This document outlines emergency response procedures for a fire and emergency services division responding to terrorist events. It establishes: - Procedures for responding to bomb threats, suspicious packages, IEDs, and chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear/explosive materials. - Personal protective equipment requirements and responsibilities for initial response teams. - Protocols for incident management, including setting up exclusion zones and decontamination areas. - Increased response procedures and protective measures for higher threat levels.

1. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
OPERATIONS
This SOP establishes procedures for emergency response by the Area II Fire
& Emergency Services Division. It outlines procedures used during
responses to terrorist events; including bomb threats, suspicious packages,
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), B-NICE materials (Biological, Nuclear,
Incendiary, Chemical, and Explosives) and our more common emergency
responses during increased THREATCONs. Under each emergency scenario,
vehicles, PPE, initial tactics and crew responsibilities will be listed.
1 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) - 11
. Scope. This SOP applies to all fire department personnel and all such
personnel who are working inside the Contamination control zone or incident
site perimeter, and all personnel operating at emergency scenes within the
structure of the Yongsan Fire & Emergency Services Incident Command
System.
2. Responsibilities: Each member of the Initial Response Team (IRT) is
responsible to understand and adhere to this SOP. Furthermore, all crew
chiefs, battalion chiefs, and Assistant Chiefs are responsible for ensuring
compliance with the contents of this SOP.
3. Notification:
3.1 Crews responding to routine emergency calls may be the first to
discover potential or actual evidence of a B-NICE (WMD) event. Crew Chiefs
and Senior Fire Officials performing response and emergency scene size-up
must be aware of indicators of B-NICE Materials, either released or on
scene.
3.2 Commo Operators may receive calls reporting potential or actual B-NICE
events and must be on the look out for clues indicating an other than
normal response.
3.3 Threats could be made to the installation and AT/FP Plan 00-1 could be
activated.
3.4 If you suspect a WMD or B-NICE event, STOP!
3.4.1 Notify the Fire Chief or SFO and all responders immediately.
3.4.2 Call for the IRT.
3.4.3 Perform the B-NICE Size-up
4. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT:
4.1 The Senior Fire Official will implement appropriate Incident Management
Staff positions required to mitigate the emergency. (see figure 4)
4.2 Establish an on-scene command post and communications network.
4.2.1 Locate and assess incident site, determine wind direction prior to
approaching immediate incident site.

2. 4.2.2 Determine cordon size including; exclusion zone, and hot, warm and
cold zones.
4.2.3 Direct MPs in evacuation of cordon.
4.2.3.1 Direct contaminated evacuee’s to a special assembly point.
4.2.4 Establish personnel accountability procedures and exposure limits.
4.3 Request the necessary emergency service agencies to assist in rescue,
decontamination and evacuation operations. This includes, but is not
limited to, additional Hazardous Materials Response Teams, Chemical
Decontamination
unit(s) and emergency medical service units from surrounding mutual-aid
jurisdictions.
4.4 Serve as liaison to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
4.4.1 Request, through the EOC, those overseas federal agencies required to
mitigate the incident. The Department of State is the lead agency for on
post WMD incidents.
4.5 Assume overall responsibility of all Fire, HAZMAT, and Emergency
Services personnel operating on the incident.
4.6 Coordinate for emergency medical services.
4.7 Direct available personnel to search for secondary devices within a 200
ft radius of the On-Scene-Control Point (OSCP) or Tactical Operations
Center (TOC).
FIGURE 4 – INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM
5. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Individual equipment will be stored
on hand and ready for issue during increased threatcons. Fire fighters
will be issued and use three different sets of protective equipment. They
can be used singly or in combination based on the anticipated threat and
situation. They are as follows;
5.1 Individual Protective Equipment (IPE)
5.1.1 Gas mask with hood attached.
5.1.2 Kevlar camouflaged helmet.
5.1.3 Web belt and canteen filled with water.
5.1.4 Flak vest.
5.1.5 First Aid kit
5.2 Chemical Warfare Defense Ensemble (J-Fire)
5.2.1 Chem suit
5.2.2 Over boots
5.2.3 Gloves

3. 5.2.4 Poncho
5.3 Firefighter Personal Protective Gear
5.3.1 Bunkers
5.3.2 SCBA
5.3.3 Boots
5.3.4 Gloves
5.3.5 PASS Device
5.3.6 Helmet
5.3.7 Nomex Hood
5.3.8 Latex Gloves
5.3.9 Surgical Masks
6. PROCEDURES: The F&ES Division may be faced with a number of different
scenarios that will force us to perform firefighting operations with less
than optimal manpower and equipment, operate in unfamiliar environments, or
place firefighters at increased personal risk. We must be prepared for
these contingencies. Some of these include;
6.1 INITIAL RESPONSE: No notice WMD event.
6.1.1 Fire Ground Command – the Incident Command System (ICS)
6.1.1.1 The Incident Command System will be used at all incidents.
6.1.1.2 The initially responding SFO or lead crew chief will formally take
command and assume the safety officer role. He will state over the radio “
Call sign is on scene, give a situational description, I am in command and
am safety.”
6.1.2 Size up – Recognizing suspicious incidents may be difficult. Be
extremely alert for clues, such as;
6.1.2.1 Occupancy or location
6.1.2.1.1 Symbolic or historic targets
6.1.2.1.2 Public buildings or assembly areas
6.1.2.1.3 Public safety, transportation, and communications
6.1.2.2 Type of Event
6.1.2.2.1 Explosions, incendiaries, pops, hisses, etc.
6.1.2.2.2 Non-trauma casualties
6.1.2.3 On-scene warning signs
6.1.2.3.1 Unexplained or sudden mass illness or death
6.1.2.3.2 Unusual orders or tastes
6.1.2.3.3 Unexplained skin, eye, or airway irritation
6.1.2.3.4 Unexplained vapor clouds, mists, or plumes
6.1.2.3.5 Chemical containers, spray devices, or lab equipment
6.1.2.3.6 Out of place items
6.1.2.3.7 Spot fires or unusual fire, smoke or color
6.1.2.3.8 Dead insects, birds, or animals
6.1.2.3.9 Anything else abnormal
6.1.2.4 If you suspect a WMD or B-NICE event, STOP! Notify all responders,
call for the IRT, and Perform the following B-NICE Size-up

4. 6.1.2.4.1 Threat Assessment
6.1.2.4.1.1 What type of material could cause the situation
6.1.2.4.1.2 What is the potential for HARM, both the public and responders
6.1.2.4.1.3 How large is the area of danger
6.1.2.4.1.4 Are we in danger here
6.1.2.4.2 Cordon Size
6.1.2.4.2.1 Establish a cordon – large enough to protect the public and
responders.
6.1.2.4.2.2 Direct MPs to stop traffic and prevent entry
6.1.2.4.2.3 Direct MPs to evacuate the area.
6.1.2.4.2.4 Determine a controlled holding area inside the cordon for all
potentially contaminated personnel inside the effected area.
6.1.2.4.3 Decon
6.1.2.4.3.1 Set up an Emergency Decontamination area using 2 ½ & 1 ¾ in.
fire hoses and salvage covers.
6.1.2.4.3.2 Set up full decontamination.
6.1.3 PPE – Based on the most significant hazard to firefighters.
Firefighters will not enter fire areas without firefighting PPE and SCBA.
6.1.4 Vehicles and Crews – First alarm
6.1.4.1 One Dong-A or MACI with 4 man crew.
6.1.4.2 At station 1 the Rescue vehicle and Ladder will also respond.
6.1.4.3 At station 2 Crash 1 will also respond.
6.1.4.4 The Assistant Chief will respond to all incidents.
6.1.5 Vehicles and Crews – Initial Response Team – B-NICE response to all
Area II locations.
6.1.5.1 HAZMAT Vehicle
6.1.5.2 Fire Chief
6.1.5.3 Rescue Vehicle
6.1.5.4 Assistant Chief
6.1.6 Mutual Aid and Fire Fighter Recall (see SOP # 55).
6.1.6.1 Only the Senior Fire Official (SFO) on scene will request mutual
Aid.
6.1.6.2 Recall of off-duty IRT firefighters will be directed by the
Assistant Fire Chief on duty.
6.2 Increased Threat Conditions (Threatcons)
6.2.1 Notifications and Implementation:
6.2.1.1 Immediately upon notification of an increased threat for Yongsan
Garrison, Area II, the Fire Alarm Communication Center Operator (FACC) will
alert the Fire Chief and the Assistant Chief for Operations on duty.
6.2.1.2 The SFO on duty will immediately complete the F & ES Threatcon
checklist for the current Threatcon.
6.3 Emergency Response during Increased Threatcon Levels (Ref: AT/FP PLAN
00-1)

5. 6.3.1 Threatcon Alpha. Denotes a higher than normal security posture.
This condition is declared as a general warning of possible terrorist
activity, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, when
circumstances do not justify full implementation of the measures contained
in a higher Threatcon. However, it may be necessary to implement selected
measures from Threatcon Bravo. Threatcon Alpha is the normal day to day
posture throughout Pakistan.
6.3.1.1 Resource Protection: No change
6.3.1.2 Emergency Operations: No change
6.3.2 Threatcon Bravo. Denotes an increased security posture. This
condition is declared when there is an increased and more predictable
threat of terrorist activity, although no particular target has been
identified. This posture will be implemented immediately upon notification
from competent authority. This threatcon is implemented by 34th Support
Group Commander or his designated representatives.
6.3.2.1 Resource Protection (Ref: AT/FP 00-1, and attch 1 of this SOP)
6.3.2.2 Emergency Response Operations
6.3.2.2.1 Protective Equipment: Normal firefighting tactics and strategies
will be employed with personnel donning and wearing firefighting ensembles
for all emergencies the same as peacetime response criteria. Standard
Operating Procedures will be used.
6.3.2.2.2 Operating Procedures
6.3.2.2.2.1 ON POST RESPONSES: Standard Operating Procedures apply.
However, firefighters will be more aware of the potential for harm and
therefore more vigilance is required.
6.3.2.2.2.2 OFF POST RESPONSES: Standard Operating Procedures and
notifications apply with the exception that all off post responses will be
validated by local authorities or post security forces as bonafide prior to
leaving the post.
6.3.3 Threatcon Charlie. Denotes an advanced security posture. This
condition is declared when an incident occurs or when intelligence is
received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent.
Initiate actions to obtain this posture immediately upon implementation
direction from competent authority. This threatcon is implemented by 34th
Support Group Commander or his designated representative.
6.3.3.1 Resource Protection (Ref. AT/FP 00-1, and attch 1 of this SOP)
6.3.3.1.1 Implement F & ES Threatcon Charlie Measures.
6.3.3.2 Emergency Operations
6.3.3.2.1 Protective Equipment: Firefighters will perform routine duties
and standbys while wearing the appropriate PPE based on the threat.
6.3.3.2.2 Operating Procedures
6.3.3.2.2.1 On Post: For all emergency responses, crews will proceed to the
emergency, perform a size up, or go into an investigative mode prior to

6. changing into firefighting PPE and SCBA. Firefighters will perform
investigations for alarm activation’s, smell of smoke, no fire and smoke
emergencies in the appropriate PPE. The SFO can make the call to switch to
firefighting PPE. Remember, what is the greatest risk at the time? The
type of emergency versus the threat.
6.3.3.2.2.1.1 If upon arrival, fire or smoke is showing, crews will change
out into firefighting PPE and SCBA before commencing any interior
operations. (Exception: Threat of chemical or biological WMD release.)
Exterior crews may attempt a controlling action while interior crews
prepare for interior attack. For aircraft emergencies involving smoke,
fire, or crashes, crews will use turrets to control fires while
firefighters are changing into bunkers. At no time will firefighters enter
a known fire area without wearing firefighting PPE and SCBA.
6.3.3.2.2.2 Off Post: Off post mutual aid emergency responses will be
limited. Local fire brigades will be notified. Required off post responses
will be coordinated with post officials on an exception basis prior to
leaving the installation.
6.3.4 Threatcon Delta. Denotes an optimum security posture. This
condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has
occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action
against a specific location is likely. Normally, this threatcon is
declared as a localized warning. Initiate actions to obtain this posture
immediately upon direction from competent authority. This threatcon is
implemented by 34th Support Group Commander or his designated
representatives.
6.3.4.1 Resource Protection (Ref. AT/FP 00-1, and attch 1 of this SOP)
6.3.4.1.1 Implement F & ES Threatcon Delta Measures.
6.3.4.2 Emergency Operations
6.3.4.2.1 Protective Equipment: Firefighters will perform routine duties
and standbys while wearing the appropriate PPE.
6.3.4.2.2 Operating Procedures
6.3.4.2.2.1 On post: For all emergency responses, crews will proceed to the
emergency, perform a size up, or go into an investigative mode prior to
changing into firefighting PPE and SCBA. Firefighters will perform
investigations for alarm activation’s, smell of smoke, no fire and smoke
in-department emergencies in their IPE. The SFO can make the call to switch
from IPE to firefighting PPE. Remember, what is the greatest risk at the
time? The type of emergency versus the threat.
6.3.4.2.2.2 If upon arrival, fire or smoke is showing, crews will change
out into firefighting PPE and SCBA before commencing any interior
operations. (Exception: Threat of chemical or biological WMD release.)
Exterior crews may attempt a controlling action while interior crews
prepare for interior attack. For aircraft emergencies involving smoke,
fire, or crashes, crews will use turrets to control fires while

7. firefighters are changing into bunkers. At no time will firefighters enter
a known fire area without wearing fire fighting PPE and SCBA.
6.3.4.2.2.3 Off post: Off post mutual aid emergency responses will be
curtailed. Local fire brigades will be notified. Required off
post responses will be coordinated with post officials on an exception
basis prior to leaving the installation.
6.3.4.2.2.4 Planned Response: All responses will be dispatched from the
Fire Control Center (FCC) after coordination with the EOC or CAT.
6.4 Emergency Response to Terrorism Involving BNICE Materials: The
following applies when intelligence indicators lead towards the possibility
of nuclear, biological, or chemical materials being used in a terrorist
attack. Most of the measures above will apply as well as the specifics
below. Actual incidents will be mitigated along the lines of a Hazmat
incident. (see SOPs 92-54 to 59 for further info)
6.4.1.1 Resource Protection: (Ref AT FP 00-1)
6.4.1.2 Emergency Operations
6.4.1.2.1 Protective Equipment: Dependent upon the threat.
6.4.1.2.1.1 Biological Threat: All responding personnel will ensure
universal medical precautions are used when working any type of fire,
explosion, or medical incident. Specific equipment is;
6.4.1.2.1.1.1 Medical gloves.
6.4.1.2.1.1.2 Surgical Masks.
6.4.1.2.1.1.3 Eye protection.
6.4.1.2.1.1.4 Bunkers.
6.4.1.2.1.2 Chemical Threat:
6.4.1.2.1.2.1 M-8 and M-9 paper and tape will be placed on all response
vehicles and bunkers.
6.4.1.2.1.3 Nuclear Threat:
6.4.1.2.1.3.1 Radiological detection equipment will be part of the first
response equipment, either on loan to F&ES or brought by post personnel.
6.4.1.2.2 Operating Procedures: Response to reports of explosions, fires,
medical: Firefighters will respond to reported emergencies using standard
pre-fire planned criteria (vehicles and manpower). Crews will stage a
minimum of 1000 ft. from the emergency scene. One crew will fully bunker
out, don SCBA, and breathe air before continuing the response. This crew
will proceed to the site and perform a size up, specifically looking for
BNICE indicators, determine the level of personal protective equipment
required, and the tactics required to mitigate the emergency. This will be
relayed to the SFO who will in-turn authorize the continued response.
7. PRESERVING EVIDENCE:
7.1 Criminal or terrorist use of WMD, hazardous materials, or a B-NICE
event is criminal. All personnel entering the cordon will ensure the
preservation of all evidence. Once the scene has been declared safe from

8. fire or other hazards, the scene will be released to CID or MPI for
investigation.
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