GLOBAL WIRELESS E-VOTING FULL REPORT FOR SEMINAR

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A SEMINAR REPORT
ON
“GLOBAL WIRELESS E-VOTING ”
SUBMITTED TO THE SAVITRIBAI PHULE PUNE UNIVERSITY,PUNE
In Partial Fulﬁllment of
T.E. Computer Engineering
T.E. Semester II
BY
Mr. Pushkar Girish Zagade
Exam Seat No: T120404321
UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF
PROF. ISHWAR KALBANDI
DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER ENGINEERING
JSPM’s Jayawantrao Sawant College of Engineering
Hadapsar, Pune-028.
[2012-13]

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CERTIFICATE
DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER ENGINEERING
JSPM’s Jayawantrao Sawant College of Engineering
Hadapsar, Pune-028.
This is to certify that the seminar report entitled
“GLOBAL WIRELESS E-VOTING ”
Submitted by
Mr. Pushkar Girish Zagade
Exam Seat No:T120404321
is a bonaﬁde work carried out under the supervision of Prof. ISHWAR KALBANDI
and it is submitted towards the partial fulﬁlment of the requirement of Savitribai
Phule Pune University,Pune.
(Prof. Ishwar Kalbandi) (Prof. N.B. Shardoor)
Internal Guide External Examiner
(Prof. A.S.Devare) (Prof. H.A.Hingoliwala)
Seminar Coordinator H.O.D.
( Dr.M.G.JADHAV )
Principal
Place: Pune
Date:

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Acknowledgments
It is our proud privilege and duty to acknowledge the kind of help and guidance received
from several people in preparation of this report. It would not have been possible to prepare
this report in this form without their valuable help, cooperation and guidance.
First and foremost, we wish to record our sincere gratitude to our beloved Principal, Dr.
M. D. Jadhav, Principal, Jayawantrao Sawant College Of Engineering ,Pune for his
constant support and encouragement in preparation of this report and for making available
library and laboratory facilities needed to prepare this report.
Our sincere thanks to Prof. H.A.Hingoliwala, Head, Department of Computer Science
and Engineering, JSCOE for his valuable suggestions and guidance throughout the period
of this report.
We express our sincere gratitude to our guide, Asst. Prof. Ishwar Kalbandi, Depart-
ment of Computer Science and Engineering, JSCOE, Pune for guiding us in investiga-
tions for this seminar and in carrying out experimental work. Our numerous discussions
with his were extremely helpful. We hold his in esteem for guidance, encouragement and
inspiration received from his.
The seminar on Global Wireless E-Voting was very helpful to us in giving the necessary
background information and inspiration in choosing this topic for the seminar. Our sincere
thanks to Prof. A.S.Devare , Seminar Coordinator for having supported the work related
to this project. Their contributions and technical support in preparing this report are greatly
acknowledged.
(Mr. Pushkar Girish Zagade)
Exam no: T120404321
Batch[2014-15]

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Abstract
With significant U.S. federal funds now available to replace outdated punch-
card and mechanical voting systems, municipalities and states throughout the
U.S. are adopting paperless electronic voting. systems from a number of dif-
ferent vendors. We present a security analysis of the source code to one such
machine used in a significant share of the market. Our analysis shows that
this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards appli-
cable in other contexts. We identify several problems including unauthorized
privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network
threats, and poor software development processes. We show that voters, with-
out any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by
any mechanisms within the voting terminal software. Furthermore, we show
that even the most serious of our outsider attacks could have been discovered
and executed without access to the source code. In the face of such attacks,
the usual worries about insider threats are not the only concerns; outsiders can
do the damage. That said, we demonstrate that the insider threat is also quite
considerable, showing that not only can an insider, such as a poll worker, mod-
ify the votes, but that insiders can also violate voter privacy and match votes
with the voters who cast them. We conclude that this voting system is unsuit-
able for use in a general election. Any paperless electronic voting system might
suffer similar flaws, despite any certification it could have otherwise received.
We suggest that the best solutions are voting systems having a voter-verifiable
audit trail,where a computerized voting system might print a paper ballot that
can be read and verified by the voter.

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Contents
Acknowledgement I
Abstract II
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 E-VOTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 DISSERTATION PLAN 5
3 E-VOTING 6
3.1 VOTING IMPORTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 E-VOTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1 REQUIREMENTS IN E-VOTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2 VOTING TECHNIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 WORKING OF E-VOTING 10
4.1 WORKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.1 GLOBAL WIRELESS EVOTING BLOCK DIAGRAM . . . . . . 10
4.1.2 DETAIL DIAGRAM OF VOTING MACHINE . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.3 EYE RETINA SCANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.4 WORKING OF WHOLE SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.5 HURDLES IN THE PATH OF IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . . . 14
4.2 ADVANTAGES OF E-VOTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3 DISADVANTAGES OF E-VOTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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4.4 FEATURES OF E-VOTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE 22
BIBLIOGRAPHY 23

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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 E-VOTING
Elections allow the populace to choose their representatives and express their preferences
for how they will be governed. Naturally, the integrity of the election process is fundamen-
tal to the integrity of democracy itself. The election system must be sufficiently robust to
withstand a variety of fraudulent behaviors and must be sufficiently transparent and com-
prehensible that voters and candidates can accept the results of an election. Unsurprisingly,
history is littered with examples of elections being manipulated in order to influence their
outcome.
The design of a good voting system, whether electronic or using traditional paper bal-
lots or mechanical devices, must satisfy a number of sometimes competing criteria. The
anonymity of a voters ballot must be preserved, both to guarantee the voters safety when
voting against a malevolent candidate, and to guarantee that voters have no evidence that
proves which candidates received their votes. The existence of such evidence would allow
votes to be purchased by a candidate. The voting system must also be tamper-resistant to
thwart a wide range of attacks, including ballot stuffing by voters and incorrect tallying by
insiders.
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GLOBAL WIRELESS E-VOTING
Another factor, as shown by the so-called butterfly ballots in the Florida 2000 presiden-
tial election, is the importance of human factors. A voting system must be comprehensible
to and usable by the entire voting population, regardless of age, infirmity, or disability. Pro-
viding accessibility to such a diverse population is an important engineering problem and
one where, if other security is done well, electronic voting could be a great improvement
over current paper systems. Flaws in any of these aspects of a voting system, however, can
lead to indecisive or incorrect election results.
ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS. There have been several studies on using computer
technologies to improve elections [4, 5, 20, 21, 25]. These studies caution against the risks
of moving too quickly to adopt electronic voting machines because of the software engi-
neering challenges, insider threats, network vulnerabilities, and the challenges of auditing.
As a result of the Florida 2000 presidential election, the inadequacies of widely-used punch
card voting systems have become well understood by the general population. Despite the
opposition of computer scientists, this has led to increasingly widespread adoption of direct
recording electronic (DRE) voting systems. DRE systems, generally speaking, completely
eliminate paper ballots from the voting process. As with traditional elections, voters go to
their home precinct and prove that they are allowed to vote there, perhaps by presenting an
ID card, although some states allow voters to cast votes without any identification at all.
After this, the voter is typically given a PIN, a smartcard, or some other token that allows
them to approach a voting terminal, enter the token, and then vote for their candidates of
choice. When the voters selection is complete, DRE systems will typically present a sum-
JSCOE,Dept.of Comp. Engg.2014-15 2

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mary of the voters selections, giving them a final chance to make changes. Subsequent to
this, the ballot is cast and the voter is free to leave. The most fundamental problem with such
a voting system is that the entire election hinges on the correctness, robustness, and security
of the software within the voting terminal. Should that code have securityrelevant flaws, they
might be exploitable either by unscrupulous voters or by malicious insiders. Such insiders
include election officials, the developers of the voting system, and the developers of the em-
bedded operating system on which the voting system runs. If any party introduces flaws into
the voting system software or takes advantage of pre-existing flaws, then the results of the
election cannot be assured to accurately reflect the votes legally cast by the voters.
Although there has been cryptographic research on electronic voting , and there are new
approaches such as , currently the most viable solution for securing electronic voting ma-
chines is to introduce a voter-verifiable audit trail [10, 20]. A DRE system with a printer
attachment, or even a traditional optical scan system (e.g., one where a voter fills in a printed
bubble next to their chosen candidates), will satisfy this requirement by having a piece of
paper for voters to read and verify that their intent is correct reflected. This paper is stored
in ballot boxes and is considered to be the primary record of a voters intent. If, for
some reason, the printed paper has some kind of error, it is considered to be a spoiled
ballot and can be mechanically destroyed, giving the voter the chance to vote again. As
a result, the correctness of any voting software no longer matters; either a voting terminal
prints correct ballots or it is taken out of service. If there is any discrepancy in the vote
tally, the paper ballots will be available to be recounted, either mechanically or by hand. (A

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verifiable audit trail does not, by itself, address voter privacy concerns, ballot stuffing, or
numerous other attacks on elections.) CERTIFIED DRE SYSTEMS.
Many government entities have adopted paperless DRE systems without appearing to
have critically questioned the security claims made by the systems vendors. Until recently,
such systems have been dubiously certified for use without any public release of the anal-
yses behind these certifications, much less any release of the source code that might allow
independent third parties to perform their own analyses. Some vendors have claimed secu-
rity through obscurity as a defense, despite the security communitys universally held belief
in the inadequacy of obscurity to provide meaningful protection
Indeed, the CVS source code repository for Diebolds AccuVote-TS DRE voting system
recently appeared on the Internet. This appearance, announced by Bev Harris and discussed
in her book, Black Box Voting , gives us a unique opportunity to analyze a widely used,
paperless DRE system and evaluate the manufacturers security claims. Jones discusses the
origins of this code in extensive detail . Diebolds voting systems are in use in 37 states, and
they are the second largest and the fastest growing vendor of electronic voting machines.
We only inspected unencrypted source code, focusing on the AVTSCE, or AccuVote-TS
version 4, tree in the CVS repository . This tree has entries dating from October 2000 and
culminates in an April 2002 snapshot of version 4.3.1 of the AccuVote-TS system. From
the comments in the CVS logs, the AccuVote-TS version 4 tree is an import of an earlier
AccuTouch-CE tree. We did not have source code to Diebolds GEMS back-end election
management system.

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Chapter 2
DISSERTATION PLAN
This topic is generally belongs to global wireless evoting.How we implement the e-voting
in world and how it is helpful. The Objective and Aim of this report is to improve voting
technique and avoid fraud in voting system.
This will help to solve social issues of voting. Considering the all disadvantages of the
present system,we proposed the sysyem Global Wireless Evoting. This system is Remote
secured system We can check eligibility We can vote from anywhere
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Chapter 3
E-VOTING
3.1 VOTING IMPORTANCE
Voting is one of the most critical features in our democratic process. By casting a vote
we hold previous politicians to account and express our hopes for the future. Of course
democracy is more than votes - it’s debate, letter writing, campaigning, consultation - but
the vote is how every single citizen can wield real and immediate power. In addition to pro-
viding for the orderly transfer of power, it also cements the citizens trust and conﬁdence in
an organization or government when it operates efﬁciently. It’s incredibly important that ev-
eryone can vote without interference, safe in the knowledge that it will be counted. Through
the long history of democracy we have learnt that in the pursuit of power some groups are
willing to threaten voters to make sure they vote ’the right way’. But if the vote is secret
then there is no way for intimidators to know whether someone has voted for them or not -
threats become useless. So votes are a vital expression of the people’s power, which need to
be secret and restricted to only one per citizen.
3.2 E-VOTING
Electronic voting is a term used to describe any of several means of determining people’s
collective intent electronically. Electronic voting includes voting by kiosk, Internet, tele-
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phone, punch card, and optical scan ballot (a.k.a. mark-sense). Voting is done for many
reasons and in many situations, ranging from determining the next garden club officers to
determining the next leader of a country. Depending on the situation, a voting scheme will
be required to meet differing needs depending on the circumstances. One hopes that in this
way the voting process becomes faster, cheaper, more convenient, and also more secure.
3.2.1 REQUIREMENTS IN E-VOTING
A voting system should satisfy these requirements:
• Eligibility and authentication only registered voters must be admitted.
• Uniqueness no voter may cast his vote more than once.
• Accuracy voting systems should record the votes correctly.
• Verifiability and audit ability it should be possible to verify that all votes have been
correctly accounted for in the final tally, and there should be reliable and verifiably
authentic election records.
• Secrecy no one should be able to determine how any individual voted.
• Non-coerciability voters should not be able to prove to others how they voted; other-
wise vote selling and coercion would be facilitated.
• Minimum skill requirement for voter
• Minimal requirement of equipment
• Minimum Time required for vote

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3.2.2 VOTING TECHNIQUE
• Raise Your Hand Or Raise Your Voice Or Put Stick in Box.
Election has been used to decide various questions for at least 2000 years. In an-
cient Greece, people voted by putting white or black stone in bucket. Early methods
including Shouting out Aye or Nay, raising hands or depositing objects to be counted.
• Paper Ballot
The ﬁrst Known use of the paper ballots in an election in the U.S. was in 1629 to
select a church pastor.
1] Invented By
Australian paper ballot system was considered as a great innovation. Standardized
ballots are printed at government expenses, given to voter at polling places, and peo-
ple are required to vote and return the ballot on the spot. The Australian government
comes up with this procedure, which is now the most widely used system in the world.
2] Procedure for voting
The paper ballot system employs uniform ofﬁcial ballots of various stock weights on
which the names of all candidates and issues are printed. Voters record their choices,
in private; by marking the boxes next to the candidate or issue choice they select and
drop the voted ballot in a sealed ballot box.This maintain securacy.

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3] Current Usage
As of 1996, paper ballots were still used by 1.7 percent of the registered voters in
the United States. They are used as the primary voting system in small commu-
nities and rural areas, and quite often for absentee balloting in other jurisdictions.
4] Problem with Paper Ballot System
• It may take a long time to get a hand count under the current system. (Counting
Problem)
• A small portion of the disabled may lose the ability to vote privately.
• Paper ballot counting and recounting generates endless arguments about whether the
X crosses inside the square

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Chapter 4
WORKING OF E-VOTING
4.1 WORKING
4.1.1 GLOBAL WIRELESS EVOTING BLOCK DIAGRAM
l
• Radio waves representing scanned retina pattern and vote to Mobile tower.
• Radio waves representing scanned retina pattern and vote to remote server.
• Acknowledgement (+ve or ve) from the server to mobile tower.
• Acknowledgement (+ve or ve) from mobile tower to Interface device.
• Ready signal if retina is scanned properly to voting machine. And if ve signal then
alert alarm will be activated.
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• Accepted vote is made to ﬂow to the interface device.
4.1.2 DETAIL DIAGRAM OF VOTING MACHINE
The voting machine is actually a device which generate the different voltages for different
votes these voltages are fed to the (ADC) which is then converted to digital bits then can be
converted to radio waves.
4.1.3 EYE RETINA SCANNING
The eye retina machine be a simple web cam or device which can capture the images
effectively .the captured image will be represented in the form of a matrix where each pixel
represents 24-bit (RGB, 8+8+8 format) let us see and understand Here for e.g.

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Here the matrix pattern of this type of picture may be as
This is an electronic kit which converts the input digital signals such as (retina pattern
votes+ secure bits) to radio waves.
4.1.4 WORKING OF WHOLE SYSTEM
Whenever voters enter to voting booth then he will be instructed to directly look at retina
scanning machine at this time the machine scans the retina. once retina scanning properly

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confirmed then it sent signal to the voting machine as to accept the vote it will be powered
on .then voter is made to vote. Now the whole data including the retina pattern is sent to
interfacing device which convert into radio waves of mobile frequency range and these radio
waves are sent to mobile tower and then to the remote server, where the authentication and
voters identification is stored into a secured database. The received data is first converted
into digital format from the radio waves through the interface device kept at the server
side, and then retina pattern and vote separated . Next the retina pattern is matched against
the existing database .If match is found then flag is check which indicates its voting status
i.e if the voter is not voted yet then +ve ack is send to the mobile tower and then to the
corresponding voting machine. This ack is recognized by the receiver kept at the voter side
and machine is made to scan next retina pattern and vote , otherwise if ve ack then alert
alarm is made to ring.

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4.1.5 HURDLES IN THE PATH OF IMPLEMENTATION
There are several more issues that we have to consider along the Implementation such as
• Security
• Efficiency
• Geographical Problems
• Security
The radio waves of a mobile frequency consist of Retina pattern and vote can be
Generated by means of external source .Thats why we need to provide some sot of
security to avoid this problem . One of the idea to solve this problem is CDMA
(which will be explained later ) and another technique is inserting security bits at
regular interval of time during the transmission of radio waves (Ex.2 msec) .At the
server side after the given interval (2 msec ) security bits are checked (ex 1001) .
In case of positive confirmation we can accept as valid vote, other wise simply re-
jected. Another problem is that one may trap the radio waves in between and can
determine the person and the vote, this may disclose the result of the election be-
fore the completion of the voting process. To avoid this problem we can go for
applying the efficient and complex encryption algorithm so that the transparency of
data can be hidden and the server side the encrypted data can be again decrypted
and original data can retrieved this make the trapping of wave meaningless .The en-
cryption algorithm can be termed as Key Complex Algorithm, which is as follows,

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1] First it ﬁnds the length of the string.
2] Generate the random numbers equal to the length of the string.
3] Add the corresponding Characters from the given string and random values.
The ﬁnal encrypted data is formed in such a way that the random data at the even
place and rest at odd place. This makes Decryption very easy. Simply subtract the
character at even place from odd place character.

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• Efﬁciency
Whenever the data which is sent from the voter (client) side, it is in the large
amount, this delays a bit a voting system and the data that is received at server side is
in the multiple access mode i.e more than one client is sending the data . To over come
this problem the following
1] Applying compression Algorithms at the Client and server side so that to decrease
the data transfer. Compression technique such as JPEG compression or any other
Compression.
2] Instead of using single server PC we will go for distributed Operating system envi-
ronment with multiple servers. This makes the job sharing and processing faster which
leads to fast responds in case of Multiple Access Environment.
3] To solve the concurrency problem in case of Multiple access environment we will
use CDMA technique which is as follow.

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Here the key values are orthogonal to each other i.e k1*k2=0 and k1*k1=1 i.e if any
tries to decode the information with any other key the data will be vanished as the
data will be in the form d1*k1. If you try to decode with K2 then effect will be as
d1*k1*k2=0. this will vanish the data .And if correct decoding key i.e k1 is used
then decoding will be d1*k1*k1=d1. this decodes the data correctly. As per the
controlling concurrency for multiple access the data from all the nodes is accepted as
k1*d1+k2*d2 +k3*d3+k4*d4.In this case if you want the data corresponding to the
second node then simply multiply the whole equation with the k2. This will give d2
as (k1*d1+k2*d2 +k3*d3+k4*d4)*k2=d2 . So by this we can show that any numbers
of nodes are allowed to send the data, the server will accept all the data and which
ever has to be extracted will be just multiplied with corresponding key. This gets the
corresponding data. Hence the concept of Multiple access.
• Geographical problem
This is the problem regarding the area where technical facilities like mobile tower or
Internet service is not present. In this case will convert the vote and retina pattern into
the electrical information and pass it through the electrical conductors until we can
reach the area where the technical facilities like internet or mobile tower is available,
and if only internet facility is available is then we can convert this electrical informa-
tion to digital means and with these data using computers connected to internet we
can pass the vote and retina pattern. Here the eye scanner will be web cam.

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4.2 ADVANTAGES OF E-VOTING
• aster vote count and tabulation.
• more accurate results as human error is excluded.
• Efﬁcient handling of complicated electoral systems formulae that require laborious
counting procedures.
• Improved presentation of complicated ballot papers.
• Increased convenience for voters.
• Potentially increased participation and turnout, particularly with the use of Internet
voting.
• More attuned to the needs of an increasingly mobile society.
• Prevention of fraud in polling stations and during the transmission and tabulation of
results by reducing human intervention.
• Increased accessibility, for example by audio ballot papers for blind voters, with In-
ternet voting as well for housebound voters and voters from abroad.
• Possibility of multilingual user interfaces that can serve a multilingual electorate better
than paper ballots.
• Reduction of spoilt ballot papers as voting systems can warn voters about any invalid
votes (although consideration should be given to ensuring that voters are able to cast
a blank vote should they so choose).

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• Potential long-term cost savings through savings in poll worker time, and reduced
costs for the production and distribution of ballot papers.
• Cost savings by using Internet voting: global reach with very little logistical overhead.
No shipment costs, no delays in sending out material and receiving it back.
• Compared to postal voting, Internet voting can reduce the incidence of vote-selling
and family voting by allowing multiple voting where only the last vote counts and
prevent manipulation with mail-in deadlines through direct control of voting times.
4.3 DISADVANTAGES OF E-VOTING
• Lack of transparency.
• Limited openness and understanding of the system for non-experts.
• Lack of agreed standards for e-voting systems.
• System certiﬁcation required, but no widely agreed standards for certiﬁcation.
• Potential violation of the secrecy of the vote, especially in systems that perform both
voter authentication and vote casting.
• Risk of manipulation by insiders with privileged access to the system or by hackers
from outside.
• Possibility of fraud through largescale manipulation by a small group of insiders.
• Increased costs for both purchasing and maintaining e-voting systems.

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• Increased infrastructure and environmental requirements, for example, with regard to
power supply, communication technology, temperature, humidity.
• Increased security requirements for protecting the voting system during and between
elections including during transport, storage and maintenance.
• Reduced level of control by the election administration because of high vendor- and/or
technologydependence.
• Limited recount possibilities.
• Need for additional voter education campaigns.
• Possible conflict with the existing legal framework.
• Possible lack of public trust in e-voting-based elections as a result of the weaknesses
above.
4.4 FEATURES OF E-VOTING
• secured login procedure
• Knowing nominees of respective wards
• profiles can be modified
• Nominees can post their vision
• Casting vote is possibl only with authentication of voter
• Inspection is performed on both voter and nominees

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• Suspected user can be reported against
• Abused user can be veriﬁed and blocked if necessary

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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
This paper describes some of the technological activities we have been carrying out within
the ProVotE project, which has the goal of introducing e-voting systems for the next provin-
cial elections.
We believe that a transition to new technologies, especially in a country which is particu-
larly cautious towards new technologies in the polling stations requires a multi-disciplinary
approach that allows to take into account not only the usability requirements of the voters,
but also those non-functional requirements that help guaranteeing security and build trust on
the new voting machines.
The technological actions described above, together with the sociological, communica-
tion, and normative actions planned for the second phase will gradually broaden the size
of experimentations to the whole province, allowing for a smooth introduction of e-voting
systems in the province of Trento.
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