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(2011) Security Breach Compromises 75,000
Staff/Student Social Security Numbers
Image from this Site
Presenters: Aron Eisold, Matt Mickelson, Bryce Nelson, Benjamin Nikolay
 UWM discovered Malware Infection, May 25, 2011
 Affected Server was Immediately Shutdown
 Authorities were called in to investigate
Image from this Site
("Information on Computer," 2011)
 UWM found Malware had access to SSNs, June 30,
2011
 No evidence of Identity Theft was found
 No suspects were found
View TMJ News Video - http://www.todaystmj4.com/news/local/127459218.html
("Information on Computer," 2011)
 UWM notified effected individuals, August 10, 2011
 They were asked to monitor their credit reports
 UWM updated security on Servers
Image from this Site
("Information on Computer," 2011)
Evaluate Analyze Synthesize
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failure
 Security was updated
in reaction to Breach
 Risk Management
Training
 Re-evaluation of IS
roles and
responsibilities
 Risk Assessment
 Regular Business/IT
Management Meetings
 Cost = $8118
Image from this Site
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 Inferred malware
access obtained via
weak Admin password
 Dictionary Attack
 Use Radom Password
Generator
 Setup automated
Password Expiration
 Password History
 ACL Access Limitation
 Hardware and Port
Lockdown
 Cost = $minimal
Image from this Site
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 UWM has a solid
“Admin Access” policy
 No Recommendations
Needed
Image from this Site
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 UWM requires use of
“Strong” Passwords
 Multiple characters
types required
 No Recommendations
Needed
Image from this Site
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 UWM requires use of
“Strong” Passwords
 Auditing of Passwords
is performed randomly
 No Recommendations
Needed
Image from this Site
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 Inferred - Server
Admin. Account
Compromised
 Delay in recognition of
illicit activity
 Provide users history
of prev. activity at
login.
 Implement Active
Directory Audit Tool
(AD Audit Plus)
 Cost = $7680 annually
Image from this Site
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 Insufficient audit trail
to catch the intruders
 Far too much elapsed
time before those
affected were notified
 Verify existing
configuration / make
changes (Windows Group
Policy / Auditing tools)
 Research and assess
possible 3rd party tools
 Cost – Variable or
minimal, depending on
option selected
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 Sensitive data
classifications do exist
 Data was separated
and housed on
different systems
 No Recommendations
needed
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 Scalability as an
enterprise level
network
 Thousands of user
accounts and various
types
 No Recommendations
needed
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 Security activity was
insufficiently logged
 Inability to track/catch
the attacker
 Checked and escaladed
on a regular basis?
 Refer to 5.7
recommendations
 “Common Sense
Security Auditing”
 Cost – Variable,
depending on route
taken
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 Attackers were never
caught
 2 months had elapsed
before notifying those
affected
 Continuously evaluate
system/audit security
on a regular basis
 Evaluate/revise
procedures and
auditing as necessary
 Cost – variable to
minimal
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 UWM will setup times
to perform audits on
their network
 No Recommendations
Needed
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 Hacker gained access
through open firewall
ports
 Purchase and install a
new firewall
 SonicWall NSA E7500
 Features Next-
Generation Firewall, &
Intrusion Prevention.
 Cost = $35,339
Image from this Site
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 UWM’s spyware failed
to deny the outside
attacker from gaining
access.
 Purchase security add-
ons to the NSA E7500
firewall.
 Included is anti-virus
and spyware, and
application intelligence
on the firewall.
 Cost = $14,514 for 3
years.
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective
Irrelevant
 There were no
transactions or digital
signatures needed in
this type of security
breach.
 No Recommendations
Needed
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 UWM has a excellent
records and retention
policy to explain how
to transfer data.
 No Recommendations
Needed
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 Malware bypassed
tamperproof security
measures
 Security design of
infrastructure kept
confidential
 No Recommendations
Needed
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 Cryptography
Encryption Keys were
not used
 Unlikely attackers
accessed data
 Implement asymmetric
database encryption
 Use DSS encryption
technology with private
and public keys
 Cost - $12,500
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Failed
 Failed to prevent the
malware to install
 Physical firewall and
configuration remained
private
 Symantec Endpoint
Protection 12.1
 SEPM Training for IT
department
 Policy and Procedure
creation and
implementation
 Cost - $40.89 per
device per year
$3761.57 for training
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective Passed
 No data was
transmitted to the WAN
 Firewall did not play a
role in this incident
 No Recommendations
Needed
Analyze Synthesize
 UWM Objective
Irrelevant
 Integrity of physical
mechanisms
maintained
 Unrelated to physical
access or
authentication of
foreign devices.
 No Recommendations
Needed
EASy as Pie!
EASy as Pie!
EASy as Pie!

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Ea sy presentation4

  • 1. (2011) Security Breach Compromises 75,000 Staff/Student Social Security Numbers Image from this Site Presenters: Aron Eisold, Matt Mickelson, Bryce Nelson, Benjamin Nikolay
  • 2.  UWM discovered Malware Infection, May 25, 2011  Affected Server was Immediately Shutdown  Authorities were called in to investigate Image from this Site ("Information on Computer," 2011)
  • 3.  UWM found Malware had access to SSNs, June 30, 2011  No evidence of Identity Theft was found  No suspects were found View TMJ News Video - http://www.todaystmj4.com/news/local/127459218.html ("Information on Computer," 2011)
  • 4.  UWM notified effected individuals, August 10, 2011  They were asked to monitor their credit reports  UWM updated security on Servers Image from this Site ("Information on Computer," 2011)
  • 6. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failure  Security was updated in reaction to Breach  Risk Management Training  Re-evaluation of IS roles and responsibilities  Risk Assessment  Regular Business/IT Management Meetings  Cost = $8118 Image from this Site
  • 7. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  Inferred malware access obtained via weak Admin password  Dictionary Attack  Use Radom Password Generator  Setup automated Password Expiration  Password History  ACL Access Limitation  Hardware and Port Lockdown  Cost = $minimal Image from this Site
  • 8. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  UWM has a solid “Admin Access” policy  No Recommendations Needed Image from this Site
  • 9. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  UWM requires use of “Strong” Passwords  Multiple characters types required  No Recommendations Needed Image from this Site
  • 10. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  UWM requires use of “Strong” Passwords  Auditing of Passwords is performed randomly  No Recommendations Needed Image from this Site
  • 11. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  Inferred - Server Admin. Account Compromised  Delay in recognition of illicit activity  Provide users history of prev. activity at login.  Implement Active Directory Audit Tool (AD Audit Plus)  Cost = $7680 annually Image from this Site
  • 12. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  Insufficient audit trail to catch the intruders  Far too much elapsed time before those affected were notified  Verify existing configuration / make changes (Windows Group Policy / Auditing tools)  Research and assess possible 3rd party tools  Cost – Variable or minimal, depending on option selected
  • 13. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  Sensitive data classifications do exist  Data was separated and housed on different systems  No Recommendations needed
  • 14. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  Scalability as an enterprise level network  Thousands of user accounts and various types  No Recommendations needed
  • 15. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  Security activity was insufficiently logged  Inability to track/catch the attacker  Checked and escaladed on a regular basis?  Refer to 5.7 recommendations  “Common Sense Security Auditing”  Cost – Variable, depending on route taken
  • 16. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  Attackers were never caught  2 months had elapsed before notifying those affected  Continuously evaluate system/audit security on a regular basis  Evaluate/revise procedures and auditing as necessary  Cost – variable to minimal
  • 17. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  UWM will setup times to perform audits on their network  No Recommendations Needed
  • 18. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  Hacker gained access through open firewall ports  Purchase and install a new firewall  SonicWall NSA E7500  Features Next- Generation Firewall, & Intrusion Prevention.  Cost = $35,339 Image from this Site
  • 19. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  UWM’s spyware failed to deny the outside attacker from gaining access.  Purchase security add- ons to the NSA E7500 firewall.  Included is anti-virus and spyware, and application intelligence on the firewall.  Cost = $14,514 for 3 years.
  • 20. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Irrelevant  There were no transactions or digital signatures needed in this type of security breach.  No Recommendations Needed
  • 21. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  UWM has a excellent records and retention policy to explain how to transfer data.  No Recommendations Needed
  • 22. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  Malware bypassed tamperproof security measures  Security design of infrastructure kept confidential  No Recommendations Needed
  • 23. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  Cryptography Encryption Keys were not used  Unlikely attackers accessed data  Implement asymmetric database encryption  Use DSS encryption technology with private and public keys  Cost - $12,500
  • 24. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Failed  Failed to prevent the malware to install  Physical firewall and configuration remained private  Symantec Endpoint Protection 12.1  SEPM Training for IT department  Policy and Procedure creation and implementation  Cost - $40.89 per device per year $3761.57 for training
  • 25. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Passed  No data was transmitted to the WAN  Firewall did not play a role in this incident  No Recommendations Needed
  • 26. Analyze Synthesize  UWM Objective Irrelevant  Integrity of physical mechanisms maintained  Unrelated to physical access or authentication of foreign devices.  No Recommendations Needed