The Deepwater Horizon investigation found that well integrity was compromised in multiple ways:
1) The cement barriers did not isolate hydrocarbons as the cement job failed.
2) The mechanical barriers in the shoe track did not prevent hydrocarbon flow.
3) A negative pressure test accepted as successful did not actually prove well integrity, as shown by later pressure increases and flows.
The document discusses the steps involved in well completion, including:
- Cleaning out the wellbore by running a bit and scraper to remove cement and cuttings.
- Circulating the well from bottom to top with completion fluid to displace drilling mud.
- Measuring the clarity of the returning fluid using an NTU measurement to ensure it is below 25.
- The goal is to clean the wellbore before running the completion string.
1. Gravel pack systems are used to control sand production in weak formations. Gravel is pumped into the annulus around a screen to block fine sand while allowing fluid flow.
2. The gravel pack assembly includes a packer, screen, blank pipe, centralizer, and bull plug. It is run in hole with the setting tool and packer. Pressure is applied to set the packer and release the setting tool.
3. Gravel slurry is then pumped through the work string, flowing out the window and filling the annulus around the screen. This blocks fine sand while maintaining production.
The document summarizes the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, including causes and timeline of events. It describes:
1) The spill occurred when the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded on April 20, 2010, killing 11 crew and spilling over 4 million barrels of oil.
2) A series of decisions ignored warnings and best practices, compromising the well design and cementing job. This included only using 6 centralizers instead of the recommended minimum of 21.
3) Pressure tests before temporarily abandoning the well showed warning signs of integrity issues but these were ignored. The rig then exploded as hydrocarbon gases rose up the well.
This document provides information about well completion processes and equipment. It discusses steps like well clean up, mud displacement, perforating, and installing downhole equipment like packers, landing nipples, and side pocket mandrels. The document also outlines considerations for completion design based on factors like the wellbore, reservoir properties, and production method. Well completion aims to enable production from the reservoir to the surface.
The document provides details about basic mud logging and rig components for both land and offshore rigs. It describes key rig components like the derrick, rotary table, blowout preventers, drill strings, and rig personnel. It also outlines different types of offshore rigs including jack-up rigs, semi-submersibles, drill ships, and platform rigs as well as their advantages and disadvantages.
This document provides an overview of well control techniques. It discusses the importance of maintaining primary well control by keeping hydrostatic pressure greater than formation pressure. It describes what a kick is and types of kicks that can occur. Common causes of kicks include not keeping the hole full, insufficient mud density, swabbing, lost circulation, and poor well planning. Warning signs of a kick and methods for recognition are outlined. Finally, it discusses the objective of well control and some important well control concepts like determining reservoir pressure and selecting a well control method.
The document discusses the steps involved in well completion, including:
- Cleaning out the wellbore by running a bit and scraper to remove cement and cuttings.
- Circulating the well from bottom to top with completion fluid to displace drilling mud.
- Measuring the clarity of the returning fluid using an NTU measurement to ensure it is below 25.
- The goal is to clean the wellbore before running the completion string.
1. Gravel pack systems are used to control sand production in weak formations. Gravel is pumped into the annulus around a screen to block fine sand while allowing fluid flow.
2. The gravel pack assembly includes a packer, screen, blank pipe, centralizer, and bull plug. It is run in hole with the setting tool and packer. Pressure is applied to set the packer and release the setting tool.
3. Gravel slurry is then pumped through the work string, flowing out the window and filling the annulus around the screen. This blocks fine sand while maintaining production.
The document summarizes the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, including causes and timeline of events. It describes:
1) The spill occurred when the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded on April 20, 2010, killing 11 crew and spilling over 4 million barrels of oil.
2) A series of decisions ignored warnings and best practices, compromising the well design and cementing job. This included only using 6 centralizers instead of the recommended minimum of 21.
3) Pressure tests before temporarily abandoning the well showed warning signs of integrity issues but these were ignored. The rig then exploded as hydrocarbon gases rose up the well.
This document provides information about well completion processes and equipment. It discusses steps like well clean up, mud displacement, perforating, and installing downhole equipment like packers, landing nipples, and side pocket mandrels. The document also outlines considerations for completion design based on factors like the wellbore, reservoir properties, and production method. Well completion aims to enable production from the reservoir to the surface.
The document provides details about basic mud logging and rig components for both land and offshore rigs. It describes key rig components like the derrick, rotary table, blowout preventers, drill strings, and rig personnel. It also outlines different types of offshore rigs including jack-up rigs, semi-submersibles, drill ships, and platform rigs as well as their advantages and disadvantages.
This document provides an overview of well control techniques. It discusses the importance of maintaining primary well control by keeping hydrostatic pressure greater than formation pressure. It describes what a kick is and types of kicks that can occur. Common causes of kicks include not keeping the hole full, insufficient mud density, swabbing, lost circulation, and poor well planning. Warning signs of a kick and methods for recognition are outlined. Finally, it discusses the objective of well control and some important well control concepts like determining reservoir pressure and selecting a well control method.
This document provides an overview of well control procedures. It discusses causes of kicks such as swabbing or pumping light mud that can lead to underbalance. Primary well control relies on mud hydrostatic pressure, while secondary control uses a blowout preventer. Tertiary control involves pumping substances to stop downhole flow. Methods for killing a well are also presented, including the driller's method, wait and weight, volumetric, and bullheading. Kick detection equipment like the pit volume totalizer and flow indicator are also outlined.
The document discusses production packers, which are subsurface tools used to provide a seal between casing and tubing. Production packers serve several purposes, such as protecting casing from corrosion, providing better well control, preventing fluid movement between zones, and isolating zones of bad cement. The key components of a production packer include slips, packing elements, and a cone. Production packers can be classified as permanent or retrievable and can be set mechanically, hydraulically, or electrically. Common types of production packers include sump packers, single-bore packers, dual-bore packers, and ESP packers.
The document discusses various types of well completions, including:
1. Open hole, slotted liner, gravel pack, cemented and perforated liner, and horizontal well completions for vertical or deviated wells.
2. Natural flow and artificial lift completions, as well as single and multiple zone completions.
3. Specific completion methods are described for horizontal wells including open hole, slotted liner, gravel pack, external casing packer, and cemented and perforated liner completions.
4. Artificial lift completions including rod pumps, hydraulic pumps, gas lift, and electrical submersible pumps are also summarized.
The document discusses various tools and techniques used in fishing operations to free a stuck drill string. It describes the components of the stuck bottomhole assembly, efforts to jar it free over multiple trips which included running a free point, backing off, and firing string shots. After extensive jarring over days, the string was finally freed at a depth of 2218 feet when a back off was made after the free point showed 80% freedom of movement.
This document contains slides from a presentation on well completions fundamentals. It discusses various aspects of well completions such as bottom hole completion techniques including perforated, open hole and liner completions. It also discusses perforations, the production string including tubing, packers and Christmas trees. The upper hole completion involves installing the production tubing, packers and the Christmas tree. Multiple completion configurations allow accessing multiple pay zones including single string and parallel string options. Horizontal and multilateral well completions also require specialized techniques and equipment.
This document provides an introduction to well control from Kingdom Drilling Services. It discusses primary and secondary well control, including maintaining pressure and monitoring flows. Loss of primary control can occur through pressure changes or lost circulation. Secondary control indicators include increased flow rates or mud pit volume changes. Methods for controlling kicks include circulating or bullheading. The document also covers well control terms, blowout prevention, shallow well hazards, and lost circulation detection and remedies.
This document discusses well control equipment used in drilling operations. It describes blowout preventers (BOPs) which are used to close the well and control kicks before they become blowouts. There are different types of BOPs including annular preventers, ram preventers, and rotational preventers. Other important well control equipment includes an accumulator unit to operate BOPs hydraulically, inside BOPs, choke and kill lines, and a wellhead with casing heads to support tubulars and control fluid flow. Components should be function tested at least weekly to verify operations and actuation times should be recorded.
Landing nipples are short pieces of pipe with internal profiles that allow lock mandrels to locate and lock into them. They are used to plug tubing for various well operations like removing equipment, pressure testing, and setting packers. The main types are selective and no-go nipples. A typical slickline plug consists of a lock mandrel, equalizing sub, and flow control device. Major manufacturers include Baker, CAMCO, Halliburton/Otis, and Weatherford CPS/Petroline.
DRILLING: It is defined as art & science of making a hole in an object.
OIL & GAS WELL DRILLING: It is an art & science of drilling a hole in the earth crust down to a desired depth in search / extraction of natural gas or oil(petroleum)
This document provides information about side sliding doors (SSDs), including:
1) SSDs are also known as sliding sleeves that provide controlled communication between the tubing and casing annulus.
2) SSDs can be used for applications like fluid displacement, well killing, gas lifting, and chemical injection by opening or closing ports between the annulus and tubing.
3) SSD sleeves can be shifted using wireline methods, coiled tubing methods, pressure darts, or differential pressure application to the annulus.
A summary presentation of a 7" Liner job, demonstrating different components, mechanisms of liner hanger and other string components. Then a quick hint about cementing operation and some extra components involved in the job like the Handling equipment, VAM HT, ...etc.
Packers are tools used to form an annular seal between concentric strings of pipe or between pipe and the open hole. They isolate production zones from each other or from the annulus. Packers have slips, cones, seals, and mandrels that allow them to be set through hydraulic or mechanical means. Selection depends on application, required ratings, and setting method. Proper installation requires a clean set point without fouling components. Packers come in a variety of types including retrievable, permanent, seal bore, inflatable, and service packers.
Wellhead function, rating and selectionElsayed Amer
The document discusses various components of wellhead and Christmas tree equipment used in oil and gas wells. It describes the purpose and components of the wellhead assembly including the casing head, casing hangers, tubing head, and tubing hanger. It also discusses the tubing head adapter and its role in connecting the tubing head to the Christmas tree. Seals, valves, and other surface equipment used to control flow from the well are also covered.
Offshore drilling is the process of drilling through the seabed to explore and extract petroleum deposits beneath the seafloor. It involves using seismic surveys to locate potential oil deposits, drilling holes hundreds to thousands of feet below the seabed using metal casing and drill pipes, and extracting oil through the wells. Offshore drilling poses environmental risks like oil spills that can harm ocean life and pollute shorelines if not properly regulated. Unconventional drilling methods allow drilling at angles and laterally to access more oil.
perforated joint, flow coupling and blast jointElsayed Amer
This document discusses perforated joints, flow couplings, and blast joints used in downhole equipment. A perforated joint is installed above a no-go and provides flow bypass when gauges are installed. It must have a total cross-sectional area of holes equivalent to the tubing internal diameter. Flow couplings are installed where turbulence is expected, such as above and below crossovers or nipples, and have thicker walls to prevent early erosion failures. Blast joints are placed near perforations and have heavy, blast-resistant coatings to protect from extreme erosional forces opposite open perforations.
The document discusses well completion processes. It describes the different types of well casing installed during completion, including conductor, surface, intermediate, production, and liner casing. It also discusses functions of casing like strengthening the wellbore and preventing fluid migration. The document outlines various completion methods like open hole, cemented liners, gravel packs, and describes how zones are produced. It classifies completions based on reservoir interface, production method (natural flow, artificial lift like rod pumps and ESPs), and number of zones. The artificial lift methods support production when natural reservoir pressure declines.
The document discusses various types of surface equipment used in oil and gas production operations, including:
1. Production trees (single and dual string), gate valves, tubing hangers, production chokes, and surface safety systems.
2. Components of these systems like tubing spools, tubing hangers, back pressure valves, lubricators, and production chokes.
3. Specialized equipment for different well types/applications such as coiled tubing, pumping, and frac stacks.
Formation damage can occur through physical, chemical, and bacterial mechanisms. The formation damage process involves filter cake formation and drilling mud formulation. Formation damage sources include drilling, completion, workover, stimulation, production, and injection operations. Common damage mechanisms are particle invasion, clay swelling/dispersion, scale precipitation, and fines migration. Remedial measures include acidizing, fracturing, clay stabilization, and surfactant treatments. Proper mud system design aims to minimize invasion and filtrate loss into the formation.
The Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico 1,500 meters below the surface and 66 km off the coast of Louisiana, killing 11 workers. Over the next 36 hours, the rig burned and eventually sank, leaving a damaged wellhead that was leaking oil into the Gulf. For months, oil gushed from the wellhead at an estimated rate of up to 40,000 barrels per day, spreading across 1,500 square km of the Gulf and reaching the coasts of Louisiana, Florida, and elsewhere in the Gulf region due to ocean currents. The well was finally capped on July 15, over 80 days after the initial explosion.
This document provides an overview of well control procedures. It discusses causes of kicks such as swabbing or pumping light mud that can lead to underbalance. Primary well control relies on mud hydrostatic pressure, while secondary control uses a blowout preventer. Tertiary control involves pumping substances to stop downhole flow. Methods for killing a well are also presented, including the driller's method, wait and weight, volumetric, and bullheading. Kick detection equipment like the pit volume totalizer and flow indicator are also outlined.
The document discusses production packers, which are subsurface tools used to provide a seal between casing and tubing. Production packers serve several purposes, such as protecting casing from corrosion, providing better well control, preventing fluid movement between zones, and isolating zones of bad cement. The key components of a production packer include slips, packing elements, and a cone. Production packers can be classified as permanent or retrievable and can be set mechanically, hydraulically, or electrically. Common types of production packers include sump packers, single-bore packers, dual-bore packers, and ESP packers.
The document discusses various types of well completions, including:
1. Open hole, slotted liner, gravel pack, cemented and perforated liner, and horizontal well completions for vertical or deviated wells.
2. Natural flow and artificial lift completions, as well as single and multiple zone completions.
3. Specific completion methods are described for horizontal wells including open hole, slotted liner, gravel pack, external casing packer, and cemented and perforated liner completions.
4. Artificial lift completions including rod pumps, hydraulic pumps, gas lift, and electrical submersible pumps are also summarized.
The document discusses various tools and techniques used in fishing operations to free a stuck drill string. It describes the components of the stuck bottomhole assembly, efforts to jar it free over multiple trips which included running a free point, backing off, and firing string shots. After extensive jarring over days, the string was finally freed at a depth of 2218 feet when a back off was made after the free point showed 80% freedom of movement.
This document contains slides from a presentation on well completions fundamentals. It discusses various aspects of well completions such as bottom hole completion techniques including perforated, open hole and liner completions. It also discusses perforations, the production string including tubing, packers and Christmas trees. The upper hole completion involves installing the production tubing, packers and the Christmas tree. Multiple completion configurations allow accessing multiple pay zones including single string and parallel string options. Horizontal and multilateral well completions also require specialized techniques and equipment.
This document provides an introduction to well control from Kingdom Drilling Services. It discusses primary and secondary well control, including maintaining pressure and monitoring flows. Loss of primary control can occur through pressure changes or lost circulation. Secondary control indicators include increased flow rates or mud pit volume changes. Methods for controlling kicks include circulating or bullheading. The document also covers well control terms, blowout prevention, shallow well hazards, and lost circulation detection and remedies.
This document discusses well control equipment used in drilling operations. It describes blowout preventers (BOPs) which are used to close the well and control kicks before they become blowouts. There are different types of BOPs including annular preventers, ram preventers, and rotational preventers. Other important well control equipment includes an accumulator unit to operate BOPs hydraulically, inside BOPs, choke and kill lines, and a wellhead with casing heads to support tubulars and control fluid flow. Components should be function tested at least weekly to verify operations and actuation times should be recorded.
Landing nipples are short pieces of pipe with internal profiles that allow lock mandrels to locate and lock into them. They are used to plug tubing for various well operations like removing equipment, pressure testing, and setting packers. The main types are selective and no-go nipples. A typical slickline plug consists of a lock mandrel, equalizing sub, and flow control device. Major manufacturers include Baker, CAMCO, Halliburton/Otis, and Weatherford CPS/Petroline.
DRILLING: It is defined as art & science of making a hole in an object.
OIL & GAS WELL DRILLING: It is an art & science of drilling a hole in the earth crust down to a desired depth in search / extraction of natural gas or oil(petroleum)
This document provides information about side sliding doors (SSDs), including:
1) SSDs are also known as sliding sleeves that provide controlled communication between the tubing and casing annulus.
2) SSDs can be used for applications like fluid displacement, well killing, gas lifting, and chemical injection by opening or closing ports between the annulus and tubing.
3) SSD sleeves can be shifted using wireline methods, coiled tubing methods, pressure darts, or differential pressure application to the annulus.
A summary presentation of a 7" Liner job, demonstrating different components, mechanisms of liner hanger and other string components. Then a quick hint about cementing operation and some extra components involved in the job like the Handling equipment, VAM HT, ...etc.
Packers are tools used to form an annular seal between concentric strings of pipe or between pipe and the open hole. They isolate production zones from each other or from the annulus. Packers have slips, cones, seals, and mandrels that allow them to be set through hydraulic or mechanical means. Selection depends on application, required ratings, and setting method. Proper installation requires a clean set point without fouling components. Packers come in a variety of types including retrievable, permanent, seal bore, inflatable, and service packers.
Wellhead function, rating and selectionElsayed Amer
The document discusses various components of wellhead and Christmas tree equipment used in oil and gas wells. It describes the purpose and components of the wellhead assembly including the casing head, casing hangers, tubing head, and tubing hanger. It also discusses the tubing head adapter and its role in connecting the tubing head to the Christmas tree. Seals, valves, and other surface equipment used to control flow from the well are also covered.
Offshore drilling is the process of drilling through the seabed to explore and extract petroleum deposits beneath the seafloor. It involves using seismic surveys to locate potential oil deposits, drilling holes hundreds to thousands of feet below the seabed using metal casing and drill pipes, and extracting oil through the wells. Offshore drilling poses environmental risks like oil spills that can harm ocean life and pollute shorelines if not properly regulated. Unconventional drilling methods allow drilling at angles and laterally to access more oil.
perforated joint, flow coupling and blast jointElsayed Amer
This document discusses perforated joints, flow couplings, and blast joints used in downhole equipment. A perforated joint is installed above a no-go and provides flow bypass when gauges are installed. It must have a total cross-sectional area of holes equivalent to the tubing internal diameter. Flow couplings are installed where turbulence is expected, such as above and below crossovers or nipples, and have thicker walls to prevent early erosion failures. Blast joints are placed near perforations and have heavy, blast-resistant coatings to protect from extreme erosional forces opposite open perforations.
The document discusses well completion processes. It describes the different types of well casing installed during completion, including conductor, surface, intermediate, production, and liner casing. It also discusses functions of casing like strengthening the wellbore and preventing fluid migration. The document outlines various completion methods like open hole, cemented liners, gravel packs, and describes how zones are produced. It classifies completions based on reservoir interface, production method (natural flow, artificial lift like rod pumps and ESPs), and number of zones. The artificial lift methods support production when natural reservoir pressure declines.
The document discusses various types of surface equipment used in oil and gas production operations, including:
1. Production trees (single and dual string), gate valves, tubing hangers, production chokes, and surface safety systems.
2. Components of these systems like tubing spools, tubing hangers, back pressure valves, lubricators, and production chokes.
3. Specialized equipment for different well types/applications such as coiled tubing, pumping, and frac stacks.
Formation damage can occur through physical, chemical, and bacterial mechanisms. The formation damage process involves filter cake formation and drilling mud formulation. Formation damage sources include drilling, completion, workover, stimulation, production, and injection operations. Common damage mechanisms are particle invasion, clay swelling/dispersion, scale precipitation, and fines migration. Remedial measures include acidizing, fracturing, clay stabilization, and surfactant treatments. Proper mud system design aims to minimize invasion and filtrate loss into the formation.
The Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico 1,500 meters below the surface and 66 km off the coast of Louisiana, killing 11 workers. Over the next 36 hours, the rig burned and eventually sank, leaving a damaged wellhead that was leaking oil into the Gulf. For months, oil gushed from the wellhead at an estimated rate of up to 40,000 barrels per day, spreading across 1,500 square km of the Gulf and reaching the coasts of Louisiana, Florida, and elsewhere in the Gulf region due to ocean currents. The well was finally capped on July 15, over 80 days after the initial explosion.
Philippe kunz – global operation – george kastner emba london - dickens cohort, This case try to explain the miss-function and give some theoretical advice
BP-Deepwater horizon-Macondo-Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill Dhanish Ahsen
Describes what went wrong at Macondo Deepwater horizon oil spill Who takes the responsibility and whom to be blamed are being discussed.The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also referred to as the BP oil spill, the BP oil disaster, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, and the Macondo blowout) began on 20 April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico on the BP-operated Macondo Prospect. It claimed eleven lives and is considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry
Cheryl MacKenzie from the United States Chemical Safety Board and Peter Wilkinson, who provided support to the CSB during the investigation, will take us through some of the more important human and organisational factors and discuss how these can be put into practice and explain why the disaster was not a Black Swan.
The speakers will highlight the issues that should be at the forefront of our thinking in all the everyday operations we take so much for granted. Understanding process safety may save our lives, and the lives of our work mates.
Piper Alpha was an oil production platform located in the North Sea that exploded and sank on July 6, 1988. The platform began producing oil in 1976 and was processing oil and gas from 24 wells at the time of the disaster. On the night of July 6th, a gas leak caused an explosion that engulfed the platform in fire. Two additional gas lines ruptured, causing massive explosions and spreading the fire across the entire platform. Within hours, the platform completely collapsed and sank into the sea, resulting in the deaths of 167 workers in one of the worst offshore oil disasters in history.
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: A Study of Behavioural Decision MakingJerome Dauvergne
This report analyses the genesis of the Deepwater Horizon disaster from a behavioural decision making perspective. In order to write this original paper I borrowed from the investigative work of the environmental journalist Abrahm Lustgarten, and from concepts developed by behavioural finance and emotional finance academics such as the Canadian Hersh Shefrin, the American John Nofsinger, and the Britons Richard Taffler and David Tuckett.
I hope you'll enjoy the read!
This document discusses creating a culture of operational discipline. It defines operational discipline as doing the right thing, the right way, every time. The core values that define this culture are: level of knowledge, formality, questioning attitude, forceful watch team backup, and integrity. It uses the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as a case study to show how robust processes alone are not enough - a culture embracing these values is also needed. While the BP leaders on the rig followed expected processes like safety tours, they did not demonstrate the core values. For example, they did not have an adequate level of knowledge, ask questions when they noticed issues, or hold others accountable. This highlights the importance of these cultural values for operational excellence.
This document discusses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill and analyzes its trauma signature compared to other disasters. It finds that the oil spill was an extreme environmental catastrophe and technological disaster caused by BP that had a prolonged duration with extensive media coverage. While there was no loss of life, it had multi-impact effects and corporate culpability. The response was rapid, funded and coordinated.
Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...Brad Keithley
The document discusses changes to offshore drilling regulation in the US following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion. It outlines the evolution of regulatory structure, splitting the former Minerals Management Service into three new agencies. Upcoming issues that could impact Alaska include a new National Oceans Policy establishing coastal planning and potential changes to Alaska's Coastal Zone Management program which determines permitting for coastal activities.
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill's impact on the us economy, Jonah Guo,Queen's MBAJonah Guo
This presentation is prepared in the Macro-economy class to analyze the macro economic affect of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. All the photos are found via Google search, copyright belong to the original authors. Logos came from the GreenPeace Logo contest
Understanding the New BP Deepwater Horizon Settlementlijoam
BP Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement, BP Claims, Deepwater Horizon Claims, Business Claims, Gulf Coast Claims Facility, ClaimsComp
The document discusses accumulator systems which are used to operate blowout preventers (BOPs) in the event of a power failure. It defines accumulators as pressure vessels that store hydraulic fluid energy. The main types are gas-charged bladders, diaphragms, and pistons. Accumulator systems have multiple independent power sources like hydraulic bottles, pneumatics, and electricity. They maintain sufficient pressure to operate all BOP rams. The document provides examples of sizing calculations to ensure accumulators provide adequate fluid volume to close BOP components based on their specific pressures and volumes.
An explosion on BP's Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico on April 22, 2010 caused a massive oil spill that has had devastating environmental consequences. The spill has caused oil to burn on the surface of the sea and killed many innocent animals. While BP and other companies like Halliburton may bear responsibility, the full blame is still unclear. The spill continues to damage the Gulf of Mexico environment.
Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA): From Portsmouth Respons...Kurt Schwehr
In 2007, a small UNH team put together a prototype emergency response web application using open source tools on a Mac Desktop and later a Mac Mini. That system, called Portsmouth Response, was designed to assist in the first hours of an environmental incident by providing easy access to basic GIS layers without requiring GIS experts. This system generalized and renamed to ERMA, begin deployed as prototypes in the Caribbean and participating in the Spill Of National Significance (SONS) drill in New England during March 2010. Before the team could evaluate the performance during the SONS drill, the Deepwater Horizon platform exploded in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. Four days later, the ERMA team was called in for 24x7 support of NOAA and USCG operations to handle the incident. ERMA went from prototype system to being the system providing the Common Operational Picture (COP) is just a few weeks. In early June, NOAA setup a system to mirror the unrestricted datasets for the public on the GeoPlatform system. The presentation describes how ERMA is designed and how it was used during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill incident.
A food chain describes how energy and nutrients move through an ecological community. Producers like plants use photosynthesis to create food, which is then consumed by primary consumers or herbivores. Secondary consumers or carnivores eat the primary consumers, and some secondary consumers are eaten by tertiary consumers at the top of the food chain. Many organisms play multiple roles by eating both plants and other animals. Detritivores break down dead organisms and cycle nutrients, while parasites live in or on a host organism. Together, interconnected food chains form a complex food web in any given environment.
The three key points are:
1) The Macondo well project encountered multiple problems during drilling including hole instability, stuck pipe, and mud losses in the reservoir section.
2) When cementing the production casing string, BP used a questionable casing design and took shortcuts like using too few centralizers and pumping the cement at too low of a rate, which increased the risk of cement failure.
3) The root causes of the accident likely included a combination of factors like complacency, overemphasis on cost and schedule over safety, availability of but not applying best practices, and failure of regulators to correct issues. Shortcuts taken during critical well operations compromised well barriers.
The document summarizes a laboratory study that investigated the effect of sand sorting on gravel pack permeability. Several experiments were conducted using sand samples with different grain size distributions and sorting. The results showed that permeability decreased with smaller grain sizes due to smaller pore throats, and decreased more significantly with poorer sand sorting and higher fluid flow rates. Permeability reduction was also greater with higher viscosity injection fluids. Under continuous flow, permeability was always higher than under discontinuous flow conditions.
This document summarizes information about ground hydrology and well completion. It discusses the different types of wells, including shallow and deep wells. It also describes various well construction methods, such as digging, boring, and drilling. Additionally, it covers topics like well casing, cementing, gravel packing, and screen placement. Proper well completion is emphasized as being important for maximizing well yield and longevity.
This document discusses drilling fluids, including their functions, classifications, properties, and calculations. It covers topics such as:
- The key functions of drilling fluids including transporting cuttings, cleaning drill bits, providing hydrostatic pressure, preventing mud loss, and more.
- The classification of drilling fluids into water-based mud and oil-based mud.
- Important properties of drilling fluids including mud weight, viscosity measurements like funnel viscosity and plastic viscosity, yield point, and gel strength.
- Calculations related to drilling fluids like plastic viscosity, yield point, and the impacts of different properties on drilling operations.
This document discusses cast-in-place piles in seismic areas. It describes the basic installation process for continuous flight auger (CFA) and drilled displacement (DD) piles. Factors affecting pile performance are outlined, including sidewall roughness, installation effects on stresses, tip resistance mobilization, and construction control. Applications in favorable and unfavorable conditions are examined. The document concludes with a discussion of inspection issues and seismic loading considerations.
The Cambay #15 well has experienced 100% water cut due to excess water production. To address this, a squeeze cement job will be performed to seal off the existing open interval between 1400-1404.5m. Cement will be squeezed into this zone and the tubing shoe adjusted upwards to 1395m to perforate a new production zone higher in the formation, transferring production to upper sands with the aim of resuming oil production.
Unlocking WhatsApp Marketing with HubSpot: Integrating Messaging into Your Ma...Niswey
50 million companies worldwide leverage WhatsApp as a key marketing channel. You may have considered adding it to your marketing mix, or probably already driving impressive conversions with WhatsApp.
But wait. What happens when you fully integrate your WhatsApp campaigns with HubSpot?
That's exactly what we explored in this session.
We take a look at everything that you need to know in order to deploy effective WhatsApp marketing strategies, and integrate it with your buyer journey in HubSpot. From technical requirements to innovative campaign strategies, to advanced campaign reporting - we discuss all that and more, to leverage WhatsApp for maximum impact. Check out more details about the event here https://events.hubspot.com/events/details/hubspot-new-delhi-presents-unlocking-whatsapp-marketing-with-hubspot-integrating-messaging-into-your-marketing-strategy/
Satta matka fixx jodi panna all market dpboss matka guessing fixx panna jodi kalyan and all market game liss cover now 420 matka office mumbai maharashtra india fixx jodi panna
Call me 9040963354
WhatsApp 9040963354
[To download this presentation, visit:
https://www.oeconsulting.com.sg/training-presentations]
This presentation is a curated compilation of PowerPoint diagrams and templates designed to illustrate 20 different digital transformation frameworks and models. These frameworks are based on recent industry trends and best practices, ensuring that the content remains relevant and up-to-date.
Key highlights include Microsoft's Digital Transformation Framework, which focuses on driving innovation and efficiency, and McKinsey's Ten Guiding Principles, which provide strategic insights for successful digital transformation. Additionally, Forrester's framework emphasizes enhancing customer experiences and modernizing IT infrastructure, while IDC's MaturityScape helps assess and develop organizational digital maturity. MIT's framework explores cutting-edge strategies for achieving digital success.
These materials are perfect for enhancing your business or classroom presentations, offering visual aids to supplement your insights. Please note that while comprehensive, these slides are intended as supplementary resources and may not be complete for standalone instructional purposes.
Frameworks/Models included:
Microsoft’s Digital Transformation Framework
McKinsey’s Ten Guiding Principles of Digital Transformation
Forrester’s Digital Transformation Framework
IDC’s Digital Transformation MaturityScape
MIT’s Digital Transformation Framework
Gartner’s Digital Transformation Framework
Accenture’s Digital Strategy & Enterprise Frameworks
Deloitte’s Digital Industrial Transformation Framework
Capgemini’s Digital Transformation Framework
PwC’s Digital Transformation Framework
Cisco’s Digital Transformation Framework
Cognizant’s Digital Transformation Framework
DXC Technology’s Digital Transformation Framework
The BCG Strategy Palette
McKinsey’s Digital Transformation Framework
Digital Transformation Compass
Four Levels of Digital Maturity
Design Thinking Framework
Business Model Canvas
Customer Journey Map
Best Competitive Marble Pricing in Dubai - ☎ 9928909666Stone Art Hub
Stone Art Hub offers the best competitive Marble Pricing in Dubai, ensuring affordability without compromising quality. With a wide range of exquisite marble options to choose from, you can enhance your spaces with elegance and sophistication. For inquiries or orders, contact us at ☎ 9928909666. Experience luxury at unbeatable prices.
Industrial Tech SW: Category Renewal and CreationChristian Dahlen
Every industrial revolution has created a new set of categories and a new set of players.
Multiple new technologies have emerged, but Samsara and C3.ai are only two companies which have gone public so far.
Manufacturing startups constitute the largest pipeline share of unicorns and IPO candidates in the SF Bay Area, and software startups dominate in Germany.
Part 2 Deep Dive: Navigating the 2024 Slowdownjeffkluth1
Introduction
The global retail industry has weathered numerous storms, with the financial crisis of 2008 serving as a poignant reminder of the sector's resilience and adaptability. However, as we navigate the complex landscape of 2024, retailers face a unique set of challenges that demand innovative strategies and a fundamental shift in mindset. This white paper contrasts the impact of the 2008 recession on the retail sector with the current headwinds retailers are grappling with, while offering a comprehensive roadmap for success in this new paradigm.
Unveiling the Dynamic Personalities, Key Dates, and Horoscope Insights: Gemin...my Pandit
Explore the fascinating world of the Gemini Zodiac Sign. Discover the unique personality traits, key dates, and horoscope insights of Gemini individuals. Learn how their sociable, communicative nature and boundless curiosity make them the dynamic explorers of the zodiac. Dive into the duality of the Gemini sign and understand their intellectual and adventurous spirit.
Ellen Burstyn: From Detroit Dreamer to Hollywood Legend | CIO Women MagazineCIOWomenMagazine
In this article, we will dive into the extraordinary life of Ellen Burstyn, where the curtains rise on a story that's far more attractive than any script.
AI Transformation Playbook: Thinking AI-First for Your BusinessArijit Dutta
I dive into how businesses can stay competitive by integrating AI into their core processes. From identifying the right approach to building collaborative teams and recognizing common pitfalls, this guide has got you covered. AI transformation is a journey, and this playbook is here to help you navigate it successfully.
IMPACT Silver is a pure silver zinc producer with over $260 million in revenue since 2008 and a large 100% owned 210km Mexico land package - 2024 catalysts includes new 14% grade zinc Plomosas mine and 20,000m of fully funded exploration drilling.
2. Investigation Context
Terms of Reference
Investigation Team
Data and Analysis
Investigation Limitations
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 2
3. Eight Barriers Were Breached
Well integrity was not established or failed
6 7 − Annulus cement barrier did not isolate hydrocarbons
1
3 5
− Shoe track barriers did not isolate hydrocarbons
2
Hydrocarbons entered the well undetected and
Riser
4 well control was lost
− Negative pressure test was accepted although well
3
8
integrity had not been established
BOP
Sea Floor − Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in
4
riser
− Well control response actions failed to regain control of
5
Casing
well
Hydrocarbons ignited on the Deepwater Horizon
− Diversion to mud gas separator resulted in gas venting
6
onto rig
− Fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon
7
ignition
Blowout preventer did not seal the well
1
Reservoir − Blowout preventer (BOP) emergency mode did not
8
seal well
2 Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 3
5. Well Integrity Was Not Established
or Failed
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 5
6. Production Casing Installation
After drilling to total depth, casing is run to
bottom in preparation for the cement job. A
Choke
double valve float collar is used to prevent
Kill
Boost backflow or ingress of fluids through the
shoe track until the cement hardens and
creates a permanent barrier.
BOP
April 18th 00:30 – April 19th 19:30
Sea Floor 17:30 – 19:30 Long string design robust, consistent with
Circulated prior
Cement 36” to cement job similar wells in the area
Mud 9 attempts made to establish circulation
28”
Spacer
to convert float valves
22”
Circulate ~6 times open hole volume,
18”
limited circulation due to concerns over
16”
creating losses and hole washout
13-5/8”
No evidence that hydrocarbons entered
11-7/8”
the wellbore prior to the cementing
9-7/8”
operation
14.17 ppg
SOBM
Primary reservoir
sands
(12.6 ppg)
Bottoms–up
Marker
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 6
7. Cement Job
Cement is pumped down casing through
the float collar and up the annulus to
isolate the primary reservoir sands.
Choke Pull out of hole
Kill April 19th 19:30 – April 20th 07:00
Boost with running
tool and drill Nitrogen cement slurry chosen
pipe
– To achieve light weight slurry due to
BOP Set and test limited pore pressure / fracture
casing hanger
seal assembly
gradient window
Sea Floor
00:35 – 02:50
Possible risk
36” Drill-Quip seal assembly installed – Stability of foam
Base Oil and successfully tested.
Centralizer
No lock down sleeve installed. – Relatively small volume
Spacer 28”
02:50 – 07:00 – Susceptible to contamination
Cap
Pull out hole with drill pipe.
Cement 22” Mitigation of risk by
Foamed 18”
– Thorough testing of slurry design
Cement
Bottoms–up
16” Marker – Precise placement
Tail Cement
Mud 13-5/8” Centralization
Primary
Nitrogen 11-7/8”
Reservoir – 6 inline centralizers spaced across
Breakout Sands the reservoir sands
Shoe – 17,168’
(12.6 ppg)
Top of
9-7/8” cement 17,260’ – Additional centralizers not run
because incorrectly thought to be
wrong type
Primary reservoir
Float Collar – 18,115’ 6 centralizers sands – Risk of channeling above reservoir
(12.6 ppg)
sands known and accepted
Shoe – 18,304’
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 7
8. Key Finding #1
The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the reservoir hydrocarbons
Cement is pumped down the
Cement Slurry Placement landing string and casing into the
Base Oil
ppg
16.7ppg
6.7
annulus to isolate hydrocarbon
bearing sands.
Spacer
14.3 ppg
Riser 14.3 ppg
Cap
Cement Mud
Channeling 16.74 ppg
Foam slurry recommended was a
14.17 ppg Cap
Cement
complex design
16.74 ppg
BOP
Risk of contamination using small
Sea Floor Foam volume of cement
Cement
Foam
14.5 ppg
Cement No fluid loss additives
14.5 ppg
Incomplete pre-job cement lab
Casing Centralizers
Spacer testing
14.3 ppg
Foam slurry was likely unstable
Float Collar
Top Wiper Plug
Top Wiper Plug and resulted in nitrogen breakout
Bottom Wiper Plug
Bottom Wiper Plug Shoe
Tail Cement Track
16.74 ppg 12.6 ppg Shoe
Track
Reservoir Reamer Shoe Tail Cement
Nitrogen Breakout
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 8
9. Cement Slurry Design Issues
An independent lab completed over 500
tests on a representative cement slurry and
reported the following:
50% quality foam at surface conditions
Original Height
was not stable
18.5% quality foam (downhole quality)
was not stable
Yield point of the Halliburton slurry was
too low for the foam cement (2 lb / 100 ft2
Final Height yield point at 135 deg F)
Fluid loss for the base slurry was
excessive compared to industry
recommendations (302 cc versus 50 cc
per 30 min)
Cement
Note: QUALITY = Nitrogen Volume /
(Nitrogen + Base Slurry Volume)
Unstable Foam Sample
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 9
10. Flow Through Shoe Track - Supporting Evidence
Casing Key Observations for Flow Seal
Shoe Through Shoe vs. Seal Assembly
Failure Assembly Failure
Y Mechanical Barrier
Failure Mode Identified Y
Y
Realistic Net Pay
Assumption N
Y
1400 psi recorded on
drill pipe during negative N
test at 18:30
Y
Ability to flow from
20:58 N
Y
Pressure Increase from
21:08 to 21:14 N
16ppg Spacer Y
Pressure Response from
21:31 to 21:34 N
14.17ppg SOBM (Mud)
8.6ppg Seawater
Influx
Y
Timing for Gas Arrival to
Surface N
Seal
N
Casing Static Kill
Shoe
Failure
Y Assembly
Failure
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 10
11. Key Finding #2
The shoe track mechanical barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons
Tail cement is displaced down the casing
into the shoe track. The tail cement is
designed to prevent flow from the
annulus into the casing. The float collar
valves, which provide a second barrier,
Riser
must close and seal to prevent flow up
Hydrocarbon Flow the casing.
Path
Shoe track had two types of mechanical
BOP Float Collar
barriers: cement in the shoe track and the
Sea Floor
double check valves in the float collar
Shoe track cement failed to act as a
Check Valves
Casing barrier due to contamination of the base
slurry by break out of nitrogen from the
foam slurry
Shoe track cement
Hydrocarbon influx was able to bypass
the float collar check valves due to either:
Valves failed to convert or
Valves failed to seal
Centralizers
Flow through shoe confirmed by fluid
modeling and Macondo static kill data
Reservoir
Flow Ports
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 11
12. Hydrocarbons Entered the Well
Undetected and Well Control Was Lost
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 12
13. Casing (Positive) Pressure Test
2700
psi
Kill
A positive pressure test verifies the
integrity of the casing and seal
assembly.
April 20th 07:00 – 12:00
Sea Floor
Casing was pressure tested to:
Cement
250 psi (low)
Mud 2700 psi (high)
Spacer Test successful
Proved integrity of blind shear rams, seal
assembly, casing and wiper plug
Test does not test the shoe track due to
presence of wiper plug
Primary
reservoir sands
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 13
14. Negative Pressure Test
The negative-pressure test checks the
integrity of the shoe track, casing and
wellhead seal assembly. This simulates
Choke
Boost
Kill
15:04 – 15:56 conditions during temporary
Seawater pumped into abandonment when a portion of the well
Boost, Choke, and Kill lines
is displaced to seawater.
BOP
April 20th 15:04 – 19:55
16:54 - Close Annular
Sea Floor
Negative test simulates underbalanced
15:56 – 16:53
424 bbls of 16 ppg
condition
spacer followed by 30 bbls
Cement of freshwater and 352 bbls
Spacer used between mud and seawater
of seawater pumped into well
Mud Leaking annular at start of test moved
Spacer 16:54 – 16:59 spacer across kill line inlet
50 bbls bled off
Seawater drill pipe due to Negative test started on drill pipe but
Influx leaking annular changed to kill line
Bleed volumes higher than calculated
Drill pipe built pressure to 1400 psi with
no flow on the kill line
Primary reservoir
sands
(12.6 ppg)
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 14
15. Negative Pressure Test
The negative-pressure test checks the
17:52 – 18:00 integrity of the shoe track, casing and
Open kill
line to conduct wellhead seal assembly. This simulates
Choke
negative test Kill conditions during temporary
Boost
16:59 – 17:08 abandonment when a portion of the well
Bled 3 - 15 bbls
into kill line
Annular seals with is displaced to seawater.
increased hydraulic
BOP
closing pressure
Flow did not April 20th 15:04 – 19:55
stop and
Fill riser with 50 bbls of mud
“spurted” Negative test simulates underbalanced
Sea Floor
Kill line closed
17:08 – 17:27 condition
Monitored that the
Cement
annular sealed Spacer used between mud and seawater
Mud 17:27 Leaking annular at start of test moved
Bled 15 bbls of spacer across kill line inlet
Spacer
seawater from drill pipe
Seawater Negative test started on drill pipe but
Decision made to
Influx change test to kill line changed to kill line
Bleed volumes higher than calculated
Cement
Tank Total
Drill pipe built pressure to 1400 psi with
Volume
no flow on the kill line
15 bbls
Primary reservoir
sands
(12.6 ppg)
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 15
16. Negative Pressure Test
The negative-pressure test checks the
1400 0 integrity of the shoe track, casing and
psi psi
18:00 – 18:35 wellhead seal assembly. This simulates
Choke Drill pipe pressure gradually
Boost increased to 1400 psi
conditions during temporary
abandonment when a portion of the well
18:42
is displaced to seawater.
BOP Pumped into kill
line to confirm full April 20th 15:04 – 19:55
Kill line opened for
Sea Floor monitoring negative test Negative test simulates underbalanced
condition
Cement 18:42 – 19:55 Spacer used between mud and seawater
Monitored kill line for 30 min
Mud 1400 psi on drill pipe described Leaking annular at start of test moved
as a “bladder effect” spacer across kill line inlet
Spacer
Seawater 19:55
Negative pressure test
Negative test started on drill pipe but
Influx was concluded and changed to kill line
considered a good test
Bleed volumes higher than calculated
Cement
Tank Total
Drill pipe built pressure to 1400 psi with
Volume
no flow on the kill line
18 bbls Additional
15 bbls 3 bbl influx
Primary reservoir
sands
(12.6 ppg)
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 16
17. Key Finding #3
The negative pressure test was accepted although well integrity had
not been established
1400 0
PSI PSI
Riser
Choke Kill Bleed volumes not recognized as a
Boost
problem
BOP
Sea Floor
BOP
Anomalous pressure on drill pipe with no
Sea Floor
flow from kill line
Spacer
Casing SOBM Test incorrectly accepted as successful
Spacer
Seawater Negative testing not standardized
Influx
Shoe – 17,168’
TOC – 17,260’
FC – 18,115’
Reservoir
Shoe – 18,304’
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 17
18. Well Monitoring – Driller’s Console and Mudlogging unit
Well monitoring is performed to understand if
the well has losses or gains
Driller is responsible for monitoring and
shutting in the well
The mudlogger provides monitoring support to
the driller
Displays and trending capability available in
both Driller’s and Mudlogger’s cabins
Flow, pressure and pit sensors can indicate
flow
Simultaneous activities were taking place on
April 20th to prepare for rig move
Standards for monitoring do not specifically
address end-of-well activities
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 18
19. Undetected Flowing Conditions
Mud in the riser is displaced with
seawater in preparation for temporary
abandonment.
Choke Kill
Boost 21:08
Spacer arrived at surface April 20th 19:55 – 21:14
Shut pumps down
for sheen test
BOP 20:02 Resume displacement of mud with
20:02 seawater
Sea Floor
Annular opened
after negative
test
20:52 Well becomes underbalanced and
starts to flow
Cement 20:00 – 21:08
Resumed pumping
Mud Displaced riser with seawater After 20:58 gain being taken and pressure
Spacer until spacer is at surface
begins increasing
Seawater
20:52 – Flow from well masked by emptying
Mud + Seawater Well becomes underbalanced
of trip tank
Mix
Influx 21:08 Pumping stops for sheen test
– Pressure increases with pump off
20:58 - 21:08
39 bbl gain 21:14 Sheen test complete, displacement
resumes
Primary reservoir
sands
(12.6 ppg)
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 19
20. Key Finding #4
The influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser
2000 3000
Flow Indications
Based on Real-time Data Flow indications:
Flow Out (calibrated)
1800
Flow In (rig pumps)
DP Press (rig pumps)
2500 #1: Drill pipe pressure
1600
increased by 100 psi,
Decreasing trend should
1400 (expected decreased);
Pump Pressure (psi)
have continued 2000
~39 bbl gain from 20:58
Flow Rate (gpm)
1200
Indication #1 to 21:08
1000 1500
800
1000
600
400
20:52-Flow starts 500
200
Cumulative Gain
0
0 39 300 0
bbl bbl bbl
20:45
20:50
20:55
21:00
21:05
21:10
21:15
21:20
21:25
21:30
21:35
1,017 psi
SOBM (mud)
Seawater
Influx
SOBM + seawater mix
21:08
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 20
21. Key Finding #4
The influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser
2000 3000
Flow Indications
Based on Real-time Data Flow indications:
Flow Out (calibrated)
1800
Flow In (rig pumps)
DP Press (rig pumps)
2500 #1: Drill pipe pressure
1600
increased by 100 psi,
Decreasing trend should
1400 (expected decreased);
Pump Pressure (psi)
have continued 2000
~39 bbl gain from 20:58
Flow Rate (gpm)
1200
Indication #1 to 21:08
1000 1500
800 #2: Drill pipe pressure
Indication #2 increased by 246 psi with
1000
600
Overboard line opened pumps off
400
20:52-Flow starts Flow out available only
500
to driller after 21:10 – Flow out does not
200
immediately drop
Cumulative Gain 0 39 300
0
bbl bbl bbl
0 after shutting down
20:45
20:50
20:55
21:00
21:05
21:10
21:15
21:20
21:25
21:30
21:35
pump
1,017 psi
1200 Normal Flow Back
1000 Flow Out
Flow Rate (gpm)
Flow In
800
SOBM (mud)
Seawater
600
Influx
SOBM + seawater mix
400
200
21:08
0
16:50
16:55
17:00
17:05
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 21
22. Key Finding #4
The influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser
2000 3000
Flow Indications
Based on Real-time Data Flow indications:
Flow Out (calibrated)
1800
Flow In (rig pumps)
DP Press (rig pumps)
2500 #1: Drill pipe pressure
1600
increased by 100 psi,
1400
Indication #3 (expected decreased);
Pump Pressure (psi)
2000
~39 bbl gain from 20:58
Flow Rate (gpm)
1200
Indication #1 to 21:08
1000 1500
800 #2: Drill pipe pressure
Indication #2 increased by 246 psi with
1000
600
pumps off
400
20:52-Flow starts 500
– Flow out does not
200
immediately drop
Cumulative Gain 0 39 300
0
bbl bbl bbl
0 after shutting down
20:45
20:50
20:55
21:00
21:05
21:10
21:15
21:20
21:25
21:30
21:35
pump
1,017 psi 1,200 psi
#3: Drill pipe pressure
increased by 556 psi with
pumps off; ~300 bbl gain
SOBM (mud)
Seawater
No well control actions taken
Influx
SOBM + seawater mix
21:08 21:31
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 22
23. Key Finding #5
Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well
Influx enters riser
3000 Based on Real-time Data First indication of well control response:
49 minutes and 1000 bbls after initial influx
Drill Pipe Presssure (psi)
2500 BOP
Mud shoots up derrick
Attempt to bleed -Diverter closed
pressure -BOP activated
2000
Explosion at 21:49
Close Drill Pipe
BOP Sealing
1500
Annular
Discussion about leaking
1000 “Differential Pressure”
- Mud and water raining onto deck
Mud overflowing
onto rig floor - TP calls WSL, getting mud back,
500 diverted to MGS, closed or was
Pumps shut down closing annular
Pressure increase due - AD calls Senior TP, Well blowing
0 to annular activation out, TP is shutting it in now
21:30
21:32
21:34
21:36
21:38
21:40
21:42
21:44
21:46
21:48
21:50
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 23
25. Diverting to the Mud Gas Separator at about 21:42
12” Vent When responding to a well control event
the riser diverter is closed and fluids
6” Vacuum
Breaker sent to either the mud gas separator or
Bursting Disk to the overboard diverter lines.
Diversion to the MGS
MGS Rated to 60 psi
working pressure Rig crew has the option to divert flow to
Rotary
Hose
Mud port/starboard overboard lines or the
System IBOP
MGS
Starboard
Diverter Overboard Diverting to port or starboard will result in
Starboard
fluids venting overboard
Port
Overboard 14” Diverter Line 14” Diverter Line Overboard
Slip Joint Rated to 100 or 500 psi Liquid outlet from MGS goes to the Mud
Overboard
Caisson Boost Kill
System under the main deck
Choke
BOP
Seawater
Seawater/Mud Mix
Influx
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 25
26. Gas flow to Surface at high rate: 21:46 to 22:00
12” Vent When responding to a well control event
the riser diverter is closed and fluids
6” Vacuum
Breaker sent to either the mud gas separator or
Bursting Disk to the overboard diverter lines.
Hydrocarbon flow from surface
MGS
equipment
Rotary
Hose
Mud
Instantaneous gas rates reached
System IBOP
165 mmscfd
Starboard
Diverter
Overboard Pressures exceeded operating ratings
(above 100 psi)
Port Starboard
Overboard 14” Diverter Line 14” Diverter Line Overboard
Gas would probably have vented from:
Slip Joint
Overboard
Caisson Boost Kill Slip joint packer into the moon pool
Choke 12” MGS “gooseneck” vent
BOP
6” MGS vacuum breaker vent
6” overboard line through burst disk
Seawater
10” mud line under the main deck
Seawater/Mud Mix
Influx
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 26
27. Gas Dispersion across the Deepwater Horizon 21:46 to 21:50 hrs
Animation of Gas Dispersion
Upper Explosive Limit
Lower Explosive Limit
3D View Cut Section Through Derrick Towards Aft
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 27
28. Secondary protective systems did not prevent ignition
Secondary protective systems are
designed to reduce the potential
consequence of an event once the
3D view primary protective systems have failed.
Fwd
Aft
Secondary Protective Systems
Gas cloud reached the supply air
intakes for engine rooms 3, 4, 5 & 6
The Fire and Gas system did not
automatically trigger a shutdown of the
HVAC system for the engine rooms
Limited areas of the rig are designated
as electrically classified zones
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 28
29. Key Finding #6
Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the
12” Vent
rig
6” Vacuum
Breaker When responding to a well control event
Bursting Disk the riser diverter is closed and fluids are
sent to either the mud gas separator or
to the overboard diverter lines.
MGS
Rotary
Hose Hydrocarbons were routed to the mud gas
Mud
System IBOP separator instead of diverting overboard
Starboard Resulted in rapid gas dispersion across
Diverter Overboard
the rig through the MGS vents and mud
system
Port Starboard
Overboard 14” Diverter Line 14” Diverter Line Overboard
Slip Joint
Overboard
Caisson Boost Kill
Choke
BOP
BOP
Sealed at
Seawater 21:47
Seawater/Mud Mix
Influx
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 29
30. Key Finding #7
The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition
Gas Dispersion at 4 minutes
Secondary protective systems are
designed to reduce the potential
(Upper Explosive Limit) consequence of an event once the
primary protective systems have
Aft failed.
Gas dispersion beyond electrically
classified areas
Section through derrick
3D view Gas ingress into engine rooms via main
(Lower Explosive Limit)
Fwd
deck air intakes
The on-line engines were one potential
source of ignition
Fwd
3D view
Aft
Aft
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 30
31. Emergency Well Control System
Did Not Seal the Well
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 31
32. Blowout Preventer (BOP)
BOP Control Panel
Surface HPU &
Accumulators Flex Joint LMRP
Upper Annular
Lower Annular
Stripping Element
Mux Cable
Hydraulic Conduit
LMRP
Accumulators
Blind Shear Ram
Blue Yellow
Control Control
Casing Shear Ram
Pod Pod (Non Sealing)
Upper VBR
Lower Stack Middle VBR
Accumulators Lower (Test) VBR
BOP
Stack
Emergency Methods of BOP Operation Available on DW Horizon Wellhead Connector
Manual Automatic ROV Intervention
Wellhead
HOT Stab
EDS
AMF AMF Sea Bed
HP BSR Close
Auto-shear
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 32
33. BOP Response (Before the Explosions)
BOP is designed to seal the wellbore and
20th
April shear casing or drill pipe if necessary.
21:38 – Hydrocarbons
enter the riser
April 20th
21:41 annular BOP closed but appears
Activation of
Upper Annular
Lower Annular BOP not to have sealed the annulus
Lower Annular
21:47 a VBR likely closed and sealed the
Stripping Element
annulus
Blind Shear Ram
Casing Shear Ram Activation of VBR
(Non Sealing)
Upper VBR
Middle VBR
Lower (Test) VBR
Wellhead Connector
Wellhead
Sea Bed Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 33
34. BOP Response (Impact of Explosions)
MUX cables provide electronic
communication and electrical power to
the BOP control pods.
April 20th
Damage to MUX cables and hydraulic line
Upper Annular
– Opening of annular BOP
Lower Annular
Annular BOP
Stripping Element gradually opens
Rig drifted off location
– Upward movement of the drill pipe in
the BOP
Blind Shear Ram
Casing Shear Ram
(Non Sealing)
Upper VBR
Middle VBR
Lower (Test) VBR
Wellhead Connector
Wellhead
Sea Bed Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 34
35. BOP Response (After the Explosions)
There are several emergency methods of
activating the BSR to seal the well.
April 20th
EDS attempts failed to activate BSR
Upper Annular
AMF sequence likely failed to activate BSR
Lower Annular
April 21st – 22nd
Stripping Element
BSR activated by ROV hot stab attempts to close BOP were
Auto-shear
ineffective
ROV simulated AMF function likely failed to
Blind Shear Ram activate BSR
Casing Shear Ram
(Non Sealing) ROV activated auto-shear appears to have
Upper VBR
activated but did not seal the well
Middle VBR
April 25th – May 5th
Lower (Test) VBR
Further ROV attempts using seabed
deployed accumulators were unsuccessful
Wellhead Connector
Wellhead
Sea Bed Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 35
36. Key Finding #8
The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well
Explosions & Fire: The AMF provides an automatic
Loss of communication means of closing the BSR without
Loss of electrical power crew intervention.
Loss of hydraulics
EDS function was inoperable due to
Damaged Hydraulic Conduit
damage to MUX cables
Damaged MUX Cable AMF could not activate the BSR due to
defects in both control pods
Auto-shear appears to have activated
Blue Yellow the BSR but did not seal the well
Control Control
Pod Pod
Potential weaknesses found in the
BOP testing regime and maintenance
management systems
Emergency Methods of BOP Operation Available on DW Horizon
Manual Automatic ROV Intervention
HOT Stab
EDS
AMF AMF
HP BSR Close
Auto-shear
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 36
37. Summary of Findings and
Recommendations
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 37
38. Recommendations
25 Recommendations Specific to the 8 Key Findings
BP Drilling Operating Practice and Management Systems
Engineering Technical Practices and Procedures
Further Enhance Deepwater Capability and Proficiency
Strengthen Rig Audit Action Closeout and Verification
Introduce Integrity Performance Management for Drilling and Wells Activities
Contractor and Service Provider Oversight and Assurance
Cementing Services
Drilling Contractor Well Control Practices and Proficiency
Oversight of Rig Safety Critical Equipment
BOP Configuration and Capability
BOP Minimum Criteria for Testing, Maintenance, System Modifications and Performance
Reliability
BP has accepted all the recommendations and is reviewing how best to implement across its
world wide operations
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 38
39. Summary of Key Findings
Well integrity was not established or failed
6 7 − Annulus cement barrier did not isolate hydrocarbons
1
3 5
− Shoe track barriers did not isolate hydrocarbons
2
Hydrocarbons entered the well undetected and
Riser
4 well control was lost
− Negative pressure test was accepted although well
3
8
integrity had not been established
BOP
Sea Floor − Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in
4
riser
− Well control response actions failed to regain control of
5
Casing
well
Hydrocarbons ignited on the Deepwater Horizon
− Diversion to mud gas separator resulted in gas venting
6
onto rig
− Fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon
7
ignition
Blowout preventer did not seal the well
1
Reservoir − Blowout preventer (BOP) emergency modes did not
8
seal well
2 Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 39