19-46_IJAPM-2015

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International Journal of Arts and Project Management 2(1):19-46 Nov. 2015
www.sagepublishers.org© SAGE GLOBAL PUBLISHERS, 2015
SUCCESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POWER-SHARING MODELS
REGARDING MANAGEMENT OF INTRACTABLE CLAN CONFLICT IN SOMALIA
Abdullahi Mohamed Hersi
Prof. Pontian Godfrey Okoth, Ph.D.
Prof. Frank Matanga, Ph.D.
Dr. Edmond Maloba Were, Ph.D
Abstract
Somalia is a country that has experienced one of the most intractable conflicts in Africa, which has
had direct security ramifications not only in the region, but also the world. It is a paradox of colonial
legacy, poor governance, zero-sum competition among different clans and political elites, coupled
with external intrusions, which among other ingredients inform the causal-factors of the political
quagmire in Somalia. In order to initiate a solution to the armed conflict and the divisive politics that
disintegrated Somalia into anarchic clan fiefdoms, a power-sharing model was initiated in 1997 by
then factions of Somali political leaders. The first government based on 4.5 (4 major clans and 0.5
for alliance of minorities) clan power-sharing model was formed in 2000 with a full mandate to
reconcile rival clans and promote democratic governance. In spite of the many concerted efforts, clan
conflict still persists. What remains unknown to the academia and policy makers is the deficiency in
the existing power-sharing arrangement in Somalia. This study therefore attempts to evaluate the
levels of success in the implementation of the power-sharing models in Somalia; and lastly is to
analyze the challenges faced in the application of the various power-sharing models. The study was
guided by two conflict theories. On the one hand, the theory of Consociationalism postulated by
Arend Lijphart, which holds that proportional power-sharing, protection of minority rights and
territorial autonomy are necessary for conflict management in a divided society. On the other hand, it
is also informed by Edward Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict theory that refers to prolonged and
often violent struggle by communal groups for basic needs such as security, recognition, acceptance,
fair access to political institutions, and economic participation. Using random and non-random
sampling, the study was conducted in 16 districts of Mogadishu in the federal republic of Somalia.
The study proportionally targeted five major clans (20% sample from each) in the current power-
sharing arrangement in Somalia. A total of 845 respondents drawn from the government,
representative of different clans and civil society directly participated in this study. In order to
increase reliability of the data collected from the field, one validation session was held. The
justification of this study is twofold. First, it contributes to the body knowledge pertaining to the field
of peace and conflict studies. Second, it enables policy makers in Somalia develop relevant programs
aimed at rebuilding strong government institutions for the benefit of the people of Somalia in
particular and Africa in general. The study also revealed that power-sharing limited to parliament
and council of ministers gave rise to an inequitable and unbalanced government structure. The study
demonstrates that consociational power-sharing model as used in Somalia has failed to end the
political and socio-economic induced conflicts. The study recommends a centripetal power-sharing
model that promotes collaborative relationship between elites from rival clans leading to fair and
competitive political democracy in Somalia.
Keywords: Centripetalism, Clan, Conflict, Conflict Management, Consociationalism, Dia, Dia-
paying group, Failed state, Federalism, Intractable Conflict, Model, Peace building, Power-sharing,
State building and Socio-emotional reconciliation

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Hersi, Okoth, Matanga, Were. Int. Journal of Arts and Project Management 2(1):19-46, Nov 2015
Introduction
As emphasized by Nunn (2008) among many others, slavery and its aftermath was a cornerstone of
organized political violence in Africa. According to Nilsson (2013) few historic events have been as
closely associated with European empire building and the colonisation of Africa as the Berlin
conference on West Africa of 1884–85. The Berlin Conference is frequently described as the
occasion when the European powers divided the African continent among themselves with the help
of a map and a ruler (Nilsson, 2013). Prior to being gobbled up by colonial powers, Africa was
divided into a patchwork of ‘tribal’ structures and proto-states (historical kingdoms) with
heterogeneous political systems (Besley, 2013). In this brief period, Europeans partitioned Africa
into spheres of influence, protectorates, colonies, and free-trade-areas. The borders were designed in
European capitals at a time when Europeans had barely settled in Africa and had little knowledge of
the geography and ethnic composition of the areas whose borders they were designing
(Michalopoulos, 2011).
According to Cassanelli (2011), the European colonialists partitioned Somali inhabited land in Horn
of Africa, hence created separate colonial identities for each of the Somali colonial territories. He
argues that western scholars working in three different European languages and academic traditions
began to produce the knowledge base that would become the foundation of the Western secular
tradition of Somali Studies. According to Mohamed (2006), the colonialists created boundaries had
not only squeezed the grazing land of the Somali pastoral nomads, but also divided family members
into demarcated colonial frontiers. During the period, which ran between 1860 and 1900, the Somali
nation was divided into five regional groupings. From north to south these were: French Somaliland
(also containing the Afar, a related pastoral people), the British Somaliland Protectorate with no
colonial settlers, the Italian colony of Somalia, the Ethiopian Ogaden (named after that local clan),
and British northern Kenya (Lewis, 2004). When Somalia became an independent state, it started to
reclaim all the Somali inhabited land in the neighbouring countries.
The Somali state collapsed in 1990 after 20 years of military rule that started in October 1969 after a
brief democratic system exercise. With the downfall of the military regime in 1990, the opposition
forces were disturbingly unprepared for the maintenance of law and order and have completely failed
to restore state institutions (Dirshe, 2013). After the collapse of the central state, Somalia
experienced what would be referred in the Hobbesian world as “a war of all against all.” A
confluence of factors including colonial legacy, external intervention, clannism, poor and failed
leadership and fierce competition of state power and resources contributed to the intractability of the
conflict in Somalia. Farah et al (2002) contend that historical claims to land and resources by
different Somali clans play an important and sometimes powerful role in current political debates in
Somalia. In this case, power-sharing refers to political arrangements which guarantee the
participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision-making, and
especially in the executive (Lijphart, 2004), but also in the legislature, the judiciary, the police and
the army. By dividing power among rival groups, power-sharing institutions reduce the danger that
one party becomes dominant and threaten the security of others (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Power-
sharing also seeks to shelter minorities from the effects of majority rule (Papagianni, 2006). Power-
sharing solutions make for good transitional devices, but in the long run the best outcome may well
be a much more fluid form of democracy that allows for the creation of flexible coalitions that bridge
the ethnic divide (Sisk, 2003). The contemporary interest in power-sharing as the underlying
principle for the organisation of the state has arisen because of the belief that sharing power is
particularly suited to the peaceful co-existence of ethnic groups in conflict and for a fair and
participatory political system (Ghai, 2005). There have been many recent examples of the use of
power-sharing to solve ethnic conflicts: Belgium, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,
the Sudan, Spain/Basques and other historical communities, Papua New Guinea/Bougainville. In

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many continuing conflicts, negotiations have revolved around the distribution of power - Sri
Lanka/Tamil Tigers, Indonesia/Acehians, Iraq/Kurds, Russia/ethnic minorities, and
Canada/Quebecois and indigenous peoples (Ghai, 2005). There are four basic principles of power-
sharing such as; grand coalition governments in which nearly all political parties have appointments;
protection of minority rights for groups; decentralization of power and decision making by consensus
(Sisk, 2003).
Samatar (2013) explains that Somali clannism is earth-shattering and globe-trotting, coming out as a
happy camper wherever Somalis set foot, from Siberia to Senegal and from the North to the South
Pole. Afyare (2010), posits that besides religious Islamic identity and the national Somali identity,
clan identity is very strong among Somali people and has played a significant role in the conflict. He
further argues that clan identity in Somalia is based on partrilineal descent where Somalis count their
name as far back as 20 or more generations starting from first name of male members of family.
Lewis (1995) also confirms that there are approximately 100 clans in Somalia though, but the size
and power of each clan varies considerably. Somalis use clan in modern ways in order for them to
manage transnational capital through clan networks. Somalis realize and reaffirm clan networks as a
resource in the moments of movement, celebration, and crisis (Kusow 2007).
In spite of her homogeneity of sharing the same language, adhering to the same religion, and
majority of them being from same ethnic group, Somalia experienced one of the longest civil wars
and intractable conflicts in Africa. The conflict has not only made Somalia an insecure and chaotic
country in the world, but also destroyed its social fabric and institutions necessary for governance
and basic human survival. Because of widespread lawlessness, ineffective government, terrorism,
insurgency, crime, and well-publicized pirate attacks against foreign vessels, Somalia topped the
Failed States Index (Messner, 2014). Many scholars and political analysts describe the political
conflict in Somalia as a power struggle between elites and their cahoots from different rival clans.
The opportunistic methods by which groups and individuals have marshaled support to gain or retain
access to public support have finally destroyed the very institutions of the state (Samatar, 1992). The
manipulation of “clan” identity by external forces and the subservient role of local politicians to gain
power persist today in Somalia (Dirshe, 2013).
In spite of protracted conflict and clan loyalty over state loyalty, Somalia is struggling to build strong
government institutions at federal and state level. But because of long absence of law and order,
there are insurmountable obstacles to the emergence of a sustainable and democratic Somali State.
Somalia’s recent experiment of federalism sparked competition and warfare among different clans
and sub-clans. Because of the predatory behavior of post colonial regimes and decades of violent
armed conflicts, many see clan based federalism as a zero-sum game in which power gained by the
state creates powerful clan hegemonies. Previous attempts for state building in Somalia have neither
addressed hostile political memories that still impact on Somali clan relations nor reduced tensions in
the wider society. Hence, the realization of genuine and all inclusive power-sharing that reflects the
interests of different clans and groups is still lacking. This study sought to evaluate the level of
success in the implementation of the power-sharing models regarding management of intractable
clan conflict in Somalia
Levels of success in the implementation of the power-sharing in Somalia
The Somalia power-sharing government has developed a viable and legitimate Somali-led political
process up to 20 August 2012, which marked the end of transitional institutions, and beyond (ADB,
2013). There is a strategy for deepening peace, attacking poverty and post-conflict reconstruction.
The TFG led the implementation of the Roadmap, working with the Transitional Federal Parliament
(TFP), regional entities and all sectors of society, including women, the business community,
religious leaders, elders and youth. On 1st
August 2012, the National Constituent Assembly of

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Somalia adopted the Provisional Constitution of Somalia, a key milestone towards the end of the
political transition of the country. On 20th
August 2012, Somali parliamentary elections marked
effectively the end of the transition period. The new Parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as
the President of Federal Republic of Somalia on 10th
September 2012 (ADB, 2013)
The government has a degree of authority and legitimacy domestically and has been recognized by
the international community, including the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and many
other organizations and countries. The President has set out a vision and priorities for the country
including security and justice, economic recovery, governance and combating corruption (ADB,
2013). Kirsti (2006) emphasizes the role of the constitution in ending post conflict transitional
period. He argues that the design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an
important role in the political and governance transition. According to him post conflict constitution
is very necessary, as it can drive the transformative process from conflict to peace. He argues that the
constitution seeks to transform the society from one that resorts to violence to one that resorts to
political means to resolve conflict, and/or shape the governance framework that will regulate access
to power and resources.
Zoppi (2013), explains that the constitution approved in 2012 represents an opportunity for Somalia
to re-establish a central government which has been absent for the last two decades, and reach a
stability that its society lacks since the pre-colonial era. The Constitution envisages the
implementation of a federalist structure for the new Somali state; a solution that is facing a number
of issues in the prickly Somali political environment. Burgess (2013) argues that the strategy of the
African Union, European Union, and United States in supporting Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda with
high-salience peace enforcement in Somalia succeeded in bringing greater top-down security. He
further explains that a combination of international assistance and training and increased combat
effectiveness by AMISOM and the SNAF led them, against expectations, to drive Al Shabaab out of
Mogadishu, Kismayo, and other urban centres. International donors and diplomats have tended to
prioritize regional stability and the crafting of ethnic power-sharing governance institutions, (Curtis,
2012).
Oksamytna (2012) shows how the involvement of international community sometimes back slide
gains made by the Somali leaders. He cites the UN-sponsored Kampala Accord signed by the
President and the Speaker of Parliament which prolonged the mandates of both institutions for a
year. One of the deal’s conditions was the resignation of a popular prime minister, Abdullahi
Mohamed, who managed to improve the situation in Mogadishu by appointing technocrats to his
cabinet, restoring the provision of some public services, and ensuring the regular payment of civil
servants’ salaries, (Oksamytna, 2012).
Power-sharing has come to signify a variety of institutional arrangements, ranging from transitional
and longer-term coalition governments to more general ideas of federalism, (Noyes, 2013). Conflict
settlements are more stable the more they institutionalize power-sharing and power-dividing across
four dimensions of society: political, economic, military, and territorial, (Carter, 2013). The more
highly institutionalized power-sharing is in society, the lower the risk of a return to civil war and the
more likely democratic consolidation. The most salient categories of power-sharing are constitutional
design, electoral system design, and decentralization/federalism (Carter, 2013). According to
Bryden (2013) , after more than 20 years of conflict, crisis, and statelessness and 12 years of
ineffectual transitional authorities, the Somali federal government (SFG) has been widely welcomed
as Somalia’s first ‘post- transition’ government. Gavin Raymond (2003) posits that conflict
devolution has been a significant trend. The fragmentation of the state has provided clan leaders
opportunities to seek more territorial, economic and political control.

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The appeal of the clan formula derives mainly from the principle that no major clan is inherently
superior to any other. This distributes decision-making power more evenly among different clans
(ICG, 2002). As Diamond, Linz & Lipset (1995) have pointed out, the presence and even generation
of cross-cutting cleavages is one of the means by which democracies ‘manage, soften, complicate,
and contain conflict’. However, as they have also stated, such cross-cutting cleavages tend to be
scarce or weakly felt in the deeply divided societies of Africa (Simonsen, 2005). Mentan (2004) also
notes that political, economic and cultural collapse hinders the rebuilding of communal identity far
more than violence. The re-establishment of stability is a priority for Somalis and for Somalia’s
partners yet progress towards restoring national government continues to be slow and disappointing.
The growth of sub-national entities in Somalia appears to offer an alternative route for achieving
stability and development (Chatham House, 2012). Despite that fact Somalia requires capable
security and governance system, the importance of genuine and inclusive reconciliation among
various clans and sub-clans cannot be over exaggerated. Sanei (2014) observes Somalia does not
only need reconciliation, but it needs a genuine reconciliation to treat its collective trauma as a nation
and set on the healing process. He argues that Somalia needs such closure in order to fix its broken
relationships, rebuild its damaged identity and rekindle a sense of nationhood.
Zoppi (2013) cites the possible danger associated with clannization of federalism. He mentions that
the risk of establishment clan federalism rather than regional one. He holds that clannization of a
federal state formation can easily trigger clan rivalries and recurrence of armed violence. He argues
that Somali needs a federal government with strong local institutions freed from latent affiliation
criteria, capable of avoiding many of risks posed by clan centric attitudes. Therefore, Somali citizens
will be able to enjoy the beauty of a fair representation in the state. (Zoppi, 2013), Kirsti (2006)
believe that the provision of security is the sine qua non of peace-building, and increasingly that the
building or rebuilding of public institutions is key to sustainability. However, the fact remains that a
successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building
mission. Boas and Rotwitt (2010) contend that the example of Somaliland and to a different degree
Puntland gives credibility to such an approach. Somaliland is without doubt the most peaceful and
stable part of the country. By adopting a system of governance anchored in the clan-based principles
of the predominantly nomadic northern Somali society, in combination with liberal democratic
values, it has been able to provide security to its citizens as well as collecting a modest level of taxes.
Renders (2012), argues that political power and economic control in Somaliland interact and
intermingle in one and same political space. She observes that Somaliland’s existence of hybrid
system has made for crucial positive contribution to the development of the polity. Ironically, the
same system has complicated further development of equitable power-sharing on a national level. As
the realm of central power expanded, clan based power brokers - often Hargeysa based politicians
and business people with vested interests in statehood as a guarantor of security and market control-
overlook the clan elders as pivotal political actors, (Renders, 2012). Thinking in terms of hybrid
political order reveals that state-building is not a legal and technical endeavor, but a process of
negotiation that occurs in an acutely political context. In Somaliland the negotiation involved a wide
range of actors: politicians, elders, the military, businesses, civil society, NGOs, and the international
community (Rift Valley Institute, 2012).
In order to underscore the importance of achieving sustainable peace through consultation and
consensus building, Burgess (2013) argues that the essence of the stability argument is that bottom-
up peace-building and diplomatic engagement with the clans must be given time. This is to achieve
results as the top-down security and premature state-building has the propensity of backfiring and
causing greater conflict. One of the primary legacies of the disintegration of the Somali State was a
return to the dominance of clan-based structures throughout the country. In the absence of the state,
local traditional mechanisms re-emerged as the basis of local governance to address social, security,
administrative and political affairs, and to provide a crucial safety net, (Interpeace and PDRC, 2007).

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Research Methodology
The researcher used mixed methods under qualitative and quantitative research techniques. This
study used phenomenological research design to collect, analyse and interpret the data. Moreover,
the researcher has used data analysis triangulation to ensure the validity and completeness of both
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analyze is well captured. The research was
conducted in Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia except one FGD and one key informant
interview which was also conducted in Nairobi, Kenya. Mogadishu consists of 16 districts. Since the
researcher focused on issues pertaining to politics of power-sharing, Mogadishu was the suitable
research area. This is because Mogadishu is the seat of all arms of federal government where
powering modeling are being practiced. Since clans are scattered all over Mogadishu, the study was
conducted in all the 16 districts of Banaadir region or Mogadishu to collect the required data from
five clans. The study randomly selected equal representative of different clans namely; Hawiye,
Darod, Dir, Digil-Mirifle and alliance of minority clans. Despite the fact that Hawiye is currently the
majority clan in Mogadishu, good numbers of other clans are also residing in the capital city. The
researcher selected proportional sample from all clans.
In this study, the population was clan elders, women and youth groups, religious leaders, business
people, NGO workers, intellectuals, civil servants, and politicians in Mogadishu proportionally
representing five different clans in Somalia. The researcher attempted to balance female and male
participation in the study. In this regard the target population was 1300 persons and 82 persons from
each district. In each of the 16 targeted districts a total of 17 persons from each of the five targeted
clans were targeted in the study population. The sampling size of the study was 845 (169 for each of
the five clans).The study employed stratified random sampling techniques to select 845 respondents
proportionally representing five different clans in Mogadishu, Somalia. The study will target, women
and youth groups; business people; university students; University lecturers; clan elders,
representatives of civil society organizations; senior civil servants; politicians and influential clan
leaders. The table below indicates categories of sample.

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Table 1: Respondent categories
Sampled groups Number of persons Percentage
Women 150 17.8
Youth 150 17.8
Elders/ matured men 150 17.8
Business people 150 17.8
University students 110 14.2
University Lecturers 10 1
Traditional Clan elders 25 3
Civil servants 60 7
Parliaments 20 2.4
Civil society 10 1.2
Independent politicians 10 1.2
Total 845 100
In order to ensure equitable representation of all targeted clans in the study, the researcher selected
20% sample from each of the five clans. Stratified sampling has been utilized to select all the
representative of clans and different sub-sections of targeted population. Qualitative and quantitative
research techniques also come in handy in presentation of research findings. This thesis comprises
statements, figures and tables. Descriptive statistics are indices that describe a given sample,
(Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Measures of distribution such as percentages and frequencies are
used. Quantitative data will be analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). The
researcher has also used of coded information to deduce generalizations from the sampled
population. The researcher has matched each specific objective with a specific data collection
method and instrument, sampling strategy, research `design, and data analysis technique as overleaf;
Results and Discussion
Figure 1: the Impact of power-sharing Models used in Somalia
Figure 1 above indicates that power-sharing models in Somalia are somewhat acceptable as more
than half of the respondents rate the performance of power-sharing as fair at 50.2% (402).
Furthermore, 25% (203) of the respondents argued that power-sharing in Somalia has failed to end
the armed conflict in the country. 18.3% (146) of the interviewees expressed their satisfaction on
power models and more specifically the 4.5 clan representation and rated it as good. 6.1% (49) of
the respondents rate the performance of power-sharing as excellent.

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Table 2: Impact of power-sharing in Somalia
Variable Frequency Percentage
Failed 203 18.3
Fair 402 50.2
Good 146 25.4
Excellent 49 6.1
Total 800 100.0
As stipulated in table 2 above, majority of the respondents 50.2% (402) argued that the result of the
power-sharing in Somalia is fair or poor. Positively, 25.4% (146) of the respondents agreed that
power-sharing system in Somalia is good, while 6.1% (49) of the interviewees also contended that
the impact of power-sharing is excellent. On the contrary, 18.3% (203) of the respondents argued
that power-sharing failed to produce tangible result.
The findings showed that the performance of power-sharing governance in Somalia was weak. The
findings further explicated that power-sharing in Somalia was necessitated by that fact that the clan
conflict was disastrous and devising inclusive political settlement that revive the collapsed state was
a priority. This is in agreement with Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), argument on the role power-sharing
arrangement in resolving political crises and civil wars. They claimed that after prolonged periods of
fighting and large numbers of casualties, the core concern on which armed opponents ultimately fix
their attention is the rules governing the use of power. They argue that the conflictants must agree to
lay aside their weapons permanently, seek to clarify who is to hold state power, how it is to be
exercised, and to what end. In the case of negotiated settlements, this is most often accomplished by
creating power-sharing and power-dividing institution, (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007).
In order to interrogate this matter further, the respondents were asked to give reasons for their
answers about the performance of power-sharing models in Somalia. As a result, the respondents
have shown different views on performance of power-sharing arrangements in Somalia. 26.4%
(211) of the respondents had the view that the power-sharing has brought equality in terms of clan
representation in the government and also in resource distribution. They believe that all the majority
clans have proportional representation in the federal Parliament and Executive. However 15.87%
(127) believed that the power-sharing has created inequality because it treats some communities as
half while the others are recognized as full. They argued that the power-sharing needs to change
hitherto structure of 4.5 clan representation to 5 model of clan representation. 17% (136) of the
respondents justified their responses by saying that power-sharing has not impacted in all institutions
and has favoured mostly Parliament and Executive neglecting other government representation in
security and economic public institutions. 12.5% (100) of the interviewees held that power-sharing
failed to restore peace and security in the country. On the contrary, 7% (57) of the respondents
considered power-sharing as a necessary arrangement to bring back Somalia in the limelight of the
international governance system. 4.1 % (33) contended that the power-sharing model in Somalia is
an indispensible arrangement that enables all clans in Somalia to form inclusive government that has
representatives from all of them. 6.7% (54) argued that the spirit of power-sharing has been abused
by the top leaders and as a result, the objectives of power-sharing to manage the conflict and
reconcile different clans remain unmet. 4.4% (35) of the respondents believed that power-sharing
promoted clannism which shelved competency and meritocracy leading to corruption and
mediocrity. . 4% (32) of the interviewees believed that power-sharing does not support institution
building as it promotes clan based divisive politics which causes political instability and a feeble
government structure. Finally, 3.1% (25) of the respondents argued that power-sharing has exposed

27
the country to foreign influences and interventions that grossly violate the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the country.
In the FGD, the participants discussed the same question about the achievement of power-sharing as
to whether the model is contributing to conflagration of the conflict or peaceful management of the
impasse. The participants in the FGD exhibited that power-sharing model has produced an inclusive
government and national charter for transitional period and subsequent provisional federal
constitution. They argued that power-sharing has created an environment for inter and intra peace
and statebuilding dialogues. The participants in the FGDs also mentioned that the power-sharing
model has reduced the level of clan based armed conflict and restored some semblance of sanity in
Somalia. The participants in the FGDs contended that power-sharing model adopted in Somalia was
a temporary arrangement aimed at creating atmosphere for peace and collaborative relationship.
They argued that power-sharing in Somalia initiated as a necessary political bargaining model that
was designed to settle the chaotic and lawlessness that prevailed in the country is working. One of
the key respondents argued that:
The power-sharing model was a temporary solution that is designed to promote equal representation
of all clans in Somalia. The power-sharing model has empowered minority groups which has
changed contemporary political realities in Somalia and as you may know some very smaller clans
with no even a single village to dwell in, have got representation both in Parliament and the Council
of Ministers. What I mean is that power-sharing model was a good step towards stable Somalia, but
one should note that this arrangement is neither fair for all clans nor a permanent structure, but rather
a temporary solution aimed at reuniting antagonists to build democratic and peaceful state, (FGD,
September, 2014).
The findings exhibited that the majority (57%) of the respondents consider the performance of
power- sharing arrangement as fair and weak. The findings further highlight that 4.5 power-sharing
has improved representation of previously marginalized minority groups who enjoy better political
representation in the national government and Council of Minister as well. However, the minority
groups are still advocating more and equal representation, where all the clans are given same clout in
the political arena. They coined the phrase ‘half-clan’ which denotes that power- sharing recognized
4 clans as full while others are considered half. This is in line with the argument put forward by
Enow and Enow (2011) who articulated that the state structure was built on the foundation of a clan
power segregation system known as 4.5. They argued that the 4.5 model was a discriminatory
structure that creates separation of the Somali people into clans that are equal and, as such, pure
Somali , against the amalgamation of various clans and communities that are unequal to the first
group and hence considered ‘impure’ or less Somali, (Enow and Enow, 2011).
The findings also show that power-sharing has not been applied to all government institutions and
position which caused imbalance of clan representation and perpetuated the mistrust towards national
government. The findings discovered that power-sharing is promoting centrifugal politics that
maintain conflict status quo and prevailing instability. The findings revealed that failure of the
national and regional leaders to abide by power-sharing principles reignited clan conflict and zero-
sum attitude. This is relevant to Olusegun (1999), findings in Nigeria. He argued that the leaders of
Nigeria governments, at all levels, have failed to fulfill their obligations to offer good governance
anchored on equitable political arrangements, transparent administrative practices and accountable
public conduct. He further observes that failure to encourage genuine power-sharing has triggered
dangerous rivalries between the central government and the 36 state governments over revenue from
the country’s oil and other natural resources. He says that politicians exploit and exacerbate inter-

28
communal tensions for selfish reasons. Thus, communities throughout the country increasingly feel
marginalized and alienated from the Nigerian state.
The findings indicate that the power-sharing institutionalizes clanocracy as opposed to meritocracy, a
reality that impedes competitive democratic politics. The findings showed that power-sharing
cemented and empowered clan allegiance. This is in line with Nkwachukwu (2008), argument which
concludes that ethnicization of public sphere in Nigeria has created politicization and negative elite
competition. He argues that the stiff political competition among the elite has resulted in the
“politicization” of ethnicity in the country leading to dysfunctional public institutions and
confrontations between various ethnic groups in the Nigeria. In Somalia context, the fluid and
segmentary clan politics and absence of strong national public institutions set hurdles in the nation
state-building.
The findings also reveal that power-sharing was initially introduced as a temporary political solution
that can transition the people of Somalia from clan allegiance to nationalistic consciousness and
democratic governance. The efforts of the Federal Government to transition the country from
association of equal rival clans that work by the rule of ‘survival of the fittest’, to sustainable peace,
good governance and equitable socio-economic development has so far produced very fruits. The
findings indicate that 4.5 consocionational power-sharing Somalia was cementing clan difference
and capacities for war. This means that Somalia required adopta power-sharing model that
encourages inter-clan cooperation and coalition-building to eventually transform the conflict while
concretizing democratic institutions. This is in agreement with Sisk (2003), who argued that power-
sharing solutions make for good transitional devices, but in the long run, the best outcome may well
be a much more fluid form of democracy that allows for the creation of flexible coalitions that bridge
the ethnic divide.
The findings point out that power-sharing is considered by majority of clans in Somalia as a
disproportional arrangement which exhibits the fluidity of clan dynamics where every sub-clan or
group is determined to get representation in the political arena. The dissatisfaction coupled with
apathy of many clan and sub-clan had adversely affected the performance of the existing power-
sharing government in Somalia.
Proportionality of power-sharing
Figure 2: Proportionality of power-sharing
As per figure 2 above, 31.4% (251) of the respondents disagreed that power-sharing was fair and
proportional for clans in Somalia. 28% (223) of the respondents strongly disagreed about the
proportionality of power-sharing. In contrast, 17.5% (140) of the interviewees agreed that clan
representation in the power-sharing is fair and equitable.7.3% (58) of the respondents strongly
agreed that power-sharing is equitable for all groups in the country.

29
In the FGD, the participants had divergent views about the proportionality of power-sharing
arrangements. Some of the interviewees expressed their satisfaction about the model arguing that it
created better representation of clan and reversed the dominance of few clans or sub-clan thereby
protecting the rights of all groups and regions. But a majority of the participants in the FGDs
expressed totally different perception over the power-sharing model widely used in Somalia. They
mentioned that power-sharing has compromised institution building and protection of citizen’s
rights, as the model promotes clannism and centrifugal politics that perpetuate vicious cycle of
conflict and culture of violence. Female interviewees argued that power-sharing model favours male
members of the clans therefore widening the gender gap and perpetuating structural injustice. One of
the key respondents of the study argued that:
The 4power-sharing is a male dominated model that denies women the enjoyment of their
irrevocable rights. This is a sexist model that promotes males interest at the expense of women and it
deliberately abuses the power and rights of women. Although women advocated for 30% quota in the
political leadership, traditional clan elders favoured male citizens. As a result, women representation
in Federal Parliament is currently 13% only. Using provisions in the provisional Constitution; UN
Security Council resolution 1325 and sequent resolutions 18820, 1888 and 1889 and other
international instruments, the Somali women continue their assiduous work to secure at least 30%
quota to end this discriminatory and unacceptable system , (FGD, October, 2014).
Other participants also explained their discontent about the power-sharing model by mentioning how
the same is agonizing interests of minority groups such as the people with disabilities. They argued
that power-sharing only recognized clans but failed to address special needs and interests of different
groups in the country. The disabled persons also pointed out that the provisional constitution has no
provision giving quota to the disabled persons or specifically addressing their rights to hold public
office. Speaking in Somali language one of the participants who is physically disabled said:
Hanaanka awood wadaagga ee hadda ka jira soomaaliya ee loo yiqaano 4.5 wuxuu aqoonsan yahay
in soomaaliya ay ka jiraan beelo kuwaas oo awooda dalka u wadaagaya sida uu qabo habka, laakiin
xitaa dastuurka Ku meel gaarka ah ma aqoonsanayo dhibaatooyinka haysta dadka naafadda ah iyo
xaqa ay u leeyhiin in ay qabtaan mas’uuliyadaha sare ee dalka. Anaga naafo ahaan, dadka iyo
dowladda midkoodna nama tixgaliyo waxaana naloo arkaa in aanan waxba istaahilin, dhibaatooyinka
na haystana cid arkeysaa ma jirto.
The unofficial translation of the above narrative is: The power-sharing model used in Somalia better
known as recognizes clans in Somalia who should share the power in accordance to the model, but
neither this model nor currently existing provisional Constitution recognizes problems facing people
with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups to hold public office. We are equally disrespected
by other fellow citizens and the Government and they see us as people who deserve nothing and we
remain invisible as nobody cares about our problems, (FGD, September, 2014)
The rights for political participation of persons with disabilities are enshrined in the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). All state parties have the responsibilities to
guarantee that the political rights of the persons with disabilities are protected and provided for. For
instance, Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) obliges
States parties to take all feasible steps to facilitate and encourage participation of persons with
disabilities in Government and other civic activities, such as the right to vote, stand for election or
participate in political organizations,(CRPD, 2006). This convention was not domesticated in
Somalia. Even though Article 22 of the provisional Constitution of Somalia allows the right of every
citizen to take part in public affairs including formation of political parties and the right to be elected,
it had had no affirmative action specifically protecting the rights persons with disabilities.

30
The participants in FGD unanimously agreed that the spirit of power-sharing was to manage the
conflict by creating an atmosphere of cooperation and of compromise rather competition and
confrontation. “Awood-wadaagu xal siyaasadeed buu ahaa ee xaq ma ahayn” meaning that
“power-sharing was a political solution but not necessarily fair”. They argued that when the central
government was destroyed by the civil war, leaders acting on external pressure agreed to adopt a
power-sharing arrangement which was a great deal. One of the respondents argued that: habka 4.5 ee
awood wadaagu wuxuu ku yimid wada xaajood iyo isutanaasul keenay in wax laysku raaco, kadibna
dowladnimadii ayaa soo noqotay, laakiin waxaa jira khaladaad badan oo curyaamiyey shaqadii laga
rabay inay dowladdu qabato. This means that 4.5 power-sharing models came through negotiation
and compromise which helped restoration of the central governance, but there are many problems
which hindered the core functions expected from the government, (FGD, September, 2014)
One of the key respondents argued that: The power struggle that caused the collapse of Somalia state
formed by different main clans i.e. Darod, Hawiye and Isaq. When the country disintegrated, Isaq
went out and formed Somaliland state where they announced their unilateral declaration of
independence; members of Darod clan were persecuted and pushed out of Mogadishu and they
sought refuge in their ancestral areas where some of them formed Puntland state while others were
plagued by internal conflict and competition; Hawiye took control of the capital city (Mogadishu)
and sizable areas of south and central regions and perceived themselves as victorious. The power-
sharing models have empowered Digil and Mirifle and minority groups. The power-sharing has
strengthened Hawiye’s hegemony because Digil & Mirifle or Rahanweyn has close territorial
proximity relations with Hawiye while majority of minority groups or the so called 0.5 are
ancestrally from Hawiye.
The findings show that the clan satisfaction on proportional representation remain poor and blurred
as majority of respondents unequivocally disagreed that power-sharing promotes imbalanced
political representation among various contending clans in the country. It reveals that the power-
sharing inhibits public institutional building processes as the same has been embarked on before the
animosities and mistrust between rival clans are properly addressed. They argued that distrust can
give rise to paranoid cognitions - false or exaggerated perceptions that one is subject to malevolent
treatment by others. The findings indicate the importance of bottom-up federal state building in
Somalia where consensual agreement and reconciliation are considered as basic prequisite for state
formation processes.

31
Figure 3: Bottom up Model from Local to Federal State Government formation process
Elected District
Commissioner/Mayor,
deputy DC/mayor, &
Executive Secretary by
District Councillors
Election of district
councillors by DCA
Mandated Traditional
clan elders select criteria
based councillors & MPs
through power-sharing
Regional Council four
elected councillors
(including DCs/mayor
from each district
State parliament elected by DCA
elects the president of sub-national
federal state government and
approves appointed
cabinet/program.
District Council
selected by clan elders
& elected by DCA
Professional District
Secretaries/
departmental heads
appointed by elected
Mayor/DC through
locally acceptable
clan/sub power-sharing
Professional Regional
Departmental
Coordinators
appointed by Regional
governor through
acceptable power-
sharing formula
Elected President and
Deputy president of the
state
Ministers appointed by the
elected president of the
state through clan based
power-sharing & approved
by the state parliament
Elected Regional Governor/
Deputy regional governor and
Regional executive Secretary
District level grand
reconciliation conference
participated by all groups
in the district
Selection of district
constituency
assembly (DCA) by
sub-clan elders
Elders submit names of 3
candidates from each
parliamentary and district
councillors seat to DCA
Technical
committee
(MIFA, area MPs,
IJA, experts and
members of
CSOs)
Election of
members of state
parliament by DCA
State parliament elected
by DCA are inaugurated
and elects their speaker
and his/her deputies

32
The state building model above indicates a bottom up and inclusive process that creates an
atmosphere for dialogue and consensus building where all the stakeholders and groups are given a
chance to actively participate in and feel ownership of the same.
Step One: The model proposes formation of a technical committee comprising senior members of
the national federal government preferably Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs, Members of
National Parliament, highly respected experts and representatives of civil society organizations
working in the area. The role of this technical committee is to organize and facilitate district level
clan reconciliation and dialogue where all groups and stakeholders in the area attend the meeting.
Additionally, the technical team should provide backstopping support to ensure that the process is
satisfactorily achieving its desired objectives. Similarly the technical committee also prepares
different pass-cards for candidates, DCA members, and observers.
Step Two: The reconciliation conference enables the participants to discuss thorny issues about the
past occurrences, more specifically about grievances from different groups and the need to address
historical injustice and crimes committed against any of the local clans and sub-clans. The
conference deliberates about the need for collaborative efforts which focuses more on future than
past. Through the support of technical team, the participants are given the chance to negotiate about
the formation of elected local district, regional councils and Parliament at the federal state level.
Using clan structures such as ‘Dia’ paying group and other locally acceptable traditional formula,
different clans and sub-clans should agree on how to share power between district and regional level
councils, district secretaries, regional coordinators and Members of Parliament at sub-national stage.
For this purpose, the conference determines numbers and roles of different clan elders who may be
assigned to select candidates for the various positions at district, regional sub-national federal state
Parliament. The conference agrees and endorses the formation of inclusive district constituency
assembly (DCA). The composition and representation of the DCA is based on the proposal
consensually agreed by the reconciliation conference but the selection is at discretion of the
traditional clan elders.
Step Three: The traditional elders are mandated to fulfil to their critical assignments. The first being
selection of DCA members that represent all groups and clans that reside in the targeted district. The
elders utilize acceptable clan-based power-sharing formula. Using the same power-sharing
arrangement, different clan-sub-clan elders nominate their quota to DCA which comprise women
group representatives, youth, traditional elders, religious, business and minority groups. All of these
groups must be equally represented while the number of DCA members may vary from district to
another depending on decision of district reconciliation conference. DCA member is selected on the
basis of his/her credibility, knowledge, clan representation, gender and disability.
Step Four: The traditional clan elders are also authorized by the reconciliation conference and
technical committee to select and propose three (3) qualified candidates for each position at district
councillors and members of parliament. Elders selecting candidates from different posts are given
clearly written selection criteria for the candidates vying to the district council and sub-national
Parliament. This criterion should state the conditions necessary for any one candidate to fulfil. The
criteria also sets the minimum requirements of experience, level of education and other qualifications
including ethics and integrity required by the public officer. The technical team organize and
facilitate brainstorming meetings participated on by representatives of different groups in the district
where the criteria for selection of candidates is developed and adopted.
Step Five: The DCA receives a list of candidates from the traditional elders of various clan-sub
clans in the area. DCA forms at least two (2) working groups namely registration and verification
committee and election committee. The primary responsibility of registration and verification

33
committee is to check whether the proposed candidates fulfil the selection criteria. It is the sole
discretion of the committee to reject and ask for replacement of any candidate that may fall below
the threshold of the selection criteria. This committee also prepares election procedures and
candidates declaration form which commits all contenders to accept the result of the election while
avoiding organizing or participating in any sort of violence. The election committee with the help of
the technical committee prepares ballot papers for both district councillors and Members of
Parliament.
Step Six: Using the ballot, the DCA starts the election of district councillors. Three candidates
compete for each seat for the district council. Any of the aspirants that garner more than 50% of the
votes casted are declared the winner by the chair of the DCA.
Step Seven: The district council are inaugurated and oldest councillor automatically becomes the
interim chair of the new council. The councillors elect their chair who is also the district
commission/mayor, deputy mayor and executive secretary through secret ballot. Any candidate that
receives more than 50% of the votes casted is declared the winner for the seat. Additionally, the DC
appoints district technical team or the secretaries for different offices and comes up with his/her
district budget for development and stabilization plans. The district council has the power to approve,
reject or amend the district development and stabilization plans. Using electoral procedures and best
practices, the district councillors elects members of regional councillors representing them in their
respective district. Equally, the regional councillors shall elect a regional governor, deputy governor
and regional executive secretary. Using a locally acceptable power-sharing model, the governor
appoints professional regional technical team/coordinators and develops regional development and
recovery plans while seeking approval from regional councillors. The regional coordinators
supervise and coordinate the work of district secretaries to implement priorities identified in the
development and recovery plans. The principal duties of technical staff is to carry out technical
administration of the regional and district councils, collect, analyze and disseminate technical
information, offer technical advice to councillors, and implement Government and Councils’
programs and projects in their areas.
Step Eight: The DCA screens the list of candidates for Member of Parliament of the sub-national
state. The elders submit three contenders for each seat to seek votes from DCA. Using secret ballot,
DCA members elect Members of Parliament representing their district. Any candidate who receives
more than 50% of the votes casted in the ballot box can be declared as the winner by the chair of the
DCA.
Step Nine: The MPs elected move to capital or seat of the parliament to be inaugurated and to elect
their speaker and deputy speaker. MPs are then required to organize the election of the president and
his/her running mate. Thereafter, the president of sub-national federal government starts consultation
with all stakeholders and different clans in the region for to select inclusive and competent men and
women that can move the state to the next level. Considering the views and advises from different
political stakeholders, clan representatives and challenges facing his government, the president
appoints his cabinet based on either pronounced or unpronounced acceptable power-sharing
arrangement. The president brings his/her cabinet and program to a session of the parliament where
honourable members of the assembly give their vote of confidence for the new council of ministers
and their program.
The government headed by democratically elected president and deputy president is legitimate as it
has a functioning governance structure that exists from the capital city to the lowest administrative
unit of the federal state. The government’s executive program must address the socio-economic,
political and geographical needs and realities of the state.

34
The findings also discovere that power-sharing widened gender imbalances and has the tendency of
favouring male contenders. It was found that patriarchy social cultural expectations subordinate
women’s role in the society perpetuating male dominance in the political and administrative
decision-making. The findings also uncovered the fact that power-sharing has no affirmative action
to provide opportunity for people with special needs to participate in the political decision of the
state. As a result, persons with disabilities have no representation in the power-sharing government
in Somalia. This shows that power-sharing is only favouring powerful elites from different clans in
Somalia. For instance, Elmi (2014) contends that power-sharing in Somalia serves the political elite
by providing them with an excuse not to advance citizenship-based politics. Meritocracy is sacrificed
in all government institutions. Further, in practice despite apparent equal representation between the
four clan-families, Hawiye and Darood politicians continue to dominate the political landscape in
Somalia with each clan assuming either positions of president or prime minister for the past decade,
(Elmi, 2014).
The findings indicate that power-sharing was agreed on by conflictants in Somalia to manage the
conflicts and rebuild national and sub-national public institutions. The findings reveal that different
clans have grievances on the presently used power-sharing model of which they regard as
disproportional and unfair. This concurs with Gates and Strom (2007), from the centre for the study
of civil war in International Peace Institute, Oslo (PRIO), who proposed that when groups are less
evenly matched and the costs of war is low, power-sharing implies non-proportional distributions of
power and positive incentives for spoilers. Under such conditions, power-sharing may increase rather
than reduce the risk of civil conflict, (Gate, and Strom, 2007).
Power-Sharing and Conflict Management
In order to shed more light on the efficacy of power-sharing in the areas of conflict management and
peace building, the respondents were given close ended questions. Figure 4 below summarizes the
answers from the respondents of the study.
53.6%46.4%
YES
NO
Figure 4: Power-sharing and Conflict Management
Majority (53.6 or 429) of the respondent agreed that power-sharing was necessary for conflict
management in Somalia.. But 26.1% (371) of the respondent disagreed that the current power-
sharing model is necessary for conflict management in Somalia. In order to get more understanding
over this matter, the researcher disaggregated the data into male and female respondents. The
rationale behind the gender disaggregation of the data was to assess the attitudes and perceptions of
different gender groups towards suitability of power-sharing in conflict management. Table 3 below
presents the opinion from the different groups.
Table 3: Power-sharing and conflict management
Variables Frequency Male Female
Yes 429 209 220
No 371 228 143
Total 800 437 363

35
Table 3 above indicates that majority of the respondents believed that power-sharing was an
important approach for conflict management in a divided society. This is consistent with many
proponents of consociational school of thought who believe that power-sharing was essential for
addressing inter or intra communal conflict. Miti et al (2013), conceptualize power-sharing as an
arrangement through which groups manage their differences. These arrangements can and have taken
place at four levels: political, territorial, military and economic, (Miti et al, 2013).
The table 3 above equally shows the number of respondents who were dissatisfied about the efficacy
of power-sharing to manage internal conflict in Somalia. This discontent adversely affects the role of
the power-sharing government to manage conflicts. However, Sriram, et al (2009) faulted the very
power-sharing arrangement; they argued that a power-sharing arrangement may tend not only
towards undemocratic states, but towards states which are not responsive to the needs of the citizenry
for security in ways which may undermine human security and state legitimacy.
Figure 5: Gender Disaggregated Data In Power-Sharing And Conflict Management
Figure 5 above indicates that 27.6% (220) of the female respondents agreed that power-sharing was
instrumental for conflict management in Somalia, whereas 26% (209) of the male respondents also
agreed that power-sharing can contribute to management of the armed conflict in the country. In
contrast, 28.5% (228) of the male respondents objected to the notion that power-sharing has
positively supported management of the conflict in the country. Similarly, 18% (143) of the female
respondents believed that power-sharing system has conflagrated conflict.
This means that 60% (220 out of 363) of female respondents perceived that power-sharing did to
some extent manage clan conflicts, while 52% (228 out of 437) of male respondents rejected the
notion that power-sharing has contributed conflict management in Somalia.
In order to find out more about applicability of power-sharing in conflict management, interviewees
were asked to provide reasons over their answers towards power-sharing system managing
intractable clan conflicts. The interviewees were given multiple choices to select the appropriate
answer from those choices provided for. In this way, respondents were able to evaluate effects of
power-sharing in the clan conflict.

36
Figure 6: Challenges Faced By Power-Sharing
Figure 6 above indicates that 28.4% (227) of the respondents were of the view that power-sharing
ignited more clan competition rather than cooperation. 23.5% (187) of the interviewees contended
that the power-sharing system has increased clan allegiance as opposed to loyalty for national
government. 19.5% (156) of the respondents believed that the power-sharing was not necessary
because it give incentive for foreign intervention. 15.7% (126) of the respondents reported that
power-sharing has triggered wrangling and political instability while 13% (104) of interviewees
argued that the power-sharing perpetuated anarchy and lawlessness.
In FGDs, the participants also expressed their view on the linkage between power-sharing and
conflict management in Somalia. Some of the interviewees argued that power-sharing government
achieved little because of different clan grievances over representation and unfair distribution of
national resources. They insisted that issues of economic distribution and formation of security
forces equally representing different clans were disregarded in the power-sharing government. The
failure of the government to restore the much-needed equitable economic and social power-sharing
has been construed as lack of seriousness and deliberate intention of the powerful clans to dominate
others. This has solidified the deep-rooted distrust between different clans and the government, a
negative perception that increases clan cleavage and recurrences of armed of conflicts.
One of the respondents termed the power-sharing as a ‘cancer’ hindering progressive and
competitive politics in Somalia. Others believed that 4.5 power-sharing was initiated in Sodere,
Ethiopia by Ethiopians and their confidant Somali warlords with a purpose of keeping Somalia in
endless instability. Speaking in Somali language, one of the respondents argued that: waxaa lagu
sameeyey Ethiopia, waxaana laguu talo-galay in Soomaaliya aaney ka bixin hardanka beelaha iyo
jaahilnimada ku saleeysan si uun iyaga loogu tiirsanaado dalkuna aanu mar dambe u noqon mid xoog
leh oo ismaamuli Karo”. Translation of this statement is:
The power-sharing model was initiated in Ethiopia and it was designed to keep Somalia in
contestation based on clannism and ignorance, so that Somalia will depend on them (Ethiopians) and
remain weak and ungovernable. FGD, September 2014.Other respondents claimed that there are
different power-sharing arrangements and some are pronounced like 4.5 and federalism while others
are not subtle. Example of unpronounced clan power-sharing can be cited from sub-national states
such as Puntland and Somaliland where power is distributed to the different clans without necessarily
observing a written model rather it is in accordance to the local dynamics.
The findings point out that power-sharing has the potential to mitigate the effects of violence armed
clan conflict that plagued the country if the letter and spirit of the same are correctly applied.
However, because the power-sharing has not properly used and factored in all government
institutions, clan conflicts still persist. These findings confirmed the assertion of Uluso, (2014) who
contends that the Somalis agreed to transition from clan power-sharing formula of 4.5, a temporary

37
bridge, to a political representation, based solely on citizenship. But, this strong desire to overcome
the injustices, deprivation, and lack of dignity inherent in clan politics is practically supplanted by
the persistent pursue of ephemeral sub clan interests with pompous self-adulation (Uluso, 2014).
The findings also reveal that the power-sharing arrangement has failed to stabilize the country and
manage intractable clan conflict. The findings note that poor application of power-sharing
arrangement in the economic, social and political government institutions caused prevailing inter or
intra clan mistrust and apathy towards the national government. The findings further discovered that
clan competition over power and resources in Somalia has recently increased which poses more
vivacious threat to the existing power-sharing government. This is in agreement with O’Callaghan
(2010), who asserted that societal differences become politicized for a variety of reasons including
mobilization for attainment of power or resources, political or otherwise. She argues that polarization
deepens and becomes ingrained over time through socialization, group separation, and the
maintenance of an “us versus them” mentality that constitute barriers to post-conflict management
and peace sustainability.
The findings also showed that power-sharing system has motivated people to give their loyalty to
clan rather than the state. Paying allegiance to the clan has concretized centrifugal politics, which
weakens the core functions of the national government. The fluid clan nature and perpetual search
for power and resources by every small sub-clan or groups further indicated challenges posed against
peace and state building in Somalia. The findings also displayed that the current lopsided power-
sharing has instigated political wrangling and instability which negatively impacted on efforts of
resuscitating public institutions and people’s confidence in the government. The findings have
similarly indicated that power-sharing has opened the country for foreign interventions which
complicated the search for sustainable and democratic governance in Somalia. The external actors’
negative involvement in the conflict and clan centric political segmentation further distorted and
dismantled endeavours for stable and secure Somalia. The findings demonstrated that clannism is
perpetuating anarchic attitude and pro-secessionist perception. The findings showed that power-
sharing in Somalia has been abused causing wide spread discontents and disgruntled clans. The
findings denoted that without proper use of power-sharing arrangement agreed by the representatives
of different clans, local grievances and mistrust towards the government will continue. In attempt to
correct the anomalies in application of the current power-sharing arrangement, the researcher
invented a new model that emphasize institutional-building in the public sphere and fair distribution
of national cake.

38
Power-sharing Model in Somalia
Figure 7: Power-sharing and Institution-Building
Security Sector Reform and Civil Protection
The findings denote that security reform and protection of civilians and their properties are necessary
ingredient of equitable power-sharing and accountable governance in Somalia. National and regional
stabilization and peace-building are political processes that cannot be achieved without reforming
security sector and promoting civil protection. There were many clan militias in all regions of
Somalia and integrating those irregular armed groups into disciplined and responsible forces required
not only proper policies and mechanisms, but also transparent and inclusive processes. Because of
the deep rooted mistrust between rivals clans and political actors, the security sector reform should
be carried out in consultation with and consent of all concerned actors. The collaboration of various
local and international actors for security sector reform (SSR) promote use of best practices while
reducing chances of adopting conflicting approaches and priorities that may cause inconsistency and
confusion. This is in agreement with the findings of IPSTC (2007), which claimed that Somalia
experiences serious SSR challenges emanating from bad practices and exclusion of key actors. They
argued that in Somalia, corruption in the police and the judiciary has slowed the development of
SSR. Correspondingly, the exclusion of local actors and civil society undermines local ownership of
the process. The lack of success has also made it hard for those in the SSR practice to come up with
best practices. This implies that SSR is very sensitive area that require comprehensive intervention
package relevant to the local context and commitment from all the state and non-state actors. The
rationale behind the reform of SSR is to establish responsible, effective and accountable security
institutions that are devoted to promote peace and enjoyment of human rights by all. In order to
produce tangible result, the international actors and institutions must not prescribe solution but rather
provide the technical support to locals. This is in line with writings of England and Boucher (2009)
who articulated that the quest for a comprehensive and consistently applied framework for SSR must
be balanced against the need for context specificity in its application. The repository and the practice
notes therefore aim not to prescribe specific actions but to offer tools and processes to assist
decision-makers and insights on how to proceed. It is worthy to note that even though SSR is
Levels of Capacity, Integrity & Accountability in the Public Institutions
Fair Economic &
development
Distribution system
Equitable power-sharing and good governance
in Somalia
Constitutional Review and implementation
Security reform
and Protection
Justice reform,
independence and
integrity.
Fair clan political
and regional
representation
Equitabilityofpower-sharinginthepublic
institutions

39
essential for peace-building in Somalia, it cannot be implemented in an environment of political
turmoil and instability where clan militias form the largest number in the armed forces. This is
concurs with the argument of Bryden (2013), who contends that the most of the uniformed forces,
whether police or military in the federal government of Somalia, were simply clan militias, loyal to
individual commanders, only nominally under government control and in many cases hostile to one
another. He further observed that armed forces were notoriously undisciplined, engaging in shoot-
outs with one another over the revenue from illicit check points, killing civilians, and committing
acts of sexual violence. This challenge cannot be overcome without the support and willingness of all
political and security actors at the local, national and international level.
National and Regional Political Representation
The findings demonstrated the importance of balanced and fair political representation both at the
national and regional government level. The findings indicated that there were two power-sharing
arrangements at the national and regional level. The 4.5 power-sharing model was only applied at
national federal government level, whereas there were many unpronounced clan power-sharing
arrangement at the regional state level. The findings showed that many clans and groups consider
the existing power-sharing at the national federal government as inequitable and unbalanced system.
The findings indicated that the 4.5 power-sharing model was not factored in all the key positions in
the government and civil service. This has ignited discontent from many clans and sub-clan leading
disgruntling behaviour that support anti-government insurgences and criminal groups. The misuse of
power-sharing principles by the certain powerful political class has led to loss of confidence and
legitimacy of the government in many clans and sub-clans which adversely affected government led
stabilization efforts at the regional and national level. This is in agreement with Bryden (2013),
argument that links stabilization and the need for political dialogue that engage different clans and
groups in the country. He argued that stabilization must be firmly anchored in a genuine political
process if they are not simply to become another source of contention and armed conflict.
Without dialogue and genuine social emotional reconciliation at the national and regional level
where all contentious and thorny issues are discussed openly, trust among rival communities and
between the government and the governed will definitely ensue. Acceptable clan based political
power-sharing and equitable representation partially addresses local grievance but cannot be a
panacea for all the historical injustice and other grievances. Therefore, reconciliation and genuine
political dialogues must take place before any power-sharing arrangement between different clans at
given region were initiated. This is similarly important for restoring trust and confidence between
previous antagonists as the approach paves way for establishment sustainable peace and state-
building at national and sub-national level. It is also worthy to note that political power-sharing
without equitable distribution of national and sub-national resources for development is retarded and
improper that may not achieve positive peace and progressive economic growth for all.
Economic Power-Sharing and Development
The findings in the chapter four showed that the majority 67% (538) of the respondents contended
that the economic resources were unevenly distributed where communities in the capital city and its
environs receive a lion’s share. The findings further demonstrated that the federal government has
failed to provide basic services to the people in the periphery. This lack of provision of essential
social services and developmental programs has a negative impact not only on the legitimacy of the
government, but also on the lives of ordinary citizens. As a result of poor economic generation and
distribution, protracted conflict and poor formal governance system, Somalia experiences abject
poverty and consistent livelihood crises. According to UNOCHA (2014), an estimated of 3.2 million
Somalis need life-saving assistance and livelihood investment aimed at strengthening their resilience
to shocks. This comprises 870,000 people, of which over 70 per cent are internally displaced persons
(IDPs), who require life-saving humanitarian assistance, and an additional 2.3 million people remain

40
highly vulnerable to climatic shocks and are on the margin of food insecurity through the end of the
year. UNOCHA (2014), further reports that the main driving factors of the protracted humanitarian
crisis in Somalia were climatic variability – and its attendant cyclical droughts and floods – poverty,
political instability, conflict, and lack of basic social services.
Humanitarian crises in Somalia were driven by many complexities interconnected to natural and
man-made factors. Political instability and conflict coupled with absence of basic social services and
lack of post conflict economic distribution policies had increased human vulnerabilities in Somalia.
However, Somalia experiences not only climatic shocks but also structural violence. In the theory of
structural violence, Galtung argues that it is not bullet and bomb alone that kill and maim people, but
what kills more is the violence that was built into the structure of political, social and economic
system. People in Somalia have experienced not only deadly protracted conflict, but also starvation;
high rate of malnutrition and incidences of preventable diseases that have caused more human
mortality than violent conflict. Poverty and skewed distribution of economic resources were some of
the primary causes of the conflict in Somalia. The post-conflict state and peace-building efforts will
hardly achieve targeted goals without economic policy that is deliberately designed to explore
natural resources and equitably distribute of the same. This is in line with Maiese (2003), who
articulates that the transition from war to peace poses great challenges to economic policy and
reforms that are often needed to develop the economy, promote equity, and consolidate peace. She
further argued that economic vitalization efforts, together with reconciliation and demilitarization,
are designed to help communities build a prosperous future. Therefore it is conceivable without
equitable economic development, peace cannot endure. In order to revive and rebuild the collapsed
state and sustain positive peace, post-conflict Somalia requires equitable economic power-sharing
where services and developmental rights of all citizens are preserved and protected. Collection of
revenues and provision of the much needed services in transparent and accountable manner are
critical factors for the post-conflict country like Somalia. The evenly distributed economic power-
sharing are not only political but a matter of justice for all and protection of human rights that are
necessary for consolidation of peace and accountable governance in Somalia. This is in agreement
with OECD (2010) report, which states that the government’s capacity to meet longer-term state
building objectives, such as raising revenue and ensuring delivery of services in a way that meets
people’s expectations, is central to the existence of the state. It strengthens the state’s legitimacy,
effectiveness and responsiveness, in part because it reduces dependency on foreign aid and technical
assistance.
Additionally, the economic resources must not only evenly and fairly distributed but the government
should establish a stringent system for public finance and resource management that safeguard the
same resources from misallocation, misappropriation and wastage which can dent the image of the
state and easily destroy the fragile peace in the country . This is in agreement with Sannerhold
(2007), who articulated that state must recognize that resource misallocation, economic
mismanagement, corruption, poor fiscal policies, and structural adjustment policies’ can have
negative effects on a society, and if left unaddressed, can cause the eruption of violent conflict.
Judicial Reform and Integrity
The findings indicated that reforming the Judiciary was fundamental in restoring functioning
government that upholds rule of law and protection of human rights. The findings showed that the
performance of the Judiciary was regarded as poor and below the required threshold. Without
independent and reformed Judiciary, peace and state building will face hurdles that can eventually
trigger recurrence of violent armed clan conflict in Somalia. The competency and effective capacity
of the Judiciary is very important for the state and citizen relationship where rule of law and respect
of fundamental human rights are not compromised. Because of the intractable clan conflict, Somalia
experienced gross abuses of human rights and impunity. The establishment of a responsible and

41
competent justice system in a highly divided and traumatized society requires not only huge
investment of human and financial resources, but also political will and determination to restore
legitimate public order, effective institutions and empowered society. This is in agreement with
UNSC (2004) report, which states that helping war-torn societies re-establish the rule of law and
come to terms with large-scale past abuses, all within a context marked by devastated institutions,
exhausted resources, diminished security and a traumatized and divided population, is a daunting,
often overwhelming, task. The report further highlights that the Judiciary in the post-conflict
societies experienced myriad deficits, including lack of political will for reform, absence of
institutional independence within the justice sector, poor domestic technical capacity, limited
material and financial resources, a lack of public confidence in Government, gross violations of
human rights and fragile peace and security. All of the aforementioned capacity deficits are true in
Somalia where justice and law enforcement remain like a story in an old book. The federal national
and sub-nation state in Somalia must face these daunting challenges and try to rebuild credible and
capable judicial and other public institutions. These reforms must be implemented within the
confines of the national and regional constitutions and the other progressive laws.
New Constitutional Dispensation
A Constitution is the supreme law of the land that shapes legal and socio-political behaviour of the
post conflict society. In order to build peace and address grievance of groups and communities in the
country, post conflict environment normally demands a new constitutional dispensation that aims to
correct past atrocities necessitated by the institutional and legal vacuums. In the case of Somalia, the
provisional federal Constitution is the supreme law of the land that was adopted by the national
constituency assembly held in Mogadishu. The design of this provisional Constitution seemed
problematic as many of its articles were either vaguely written or had so many gaps that caused more
confusion and competition among political and legal actors of the country. However, despite its
many areas of weakness, the Constitution attempts to respond to historic injustices and appreciates
that where security and justice are not available to all equally, grievances may develop that can cause
or inflame conflict. Justice and security are also necessary for Somalia’s economic and social
development, and vital for the protection of human rights. The current institutions and organizations
that make up the security and justice agencies (such as the police, armed forces and judiciary) are
often unable to provide people with adequate services, (IDLO, 2012). Like many post-conflict
societies, Somalia was facing many challenges including political contestation between the President
and his Prime Minister. The provisional Constitution was either silent on provision of a solution or
vaguely define the confines of the power of the different constitutional offices. As result of the
constitutional confusions, the conflicts were in many times resolved through weak Parliament, where
the parliamentarians were mobilized in favour of the President and they voted out the Premier.
Bribery, vote buying and other corrupt behaviour aimed at enticing the parliamentarians for political
reward should they sign and vote in a motion of no confidence against the sitting Prime Minister
and his government has become a political culture in Somalia. The new federal state formation,
absence of competent national institutions, social reconciliation and distrust all pose many legal and
political challenges of which the government is required to address. This is in line with IDLO (2012)
findings that stressed that the two of the most challenging issues must be addressed as
implementation of the constitution goes forward are reconciliation and political reconstruction, and
institution-building. The process of constitution-building can provide a forum for the negotiation of
solutions to the divisive or contested issues that led to violence. It can also lead to the democratic
education of the population, begin a process of healing and reconciliation through societal dialogue,
and forge a new consensus vision of the future of the state (Kirsti, 2006).
Conclusion
The objective of the study was to evaluate the levels of success in the implementation of the power-
sharing models regarding management of intractable clan conflict. In this objective the study

42
concludes that the implementation of power-sharing models in Somalia have produced little result
and failed to end clan competition and armed conflicts. The implementation of various power-
sharing models rendered Somalia nominal government that increased representation of minority and
other previously marginalized clans. It was noted that spirit of power-sharing for creating inclusive
governance system has partially been abused and as a result majority of the respondents considered
the power-sharing as disproportional.
The power-sharing models solidified and institutionalized clannism and centrifugal politics that
entrenched conflicts on identity and kinships. Despite the fact that power-sharing models had good
intentions for peaceful management of the conflict, the models failed in the test. The unfair
distribution of national resources has discontented many clans in the periphery considering them as
illegitimate administration favouring Mogadishu and its environs. The presently used power-sharing
was viewed as diluted and impediment against healthy and centripetal competitive democratic
politics in Somalia.
Recommendations
The objective of the study was to evaluate the level of success in the implementation of the power-
sharing models regarding management of intractable clan conflict in Somalia. The study found that
The 4.5 power-sharing was a male dominated model that denied women the enjoyment of their
irrevocable rights. The power-sharing was viewed a model that widened gender gap and structural
injustice. Therefore, there is need to review the provisional constitution and ensure that rights of
women and other marginalized groups are enshrined in the new constitutional dispensation.
The need for equitable and fair economic distribution resources was echoed by all respondents of the
study. One of the main challenges of the resource based power-sharing was the absence of legal
framework that dissect how the resources at national and sub-national levels will be shared and who
has the final say on what. Therefore, there is need to put in place the required legislation for this
important aspect of power-sharing.
The study observed that the processes for formation of new sub-national state were flawed by elite
domination and quasi-delegate conferences. This has caused in many areas, clans and group conflicts
where many innocent lives were lost. On this note, consultative processes and reconciliations where
people are given ample time to discuss, resolve their differences and reach a consensus is needed for
new state formation. A bottom up approach where district and regional council and civil
administration are formed through transparent, consultative and reconciliation is also recommended
for Somalia especially south and central areas where communities either fought each other or
experienced long periods of lawlessness and absence of formal government institutions.
There are many clan militias operating in different regions of the country and power-sharing
government did little to form national army forces that are balanced in terms of clan representation
and deployment in different areas. Therefore, all these militiamen should integrate and transform into
competent, well equipped and disciplined army forces, or disarmed, demobilized and rehabilitated by
offering market-driven skills, income and employment opportunities.

43
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