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                                   Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies
                                   W
                                   WHITE PAPER




                                   Introduction
Executive Summary                  For all the beneļ¬ts of an open Internet, there is a dangerous ļ¬‚ip side. Domain name system
DNSSEC represents a vital          (DNS) servers are a perfect case in point. With no inherent security, DNS servers at a host of
means with which to address        organizations have been repeatedly compromised to enable a host of malicious endeavors,
many security threats, including   including cache poisoning (injecting incorrect/fraudulent data into a name serverā€™s cache,
cache poisoning, man-in-the-       which then gets served to users), redirecting phone calls, man-in-the-middle attacks to steal
middle attacks, and more. But      passwords, rerouting email, denial of service attacks, and more.
the DNSSEC infrastructure
is only as secure as the           To combat these threats, many organizations have implemented Domain Name Systems
cryptographic keys used to         Security Extensions (DNSSEC), the process of digitally signing DNS records in order to ensure
protect DNS records. This paper    that the messages received are the same as those that were sent.
reveals important strategies       By adopting DNSSEC, a range of organizations, including domain providers, online banks and
for maximizing DNSSEC              retailers, SaaS providers, and more, can realize a range of beneļ¬ts:
security, outlining the key role
HSMs play and the critical           ā€¢ Boost security. DNSSEC can help guard against cache poisoning, redirected phone calls,
requirements for successful HSM        man-in-the-middle attacks, and more.
implementations.                     ā€¢ Ensure compliance. DNSSEC can help address ICANN, NSEC, and other mandates and
                                       guidelines.

                                     ā€¢ Reduce costs. By safeguarding against a range of network based threats, organizations
                                       can reduce the time and cost associated with threat mitigation and post-attack forensics
                                       and reparation.

                                   Without Robust Security, DNSSEC Can Be Compromised
                                   In addition to several new concepts and operations for both the DNS server and the DNS
                                   client, DNSSEC introduces four new resource records (DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, and DS) to
                                   DNS. What this means is that DNSSEC requires some new procedures such as key generation,
                                   signing, and key management. But, for all the potential DNSSEC beneļ¬ts outlined above,
                                   the intended gains arenā€™t guaranteed because the resource records introduced by DNSSEC
                                   are kept in an unencrypted ļ¬le. It is only when the entire DNSSEC infrastructure is fully and
                                   comprehensively secured that organizations can begin to fully enjoy DNSSECā€™s beneļ¬ts. To do
                                   so, they need capabilities to do the following:




                                   Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper                                              1
ā€¢ Secure digital signatures. DNS messages need to be digitally signed in order to ensure the
HSM Advantages                validity of DNS services.
ā€¢ Completeness
                            ā€¢ Control access. Organizations need to ensure only authorized customers and internal staff
ā€¢ Performance
                              can access sensitive applications and data.
ā€¢ Compliant and Secure
ā€¢ Centralization of Key     ā€¢ Maintain application integrity. All associated application code and processes need to be
  Management                  secured to ensure integrity and prohibit unauthorized application execution.

                            ā€¢ Scale to accommodate high volume processing. Since DNS updates are very frequent,
                              DNSSEC infrastructures need to deliver the performance and scalability required to ensure
                              timely processing at all times.

                          The Role of HSMs in DNSSEC
                          As outlined above, it is only by ensuring security throughout the DNSSEC infrastructure that
                          businesses can realize the beneļ¬ts of DNSSEC. To ensure the validity of DNS services, DNSSEC
                          employs public key cryptography to digitally sign DNS messages.

                          To realize the security required, robust protection of private signing keys is vital. If the keys and
                          their corresponding digital certiļ¬cates are compromised, the chain of trust in the DNS hierarchy
                          is broken, rendering the entire system obsolete. This is where hardware security modules (HSMs)
                          come into play.

                          HSMs are dedicated systems that physically and logically secure the cryptographic keys and
                          cryptographic processing that are at the heart of digital signatures. HSMs support the following
                          functions:

                            ā€¢ Life-cycle management, including key generation, distribution, rotation, storage,
                              termination, and archival.

                            ā€¢ Cryptographic processing, which produces the dual beneļ¬ts of isolating and ofļ¬‚oading
                              cryptographic processing from application servers.

                          By storing cryptographic keys in a centralized, hardened device, HSMs can eliminate the risks
                          associated with having these assets housed on disparate, poorly secured platforms. In addition,
                          this centralization can signiļ¬cantly streamline security administration.
                                                                                             DNS Root Server Cluster




                                                                                                                  HSM                         Authoritative Server Cluster
                                                              TLD Server Cluster                       *FIPS 140-2 Level 4 Validated



                                                                                               Root zone records signed by
                                                                                                   private key in HSM

                                                                                                                           2                              SafeNet HSM
                                                                                                                                                   Enterprise level zone key signed by
                                                                   SafeNet HSM                                                                      SafeNet HSM (www.mybank.com)

                                                                                                                                                           SafeNet HSM stores the cryptographic
                                                            TLD zone records signed by   3                                                    4            keys that sign the DNS records:
                                                                                                                                                           (DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, and DS)
                                                            private key in SafeNet HSM



                                                                                         Recursive (Caching) Name Server

                                    1   Client initiates query for www.mybank.com
                                                                                                            5
                                        ISP Caching name server starts recursive
                                    2   search at root if no record found in cache.

                                        Recursive search referred to applicable
                                    3   TLD by root. If record does not exist in TLD
                                        zone query referred to the Authoritative
                                        server. (Simplified example ā€“ additional                                                       1
                                        zone searches may be required to identify
                                        Authoritative Name Server.)                      Client-Side
                                                                                         of the DNS                               DNS Query
                                    4   Authoritative Server responds with signed
                                        DNS zone record

                                        Recursive server returns verified IP address
                                    5   for ā€œmybank.comā€ to DNS client




                          The diagram above depicts the steps involved in securing DNS messages through the use of HSMs. By
                          safeguarding digital certiļ¬cates and cryptographic keys, organizations can maximize the security of their DNSSEC
                          implementations.


                          Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper                                                                                                                     2
The Advantages of HSMs
SafeNet DNSSEC Beneļ¬ts   Compared to the process of storing cryptographic keys in software residing on general purpose
ā€¢ Enhance Security
                         application servers, HSMs deliver several advantages:
ā€¢ Ensure Compliance
ā€¢ Optimize Operational   Completeness
  Performance            HSMs are fully contained solutions for cryptographic processing, key generation, and key
                         storage. As purpose-built appliances, they automatically include the required hardware
                         and ļ¬rmware (i.e., software) in an integrated package. Physical and logical protection of the
                         appliance is supported by a tamper resistant/evident shell; and protection from logical threats,
                         depending on the vendorā€™s products, is supported by integrated ļ¬rewall and intrusion prevention
                         defenses. Some HSM vendors also include integrated support for two-factor authentication.
                         Security certiļ¬cation is typically pursued by HSM vendors and positioned as a product feature.

                         Software for these same functions is not a complete out-of-the-box solution. Server hardware is
                         a separate purchase, unless unused servers are present, as is ļ¬rewall, intrusion prevention, and
                         two-factor authentication. Being tamper resistant is not a trait typically associated with general-
                         purpose servers. Security certiļ¬cation encompassing the combination of hardware platform
                         and software would be the responsibility of the user organization and can be a lengthy and
                         very costly activity, especially if involvement with certiļ¬cation bodies is not standard operating
                         practice for the organization using the software.

                         Performance
                         Cryptography is a resource intensive process that will introduce latency to any application that
                         depends on it. Depending on the application and organization involved, the objective could be
                         to minimize the latency introduced by cryptography. HSMs have an advantage over software as
                         they are designed to optimize the efļ¬ciency of cryptographic processing. Compared to software
                         running on general purpose servers, HSMs will accelerate processing; an outcome of being
                         purpose-built.

                         Compliant and Secure
                         Frequently, cryptography is used to meet compliance mandates. Cryptography use, however,
                         does not guarantee that information is secure. Further, there are no security guarantees (i.e.,
                         promises of no security instances ever) with any security solution so the objective becomes one
                         of managing risk by reducing the number of vulnerabilities and the likelihood of vulnerabilities
                         being exploited. The aforementioned completeness attributes of HSMs allow organizations that
                         deploy HSMs to take efļ¬cient and simultaneous steps toward compliance and security.

                         Centralization of Key Management
                         An attribute of software is its portability; software can be installed on several servers.
                         Consequently, cryptographic keys have greater likelihood to reside in several locations/software
                         hosts. This multi-location characteristic will add to administrative complexity and potential
                         lapses in the life-cycle management of cryptographic keys (e.g., rotation and revocation). In
                         addition, if consistency in the protective layer of the software host (e.g., ļ¬rewall, intrusion
                         prevention, and access control) cannot be ensured, the risk of keys being compromised
                         increases. With HSMs, the tendency is to store keys in a single unit. Not only does this streamline
                         administration and reduce the potential for management lapses but it also supports a
                         consistent layer of key protection.




                         Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper                                                3
By leveraging HSMs, organization    The Beneļ¬ts of DNSSEC with SafeNet
can enjoy the utmost in security    SafeNet offers a broad set of HSMs that are ideally suited to the demands of securing private
of the cryptographic keys and       signing keys. By employing SafeNet HSMs, organizations can realize a range of beneļ¬ts:
digital certiļ¬cates that underpin
                                    Enhance Security
the DNSSEC infrastructure.
                                    SafeNet HSMs deliver sophisticated security capabilities that enable businesses to enjoy
                                    maximum security of DNSSEC. SafeNet HSMs ensure the most rigorous control over keys and
                                    their corresponding digital certiļ¬cate. As a result, organizations can eliminate the threats of
                                    DNS exploits, and the damage they can wreak.

                                    Ensure Compliance
                                    The Internet Engineering Task Force has published a comprehensive set of guidelines for
                                    ensuring DNSSEC security. For example, RFC 5011 outlines extensive standards for securing
                                    various points in the DNS tree, referred to as trust points. Each trust point must be validated
                                    by at least one associated public key. In addition, the guidelines specify a host of efforts for
                                    securely adding keys, rotating keys, and removing keys. With their robust encryption and policy
                                    management support, SafeNet HSMs enable organizations to ensure compliance with these
                                    guidelines.

                                    Further, ICANN DNSSEC requirements state that private keys must be generated and stored on
                                    FIPS 140-2 validated HSMs. Many SafeNet HSMs meet these demanding FIPS requirements and
                                    many are also Common Criteria certiļ¬ed.

                                    Optimize Operational Performance
                                    By leveraging SafeNetā€™s secure HSMs, organizations can realize signiļ¬cant gains in operational
                                    performance:

                                      ā€¢ Improve staff efļ¬ciency. By centralizing keys and policy administration on a central,
                                        comprehensive platform, security teams can signiļ¬cantly streamline administrative efforts.
                                        Further, with an appliance that supports XML, SafeNet enables easier up-front HSM
                                        integration.

                                      ā€¢ Ensure high performance. By managing cryptographic processing on purpose-built
                                        appliances, SafeNet HSMs deliver scalable, responsive performance, ensuring the timely,
                                        reliable response required in DNSSEC environments.

                                      ā€¢ Optimize key storage. With its support for the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
                                        (ECDSA), SafeNet enables more efļ¬cient storage of cryptographic keys.

                                      ā€¢ Enhance customer service and loyalty. SafeNet HSMs safeguard the DNS infrastructure, so
                                        organizations can eliminate the DNS exploits that put customers at risk. By ensuring high
                                        levels of security, organizations can foster greater trust and loyalty among their customer
                                        base.

                                    SafeNetā€™s Breadth of HSM Offerings
                                    SafeNet HSMs provide reliable protection for applications, transactions, and information assets
                                    by safeguarding the cryptographic keys that are at the heart of any encryption-based security
                                    solution. SafeNet HSMs are the fastest, most secure, and easiest to integrate application
                                    security solution for enterprise and government organizations to ensure regulatory compliance,
                                    reduce the risk of legal liability, and improve proļ¬tability.

                                    SafeNet offers these HSM products:

                                    General Purpose HSMs, Network Attached
                                     ā€¢ Luna SA. Luna SA offers award-winning application protection through powerful
                                       cryptographic processing and hardware key management. Luna PCI for Luna SA 4.1 has
                                       received Common Criteria EAL4+ certiļ¬cation.



                                    Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper                                                4
ā€¢ Luna SP. The SafeNet Luna SP allows developers to securely deploy Web applications, Web
By adopting DNSSEC                services, and other Java applications in a protected, hardened security appliance.
organizations can realize a
range of beneļ¬ts including:     ā€¢ Luna XML. SafeNet Luna XML is designed to secure next-generation XML Web services
ā€¢ Boost security                  and service-oriented architectures (SOAs). Other HSMs take months to integrate with
ā€¢ Ensure compliance               new applications due to complex security APIs. Luna XML has zero footprint on the
                                  host application server, providing for rapid, independent, ļ¬‚exible, and highly scalable
ā€¢ Reduce costs
                                  deployments.

                                ā€¢ ProtectServer External. The SafeNet ProtectServer External is a network-attached HSM
                                  that connects via TCP/IP to a single machine or complete network (LAN) to function as a
                                  central cryptographic subsystem that delivers symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic
                                  services. All operations that would otherwise be performed on insecure servers are
                                  securely processed within the HSM, ensuring that sensitive keys are always protected from
                                  compromise.

                                ā€¢ Luna SX. The SafeNet Luna SX is a central management console for rapid HSM setup and
                                  easy remote administration for the SafeNet Luna SA and Luna SP. Using a simple GUI,
                                  SafeNet HSMs can be managed remotely and securely.

                              General Purpose HSMs, Embedded
                               ā€¢ Luna CA4 HSM. The SafeNet Luna CA4 offers a complete hardware security solution for
                                 the protection of sensitive root keys belonging to certiļ¬cate authorities used in public key
                                 infrastructures (PKI).

                                ā€¢ Luna PCI. SafeNet Luna PCI is designed to protect cryptographic keys and accelerate
                                  sensitive cryptographic operations across a wide range of security applications.

                                ā€¢ Luna PCM. SafeNet Luna PCM is a low-cost family of compact HSMs, offering hardware-
                                  based key management and hardware-accelerated cryptographic performance within a
                                  compact PCMCIA card.

                                ā€¢ ProtectServer HSMs. For server systems and support applications that require high
                                  performance symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations, ProtectServer Gold and
                                  ProtectServer Internal-Express provide tamper-protected hardware security.

                              Conclusion
                              Today, DNSSEC represents a critical approach for guarding against a range of threats to Internet-
                              based communications. By leveraging HSMs, organization can enjoy the utmost in security of
                              the cryptographic keys and digital certiļ¬cates that underpin the DNSSEC infrastructure. Today,
                              SafeNet offers a broad range of HSMs, solutions that accommodate the needs of a range of
                              deployments, and ensure organizations enjoy maximum security in their DNSSEC environments.

                              About SafeNet, Inc.
                              Founded in 1983, SafeNet is a global leader in information security. SafeNet protects its
                              customersā€™ most valuable assets, including identities, transactions, communications, data
                              and software licensing, throughout the data lifecycle. More than 25,000 customers across
                              both commercial enterprises and government agencies and in over 100 countries trust their
                              information security needs to SafeNet.




                              Contact Us: For all ofļ¬ce locations and contact information, please visit www.safenet-inc.com
                              Follow Us: www.safenet-inc.com/connected
                              Ā©2010 SafeNet, Inc. All rights reserved. SafeNet and SafeNet logo are registered trademarks of SafeNet.
                              All other product names are trademarks of their respective owners. WP (EN)-11.29.10


                              Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper                                                       5

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Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies

  • 1. B Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies W WHITE PAPER Introduction Executive Summary For all the beneļ¬ts of an open Internet, there is a dangerous ļ¬‚ip side. Domain name system DNSSEC represents a vital (DNS) servers are a perfect case in point. With no inherent security, DNS servers at a host of means with which to address organizations have been repeatedly compromised to enable a host of malicious endeavors, many security threats, including including cache poisoning (injecting incorrect/fraudulent data into a name serverā€™s cache, cache poisoning, man-in-the- which then gets served to users), redirecting phone calls, man-in-the-middle attacks to steal middle attacks, and more. But passwords, rerouting email, denial of service attacks, and more. the DNSSEC infrastructure is only as secure as the To combat these threats, many organizations have implemented Domain Name Systems cryptographic keys used to Security Extensions (DNSSEC), the process of digitally signing DNS records in order to ensure protect DNS records. This paper that the messages received are the same as those that were sent. reveals important strategies By adopting DNSSEC, a range of organizations, including domain providers, online banks and for maximizing DNSSEC retailers, SaaS providers, and more, can realize a range of beneļ¬ts: security, outlining the key role HSMs play and the critical ā€¢ Boost security. DNSSEC can help guard against cache poisoning, redirected phone calls, requirements for successful HSM man-in-the-middle attacks, and more. implementations. ā€¢ Ensure compliance. DNSSEC can help address ICANN, NSEC, and other mandates and guidelines. ā€¢ Reduce costs. By safeguarding against a range of network based threats, organizations can reduce the time and cost associated with threat mitigation and post-attack forensics and reparation. Without Robust Security, DNSSEC Can Be Compromised In addition to several new concepts and operations for both the DNS server and the DNS client, DNSSEC introduces four new resource records (DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, and DS) to DNS. What this means is that DNSSEC requires some new procedures such as key generation, signing, and key management. But, for all the potential DNSSEC beneļ¬ts outlined above, the intended gains arenā€™t guaranteed because the resource records introduced by DNSSEC are kept in an unencrypted ļ¬le. It is only when the entire DNSSEC infrastructure is fully and comprehensively secured that organizations can begin to fully enjoy DNSSECā€™s beneļ¬ts. To do so, they need capabilities to do the following: Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper 1
  • 2. ā€¢ Secure digital signatures. DNS messages need to be digitally signed in order to ensure the HSM Advantages validity of DNS services. ā€¢ Completeness ā€¢ Control access. Organizations need to ensure only authorized customers and internal staff ā€¢ Performance can access sensitive applications and data. ā€¢ Compliant and Secure ā€¢ Centralization of Key ā€¢ Maintain application integrity. All associated application code and processes need to be Management secured to ensure integrity and prohibit unauthorized application execution. ā€¢ Scale to accommodate high volume processing. Since DNS updates are very frequent, DNSSEC infrastructures need to deliver the performance and scalability required to ensure timely processing at all times. The Role of HSMs in DNSSEC As outlined above, it is only by ensuring security throughout the DNSSEC infrastructure that businesses can realize the beneļ¬ts of DNSSEC. To ensure the validity of DNS services, DNSSEC employs public key cryptography to digitally sign DNS messages. To realize the security required, robust protection of private signing keys is vital. If the keys and their corresponding digital certiļ¬cates are compromised, the chain of trust in the DNS hierarchy is broken, rendering the entire system obsolete. This is where hardware security modules (HSMs) come into play. HSMs are dedicated systems that physically and logically secure the cryptographic keys and cryptographic processing that are at the heart of digital signatures. HSMs support the following functions: ā€¢ Life-cycle management, including key generation, distribution, rotation, storage, termination, and archival. ā€¢ Cryptographic processing, which produces the dual beneļ¬ts of isolating and ofļ¬‚oading cryptographic processing from application servers. By storing cryptographic keys in a centralized, hardened device, HSMs can eliminate the risks associated with having these assets housed on disparate, poorly secured platforms. In addition, this centralization can signiļ¬cantly streamline security administration. DNS Root Server Cluster HSM Authoritative Server Cluster TLD Server Cluster *FIPS 140-2 Level 4 Validated Root zone records signed by private key in HSM 2 SafeNet HSM Enterprise level zone key signed by SafeNet HSM SafeNet HSM (www.mybank.com) SafeNet HSM stores the cryptographic TLD zone records signed by 3 4 keys that sign the DNS records: (DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, and DS) private key in SafeNet HSM Recursive (Caching) Name Server 1 Client initiates query for www.mybank.com 5 ISP Caching name server starts recursive 2 search at root if no record found in cache. Recursive search referred to applicable 3 TLD by root. If record does not exist in TLD zone query referred to the Authoritative server. (Simplified example ā€“ additional 1 zone searches may be required to identify Authoritative Name Server.) Client-Side of the DNS DNS Query 4 Authoritative Server responds with signed DNS zone record Recursive server returns verified IP address 5 for ā€œmybank.comā€ to DNS client The diagram above depicts the steps involved in securing DNS messages through the use of HSMs. By safeguarding digital certiļ¬cates and cryptographic keys, organizations can maximize the security of their DNSSEC implementations. Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper 2
  • 3. The Advantages of HSMs SafeNet DNSSEC Beneļ¬ts Compared to the process of storing cryptographic keys in software residing on general purpose ā€¢ Enhance Security application servers, HSMs deliver several advantages: ā€¢ Ensure Compliance ā€¢ Optimize Operational Completeness Performance HSMs are fully contained solutions for cryptographic processing, key generation, and key storage. As purpose-built appliances, they automatically include the required hardware and ļ¬rmware (i.e., software) in an integrated package. Physical and logical protection of the appliance is supported by a tamper resistant/evident shell; and protection from logical threats, depending on the vendorā€™s products, is supported by integrated ļ¬rewall and intrusion prevention defenses. Some HSM vendors also include integrated support for two-factor authentication. Security certiļ¬cation is typically pursued by HSM vendors and positioned as a product feature. Software for these same functions is not a complete out-of-the-box solution. Server hardware is a separate purchase, unless unused servers are present, as is ļ¬rewall, intrusion prevention, and two-factor authentication. Being tamper resistant is not a trait typically associated with general- purpose servers. Security certiļ¬cation encompassing the combination of hardware platform and software would be the responsibility of the user organization and can be a lengthy and very costly activity, especially if involvement with certiļ¬cation bodies is not standard operating practice for the organization using the software. Performance Cryptography is a resource intensive process that will introduce latency to any application that depends on it. Depending on the application and organization involved, the objective could be to minimize the latency introduced by cryptography. HSMs have an advantage over software as they are designed to optimize the efļ¬ciency of cryptographic processing. Compared to software running on general purpose servers, HSMs will accelerate processing; an outcome of being purpose-built. Compliant and Secure Frequently, cryptography is used to meet compliance mandates. Cryptography use, however, does not guarantee that information is secure. Further, there are no security guarantees (i.e., promises of no security instances ever) with any security solution so the objective becomes one of managing risk by reducing the number of vulnerabilities and the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited. The aforementioned completeness attributes of HSMs allow organizations that deploy HSMs to take efļ¬cient and simultaneous steps toward compliance and security. Centralization of Key Management An attribute of software is its portability; software can be installed on several servers. Consequently, cryptographic keys have greater likelihood to reside in several locations/software hosts. This multi-location characteristic will add to administrative complexity and potential lapses in the life-cycle management of cryptographic keys (e.g., rotation and revocation). In addition, if consistency in the protective layer of the software host (e.g., ļ¬rewall, intrusion prevention, and access control) cannot be ensured, the risk of keys being compromised increases. With HSMs, the tendency is to store keys in a single unit. Not only does this streamline administration and reduce the potential for management lapses but it also supports a consistent layer of key protection. Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper 3
  • 4. By leveraging HSMs, organization The Beneļ¬ts of DNSSEC with SafeNet can enjoy the utmost in security SafeNet offers a broad set of HSMs that are ideally suited to the demands of securing private of the cryptographic keys and signing keys. By employing SafeNet HSMs, organizations can realize a range of beneļ¬ts: digital certiļ¬cates that underpin Enhance Security the DNSSEC infrastructure. SafeNet HSMs deliver sophisticated security capabilities that enable businesses to enjoy maximum security of DNSSEC. SafeNet HSMs ensure the most rigorous control over keys and their corresponding digital certiļ¬cate. As a result, organizations can eliminate the threats of DNS exploits, and the damage they can wreak. Ensure Compliance The Internet Engineering Task Force has published a comprehensive set of guidelines for ensuring DNSSEC security. For example, RFC 5011 outlines extensive standards for securing various points in the DNS tree, referred to as trust points. Each trust point must be validated by at least one associated public key. In addition, the guidelines specify a host of efforts for securely adding keys, rotating keys, and removing keys. With their robust encryption and policy management support, SafeNet HSMs enable organizations to ensure compliance with these guidelines. Further, ICANN DNSSEC requirements state that private keys must be generated and stored on FIPS 140-2 validated HSMs. Many SafeNet HSMs meet these demanding FIPS requirements and many are also Common Criteria certiļ¬ed. Optimize Operational Performance By leveraging SafeNetā€™s secure HSMs, organizations can realize signiļ¬cant gains in operational performance: ā€¢ Improve staff efļ¬ciency. By centralizing keys and policy administration on a central, comprehensive platform, security teams can signiļ¬cantly streamline administrative efforts. Further, with an appliance that supports XML, SafeNet enables easier up-front HSM integration. ā€¢ Ensure high performance. By managing cryptographic processing on purpose-built appliances, SafeNet HSMs deliver scalable, responsive performance, ensuring the timely, reliable response required in DNSSEC environments. ā€¢ Optimize key storage. With its support for the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), SafeNet enables more efļ¬cient storage of cryptographic keys. ā€¢ Enhance customer service and loyalty. SafeNet HSMs safeguard the DNS infrastructure, so organizations can eliminate the DNS exploits that put customers at risk. By ensuring high levels of security, organizations can foster greater trust and loyalty among their customer base. SafeNetā€™s Breadth of HSM Offerings SafeNet HSMs provide reliable protection for applications, transactions, and information assets by safeguarding the cryptographic keys that are at the heart of any encryption-based security solution. SafeNet HSMs are the fastest, most secure, and easiest to integrate application security solution for enterprise and government organizations to ensure regulatory compliance, reduce the risk of legal liability, and improve proļ¬tability. SafeNet offers these HSM products: General Purpose HSMs, Network Attached ā€¢ Luna SA. Luna SA offers award-winning application protection through powerful cryptographic processing and hardware key management. Luna PCI for Luna SA 4.1 has received Common Criteria EAL4+ certiļ¬cation. Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper 4
  • 5. ā€¢ Luna SP. The SafeNet Luna SP allows developers to securely deploy Web applications, Web By adopting DNSSEC services, and other Java applications in a protected, hardened security appliance. organizations can realize a range of beneļ¬ts including: ā€¢ Luna XML. SafeNet Luna XML is designed to secure next-generation XML Web services ā€¢ Boost security and service-oriented architectures (SOAs). Other HSMs take months to integrate with ā€¢ Ensure compliance new applications due to complex security APIs. Luna XML has zero footprint on the host application server, providing for rapid, independent, ļ¬‚exible, and highly scalable ā€¢ Reduce costs deployments. ā€¢ ProtectServer External. The SafeNet ProtectServer External is a network-attached HSM that connects via TCP/IP to a single machine or complete network (LAN) to function as a central cryptographic subsystem that delivers symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic services. All operations that would otherwise be performed on insecure servers are securely processed within the HSM, ensuring that sensitive keys are always protected from compromise. ā€¢ Luna SX. The SafeNet Luna SX is a central management console for rapid HSM setup and easy remote administration for the SafeNet Luna SA and Luna SP. Using a simple GUI, SafeNet HSMs can be managed remotely and securely. General Purpose HSMs, Embedded ā€¢ Luna CA4 HSM. The SafeNet Luna CA4 offers a complete hardware security solution for the protection of sensitive root keys belonging to certiļ¬cate authorities used in public key infrastructures (PKI). ā€¢ Luna PCI. SafeNet Luna PCI is designed to protect cryptographic keys and accelerate sensitive cryptographic operations across a wide range of security applications. ā€¢ Luna PCM. SafeNet Luna PCM is a low-cost family of compact HSMs, offering hardware- based key management and hardware-accelerated cryptographic performance within a compact PCMCIA card. ā€¢ ProtectServer HSMs. For server systems and support applications that require high performance symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations, ProtectServer Gold and ProtectServer Internal-Express provide tamper-protected hardware security. Conclusion Today, DNSSEC represents a critical approach for guarding against a range of threats to Internet- based communications. By leveraging HSMs, organization can enjoy the utmost in security of the cryptographic keys and digital certiļ¬cates that underpin the DNSSEC infrastructure. Today, SafeNet offers a broad range of HSMs, solutions that accommodate the needs of a range of deployments, and ensure organizations enjoy maximum security in their DNSSEC environments. About SafeNet, Inc. Founded in 1983, SafeNet is a global leader in information security. SafeNet protects its customersā€™ most valuable assets, including identities, transactions, communications, data and software licensing, throughout the data lifecycle. More than 25,000 customers across both commercial enterprises and government agencies and in over 100 countries trust their information security needs to SafeNet. Contact Us: For all ofļ¬ce locations and contact information, please visit www.safenet-inc.com Follow Us: www.safenet-inc.com/connected Ā©2010 SafeNet, Inc. All rights reserved. SafeNet and SafeNet logo are registered trademarks of SafeNet. All other product names are trademarks of their respective owners. WP (EN)-11.29.10 Building Trust into DNS: Key Strategies White Paper 5