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Digital Leviathan
Nation-State Big Brothers
(from huge to little ones)
Eduardo Izycki & Rodrigo Colli
Las Vegas, August 11th 2018
AGENDA
INTRO
SOURCES
OUTCOMES
CONCLUSION
INTRO
INTRO
“We should give our obedience to an unaccountable
sovereign otherwise what awaits us is a ‘state of
nature’ that closely resembles civil war – a situation
of universal insecurity”.
? !
The claim
Terrorism, cybercrime, foreign espionage, among
other are examples that support politicians
claims for increase state power over online life.
Opposing evidence
The current use of cyber offensive tools are
aimed to political objectives rather than public
safety
Thomas Hobbes
Espionage
Surveillance /
Eavesdropping
Censorship
Stealing of information and/or
personal data (for achieving political
purposes, i.e. opposition party, NGO,
ethnic minorities)
Untargeted violations of privacy
(monitoring of behavior, activities, or
other changing information of people
online)
Block specific applications or
technologies; filtering and blocking of
websites; manipulation of content or
traffic manipulation; violations of
user rights.
INTRO
1 2 3
SOURCES
APT Reports
Leaks from
spyware providers
Acquisition of
technology
• Total of 758 reports/blog posts from
vendors, NGO, CSIRT and universities,
• The dataset has bias from a western
perspective (close to 80%)
• Two big providers of surveillance solutions
Hacking Team and Gamma Group,
• Data is available from multiple sources
(Wikileaks has a good search platform)
• Surveillance and/or intrusion technologies
reported from multiple sources
• Purchases made by different countries
(potential cyber capabilities)
SOURCES
1 2 3
• Focus on attacks targeting NGO, political
groups, media outlets, or opposition was
considered as an indicator of state
misbehavior
• Many cases it was possible to identify
who acquired it (law enforcement, military,
intelligence, etc)
• Buggedplanet.info and Surveillance
Industry Index (SII) were helpful sources
Censorship
Transparency
Reports
• Freedom House, OONI, Google, Reporters
without Borders and OpenNet provide
evidence of some level online censorship,
• Blocking applications, technologies, traffic;
filtering and blocking of websites; violations
of user rights
• Transparency Reports issued by major
social networks and content providers
•Facebook, Twitter, Google, Yahoo, Apple,
LinkedIn, Snapchat, Tumblr, Dropbox,
Wiki,Microsoft, and WordPress
SOURCES
4 5
• Based on a western view of freedom of
speech (an individual or a community to
articulate their opinions and ideas without
fear of retaliation, censorship or sanction)
• Provides extra detail on the intent of
Nation-States use of social media for
surveillance
OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES
55% 119 17
+
Documents that had
some level of
attribution
Considered state-
sponsored attacks
Countries attributed
with a state-sponsored
APT
Extensive use of Python3 (NLTK) and regular expressions for
processing documents / posts
402
Single APT Groups
and/or Campaigns
EUA
México
França
Reino Unido
Egito
Emirados Árabes
Israel
Turquia
Líbano
Irã
Síria
Etiópia
Índia
Paquistão
China
Coreia do Norte
Rússia
STATE SPONSORED APT
OUTCOMES
Cazaquistão
Bahrain
46
41
32
27
24
18
17 17
8 8
6
5
Political
Targets
FFAA Government Diplomacy P&D Midia Energy Telecom Automation Finnacial Oil & Gas Health
State-Sponsored APT - Targets
OUTCOMES
57% 26 29
+
Countries acquired
offensive solutions from
private vendors
In 41 cases it was
possible to identify the
user/buyer
User/buyer was an
intelligence agency
and/or armed forces
Countries that acquired
more than one offensive
solution
Wikileaks' search platform, Buggedplanet.info, Surveillance Industry Index,
and reports from Citizen Lab / Privacy International / Freedom House
71
ACQUIRED OFFENSIVE SOLUTIONS
Bull / Amesys
2 countries
Cyberbit
10 countries
Dreamlab
2 countries
Gamma Group
55 countries
Hacking Team
37 countries
NSO Group
3 countries
SS8
4 countries
Trovicor
9 countries
Major Private Vendors
Procera
2 countries
OUTCOMES
NEW THREATS
Users / Buyers
Saudi Arabia
GIP / GID / MD
Azerbaijan
Azerbajan NS
Bangladesh
(DGFI)
Cyprus
Intelligence Agency
Ecuador
SENAIN
Spain
CNI
Hungary
SSNS
Indonesia
Lembaga Sandi Negara
Kenya
NIS
Marroco
CSDN / DST
Mongolia
SSSD
Malasya
MACC / MALMI / PMO
Oman
Intelligence Agency
Panama
Presidency Cabinet
Serbia
BIA
Singapore
IDA SGP
Thailand
Royal Thai Army
Uganda
CMI
Uzbequistan
NSS
OUTCOMES
MULTIPLE OFFENSIVE SOLUTIONS
>
OUTCOMES
2
6
1
2
0
8
3
7
15
27
4
13
1
29
13
22
Africa
Europe
US/Canada
Latin America
Oceania
MENA
Russia & CIS
Southeast Asia
Contries with multiple solutions
Solutions (Total) Multiple Providers
1
1
1
2
2
2
11
21
30
Law Enforcement / Armed Forces
Customs / IRS
Telecom
Armed Forces
Intelligence / Armed Forces
State Level
Law Enforcement
Intelligence Agency
Unidentified
User / Buyer
74%
In 32 countries the
shutdown reached
national level
OUTCOMES
42 57
+
Countries with evidence
of online censorship
Countries with evidence
of some level of internet
shutdown
Countries with evidence
from two or more
sources
Reports from Freedom House, OONI, Google, Reporters without
Borders and OpenNet Initiative
40
OONI – Open Observatory of Network Interference
OUTCOMES
FREEDOM HOUSE – Freedom of the Net
OUTCOMES
WEB FOUNDATION – Web Index
OUTCOMES
OPEN NET INITIATIVE
OUTCOMES
Censorship and Shutdowns – Multiple Sources
ACCESSNOW.ORG – SHUTDOWN TRACKER
OUTCOMES
#OpOperadoras – Brazil 2016
Saudi Arabia
All sources
Bahrain
4 sources
Turkey
4 sources
Iran
4 sources
United Arab Emirates
3 sources
China
All sources
Vietnam
All sources
Pakistan
4 sources
Ethiopia
4 sources
63%
World average requests
where some data was
produced (FB – 2017)
OUTCOMES
10 125
+
Companies worldwide
publish transparency
reports
Major content providers
covered in this analysis
Countries have
requested information
or to remove content
Most transparency reports data are available in csv/json formats, unfortunately
some only PDF
70
Transparency Reports
OUTCOMES
-
2.000
4.000
6.000
8.000
10.000
12.000
14.000
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Facebook-TransparencyReport-Total
DataRequests
Facebook - Transparency Report
Brazil India Mexico Poland Turkey
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
ACCOUNTINFORMATIONREQUESTS
Twitter - Transparency Reports
Brazil India Mexico Poland Turkey
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
TotalNumberofLawEnforcement
Requests
Microsoft - Transparency Report
Brazil India Mexico Poland Turkey
-
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
7.000
8.000
9.000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
UserDataRequests
Google - Transparency Report
Brazil India Mexico Poland Turkey
Transparency Reports
OUTCOMES
-
500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Facebook-TransparencyReport-
TotalDataRequests
Facebook - Transparency Report
-
500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
UserDataRequests
Google - Transparency Report
31,6%
1,0%
35,4%
44,2% 42,5%
50,8%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Twitter - Transparency Reports
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
ACCOUNTINFORMATIONREQUESTS
Twitter - Transparency Reports
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES
Sponsored APT – Users Affected
There are evidence that 19 countries were attributed as
authors/sponsors of cyber attacks.
Another 18 countries possess cyber weapons with
Intelligence Agencies
At last, 34 countries acquired cyber weapons but the
user/buyer is not known
Cyber offensive tools being used against
political targets
1
85 countries attacked and/or possess cyber weapons
54,9 %
Worldwide
Sponsored APT + Intelligence Agencies
64,0%
Worldwide
All Cyber Offensive Capabilities
92,2%
Worldwide
CONCLUSION
CENSORSHIP & BLOCKING
Censorship/Shutdowns – Internet Users
Out of 57 countries that engaged in censorship or
shutdowns, 26 did both.
Concerning social media such as Facebook, Twitter and
Google, all countries have increased its yearly number of
requests
Online Censorship and
Internet Shutdowns
2
The two are strongly correlated
56,7 %
Worldwide
Eduardo Izycki
Independent Researcher
linkedin.com/in/eduardoizycki
eduizycki@protonmail.com
Thanks!

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Digital Leviathan: a comprehensive list of Nation-State Big Brothers (from huge to little ones)

  • 1. Digital Leviathan Nation-State Big Brothers (from huge to little ones) Eduardo Izycki & Rodrigo Colli Las Vegas, August 11th 2018
  • 4. INTRO “We should give our obedience to an unaccountable sovereign otherwise what awaits us is a ‘state of nature’ that closely resembles civil war – a situation of universal insecurity”. ? ! The claim Terrorism, cybercrime, foreign espionage, among other are examples that support politicians claims for increase state power over online life. Opposing evidence The current use of cyber offensive tools are aimed to political objectives rather than public safety Thomas Hobbes
  • 5. Espionage Surveillance / Eavesdropping Censorship Stealing of information and/or personal data (for achieving political purposes, i.e. opposition party, NGO, ethnic minorities) Untargeted violations of privacy (monitoring of behavior, activities, or other changing information of people online) Block specific applications or technologies; filtering and blocking of websites; manipulation of content or traffic manipulation; violations of user rights. INTRO 1 2 3
  • 7. APT Reports Leaks from spyware providers Acquisition of technology • Total of 758 reports/blog posts from vendors, NGO, CSIRT and universities, • The dataset has bias from a western perspective (close to 80%) • Two big providers of surveillance solutions Hacking Team and Gamma Group, • Data is available from multiple sources (Wikileaks has a good search platform) • Surveillance and/or intrusion technologies reported from multiple sources • Purchases made by different countries (potential cyber capabilities) SOURCES 1 2 3 • Focus on attacks targeting NGO, political groups, media outlets, or opposition was considered as an indicator of state misbehavior • Many cases it was possible to identify who acquired it (law enforcement, military, intelligence, etc) • Buggedplanet.info and Surveillance Industry Index (SII) were helpful sources
  • 8. Censorship Transparency Reports • Freedom House, OONI, Google, Reporters without Borders and OpenNet provide evidence of some level online censorship, • Blocking applications, technologies, traffic; filtering and blocking of websites; violations of user rights • Transparency Reports issued by major social networks and content providers •Facebook, Twitter, Google, Yahoo, Apple, LinkedIn, Snapchat, Tumblr, Dropbox, Wiki,Microsoft, and WordPress SOURCES 4 5 • Based on a western view of freedom of speech (an individual or a community to articulate their opinions and ideas without fear of retaliation, censorship or sanction) • Provides extra detail on the intent of Nation-States use of social media for surveillance
  • 10. OUTCOMES 55% 119 17 + Documents that had some level of attribution Considered state- sponsored attacks Countries attributed with a state-sponsored APT Extensive use of Python3 (NLTK) and regular expressions for processing documents / posts 402 Single APT Groups and/or Campaigns
  • 11. EUA México França Reino Unido Egito Emirados Árabes Israel Turquia Líbano Irã Síria Etiópia Índia Paquistão China Coreia do Norte Rússia STATE SPONSORED APT OUTCOMES Cazaquistão Bahrain 46 41 32 27 24 18 17 17 8 8 6 5 Political Targets FFAA Government Diplomacy P&D Midia Energy Telecom Automation Finnacial Oil & Gas Health State-Sponsored APT - Targets
  • 12. OUTCOMES 57% 26 29 + Countries acquired offensive solutions from private vendors In 41 cases it was possible to identify the user/buyer User/buyer was an intelligence agency and/or armed forces Countries that acquired more than one offensive solution Wikileaks' search platform, Buggedplanet.info, Surveillance Industry Index, and reports from Citizen Lab / Privacy International / Freedom House 71
  • 13. ACQUIRED OFFENSIVE SOLUTIONS Bull / Amesys 2 countries Cyberbit 10 countries Dreamlab 2 countries Gamma Group 55 countries Hacking Team 37 countries NSO Group 3 countries SS8 4 countries Trovicor 9 countries Major Private Vendors Procera 2 countries OUTCOMES
  • 14. NEW THREATS Users / Buyers Saudi Arabia GIP / GID / MD Azerbaijan Azerbajan NS Bangladesh (DGFI) Cyprus Intelligence Agency Ecuador SENAIN Spain CNI Hungary SSNS Indonesia Lembaga Sandi Negara Kenya NIS Marroco CSDN / DST Mongolia SSSD Malasya MACC / MALMI / PMO Oman Intelligence Agency Panama Presidency Cabinet Serbia BIA Singapore IDA SGP Thailand Royal Thai Army Uganda CMI Uzbequistan NSS OUTCOMES
  • 15. MULTIPLE OFFENSIVE SOLUTIONS > OUTCOMES 2 6 1 2 0 8 3 7 15 27 4 13 1 29 13 22 Africa Europe US/Canada Latin America Oceania MENA Russia & CIS Southeast Asia Contries with multiple solutions Solutions (Total) Multiple Providers 1 1 1 2 2 2 11 21 30 Law Enforcement / Armed Forces Customs / IRS Telecom Armed Forces Intelligence / Armed Forces State Level Law Enforcement Intelligence Agency Unidentified User / Buyer
  • 16. 74% In 32 countries the shutdown reached national level OUTCOMES 42 57 + Countries with evidence of online censorship Countries with evidence of some level of internet shutdown Countries with evidence from two or more sources Reports from Freedom House, OONI, Google, Reporters without Borders and OpenNet Initiative 40
  • 17. OONI – Open Observatory of Network Interference OUTCOMES
  • 18. FREEDOM HOUSE – Freedom of the Net OUTCOMES
  • 19. WEB FOUNDATION – Web Index OUTCOMES
  • 21. Censorship and Shutdowns – Multiple Sources ACCESSNOW.ORG – SHUTDOWN TRACKER OUTCOMES #OpOperadoras – Brazil 2016 Saudi Arabia All sources Bahrain 4 sources Turkey 4 sources Iran 4 sources United Arab Emirates 3 sources China All sources Vietnam All sources Pakistan 4 sources Ethiopia 4 sources
  • 22. 63% World average requests where some data was produced (FB – 2017) OUTCOMES 10 125 + Companies worldwide publish transparency reports Major content providers covered in this analysis Countries have requested information or to remove content Most transparency reports data are available in csv/json formats, unfortunately some only PDF 70
  • 23. Transparency Reports OUTCOMES - 2.000 4.000 6.000 8.000 10.000 12.000 14.000 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Facebook-TransparencyReport-Total DataRequests Facebook - Transparency Report Brazil India Mexico Poland Turkey 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 ACCOUNTINFORMATIONREQUESTS Twitter - Transparency Reports Brazil India Mexico Poland Turkey 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TotalNumberofLawEnforcement Requests Microsoft - Transparency Report Brazil India Mexico Poland Turkey - 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 7.000 8.000 9.000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 UserDataRequests Google - Transparency Report Brazil India Mexico Poland Turkey
  • 24. Transparency Reports OUTCOMES - 500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Facebook-TransparencyReport- TotalDataRequests Facebook - Transparency Report - 500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 UserDataRequests Google - Transparency Report 31,6% 1,0% 35,4% 44,2% 42,5% 50,8% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Twitter - Transparency Reports 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 ACCOUNTINFORMATIONREQUESTS Twitter - Transparency Reports
  • 26. CONCLUSION OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES Sponsored APT – Users Affected There are evidence that 19 countries were attributed as authors/sponsors of cyber attacks. Another 18 countries possess cyber weapons with Intelligence Agencies At last, 34 countries acquired cyber weapons but the user/buyer is not known Cyber offensive tools being used against political targets 1 85 countries attacked and/or possess cyber weapons 54,9 % Worldwide Sponsored APT + Intelligence Agencies 64,0% Worldwide All Cyber Offensive Capabilities 92,2% Worldwide
  • 27. CONCLUSION CENSORSHIP & BLOCKING Censorship/Shutdowns – Internet Users Out of 57 countries that engaged in censorship or shutdowns, 26 did both. Concerning social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, all countries have increased its yearly number of requests Online Censorship and Internet Shutdowns 2 The two are strongly correlated 56,7 % Worldwide