The document summarizes an upcoming webinar on DNSSEC hosted by .ORG, The Public Interest Registry and Afilias. The webinar will provide an introduction to DNSSEC including how it adds security and authentication to the Domain Name System to prevent forged DNS data. It will also discuss PIR's implementation timeline and test program for DNSSEC in the .ORG top-level domain.

1. DNSSEC Industry Coalition
Webinar Series
Brought to you by
.ORG, The Public Interest Registry and
Afilias

2.  Lauren Price, DNSSEC Industry Coalition Chair
◦ Sr. Product Marketing Manager, .ORG The Public
Interest Registry
◦ lprice@pir.org
 Jim Galvin, Afilias
◦ Director, Strategic Relationships & Technical
Standards
◦ jgalvin@afilias.info
 Sadik Chandiwala, Afilias
◦ Technical Account Manager
◦ sadik@ca.afilias.info
2

3.  The Vulnerability of DNS
 Quick Intro to DNSSEC
 PIR and DNSSEC Timeline
 Friends and Family Program
 Some DNSSEC Terminology
 OT&E Functionality and Changes
◦ EPP
◦ Etc.
 Resources
 Questions

4.  When you visit a web site, send an email, or
download software, can you be sure you are
communicating with the server that you think
you are?
 The answer is ‘no’, at least not with certainty.

5.  DNSSEC (short for Domain Name System Security
Extensions) adds security to the Domain Name
System.
 DNSSEC is designed to protect Internet resolvers
(clients) from forged DNS data, such as that
created by DNS cache poisoning.

6.  Currently, a DNS resolver sends a query out to the
Internet and then accepts the first response it
receives, without question.
 If a malicious system were to send back an incorrect
response, the resolver would use this address until
its cache expired.
 This is bad enough if a single user's computer gets
this bad data, but it is much worse if it's another
name server that answers queries for an ISP –
affecting thousands of users.

7.  It provides proof that DNS data has not been
modified in transit to the end-user
 It does this by providing additional information,
something like a “seal of origin”, that can be verified
as being correct or not.
 It is a set of extensions to DNS, which provide:
a) origin authentication of DNS data,
b) data integrity, and
c) authenticated denial of existence.

8.  Each piece of a domain’s DNS information has a digital
signature attached to it.
 When a user enters the domain in a browser, the resolver
verifies the signature.
 If it does not match, the resolver discards the response and
waits for another.
 Only a response with a verified signature will be accepted by
the resolver
 The description above is a common scenario. Please note
that different resolvers may take different actions
** Note: DNSSEC only adds signatures to DNS data. It does not encrypt
anything. It has no effect on increasing the privacy of the DNS, and
information in the DNS is still public information.

9. End User Benefits
 Ensures you are communicating to the correct
website
 End Users that are not DNSSEC aware will not see
any adverse effect.
Registrant Benefits
 Mitigates the risk of possible fraud
 Greater protection of brand
◦ Significantly decreases the threat of domain hijacking

10. Registrar Benefits
 Ability to meet Registrant demands for increase
security of their domain
 Ability to continue to sell domains that are not
secured by DNSSEC for those registrants who are not
interested.
 Complying with new industry standards
Registry Benefits
 Meeting new industry standards
 Ability to meet Registrar demands for increase
security of their portfolio of domains

12.  Top five perceptions of the .ORG Brand*
◦ Informative
◦ Well-Intentioned
◦ Trustworthy
◦ Valuable Information
◦ Reliable
We expect to keep it that way!
* Source: e5 Marketing Survey of over 10,000 respondents in an electronic form,
November 2008
12

13.  .ORG zone signed June 2, 2009
 Registrars can participate in the testing phase
 Registrars are encouraged to test in OTE
 A certification test will be required
 2 registrars have passed their certification test to date
 We have selected small set of domains and have
manually inserted the DS records at the Registry
 Successful scheduled Key Rollovers

14.  Additional mandatory .ORG DNSSEC OT&E Test
required
 Registrars must pass the OT&E Test to become
DNSSEC Aware
 PIR will enable DNSSEC functionality for the
Registrar after successful completion of the OT&E
test.

15.  We expect to be done with our internal testing by
Q409
 Estimated full production timeframe first half of
2010 meaning registrars can submit live
delegations

17.  A DNS resolver is the program on a user’s
computer that sends the query to the DNS.
 Once a response is received, the resolver returns
the response back to the end user’s application.
domain.org?
192.0.5.4
User’s PC
Resolver

18.  A key pair contains two digital keys — a private key
(held only by the .ORG registry) and a public key
(distributed to the public).
 The .ORG registry uses the .ORG private key pair to
sign the zone.
 End users' validators (or the validators at their ISPs)
use the .ORG public key to validate the signature
once they've asked for it.

19. If I trust a public key from someone, I can use that key to verify
the signature … and authenticate the source
 Make sure the root zone key can be trusted
◦ Pointers in the root zone point to lower zones
(org/com/info/de etc)
◦ Each pointer is validated with the previous validated
zone key
 When DNSSEC is fully deployed, only the key for the
root zone is needed to validate all the DNSSEC keys
on the Internet

20. Root Servers
.org authoritative NS
Local
Cache
Recursive
DNS Server
Local
cache
domain.org authoritative NS
User’s PC Resolver Confidential – Copyright
2008 Afilias Limited

21. Root Servers
DNSSEC DNSSEC .ORG authoritative NS
Recursive
DNS Server DNSSEC
Local cache
domain.ORG authoritative NS
User’s PC Resolver Confidential – Copyright
2008 Afilias Limited

22.  A key rollover will occur when the .ORG registry
needs to change its side of a key pair.
 This means that the entire pair needs to be
changed
◦ The .ORG zone will need to be re-signed with a
new private key
AND
◦ The public will need to update their validating
resolvers with the new public portion of the .ORG
zone key.

23. PIR will be required to do Key Rollovers on a regular
basis:
1. If one of the .ORG private keys were compromised
(i.e., stolen) and had to be immediately revoked.
2. For prevention of compromise (see next question
for further information), where a key rollover
would be scheduled at regular intervals.

24.  Digital signatures are not secure all of the time.
They are subject to cryptanalysis.
 It is possible for an attacker to learn the private key
in a key pair even though that key has never been
disclosed, either through "brute force" or other
types of attacks.
 Since every attack requires time to complete,
periodically changing the key decreases the length
of time an attacker has to attempt the compromise.

25. What would happen if end users do not update their
validating resolvers with the new .ORG zone key?
 Once the old key is purged, domains in the .ORG
zone that were signed would no longer resolve for
those people who did not use the new .ORG key.
 It would not affect people that are not using
DNSSEC – they would continue to see the domain
name.

26.  A key rollover will be announced on the PIR Web
site prior to the scheduled event
 Anyone using DNSSEC will have to watch for these
announcements, specially ISPs, registrars, and
people using DNSSEC in applications.

27.  Changes have been made to support the DNS
protocol.
 Built New Registrar Tool Kit for DNSSEC
◦ Adds DNSSEC EPP transactions (RFC 4310)
 EPP server has been modified for DNSSEC
 Adds DNSSEC EPP transactions (as per RFC 4310)
 Changes to the Registry Database to now Store DS
Information
DNSSEC

28.  Covered in the ORG manual: Extensible Provisioning
Protocol (EPP) v1.0 ORG DNSSEC Registrar Acceptance
Criteria
 Registrars must test the basic operations that their
client application can perform in the ORG DNSSEC
registry environment including:
◦ Create Domain
◦ Create Domain with Optional Key Data
◦ Query Domain
◦ Query Domain with Optional Key Data
◦ Update Domain – Adding DS Data
◦ Update Domain – Changing DS Data
◦ Update Domain – Change to Include Optional Data
◦ Update Domain – Removing DS Data

29. DNSSEC adds four new resource record types:
1. Resource Record Signature (RRSIG)
 Signature over RRset made using private key
2. DNS Public Key (DNSKEY)
 Public key, needed for verifying a RRSIG
3. Delegation Signer (DS)
 ‘Pointer’ for building chains of authentication
4. Next Secure (NSEC, NSEC3)
 As an alternative to NSEC, NSEC3 (defined in RFC 5155) can
prevent walking of DNSSEC zones and permits optional
gradual expansion of delegation-centric zones.
 NSEC: Indicates which name is the next one in the zone and which
type-codes are available for the current name

30. The DNSSEC Data Fields
Keytag • Contains the key tag value of the DNSKEY RR that validates this signature, in
network byte order
• Provides a mechanism for selecting a public key efficiently.
Algorithm • Identifies the public key's cryptographic algorithm and determines the format of
the Public Key field
Digest Type • Identifies the algorithm used to construct the digest
Digest • The DS record refers to a DNSKEY RR by including a digest of that DNSKEY
RR.
Maximum • Specifies a validity period for the signature
Signature Life
Flags • Identifies whether or not the DNSKEY record holds a DNS zone key
Protocol • The Protocol Field MUST have value 3, and the DNSKEY RR MUST be treated
as invalid during signature verification if it is found to be some value other tan 3.
Confidential – Copyright
Public Key • Holds the public key material 2005 Afilias Limited

31. The following EPP commands will now contain the
optional DNSSEC data:
1. Session Mgmt. 2. Object Query 3. Object
<login> <check> Transform
<logout> <info> <create>
<poll > <delete>
<transfer> <renew>
<transfer>
<update>

32.  Create Domain is changed because a DNSSEC
secure domain must be created with a DS record
attached to it
 Registrar needs to be accredited for creating
domain names with DS records
 If they are not, the system will reject the domain
create command and throw a validation error – You
are not authorized to perform this action.

33.  If the maxSigLife is not entered for a <create>
domain name with DS records, the system will set it
to the default value (40 days)
 If the user provides empty tags for the following
parameters, the domain will not be created and an
error message will be returned:
◦ secDNS:keyTag
◦ secDNS:alg
◦ secDNS:digestType

34.  <update> domain command is now changed as DS
information can be added or changed for each domain
 If the Registrar is not accredited for creating domain
names with DS records and attempts to add DS data to
an existing domain name, the system will reject the
domain update command and return an error
 If the domain name already has 10 DS records and the
sponsoring Registrar attempts to add another, the
system will reject the domain update command and
return an error per EPP RFC 3730.
 If the maxSigLife is not entered for a domain name with
DS records, the system will set it to the default value
(40 days)

35. The following fields will be appended to the WHOIS
output for a domain name with DS records –
◦ DNSSEC (Can be Signed or Unsigned) – To denote if the
domain name is digitally signed.
◦ DS Created – Time stamp that the record was created in
UTC
◦ DS Maximum Signature Life - Maximum Signature Life
associated with this DS record

36.  If a domain name has more than one DS record
associated with it, the DS record information for all
the records will be displayed one after the other as
displayed in the screenshot (above) If a domain
name does not have any DS records associated with
it, the DNSSEC value displayed will be Unsigned

37.  .ORG OT&E Test Criteria
 General FAQ
 ORG manual: Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
v1.0 ORG DNSSEC Registrar Acceptance Criteria
 Registrar Tool Kit (RTK – Addon) including the
DNSSEC extensions is available for download from:
◦ https://registrars.pir.org/registrar_relations/dns_
security
◦ www.sourceforge.net

38. The Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC are described in these IETF documents:
◦ RFC 4033: DNS Security Introduction and Requirements
◦ RFC 4034: Resource Records for the DNS Security
Extensions
◦ RFC 4035: Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions
.ORG website
◦ http://www.pir.org/dnssec
DNSSEC related information website
www.dnssec-deployment.org
www.dnssec.net

39. Questions?