Aristotle S Theory Of Revolution Looking At The Lockean Side

University of Utah
Aristotle's Theory of Revolution: Looking at the Lockean Side
Author(s): Leslie Friedman Goldstein
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 311-331
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Aristotle's Theory of Revolution:
Looking at the Lockean Side
LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE
This article provides a detailed account of the theory of revolution pre-
sented in Books IV-VI of Aristotle's Politics and argues that despite impor-
tant differences of emphasis, rhetoric, and tone, there is a surprising
degree of similarity to the theory of revolution familiar to Americans from
John Locke's Second Treatise of Government. Aristotle and Locke share the
views that governments must avoid oppressing their subjects if they are
to avoid being overthrown, that revolution against oppressive rulers is
inevitable, that security for property would have a central place in the
avoidance of oppression, and that the succumbing to the temptations of
power on the part of ruling groups is the fundamental provocation of rev-
olution. This aspect of Aristotle's political thought has been little noticed,
but is an important dimension of it. Moreover, it provides a certain depth
of insight into that side of Locke's thought that most sharply contrasts
with Hobbes's thought, namely Locke's distrust of the corrupting force of
political power.
In Books IV-VI of Politics Aristotle supplemented the Socratic options for
stemming abuses of political power-the teaching of moderation and the luring
of potential tyrants toward philosophy-by invoking the low but solid ground of
the rulers' self-interest in staying in power. The core premises of the Aristotelian
teaching on sedition are essentially a "crime doesn't pay" story for rulers. These
premises were then available for Locke's much later elaboration when he-like
Aristotle suspicious of the corrupting force of political power-needed an alter-
native to Hobbes's absolutist political conclusions.
This claim about the core of Aristotle's teaching on sedition sheds significant
new light on Aristotle's maxim that the political theorist must elaborate not only
the best regime for an ideal situation but should also provide guidance for poli-
tics "based on a [given] presupposition" (Politics IV, 1, 1288b 28-30).1 Locke's
supposition is emphatically that what people want from politics is the preserva-
tion of their lives, liberties, and properties. Aristotle argues in Book III that
1 Translations generally follow Lord (1984). Where they differ, they are my own.
Poliitical Research Quarterly, Vol. 54 (June 2001): pp. 311-331
311

Political Research Quarterly
people form their political association for the good life, a life of happiness, or
human flourishing. Happiness requires that people of good character be formed.
But it turns out in Books IV-VI that, while a few are motivated by the desire for
honor, most people most of the time are motivated by concern for their property
and their physical dignity and security Genuinely good people, who have the
desire and capacity to serve the public good, rarely hold political power. Even
when they do hold power, their appetites and passions open them to being cor-
rupted if legal institutions are not structured in such a way as to check their
power (III, 3: 1287a 31-32). Consequently, the "given supposition" typically in
play in Aristotle's prescriptions for real-world politics may be not so far from the
world that Locke describes.
The argument here does not rely on a view that John Locke was some sort of
latter-day Thomist, who like St. Thomas took his bearings from a law of nature that
amounted to an adaptation of the concept of natural justice, or what was right
according to nature, found in Aristotle.2 To the contrary, one can take as a point of
departure that: "It is on the basis of Hobbes's view of the law of nature that Locke
opposes Hobbes's conclusions. He tries to show that Hobbes's principle-the right
of self-preservation-far from favoring absolute government, requires limited gov-
ernment" (Strauss 1953: 231-32; for a similar view see also Cox 1960 and 1982;
Macpherson 1962; Goldwin 1987; M. Zuckert 1994: 234-237 and 240; but cf.
Grant 1987; Simmons' 1993, and the preponderance of Locke scholarship cited
therein for the view that Locke's state of nature differs radically from that of
Hobbes). Whatever may be Locke's similarities with Hobbes, it is nonetheless clear
that those of Locke's "conclusions" that amount to his theory of revolution openly,
deliberately, and directly opposed Hobbes's view condemning revolutionary resist-
ance to oppressive government (as expressed, e.g., in Leviathan, ch. 20).
It is the argument of this article that most of the core premises of Locke's
theory of revolution are present in Aristotle's political writings. The sole exception
to this claim, albeit an important exception, is Locke's grounding of the right of
revolution in the rhetoric of pre-political inalienable rights; such rhetoric is absent
in Aristotle. The claim is not that Locke took his premises directly from Aristo-
tle-this article is not a biographical exercise.3 Rather it is an essay on Aristotle's
political thought, an essay in the spirit of the argument of Gadamer (1975: espe-
2 Cf. Barker (1962) lxi-lxii.
3 As a strictly historical matter, while Locke may in fact have adapted both his rhetorical approach
and the substance of his justification of revolution from some of the things Aristotle says, there are
numerous conceivable alternative sources of influence that intervened in the two thousand years
that separate the two men, which also may have helped to shape Locke's thinking on a popular
right of revolution. These range from Roman theories of popular control over the emperor, to feudal
theories of limits on kingship, to church governance theories of both the conciliarists and monar-
chomachs, to common law traditions (see, e.g., Procop? 1988; Nelson 1988; Dunbabin 1988;
Black 1988; Vincent 1987, ch.3; Myers 1982 and the numerous sources cited therein).
312

Aristotle's Theory of Revolution
cially 235-40, 258-67, 482-85; see also Yack 1993: 18-21) that one cannot help
but view the thought of philosophers of the past through a prism shaped by the
later philosophic tradition of which one is aware, and by which one's own thought
has to some degree been influenced. Locke depicted in stark and striking tones
the inevitability and justness of revolutionary resistance to tyranny; the clarity and
starkness of Locke's analysis rendered it more difficult, perhaps, for post-Locke
generations to discern the more muted statements along similar lines in Aristotle.
The argument here is that there is much more of the Lockean in Aristotle's
political thought, especially in Books IV through VI of Politics, than is generally
recognized.4 It is at least possible that Locke did find a large part of his inspira-
tion directly in Aristotle's writings, although that is not the point. The point is
that a highlighting of these rather muted Locken themes in Aristotle's theory of
revolution will help bring into clearer focus certain other important elements of
Aristotle's overall political philosophy.
Granted, the discussion of revolution as Aristotle presents it contrasts
sharply with Locke's approach, at least at first glance. Locke is seeking an answer
to the question whether reason, employed as a tool to serve the natural impulse
to comfortable self-preservation, suggests that there must be limits on the power
of government, and, if so, what mechanism can enforce those limits? Aristotle
addresses a different question: How can existing government stave off the sedi-
tion that is the prelude to revolution, and thereby revolution itself?5 Yet despite
the difference in the formal focus of their respective questions, there is a surpris-
ing degree of substantive similarity of content in the answers they generate.
As a prelude to this exercise of recovering Aristotle's teaching on revolution,
this essay, first, outlines the core premises of John Locke's theory of revolution.
Next it describes the sense and extent to which these premises are present in
Aristotle's Politics. The essay concludes with an elaboration of the claim that
attention to this under-explored aspect of Aristotle's thought enriches one's
understanding of both Aristotle and of Locke.
PRELUDE: LOCKE'S THEORY OF REVOLUTION
Summary
Locke's theory of revolution is at once normative and descriptive, and is a
story familiar to most Americans: Governments exist for the purpose of securing
4 This is not, however, a claim that Locke's notion of "rights" is rooted in Aristotle, cf. Miller 1995, 1996.
5 Aristotle also addresses broader questions of how to stave off political change generally-not just
sedition and revolution-but his answer to this general question is undercut by many of his rec-
ommendations concerning the specific question of how to stave off revolution. Specifically, he rec-
ommends that unjust regimes should be reformed (to stave off revolution). Since reform is a kind
of political change, this specific advice undercuts the purported advice against regime change in
general. This undercutting appears to be intentional.
313

to each member of society his6 life, liberty , and estate. Humans have the impulse
of self-preservation as a matter of nature and therefore the impulse is God-given.
Liberty and property as the means of preservation also belong to individuals,
therefore, as a matter of God-given natural rights. But humans-"the greater part
no strict observers of equity and justice"-have a way of being biased by self-
interest in judging conflicts over where their property ends and another's begins.
Therefore, without government, people would be exposed to "continual dan-
gers"; their lives, freedom and possessions, "very unsafe, very unsecure" (para.
123). So men compact, each with everyone, to form a society where they agree
to put all their forces together under a government whose form will be chosen
by the majority. This government will provide clear rules (a "settled, known
law"), independent judges for disputes, and an executive force to back up judg-
ments. The power of this government must logically be limited by the end for
which it was formed-preservation of the lives, liberties, and fortunes of the soci-
ety.7 If the people in government ever set out to attack these things, which Locke
likes to call collectively the "property" of the members of society, it no longer
makes sense to think of these people as the government. They have abandoned
the job with which they were entrusted, and they should, and will, be fought as
the public enemies they have shown themselves to be. They have introduced a
state of war against their former fellow-citizens by using "force without right"
(para. 232). Between such tyrannical rulers and the society they have attacked
there exists perforce a state of nature, because any two parties who do not share
an agreed-upon judge are in such a condition. And in this condition everyone
has the right of nature, which is to say, the right of self-defense. So revolution
against tyrannical government is by nature right, whether the government be a
single prince, a select few, or a legislature comprised of elected representatives of
the majority.8
6 Locke writes repeatedly of the "uniting into commonwealths" as something that "men" do. See, e.g.,
Second Treatise, para. 124. Hereafter, references to the Second Treatise will give simply the paragraph
number.
7 Individual members of society each join and consent to government with private goals, each to
secure his own comfortable self-preservation. But once society has been formed, the job of gov-
ernment becomes the securing of the lives, liberty and possessions of the society as a whole, in
peace and safety, and the protection of each individual member becomes a secondary consideration
(para. 129, 131, 134, 217). It is to be pursued only "as far as will consist with the public good"
(para. 134).
8 Locke does write that any form of government ("one or many") might behave tyrannically (para.
201). However, he-unlike Aristotle--does not really discuss the possibility that a direct democ-
racy would behave tyrannically toward those outside of government, i.e., outside the majority I
believe this is because Locke's theory of revolution has no solution for such tyranny. His theory
would define it as tyranny, but unlike all other versions of tyranny, it cannot be kept in check by
the fear of a successful revolution by the oppressed majority Without oppression of the "major
force" in a community, or at least a well-grounded fear that the oppression threatens to reach a
314

Operational Premises
Locke's operational theory of revolution, that is, his theory as a matter of
observable practice, of how, when and why revolution occurs is as follows:
1. Inevitability: Human nature being what it is, if government engages in a
"long train" of actions that either attack the lives, freedom, or property of the
majority of the people, or are such that the "precedent and consequences seem
to threaten all," it is inevitable that the people will fight back against the govern-
ment that is attacking them (on long train of abuses, see para. 168, 205, 209,
210, 225, 230; on inevitability, see also para. 94, 149, 224; "First Letter on Tol-
eration," at pp. 53-54.) People threatened by severe misrule "cannot but feel
what they lie under" (para. 225), and the natural response to collective threat is
collective self-defense.
2. As a corollary to inevitability, it follows that attempts at deception of the
mass of the people about the fact of their oppression cannot succeed in staving off revo-
lution. "[T]alk ... hinders men not from feeling."
[W]hen the people are made miserable ... cry up their governors, as much as
you will for sons of Jupiter, let them be sacred and divine, descended or author-
ized from Heaven; give them out for whom or what you please the same will
happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon
any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. ..
(para.224; Locke's italics).
3. As a general matter, oppressions of a few that are not seen as threats to the
many do not provoke revolution; revolutions are provoked only when the dominant force
in a community-the majority-feels threatened: Because revolution arises as an
expression of the natural impulse to self-preservation (which includes the natu-
ral impulse to retain the liberty and material acquisitions that facilitate preserva-
tion), an isolated, oppressed minority unable to persuade a majority that it too
faces the threat of oppression will not normally, i.e., not rationally, attempt an
overthrow of government, because to do so will be suicidal, and therefore con-
trary to their natural impulses (para. 208; see also 161, 168, 209, 223, 225, 230).
Indeed, even the majority is prone not to stir without substantial provoca-
tion; only a long train of abuses suffices to break through their inertia; revolution,
after all entails substantial risk-would-be perpetrators need to be convinced
that an attempt is worth the "trouble and cost" (para. 176).9
majority eventually, there cannot be rational hope for a victorious revolution, so the minority nor-
mally will simply endure their oppression. Locke's theory does not offer effectual protection for
minority rights (apart from the solace that God and nature are in principle on their side.)
9 My attention was drawn to this passage by Grant (1987: 167).
315

At this point a divergence arises between Locke's theory of what is right
according to nature and what happens as a matter of the normal patterns of what
might be called brute nature or mere nature. Many regimes that deprive minori-
ties of what is justly, or by nature, their right, will nonetheless, according to the
logic of brute nature, endure.10
Despite Premise 3, however, Locke does admit that some factious people on
occasion have behaved irrationally:
4. Contrary to the natural pattern, sometimes exceptions do occur, in which excep-
tionally ambitious or prideful men stir up sedition to the point of "great disorder" Locke
"grant[s] that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have sometimes
caused great disorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to states
and kingdoms" (para. 230). But he suggests that faction has more often been trig-
gered by "the rulers' insolence, and endeavors to get, and exercise an arbitrary
power over their people" than by a "desire in the people to cast off the lawful
authority of their rulers" (para. 226, 230; Locke's italics). Thus, two more prem-
ises are these:
5. Those who hold governmental power are more likely to provoke sedition and
revolution by tyrannical behavior than are the ruled to engage in unprovoked, or even
slightly provoked sedition. This is true because:
6. Power has a corrupting influence.
[T]hey who are in power (by the pretence they have to authority, the tempta-
tion of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of those about them) [are]
likeliest to [provoke revolution]; the properest way to prevent the evil is to show
them the danger and injustice of it who are under the greatest temptation to run
into it (para. 226; see also 91-93, 111, 137, 218).
7. The final clause of this quotation yields the next premise: The "best fence
against rebellion" that a political theorist can provide is to persuade rulers (not their
too-often put-upon subjects) to mend their ways, by warning them that oppressive gov-
ernment is what causes revolution (para. 226).11 Rulers need to temper their
insolence and greed, which are likely to be aggravated by the temptations of
power. The stimulus to such self-reform can be provided by an awareness,
offered by the political theorist, Locke, that such restraint will enable their rule
10 This would seem to be an utterly straightforward reading of the paragraphs cited at Premise 3, but
a number of Locke scholars dispute it. For a discussion of the debate, see citations and analysis
thereof in Simmons 1993: 172-77.
1 Cf. Tarcov (1981) who argues that the "best fence," in Locke's view, is an alert oppositional polit-
ical leadership who will alert the citizenry about a build-up of princely power tending toward
tyranny In my judgment, Tarcov's interpretation relies on reading more into para. 242 than is
really there and gives too little attention to Locke's actual description of the benefit of his teaching
on revolution in para. 226.
316

to last (and peace and prosperity thereby to prevail). Locke is putting forth his
teaching on revolution, "this doctrine," as "the probablest means to hinder [rebel-
lion]." The "rebellion" in question is tyrannical behavior by the ruler that re-
introduces the state of war.
Locke's rhetorical emphasis is overwhelmingly addressed to the human pas-
sion of greed; thus he repeatedly warns that:
8. What rulers need to refrain from attacking is the "property" of their subjects.12
Moreover, he advises them that "the increase of lands and the right employing of
them [i.e., by developing an incentive structure that encourages industriousness]
is the great art of government" (para. 42). While Locke clearly indicates that he
uses the term "property" to include "life, liberty and estate," his choice of this dic-
tion inevitably underlines, as a practical matter, people's concerns with their own
material possessions.
9. Rulers heedful of Locke can easily avoid having seditious subjects, because a
populace contented by security for their lives and property will be the rulers' strongest
bulwark against the rare, ambitious minority faction. Misdeeds by rulers short of a
direct attack on the lives, liberty or estates of the general public are not likely to
provoke sedition. Indeed, even a minority justified in hostility to the government
"will not easily engage ... in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being
as impossible for one or a few oppressed men to disturb the government, where
the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for a raving
madman, or a heady malcontent to overturn a well-settled state; the people being
as little apt to follow the one as the other" (para. 208; italics omitted).
The combination of Premises 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 yields the following: Locke's
message concerning the occasional reality of factious behavior by "heady
malcontents" appears to be that, while such behavior can sometimes reach the
point of causing "great disorder" (the unfortunate reality being that some human
beings instead of following reason are "quarrelsome and contentious," para. 34),
the efforts of these ambitious few are not likely to prove "fatal" to "states and
kingdoms" unless the people at large have been seriously aggrieved by their gov-
ernment. Thus, Locke's overall message on revolution is that the primary cause
of rebellion is overreaching on the part of those in power. The temptations of
power and its corrupting force in unleashing the greed of rulers are the problems
that political theory can successfully address: The way to guard against depreda-
tions by governing authorities is to alert them to their own self-interest, with a
clear warning that severe mistreatment of the public will backfire by provoking
successful revolution.
12 The difficulty of figuring out how to keep rulers from using their political power to enrich them-
selves at the expense of their subjects is a problem as old as political philosophy itself. See Plato's
Republic 417a 6-b 3.
317

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF REVOLUTION
Aristotle's Premises
Although Aristotle makes the point in terms more measured than Locke's
rallying cry, "[The people] cannot but feel what they lie under," a premise close
to that of the inevitability of seditious overthrow of tyrannical regimes (Premise #1
above) does appear in Politics. Premise 1 in Aristotle's characteristically more cau-
tious rendition comes out as: "It is difficult for a regime to last if its constitution
is contrary to justice" (VII, 13: 1332b 28-29).13 He underlines this point by
insisting that the least just regimes-self-interested oligarchies and tyrannies-
are the shortest-lived. Those tyrannies that are believed to have lasted even as
long as seventeen years were, strictly speaking, not tyrannies. The so-called
tyrants in each of them (see examples at V, 12: 1315b 12-33) actually served
more as constitutional monarchs or popular leaders, either putting themselves
under the rule of law, or ruling in such a way as to please the populace in such
ways as exemplary public service in warfare, acts of concern for the public good,
and moderate rule. Thus, Aristotle is able to conclude, "Most [versions of] tyran-
nies [i.e., those that really warrant the label] have all been completely short-
lived" (V, 12: 1316b 38-39).
Like Locke, Aristotle also warns potentially oppressive rulers that they will
not be able to fool all of the people all of the time. While a genuinely well-man-
aged regime (in terms of the range of the practicable) would please all segments
of the community and thus would be altogether free of seditious faction (II,
9:1270b 21-22; II, 12: 1274a 15-21; III, 11: 1281b 28-34; IV, 9: 1294b 34-40;
VI, 5: 1320a 15-16), to survive in the sense of avoiding a successful sedition, a
regime must at least please the strongest elements of the community, its domi-
nant forces (IV, 13: 1297b 5-10; IV, 12: 1296b 14-16; V, 9: 1309b 16-18; VI, 7:
1320b 26-28). Strength, for Aristotle, is measured as a blend of the strength of
13 My case would be easier if this passage actually read as it is rendered in the Jonathan Barnes revi-
sion of Benjamin Jowett's translation of the Politics (Everson, ed. 1988: 176). There it is rendered:
"No government can stand which is not founded upon justice." But Aristotle does describe the sur-
vival chances of an unjust regime as "difficult" (chalepon) rather than literally impossible. In my
view, incidentally, this passage, together with the sentence that follows it, indicates Aristotle's view
that justice does prevail in the Bk. VII-VIII City According-to-Prayer, i.e., that city for which one
would wish once one understood what is best simply (III, 18; IV, 1; VII, 4: 1325b 37). (But cf. the
arguments of C. Zuckert [1983]; Nichols [1992: 144-45]; Yack [1993: 168-69]; and Annas
[1996].) Therefore, there are no un-natural slaves in it. All have citizen rights except resident
aliens plus natural slaves plus foreign serfs (presumably those lacking adequate thumos to object
to being ruled, and who would be working voluntarily in the City of Prayer, for rule over free
others who submit only involuntarily is tyrannical; see VII, 7: 1327b 25-30. These groups would
do all the vulgar necessary work. In this reading, I agree with Miller (1995: 240-41) and disagree
with the assertion of Cooper (1996: 867n.) that Aristotle "can hardly have seriously intended that
. all the native-born free persons. .. should exercise rights of citizenship."
318

numbers and "quality" (Bk. IV, ch. 12). Numbers can be a source of political
power, but so can the political skills gained through "education," or the respect
accorded to some people because of their "good birth" into families revered for
having contributed to the public weal. Aristotle also includes "wealth" in his cal-
culus of political power. Owners of wealthy estates not only can afford the best
military equipment, but could also hire mercenaries (V, 6: 1306a 21-23) or (per-
haps more likely) acquire legions of followers by giving out jobs on their estates
(VI, 5: 1320b 8-9).
To be sure, Locke does not discuss at any length the relevance for revolution
of differences of political power attainable within civil society, and indeed down-
plays them by his frequent refrain, "The people shall be judge." However, a
recognition of differences of political influence within civil society does not con-
tradict anything in Locke's theory. Moreover, Aristotle himself, in a sense, warns
of the future appropriateness of thinking in terms of the people as the ultimate
judge, for he predicts (long before the universal prevalence of imperial or nation-
based states), "Now that it has happened that cities have become even larger, it
is perhaps [or alternatively, probably: isos] no longer easy for any regime to arise
other than a democracy" (III, 15: 1286b 19-20). But even outside of democracy,
government cannot afford to ignore the force of numbers; Even in an oligarchy,
if it treats the multitude unjustly, Aristotle warns, any leader would be adequate
to guide a successful revolt (V, 6: 1305a 38-41).
Aristotle, in considering how rulers should please the dominant elements of
the community, focuses more than Locke does on the question of who should
share the prerogatives of political office, as distinguished from policy outcomes
per se, although he does not entirely ignore the latter (e.g. VI, 5: 1320a 34-40).
This emphasis seems to be because he sees his audience as primarily "legislators,"
or founders who are devising a political framework after some regime has been
overthrown. (This concern is particularly apparent in Bk. IV, ch. 12, and in Bk. VI,
ch.5.) Still, it does make sense to expect that participation in rule will yield some
sharing of the benefits of rule, and the absence of participation, a consequent
absence of benefits. Indeed, Aristotle makes this point explicitly: Constitutions
that do not have an adequate amount of power-sharing in their initial structure,
he writes, are bound to produce bad [policy] in the end (V, 1: 1302a 5-8).
And Aristotle, like Locke, warns against governmental deception that aims
at exclusion of the general populace. He specifically singles out for criticism con-
stitutional devices that aim to give the illusion of a popular say in government
but are rigged to assure predominance by the wealthy, insisting that "in time from
things falsely good there must result a true evil" (IV, 12: 1297a12; the list of such
devices follows in IV, 13; he repeats the point at V, 8:1308a 2-3). This statement
that, sooner or later, the truth will out when it comes to government oppression,
amounts to Aristotle's endorsement of Premise 2: In the long run, deception of the
people cannot stave off revolution if government has become tyrannical.
319

Aristotle also agrees with Locke that if only a few are treated unjustly, they
will not be able to overthrow a government, as long as that government contin-
ues to please the preponderant elements in the community (V, 1:1301a 39-b2; V,
4: 1304b 2-5). Thus, Premise 3: Generally speaking, if the unjustly treated are a
tiny minority (without the backing of an aggrieved public) they will not revolt. Those
regimes last where the governing body treats well the people outside the ruling
group, for these regimes lack an aggrieved public (V, 8: 1308a 4-10).
Aristotle gives far more attention than does Locke to the 4th Premise: Excep-
tionally ambitious minorities can on occasion stir up sedition to the point of great dis-
order. In Book V especially, Aristotle dwells at great length upon the various
details of a grand variety of seditious overthrows or attempted overthrows of
rulers from prior history. The basic source of these was a perception of unfair-
ness. Sometimes, as in Locke's later theory, the felt grievance was on the part of
the common people, when their property was attacked (IV, 13: 1297b 5-8; V, 8:
1308a 8-9, 1308b 32-1309a 9; VI, 4: 1318b 14-20), but not always. Aristotle's
description and theory of revolution gives much greater prominence than does
Locke to the seditions triggered by a sentiment of frustrated ambition or of
offended dignity (including sexual dignity) on the part of would-be rulers-
those Locke dubbed "heady malcontents." These ambitious leaders, typically of
the wealthy classes, but sometimes from the military or naval ranks, can end up
strong enough to overpower the elements supportive of the regime partly
because the ruling groups treated segments of the population unjustly but also
partly because the tiny city-states of the ancient world were far less capable of
defending against coups than large nation-states came to be.14 It is conceivable
that the reason Locke's theory of revolution could look so different from Aristo-
tle's is that the largeness of kingdoms and even principalities in Locke's day ren-
dered much less frequent a viable threat of turbulence from an ambitious few, as
compared with the polis of fourth-century-BC Greece. Still, even in Aristotle's
description, Premise 3 is meant to convey the more general picture: if ambitious
leaders cannot tap into some degree of perceived injustice by powerful segments
of the community, they will not have enough followers to succeed in their coup
or revolution. (Incidentally, Aristotle shows more respect than Locke does for
those zealots for justice-"very few in number" but not unknown to history-
who, motivated primarily by a desire to do a noble thing, led lost causes against
bad government [V, 10: 1312a 4-39].)
14 Aristotle understood that bigness would enhance stability. He argued that this enhancement could
come about by expansion of the middle class, a group easier for rulers to keep satisfied than are
either the very rich or the very poor (Bk. IV). He argued, however, that the City of Prayer could
not be large in this way, for in a large city it is too difficult for the ruled and rulers (as they take
turns ruling) to recognize each other's particular talents for government and particular needs as
subjects being ruled (Bk. VII, ch.4).
320

Aristotle's version of Premise 5, that revolution finds its source more often in
unjust provocation by rulers than in unprovoked sedition from the populace, or the ruled,
is thus not so prominent as in Locke, again because the problem of coups from
ambitious or outraged leaders was more pressing in Aristotle's day. Nonetheless, it
is clearly implied in his general advice for avoiding revolution: any regime that
wants stability needs to avoid the excesses that render it unjust. Oligarchies
should become somewhat democratic in governing structure so that they will be
less inclined to oppress the common people (VI, 6); democracies should adopt
laws that make more secure the property of the wealthy (VI, 5); tyrannies need to
become more kinglike, adopting the rule of law and a moderate way of life,
refraining from attacking either the common people or the elite (V, 11 and 12).
Aristotle's advice to tyrants is sometimes misread because he prefaces this
advice-the advice that he gives in his own name (viz., become more kinglike and
less tyrannical)-with an acknowledgment of the details of the "received wisdom"
on how to preserve tyranny--viz., be tyrannical: operate the kind of regime asso-
ciated with twentieth century totalitarianism, replete with spying on the subjects,
the constant stimulation of warfare, and prohibitions on voluntary organizations
or private meetings among the subjects. It is this "received wisdom" that Aristotle
is attempting to replace. Aristotle argues plainly that to follow the received wisdom
is to provoke revolution. "Indeed, what must be done is the opposite in nearly
every case of the things mentioned previously." Tyrannies that took the tyrannical
route were short-lived, while "tyrants" who behave in fact like benevolent kings,
appearing not as appropriators of their subjects' property but as stewards of it will
attain "longer-lasting" rule (V, 10: 1313a 1-V, 11: 1315b 10). These maxims about
how to avoid the excesses that amount to tyranny are the fenceposts of Aristotle's
"best fence against rebellion" argument (Premise 7).
One also finds in Aristotle an explanation for this "best fence" argument that
is similar to Locke's: (Premise 6) Power has a corrupting influence. In recommend-
ing a mix of democratic and aristocratic elements that check each other, such that
the common people would serve as electors of the most capable for political
office and as auditor of the elected officials, Aristotle offers the following expla-
nation: "[The officials] will rule justly by the fact that others have authority over
the audits. For to be under constraint and unable to do everything one might
resolve to do is beneficial. The license to do whatever one wishes cannot defend
against the base element in every human being" (VI, 4: 1318b 38-1319a 1; see
also IV, 14: 1298b 15-26; III, 16: 1287a 30-31).
Premise 8, what rulers need to refrain from attacking is the "property" of their
subjects, would seem to offer particular difficulty for the argument of this essay,
because Aristotle specifically criticized a competing political theorist, Phaleas, for
believing that solving the property problem would solve all political problems.
Aristotle pointed out in that discussion that there is a kind of person who cares
not just about bodily appetites, but who craves honor, societal respect, fame, a
321

"place in history."'5 Such people pose a much more serious threat than petty
crime, for they are the potential tyrants. What they need is not the right amount
of property, but rather proper education, which will teach moderation and phi-
losophy (Bk. II, ch. 7). Part of that education, however, is offered right here in Pol-
itics. To the extent that the education in the need for moderation is in part the
teaching on the proper limits of political power contained here, the Phaleas cri-
tique is not necessarily at odds with Premise 8.
And, indeed, Aristotle repeats more than once the importance of the advice
that links successful regime survival with refraining from attacks on people's
property. The many, he writes, "strive more for profits than for honor." They even
will tolerate oligarchies and used to tolerate tyrannies, so long as rulers do not
take their property or prevent them from working (VI, 4: 1318b1 6-19; see also
V, 8: 1308a 8-10). A slight variation on this warning appears in Bk. IV, ch.13: The
poor are willing to remain tranquil even when they have no share in political pre-
rogatives, provided no one acts "hubristically" toward them nor deprives them of
any of their property (IV, 13: 1297b 5-9; see also V, 11: 1315a 14-24)). The
Greek "hubris," generally translated "arrogance" (although Simpson [1997] and
Keyt [1999] offer the more apt, "insolence") involves, according to Aristotle's
Rhetoric, the deliberate taking of pleasure in acts of humiliation toward others
(Rh.1378b 23-29, as cited in Reeve 1998: 244). It may be that Machiavelli had
this passage in mind when he later wrote in The Prince that what ordinary people
want from their government is security for their property and protection against
the violation of their wives and daughters (referring to the latter as a loss of their
men's honor) (ch.17: 67 and ch.19: 72). Machiavelli's discussion is helpful, in
any case, for highlighting the linkage between Aristotle's warning against hubris-
tic behavior by the rulers and the security for life and limb that Locke clearly
includes under his umbrella term "property," for, per Locke, one's first natural
property is the property in one's own body (para. 27).
While it is true that Aristotle does advise rulers specifically against unjustly
depriving ambitious societal leaders of their prerogatives (V, 8: 1308a 8-9), he also
makes clear that it is not just the common people who want their property left
alone. He notes that the kinds of leaders who come to power in oligarchies, too,
care at least as much about the profits of office as they do about honor (VI, 7:
1321a 41-44). And Aristotle identifies governmental attacks on the property of
the well-off as a common provocation for elite-led seditions against democracies.
The matter of property is serious enough that Aristotle writes, "A very great
thing in every regime is to have the laws and management of the rest arranged in
such a way that it is impossible to profit from the [political] offices" (V, 8: 1308b
15 I realize that I am truncating Aristotle's argument here, blurring together the craving for fame or
honor (potentially including a desire for more than one's fair share of political offices) with the
desire for pure, or unmixed pleasure. I do so to avoid a lengthy tangent.
322

32-1309a 14). He adds that preventing government officials from taking the
property of the people or treating them hubristically, however, is a difficult thing
to accomplish, "for it does not always turn out that those sharing in the govern-
ing body are the refined sort" (IV, 13: 1297b 8-10).
However unrefined rulers may turn out to be, they should at least under-
stand a frank appeal to their self-interest. For this reason, Aristotle has con-
structed the "best fence against rebellion argument," warning them that their best
safeguard against sedition lies in making their regime more just. And even if they
cannot have total assurance of having headed off sedition from every possible
ambitious leader, in light of the prevalence of concern for property among both
the wealthy and the common people, rulers who secure the lives, limbs, and prop-
erty of their subjects will have a substantial bulwark against sedition led by ambitious
competitors (Aristotle's version of Premise 9).
Limits of the Argument
Differences of Thematic Focus. Whereas the modem fame of Locke's Second
Treatise is as "a work principally designed to assert a right of resistance to unjust
authority, a right, in the last resort, of revolution" (Simmons 1993:147, citing
Dunn 1984: 28), no one would assert the same of Aristotle's Politics. Nonetheless
the core premises of Locke's operational theory of revolution, that is, of his theory
of when and why revolutions take place, are in fact present in Aristotle's earlier
work. It is true that Locke's Treatise is ostentatiously an essay that justifies revo-
lution. Such justification is not Aristotle's thematic focus. However, it is in fact
observably present in Politics, if one looks for it. The argument here-to reiter-
ate-is not a claim that Locke was in all important respects an Aristotelian. He
emphatically was not. Rather, the argument here is that Aristotle provides an
operational theory of revolution that contains most of the core premises of
Locke's later theory, including its prescriptive element: viz. revolutions against
tyrannical regimes are natural and virtually inevitable, and that the best fence
against rebellion is to alert would-be tyrants of this operational theory so that
they will mend their ways, and temper potential excesses of the regime. This fact
demarcates an underappreciated aspect of Aristotle's Politics, an underapprecia-
tion that this essay aspires to correct.16
16 It is perhaps a mark of this under-appreciation that scholars debate whether Aristotle was naively
over-optimistic to hope that tyrannical governments would heed this warning--compare Mulgan
1977: 134-35 with Polansky 1991: 331-32--but a comparable argument (so far as I have been
able to discover) does not appear in the Locke scholarship. Perhaps this view of Locke as more
hard-headed is attributable to his having discernibly inspired actual revolutions, such as the Amer-
ican. Thus, his warning to would-be tyrants took on "teeth" that were not so apparent in Aristo-
tle's more muted approach.
323

If this argument is correct, skeptics may wonder, why does Aristotle under-
play the theory, mute it, as it were, by emphasizing different concerns? No defin-
itive answer is available, but one can suggest the plausible hypothesis that Aris-
totle chose to emphasize the usefulness of his political science for rulers already
in power and for regimes already in place (e.g., in Politics, Book IV, ch. 1),
because of his consciousness of the relatively recent fate of Socrates."7
Moreover, if this argument is correct-if Aristotle's true concern, like
Locke's, is to prevent tyranny (in the general sense of oppressive government) by
warning that the closer government gets to tyranny, the more likely revolution-
ary overthrow becomes-then many of Aristotle's prescriptions take on new
meaning. For instance, his counsels that specific laws, type of citizen education,
and even the sense of justice appropriate in governing officials must be tailored
to the needs of the regime so as to preserve it (V, 9: 1309a 36-39; 1309b 14-17;
1310a 14-19), have an import that is the opposite of how they are generally
taken.'8 He is not saying that this means, for instance in an oligarchy, that the
laws and education adopted should be those closest to the wishes or inclinations
of the ruling oligarchs; on the contrary, they should be such as to temper or
restrain those inclinations: "But to be educated relative to the regime is not to do
the things that oligarchs or those who want democracy enjoy, but rather the
things by which the former will be able to run an oligarchy and the latter to have
a regime that is run democratically" (1310a 19-24). And what enables an oli-
garchy to continue in existence as an oligarchy, for instance, turns out to be that
it avoid the excesses characteristic of oligarchy, namely oppression of the
common people. Its rulers need to learn how to become "less oligarchical" in
order to stay in power. Some scholars take this fact as evidence that Aristotle
stumbled into an unwitting inconsistency (Mulgan 1977: 136; Rowe 1991: 67-
69; Reeve 1998: lxiii-lxiv), in that his prescription for making a regime endure is
to alter the regime for the better, which makes it a different regime.19 But one
17 Reportedly, Aristotle explained his departure from Athens, one year prior to his death from natu-
ral causes with the remark that he did not want Athens to sin a second time against philosophy
(Lord 1984: 6). Locke was free to endorse revolution against tyranny more openly because he
wrote under the cloak of anonymity (and perhaps, too, he chose this mode because he was intent
on fomenting a particular, immediate revolution [Ashcraft 19861). When Mulgan (1977: 136)
argues that Aristotle "should have admitted more openly that he considers the[] position [of tyran-
nical oligarchs, democrats or monarchs] untenable and that they must change the nature of their
rule or be overthrown," he writes as though the problem of Socrates was no problem. But the fact
is, Aristotle did openly admit these things; he simply did not stress them. He wrote them, as it
were, quietly, rather than shouting them from the rooftops, or the barricades.
18 Reeve (1998) seems at some points to agree with my reading (lxiv [describing a "stable but non-
rigid" regime] and lxvii) but at others to take these statements at their face value (liii, lxii, later on
lxvii).
19 Keyt, in an innovative reading, suggests that the real import of these passages is to render the
rulers of all regimes at least law-abiding; that Aristotle aims here to check each regime's potential
324

could suggest that this is not an inconsistency. Aristotle is simply advising vari-
ous sovereign bodies that political power has limits; any sovereign who ignores
Aristotle's advice and uses political office to gratify every whim risks losing the
regime to seditious overthrow by aggrieved subjects.
Differences of Fundamental Premise: Irrespective of the evidence on the
authors' theories of revolution, one might also object that the differences between
the respective overall political philosophies of Locke and Aristotle are so over-
whelming that any similarity on revolution is insignificant and misleading.
Important points of contrast include, first, that for Aristotle it is of central signif-
icance that the political scientist identify the best regime, the City According-to-
Prayer, in order to have a standard by which to assess better and worse (Bk. III,
ch. 18; Bk. IV, ch. 1; Bks. VII-VIII). For Locke, by contrast, the type of regime that
will be legitimate in any particular society is a matter of original majority prefer-
ence-rule by one, by a select few, and by direct majority can equally be legiti-
mate as long as the government does not turn tyrannical. As long as it does not,
at least tacit consent can be assumed, and consent of the governed is what makes
for legitimate government. Locke's theory aims only to guard against the worst
excesses (Tarcov 1981: 214-17), while Aristotle orients his theory according to
the polestar of the best imaginable.
A second fundamental difference that might arguably render comparison
inappropriate is that for Locke (following Hobbes) the aims of the political
society concern the things of the body-security for life itself and freedom to
pursue a comfortable life. Aristotle, to the contrary, argues that real-life polit-
ical societies err in limiting their concerns to such things, when what politi-
cal societies should do is foster excellence of character or soul (psyche) among
the citizenry.20
However, despite these two massive differences of orientation, Aristotle
acknowledges that real-life societies typically-indeed universally in practice-
are not interested in hearing the good character message. People in government,
including the common people in direct democracies, are more interested in
deterioration into the extreme of lawlessness (1999: 136-142). While more attractive than those
readings that simply condemn Aristotle for inconsistency, Keyt's seems to pay insufficient heed to
the fact that Aristotle is giving advice that goes beyond law-abidingness to guide regime-design
itself. Moreover, Aristotle's approving description of so-called tyrants who in fact moderated their
tyrannies by putting themselves under law or by ruling in the public interest, thus rendering
themselves "monarchs" rather than tyrants, properly speaking, belies the notion that Aristotle
opposed all regime improvement (V, 12: 1315b 12-33).
20 Aristotle notes that even Sparta and similarly warlike political communities err in fostering only a
part of virtue, military courage, rather than the whole of it, and also because they value the goods
that are attainable through conquest more highly than the virtue involved in acquiring the goods
(Bk. II, ch.9: 1271a 42-1271b 11; see also VII, ch.2: 1324b 3-38; VII, 14: 1333a 37-1334a10;
VIII, 4: 1338b 9-38).
325

maintaining their own power than in any betterment of their souls (VI, 4: 1318b
2-5). And what people generally seek is property; the common many prefer
profits to honor (VI, 4: 1318b 17-18), and the wealthy few also "seek profits no
less than honor" (VI, 7: 1321a 41-43). Indeed there is no existing political soci-
ety where one can find even as many as one hundred men who have genuine
excellence of character (V, 1: 1302a 1-1302a 3).21 Thus, while the City of Prayer
for Aristotle provides a model for deciding what is better and worse legisla-
tion,22 his argument in Books IV-VI is that the political theorist must be able to
offer usable advice to real governments, and therefore must be able to address
the actual concerns of those governments. Here, therefore, Aristotle traverses
ground similar to Locke's.
Finally, the two theorists differ notoriously over the naturalness of human
equality. Locke maintains that no one has a natural right to rule another23 (since
all humans are one species) so legitimate ruling authority can come only from
consent. Aristotle argues that according to the nature of justice, some have a
more just claim to rule because they are people of moral excellence and practi-
cal wisdom, and for these reasons will do a better job. "The greatest factional
split is probably that between virtue and depravity" (V, 3: 1303b 14-15), but
this fact turns out to have little practical relevance because, although the people
of excellent character most deserve to rule, they are such a tiny minority that,
practically speaking, they would not dream of trying to come to power force-
fully (V, 1: 1301a 39-b2; V, 4: 1304b 4-6). Like Locke's outnumbered oppressed
minority, they simply have to endure the situation. Moreover, they would not be
able to persuade ordinary people to hand over power to them; such a thing
would be even more difficult than figuring out the perfect formula of distribu-
tive justice for a particular community. People in power will not heed claims
(however well-founded they might be) that justice requires them to turn over
their power to other people (VI, 3: 1318b 2-5). Thus, Aristotle, instead of
appealing directly to arguments based on justice, winds up, like Locke, warning
21 Aristotle says literally there are not 100 who are "good and well-born" and that "good birth and
excellence are in few." It is possible that his point in conjoining good birth with goodness is to
state that the conjunction of actual goodness with the societal influence that would come from
good birth is what is rare. I think it more likely, however, that his reference to good birth is as an
aspect of complete goodness, as in the expression "well brought-up." A youngster may start out
good but without good parents his or her chance of ending up good are far slimmer.
22 Not everyone agrees that Aristotle's City of Prayer, the city that is best simply, provides a standard
of justice that enables one to judge what is better and worse among actual regimes, cf. C. Zuckert
(1983); Nichols (1992: 144-45); Yack (1993: 168-69); Annas (1996). But see Miller (1995: 239-
45), Rowe (1991), and Bradley (1991) for examples of readings that accord with mine.
23 No one, that is, except someone who has been attacked without provocation. An attacker without
material motive has abandoned the human species and demoted himself to the ranks of vicious
beasts and thus may be executed or subjected to the lesser penalty of slavery
326

ruling groups that if they wish to avoid being overthrown they must refrain from
tyrannical excesses.24
As for the matter of using consent of the governed to distinguish legitimate
from illegitimate government, Aristotle himself uses the voluntariness of submis-
sion to rule as a definitional marker that distinguishes tyrannical from healthy
rule (III, 14:1285a 27, b 3, b 5, b 8, b 21; IV, 10: 1295a 19-23; V, 10:1313a 3-
11). The three healthy-i.e., non-tyrannical-regimes had been defined as ones
that serve the public interest rather than simply the ruler's interest; in noting
three times that tyrannies are regimes where the public is being ruled involun-
tarily, Aristotle is indicating that the people do voluntarily submit when the
public interest is being served. Thus, voluntary submission to the rule of another
would appear to be the Aristotelian version of what Locke calls tacit consent to
government.
CONCLUSIONS
Aristotle's critique of Phaleas indicates that Aristotle understood that the
political problem of coping with people who want more than their fair share of
things is a problem too deep and too broad to solve by economic techniques
alone. Its ultimate solution would have to include the Socratic remedies
endorsed, for instance, in Plato's Republic, namely, teaching moderation and turn-
ing potential tyrants toward the pleasures offered by philosophy. Thus, Aristotl
strived to elevate political-life-as-he-found-it, by teaching that the polis properly
aims at the fostering of human excellence. (Indeed, Aristotle treats political life
per se as worthy of considerably more dignity than Socrates does. One does no
find in Aristotle the Socratic tendency to warn that the truly just person is bes
advised to stay away from politics [Apology 31d-32a; Republic 496c-e]).
Nonetheless, Aristotle also went beyond these remedies suggested by
Plato. Aristotle frankly acknowledged that no communities in fact provided
education in moderation. Consequently, he may have reasonably inferred tha
few were likely to do so in the future. Moreover, one may entertain legitimat
doubts about the likelihood that the lure of Socratic philosophy would pull a
large fraction of the world's potentially tyrannical rulers away from the temp-
tations of power. It is conceivable that Aristotle entertained these very doubts
He certainly stated clearly that once people have power, it is virtually impossi-
ble to succeed with purely justice-based arguments to persuade them to accept
checks on their own power (VI, 3: 1318b 2-5). And finally, Aristotle frankly
24 While Aristotle initially defines tyranny as the selfish rule of a monarch (III: 7), he later extend
the usage to cover self-aggrandizing rule by any group (included a popular majority) at the
expense of the rest of the public: extremist oligarchies and extremist democracies alike are prop-
erly regarded as tyrannies: "for these happen to be tyrannies [with the power] divided up" (V, 10
1312b 37-38).
327

acknowledged that what the vast majority of people want from government is
protection for their property
Thus, in Books IV-VI of Politics, Aristotle supplemented the Socratic options
for stemming abuses of political power by appealing to the low but solid ground
of the rulers' self-interest in staying in power. The core premises of the Aris-
totelian teaching on sedition-essentially a "crime doesn't pay" story for rulers-
were then available for Locke's much later elaboration. These in sum maintained
that governments must avoid oppressing their subjects if they were to avoid
being overthrown, that revolution against oppressive rulers is both inevitable and
natural,25 that security for property would have a central place in the avoidance
of oppression, and that the succumbing to the temptations of power on the part
of ruling groups is the fundamental provocation of revolution.
Locke (in direct contrast with Hobbes) agreed with Aristotle in distrusting
the corrupting influence of political power and thus re-worked Aristotle's basic
premises to provide an alternative to Hobbes's absolutist political conclusions.
Aristotle, for example, said of his recommended checking of the excesses that
amount to tyranny not only that it will render a monarch's rule "more noble and
more enviable" (because he will be ruling better people) and will render the ruler
himself, if not of "fine" character, at least "half-decent," but also that these
improvements will render his rule "longer-lasting" (V, 11: 1315b 4-10). Locke's
re-worked teaching on revolution holds onto the "longer-lasting" side of the
argument, and in effect drops the rest.
What this look at his "Lockean" side can teach us readers about Aristotle's
own political philosophy is the degree to which it paid heed to what might be
called the hard-headed realities. Most people want from their political commu-
nities protection for their physical security and for their property; persons of
genuinely excellent character are so exceedingly rare that they will hardly ever
be in power; the possessing of power has a way of corrupting those who rule.
While Aristotle did see the need to attend to these realities, he, in contrast to
Locke, refused to decomplicate his political theory, to focus almost exclusively
on the readily predictable. In Aristotle's theory (unlike Locke's) the human
yearning for nobility of character, the human desire to be a good and respect-
worthy person and to be surrounded by such people, and the craving for a
25 Keyt's explication astutely likens revolution to death of a regime and remarks that "death is some-
times a justly imposed penalty" (Keyt 1999: xiv-xv). Revolution, one could add, is the natural fate
of a regime in the extremely diseased condition of tyrannical excess. Both Locke and Aristotle
make a point of describing the naturalness of this outcome (natural in the sense that it is a ten-
dency intrinsic to the nature of tyranny) as a way of preventing the conditions of extreme disease
in the body politic. Locke is more outspoken than Aristotle in emphasizing that tyrants deserve
what they get (Since tyranny violates natural rights, it is by nature right to overthrow it). Still, Keyt
notes that in at least one passage Aristotle implies that resistance to tyranny is something worthy
of honor (V, 10: 1312a 21-39; Keyt 1999: xv).
328

Aristotles Theory of Revolution
social order characterized by justice, do not disappear. The tension between
these genuinely human but too-frail traits and the traits that characterize the
pursuit of comfortable self-preservation remains present in his political philos-
ophy, as do a variety of other tensions. These would include that between the
need for wisdom and the need for consent; the tensions among the needs for
freedom, for solidarity, and for ultimate meaning; and the tension between the
necessary conditions of political life-physical security and societal commu-
nity-and the highest goals of political life-the wisdom and human excellence
that are required for happiness (Salkever 1990: 84-89).
Nonetheless, despite these important differences, Aristotle's was a politics
attentive as well to the more base political tendencies on which Locke was later
to focus so emphatically. If governing authorities are to behave in even half-
decent ways, the political philosopher needs to develop an argument that is not
itself base but that can cope with the kind of base self-interest that is all too
prevalent in human affairs. Accomplishing this is a worthy enough task that Aris-
totle devoted the good part of three books of Politics to it.
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Received: March 7, 2000
Accepted for Publication: October 9, 2000
lesl@udel.edu
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