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Chapter 7
Risk Based Approach
The Presentation Slides for Teaching
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing
Website : https://sites.google.com/site/quanrisk
E-mail : quanrisk@gmail.com
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
Declaration
 Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited.
 All rights reserved. No part of this presentation file may be
reproduced, in any form or by any means, without written
permission from CapitaLogic Limited.
 Authored by Dr. LAM Yat-fai (林日辉),
Director, CapitaLogic Limited,
Adjunct Professor of Finance, City University of Hong Kong,
Doctor of Business Administration,
CFA, CAIA, CAMS, CFE, FRM, PRM, MCSE, MCNE.
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 2
What is risk based approach?
 You know that you have to
do something
 You do not know
 what to do
 how to do
 how much to do
 But, the HKMA’s high
priority AML task in 2018
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 3
Outline
 What is risk?
 Money laundering risk
 AMLO risk
 Guideline risk
 Customer profile risk
 Risk stereotyping approach
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 4
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
1 November 2002 to 21 July 2003
Country Inflection Death Death rate (%)
China 5,328 349 6.55
Hong Kong 1,755 299 17.04
Taiwan 346 37 10.69
Canada 251 44 17.53
Singapore 238 33 13.87
Others 355 13 3.66
Total 8,273 775 9.37
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 5
Human influenza
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 6
Infectious disease risk
SARS
Human
influenza
Inflection rate →
Deathrate→
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 7
Wuhan coronavirus
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 8
Changing faces of
money laundering risk
 Risk measure
 Expected loss
 Risk dimension
 Loss amount
 Failure frequency
 Risk stereotyping
 Country
 Clientele
 Service
 Delivery channel
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 9
Risk
 There is a reasonable expectation of a future event
 e.g. You will pass this course by attending eight classes
and submitting an 1,000 word assignment
 The uncertainty of this reasonable expectation
 e.g. You fail in this course
 NOT a reasonable expectation
 e.g. You will pass this course without submitting an
assignment
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 10
Dart board
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 11
Basel III framework on
operational risk measurement
Failure frequency →
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
Lossamount→
12
Modelling of a ML event
Criminal
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
Laundering trades
Money laundering instrument
13
Components of a business event
Customer
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
Transactions
Financial service
14
Money laundering risk and controls
ML risk
Financial
service
Service
level
Anonymity
Customer
profile
Country Race
Industry Profession
Family
Other closely
connected
parties
Transactions
Distance to
suspicious
scenario
Distance to
norm
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 15
Money laundering risk controls
 Money laundering risk controls
 More limitations to use a financial service
 Higher threshold to accept customer
 Lower threshold to submit a STR to the JFIU
 Combinations of the above three
 NOT money laundering risk controls
 Enhanced customer due diligence
 Improve the accuracy of estimating a criminal
 Close and/or ongoing monitoring
 Reduce the deviation of the customer risk level
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 16
Personal risk controls
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 17
Instrument
Criminal
Reporting
threshold
真假周潤發
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 18
A risk based
AML compliance programme
 The single most important instrument in an
AML compliance programme
 Most FIs do not use the risk based approach
smartly
 Extremely
experience oriented
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 19
Issues of risk based approach
 Subjective
 No uniform standard among different
 Industries
 Financial sectors
 FIs in the same financial sector
 Principal agent problem between a regulator
and a FI
 A two-man game between a regulator and a FI
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 20
Risks facing FIs
 Money laundering risk
 Suspicious transaction reporting
 AMLO risk
 Know your customer
 Record keeping
 Guideline risk
 AML compliance programme
 Customer profile risk
 Chance of being a criminal
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 21
Outline
 What is risk?
 Money laundering risk
 AMLO risk
 Guideline risk
 Customer profile risk
 Risk stereotyping approach
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 22
Court’s judgment of guilty principles
 Balance of probability (BOP)
 Both prosecutor and defendant exhibit their facts
 More than 50% facts suggest that a person has violated an
ordinance
 A more than 50% requirement
 Civil litigation
 Beyond reasonable doubt (BRD)
 Prosecutor has to prove the guilty of the defendant
 All major facts suggest that a person has violated an ordinance
 No reasonable doubt
 A strong requirement
 Criminal litigation
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 23
Judgment procedure
 List the facts independently
 From both the prosecutor and defendant
 Cite the ordinance
 Highlight the legal elements
 Technical debate (for criminal litigation only)
 List the reasonable doubts from the facts against the key elements
 Judgment
 Compare the facts with the legal elements
 Chance of being guilty
 By default, innocence
 If chance > 50%, guilty under the BOP
 If chance → 100%, guilty under the BRD
 If guilty under the BRD, then must be guilty under the BOP
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 24
Money laundering (洗錢)
 An act intended to have the effect of making any
property
 that is the proceeds obtained from the commission of
an indictable offence under the laws of Hong Kong;
or
 of any conduct which if it had occurred in Hong Kong
would constitute an indictable offence under the laws
of Hong Kong; or
 that in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
represents such proceeds, not to appear to be or
so represent such proceeds
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 25
Money laundering risk
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
 The criminal risk of a FI arising from
participating in ML activities
 either knowingly or not knowingly
 By default, in case a ML transaction is
discovered to be processed by a FI, the FI is
deemed to have participated knowingly in the
ML transaction unless the FI can prove that its
participation on not knowingly basis
26
The worst situation for a FI
 A customer conducted ML activities through a FI
 These ML activities were investigated by the police
according to the DTRPO and/or OSCO
 The court judged that the customer had conducted ML
activities, subject to the principle of beyond reasonable
doubt
 Criminal litigation
 Convicted
 The FI had not submitted the STR before the
investigation
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 27
Suspicious transaction reporting
 List all the objective facts showing
 ML activities vs regular activates
 Screen, Ask, Find
 If more facts on ML activities
 Submit a STR to the JFIU
 Evaluate
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 28
Example 1.1 – Sanctions list matching
ML activities
 Highlighted by sanctions list
matching system
Regular activities
 Overseas company search
report shows counterparty
details different from those
on the sanctions record
 Customer confirms the
details of the counterparty
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 29
Example 1.2 – Sanctions list matching
ML activities
 Highlighted by sanctions list
matching system
 Overseas company search
report unavailable for the
counterparty
 Customer does not confirm
the details of the
counterparty
Regular activities
 Customer shows similar
transactions in another bank
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 30
Example 1.3 – Sanctions list matching
ML activities
 Highlighted by sanctions list
matching system
 Customer does not confirm
the details of the
counterparty
Regular activities
 Overseas company search
report shows counterparty
details different from those
on the sanctions record
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 31
Example 2.1 – Transaction monitoring
ML activities
 Highlighted by transaction
monitoring system
 Many small incoming
transactions
 A few large out going
transactions afterwards
Regular activities
 Customer advises that these
are group order transactions
 Customer shows the group
order webpage
 Customer conducted similar
transactions before
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 32
Example 2.2 – Transaction monitoring
ML activities
 Highlighted by transaction
monitoring system
 Many small incoming
transactions
 A few large out going
transactions afterwards
 Customer has no similar
transactions before
 Customer refuse to provide
any sales and marketing
information
Regular activities
 Customer advises that these
are group order transactions
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 33
Example 2.3 – Transaction monitoring
ML activities
 Highlighted by transaction
monitoring system
 Many small incoming
transactions
 A few large out going
transactions afterwards
 Customer has no similar
transactions before
Regular activities
 Customer advises that these
are group order transactions
 Customer shows the group
order webpage recently in
action two weeks ago
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 34
Advantages of
the BOP based approach
 Strong theoretical basis
 Sound legal practices
 Easy to formalize into procedure
 Inline with the JFIU’s SAFE approach
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 35
The role of profitability
More facts to
support regular
activities
STR
ML activities →
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
Profitability→
36
Outline
 What is risk?
 Money laundering risk
 AMLO risk
 Guideline risk
 Customer profile risk
 Risk stereotyping approach
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 37
AMLO risk
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
 The risk of disciplinary actions to a FI as a result of
violating the AMLO
 Know your customer
 Record keeping
 Small financial penalty
 But strong negative impact to reputation
 AML regulator assesses a violation using the principle
of beyond reasonable doubt
 AML and CTF Tribunal judges a violation using the
principle of balance of probability
38
State bank of India Hong Kong Branch
 Failed to
 Carry out the customer due diligence measures set out in
sections 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) of Schedule 2 to the AMLO
before establishing business relationships with 28 corporate
customers;
 Continuously monitor its business relationships with its
customers;
 Establish and maintain effective procedures for determining
whether its customers or beneficial owners of its customers
were politically exposed persons; and
 Establish effective procedures to ensure compliance with
the specified provisions in sections 3 and 5 of Schedule 2 to
the AMLO.
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 39
Coutts Hong Kong
 Failed to establish and maintain effective procedures
for
 determining whether its customers or the beneficial owners
of its customers were politically exposed persons;
 obtaining senior management approval to continue a
business relationship with a customer after Coutts Hong
Kong had come to know that the customer or a beneficial
owner of the customer was a PEP; and
 Failed to identify PEPs despite relevant information
being publicly available and to follow up promptly on
PEP alerts received from a commercially available
database to which Coutts Hong Kong subscribed.
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 40
Shanghai Commercial Bank
 In summary, Shanghai Commercial Bank did not:
 continuously monitor its business relationship with 33 customers by
examining the background and purposes of their transactions that were
identified as (i) complex, unusually large in amount or of an unusual
pattern and (ii) having no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and
setting out its findings in writing
 establish and maintain effective procedures for the purpose of carrying
out its duty under section 5 of Schedule 2 to the AMLO to continuously
monitor business relationships; and
 carry out customer due diligence measures in respect of certain pre-
existing customers when a transaction took place with regard to each of
the customers that (i) was, by virtue of the amount or nature of the
transaction, unusual or suspicious, or (ii) was not consistent with
SCOM’s knowledge of the customer or the customer’s business or risk
profile, or with its knowledge of the source of the customer’s funds.
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 41
JPMorgan Chase Bank
 In summary, JPMorgan Hong Kong did not establish and maintain effective
procedures:
 for the purpose of carrying out its CDD duties. JPMorgan Hong Kong’s CDD procedures for
certain customers did not require (i) certificates of incumbency or comparable documents to be
obtained to verify their existence, and (ii) the identities of beneficial owners to be verified.
JPMorgan Hong Kong failed to carry out all relevant CDD requirements before establishing
business relationships with certain customers;
 for the purpose of carrying out its duties to continuously monitor business relationships. As
regards groups of related customers, JPMorgan Hong Kong’s procedures did not require a
periodic review to be conducted of a customer’s CDD information if a periodic review had
been conducted in respect of another customer in the same group. As a result, JPMorgan Hong
Kong failed to carry out periodic reviews of certain customers within relationship groups to
ensure that the documents, data and information obtained by JPMorgan Hong Kong were up-to-
date and relevant. Among 495 high risk customers in such relationship groups, 259 customers
were not subject to annual review; and
 for identifying and handling wire transfers which did not comply with the requirement to
include the originator’s name in the message or payment form accompanying the wire transfer.
JPMorgan Hong Kong carried out a number of outgoing wire transfers without including the
names of the originators in the relevant SWIFT messages.
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 42
AMLO compliance –
Principle of balance of probability
 List all the facts on KYC and record keeping
showing
 Fully compliant
 Partially compliant
 Not compliant
 If less than 50% of facts show fully compliant
 Re-work the KYC and/or record keeping
programme
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 43
AMLO compliance assessment
Fully compliant Partially compliant Not compliant
Policies and procedures
reviewed and updated
within one year
Policies and procedures
reviewed and updated
several years ago
No policies and/or
procedures
KYC programme reviewed
by independent
professional firms within
one year
KYC programme reviewed
by operational risk
management before
No review on KYC
programme
Transaction records audited
by internal audit within one
year
Transaction records
reviewed by the IT
department before
No review on transaction
records
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 44
Outline
 What is risk?
 Money laundering risk
 AMLO risk
 Guideline risk
 Customer profile risk
 Risk stereotyping approach
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 45
Guideline risk
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
 The risk of a supervisory examination finding on a FI
as a result of not complying with any details in AML
related guidelines
 For all major AML related topics
 No criminal or reputation consequence
 But too many non-compliance on KYC and/or record
keeping may results investigation from regulatory
enforcement
 AML regulator assesses a non-compliance using
common sense and/or industry practices approach
46
AML guidelines compliance –
Common sense approach
 List all the facts on an AML compliance
programme showing
 Fully compliant
 Partially compliant
 Not compliant
 Classify all partially or not compliant into
 Higher priority
 Medium priority
 Lower priority
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 47
AML guidelines compliance –
Common sense approach
 Classify all mitigation actions into
 Higher cost
 Medium cost
 Lower cost
 Implement the mitigation actions immediately for
the items
 Not compliant, higher priority and lower cost
 Implement the mitigation actions later for the
items
 Partially compliant, lower priority and higher cost
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 48
Regulatory expectation management
 Demonstrate improvement instead of
perfection
 Willing to be pin pointed by regulators
 Design strategically imperfect AML
compliance program
 Show action plan instead of corrective action
results
 Prioritize corrective actions
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 49
Regulatory relationship management
 Handle regulators as peers instead of superiors
 Senior management never entertain front line
regulators directly
 Never submit requested information to regulators
before due dates
 Use e-mail as the primary communications channel
with regulators
 Keep all communications records with regulators
 Ask regulator “Yes” or “No” instead of open end
questions
 Never commit in written support of any regulatory
initiatives
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 50
Outline
 What is risk?
 Money laundering risk
 AMLO risk
 Guideline risk
 Customer profile risk
 Risk stereotyping approach
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 51
Money laundering risk and controls
ML risk
Financial
service
Service
level
Anonymity
Customer
profile
Country Race
Industry Profession
Family
Other closely
connected
parties
Transactions
Distance to
suspicious
scenario
Distance to
norm
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 52
Customer profile risk
 The chance of a customer to be connected to
criminal activities
 Assess through the KYC
 The most frequently referred risk by the phase
“risk based approach”
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 53
Customer profile risk
Lower chance
 Less sensitive sanctions list
matching algorithm
 Higher threshold to result
outliers through transaction
monitoring
 Fewer layers of KYC in a
corporation's shareholder chain
 No direct participation of KYC
from the compliance function
 Less frequent compliance
review
Higher chance
 More sensitive sanctions list
matching algorithm
 Lower threshold to result
outliers through transaction
monitoring
 More layers of KYC in a
corporation's shareholder chain
 Review of KYC from the
compliance function
 Annual compliance review
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 54
Outline
 What is risk?
 Money laundering risk
 AMLO risk
 Guideline risk
 Customer profile risk
 Risk stereotyping approach
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 55
Risk stereotyping
 A one dimensional risk assessment approach based on
several isolated risk factors
 Lower predictive power
 Recent example in the United States
 Since many terrorists are connected to Islamic countries
 Therefore people from Islamic countries are higher risk
 In fact, most people from Islamic countries are not terrorists
 Practices used in the AML guideline
 Layering of risk stereotyping as a risk compensation
 When a risk stereotyping system results a higher risk, use a more
comprehensive risk stereotyping system to re-assess the risk
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 56
Risk stereotyping factors
 Country
 Clientele
 Service
 Delivery channel
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 57
Country
Iran, Syria,
North Korea
Thailand, Vietnam,
Philippines
U.S., U.K.,
Singapore
ChanceofML→
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 58
Clientele
Correspondent banking
Private banking
Corporate banking
Commercial banking
SME banking
Retail banking
ChanceofML→
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 59
Service
Project finance
Trade finance
FX trading
Equity trading
Deposits
Personal loans
ChanceofML→
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 60
Delivery channel
Agency services
Internet banking
Branch offices
ChanceofML→
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 61
Reference
 Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorist Financing (for Authorized
Institutions) (Oct 2018)
Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 62

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Chapter 7 risk based approach

  • 1. Chapter 7 Risk Based Approach The Presentation Slides for Teaching Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Website : https://sites.google.com/site/quanrisk E-mail : quanrisk@gmail.com Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited
  • 2. Declaration  Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited.  All rights reserved. No part of this presentation file may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without written permission from CapitaLogic Limited.  Authored by Dr. LAM Yat-fai (林日辉), Director, CapitaLogic Limited, Adjunct Professor of Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Doctor of Business Administration, CFA, CAIA, CAMS, CFE, FRM, PRM, MCSE, MCNE. Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 2
  • 3. What is risk based approach?  You know that you have to do something  You do not know  what to do  how to do  how much to do  But, the HKMA’s high priority AML task in 2018 Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 3
  • 4. Outline  What is risk?  Money laundering risk  AMLO risk  Guideline risk  Customer profile risk  Risk stereotyping approach Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 4
  • 5. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 1 November 2002 to 21 July 2003 Country Inflection Death Death rate (%) China 5,328 349 6.55 Hong Kong 1,755 299 17.04 Taiwan 346 37 10.69 Canada 251 44 17.53 Singapore 238 33 13.87 Others 355 13 3.66 Total 8,273 775 9.37 Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 5
  • 6. Human influenza Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 6
  • 7. Infectious disease risk SARS Human influenza Inflection rate → Deathrate→ Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 7
  • 8. Wuhan coronavirus Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 8
  • 9. Changing faces of money laundering risk  Risk measure  Expected loss  Risk dimension  Loss amount  Failure frequency  Risk stereotyping  Country  Clientele  Service  Delivery channel Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 9
  • 10. Risk  There is a reasonable expectation of a future event  e.g. You will pass this course by attending eight classes and submitting an 1,000 word assignment  The uncertainty of this reasonable expectation  e.g. You fail in this course  NOT a reasonable expectation  e.g. You will pass this course without submitting an assignment Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 10
  • 11. Dart board Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 11
  • 12. Basel III framework on operational risk measurement Failure frequency → Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited Lossamount→ 12
  • 13. Modelling of a ML event Criminal Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited Laundering trades Money laundering instrument 13
  • 14. Components of a business event Customer Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited Transactions Financial service 14
  • 15. Money laundering risk and controls ML risk Financial service Service level Anonymity Customer profile Country Race Industry Profession Family Other closely connected parties Transactions Distance to suspicious scenario Distance to norm Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 15
  • 16. Money laundering risk controls  Money laundering risk controls  More limitations to use a financial service  Higher threshold to accept customer  Lower threshold to submit a STR to the JFIU  Combinations of the above three  NOT money laundering risk controls  Enhanced customer due diligence  Improve the accuracy of estimating a criminal  Close and/or ongoing monitoring  Reduce the deviation of the customer risk level Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 16
  • 17. Personal risk controls Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 17 Instrument Criminal Reporting threshold
  • 18. 真假周潤發 Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 18
  • 19. A risk based AML compliance programme  The single most important instrument in an AML compliance programme  Most FIs do not use the risk based approach smartly  Extremely experience oriented Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 19
  • 20. Issues of risk based approach  Subjective  No uniform standard among different  Industries  Financial sectors  FIs in the same financial sector  Principal agent problem between a regulator and a FI  A two-man game between a regulator and a FI Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 20
  • 21. Risks facing FIs  Money laundering risk  Suspicious transaction reporting  AMLO risk  Know your customer  Record keeping  Guideline risk  AML compliance programme  Customer profile risk  Chance of being a criminal Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 21
  • 22. Outline  What is risk?  Money laundering risk  AMLO risk  Guideline risk  Customer profile risk  Risk stereotyping approach Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 22
  • 23. Court’s judgment of guilty principles  Balance of probability (BOP)  Both prosecutor and defendant exhibit their facts  More than 50% facts suggest that a person has violated an ordinance  A more than 50% requirement  Civil litigation  Beyond reasonable doubt (BRD)  Prosecutor has to prove the guilty of the defendant  All major facts suggest that a person has violated an ordinance  No reasonable doubt  A strong requirement  Criminal litigation Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 23
  • 24. Judgment procedure  List the facts independently  From both the prosecutor and defendant  Cite the ordinance  Highlight the legal elements  Technical debate (for criminal litigation only)  List the reasonable doubts from the facts against the key elements  Judgment  Compare the facts with the legal elements  Chance of being guilty  By default, innocence  If chance > 50%, guilty under the BOP  If chance → 100%, guilty under the BRD  If guilty under the BRD, then must be guilty under the BOP Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 24
  • 25. Money laundering (洗錢)  An act intended to have the effect of making any property  that is the proceeds obtained from the commission of an indictable offence under the laws of Hong Kong; or  of any conduct which if it had occurred in Hong Kong would constitute an indictable offence under the laws of Hong Kong; or  that in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, represents such proceeds, not to appear to be or so represent such proceeds Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 25
  • 26. Money laundering risk Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited  The criminal risk of a FI arising from participating in ML activities  either knowingly or not knowingly  By default, in case a ML transaction is discovered to be processed by a FI, the FI is deemed to have participated knowingly in the ML transaction unless the FI can prove that its participation on not knowingly basis 26
  • 27. The worst situation for a FI  A customer conducted ML activities through a FI  These ML activities were investigated by the police according to the DTRPO and/or OSCO  The court judged that the customer had conducted ML activities, subject to the principle of beyond reasonable doubt  Criminal litigation  Convicted  The FI had not submitted the STR before the investigation Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 27
  • 28. Suspicious transaction reporting  List all the objective facts showing  ML activities vs regular activates  Screen, Ask, Find  If more facts on ML activities  Submit a STR to the JFIU  Evaluate Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 28
  • 29. Example 1.1 – Sanctions list matching ML activities  Highlighted by sanctions list matching system Regular activities  Overseas company search report shows counterparty details different from those on the sanctions record  Customer confirms the details of the counterparty Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 29
  • 30. Example 1.2 – Sanctions list matching ML activities  Highlighted by sanctions list matching system  Overseas company search report unavailable for the counterparty  Customer does not confirm the details of the counterparty Regular activities  Customer shows similar transactions in another bank Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 30
  • 31. Example 1.3 – Sanctions list matching ML activities  Highlighted by sanctions list matching system  Customer does not confirm the details of the counterparty Regular activities  Overseas company search report shows counterparty details different from those on the sanctions record Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 31
  • 32. Example 2.1 – Transaction monitoring ML activities  Highlighted by transaction monitoring system  Many small incoming transactions  A few large out going transactions afterwards Regular activities  Customer advises that these are group order transactions  Customer shows the group order webpage  Customer conducted similar transactions before Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 32
  • 33. Example 2.2 – Transaction monitoring ML activities  Highlighted by transaction monitoring system  Many small incoming transactions  A few large out going transactions afterwards  Customer has no similar transactions before  Customer refuse to provide any sales and marketing information Regular activities  Customer advises that these are group order transactions Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 33
  • 34. Example 2.3 – Transaction monitoring ML activities  Highlighted by transaction monitoring system  Many small incoming transactions  A few large out going transactions afterwards  Customer has no similar transactions before Regular activities  Customer advises that these are group order transactions  Customer shows the group order webpage recently in action two weeks ago Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 34
  • 35. Advantages of the BOP based approach  Strong theoretical basis  Sound legal practices  Easy to formalize into procedure  Inline with the JFIU’s SAFE approach Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 35
  • 36. The role of profitability More facts to support regular activities STR ML activities → Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited Profitability→ 36
  • 37. Outline  What is risk?  Money laundering risk  AMLO risk  Guideline risk  Customer profile risk  Risk stereotyping approach Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 37
  • 38. AMLO risk Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited  The risk of disciplinary actions to a FI as a result of violating the AMLO  Know your customer  Record keeping  Small financial penalty  But strong negative impact to reputation  AML regulator assesses a violation using the principle of beyond reasonable doubt  AML and CTF Tribunal judges a violation using the principle of balance of probability 38
  • 39. State bank of India Hong Kong Branch  Failed to  Carry out the customer due diligence measures set out in sections 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) of Schedule 2 to the AMLO before establishing business relationships with 28 corporate customers;  Continuously monitor its business relationships with its customers;  Establish and maintain effective procedures for determining whether its customers or beneficial owners of its customers were politically exposed persons; and  Establish effective procedures to ensure compliance with the specified provisions in sections 3 and 5 of Schedule 2 to the AMLO. Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 39
  • 40. Coutts Hong Kong  Failed to establish and maintain effective procedures for  determining whether its customers or the beneficial owners of its customers were politically exposed persons;  obtaining senior management approval to continue a business relationship with a customer after Coutts Hong Kong had come to know that the customer or a beneficial owner of the customer was a PEP; and  Failed to identify PEPs despite relevant information being publicly available and to follow up promptly on PEP alerts received from a commercially available database to which Coutts Hong Kong subscribed. Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 40
  • 41. Shanghai Commercial Bank  In summary, Shanghai Commercial Bank did not:  continuously monitor its business relationship with 33 customers by examining the background and purposes of their transactions that were identified as (i) complex, unusually large in amount or of an unusual pattern and (ii) having no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and setting out its findings in writing  establish and maintain effective procedures for the purpose of carrying out its duty under section 5 of Schedule 2 to the AMLO to continuously monitor business relationships; and  carry out customer due diligence measures in respect of certain pre- existing customers when a transaction took place with regard to each of the customers that (i) was, by virtue of the amount or nature of the transaction, unusual or suspicious, or (ii) was not consistent with SCOM’s knowledge of the customer or the customer’s business or risk profile, or with its knowledge of the source of the customer’s funds. Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 41
  • 42. JPMorgan Chase Bank  In summary, JPMorgan Hong Kong did not establish and maintain effective procedures:  for the purpose of carrying out its CDD duties. JPMorgan Hong Kong’s CDD procedures for certain customers did not require (i) certificates of incumbency or comparable documents to be obtained to verify their existence, and (ii) the identities of beneficial owners to be verified. JPMorgan Hong Kong failed to carry out all relevant CDD requirements before establishing business relationships with certain customers;  for the purpose of carrying out its duties to continuously monitor business relationships. As regards groups of related customers, JPMorgan Hong Kong’s procedures did not require a periodic review to be conducted of a customer’s CDD information if a periodic review had been conducted in respect of another customer in the same group. As a result, JPMorgan Hong Kong failed to carry out periodic reviews of certain customers within relationship groups to ensure that the documents, data and information obtained by JPMorgan Hong Kong were up-to- date and relevant. Among 495 high risk customers in such relationship groups, 259 customers were not subject to annual review; and  for identifying and handling wire transfers which did not comply with the requirement to include the originator’s name in the message or payment form accompanying the wire transfer. JPMorgan Hong Kong carried out a number of outgoing wire transfers without including the names of the originators in the relevant SWIFT messages. Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 42
  • 43. AMLO compliance – Principle of balance of probability  List all the facts on KYC and record keeping showing  Fully compliant  Partially compliant  Not compliant  If less than 50% of facts show fully compliant  Re-work the KYC and/or record keeping programme Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 43
  • 44. AMLO compliance assessment Fully compliant Partially compliant Not compliant Policies and procedures reviewed and updated within one year Policies and procedures reviewed and updated several years ago No policies and/or procedures KYC programme reviewed by independent professional firms within one year KYC programme reviewed by operational risk management before No review on KYC programme Transaction records audited by internal audit within one year Transaction records reviewed by the IT department before No review on transaction records Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 44
  • 45. Outline  What is risk?  Money laundering risk  AMLO risk  Guideline risk  Customer profile risk  Risk stereotyping approach Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 45
  • 46. Guideline risk Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited  The risk of a supervisory examination finding on a FI as a result of not complying with any details in AML related guidelines  For all major AML related topics  No criminal or reputation consequence  But too many non-compliance on KYC and/or record keeping may results investigation from regulatory enforcement  AML regulator assesses a non-compliance using common sense and/or industry practices approach 46
  • 47. AML guidelines compliance – Common sense approach  List all the facts on an AML compliance programme showing  Fully compliant  Partially compliant  Not compliant  Classify all partially or not compliant into  Higher priority  Medium priority  Lower priority Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 47
  • 48. AML guidelines compliance – Common sense approach  Classify all mitigation actions into  Higher cost  Medium cost  Lower cost  Implement the mitigation actions immediately for the items  Not compliant, higher priority and lower cost  Implement the mitigation actions later for the items  Partially compliant, lower priority and higher cost Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 48
  • 49. Regulatory expectation management  Demonstrate improvement instead of perfection  Willing to be pin pointed by regulators  Design strategically imperfect AML compliance program  Show action plan instead of corrective action results  Prioritize corrective actions Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 49
  • 50. Regulatory relationship management  Handle regulators as peers instead of superiors  Senior management never entertain front line regulators directly  Never submit requested information to regulators before due dates  Use e-mail as the primary communications channel with regulators  Keep all communications records with regulators  Ask regulator “Yes” or “No” instead of open end questions  Never commit in written support of any regulatory initiatives Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 50
  • 51. Outline  What is risk?  Money laundering risk  AMLO risk  Guideline risk  Customer profile risk  Risk stereotyping approach Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 51
  • 52. Money laundering risk and controls ML risk Financial service Service level Anonymity Customer profile Country Race Industry Profession Family Other closely connected parties Transactions Distance to suspicious scenario Distance to norm Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 52
  • 53. Customer profile risk  The chance of a customer to be connected to criminal activities  Assess through the KYC  The most frequently referred risk by the phase “risk based approach” Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 53
  • 54. Customer profile risk Lower chance  Less sensitive sanctions list matching algorithm  Higher threshold to result outliers through transaction monitoring  Fewer layers of KYC in a corporation's shareholder chain  No direct participation of KYC from the compliance function  Less frequent compliance review Higher chance  More sensitive sanctions list matching algorithm  Lower threshold to result outliers through transaction monitoring  More layers of KYC in a corporation's shareholder chain  Review of KYC from the compliance function  Annual compliance review Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 54
  • 55. Outline  What is risk?  Money laundering risk  AMLO risk  Guideline risk  Customer profile risk  Risk stereotyping approach Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 55
  • 56. Risk stereotyping  A one dimensional risk assessment approach based on several isolated risk factors  Lower predictive power  Recent example in the United States  Since many terrorists are connected to Islamic countries  Therefore people from Islamic countries are higher risk  In fact, most people from Islamic countries are not terrorists  Practices used in the AML guideline  Layering of risk stereotyping as a risk compensation  When a risk stereotyping system results a higher risk, use a more comprehensive risk stereotyping system to re-assess the risk Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 56
  • 57. Risk stereotyping factors  Country  Clientele  Service  Delivery channel Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 57
  • 58. Country Iran, Syria, North Korea Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines U.S., U.K., Singapore ChanceofML→ Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 58
  • 59. Clientele Correspondent banking Private banking Corporate banking Commercial banking SME banking Retail banking ChanceofML→ Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 59
  • 60. Service Project finance Trade finance FX trading Equity trading Deposits Personal loans ChanceofML→ Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 60
  • 61. Delivery channel Agency services Internet banking Branch offices ChanceofML→ Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 61
  • 62. Reference  Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (for Authorized Institutions) (Oct 2018) Copyright © 2020 CapitaLogic Limited 62