Applying The SDMS Model To The Analysis Of The Tabasco Flood Disaster In Mexico

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Applying the SDMS Model to the Analysis of the Tabasco Flood Disaster in
Mexico
Jaime Santos-Reyesa
; Alan N. Beardb
a
Safety; Risk, Accident and Reliability Analysis Research Group, Systems Engineering Department,
SEPI-ESIME, IPN, Mexico City, Mexico b
School of the Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University,
Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
Online publication date: 08 June 2011
To cite this Article Santos-Reyes, Jaime and Beard, Alan N.(2011) 'Applying the SDMS Model to the Analysis of the
Tabasco Flood Disaster in Mexico', Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal, 17: 3, 646 — 677
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Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 17: 646–677, 2011
Copyright C
Taylor Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1080-7039 print / 1549-7860 online
DOI: 10.1080/10807039.2011.571099
Applying the SDMS Model to the Analysis
of the Tabasco Flood Disaster in Mexico
Jaime Santos-Reyes1
and Alan N. Beard2
1
Safety; Risk, Accident and Reliability Analysis Research Group, Systems
Engineering Department, SEPI-ESIME, IPN, Mexico City, Mexico; 2
School of the
Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
ABSTRACT
The Tabasco flood disaster occurred in November 2007 and it has been regarded
as one of the worst natural disasters that have struck the State of Tabasco, Mexico, in
more than 50 years. It is believed that 80% of the State was flooded and more than
one million people were left homeless. This article addresses the issue of learning
from past flood disasters. The developed Systemic Disaster Management System
(SDMS) model was used to analyze the flood disaster. A number of systemic failures
were highlighted by the model. It is hoped that by conducting such an analysis,
lessons can be learned so that the impact of natural disasters such as the case of
Tabasco’s flooding can be prevented or mitigated in the future.
Key Words: flood risk, flood disaster, SDMS, Tabasco flood.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history natural disasters have caused destruction and human suffer-
ing worldwide. Flooding may be regarded as one of the world’s most frequent and
damaging types of natural disasters (IFRC 1998; Kenyon et al. 2008; OECD 2006;
Munich Re 2005). Moreover, flood disasters are expected to increase over the next
50–100 years owing to the effects of climate change (IPCC 2007; Stern 2007; Few
2006). In general, the consequences of flood disasters cover a wide range of damages
that include economic, political, social, psychological, and environmental impacts
(Jonkman and Kelman 2005; Gautam and van van der Hoek 2003; Jonkman 2007;
Ahern et al. 2005; Jonkman et al. 2008; Steenge and Bočkarjova 2007; USACE 2006;
IPET 2009). On the other hand, Europe has been hard hit by severe and repeated
flooding; for instance the flooding on the Oder River in 1997, which caused the
evacuation of 162,000 people (Kundzewicz 1999). Flooding on the Elbe River in
Address correspondence to Jaime Santos-Reyes, Safety; Risk, Accident and Reliability Analysis
Research Group, Systems Engineering Department, SEPI-ESIME, IPN Av. IPN 2126, Edif.
14–N, Dep. 403 Col. San Jose Ticoman, 07320, Mexico City, Mexico. E-mail: jrsantosr@
hotmail.com
646
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Analysis of the Tabasco Flood Disaster
2002 caused an estimated $12 billion in damages in Germany and the Czech Re-
public (Becker and Gruewald 2003). McCarthy et al. (2007) argue that more than
£200 billion worth of property and infrastructure, and more than 4 million people,
are at risk from flooding around Britain’s rivers and coasts and in towns and cities.
A great deal of effort has been made by both academe and environmental agencies
and world organizations to investigate and develop approaches to address a wide
range of issues intended to help mitigate the impact of flood disasters (Demeritt
et al. 2007; DKKV 2004; Parker and Fordham 1996; Evans et al. 2008; van Berkom
et al. 2007; Acharya and Bhat 2003; Li-Hua and Jia-Lu 2010; Penning-Rowsell et al.
2006; Masozera et al. 2007; Cloke and Pappenberger 2009; Pau and Sanders 2006;
DEFRA 2005). Also, there have been studies conducted on analyzing past flood
disasters (Poliwoda 2007; DKKV 2004).
The authors of the present article argue that in order to gain a full understanding
and comprehensive awareness of flood risk in a given situation it is necessary to
consider in a coherent way all the aspects that may contribute to flood disasters.
In short, there is a need for a systemic approach to natural disasters management;
systemic means seeing pattern and inter-relationship within a complex whole (i.e.,
to see events as products of the working of a system). System may be defined as a
whole that is made of parts and relationships. Given this, failure may be seen as the
product of a system and, within that, see death/injury/property losses and losses to
the economy as results of the working of systems. A Systemic Disaster Management
System (SDMS) model has been developed from this point of view (Santos-Reyes
and Beard, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2010). The article presents the results of the Tabasco
flood disaster that occurred in 2007.
THE TABASCO FLOOD DISASTER AND ITS CONTEXT
Shown in Figure 1 is the State of Tabasco, which is located at the Southern part
of Mexico. The state is bordered by three states: Veracruz to the west; Chiapas to
the south; and Campeche to the northeast. Moreover, Tabasco borders to the east
with Guatemala and to the north with the Gulf of Mexico. Tabasco’s capital city is
Villahermosa. On the other hand, the hydrology of Tabasco is a complex network
of rivers, lagoons, and streams (Figure 2). Two of Mexico’s biggest rivers, Grijalva
and Usumacinta, flow through the state. Moreover, both of them converge before
draining into the Gulf of Mexico. The volume of water between the two is believed to
be 125 billions of cubic meters of water and this represents 35% of the total amount
of water of all the rivers in the country.
Regions
The state of Tabasco is divided two major regions, the Grijalva and the Usumacinta
regions. The Grijalva region (hereafter Region-A (RA)) consists of 11 Municipalities
(M) (these Municipalities are embedded within three sub-regions, namely: SRA1,
SRA2, and SRA3), as depicted in Figure 1. Similarly, the Usumacinta region (here-
after Region-B (RB)) consists of two sub-regions, SRB1 and SRB2, as shown in Figure
1. It should be pointed out that Figure 1 will be the key to the modelling process
when using the SDMS model. (See later sections for a description of this.)
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 17, No. 3, 2011 647
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J. Santos-Reyes and A. N. Beard
Figure 1. Tabasco’s regions (Tabasco 2009). (Color figure available online.)
Figure 2. Tabasco’s complex network of rivers, lagoons, streams, and dams
(CEPAL/CENAPRED 2008). (Color figure available online).
648 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 17, No. 3, 2011
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Shown in Figure 2 is the Grijalva dam system (i.e., La Angostura, Chicoasen,
Malpaso, and Peñitas). The Peñitas dam is a few kilometers from the Tabasco’s
capital city, Villahermosa.
The Flooding
The disaster occurred in November 2007 and it has been regarded as one of the
worst that has hit the state for more than 50 years. It is believed that 80% of the state
was flooded and more than one million people were left homeless. The sequence
of the main events is thought to be those shown in Figure 3 (CEPAL/CENAPRED
2008).
Summary of the Consequences of the Disaster
Overall, the consequences of natural disasters are severe in terms of loss of life,
property, and economy. A summary of the consequences of the flooding are as
follows (CEPAL/CENAPRED 2008):
• It is believed that 1.2 million of people were affected.
• 6500 km of roads and paths were affected.
• 132 bridges were damaged.
• 570,000 hectares of agricultural and livestock were affected.
• 621 towns were affected indirectly (including urban and country areas).
• 835 towns were flooded (including urban and country areas).
• The economical damages were reported to be 31,871 millions of Mexican Pesos
(more than three billion US Dollars).
THE SDMS MODEL
This section presents a brief overview of the fundamental characteristics of the
Systemic Disaster Management System (SDMS) model. The approach taken to for-
mulate the SDMS builds on the Viable System Model (VSM) developed and pro-
posed by Beer (1994a,b), and the Failure Paradigm Method (FPM) proposed by
Fortune (1993). A Viable System is defined by Beer (1994b) as that which is able
to maintain a separate existence. Beer contends that in any viable system there are
five necessary and sufficient sub-systems interactively involved in any organism or
organization that is capable of maintaining its identity independently of other such
organisms within a shared environment. The VSM facilitated an understanding to
formulate the SDMS organizational structure. The FPM, inter alia, provided some
best practices that helped to understand some human aspects. (It should be pointed
out that the SDMS is a modified version of the Systemic Safety Management System
(SSMS) model, which has been applied to sociotechnical systems; see for example
Santos-Reyes and Beard (2001, 2002).
The SDMS model is intended to maintain disaster risk within an acceptable
range in any organization’s operations. It may be argued that if all the sub-systems
and connections are present and working effectively, the probability of a failure
should be less than otherwise. Some of the features of the model are summarized in
Table 1
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The rise of the main rivers’
levels that flow a cross the
state have been detected.
It is believed the rise of the
river levels have affected
about 35,000.
The CFE informs that water from the “Peñitas”
dam has been discharged and it is believed that
about 1500 m3
/s has been released on 29
October. This caused an increase for about a
meter (1 m) above the “Grijalva” River’s level.
Local authorities requested the population to build
physical barriers (mainly sandbags) in order to
contain the flood. Also, the evacuation of people
living in the flooded areas started. The CONAGUA
reports that at this stage the heavy raining still
continuing reaching levels of about 317 mm; it
claimed that these levels have not been seen for
more than 50 years.
Civil protection and the military have been working
for the reinforcement of the physical barriers that
have been built (sandbags) in order to contain the
flooding. At this stage, it is believed the “Grijalva”
river is about to overflow and that the Tabasco’s
capital city (i.e., “Villahermosa”) was under threat to
be flooded. It is thought that more than 227 school
buildings have been affected and about 44 of these
had been used as shelters.
It is believed that two rivers (i.e.,
“Carrizal” and “Grijalva”)
overcame the physical barriers
due to an increase of their flow
capacity. Tabasco’s Governor
announces that 70% of the state
is under water and about 300,000
people have been affected. The
main economical activities have
been halted; i.e., schools were
closed; hospitals, electricity,
communication systems, water
supply, etc. have been affected.
Tabasco’s Governor states
that 80% of the state is
probably flooded and gave
a figure of 400,000 people
being affected.
The army is deployed at the
affected areas (i.e.,
supermarkets, shops, etc.) in
order to protect these from
looting.
Residents have been
relocated to shelters and it
is believed they
complained about the
inadequacies in the
distribution of aid.
Moreover, some shops
and Lorries carrying aid
have been looted.
Food shortages are reported at the
shelters. A landslide washes away 50
houses in the village of “Juan del
Grijalva” on the Tabasco-Chiapas
border; 70 people are reported
missing.
The water levels in both
the “Grijalva” and the
“Carrizal” rivers fall
significantly overnight.
Pumping begins to drain
the capital city; i.e.,
“Villahermosa.”
October
28
th
October
29
th
October
30
th
October
31
st
November
1
st
November
2
nd
November
3
rd
November
4
th
November
5
th
November
6
th
The “Grijalva” river breaks
the dykes in the capital
city of Tabasco. The city’s
is ordered to evacuate
and it is believed one
million homes are under
water.
Figure 3. Timeline of the key events leading to the flood disaster in 2007.
650
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Table 1. Characteristics of the SDMS.
1. The SDMS and its environment
2. Recursive structure (i.e., layered) and relative autonomy
3. Structural organization which consists of a basic unit in which it is necessary to achieve
five functions associated with systems 1 to 5. (See Figure 4.)
a) System 1: disaster policy implementation.
b) System 2: National Early Warning Coordination Centre (NEWCC)
c) System 2∗
: Local Early Warning Coordination Centre (LEWCC)
d) System 3: disaster Functional (Monitoring, Assessment)
e) System 3∗
: disaster audit
f) System 4: disaster development
g) System 4∗
: disaster confidential reporting
h) System 5: disaster policy
(Note: whenever a line appears in Figure 4 representing the SDMS model, it represents
a channel of communication, except for the line that connects systems 3 and 4).
4. Four organizational principles
5. Internally Committed Systems (ICS)
6. Paradigms, which are intended to act as templates giving essential features for human
factors and for effective communication and control.
Structural Organization of the SDMS Model
This systemic approach to disaster management consists of a set of five necessary
and sufficient interrelated sub-systems, labelled as Systems 1 to 5 (Figure 4). System
1, disaster policy implementation, consists of various operations of an organization
in which the organization’s safety policy must be implemented. System 2 coordi-
nates all the activities of the operations that form part of System 1. Moreover, it
also coordinates other Local Early Warning Co-ordination Centres (LEWCCs). Fur-
thermore, System 2∗
is responsible for communicating advance warnings to other
early warning co-ordination centers and to key decision-makers in order to take
appropriate actions prior to the occurrence of a major natural hazard event. Sys-
tem 3, disaster functional, ensures that System 1 implements the organization’s
safety policies. System 3∗
, disaster audit, is part of System 3 and it is concerned with
safety sporadic audit. System 4, disaster development, is responsible for identifying
strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities that can suggest Systemic changes
to an organization’s safety policies. System 4∗
, confidential report, is part of Sys-
tem 4 and it is concerned with confidential reports or causes of concern that may
require direct and immediate intervention of the corporate management. Finally,
System 5, disaster policy, is responsible for establishing safety policies for the whole
organization.
Recursive Structure
A recursion may be regarded as a level that has other levels below or above it.
The concept of recursion is intended to help to identify the level of the organization
being modeled or being considered for analysis.
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4*
System
5
System
4
System
3 System
2
NEWCC
Disaster
‘future
Environment’
‘Total
Environment’
(See Santos-
Reyes and Beard
(2010) for further
details about this)
3*
System 1
‘hot-line’
LDO
National Disaster Management Unit
(NDMU)
LDMU 2*
LEWCC
Figure 4. The structural organization of a SDMS model. NDMU = National Dis-
aster Management Unit; LDO = Local Disaster Operations; LDMU =
Local Disaster Management Unit; NEWCC = National Early Warning
Coordination Centre; LEWCC = Local Early Warning Coordination
Centre.
The SDMS and Its Environment
Environment may be understood as those circumstances to which the SDMS
response is necessary (see the elliptical broken line symbol in Figure 4). Environment
lies outside the SDMS but interacts with it (e.g., natural hazards, economic and
political drivers). Thus, it is important to consider it.
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Hot-Line
Shown in Figure 4 is a dashed line that goes directly from System 1 to
System 5, representing a direct communication or hot-line for use in exceptional
circumstances (e.g., during an emergency). Also shown in Figure 4 is a line with an
arrow from System 1 to System 4∗
and System 5, representing a safety confidential
reporting system. Both channels, the hot-line and the confidential reporting system,
represent initially one-way communication channels but they may become two-way
communication channels between Systems 1 and 5 and 1 and 4∗
, respectively.
Santos-Reyes and Beard (2001) provide a detailed description of the channels of
communication connecting the five sub-systems (i.e., Systems 1–5) and the additional
sub-models, such as ICS, Communication, and Control paradigms.
MODELLING A DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR COMPARISON
The methodology for the analysis of the present study comprised the application
of the SDMS model as a template for comparison with the existing disaster manage-
ment system at the time of the flooding. This process involved the following steps:
first, the concept of recursion has been used in order to model disaster management
systems at the level of whole State of Tabasco. Second, the identified disaster man-
agement system has been represented in the format of the structural organization
(i.e., Systems 1–5 and their associated channels of communication) of the SDMS
model; then, this has been used as a template for comparison.
Figure 1 has been used in order to model the flood disaster management system
for the present case. That is, System 1 has been de-composed on basis of geography;
referring to Figure 2: Region-A (RA) has been divided into three sub-regions (i.e.,
SRA1, SRA2, and SRA3). On the other hand, Region-B has been divided into two
sub-regions (i.e., SRB1 and SRB2).
Recursive Structure
Three levels of recursion for the case of Tabasco’s disaster management system
are shown in Figure 5. It can be seen that System 1 at level 1 contains the sub-system
of interest; that is, the Tabasco Disaster Operations (TDO), which may be taken
to be the highest level of the system of interest (i.e., level of the State). The sub-
system is represented as an elliptical symbol that contains two essential elements: (1)
the Tabasco Disaster Management Unit (TDMU) represented by a parallelogram
symbol that is concerned with flood risk management in Tabasco Disaster Operations
(TDO) of the organization and (2) the TDO is where the flood risks are created,
within System 1, due to the interaction of all the processes that take place, say within
the State, regions, sub-regions, or communities, and so on. There may be other
risks due to interaction with the environment (see Santos-Reyes and Beard 2010 for
further details about these). Note that the double arrow line connecting (1) and
(2) represent the managerial interdependence.
Increasing the level of resolution of the system of interest, that is, TDO at one
level below recursion 1 will result in the Region-A Disaster Operations (RADO)
and Region-B Disaster Operations (RBDO) and these are shown at level 2 in
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TDMU represents the management unit; i.e. systems 2–5 (see Figure 6)
TSM
TDMU
RADO
RADMU
TDO
RBDMU
RBDO
Recursion 1
(or Level 1)
System 1
System 1
Recursion 2
(or Level 2)
TDO
SRA1-
DO
SRA2-
DO
SRA3-
DO
SRA1-DMU SRA2-DMU SRA3-DMU
Recursion 3
(or Level 3)
RADO
TSM
SRB1-
DO
SRB1-DMU
SRB2-
DO
System 1
SRB2-DMU
RBDO
System 1
Figure 5. Nested “Flood disaster management systems”; see Figure 1. See Table A1
for details of the acronyms used in the figure.
Figure 5. It must be pointed out that each of these sub-systems can be decomposed
into further sub-systems depending on our level of interest. For example, sub-region
B1-Disaster Operations (SRB1-DO) and sub-region B2-Disaster Operations (SRB2-
DO) are shown as sub-systems of the RBDO at level 3. Moreover, each sub-system
that forms part of System 1 at level 3 can be de-composed further depending on
the level of interest of the disaster management system modeller or analyst. For the
present case, only recursions 1 and 2 will be considered for the analysis.
Structural Organization
The systems that were identified in the previous section were represented in the
format of the structural organization of the SDMS model (i.e., Systems 1–5; see
Table 1). This process has identified a total of three disaster management systems-
in-focus for the present case; however, only one is shown in Figure 6. It should be
pointed out that Figure 6 always should be seen in the context of Figure 5.
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‘hot-line’
This square box
is TDMU at
Recursion 1
(See Figure 5)
This circle is ‘Tabasco
Disaster Operations
(TDO)’ at Recursion 2
(See Figure 5)
System 3
Safety
‘future
Environment’
3*
System 4
System 5
System 1
RA
DMU
RB
DMU
RBDO
RADO
See Annex-A for details of the acronyms used in the Figure.
2*
RA-
EWCC
2*
RB-
EWCC
System
2
TEWCC
‘Total
Environment’
(See Santos-
Reyes and
Beard 2010,
for details
about this)
Tabasco Disaster Management Unit
(TDMU)
4*
Key:
A problem has been identified
Satisfactory
Require further analysis
Figure 6. “Flood disaster management system-in-focus” at Recursions 1 2; this
figure should be seen in the context of Figure 5.
RESULTS OF THE COMPARISON OF THE SDMS WITH THE “SYSTEM” IN
PLACE AT THE TIME OF THE DISASTER
This section presents the results of the comparison process between the features
of the SDMS model with the flood management system at the time of the disaster.
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The following characteristics of the model have been used to achieve these: (a) the
structural organization (i.e., Systems 1–5); (b) the Internally Committed Systems
(ICS); and (c) the four organizational principles.
The results of each of the above will be presented in the subsequent sections.
(A) Structural Organization of the SDMS Model (see Table 1 and Figure 6)
System 1: Disaster policy implementation
Summarized in Table 2 are the main findings of the mapping process in relation
to System 1.
System 2: Early warning coordination center (EWCC) (see Table 3 and Figure 7)
The function of System 2 is to coordinate the activities of the operations of
System 1. To achieve the plans of System 3 and the needs of System 1, System 2 gathers
and manages the safety information of System 1’s operations. In a relatively well
coordinated system the information flows might be according to the arrangement
shown in Figure 7. In general, the arrangement indicates that if a deviation occurs
from the accepted criteria, then the functions of RA-EWCC and RB-EWCC are the
following :
Firstly, detect any deviation from the accepted criteria (see action point “2” in
Table 3 and Figure 7). Secondly, issue the disaster warning simultaneously to: (a)
RADMU; so that it implements the pre-planned measures in the operations; see ac-
tion points “3,” “4,” and “5” (e.g., evacuation, search and rescue, emergency medical
services); (b) other EWCCs (i.e., RB-EWCC) through action point “2A.” Similarly,
these coordination centers have to assess consequences and implement measures
within their operations and make reports quickly to System 2 (TEWCC); see Table
3 and Figure 7; (c) System 2 (TEWCC) through action point “4A.” By receiving the
warning it takes fast corrective action, either through the channels of communica-
tion that connects the RA-EWCC or via System 3 and this is shown in Figure 7. Some
of the functions of the TEWCC are: collection and compilation of information from
the affected area, supply of information to System 3. Summarized in Table 3 are the
findings of the comparison process.
Systems 3–5
Overall, Systems 2–5 are intended to help the operations of System 1 to achieve
its purpose; that is, to maintain flood risk within an acceptable range whatever that
might be. Summarized in Table 4 are the main findings of the comparison process.
(B) Internally Committed Systems (ICS) and Resilience
An ICS is a system that is committed to a particular purpose or objective based on
its own reasons or motivation. In other words, an ICS refers to the critical awareness
of self-reflective human beings regarding their purposes and the implications of
their actions for all those who might be affected by the consequences. This means
that all those involved in the life-cycle of the organization’s operations should be
committed to address flood risk pro-actively, motivated by their own objectives or
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Table 2. Results of the comparison process-System 1 with the existing system.
System 1: Disaster policy implementation (see Figure 6)
“System” in place at the time of the disaster
Comments/Discrepancies/Similarities
RADO (Region-A Disaster Operations) This represents the activities involving people, businesses, infrastructure, etc,
in the Region-A (Region-A consists of eleven municipalities), as shown in
Figure 1. It is here where flood risks are created.
RADMU (Region-A
Disaster Management
Unit)
RADMU is in charge with flood risk
management. Its purpose is to
maintain flood risk within an
acceptable range whatever that
might be in RADO
First, there is no evidence of a flood risk assessment before the disaster. This
is a key issue in dealing with flood risk management. In fact, there is no
evidence that risk assessment was considered as being a key component in
the process of decision-making regarding flood risk management at the
time.
Second, it is not clear what were the roles and responsibilities of the key
players involved in the flood risk management in RADO before and
during the disaster.
Third, there is no evidence of the existence of a well defined and clear
purpose of the key organizations that performed the functions associated
with RADMU before the disaster.
Responsible for a continuous
monitoring of flood risk in RADO
Deficiencies in the monitoring of disaster risk before the flooding; For
example, failed to prevent new developments in floodplain zones. Even
hospitals were built in these high flood risk areas. Moreover, it failed to
monitor the progress of the PICI project which aimed at building physical
defences.
Flood risk assessment. If a deviation
from the accepted criteria occurs,
then it has the responsibility to
detect it and act to bring it back into
acceptable conditions.
Organizations, such as local authorities, civil protection, and so on that
performed some of the functions associated with RADMU failed to
perform. For example, before the flooding there was not a well defined
plan for dealing with development in flood prone areas. For example, a
Hospital was built in a risk flood and nothing was done to remove it to a
safer place. This is just one of several cases.
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2. Results of the comparison process-System 1 with the existing system.
System 1: Disaster policy implementation (see Figure 6)
RBDO (Region-B Disaster Operations) This represents the activities involving people, businesses, infrastructure,
and so on, in the Region-B (Region-B consists of seven municipalities), as
depicted in Figure 1. It is here where flood risks are created.
RBDMU (Region-B
Disaster Management
Unit
RADMU is in charge with flood risk
management. Its purpose is to
maintain flood risk within an
acceptable range whatever that
might be in RBDO
Similar to the above.
Responsibly for a continuous
monitoring of disaster risk in RBDO
Flood risk assessment. If a deviation
from the accepted criteria occurs,
then it has the responsibility to
detect it and act to bring it back into
acceptable conditions.
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Table 3. Results of the comparison process- System 2 with the existing system.
Action point System 2 EWCC (see Figure 7)
Relevant information to RA-EWCC; e.g. whether
conditions, meteorological data, rainfall data,
River and Dam levels.
Apparently, the National Meteorological Centre, CFE, Conagua, performed
part of these activities. However, it is not clear how effective they were and
whether it was communicated and share with the public, local authorities,
and all the emergency responders.
1
2
Flood risk assessment; i.e. if any deviation from the
pre-planned flood risk acceptable criteria occurs
then it issues the warning to action points 2A and
3 as depicted in Figure 7.
First, is not clear whether a flood risk assessment was conducted. Moreover, it
is not clear who/what performed the functions associated with action
points “2A” and “3.”
2A
{a} Communicates the warning to other EWCCs {a} It is not clear if there was an arrangement such as this at the time of the
flooding.
{b} It also receives information from the TEWCC
as shown in Figure 7.
{b} Similar to the above.
3
The function of the RADMU is to respond to the
warning and prevent or mitigate the impact of
the flooding.
In order to be able to mitigate potential harm and respond effectively to
flooding, the people, organizations that performed the functions
associated with RADMU need to understand the scale and nature of flood
risk. However, there is no evidence of this.
4
Planning and taking measures in order to respond
to the warning.
There is no evidence of an effective emergency planning. For example, it is
not clear whether the emergency responders had an adequate
understanding of the location of critical areas, their vulnerability of
flooding, the likely consequences of their loss, etc. It seems that the
emergency was left to improvisation.
659

Table 3. Results of the comparison process- System 2 with the existing system.
Action point System 2 EWCC (see Figure 7)
4A
Issues the warning to the TEWCC (see Figure 7)
and by receiving all this information, the TEWCC
enables to take a higher order view of the total
consequences. It will report to system 3, which is
on the vertical command channel (see Figure 7).
It is not clear whether forecasting and alert systems in place were accurate.
See later sections for details about this.
Deficiencies in relation to flood warnings; e.g. people did not know what to
do before, during and after the flooding.
5
{a} the warning is issued. {a} The public were informed by a number of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs); e.g. radio, TV, telephone, mobile
telephone. However, these failed or were disrupted by the flooding. For
example, on November 1 and 2, 40,000 out of 130,000 telephone lines
failed. Moreover, 10 out of 24 radio stations were operational during the
flooding. Clearly, this has contributed to the vulnerability of the
population.
{b} Implementation of pre-planned measures to
evacuate safely and prevent fatalities
It is not clear whether the flood warnings were sufficiently clear and
accurate. For example, people and emergency responders found warnings
did not provide all the key information needed as well as in a readily
accessible format.
{b} It is not clear whether the general public was well prepared regarding
what to do before, during, and after the emergency.
660

6
7
8
7A
9
9A
RBDMU
2*
RB-EWCC
RBDO
To/from
System 3
10
System
2*
TEWCC
1
2
3
2A
4
4A
RADMU
2*
RA-EWCC
RADO
5
System
3
Systems
4-5
Tabasco Disaster Management Unit (TDMU)
To RB-
EWCC
This square box is
TDMU at
Recursion 1 (see
Figure 5)
See Annex-A for details of the acronyms used in the Figure.
To/from
System 3
To/from
System 2
To/from
System 2
Key:
A problem has been identified
Satisfactory
Require further analysis
Figure 7. Flood early warning coordination centers.
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Table 4. Results of the comparison process—Systems 3–5 with the existing system.
SDMS (Systems 3–5)
System 3: Disaster functional
It is directly responsible for maintaining flood risk within an
acceptable range in system 1 operations (RADO+RADMU
and RBDO+RBDMU), and ensures that system 1 implements
the organizations safety policy. It achieves its function on a
day-to-day basis according to the safety plans received from
system 4. System 3 requests from systems 1, 2, and 3∗
information about the safety performance of system 1 to
formulate its safety plans and to communicate future needs to
system 4. It is also responsible for allocating the necessary
resources to system 1 to accomplish the organizations safety
plans.
Deficiencies of the planning of new developments; houses and critical
infrastructures have been built in floodplain zones. For example, a hospital
was built in a flood hazard area and after the floods it has to be removed.
Deficiencies in planning for maintaining power and water supplies and
protecting essential services. For example, during the flooding there was a
loss of the power supply and this in effect affected several radio stations.
Lack of monitoring the progress of the Flooding Control Project (PICI).
It is not clear whether there are building standards regarding the building of
houses.
It is not clear whether there have been enough resources been spent on
managing flood risk. For example, the PICI project was aimed at
improving physical defences; however, the project had not been
completed at the time of the disaster.
It is not clear whether enough resources have been allocated to improve the
publics understanding of community flood risks, etc.
System 3∗
: Disaster Audit
It is part of system 3 and its function is to conduct audits
sporadically into the operations of system 1. System 3∗
intervenes in the operations of system 1 according to the
safety plans received from system 3. System 3 needs to ensure
that the reports received from system 1 reflect not only the
current status of the operations of system 1, but are also
aligned with the overall objectives of the organization.
It failed to identify the inadequacy of the design and construction of houses
and critical infrastructure, such as hospitals.
It failed to conduct an audit in order to assess the progress of the PICI
project.
It failed to identify the inadequacy of the design and construction of houses
and critical infrastructure, such as hospitals.
It failed to conduct an audit in order to assess the progress of the PICI
project.
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System 4: Disaster development
It is concerned with safety research and development (R and D)
for the continual adaptation of the flood risk management
system as a whole. By considering strengths, weaknesses,
threats and opportunities, system 4 can suggest changes to the
organizations safety policies.
The function associated with system 4 did not exist at the time of the flood
disaster. For example none of the following issues have been addressed
explicitly by the existing system:
{a} The impact of climate change.
There is no evidence of research on future scenarios on climate change.
That is, in order to be able to adapt to climate change it is necessary to
have an understanding of what changes might occur regarding top
extreme events. For example, the UK Climate Impacts Programme
(Hulme et al. 2002) produced climate change scenarios for the UK and an
example of the predictions are: temperatures will increase by up to 3◦
C by
the 2050s. According to the findings, there will be greater warming in the
summer and autumn, and there will be more summer warming in the
South East than the North West of the UK; the global sea level will rise by
up to 36 cm by the 2050s, and there are vertical land movements in the
UK, leading to regional differences in relative sea levels; and the number
and intensity of extreme events will increase, including heat waves,
downpours, and storm surges.
{b} Understanding of where and when flooding might occur and the
potential consequences is vital if flood risk is to be reduced and the effects
of flooding.
{c} Development of weather prediction forms is a crucial aspect of flood
risk management. That is, the ability to predict severe weather, days in
advance, provides a first indication of possible coastal, river, and surface
water flooding events.
{d} Development of flood maps that may give details of the areas that
could be affected by flooding from rivers and the sea, the location of flood
defences and an indication of the areas that would benefit from them
during a major flooding event.
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Table 4. Results of the comparison process—Systems 3–5 with the existing system. (Continued)
SDMS (Systems 3–5)
System 4∗
: Disaster confidential reporting
It is part of system 4 and is concerned with confidential reports
or causes of concern from any employee, about any aspects,
some of which may require the direct and immediate
intervention of system 5.
It did not exist at the time of the disaster.
Information flows during the response and recovering phases of an
emergency is of vital importance. For example, it was not clear how
members of the general public, the media, the people who was in charged
with leading response and recovery at the local, regional levels could
communicate with the government (or the people who performed the
functions associated with systems 4 and 5). Moreover, there is no evidence
of a system in place for collecting data; e.g. who is responsible for
collecting data; the information that is needed, when it is needed, etc. This
is important because vulnerable people could have received the necessary
support they needed during the flooding.
System 5: Disaster policy
It is responsible for deliberating safety policies and for making
normative decisions. According to alternative safety plans
received from system 4, system 5 considers and chooses
feasible alternatives, which aim to maintain the risk within an
acceptable range throughout the life cycle of the RADO and
RBDO.
There was not a policy aiming at the promotion of flood risk reduction
strategies. For example, the resources allocated to the PICI project were
badly mismanaged.
There was a lack of a policy directed to limiting the consequences of the
flood disaster; e.g. the inadequacy of the rescue and evacuation of the
population. It is believed that more than one million people affected by
the disaster (equivalent to the 50% of the total population of the State of
Tabasco) could not find shelter. Moreover, some of the shelters have been
flooded at the time.
Lack of a policy of awareness; i.e. people were not informed of the risks they
faced before, during and after the flood.
It failed to promote planning policies regarding development of new
buildings in flood risk areas.
It failed to promote individual, community business, and critical
infrastructure resilience.
664

purposes. This freedom to achieve safety awareness is, however, limited by the organi-
zation’s safety policy, plans, standards, and procedures. Individuals, teams, groups,
and departments that perform an organization’s operations related to flood risk
management should not only be assigned tasks but they should have both authority
and responsibility by their understanding of flood risk and their specific tasks. They
should be endowed with authority in their daily tasks by their knowledge to perform
their tasks properly and in an acceptable way with regard to flood risk.
Summarized in Table 5 are the main findings of the comparison process.
(C) Four Organizational Principles (see Table A2)
This section presents the results of the analysis conducted by applying the organi-
zational principles (Beer 1994b) to the following channels: The channels connecting
the RBDMU (includes the RB-EWCC) and the RBDO (i.e., Region-B Disaster Op-
erations). In other words, the loop RBDO-‘6’-‘7’-‘8’-‘9’-‘10’-RBDO, as depicted in
Figure 7. The loop has been shown with a particular crossed-lines, meaning that it
needs further analysis; that is, the application of the four organizational principles.
Highlighted in Figure 8 are the problems found when applying the organizational
principles to these channels.
DISCUSSION
Floods may be ranked as the highest among natural disasters in recent years
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2004). In 2007, the International Federa-
tion of Red Crescent Societies published a report and concluded that in the 10 years
to 2006, there were a total of 1486 flood disasters, affecting all five continents. The
greatest number was in Asia (547 flood disasters) and the lowest, Oceania (43 flood
disasters) (International Federation of Red Crescent Society 2008). On the other
hand, there is evidence that there will be an increasing trend toward more frequent
and intense precipitation events. For example, The International Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC 2007) concluded that there was a 90–99% probability that such in-
creased, heavy rainfalls worldwide will result in damage to ecosystems and the loss of
agricultural systems that support food production, destruction of the built environ-
ment, industrial and transport infrastructures, loss of human settlements, adverse
effects on ground and surface water catchments, poor sanitation, and drinking water
quality.
Given the above, the present article addressed the following question: What can
be learned from past flood disasters?
A SDMS model was constructed based on systems ideas (Beer 1994a,b). It has been
argued elsewhere that the SDMS model can be applied proactively and reactively
(Santos-Reyes and Beard 2001, 2005, 2010). For the present application, the model
was applied reactively to the analysis of the Tabasco flood disaster that occurred in
2007. The approach was to model a flood disaster management system by using the
SDMS, then it was used as a template for comparison with the existing flood disaster
management system at the time of the disaster. The key features of the model
that were used in the analysis are the following: (a) the structural organization
(i.e., Systems 1–5); (b) the four organizational principles; and (c) the concepts of
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Table 5. Results of the comparison process—ICS and Resilience.
Internally Committed Systems (ICS) and Resilience
ICS
Individuals, teams, groups, and departments that constitute an
organization should have more involvement with flood risk in
their daily tasks.
Top and line management should encourage the development
of ICS. The more the organizations management wants
internal commitment from its employees, teams, and
departments the more it must try to involve employees in
defining flood risk objectives, specifying what these are and
how to achieve them, and setting safety targets.
There is no safety vision, strategy or policy that can be achieved
without an able and committed population.
There is no evidence of the features of the ICS within the existing “system.”
For example:
There is evidence that some communities, householders knew prior to the
floods that they were at risk; however, they had done nothing to prepare
for flooding.
Some communities, householders at risk were in a state of denial and choose
to ignore the flood warnings and stay at their houses and businesses.
People built houses in floodplain areas (CEPAL/CENAPRED 2008).
There is a lack of an effective flood risk awareness campaign. For example, it
is not clear whether prior to the flood disaster there were initiatives to
inform children, the public about guides on preparing for flooding
(before, during, and after floods). Moreover, there is no evidence of
educating children and public in general on issues such as: the problem of
flooding; understanding flood symbols; flood defences; and flooding in
the future, etc.
Finally, there have not been genuine public evacuation exercises for
flooding.
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Resilience
The ICS concept is related to Resilience when applied to
individuals, communities. The term (i.e., Resilience) relates
to withstanding the consequences of an undesired event;
being aware of flood risks; acting to mitigate them; and
responding effectively when the risks materialize.
There is no evidence of personal and community resilience. For example:
Individuals and families were not prepared for flooding; e.g. they did not
create a personal stockpile of supplies that might be useful in an
emergency; for example, some useful tools, water, food, blankets and
clothing. It is believed people were shouting “we do not need to evacuate,
but water and food” (Barboza and Morales 2007b).
Clearly, thinking about the possible need of these reserves in advance of an
emergency such as the flooding can enhance the resilience of individuals
and communities.
Individuals and the public in general did not make up a flood kit to protect
their personal documents such as: IDs, birth certificates, professional
certificates, insurance policy, etc. For example, several persons are believed
to have lost their personal documents after the disaster.
There is no evidence of both property and business resilience. For example,
businesses had not had a flood plan that examines possible flooding
scenarios, etc. Clearly, the decision-making was not based on risk
assessment.
667

Correct interpretation
of the warnings
ALL CLEAR
Accurate interpretation of
the reports
The public does not need to take any
action
of the warnings
the reports
of the warnings
the reports
of the warnings
the reports
ACT NOW message
transmitted/broadcasted
SEVERE FLOOD
WARNING
ACT NOW!-Extreme danger to life property
(Message carried by channels: TV
, Radio, etc)
FLOOD WARNING
FLOOD WATCH
RBDMU
and
RB-EWCC
1
st
Organizational
principle
Channel capacity
(2nd
organizational
principle)
Transducer capacity
(3rd
organizational
principle)
1
st
Organizational
principle
Transducer capacity
(3rd
organizational
principle)
Loop 1
Loop 1
Loop 2
Loop 3
Loop 4
Loop 2
Loop 3
Loop 4
The General
Public in
RBDO
ACT NOW!-Flooding homes business expected
(Message carried by channels: TV, Radio, etc)
BE AWARE, PREPARED, WATCH OUT!
NO ACTION IS REQUIRED!
ACT NOW message
BE AWARE message
NO ACTION message
Reports on the public response (e.g. the public
prepare their personal community flood plans
Reports on the public response to the warnings
(e.g. the public evacuation to safety)
Reports on the public response to the warnings
(e.g. the public evacuation to safety)
Figure 8. The “four organizational principles” applied to the flood risk warnings. The “shaded” area indicates that problems or
deficiencies have been identified.
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Internally Committed Systems and Resilience. The results of the comparison process
are presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 and Figures 6, 7, and 8. In what follows some
discussion will be presented for each of the above.
The Structural Organization (i.e., Systems 1–5)
System 1: Disaster policy implementation (Table 2)
It is not clear who/what performed the functions associated with RADMU and
RBDMU explicitly. A number of the existing organizations performed some of the
functions associated with RADMU and RBDMU; for example, civil protection and
local government. Moreover, it may be argued that each of these organizations
performed their functions in isolation. On the other hand, there is no evidence
of a system that conducts flood risk assessments and monitoring the flood risk on
a continuous basis (see Table 2). In the SDMS model, both RADMU and RBDMU
enjoy a relative autonomy (see Santos-Reyes and Beard 2001 for details about this
concept) in order to achieve their key objectives in maintaining flood risk within an
acceptable range. However, the existing system at the time of the disaster did not
perform this function. Moreover, the system in place were neither prepared before
nor during and after the flood event. (See later sections and Figure 8 for details
about this).
System 2: Disaster—EWCC (Table 3)
Overall, System 2 along with System 1 monitors the operations of System 1. Il-
lustrated in Figure 7 is the arrangement to achieve an effective coordination and
summarized in Table 3 are the findings. The system in place at the time of the
disaster lacked the functions associated with System 2. It is not clear if there were
early warning centers aimed at providing flood warnings to the population (this
issue is further analyzed by the four organizational principles; a later section ad-
dresses this). Moreover, the inadequacy of the existing forecast and alert systems in
place contributed to the vulnerability of the population. For example, a report by
SRCAH (2008), concluded that: “The lack of accurate forecast models to simulate
meteorological phenomena in the Gulf of Mexico and their subsequent effect on
rainfall and surface hydrology. . . . ”
Furthermore, there is no evidence of the real-time alert systems with sufficient
lead time regarding, for example, the volumes and discharges that might occur in
the rivers within the complex hydrological system shown in Figure 2 (SRCAH 2008;
CEPAL/CENAPRED 2008).
Another aspect that should be raised is the fact that there is little evidence of
an effective coordination among the key players of the system in place at the time
of the flooding. The organizations involved were: the CFE, CONAGUA, and local
government. The CFE (2009) is a company that provides all the services involved in
power generation, transmission, and distribution across Mexico. CFE was (and still
is) in charge of one of the dams that played a key role in the flooding; that is, the
Peñitas Dam, which is located a few kilometers from the capital city, Villahermosa
(see Figure 2). On the other hand, the National Water Commission (CONAGUA) is
an agency of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT)
of the Mexican Government. CONAGUA’s main tasks are: the administration of the
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National Waters; the Management and control of the hydrologic system; and the
promotion of social development (CONAGUA 2009).
It is believed the rainfall during October 23 and onward created a series of
floods reported in the Peñitas dam. For example, SRCAH (2008) argued that the
dam received a peak discharge of about 5000 m3
/s, between October 11 and 12.
However, from October 23 to October 26 a peak discharged was reported to be
more than 3500 m3
/s. Finally, on October 29, another flood with a peak discharge
of 5000 m3
/s has been reported; this led to the decision to open the Peñitas dam’s
spillway gates to prevent its failure.
Given the above, it is not clear how these developments were communicated
to the local authorities and the population. That is, the flood risk associated with
the opened of the dam’s spill gates. By this time, there was confusion among the
population of what to do. For example, Ramos et al. (2007) reported: “Tabasco,
under water, 300,000 affected” and “About 150,000 people refuse to leave their
homes.”
Systems 3–5
Systems 3–5 are intended to help the needs of System 1 in order to achieve its
objectives. However, they failed to perform their functions. Again, is not clear who
performed the functions associated with these systems.
System 3: Disaster—functional, monitoring (Table 4)
It is not clear who or which organization performed the functions associated
with System 3 (e.g., the lack of monitoring and accountability of the PICI project
aimed at the building of physical flood defenses. It is believed that more than
two billion Mexican pesos (151,000,000 USD) has been allocated to the project
(Patterson 2007). The project was planned to conclude by May 2006; if an adequate
monitoring had been in place, surely by the time of the 2007 flooding the physical
flood defenses may have contributed significantly to reduce flood risks.
The lack of resources to implement forecasting and early warning systems tech-
nologies to monitor the hydrometereological conditions of the State contributed to
the problems in responding to the flooding.
System 3∗
: Disaster—audit (Table 4)
As shown in Table 3, the organizations involved in performing the functions asso-
ciated with System 3∗
failed to perform their functions. For example, it is not clear
how often audits were conducted on the adequacy of the existing physical defenses.
Moreover, if a proper audit and inspection had been conducted, surely some critical
infrastructures located in floodplain zones could have been detected and corrected.
For example, following the 2007 flooding, Barboza et al. (2007) reported that: “A
hospital (IMSS) has been flooded, the patients and medical personnel were evacu-
ated to hospitals located in other States.” Moreover, this hospital had to be relocated
to another area.
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System 4: Disaster—research and development (Table 4)
As mentioned at the beginning of the Discussion section, one of the studies
conducted by the IPCC (2007) concluded that there was a 90–99% probability that
global warming would cause increased heavy rainfalls worldwide. Given this, the
question is what have organizations involved with flood risk management in Tabasco
have done (or are) about this? There is no evidence of research being conducted
on scanning the future regarding flood risk in Tabasco. As can be seen from Figure
2, the hydrology of Tabasco is a complex network of rivers, lagoons, dams, and so
on. In short, Tabasco is vulnerable to flooding by its very geographical conditions.
Clearly, there should be some research aiming at future flood scenarios and be well
prepared for these. For example, a report concluded that (CEPAL/CENAPRED
2008): “80% of the population is living in floodplain areas.”
Another aspect that should be pointed out is the need to consider risk assessment
as a key component of the process of flood risk management in Tabasco. At the time
of the disaster, there is no evidence of this. For example, if flood risk assessment
had been conducted, scenarios of flooding from different sources such as: fluvial
flooding, pluvial flooding, surface water flooding, and groundwater flooding should
have been analyzed and acted on.
System 4∗
: Disaster—confidential reporting (Table 4)
During crises it is of vital importance to have a communication channel with a
bottom-up approach. This would have helped the general public, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), emergency responders, and so on, to communicate with
those within organizations that performed the functions associated with Systems 4
and 5. For example, the following should have been reported and acted upon: “The
oil and gas industry infrastructures such as pipelines are ‘physical barriers’ to the
flow of water from rivers” (CEPA/CENAPRED 2008).
System 5: Disaster—policy (Table 4)
Shown in Table 3 are some examples of the lack of a clear policy aimed at
preventing floods in Tabasco. It seems that the existing policy was reactive rather
than proactive.
ICS and Resilience (see Table 5)
ICS
In the SDMS model, individuals, teams, groups, and departments that constitute
an organization should have more involvement with flood risk in their daily tasks.
It has been argued that the more an organization’s management wants internal
commitment from its employees, teams, and departments the more it must try to
involve employees, and the public in defining flood safety objectives, specifying what
these are and how to achieve them, and setting flood safety targets. However, this
was not the case in the existing system at the time of the flood disaster. For example,
the PICI project was aimed at building physical flood defenses but it did not address
people; it may be argued that the people should be considered an important element
in flood risk management. The evidence shows that the population was not prepared
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for dealing with flood risk. For example, Barboza and Morales (2007a) reported
that: “About fifteen families refuse to leave their homes because they are afraid of
being robbed.” Another example comes from (Barboza and Morales 2007b): “What
we need is food and water, but not evacuation.” and Goumbel (2007) reported that
“About 10,000 residents, according to one government estimate were left wandering
the streets with nowhere to go.”
Resilience
As mentioned in Table 3, resilience relates to withstanding the consequences of an
undesired event, being aware of flood risks, acting to mitigate them, and responding
effectively when the risks materialize. However, individuals and communities in
Tabasco did not show resilience. For example “We need food, water and boats
to evacuate . . . ” (Suverza 2007) and “About 10,000 people refused to leave their
homes” (Ramos et al. 2007). Moreover, critical infrastructures did not show resilience
either. For example, Barboza and Morales (2007a) reported “The bus services from
the capital city of Villahermosa have been suspended because the facilities have been
flooded.” Goumbelm (2007) noted “Villahermosa and many other communities are
without fresh water or electricity. Landline and mobile phone connections have
failed.”
Four Organizational Principles (Beer 1994b)
The organizational principles were applied to further explore the population’s
response to the flood risk warnings issued by the organizations or individuals that
performed the functions associated with RADMU and RA-EWCC (i.e., System 2∗
)
and this process is depicted in Figure 8. Four loops are shown; the upper half of
the loops represents the flood risk warnings issued and the lower half of the loops
represent the actions needed to be taken by the public. The measures that were in
place to respond should have been designed to satisfy the organizational principles.
Given this, the following shortcomings were identified (in Figure 8, deficiencies
are indicated in shaded areas): (1) it is not clear whether the flood risk warnings
were effective at the time of the disaster; that is, clear and easy to understand by
the population (i.e., ACT NOW, BE AWARE, etc.); (2) it is not clear whether the
actual flood risk warnings were transmitted to the population. This was because the
communication infrastructure failed. For example: “Villahermosa and many other
communities are without fresh water or electricity. Landline and mobile phone
connections have failed” (Goumbel 2007). Moreover, TV and radio failed because
of the electricity failure in the region (CEPAL/CENAPRED 2008).
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the channels carrying flood risk warnings
considered the public with no proper education (i.e., Tabasco has a considerable
illiterate population). This needs to be investigated further. The response to the
flood risk warnings by the population was deficient. Two examples: “About 10,000
residents, according to one government estimate were left wandering the streets
with nowhere to go” (Goumbel 2007) and “About 10,000 people refused to leave
their homes” (Ramos et al. 2007).
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SOME KEY LESSONS
1. Flood risk assessment should be considered as a key component in the process of
flood risk management (it may be an accepted fact in some countries but others
may not have considered it important in dealing with flood risk management).
2. In order to be able to understand flood risk it is important to consider both (a)
hard (e.g., physical flood defenses, flood early warning technologies, forecasting)
and (b) soft (i.e., people) aspects of the system.
3. (a) and (b) should not be considered in isolation but within a coherent system.
4. Communication is a key component of a disaster management system. Informa-
tion, such as flood risk warnings, should be accurate and clear to the end user
(i.e., the population) before, during, and after the flooding. The channels of
communication should be designed accordingly.
5. Flood risk changes continuously. There should be a system to manage flood risk
on a daily basis. That is, the system should be able to adapt continuously to the
new threats and opportunities regarding flood risks.
6. Scanning future flood risk scenarios will become a must do research activity for
any existing system to be adaptable.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Some findings of the analysis of the Tabasco flood disaster have been presented.
The approach has been the application of the SDMS model. The SDMS has been
used as a template for comparison with the existing disaster management system
at the time of the flooding. The results have shown the potential of the model
to be used as a diagnostic tool for analyzing past flood disasters. However, more
work is needed in order to further explore the SDMS model. For example future
work may involve the following: (a) to apply the communication paradigm to see
the effectiveness of the communication of flood warnings to communities and small
villages in Tabasco; (b) to model a flood disaster management system for the State of
Tabasco. The concept of recursion may help to achieve this by considering the Sub-
regions (SR) and Municipalities (M) shown in Figure 1; and (c) to model a generic
flood disaster management system that may be used as a template for comparison
with other flood disasters. This process may help both to improve the model and to
learn from past flood disasters. It is hoped that by conducting such analysis lessons
can be learned so that the impact of natural disasters such as the case of Tabasco’s
flooding can be prevented or mitigated in the future.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This project was funded by SIP-IPN under the following grant: SIP-IPN: No-
20101302.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Acronyms used in the figures.
RADMU = Region-A Disaster Management Unit
RADO = Region-A Disaster Operations
RA-EWCC = Region-A Early Warning Coordination Centre
RBDMU = Region-B Disaster Management Unit
RBDO = Region-B Disaster Operations
RB-EWCC = Region-B Early Warning Coordination Centre
SRA1-DMU = Sub-region A1-Disaster Management Unit
SRA1-DO = Sub-region A1-Disaster Operations
SRA2-DO = Sub-region A2-Disaster Operations
SRA3-DO = Sub-region A3-Disaster Operation
SRB1-DMU = Sub-region B1-Disaster Management Unit
SRB1-DO = Sub-region B1-Disaster Operations
SRB2-DMU = Sub-region B2 Disaster Management Unit
SRB2-DO = Sub-region B2-Disaster Operations
TDMU = Tabasco Disaster Management Unit
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Table A1. Acronyms used in the figures.
(Continued)
TDO = Tabasco Disaster Operations
TEWCC = Tabasco Early Warning Coordination Centre
NEWCC = National Early Warning Coordination Centre
LEWCC = Local Early Warning Coordination Centre
NDMU = National Disaster Management Unit
LDMU = Local Disaster Management Unit
LDO = Local Disaster Operations
M Municipality
Table A2. The four organizational principles (Beer 1994b).
The First Principle of Organization
“Managerial, operational and environmental varieties, diffusing through an
institutional system, tend to equate; they should be designed to do so with minimum
damage to people and to cost” (i.e., for a high viability system). An example could be
an evacuation system designed to save lives in the case of a fire or explosion; then the
evacuation capacity must be at least as great as the number of possible evacuees.
The Second Principle of Organization
“The four directional channels carrying information between the management unit,
the operation, and the environment must each have higher capacity to transmit a
given amount of information relevant to variety selection in a given time than the
originating sub-system has to generate it in that time. For example, the channels
carrying procedures of evacuation must have enough specificity so as to reduce
ambiguities or eliminate unclear instructions.”
The Third Principle of organization
“Wherever the information carried on a channel capable of distinguishing a given
variety crosses a boundary, it undergoes transduction; and the variety of the
transducer must be at least equivalent to the variety of the channel. For example, in
the case of means of escape for rail users, a transducer might be a fire safety
instruction leaflet. This would transduce between the person making up the
evacuation rules and the people the rules are aimed at; then the notice must be
comprehensive and clear.”
The Fourth Principle of Organization
“The operation of the first three principles must be cyclically maintained through time,
and without hiatus or lags. (That is, they must be adhered to continuously).”
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