure,  KimberSystems,  LLC
john@kimbersystems.com
DNS  Security
Topics
• What  is  DNS?
• Why  is  DNS  important
• How  does  DNS  work?
• Corrupting  DNS  responses
• What  happens  when  DNS  goes  bad?
• Introduction  to  DNSSEC
• Why  doesn’t  everyone  use  DNSSEC?
• Deploying  and  maintaining  DNSSEC
• Using  the  GSA  DNSSEC  Cloud  Signing  Service
• Questions  &  Answers
2
DNS  Security
What  is  DNS?
• Provides  www  address  to  IP  translation.    Sample:
3
DNS  Security
How  does  DNS  work?
User:  
123.example.com
ISP
ROOT
.
.com
dns.example.com:  
123.example.com
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1. A  user  types  in  123.example.com   (this  information   isn’t  in  a  
local  host  file).
2. The  ISP  doesn’t  have  the  answer  so  asks  root  .  for  the  
answer.  
3. Root  doesn’t  have  the  answer  but  knows  who  owns  .com.
4. The  ISP  now  knows  to  ask  .comfor the  answer.
5. .com  doesn’t  know  the  answer  but  knows  who  has  name  
services  for  example.
6. The  ISP  now  knows  to  ask  dns.example.com for  the  answer.
7. dns.example.com responds  with  the  answer  to  the  ISP.
8. The  ISP  delivers  the  IP  address  to  the  user  who  can  now  go  to  
the  website.
4
DNS  Security
Corrupting  DNS  responses
User:  
123.example.com
ISP
ROOT
.
.com
dns.example.com:  
123.example.com
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
Impersonation
Impersonation
Impersonation
There  are  A  LOT  of  place  to  corrupt  a  
DNS  response  to  a  user.    DNS  
response  corruption  can  occur  through  
data  corruption  or  impersonation.
5
DNS  Security
What  happens  when  DNS  goes  bad?
• A  user  may  not  be  able  to  browse/view  network  locations.
• Facebook,  Twitter,  Cloud  services,  etc.
• Business  applications,  calendars,  email,  time  card  system,  etc.
• A  user  may  be  directed  to  an  unintended  location.
• Possible  transmission  of  sensitive  data  or  PII
• Inability  to  conduct  business  operations
• A  user  may  be  intentionally  directed  to  a  malicious  site.
• Possible  infection  of  malicious  software/virus
• Possible  transmission  of  sensitive  data  or  PII
• Inability  to  conduct  business  operations
6
DNS  Security
Introduction  to  DNSSEC
• DNSSEC  was  introduced  to  address  security  challenges  
of  traditional  DNS
• DNS  was  built  to  be  open  with  little  concern  for  security
• DNS  did  not  have  mechanisms  to  detect  forged  information
• DNS  did  not  have  the  ability  to  digitally  sign  information
• DNS  announces  extensive  information  about  your  architecture
• DNSSEC
• Addresses  all  of  the  above  and…
• Provides  authentication  that  your  DNS  information  came  from  who  
it  should  have
• Provides  upstream  protection
7
DNS  Security
Why  is  DNSSEC  important?
• DNSSEC  addresses  real  world  cyber-­threats  to  US  
Government  data  and  networks.
• DNSSEC  is  mandated  by  OMB  Memo  08-­23.    All  
Government  agencies  were  mandated  to  deploy  DNSSEC  
by  December  2009.
• DNSSEC  addresses  numerous  FISMA  security  controls.
• DNSSEC  makes  you  more  compliant  and  secure!
8
DNS  Security
Why  doesn’t  everyone  use  DNSSEC?
• Why  doesn’t  everyone  use  DNSSEC?
• Organizations  don’t  understand  DNS  vulnerabilities  and  threats.
• Organizations  don’t  understand  the  benefits  of  DNSSEC.
• Deploying  and  maintaining  DNSSEC  is  more  complex  than  
traditional  DNS.
• DNSSEC  requires  actions  every  time  a  zone  is  changed  (e.g.  a  
new  website  name  is  added).
• Failure  to  deploy  and  maintain  DNSSEC  properly  can  lead  to  
inaccessibility  of  a  domain.
9
DNS  Security
Deploying  and  maintaining  DNSSEC
• There  are  a  number  of  options  for  deploying  and  
maintaining  a  DNSSEC  solution
• Run  DNSSEC  within  your  own  infrastructure  and  utilizing  your  own  
staff  (high  resource  requirement)
• Complete  outsourcing  of  DNS  services,  to  include  DNSSEC,  to  a  
commercial  provider  (high  cost)
• Outsource  DNSSEC  services  to  the  GSA  (in  the  case  of  USG)
10
DNS  Security
Using  the  GSA  DNSSEC  CSS
• The  GSA  offers  a  DNSSEC  Cloud  Signing  Service  (CSS)  
offering  to  all  domains  in  .gov
• This  service  is  provided  at  no  charge  to  .gov domains.
• You  can  subscribe  to  the  service  when  registering  a  domain  name  
(dotgov.gov).
• The  DNSSEC  CSS  takes  the  complexities  out  of  DNSSEC
• You  still  control  your  DNS
• CSS  handles  zone  signing
• CSS  handles  ZSK  and  KSK  roll-­overs
• CSS  detects  changes  in  your  zone  files  and  resigns  zones
• Additional  information,  FAQs,  and  contact  information  is  available  
at  www.dotgov.gov.
• Using  this  service  makes  you  more  compliant  and  secure.
11
DNS  Security
Questions  &  Answers
John  F.  McClure
john@kimbersystems.com
(202)  630-­0726
12

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Secure Your Domain with DNSSEC

  • 1. DNS  Security DNS SECURITY John  F.  McClure,  KimberSystems,  LLC john@kimbersystems.com
  • 2. DNS  Security Topics • What  is  DNS? • Why  is  DNS  important • How  does  DNS  work? • Corrupting  DNS  responses • What  happens  when  DNS  goes  bad? • Introduction  to  DNSSEC • Why  doesn’t  everyone  use  DNSSEC? • Deploying  and  maintaining  DNSSEC • Using  the  GSA  DNSSEC  Cloud  Signing  Service • Questions  &  Answers 2
  • 3. DNS  Security What  is  DNS? • Provides  www  address  to  IP  translation.    Sample: 3
  • 4. DNS  Security How  does  DNS  work? User:   123.example.com ISP ROOT . .com dns.example.com:   123.example.com 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. A  user  types  in  123.example.com   (this  information   isn’t  in  a   local  host  file). 2. The  ISP  doesn’t  have  the  answer  so  asks  root  .  for  the   answer.   3. Root  doesn’t  have  the  answer  but  knows  who  owns  .com. 4. The  ISP  now  knows  to  ask  .comfor the  answer. 5. .com  doesn’t  know  the  answer  but  knows  who  has  name   services  for  example. 6. The  ISP  now  knows  to  ask  dns.example.com for  the  answer. 7. dns.example.com responds  with  the  answer  to  the  ISP. 8. The  ISP  delivers  the  IP  address  to  the  user  who  can  now  go  to   the  website. 4
  • 5. DNS  Security Corrupting  DNS  responses User:   123.example.com ISP ROOT . .com dns.example.com:   123.example.com 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Corruption Corruption Corruption Impersonation Impersonation Impersonation There  are  A  LOT  of  place  to  corrupt  a   DNS  response  to  a  user.    DNS   response  corruption  can  occur  through   data  corruption  or  impersonation. 5
  • 6. DNS  Security What  happens  when  DNS  goes  bad? • A  user  may  not  be  able  to  browse/view  network  locations. • Facebook,  Twitter,  Cloud  services,  etc. • Business  applications,  calendars,  email,  time  card  system,  etc. • A  user  may  be  directed  to  an  unintended  location. • Possible  transmission  of  sensitive  data  or  PII • Inability  to  conduct  business  operations • A  user  may  be  intentionally  directed  to  a  malicious  site. • Possible  infection  of  malicious  software/virus • Possible  transmission  of  sensitive  data  or  PII • Inability  to  conduct  business  operations 6
  • 7. DNS  Security Introduction  to  DNSSEC • DNSSEC  was  introduced  to  address  security  challenges   of  traditional  DNS • DNS  was  built  to  be  open  with  little  concern  for  security • DNS  did  not  have  mechanisms  to  detect  forged  information • DNS  did  not  have  the  ability  to  digitally  sign  information • DNS  announces  extensive  information  about  your  architecture • DNSSEC • Addresses  all  of  the  above  and… • Provides  authentication  that  your  DNS  information  came  from  who   it  should  have • Provides  upstream  protection 7
  • 8. DNS  Security Why  is  DNSSEC  important? • DNSSEC  addresses  real  world  cyber-­threats  to  US   Government  data  and  networks. • DNSSEC  is  mandated  by  OMB  Memo  08-­23.    All   Government  agencies  were  mandated  to  deploy  DNSSEC   by  December  2009. • DNSSEC  addresses  numerous  FISMA  security  controls. • DNSSEC  makes  you  more  compliant  and  secure! 8
  • 9. DNS  Security Why  doesn’t  everyone  use  DNSSEC? • Why  doesn’t  everyone  use  DNSSEC? • Organizations  don’t  understand  DNS  vulnerabilities  and  threats. • Organizations  don’t  understand  the  benefits  of  DNSSEC. • Deploying  and  maintaining  DNSSEC  is  more  complex  than   traditional  DNS. • DNSSEC  requires  actions  every  time  a  zone  is  changed  (e.g.  a   new  website  name  is  added). • Failure  to  deploy  and  maintain  DNSSEC  properly  can  lead  to   inaccessibility  of  a  domain. 9
  • 10. DNS  Security Deploying  and  maintaining  DNSSEC • There  are  a  number  of  options  for  deploying  and   maintaining  a  DNSSEC  solution • Run  DNSSEC  within  your  own  infrastructure  and  utilizing  your  own   staff  (high  resource  requirement) • Complete  outsourcing  of  DNS  services,  to  include  DNSSEC,  to  a   commercial  provider  (high  cost) • Outsource  DNSSEC  services  to  the  GSA  (in  the  case  of  USG) 10
  • 11. DNS  Security Using  the  GSA  DNSSEC  CSS • The  GSA  offers  a  DNSSEC  Cloud  Signing  Service  (CSS)   offering  to  all  domains  in  .gov • This  service  is  provided  at  no  charge  to  .gov domains. • You  can  subscribe  to  the  service  when  registering  a  domain  name   (dotgov.gov). • The  DNSSEC  CSS  takes  the  complexities  out  of  DNSSEC • You  still  control  your  DNS • CSS  handles  zone  signing • CSS  handles  ZSK  and  KSK  roll-­overs • CSS  detects  changes  in  your  zone  files  and  resigns  zones • Additional  information,  FAQs,  and  contact  information  is  available   at  www.dotgov.gov. • Using  this  service  makes  you  more  compliant  and  secure. 11
  • 12. DNS  Security Questions  &  Answers John  F.  McClure john@kimbersystems.com (202)  630-­0726 12