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![Alice p=5 q=7 n = 35
φ(n) = 4*6=24
e = 5; d: ed = 5d =1 mod 24 ;
=> d = 5
Public key: (n=35, e=5)
Private key: d=5
M = [0, n-1] For all m Є M
R(m)=m m = 26; R(m) = 26
s = 265 mod 35 = 31
message
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message signature
Signer’s private key
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Signer’s public key
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Ok / not Ok](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/cybersecurityppt-190814034501/85/Cyber-securityppt-27-320.jpg)
Uploaded bySachin Roy
Cyber securityppt
This document discusses automotive cyber security. It begins by outlining the evolution of automotive technology and the increased connectivity of modern vehicles. This connectivity introduces new security challenges as vehicles can be attacked remotely by hackers. The document then classifies different types of attackers and attacks, including logical and physical attacks. It discusses methods for secure component identification using cryptography and physically unclonable functions. The document also covers secure software initialization, updates, and architectures. Finally, it discusses secure vehicular communication.
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Cyber securityppt
- 1. Presented by : AUTOMOTIVE CYBERSECURITY 1
- 2. Table of contents •Automotive Evolution • Security challenges for connected cars • Classification of Attackers in the automotive • Classification of vehicular attacks • Secure Component Identification • Vehicular Software Protection – Secure Software Initialization – Software Security Architectures – Secure Software Updates • Secure Vehicular Communication 2
- 3. Phases of AutomotiveEvolution 3
- 4. Innovation in Automotive Advancedrive assistant system (ADAS) Smart lighting control. Adaptive cruise control Collision avoidance Parking assist. Smart transportation Traffic congestion. Vehicle-to- infrastructure and vehicle-to-vehicle communication. Traffic line control. Advance flee management Usage and behaviour monitoring Real-time telemetric Package tracking Autonomous driving Decisive goal is to made driverless cars with zero fatalities or collisions. 4
- 5. 5 With cars incorporatingup to 100 ECUs, approaching the upper boundaries of the wiring harness, So the industry is moving towards greater integration, virtualization, reducing the total number of ECUs, increasing the number of functions, Increasing complexity of the software.
- 6. 6 All these electronicfunctions bring great benefits to the driver, increasing comfort, convenience, safety and efficiency. Wireless interfaces connect the in-vehicle systems of these ‘Connected Cars’ to external networks e.g. internet, enhancing consumer experience by enabling new features and services. Connectivity also makes the Connected Car vulnerable to hackers who attack the vehicle by seeking and exploiting weaknesses in its computer systems or networks.
- 7. Security challenges forAutomotive New Features ECall systems bring rapid assistance to motorists involved in a collision Car owners may want to chip-tune their engine, to increase performance of the engine. The OBD-II port offers diagnostic and reporting capabilities. Autonomous Emergency Braking systems Car sharing systems allow access to a vehicle via a smart card or mobile device. Automated Vehicle Identification allows the car to identify itself for seamless access to a parking or a toll road. If not protected well, a thief might be able to abuse this system to gain access to the vehicle. Attackers may use it to gain access to the in-vehicle network, potentially even remotely. When not protected, hackers could steal for example personal data including payment details. You don’t want third parties to get access to this personal data. it should not be possible for hackers to activate this system by sending fake V2X messages to a vehicle Threats OEMs may want to protect against such manipulation by the vehicle owner.
- 8. Attacker 1 Internal Class 1 Attacker2 Internal Class 2 Attacker 3 Internal Class3 Attacker E0 External Class 0 Exemplary attackers Driver, Owner Motor mechanics, Backyard garage Organized crime, Rival, academia Thief, V2I or V2V mischief Physical Access Limited to resp. skills Extensive, but not unlimited Virtually unlimited None or only very limited Technical Resources Generally low Medium to high Very high Varies, usually low to medium Knowledge Resources Generally low Medium to high Very high Varies, but can be high Financial Resources low Medium Very high Generally low Reliable Protection Mostly feasible Varies, but still feasible Only by econ. Mostly feasible Potential attackers in the automotive domain classified according to their access perimeter, technical and knowledge resources
- 9. 9 According to accessperimeter of attacker, vehicular attacks can be classified in:- 1.logical attacks: Attacks via logical interface and external communication, include active as well as passive encroachments. 2.Physical attacks: By direct attacking the hardware to- 1. Access internal secrets (Crpt. Key). 2. Disable (physically) security measures. 3. Introduce physical signals to do enable further attacks.
- 10. Logical Attacks Cryptographic Attacks: Tried to break the security of IT systems while exploiting potential conceptual weaknesses or while just “brute forcing” the underlying cryptography of cryptographic algorithms or (cryptographic) protocols. Software Attacks : Software attacks particularly exploit flaws and vulnerabilities in design or implementation3 such as: 1. Integer 2. Heap or buffer overflows 3. Race conditions or infinite loops 4. Corrupting input and output data 5. Dependency corruption 6. Resources exhaustion 7. Enforcing restarts or resets. Communication attacks: These Attacks on vehicular communication are probably the primary challenge for the most future VC-based applications. Comprise active and passive attacks on all communication channels accessible by the respective attacker.
- 11. 11 Physical Attacks Monitoring andside channel attack :Mean the passive, noninvasive interception and examination of all channels susceptible to the attacker that allow him to breach the security of the respective device Denial of Service Attacks : Physical denial of service attacks refer to active, invasive and non-invasive attacks on the physical availability while preventing or considerably delaying access to critical resources, communication, or functionality. Fault attacks or perturbation attacks are active, non-invasive attacks that expose the respective attack target to an anomalous operating environment to induce faults that could disrupt or modify the execution of some critical instructions. Penetration Attacks : Penetration attacks are active, invasive attacks that intercept internal communications, readout internal memories, or monitor any internal processing behavior to discover internal structures, secrets, and functionality. Modification Attacks Communication attacks
- 12. Secure Component Identification Cryptographic ComponentIdentification Physically Unclonable Functions
- 13. Wireless or Wired Communicatio n Module CryptographicComponent Identification Abstract view of a vehicle in a (Secure vehicular communication system) Central Processing Module Credentials and Cryptographic keys Unique Identity Vehicle Component Credential Certificate
- 14. Cryptographic Component Identification(Procedure) Secret Vehicle Key Central Processing Module Vehicle Component Credential Certificate (Cryptographic TAG) Certification Check during component Installation Secret Vehicle Key Central Processing Module Vehicle Component Credential Certificate (Cryptographic TAG) Secret Vehicle Key Central Processing Module Vehicle Component Credential Certificate (Cryptographic TAG)Security Key to signal component legitimacy Successful Certification check Phase Component Installation Vehicle Operation Component Removal Procedure Verification of the Establishment of the Check for the Deletion of the
- 15. Component Identification using(PUF) PUF is a function that maps a set of challenges to a set of responses based on an intractably complex physical system. Due to smallest individual physical differences of every physical device, even identical circuits based on identical layouts provide a very individual and unpredictable response for the same challenge.
- 16. Process for generationof Cryptographic key Using (PUF) In initialization step, 1. An output is generated from the PUF circuit 2. The error correcting syndrome for that output is computed and saved for later. 3. syndrome and this bit vector are public information and can be stored anywhere (on-chip, off-chip, or remotely on a server).
- 17. Key Regeneration Stepsusing PUF: 1. The PUF first produces an output from the circuit. 2. the PUF uses the syndrome from the initialization step to correct any changes in the circuit output. 3. The output of the error correcting code (ECC) can be simply hashed down to a desired length and used as a cryptographic key.
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- 19. 1. Integrity. 2. Simple,Fast. 3. Protected Reference. 1. Integrity. 2. Authenticity. 3. Simple, Fast. 4. Shared Secret. 1. Integrity. 2. Authenticity. 3. Non-repudiation. 4. Adequate security. 5. Quite slow & complex. 1. Authenticity. 2. Integrity. 3. Non-repudiation. 4. Freshness 5. Maximum Security. 6. Most costly and inflexible MAC Digital signature Physical protection Secure Software Initialization methods non-repudiation Authenticity unauthorized modifications are detectable unauthorized modifications are infeasible Hash function Secure Software Initialization Characteristics
- 20. • A hashfunction is a mathematical, efficiently computable function that has fixed size output: – E.g., H : {0,1}* {0,1}160 – Input is called “message”, output is “digest” Hash function MAC Digital signature Physical protection
- 21. Cryptographic Hash Functions& properties Name Digest length Basic unit of processing Number of steps Maximum message size MD5 128 bits 512 bits 64 (4 rounds of 16) infinity SHA-1 160 bits 512 bits 80 (4 rounds of 20) 2^64-1 bits RIPEMD- 160 160 bits 512 bits 160 (5 [paired rounds of 16) infinity Deterministic Quick to compute the hash value Infeasible to generate a message from its hash value Small change to a message should change the hash value Infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash value
- 22. Message Digest 5(MD5) Variable length message Divided in 512 Blocks 16 *32 bit words Padding Original Message 1 0 0 0 0 64 bit represent length of the message 4. Input message is "padded" (extended) its length (in bits) equals to 448 mod 512. 2. At least one bit and at most 512 bits are appended. 1. A single "1" bit is appended to the message. 3. Last 64 bit represent length of the message
- 23. MD5 consists of64 of these operations, grouped in four rounds of 16 operations. F is a nonlinear function; one function is used in each round. Mi denotes a 32-bit block of the message input, and Ki denotes a 32-bit constant, different for each operation. “S” denotes a left bit rotation by s places, “S” varies for each operation. denotes addition modulo 232. denotes addition modulo 232. 64 bit 128 bit MD5 Algorithm
- 24. Hash function MAC Digital signature Physical protection DefinitionMAC defined over (K, M, T) is a pair of algorithms (E, D):E(k, m): returns a message authentication code t which belongs to a set T D(k, m, t): returns a value true or false depending on the correctness of the received authentication code Where : M is a set of all possible messages m, K is a set of all possible keys k, T is a set of all possible authentication codes t
- 25. The following Blockdiagram present RCBC MAC algorithm
- 26. Hash function MAC Digital signature Physical protection • Usedto provide – Data integrity – Message authentication – Non-repudiation RSA (Digital signature algorithm ) • Developed in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) • Most popular public key cryptosystem • Based on the hard problem of “integer factorization” Key-Generation for RSA(1) 1. Generate two large random distinct primes p and q, each roughly the same size 2. Compute n = pq and 3. Select random integer e: 2. Compute unique integer d: 2. Public key is (n, e); Private key is d. ( ) ( 1)( 1)n p qφ = − − 1 , such that gcd( , ) 1e eφ φ< < = 1 , such that 1modd edφ φ< < =
- 27. Alice p=5 q=7n = 35 φ(n) = 4*6=24 e = 5; d: ed = 5d =1 mod 24 ; => d = 5 Public key: (n=35, e=5) Private key: d=5 M = [0, n-1] For all m Є M R(m)=m m = 26; R(m) = 26 s = 265 mod 35 = 31 message Signing algorithm message signature Signer’s private key Unsecured channel Signer Signature verification algorithm Signer’s public key Verifier Ok / not Ok
- 28. 28 Hardware-protected software initialization enforces: 1. Integrity, 2.Authenticity, 3. Non-repudiation. Tamper- Evidence Tamper-Resistance Tamper-Detection Tamper- Response Physical Protection or Tamper protection Hash function MAC Digital signature Physical protection
- 29. Varifiable Initialization (TCG) Trusted Computing Group : An organization formed to develop, define, and promote open standards for hardware-enabled trusted computing and security technologies, including hardware building blocks and software interfaces, across multiple platforms, peripherals, and devices. Most Important Components of TCG is: 1. Trusted Platform Module (TPM). 2. Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM), a kind of (protected pre-BIOS (Basic I/O System). 3. Trust Software Stack (TSS), which is the software interface to provide TC functionalities to the Operating system. TPM (Trusted Platform Module): a tamper-resistant hardware module mounted in a platform. Responsible for: measurement, root of trust, storage, reporting and policy enforcement, No direct memory access, Protected TPM chip
- 30. 3030 Execution Engine (8- Bit/16 BituC) I/O (33MHz LPC bus) Volatile Memory PCR (>=16 *160 Bit) RAM (~8kB, secure execution) Non-volatile Memory ROM (~64Kb, Firmware, certificate) EEPROM (~16kB,Owner secret, user data, SRK, EK, counters) Monotonic Counters (>= 4*32 Bit) Tampering Sensors (U, f, Shield, reset) Asymmetric Key Generation Asymmetric Crypto Engine (RSA >= 2048 Bit) TRNG (>=256 Bit per call) Hash Engine (SHA-1, HMAC) Internal Structure of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) according to the recent TCG specification
- 31. The Core Rootof Trust for Measurement (CRTM) • The CRTM is the first piece of code that executes on a platform at boot time. (I.e. Bios or Bios BootBlock in an IA-32 platform) • It must be trusted to properly report to the TPM what software executes after it. • Only authorized entities must be able to reflash the CRTM… (those that vouch for its behavior) The Authenticated boot process CRTM and TPM during the boot process
- 32. Trusted Software Stack32 •TSS enables application development and interoperability – Supply one entry point for applications to the TPM functionality – Provides synchronized access to the TPM – Hide building command streams with appropriate byte ordering and alignment from applications – Manage TPM resources • Several implementations available – IBM – Infineon – NTRU – Open Source (TrouSerS) Application CSP Cryptographic API TSS Service Services TSS SPI TPM Devices Driver TSS Core Services TSS CSI TPM Device Driver Library TPM DDLI
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- 34. Software Security Architecture •Enables a single computing device to securely run multiple process in parallel by sharing of resources. • Provide runtime isolation. • Subsystem, components can communicate only via strictly controlled communication channel. • Different types of security architectures are: 1. Virtualized security architecture. 2. Hardware isolated architecture. 3. Monolithic security architecture. 34
- 35. Virtualized Security Architecture •A small security kernel act as control instance between vehicular hardware and actual application. • Kernel provides strong separation of resources and implements elementary security mechanisms. 35 Virtualized vehicular security architecture Security Software layer Application Layer Separation layer Hardware layer
- 36. 36 Security Software layer Hardwarelayer • Conventional hardware and dedicated cryptographic microchip securely attached to the vehicular hardware. • It provides fundamental security-critical functions: 1. Cryptographic operation (encryption, decryption or hashing). 2. Secure timing. 3. Secure random number generation. •During start-up, this layer could enable the verifiable or secure initialization by cryptography the corresponding boot strapping process. • Provide Strong isolation between applications, components or subsystems. •Communication will be only via strictly controlled communication channel. •Appropriate resources management interface and enforce effective access control policy.
- 37. 37 Application Layer Separation layer •Providesecurity functionalities on more abstract level. •It uses the functionality offered by separation layer. •Provide elementary security mechanism such as secure storage or secure communication. •Multiple legacy operating systems can be executed concurrently, but strongly isolated. •Communication between applications as well as potential I/O are depends on the conditions of the effective security policy enforced by the underlying kernel. •Provides all services and application that are not security critical.
- 38. Hardware isolated architecture. •Relay on particular hardware isolation mechanism such as ARM trust zone Technology. • In this architecture additional hardware mechanism built in, it virtually provide additional secure execution environment. 38 • Processor can switch from the legacy environment (non secure world) to a virtual security environment (secure world), each world operates independently. • Communication between two world only possible by calling a privileged instruction from the non-secure kernel. Hardware isolated vehicular security architecture by ARM TrustZone Technology
- 39. Monolithic Security Architecture. •Its for isolated security applications, employ hardware dedicatedly. • The security kernel only provides only basic resources management services. • Monolithic applications that themselves include all necessary resource management and security mechanism could even completely omit a separate security kernel, running on top of the monolithic application. 39 Dedicated monolithic vehicular security architecture
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- 41. 41 Software updates inautomotive Essential for vehicle OEMs: • To manage the software efficiently over the lifecycle of the vehicle. • To provide improvements in performance. • To deliver corrections to faulty software that endanger lives or the environment.
- 42. 42 OEMs is usingSoftware OTA for software updates because: 1. Saves on recall caused by software bugs. 2. Implement into vehicle’s network with as little changes as possible. 3. Cost reduction as compared to manually recall and updating. Challenges in OTA software update: 1. Cloud connection are active all the time and thus OTA interfaces are potentially accessible for hackers. 2. Provide doors for attacks to permanent endanger the operation of vehicles like functional changes, tuning, Trojans. 3. Potential to attack vehicles is threatening Tier1s, OEMs and politicians.
- 43. Evolutionary Software OTAFlow (Software Development to Vehicle Reboot) 43 Release new software version Formatting for update handling Service pack at OEM’s update server Transport Via INTERNET Over The Air – Telematics unit TCU › Receive and decrypt from secure wireless protocol Download service pack › Check OEM authenticity › Setup encryption services › Stored in vehicles central storage › Verify data › Unpack for ECUs Updating the vehicle i.e. using UDS › Start UDS programming session › Send service packs to ECUs in blocks using UDS protocol. Update inside ECUs: Secure Flash Bootloader and HSM › Erase Flash › Decrypt and unzip blocks (E2E protection) › Write new code into Flash › Update and verify signatures (HASH) Reboot the vehicle with new SW versions › Exit update mode › Restart all ECUs within the car. Safety responsibility: -Vehicle protection and safety responsibility. -ECU-IP protection and safety responsibility. -Secure update service. -Secure Flash Boot Loader.
- 44. Secure Software updatebased on Digital Signature 44 Software Development Digital Signature Program code OEM Trust Centre Signature PC Secret Key Flash Tool OEM Certificate ECU Security Module Public Key OEM’s DATABASE Steps for secure software update by means of digital signature: 1. Software development. 2. Software is signed at the OEM’s trust, it is protected environment, employs the OEM’s secret key to authenticate authorized software by creating digital signature. 3. Signature is append to the software. 4. Signature and software stored in the OEM’s database for distribution. 5. Now signed software can be loaded into the prospective flashing tool. Flashing tool itself can be authenticate. 6. ECU can verify the loaded software for integrity and authenticity by verifying signature.
- 45. Certificate Validation of vehicle configuration SecureSoftware update based on Trusted Computing 45 Certificate Generation And asymmetric key Current vehicle hardware and software configuration Vehicle User Content Provider Content Binding Bound & encrypted content Private Key Public Key Uses public key to establish trusted channel Trusted channel configuration Yes Decryption and installation
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