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What s in a name?	


 A @textfiles
   attempt at
gathering all of
  the world s
      DNS
Intro	



    TEAM
Not quite this cool...
maybe...
Black Box Testing
Starts like this right?
CompanyX	

    Go...
Step 1:
ARIN’s REST Web Services
Whois Black Magic	

whois -h whois.arin.net > ! COMPANY	


 Microsoft (C00006676) DIRECP-NET1-206-71-11 (NET-206-71-119-0-1) 206.71.119.0 - 206.71.119.255Microsoft (C00006677) DIRECP-
 NET1-118 (NET-206-71-118-0-1) 206.71.118.0 - 206.71.118.255Microsoft (C00006678) DIRECP-NET1-117 (NET-206-71-117-0-1)
 206.71.117.0 - 206.71.117.255Microsoft (C00061532) UUHIL-BLK1-C155-112 (NET-209-154-155-112-1) 209.154.155.112 -
 209.154.155.119Microsoft (C00168056) SBCIS-101411-164355 (NET-65-68-62-152-1) 65.68.62.152 - 65.68.62.159MICROSOFT
 (C00313928) SBC067039208168020503 (NET-67-39-208-168-1) 67.39.208.168 - 67.39.208.175Microsoft (C00330795) () -Microsoft
 (C00446770) SBC066136085192030113 (NET-66-136-85-192-1) 66.136.85.192 - 66.136.85.199MICROSOFT (C00458472) MFN-
 T280-64-124-184-72-29 (NET-64-124-184-72-1) 64.124.184.72 - 64.124.184.79MICROSOFT (C00459322) () -Microsoft (C00637972)
 CW-204-71-191-0 (NET-204-71-191-0-1) 204.71.191.0 - 204.71.191.255Microsoft (C01563731) CVNET-454AA20 (NET-69-74-162-0-1)
 69.74.162.0 - 69.74.162.255Microsoft (C01647285) UU-65-221-5 (NET-65-221-5-0-1) 65.221.5.0 - 65.221.5.255Microsoft (C01793454)
 MICROSOFT (NET-74-93-205-144-1) 74.93.205.144 - 74.93.205.151Microsoft (C01793455) MICROSOFT (NET-74-93-205-152-1)
 74.93.205.152 - 74.93.205.159Microsoft (C01793456) MICROSOFT (NET-74-93-206-64-1) 74.93.206.64 - 74.93.206.71Microsoft
 (C01807326) MICROSOFT (NET-70-89-139-120-1) 70.89.139.120 - 70.89.139.127Microsoft (C02008777) RSPC-1218167167199384
 (NET-67-192-225-208-1) 67.192.225.208 - 67.192.225.223Microsoft (C02312189) OW-3236-1 (NET-206-72-124-64-1) 206.72.124.64 -
 206.72.124.95Microsoft (C02313555) OW-4867-1 (NET-206-72-120-248-1) 206.72.120.248 - 206.72.120.255Microsoft (C02313803)
 OW-4469-1 (NET-206-72-120-104-1) 206.72.120.104 - 206.72.120.111Microsoft (C02499241) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-153-72-1)
 64.119.153.72 - 64.119.153.79Microsoft (C02499329) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-130-112-1) 64.119.130.112 - 64.119.130.119Microsoft
 (C02499544) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-153-80-1) 64.119.153.80 - 64.119.153.87MICROSOFT (C02570623) MCRS-68-188-29-64
 (NET-68-188-29-64-1) 68.188.29.64 - 68.188.29.127Microsoft (C02580886) RACKS-8-1283476925266189 (NET-184-106-14-208-1)
 184.106.14.208 - 184.106.14.215Microsoft (C02597593) MICROSOFT (NET-66-228-68-96-1) 66.228.68.96 - 66.228.68.111Microsoft
 (C02597706) () -Microsoft (C02599338) RACKS-8-1286223485308418 (NET-184-106-32-152-1) 184.106.32.152 -
 184.106.32.159Microsoft (C02654382) () -Microsoft (C02677592) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-136-168-1) 64.119.136.168 -
 64.119.136.175Microsoft (C02718410) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-136-240-1) 64.119.136.240 - 64.119.136.255Microsoft (C02768521)
 MICROSOFT (NET-66-228-80-160-1) 66.228.80.160 - 66.228.80.191
ShoNuff! By Jason Ross
Step 2: Listen to this guy	



                                OSINT
Step 3: Bounce!
Step 4:	

DNS brute force and hope that
GW.COMPANYX.COM exists
But the best way...	



         but...
Problems:	

Very small percentage of companies OWN IP space	

You rarely get Internal IP space from OSINT	

Getting more rare to see companies host their own EMAIL
 gateway
TL;DR	

or TL;Want-To-Party
PTR Records	

       IN ADDR ARPA	


AKA.. the bastard child of DNS
  everyone forgets about
Why?
Only 4.294 Billion address...
Bash + Dig = 1 request per second (.5 msec + proc time)	




 NMAP w/ just DNS resolution = 2 seconds per /24 	





       IF everyone’s servers were as fast as
                      Google’s
didn t want to be old by the time it finished
MassResolve: ~3000 requests per second	





                           =	

       mubix@research:~ time massresolve IPv4.txt	



l   262974m1.855suser    394461m0.007ssys      3x262974m0
Quick tangent...	


•  Is there parent here that doesn t wish this
  was true?
But people don t like it when
you DoS their DNS servers
but it s not malicious...
a bunch of text files...	

40 GBs of text files	

Most commands don’t like receiving 30,000+ text files in
                      STDIN	

                  I broke grep...	

                 xargs -I mutex FTW	


   668,246,000 - Initial DB load
REALLY SLOW TO
   SEARCH...	



  we’ll come back to this...
So I bought one of these...
from
and someone forgot to format it...
now what?
Continuing the
  addiction
there’s more?!!!
There are 66 types	

  but over 200 in use that I ve found
what s the fastest way
    to get them?
Zone Transfer	

  kickin it like it s 1999
What is a Zone?
MICROSOFT IS
  WRONG
MICROSOFT IS
  WRONG	

 ok...well somewhat wrong
What is a Zone?	

these are zones
HD Moore: Its 2012 and you
can still perform zone
transfers from 65 of 312
TLDs, including ORG, INFO,
PRO, and XXX (zones:
http://t.co/rwFQbzjw )
What is a Zone?	

this is also a zone
B,C,F,G, and K	





Why? I don’t know...
but...	

•  COM, NET failed to transfer their zones
learning when to quit...
What is a Zone?
What other sources?
Alexa Top “One Million” Domains
908584: 0: Testing AXFR on ns899.hostgator.com. for lancasterpuppies.com - Output:
4908584: 1: Testing AXFR on ns900.hostgator.com. for lancasterpuppies.com - Output:
4908585: 0: Testing AXFR on ns1.webserver.at. for promi.at - Output: 16908585: 1: Testing
AXFR on ns2.webserver.at. for promi.at - Output: 16908586: 0: Testing AXFR on
ns2.bluehost.com. for eveliux.com - Output: 41908586: 1: Testing AXFR on
ns1.bluehost.com. for eveliux.com - Output: 41908587: 0: Testing AXFR on
ns2.hongkonghosting.com.hk. for godiva.com.hk - Output: 4908587: 1: Testing AXFR on
ns1.hongkonghosting.com.hk. for godiva.com.hk - Output: 4908588: 0: Testing AXFR on
ns01.businesscatalyst.com. for willcuttguitars.com - Output: 4
NS2 FTW!!
21 and 22
Making OSINT easy...	

• xxx.xxx.net. 	

       	

38400 	

IN    	

HINFO	

"intel" "linux 	

• _xmpp-server._tcp.im.xx.net. 86400 IN              	

SRV 	

5 0 5269 im.xx.net.	

• admin.xx.net. 	

86400 	

IN    	

SSHFP 	

1 1 493E20AA602AA0844823DD5CDF4F4A013B61FACD	

• xx.xx.ru.     	

      	

10800 	

IN    	

HINFO	

"SCSI/Pentium/133" "BSDI3.1"	

• admin.xx.k12.xx.us. 86400 IN 	

HINFO	

"PC" "MS-WINDOWS-98"	

• www.xx.net. 	

        	

86400 	

IN    	

HINFO	

"NonAlpha" "NetBSD"
TXT records	

       are not your password manager	


xxxx.xxx.net. 	

86400 	

IN 	

TXT       	

"ssh:
         F8nn2009#@ppyf33t"
same problem	

           lots of text files -> database	

                         =	

                  slow searching	

and how do you put 200+ DNS types into a database?
Becoming a DBA
TEAM	

not telling you the back-end... at least on camera
What would you
 search for?
there’s more?!!!
DNS
Sources	

•    Alexa	

•    Zone Transfers	

•    Brute forcing with an actively updated list of the Top 50,000
     sub zones	

•    MassResolve	

•    My wife s DNS traffic	

•    Other online resources	

•    You! If you want to submit a DNS log for your company
     GREAT! ;-) or a ZT, or just want me to update a domain, I
     accept it all.
9109 sites in database
Parsing	

•    New NS records go to ZT and Domain brute forcer	

•    New A records go to PTR and Type brute forcer	

•    New PTR records attempt to resolve forward and break down into zones then
     go to respective parsers	

•    New other records go to Type Brute forcer	

•    Anything older than 6 months get rechecked	

•    MOR PARSERS!!	

•    you see where this is going.....	

•    New input gets checked against DB, new records get ADDED, they don t
     replace, so historical data will stay with date/time stamps
DNS traffic...	



•  In September of 2011, DNS traffic
  surpassed my family s TOTAL other
  bandwidth per month...
How is this different
    from Shodan?	

•  Results aren t based on open ports	

•  I m not going to monetize it, I m doing it
  for my use, but since it needs to be
  available everywhere so I can use it, so can
  you ;-)	

•  And I ll give you the code to do it yourself
  if you want to... although...
there’s more?!!!
Why is this useful?	


•  Because now I have one place to get as
  much data as I can on a target in regards to
  DNS (including historical) and I never have
  to touch one of their servers
and here it is...	

  https://www.deepmagic.com/	

 $record_type	

remember the (s), I usually have mean stuff on 80	

   “everything” search is cludgy right now	

            I am not a web coder	

   •    Free to use, and always will be (PERIOD)	

   •    That means I make no money on it	

   •    Logs last for 24 hours 	

        •    so I can catch issues, then they go to /dev/null	

   •    And those will never be released to anyone and long as I
        can help it, and if that does happen I will just pull it down
Next steps...	


•  Integration with Sho-nuff	

•  Idea? Ways to make it better?	

•  DARPA Security Fast Track?
How d I do Jason?
Questions?	


•  Rob Fuller	

•  @mubix	

•  mubix@hak5.org

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A @textfiles approach to gathering the world's DNS

  • 1. What s in a name? A @textfiles attempt at gathering all of the world s DNS
  • 2. Intro TEAM
  • 3. Not quite this cool...
  • 7. CompanyX Go...
  • 9.
  • 10. ARIN’s REST Web Services
  • 11. Whois Black Magic whois -h whois.arin.net > ! COMPANY Microsoft (C00006676) DIRECP-NET1-206-71-11 (NET-206-71-119-0-1) 206.71.119.0 - 206.71.119.255Microsoft (C00006677) DIRECP- NET1-118 (NET-206-71-118-0-1) 206.71.118.0 - 206.71.118.255Microsoft (C00006678) DIRECP-NET1-117 (NET-206-71-117-0-1) 206.71.117.0 - 206.71.117.255Microsoft (C00061532) UUHIL-BLK1-C155-112 (NET-209-154-155-112-1) 209.154.155.112 - 209.154.155.119Microsoft (C00168056) SBCIS-101411-164355 (NET-65-68-62-152-1) 65.68.62.152 - 65.68.62.159MICROSOFT (C00313928) SBC067039208168020503 (NET-67-39-208-168-1) 67.39.208.168 - 67.39.208.175Microsoft (C00330795) () -Microsoft (C00446770) SBC066136085192030113 (NET-66-136-85-192-1) 66.136.85.192 - 66.136.85.199MICROSOFT (C00458472) MFN- T280-64-124-184-72-29 (NET-64-124-184-72-1) 64.124.184.72 - 64.124.184.79MICROSOFT (C00459322) () -Microsoft (C00637972) CW-204-71-191-0 (NET-204-71-191-0-1) 204.71.191.0 - 204.71.191.255Microsoft (C01563731) CVNET-454AA20 (NET-69-74-162-0-1) 69.74.162.0 - 69.74.162.255Microsoft (C01647285) UU-65-221-5 (NET-65-221-5-0-1) 65.221.5.0 - 65.221.5.255Microsoft (C01793454) MICROSOFT (NET-74-93-205-144-1) 74.93.205.144 - 74.93.205.151Microsoft (C01793455) MICROSOFT (NET-74-93-205-152-1) 74.93.205.152 - 74.93.205.159Microsoft (C01793456) MICROSOFT (NET-74-93-206-64-1) 74.93.206.64 - 74.93.206.71Microsoft (C01807326) MICROSOFT (NET-70-89-139-120-1) 70.89.139.120 - 70.89.139.127Microsoft (C02008777) RSPC-1218167167199384 (NET-67-192-225-208-1) 67.192.225.208 - 67.192.225.223Microsoft (C02312189) OW-3236-1 (NET-206-72-124-64-1) 206.72.124.64 - 206.72.124.95Microsoft (C02313555) OW-4867-1 (NET-206-72-120-248-1) 206.72.120.248 - 206.72.120.255Microsoft (C02313803) OW-4469-1 (NET-206-72-120-104-1) 206.72.120.104 - 206.72.120.111Microsoft (C02499241) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-153-72-1) 64.119.153.72 - 64.119.153.79Microsoft (C02499329) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-130-112-1) 64.119.130.112 - 64.119.130.119Microsoft (C02499544) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-153-80-1) 64.119.153.80 - 64.119.153.87MICROSOFT (C02570623) MCRS-68-188-29-64 (NET-68-188-29-64-1) 68.188.29.64 - 68.188.29.127Microsoft (C02580886) RACKS-8-1283476925266189 (NET-184-106-14-208-1) 184.106.14.208 - 184.106.14.215Microsoft (C02597593) MICROSOFT (NET-66-228-68-96-1) 66.228.68.96 - 66.228.68.111Microsoft (C02597706) () -Microsoft (C02599338) RACKS-8-1286223485308418 (NET-184-106-32-152-1) 184.106.32.152 - 184.106.32.159Microsoft (C02654382) () -Microsoft (C02677592) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-136-168-1) 64.119.136.168 - 64.119.136.175Microsoft (C02718410) MICROSOFT (NET-64-119-136-240-1) 64.119.136.240 - 64.119.136.255Microsoft (C02768521) MICROSOFT (NET-66-228-80-160-1) 66.228.80.160 - 66.228.80.191
  • 13. Step 2: Listen to this guy OSINT
  • 15. Step 4: DNS brute force and hope that GW.COMPANYX.COM exists
  • 16. But the best way... but...
  • 17. Problems: Very small percentage of companies OWN IP space You rarely get Internal IP space from OSINT Getting more rare to see companies host their own EMAIL gateway
  • 18.
  • 20. PTR Records IN ADDR ARPA AKA.. the bastard child of DNS everyone forgets about
  • 21. Why?
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25. Only 4.294 Billion address...
  • 26. Bash + Dig = 1 request per second (.5 msec + proc time) NMAP w/ just DNS resolution = 2 seconds per /24 IF everyone’s servers were as fast as Google’s
  • 27. didn t want to be old by the time it finished
  • 28.
  • 29. MassResolve: ~3000 requests per second = mubix@research:~ time massresolve IPv4.txt l 262974m1.855suser 394461m0.007ssys 3x262974m0
  • 30. Quick tangent... •  Is there parent here that doesn t wish this was true?
  • 31. But people don t like it when you DoS their DNS servers
  • 32. but it s not malicious...
  • 33. a bunch of text files... 40 GBs of text files Most commands don’t like receiving 30,000+ text files in STDIN I broke grep... xargs -I mutex FTW 668,246,000 - Initial DB load
  • 34. REALLY SLOW TO SEARCH... we’ll come back to this...
  • 35. So I bought one of these...
  • 36. from
  • 37. and someone forgot to format it...
  • 39. Continuing the addiction
  • 40.
  • 42. There are 66 types but over 200 in use that I ve found
  • 43. what s the fastest way to get them?
  • 44. Zone Transfer kickin it like it s 1999
  • 45. What is a Zone?
  • 46.
  • 47. MICROSOFT IS WRONG
  • 48. MICROSOFT IS WRONG ok...well somewhat wrong
  • 49. What is a Zone? these are zones
  • 50. HD Moore: Its 2012 and you can still perform zone transfers from 65 of 312 TLDs, including ORG, INFO, PRO, and XXX (zones: http://t.co/rwFQbzjw )
  • 51. What is a Zone? this is also a zone
  • 52.
  • 53. B,C,F,G, and K Why? I don’t know...
  • 54.
  • 55. but... •  COM, NET failed to transfer their zones
  • 56. learning when to quit...
  • 57. What is a Zone?
  • 59. Alexa Top “One Million” Domains
  • 60. 908584: 0: Testing AXFR on ns899.hostgator.com. for lancasterpuppies.com - Output: 4908584: 1: Testing AXFR on ns900.hostgator.com. for lancasterpuppies.com - Output: 4908585: 0: Testing AXFR on ns1.webserver.at. for promi.at - Output: 16908585: 1: Testing AXFR on ns2.webserver.at. for promi.at - Output: 16908586: 0: Testing AXFR on ns2.bluehost.com. for eveliux.com - Output: 41908586: 1: Testing AXFR on ns1.bluehost.com. for eveliux.com - Output: 41908587: 0: Testing AXFR on ns2.hongkonghosting.com.hk. for godiva.com.hk - Output: 4908587: 1: Testing AXFR on ns1.hongkonghosting.com.hk. for godiva.com.hk - Output: 4908588: 0: Testing AXFR on ns01.businesscatalyst.com. for willcuttguitars.com - Output: 4
  • 62.
  • 63.
  • 65. Making OSINT easy... • xxx.xxx.net. 38400 IN HINFO "intel" "linux • _xmpp-server._tcp.im.xx.net. 86400 IN SRV 5 0 5269 im.xx.net. • admin.xx.net. 86400 IN SSHFP 1 1 493E20AA602AA0844823DD5CDF4F4A013B61FACD • xx.xx.ru. 10800 IN HINFO "SCSI/Pentium/133" "BSDI3.1" • admin.xx.k12.xx.us. 86400 IN HINFO "PC" "MS-WINDOWS-98" • www.xx.net. 86400 IN HINFO "NonAlpha" "NetBSD"
  • 66.
  • 67.
  • 68. TXT records are not your password manager xxxx.xxx.net. 86400 IN TXT "ssh: F8nn2009#@ppyf33t"
  • 69. same problem lots of text files -> database = slow searching and how do you put 200+ DNS types into a database?
  • 71. TEAM not telling you the back-end... at least on camera
  • 72. What would you search for?
  • 74. DNS
  • 75. Sources •  Alexa •  Zone Transfers •  Brute forcing with an actively updated list of the Top 50,000 sub zones •  MassResolve •  My wife s DNS traffic •  Other online resources •  You! If you want to submit a DNS log for your company GREAT! ;-) or a ZT, or just want me to update a domain, I accept it all.
  • 76. 9109 sites in database
  • 77.
  • 78. Parsing •  New NS records go to ZT and Domain brute forcer •  New A records go to PTR and Type brute forcer •  New PTR records attempt to resolve forward and break down into zones then go to respective parsers •  New other records go to Type Brute forcer •  Anything older than 6 months get rechecked •  MOR PARSERS!! •  you see where this is going..... •  New input gets checked against DB, new records get ADDED, they don t replace, so historical data will stay with date/time stamps
  • 79. DNS traffic... •  In September of 2011, DNS traffic surpassed my family s TOTAL other bandwidth per month...
  • 80. How is this different from Shodan? •  Results aren t based on open ports •  I m not going to monetize it, I m doing it for my use, but since it needs to be available everywhere so I can use it, so can you ;-) •  And I ll give you the code to do it yourself if you want to... although...
  • 82. Why is this useful? •  Because now I have one place to get as much data as I can on a target in regards to DNS (including historical) and I never have to touch one of their servers
  • 83. and here it is... https://www.deepmagic.com/ $record_type remember the (s), I usually have mean stuff on 80 “everything” search is cludgy right now I am not a web coder •  Free to use, and always will be (PERIOD) •  That means I make no money on it •  Logs last for 24 hours •  so I can catch issues, then they go to /dev/null •  And those will never be released to anyone and long as I can help it, and if that does happen I will just pull it down
  • 84. Next steps... •  Integration with Sho-nuff •  Idea? Ways to make it better? •  DARPA Security Fast Track?
  • 85. How d I do Jason?
  • 86. Questions? •  Rob Fuller •  @mubix •  mubix@hak5.org