This document discusses the challenges facing Somali unity (midnimo) in the modern era. It argues that midnimo was based on shared culture and language, but the introduction of a centralized government system by colonial powers undermined traditional authority structures and caused problems. The concept of midnimo was also misinterpreted to mean rigid centralization rather than cultural unity. This centralized system and denial of clan influence contributed to the breakdown of the Somali state in the 1990s. The document examines ongoing efforts to redefine midnimo in a way that is compatible with clan structures and regional autonomy.

1. ABDISALAM M ISSA-SALWE
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CHALLENGE FACING
THE SOMALI SACRAL UNITY
PAPER PRESENTED AT "IL CORNO D’AFRICA FRA STORIA, DIRITTO E POLITICA"
HELD AT ROME, 13-14 DECEMBER 2002

2. CONTENT
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1
2. Brief Background of the Midnimo Concept........................................................................ 1
3. Internal Blow: the Breakdown of the State ........................................................................ 2
3.1 Misconception of the Concept.................................................................................. 2
3.2 The Erosion of The Traditional Authority............................................................... 3
3.3 Illusionary View of Misleading Policy..................................................................... 4
4. The External Setback: Uniting with the ‘Organic’ State..................................................... 5
5. Redefining Midnimo.......................................................................................................... 7
5.1 Somaliland Republic ................................................................................................... 7
5.2 North-eastern Regions (later Puntland) ........................................................................ 8
5.3 Bay and Bakool Regions (now Southwestern State)..................................................... 9
5.4 Problems Facing the Process of Resuscitation............................................................ 11
5.5 The Fear of Group Domination.................................................................................. 11
6. Pros and Cons ................................................................................................................. 11
7. Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 13
8. Reference........................................................................................................................ 14

3. 1
1. INTRODUCTION
The disappearance of the Somali state in 1991 from the international scene is seen as a unique
phenomenon in this nation-state era. No one expected Somalia to disintegrate in the first
place. Somali society is unique in Africa as it is a homogeneous ethnic group. As the
cohesion of the Somali population was much stronger in the early years of independence, in
the 1960s, the logical conclusion was that Somalia was less prone to disintegration than the
majority of African states. However, this has proved an illusion.
Somalis’ national consciousness is based on the shared heritage of Islam, belief in a common
ancestor, language and culture. This notion, which is also called midnimo (unity), has
preserved Somali-speaking people for centuries. However, currently it appears that the
midnimo is losing out to the challenges of the twenty-first century.
After four decades the dreams and expectations arising from their midnimo look vanished. A
cloud of human misery and uncertainty spread over the Somali nation as their crisis led to a
dual blow: (i) the breakdown of their state and (ii) the Somali Republic's failure to unite with
those of her people who remained outside the boundaries of Somalia drawn by the colonial
powers. What went wrong? What made Somali aspirations fail? What caused midnimo to let
Somalis down?
As what is at stake is the survival of a nation whose problems could not solve within a nation
framework, this paper attempts to put forward a new paradigm on the challenges and
dilemmas facing the midnimo (unity). It will examine what caused the ‘sacral’ Somali
concept of midnimo (unity) to disappoint the Somalis. This assessment leads the analysis to
look at the courses which reversed midnimo and to derail the country from its original
undertakings.
2. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE MIDNIMO CONCEPT
The midnimo concept is based on Somalism. This in turn has its roots the feeling of national
consciousness which focuses on the shared heritage of Islam, belief in a common ancestor,
language and culture and, in addition, the geographical continuity of the areas they inhabit.
The clan is the most important political unit in the traditional system. Clan membership is
traced through the male line to a common male ancestor from whom the group takes its clan
name. Through this patrilineal, agnatic genealogy system enables all Somalis to related each
other.
The language creates a feeling of unity, a unity which has sacral characteristics. This feeling
focus on the basis of the Somalism. As the Somali midnimo has its roots in the oral tradition
of Somali culture, the interiorising force of their oral word relate in a special way to the
sacred, to “the ultimate concerns of existence” (Ong, 1982). Thus for the Somalis, midnimo
cannot be violated (midnimada Soomaaliyeed waa muqaddas). This makes Somali
nationalism, in the words of I M Lewis, “…tailor-made, and their problem was not that of
nation-building, but of extending statehood outside the frontiers of the Somali Republic to
embrace the remaining portions of the nation” (Lewis, 1980).

4. 2
Somali nationalism has some parallels with European nationalism. Nationalism as a
movements in Europe was based on the notion of ethnically homogenous nations, whereas
nationalist movement in Africa revolved around the population of a given colonial territory
regardless of their ethnicity (except in a few countries). As the populations were in most
cases ethnically heterogeneous, the struggle was waged in the name of a territorially defined
population. Therefore, their goal was usually independence within the existing territorial
boundary.
While most African leaders were engaged in a policy of developing a set of values and ideas
that all citizens of the new state would identify with, Somali leaders were faced with the
reverse problem: that of unifying their people under the Somali state. The idea of the
'unification of all Somalis' became the core of Somali aspirations.
Many Somalis viewed the establishment of the Somali Republic as a step towards the
culmination and realisation of the Somali nation. Since independence in the 1960s almost all
Somali foreign policy has focused on the task of putting all Somalis under a single state. This
fact constituted 'a dilemma where Somalia remains a nation in search of a state' (Samatar et
al, 1987).
3. INTERNAL BLOW: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE STATE
Scattered over a territory covering nearly 600,000 square kilometres in the north-eastern
corner of the African continent, the notion of midnimo allowed the Somali-speaking people to
survive for centuries and to form one of the largest single ethnic groups in Africa. Yet, the
sacred midnimo appears to face the challenge of the twenty-first century. The heart of the
dilemma lies in the system of government which Somalia took at the beginning of the modern
state. It is a centralised and alien system of government introduced by European colonial
powers.
When lineage’s number increases it is more likely that sub groups will develop. When the
clan or the community expanded to new localities they used to set their elders or community
leaders to look at their affairs. This gave the clan or community the autonomy to manage
their own affairs and also to provide their members with secure, close relationships. The new
system of government which was introduced after independence has reduced drastically the
control of the local community over their own affairs.
The modern Somali nationalism provided a mechanism to transform the cultural nationalism
to a political nationalism. This new trend also predicted a new form of notion which has
transformed the autonomous and harmonious Somalism to a strict form of centralisation. The
psychological environment fashioning the feeling of Somalism was the mechanism behind
this determination. Behind this, the concept of centralisation was based on the often
misinterpreted Somali notion of midnimo (unity), often called Somalism.
3.1 MISCONCEPTION OF THE CONCEPT
What led to the current problem is believed to be the misinterpretation of the concept itself.
midnimo is often misinterpreted and distorted until it has failed to be what it should stand for.
The drive of unifying the missing territory has been interpreted to putting Somalis under a

5. 3
very rigid, centralised system. This not only leads to frustration, but also contradicts Somali
traditional culture.
The diversity of the ecological and economic conditions compelled most Somalis to lead a
scattered life in either pastoral, agricultural, or towndwelleres. All these types of living shared
a similar culture. This cultural bond is the basis of Somali egalitarianism which is based on
equality on ground such as: social experience, economic and social life styles that did not
create separation; a predominant oral culture that tends to unite people, so that people are able
to cross their boundaries to identify with each other with a language that fosters unity.
This type of life made Somalis to live widely dispersed and consequently to lack the
necessary organisational form needed to form a single political unit. The centralisation of the
system of government has also effected the essence of traditional authority as well as the type
of authority which was replaced during the formation of the modern Somali statehood. How
has the impacted been developed?
3.2 THE EROSION OF THE TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY
In spite of the fact that Somalia’s nightmare came into focus in this decade, it is believed that
it had begun in the closing decade of the nineteenth century. This had not only resulted in the
partition of Somali territory, but also had left behind a centralised system of government alien
to the Somalis. Traditionally, Somali political authority was spread throughout the
community, as there was no centre for political control. Clan leaders dealt with people
politically on a face-to-face basis, and were responsible for all affairs concerning the clan and
its relations with other clans. They claimed no rights as rulers over their people. The clan-
leader had not much executive power (Kapteijns, 1993). Somali egalitarianism is
encapsulated in the right of every man to have a say in communal affairs. After lengthy
discussion and analysis of the matter concerned, a decision in the shir is decided by
consensus.
During the late 1930s to 1960s lineage politics were manipulated to serve the political needs
of the colonisers. A new form of hierarchy was introduced, and chiefs, called caaqils, were
appointed by the colonial administration to represent and speak for the clan lineages. This
process was to undermine local authority. These subordinate caaqils were used as political
representatives of colonial authorities as they were paid a stipend by the colonial
administration and given other concessions. These spokesmen were generally, for obvious
reasons of convenience and availability, drawn from the urban areas. The colonial masters
paid them and as a result undermined the traditional source of authority (Lewis, 1980;
Samatar, 1988). This also weakened the integrity of the community harmonious relations and
enforcement of peace for “the common good among local groups was replaced by a high
public political profile of a socio-economic nature” (Sadia, 1994).
Traditional chiefs thus became marginalized. Such social changes, which saw influence
shifting from traditional (rural) leaders to a new urban leadership, were to have an impact on
the modern Somali political leadership.
While, the ability of the traditional assemblies to influence decisions grew steadily weaker,
power shifted to modern political leaders who were not up to the communal responsibility.

6. 4
These new leaders, living away from the communities were free of the traditional pattern of
constraints and became less and less accountable for their actions.
This new political culture created a type of leader who was more concerned with personal
power and aggrandisement. Such a person, physically and socially removed from the
traditional power base, felt free to operate unchecked by the clan, and this lack of
responsibility to his constituents was not compensated for by a more general, though
essential, sense of responsibility to society as a whole that should accompany public service.
This degeneration in standards of responsibility would help pave the way for the subsequent
leadership crises during the military era, and in the period of disintegration of the Somali
nation state.
The civilian government, which ruled Somalia in the 1960s, did not change much of what
they had inherited from their colonial predecessors. They gave priority and sometimes paid
salaries to the “townie” clan representatives. The military regime, which came to power in
1969, followed a similar policy. In addition to that, it created their clan representatives called
nabaddoon and samadoon (peace-seekers). Clan manipulation was also a mark of the regime;
the policy became a political instrument whose effect on the Somali public was to build up
resentment among other clan groupings. The regime set a two-tier system, one which
rewarded some sub-clans for their loyalty to the Kacaanka Barakaysan (the Blessed
Revolution), and the other to persecute and repress those sub-clans "for their recalcitrance or
reluctance to be enthusiastic about the new order imposed upon them." (Siciid, 1993). To
create fear among the social groupings, family members and neighbours were encouraged to
spy on each other and report to the Guulwadayaal, the para-military force established, which
acted as the regime's watchdog at neighbourhood level (Issa-Salwe, 1996). The song
“harkaaga laguu diray” (your shadow is watching you) was meant to intimidate people from
drifting from the ‘revolutionary path’.
3.3 ILLUSIONARY VIEW OF MISLEADING POLICY
Clanship remained a major force in the Somali politics since 1940s. This influence did not
abate with modernity as claimed by some scholars and intellectuals. This view has raised
many debates which continue until today. According to I M Lewis and Said Samatar, Somali
leadership, including the intellectuals, failed to realise clanship influence over Somali
politics. The kinship group or lineages are the building blocks of Somali society and it is the
one which has the Somali socio-political identity.
During the independence struggle the nationalistic mood influenced a trend which was to get
rid of the clan name which was the traditional way to address themselves openly. This
influence was also evidenced in the Somali modern poems which had a major role in
moulding the nationalist mood. The view of the new educated elite which was developing in
this period was influenced by the new trend. According to Abdullahi H Adan, the civilian
government's approaches “were essentially designed to preserve, rather than upset, the
political balance that grew out of the nationalist agitation of the 1940s and 1950s" (Adan,
1997). This gradualist approach on social and economic change could not satisfy the populist
elite dissent political manifested by "ameliorative political demands (reformism) versus
revolutionary opposition" (ibid.).

7. 5
These illusions of denying their social engineering mislead the national policy and social
expression. In the end this ended up with various Somali governments to create false
impression to deal with the social reality (example, the “ex”, the rhetoric of Siyad Barre). For
some leaders this was a cover up policy while the kinship influence played their policy (i.e.
Barre’s rhetoric façade for his MOD strategy). Instead, the military regime "denied any
public space or opportunity clan driven politics, it also constrained the activities of its
entrepreneurs in the name of national unity and social modernization" (ibid.).
The divisive element of clanship is thriving with modernity. For example, it has adopted the
modern technology for its ends (i.e. the Internet). Currently, there are almost four hundred
Somali websites. These sites come broadly under six categories: community/political,
cultural/literary, professional/educational, online newspapers, business and personal. The
majority of these websites tend to publish in the form of ‘online news'. Some of these sites
tend to use the web as a means for expressing their political stance of movement or their
specific group identity. Their aim is to rally their social groups or communities. The other
factor for using ‘online news’ is construct identity; thus the ‘online news’ feature is just a side
effect.
Despite all six categories running different services, they generally have similar structures.
For instance, the majority of them have online newspapers, literary, Islamic information links
and an Internet Relay Chat section. The characteristic of the Islamic links shows Somali
importance for Islam and its teaching.
Somali websites activities epitomise the turbulent, darkest sides as well as the best sides of
the history of the Somali nation. When a society begins to disintegrate during periods of
social or economic turmoil, it experiences an identity crisis. In such a situation, "people
endeavour to reconstitute their identities and social meaning by articulating and identifying
with alternative discourses" (Laclau et al, 1985).
4. THE EXTERNAL SETBACK: UNITING WITH THE ‘ORGANIC’ STATE
The collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s triggered a new debate over the question
of how and why this came about. Different theories have been put forward one of which
identifies the fundamental malaise resulting from the boundary problems which Africa
inherited. Somalia's resources, energy and spirit concentrated on the goal of uniting its
remaining kinsmen in Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia under one flag. This policy effectively
isolated it from the pan-African movement. However, Somalis themselves did not see that
pan-Somalism, which was the driving force of their foreign policy, as contradicting their pan-
Africanism. In fact, they regarded it as an application of the wider principle, since it aimed at
a legitimate unification of territories which colonial interests had arbitrarily destroyed. Many
OAU member states, however, saw Somalia's position as troublesome and potentially
divisive and were not well disposed towards it.
The newly formed African countries resisted the strategy of putting all Somalis in one
‘organic’ state in the 1960s; they saw Somalia's position as upsetting the balance of the newly
formed African states.
In the early 1960s, it was widely believed that the inherited borders of the new African states
would give rise to many bitter conflicts (Touval, 1972). The predictions that boundary and
territorial conflict would plague Africa after independence were based on the assumption that

8. 6
‘tribes and ethnic groups divided would seek to become united, to become members of the
same state, or form a state of their own’, and that they would therefore challenge the
boundaries dividing them.
The domestic influence over the boundary politics is one of the aspects involved in state
formation. Many states advocated the territorial status quo and the sanctity of the boundaries
imposed by the colonial powers. The ethnic compositions of these states, their political
history and their internal politics were the factors which influenced them towards boundary
and territorial problems. Boundaries may from to the external shell of the state. Therefore, for
many new African states, their survival got linked to protection of the shell. Maintenance of
the status quo has come to be associated with the self-preservation of the state (Ibid.). If
secession were granted to any group or region, it was feared, it would stimulate secessionist
demands from other groups or regions, thus threatening the integration of the state. Many
African states were vulnerable and suspicious of any challenge to the boundaries defined by
colonialists for fear that the framework of political entities in the continent might be swept
away in anarchy of tribal and other conflicts (Gobban, 1945).
The year 1960 is known as the annus mirabilis of African independence as the majority of
African states came into existence during that year. By the latter half of the 1990s there were
fifty, or (if the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic is included), fifty-one independent states.
With only a few exceptions, (such as Ethiopia, Egypt and Liberia), all are relatively 'new'
states. As they acquired statehood, the new states began to search for new identities as nation-
states. They embarked on the task of welding into a nation a variety of peoples, speaking
different languages, and at different stages of social and political development.
Boundaries may be called the external shell of the state. Therefore, survival of several new
African states depended on protecting the shell. By defining themselves according to the
inherited colonial boundaries, the majority of African states found that for their own survival
they must respect the inherited colonial borders. In many cases, the maintenance of the status
quo has come to be associated with self-preservation of the state.
Despite the fact that almost all African states have at one time or another been involved in
some border dispute, four states have been opposed to the principle of accepting the inherited
boundaries. These were Morocco, the Somali Republic, Ghana, and Togo. Their irredentist
policies caused many conflicts with their neighbours which also became international
concerns: conflicts between Morocco and Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, Somalia and
Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and between Ghana and Togo.
In spite of this, almost all African states have at one time or another been involved in some
border dispute. Two states opposed the principle of accepting inherited boundaries. One of
these was Somalia. Somalia's territorial claims, and the counter claims of Ethiopia, Kenya
and France (Djibouti) have provoked many international problems.
Somalia's aim was to unite all members of the Somali nation within a Somali nation-state.
Somalia's claims can be categorised, according to Touval's definition, as ‘core values’.
Claims which concern ‘core values’ of self-image focus upon ethnic distinction. For the
Somali people the creation of an independent Somali Republic, on 1 July 1960, was only the
beginning of their struggle for national unity. The policy of uniting Somalia's remaining
relatives under one flag challenged the principle of accepting existing borders.

9. 7
Mentioned above, boundaries came to be associated with the external shell of the state. This
strategy became a survival kit for the many new African states and therefore they opted to
protect this policy. Maintenance of the status quo has come to be associated with the self-
preservation of the state (Issa-Salwe, 2000).
There has been many sympathy which Somalia gained from some quarters. However, it did
not help to achieve its aim. This colonial legacy was to impact on the political, social and
economic life of the Somali nation. In fact, this is believed to be one of the major factors
which led to the collapse of the modern Somali state in the early 1990s.
5. REDEFINING MIDNIMO
Leading a decentralised life style is the tradition of the Somalis and the current crisis has led
them to realise how far it is important for them to regain what belongs to them. This also
reflects Somalis’ loss of confidence in their politicians. This last influence has awakened in
the Somalis the need to take part in the political life of their country.
The civil war, which ensued after the ousting of the military regime, created a situation that
forced people to return to their clan "areas". Once in their safe area, these people began to
feel the need for some other essential requirements or services. Thus, these requirements and
the underpinning social intercourse could not be possible without a regulating body or
institute. It was this need which brought the creation of some administrative bodies in some
parts of the country. It is this same feeling which has pushed Somalis towards
decentralisation.
Somali culture offers some clues how best Somalis can survive. Somalis led a decentralised
life for centuries. A mechanism for decentralisation is possible when there is a system based
on regional autonomy or state (canton). The principal based on this system is a bottom-up
approach, which maintains procedures built from the grass roots.
At present, the Somali midnimo faces its biggest challenges. When a society begins to
disintegrate during periods of social or economic turmoil, it experiences an identity crisis. In
such a situation, "people endeavour to reconstitute their identities and social meaning by
articulating and identifying with alternative discourses" (Laclau et al, 1985). Following the
breakdown of the State, Somalis did not give up trying again to reconstruct their lives. In
spite of the fact that the midnimo has experienced its downfall since the creation of the state,
just recently it took to a new turn which may be re-awaken. This is what can be referred as
resuscitation of the midnimo. And some of its development may be witnessed from how the
Somalis are trying to respond to the collapse of their statehood. Somaliland was the first to
attempt to regenerate midnimo in 1991, followed by North-eastern Regions in 1992 (later
Puntland in 1998), and Bay in 1995. However, this process took place at many levels for
example the establishment of Amoud University, etc.
5.1 SOMALILAND REPUBLIC
On 18 May 1991 the Somali National Movement, which had taken control of the North-
western regions, declared the regions as an independent Somaliland Republic. They argued
that its action was not secessionist but rather the reinstatement of the status which existed for

10. 8
four days, 26-30 June 1960, before British and Italian Somalilands were united into the
Republic of Somalia.
Their bold effort can be perceived as having two effects: that of trying to reshape or
redefining the midnimo as well as drawing themselves into a no-way-out situation. This is
more evident when Somaliland tries to define itself as what had constituted the former British
Somaliland (formerly North-western, Awdal and Togdheer regions).
Not only have they exasperated the Somalis, but also have frustrated the Somali peace
solution. Somaliland’s venture not only has impact on the Somali nation, but also touches the
very heart of the century old problem of the formation of African state and controversies
about their boundaries. In spite that of this secessionism appearing to signal the end of the
long road to midnimo and offering a respite to some African countries who fear the apparent
Somali expansionism implied by midnimo, it makes African leaders throughout the continent
tremble. If secession were granted to any group or region, they fear, it would stimulate
secessionist demands from other groups or regions, thus threatening the integration of the
African state. Many African states are vulnerable to and suspicious of any challenge to the
boundaries defined by the colonialists for fear that the framework of political entities in the
continent might be swept away in an anarchy of tribal and other conflicts.
Nevertheless, the ethnic Somali people of regions bordering the Somali state played a major
role in the process of the midnimo when they expressed a desire first to join their brethren of
Italian Somaliland in 1960. In April 1960 in Hargeysa, the Legislative Council passed a
resolution calling for union with Italian Somaliland.
During this period, there was rumour that some of the new Somali political leaders in the
north had campaigned for a different option from that of the people: to delay the unification
with Italian Somaliland. Others went further: to advocate the formation of a separate state.
Both groups’ ambitions were defeated by the strong will and aspirations of the Somali
people.
Just after four months of the formation of the Somali Republic, the first challenge to the unity
was experienced in December 1961 when a secessionist military coup led by twelve northern
officers was attempted (Lewis, 1980). The objective was to detach the northern region from
the Somali Republic. The revolt leaders were arrested by their subordinates who defied the
orders of their own commanders (ibid.). While the aspiration of the Somalis played a major
role in suppressing the secessionist coup, they attempted to express their feeling in more
democratic ways, when the majority of people of the north voted against the constitution of
1961 in a referendum, whereas in the southern regions only a huge majority in favour (ibid.).
5.2 NORTH-EASTERN REGIONS (LATER PUNTLAND)
The second course of action for the resuscitation of midnimo came on 21 December, 1991,
when Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) leadership, the traditional religious leaders,
intellectuals and politicians of the North-eastern regions (NER) agreed to form a regional
administration under the leadership of former Police Chief (1960-1969), General Mahamed
Abshir Muse, with Abdullahi Boqor Muse as General Co-ordinator (Issa-Salwe, 1996). They
justified their move on the grounds of the collapse of the central government and the need of
self-reliance and self-defence.

11. 9
Under NER three regions came to be identified. These are Bari, Nugaal and North Mudug,
whose people share a single socio-economic resource, and a common political and traditional
leadership. Although administratively NER regions were working as one entity, competing
interests within SSDF leadership on the other hand, and between SSDF and the Council of
Elders (Isimo) on one hand weakened and obstructed the smooth running of the
administration. Nevertheless, these regions were united on the policy of self-reliance and of
mobilisation of regional self-defence campaigns during the early years of the civil war.
In August 1998 NER joined with Sool and East Sanaag regions to form a new administration.
Representatives from these regions agreed in Garoowe to call the administration the Puntland
State of Somalia. Ethnically, these people are mainly from the Daarood and Meheri clans and
their attempt is partially a direct response to the domineering political ambitions of the
Hawiye in the south and the secessionist moves of Isaaq, the predominant clan in Somaliland.
Puntland was to articulate itself within the framework of the Somali state. Puntland’s new
border encroaches with that of Somaliland as two of its regions Sool and Eastern Sanaag are
also claimed by Somaliland.
The Puntland leadership declared that “this is an experiment and first step towards the new
Somalia” (see Puntland State Information, August 1998). This policy, according to them, is to
“recreate” Somalia by a bottom-up approach as “this will lead to the establishment of
separate regional administrations, leading to negotiations between equal regional states to
pave the way for the reconstruction of a central federal system of Government in Somalia”
(ibid). The central government would have primary responsibility over national defence,
foreign, financial and monetary guidance.
5.3 BAY AND BAKOOL REGIONS (NOW SOUTHWESTERN STATE)
The Conference of Digil and Mirifle held in Baydhaba in 1995 responded the third attempt to
redefine midnimo. Between 26 February and 19 March 1995 traditional leaders, elders,
intellectuals and women’s organisations of Digil and Mirifle community met in a conference
to answer the pressing needs for security and basic social services following the breakdown
of the state.
The conference passed a regional constitution which decided to form a regional
administration which would be run by a Council of Leaders. The constitution emphasises that
the supreme authority in the political affairs of the region is the Council of Leaders. The
Council of Leaders should be composed of 33 permanent members (see The Conference of
Digil and Mirifle). The conference further reiterated that the regional arrangement has the
responsibility to enter in contract with other Somali regions to form a federal Somali state.
The type of federal structure proposed by the Conference of Digil and Mirifle for the future
Somali state is based on “four states” divided among the main Somali clans, the Hawiye,
Daarood, Isaaq and Dir community (ibid.). For the Digil and Mirifle communities, the notion
of decentralisation goes beyond their resolution of 1995. During the independence struggle of
1940s and 1950s, the Independent Constitutional Party, known also as Hisbul Disturul Digil
& Mirifle (HDSM), advocated a federal system for the Somali nation. HSDM represented the
southern region ethnic people, namely the Rahanweyn, Digil, Bantu and Arab communities
(Issa-Salwe, 1996).

12. 10
They put their proposal in January 1948 to the Commission of the Four Powers (Britain,
USSR, US and France) which visited Muqdisho following the defeat of Italy in 1945. The
commission was established to investigate the wishes of the former Italian Somaliland,
concerning their political future.
The Digil, Mirifle and their allied communities’ worries extended also during the
independence. They always used to worry the pastoralist to migrate to the fertile area they
live. Migration is part of Somali society tradition. For centuries Somali clans migrated, first
from south-eastern Ethiopia, which is believed to be the cradle of their earliest ancestors
(Hersi, 1997), spreading north-eastward to populate the Horn. Centuries later, a new wave of
migration began flowing in the opposite direction, to the south and west (Ibid. 22). The
traditional migration patterns that can be discerned show that the Somali clans followed two
main routes: the river Shabeelle valley and along the line of coastal wells on the Indian Ocean
littoral (Lewis, 1993). By the close of the seventeenth century Somali clans had spread to the
northern part of what is now Western Somaliland, and the southern part of the Jubba river up
to the Tana river, presently Kenya (Ibid.; Hersi, 1997).
In spite of the fact that Somali migration subsided for some time, it did not disappear
completely. In fact, it gained a new impetus during the modern Somali state. Following the
Sahalian drought of 1973-74, the Somali government began a policy of expropriating the
fertile land along the Lower Shabeelle and Middle Jubba river (Besteman, 1996). And in the
following year it enacted a mandatory land registration (the 1975 Land Law) which required
farmers to “apply to the state for leasehold title” (Ibid.). Although this process is common in
most of African countries, in Somalia it degenerated as the system became so centralised and
easy to abuse and manipulate. Only those people who could afford to access the cumbersome
administrative requirements could register. Because of this, many local people were
displaced. The policy represented the first phase of an irreversible demographic shift in
modern times, in which the pastoralist clans migrated to southern Somalia (Menkhaus et al,
1996).
The deterrence of the Digil and Mirifle community, however, could not hold long as this did
protect them from General Mahamed Farah Garaad Aideed’s Somali National Alliance taking
the region by force in late 1995. General Aideed took advantage of the situation to take
control of Bay and adjacent regions, following a political dispute within the Somali
Democratic Movement (the Digil and Mirifle armed movement). The general’s militia’ booty
was the land stretching from Marka through Lower Shabeelle and Jamaame to the Lower
Jubba region. During the same period these regions became the battleground of Siyad Barre’s
forces and General Aideed’s. This triggered a famine whose intensity and intensity of the
situation the world came to realise only when Baydhaba hit the international media as the
"City of Death" (Issa-Salwe, 1996). In the end of 1999, with the held of Rahanweyn
Resistance Army (RRA) (to fight General Aideed’s forces), the Digil and Mirifle community
regained the control of their region. And on 8 December 1999 for the third time since the
1940s, they established their own "autonomous administration". Similarly, HSDM’s proposal
reflected their fear of pastoral domination by the Daarood and Hawiye clans. Federal form of
governance is seen by these communities as “safety and protection of their land” (Menkhaus,
1980).

13. 11
5.4 PROBLEMS FACING THE PROCESS OF RESUSCITATION
Kinship influence has played a major political force in the Somali politics since the beginning
of the 1940s. Political leaders have been torn between their personal ambitions, that of their
groups (or grassroot supporters), which are generally based on the kinship ties, and that of
their national commitments. If a leader opts for one at the cost of the other, he is either
alienated from his groups or fails his national obligations.
These illusions of denying their social engineering mislead the national policy and social
expression. In the end this ended up with various Somali governments to create false
impression to deal with the social reality (example, the “ex”, the rhetoric of Siyad Barre). For
some leaders this was a cover up policy while the kinship influence played their policy (i.e.
Barre’s rhetoric façade for his MOD strategy).
Another major problem is the fear of clan supremacy. While the process of restoration is
essential for the survival of the Somali nation, there is fear that the major clan would try to
gain supremacy. For example, when SNM declared the Northern regions as an independent
republic, most non-Isaaq people living in the north were uneasy, and suspected that it was an
attempt at `Isaaq hegemony'. Similarly, the formation of Puntland created fear among the
small Daarood groups, fearing that the Harti would attempt to dominate the region.
5.5 THE FEAR OF GROUP DOMINATION
Although Somaliland has begun to articulate itself outside the Somali nation, it has similar
concerns as the Puntland and Bay communities. Their common concern is their future. Their
anxiety prompted them to review the responsibility they have towards the parts they have
taken control of. What each group started in its own way can be seen an attempt at redefining
what Somalis cherishes most: the midnimo. Their initiatives are known as "building-blocks"
and are seen as a solution to the Somali problem.
The reasons for their attempt, other than that of solving the Somali dilemma shows two
tendencies: (i) the need to take their fate into their own hands (the inner desire of this
yearning is the basis for ownership and political legitimacy), and (ii) their willingness to
survive within the framework of the Somali nation. This last aspiration could be one of the
fundamentals of human being to express himself.
From the above underlying principle we can also perceive another important aspect which led
to the civil war: the fear of clan domination. Basically, the mistrust created by the civil war is
so deep that it has opened old traditional rivalries. The memory of the dreadful fratricidal
war, which is still lingering in the minds of the Somalis, has caused society to review their
political lives and fate. The trauma which resulted from the civil strife has its result in the fear
of clan domination.
6. PROS AND CONS
While ethnicity can create some form of social cohesion, it may also hinder any attempt to
state formation. There is a theory which says that the utility of the traditional Somali political
characteristics hardly reconcile with a view of a state. This view is based on the divisive

14. 12
element of clanism. Nonetheless, the new social situation has engendered a new political and
social space where Somalis could recreate themselves.
While ethnicity can create some form of social cohesion, it may also hinder any attempt to
state formation. There is a theory which that the utility of the traditional Somali political
characteristics hardly reconcile with a view of a state. This view is based on the divisive
element of clanism. Nonetheless, following the new social situation has engendered red new
political and social space where situation Somalis could recreate themselves.
Although what Somaliland, Puntland and Bay have started leads to reconstitute an alternative
discourses, there are trends which may hamper or hold back the very process and goal which
they are supposed to aim. Adopting the experience gained from the defunct Somali republic,
these communities pledge to put their efforts on the process of institutional building so that
the state authority can spread over its jurisdiction. As far as these new administrations are
concerned, this process will decentralise power and create self-reliance in development.
It seems that the dictatorial style of Somali leaders is still haunting Somalis. Both Puntland
and Bay autonomous regions have been plunged into chaos following the dictatorial style of
their leaders. Accordingly, it will promote "civil society inclusiveness and grassroots
involvement" in peace making. It seems, however, that these administrations are more
concerned to build their own power than public institutions. If this is true then this procedure
may emerge to be an attempt by them to secure control of their people in ‘the name of order
and law enforcement’. Any attempt to that direction will certainly have a negative effect as it
will induce insatiability and create an environment of mistrust and insecurity among people.
Not only it contradicts the very promise which their leadership are engaged (or contracted)
with the people, but it may also derail its experiment.
In June 2001, President Col Abdullahi Yusuf 's plunged Puntland in constitutional crisis
when he unconstitutionally extended his presidency and that of his parliament for another
three-year term. A number of Puntland's traditional elders meeting in Garowe in July 2001
rejected his claim, and named Yusuf Haji Nur, Puntland's former Chief Justice, as "Acting
President" until the election of a new administration. The elders then convened a general
congress in August and, on 14 November 2001, elected Jama Ali to a three-year term in the
hope that this would end the leadership wrangle. However, to force his will on the people,
Col Abdullahi Yusuf has opted to use military force with the backing of Ethiopia.
Similarly, in Baydoba, Xasan Maxamed Nuur "Shaarguduud" (RRA chairman) had thrown
Bay and Bakool region in total chaos following disagreement with his lieutenants.
Both Puntland and Bay show a tendency of a “command and control” type state. This
condition creates a situation to oppose the will of the people or new ideas and at the end may
generate resentment among the people. Once political power is used for illegitimate ends, it
becomes difficult for those who hold this power to submit a system of governance which will
demand accountability.
For the benefit and integrity of the resuscitation, both Puntland and Bay leadership should
generate an environment that would be allowed to flourish their cheered effort. In Puntland
and Bay, as well as any other area in Somalia, the institute building process can be possible
only with the people's vision and participation. At any level, Somalis must be convinced of
the benefit of nation-statehood.

15. 13
7. CONCLUSION
Any solution, unless it is based on today’s reality, is prone to fail or possibly to complicate
and intensify the conflict. One of the main causes of Somalis’ present dilemma is mistrust. In
spite of that Somalis have undergone much tragedy in their recent history. Event in the
regions shows their commitment to rebuild their nation. This is what can be referred to as the
resuscitation of the midnimo. If this current process fails the reality shows that the Somali
most cherished midnimo will be gone forever. Former the Somali nation will be fragmented
as some parts might be assimilated by other states, while others will have to face the new
reality to form their independent state.
Since the trust and legitimacy of the political authority lies at the grassroot level, this is the
level at which the recreation of the state should begin. The relative success achieved by
Puntland, Somaliland and Bay is based on this approach.
As mentioned above, Somali culture offers some clues of how best Somalis can survive.
Leading a decentralised life style is the tradition of the Somalis and the current crisis has led
them to realise it is important for them to regain what belongs to them. This also reflects
Somalis’ loss of confidence in their politicians. This last influence has been awakened in the
Somalis and so has the need to take part in the political life of their country.
This question is related to the issue of authority. As mention above, Somali political authority
was spread throughout the community, the centralisation structures have severed the course
of authority. The central government was expected to appoint the local authority. In this case,
the local administration structures do not drive from the explicit consent of the local people,
but depend instead upon the endorsement of a higher political authority. This alien system
exasperated when the central government abused the system.
The process of resuscitating the midnimo opens a new opportunity to recreate the Somali
nation in a new structure of modern governance which balances the various communities
throughout Somalia. Rejecting centralised rigidities which led to the chaos and opting for
radical decentralisation is a foundation, not a luxury but a survival kit. Only a fully federal
system (with fiscal freedom) which allows the people to govern themselves at the most local
level as appropriate can give the Somali the promise of a news hope and peaceful future.

16. 14
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